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22. Managing Global Disorder: Prospects for U.S.-Russian Cooperation
- Author:
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Publication Date:
- 08-2017
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Abstract:
- While relations between the United States and Russia have deteriorated in recent years, making it exceedingly difficult for both countries to collaborate in managing a variety of common concerns, emerging challenges to global order make such cooperation increasingly imperative. To explore where U.S.-Russia cooperation is desirable and, in some places, even necessary, the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations convened an international group of twenty-three experts at the Tufts University European Center in Talloires, France, on June 9 and 10, 2017, for the workshop “Managing Global Disorder: Prospects for U.S.-Russian Cooperation.”
- Topic:
- NATO, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, Europe, and North America
23. How Anonymous Shell Companies Finance Insurgents, Criminals, and Dictators
- Author:
- Jodi Vittori
- Publication Date:
- 09-2017
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Abstract:
- The Panama Papers leak of eleven million documents in April 2016 revealed that former Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, the brother-in-law of Chinese President Xi Jinping, longtime friends of Russian President Vladimir Putin, drug kingpins, and even a soccer megastar had something in common: they all channeled money through anonymous shell companies. Anonymous shell companies are entities that usually employ few or no workers, do not conduct any substantive business, and allow their owners to store or route money while hiding their identities. Because of the secrecy they can provide, anonymous companies represent an important nexus of corruption, money laundering, transnational organized crime, and terrorism, which directly harm U.S. interests. As one of the main facilitators of anonymous companies, the United States should pass legislation to disclose ownership information for all companies, increase federal contract transparency, and boost other business and government transparency mechanisms at home and abroad. Doing so would significantly cut back on the ability of terrorists, criminals, and their ilk to use American corporations, real estate, and trusts to finance activities that harm the United States and its foreign interests.
- Topic:
- Corruption, International Trade and Finance, Transparency, and Panama Papers
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
24. Innovations in Global Governance
- Author:
- Miles Kahler and Deborah Avant
- Publication Date:
- 09-2017
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Abstract:
- Over the last three decades, a diverse collection of actors—private corporations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and subnational (state, provincial, and urban) governments—has developed and promoted a global agenda of collective action. From advancing human rights to combating climate change, these actors have become new governors in world politics. More recently, a second movement—a loose array of populist and nationalist groups and governments—has questioned the forward momentum of institutionalized global cooperation. Brexit, followed by the Donald J. Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris Agreement on climate change, as well as proposed cuts in U.S. contributions to the United Nations and development assistance, suggest a weakening—if not undermining—of the network of treaties, institutions, and relationships constructed over the last seventy years. Each of these movements aims to transform a global order based on intergovernmental agreements and institutions. The first movement has already done so by increasing participation in global governance of new actors who are pursuing cooperative outcomes in collaboration with and independently of national governments and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Their involvement both complements and complicates the traditional international order. The second movement, in contrast, asserts national interest and sovereignty against the constraints of global governance. Although the conflict between these two movements remains unresolved, they will likely shape the future global order.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Human Rights, Governance, and NGOs
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
25. What the Trump Administration’s NAFTA Priorities Get Right (and Wrong) About Digital Trade
- Author:
- Anupam Chander
- Publication Date:
- 09-2017
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Abstract:
- Digital commerce and trade are increasingly important to the global economy. Seven of the ten most valuable firms today are technology companies (Apple, Alphabet, Microsoft, Amazon, Facebook, Alibaba, and Tencent). Data, according to some analysts, is the new oil. A major study concluded that the internet has powered some one-fifth of recent economic growth within the leading economies. Jobs are increasingly dependent on digitization; digital skills are needed for all but two job categories [PDF] in the United States: dishwashing and food cooking. Just as national economies are becoming more digitized, barriers to digital trade are being erected. These barriers limit opportunities for consumers to access global providers and for small- and medium-sized enterprises to reach new customers. It is not only technology firms that suffer; all enterprises with international operations need cross-border data flows to process, analyze, and transfer data about employees, customers, and operations. Global supply chains depend on the flow of goods, data, and services across borders. Moreover, commitment to the free flow of information across borders is essential to freedom of expression. Digital trade is about more than access to markets; it is about access to information. The renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is an excellent opportunity to set the gold standard for digital free trade. Despite public pronouncements about the harm free trade causes to the steel and automobile industries, the Donald J. Trump administration, to its credit, recognizes the importance of removing digital trade barriers in its stated objectives for the NAFTA renegotiation [PDF]. In its negotiations with Canada and Mexico, the Trump administration should seek rules limiting data localization, promote a balanced approach to intellectual property protections, support cross-border privacy rules, and remove barriers that hinder the trade of services.
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Digital Economy, and NAFTA
- Political Geography:
- United States, Canada, North America, and Mexico
26. Countering Sexual Violence in Conflict
- Author:
- Jamille Bigio and Rachel Vogelstein
- Publication Date:
- 10-2017
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Abstract:
- Armies and armed groups often subject noncombatants—particularly women and children—to conflict-related sexual violence, such as rape, sexual slavery, and forced marriage. Despite international recognition of this devastating abuse as a crime against humanity, sexual violence continues to plague conflicts from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to Syria. This practice has also proliferated among extremist groups, including Boko Haram in Nigeria and the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Additionally, sexual violence has tarnished the operations of peacekeepers charged with protecting civilians, thereby undermining the integrity and effectiveness of international peacekeeping institutions across the globe. Sexual violence in conflict is not simply a gross violation of human rights—it is also a security challenge. Wartime rape fuels displacement, weakens governance, and destabilizes communities, thereby inhibiting postconflict reconciliation and imperiling long-term stability. Combating conflict-related sexual violence merits a higher place on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. Although the U.S. government has taken modest steps to address sexual violence in conflict under successive Republican and Democratic administrations, more action is needed. To counter such violence, the Donald J. Trump administration should require training on conflict-related sexual violence in U.S. security cooperation efforts; expand the number of women serving in militaries, police, and peacekeeping forces around the world; increase accountability for the crime of sexual violence; and undermine terrorist financing streams raised through the abduction of women and children. These steps will help the United States and its allies respond effectively to the security threat posed by conflict-related sexual violence and advance U.S. interests in peace and stability.
- Topic:
- Human Rights, Gender Based Violence, Conflict, and Sexual Violence
- Political Geography:
- United States, Iraq, Syria, Nigeria, and Congo
27. Chinese Investment in Critical U.S. Technology: Risks to U.S. Security Interests
- Author:
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Publication Date:
- 10-2017
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Abstract:
- Chinese firms, both private and state-owned, have in recent years invested billions of dollars in the U.S. technology industry, raising concerns that a powerful rival has gained or could soon gain access to sensitive and, in some cases, critical technologies that underpin American military superiority and economic might. At the workshop entitled “Chinese Investment in Critical U.S. Technology: Risks to U.S. Security Interests,” held in San Francisco, on July 18, 2017, CFR convened nearly thirty current and former government officials, academics, bankers, investors, and corporate executives to explore whether the large and growing early-stage Chinese investment in critical U.S. technology poses a threat to U.S. national security, and, if so, to outline policies that mitigate the risks of unbridled Chinese investment and to bolster U.S. competitiveness.
- Topic:
- Security, Science and Technology, Foreign Direct Investment, and Cybersecurity
- Political Geography:
- United States, China, Asia, and North America
28. China and the U.S.-ROK Alliance: Promoting a Trilateral Dialogue
- Author:
- Heung-kyu Kim
- Publication Date:
- 11-2017
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Abstract:
- As the Republic of Korea faces an increasing threat from North Korea, evolving U.S.-China relations are becoming important to Seoul’s strategy for dealing with Pyongyang. The United States and China are competitors, but they also seek cooperation on a range of global issues. And although South Korea seeks to have good relations with both great powers, it is increasingly being pushed to take sides in the ongoing U.S.-China competition. As the U.S.-China relationship becomes more complex, South Korea needs to carefully evaluate its policy toward China in order to find the best ways to ensure Chinese cooperation on the North Korean issue, particularly taking into account China’s evolving view of North Korea. Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China is profoundly changing its foreign policy, including its relations with the United States and the two Koreas. With more confidence in its own diplomatic, military, and economic capacity to protect its national interests, China under Xi’s leadership has begun to regard the entire Korean Peninsula as part of its sphere of influence.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Denuclearization
- Political Geography:
- United States, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea
29. Economic Constraints on Russian Foreign Policy
- Author:
- Christopher Smart
- Publication Date:
- 11-2017
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Abstract:
- The recent collapse in the U.S.-Russia relationship has roots that stretch back to fundamental misunderstandings at the end of the Cold War. Western democracies have watched with dismay as tightening political controls in Russia have throttled domestic pluralism, while Moscow’s roughshod foreign policy and military tactics have driven its neighbors into submission or open hostility. Russia has bemoaned what it sees as Western arrogance and a stubborn refusal to recognize its security concerns and great-power status. Today, Russia’s annexation of Crimea, support of Syrian repression, and, above all, meddling in the U.S. presidential election have shattered any desire in Washington—at least outside the Oval Office—to search for common ground. Indeed, amid congressional logjams on nearly every issue, overwhelming bipartisan majorities passed a stiffer sanctions regime. The narrative in Moscow, meanwhile, paints a consistent picture of Washington actively rallying Europeans to expand footholds around Russia’s borders with an ultimate goal of regime change in the Kremlin itself. In spite of President Donald J. Trump’s apparent eagerness to improve relations, deepening resistance across the political spectrum makes any progress fanciful at this stage.Whether either side understands how to get relations back on track remains uncertain. What is clear is that neither side wants to. Deep-seated U.S. mistrust and an unyielding Russian government seem likely to confine the bilateral relationship to a series of sour exchanges and blustery confrontations for now. Yet one persistent weakness will ultimately limit Russia’s foreign agenda: an economy that is likely to fall increasingly behind those of its major neighbors and partners. For now, Russia has largely learned to tolerate Western economic sanctions, and its companies have found ways to live with restricted access to finance. Without reform and economic integration with the West, however, Russian influence will drift toward the margins of global diplomacy. Russia’s economy will atrophy from a combination of hyperconcentrated decision-making, continuing dependence on hydrocarbons, and persistent financial isolation. Core goals of Russia’s foreign policy will steadily recede from view, including important elements of the economic agenda with its immediate neighbors, the European Union and China. Though a snapback of oil prices would undoubtedly delay any day of reckoning, even large new inflows of petro-profits will not fundamentally close the widening gap with major partners.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Economics, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, Europe, and North America
30. Countering Russian Information Operations in the Age of Social Media
- Author:
- Keir Giles
- Publication Date:
- 11-2017
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Abstract:
- As investigations into attempts to influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election continue, more aspects of Russia’s approach to information warfare are coming to light. A steady stream of new disclosures is revealing a complex blend of hacking, public disclosures of private emails, and use of bots, trolls, and targeted advertising on social media designed to interfere in political processes and heighten societal tensions. Moscow’s hostile actions are driven by the belief that Russia is already in a state of conflict with the West, led by the United States, and that the internet is a domain for waging this conflict. From the earliest stages of the internet’s development, Russia has held a starkly different view from the West of its benefits and its potential. Russia’s national security establishment immediately saw connectivity as a threat and a potential weapon—and eventually as one that could help achieve regime change and deprive a country of its sovereignty—rather than as an enabler of economic development. The organization of Russia’s information-warfare capabilities, which include cyber operators, media outlets, and false flag entities, is shrouded in secrecy. In the West, generally only the intelligence community has a clear picture of how Russian capabilities are directed. Barring the sudden appearance of a Russian counterpart to Edward Snowden, the only view into Russia’s information toolbox is provided by cybersecurity companies and criminal prosecutions. The picture is further muddied because the Russian government keeps many of its cyberwarfare actors at arm’s length by employing contractors and former criminals through middlemen, giving Moscow a degree of deniability if caught. Nevertheless, both Western governments and private industry can take steps to mitigate Russian influence operations. Western governments should swiftly and decisively denounce Russian information activities as soon as they are identified, and their counterintelligence agencies should identify quantitative means to measure the effectiveness of Russia’s methods. Social media companies should more aggressively police their platforms for malicious state-sponsored content, and they should work with news organizations to promote verified and fact-checked content on their platforms.
- Topic:
- Cybersecurity, Political stability, Disinformation, and Election Interference
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, Europe, and North America
31. The Challenge From North Korea
- Author:
- Riccardo Alcaro and Ettore Greco
- Publication Date:
- 11-2017
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Abstract:
- A nuclear-armed North Korea is a threat to the fragile strategic equilibrium on the Korean Peninsula and to international security at large. Emboldened by a nuclear arsenal, the highly militarized regime of President Kim Jong-un could be tempted to embark on aggressive acts. Meanwhile, the United States could opt for preventive military action. Even if neither party seeks a military confrontation, conflict could ensue due to miscalculation or simple misreading of each other’s intentions. Limited military exchanges could spiral out of control, eventually involving not only North Korea, the United States, and its allies in the region—Japan and South Korea—but also China. The repercussions of North Korea’s nuclear challenge may not be limited to Northeast Asia, not least because the nonproliferation regime, a pillar of international security, would be dealt a serious, if not fatal, blow if regional adversaries sought to meet it by acquiring their own nuclear arsenals. The destabilizing effects of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic programs on regional and international security cannot be overestimated. In devising a response to the North Korean challenge, regional actors should remain committed to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but they should also implement security measures with observable results short of full denuclearization. Specifically, the United States and its allies should concentrate on sanctioning North Korea and on diplomatic action, actively seeking the involvement of China and Russia, while employing a strategy of deterrence and containment.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Denuclearization
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea
32. U.S.-ASEAN-ROK Cooperation on Nontraditional Security
- Author:
- Jaehyon Lee
- Publication Date:
- 12-2017
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Abstract:
- Traditional security issues in the Asia-Pacific, such as tensions on the Korean Peninsula or disputes over the South China Sea, consistently attract the attention of policymakers within the region and abroad. But their consequences for ordinary people are often dwarfed by the fallout from nontraditional security (NTS) events, such as climate change, resource scarcity, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, famine, people smuggling, drug trafficking, and transnational crime. For countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the human and economic losses from NTS threats can be staggering. Moreover, economic and social costs from NTS threats consume resources that otherwise could be channeled toward economic growth and social welfare. Historically, there have been bilateral and multilateral attempts at cooperation on NTS in the Asia-Pacific, but they have not been enough. Trilateral cooperation among the United States, ASEAN, and South Korea would benefit not just the participating parties, but also the region as a whole. Such cooperation would allow South Korea to contribute to the region and is consistent with the Moon Jae-in government’s desire to play a greater foreign policy role beyond the Korean Peninsula. It would also advance the U.S.-South Korean alliance and give South Korea experience that could be used in future NTS crises in North Korea such as famines, natural disasters, or pandemics.
- Topic:
- Security, Climate Change, Natural Disasters, Natural Resources, and Drugs
- Political Geography:
- United States, Asia, South Korea, and Southeast Asia
33. Writing New Rules for the U.S.-China Investment Relationship
- Author:
- Jennifer M. Harris
- Publication Date:
- 12-2017
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Abstract:
- Chinese outbound investment is on the rise, and much of it is finding its way into the United States. Be- tween 2010 and 2015, China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to the United States grew by an average of 32 percent annually.1 Within the past two years alone, Chinese foreign investment inflows to the United States increased four-fold, and available data suggests 2017 will see the second highest annual investment on record, after 2016.2 This is not a two-way street: the United States and other foreign investors do not enjoy similar open market access in China. China maintains a dizzying assortment of formal and informal barriers to for- eign investment—from outright restrictions and quotas to mandatory joint ventures, forced localization measures, and domestic licensing regimes. Despite years of negotiations, these barriers are, if anything, growing more cumbersome in many sectors. U.S. firms paint a darkening picture of the business climate they face in China. U.S. FDI in China has slowed considerably in recent years: after growing roughly 180 percent from 2002 to 2007 (albeit from a low baseline), U.S. FDI flows into China have declined since 2012.3 The one-way surge of Chinese investment into the United States comes against a backdrop of strategic mistrust between Washington and Beijing. Ongoing accusations of state-sponsored cyber predation of U.S. firms, Beijing’s increasing aggressiveness over territorial disputes, its systematic efforts to under- mine the U.S. alliance system in Asia, and mounting tensions over North Korea all contribute to a dark- ening mood in the U.S.-China relationship. And, like so much involving China, this investment is simply different. Rarely, if ever, has the United States seen an increase in investment of this magnitude—espe- cially from a non-ally and especially from one where the lines between state ownership and private own- ership are so inherently blurred. For all the concern surrounding Japanese investment in the United States in the 1980s—coming as it did amid fierce economic competition—those debates ultimately re- mained under the umbrella of the U.S.-Japan military alliance. All of this raises questions about whether the United States needs to tighten its stance on Chinese in- bound investment; proposals to that effect have bipartisan support in the Congress. The Donald J. Trump administration has signaled its desire for a tougher approach in its economic dealings with China, which U.S. businesses seem to welcome. One foundation for such an approach is the principle of reciprocity. Roughly two dozen sectors in China—construction, mining, banking, insurance, and so on—remain effectively off-limits to American investment, because the Chinese government protects its domestic companies through regulations and financial subsidies. Even in sectors that technically allow foreign investment, discriminatory industrial policies tilt the playing field in favor of Chinese firms. Until this changes, Washington would be justi- fied—even obligated—to limit Chinese investment in the U.S. market. However, U.S. policymakers do not have a consensus on what a policy of reciprocity would entail, and different policy interpretations could spell quite different economic and foreign policy consequences for the United States. The United States should aim for a version of reciprocity that allows it the flexibility to maximize pressure on the broad range of Chinese industrial policy concerns while leaving a clear route to negotiations. The United States should also encourage European and other Western countries, many of which are seeing similar increases in Chinese investment, to adopt this new approach.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Foreign Direct Investment
- Political Geography:
- United States, China, Asia, and North America
34. Arctic Imperatives: Reinforcing U.S. Strategy on America’s Fourth Coast
- Author:
- Thad W. Allen, Christine Todd Whitman, and Esther Brimmer
- Publication Date:
- 03-2017
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Abstract:
- "The United States, through Alaska, is a significant Arctic nation with strategic, economic, and scientific interests," asserts a new Council on Foreign Relations-sponsored (CFR) Independent Task Force report, Arctic Imperatives: Reinforcing U.S. Strategy on America's Fourth Coast. With the Arctic "warming at twice the rate as the rest of the planet" and melting sea ice opening up this resource-rich region to new trade routes and commercial activities, the report stresses that "the United States needs to increase its strategic commitment to the region or risk leaving its interests unprotected." The report notes that while Russia has numerous ice-breaking vessels and China is building a third icebreaker, the United States owns only two operational icebreaking ships—one heavy icebreaker and one medium-weight icebreaker—to serve both the Arctic and the Antarctic. Asserting that "icebreakers are a national capacity" required for a range of maritime missions to support U.S. security, economic, and commercial needs, the Task Force recommends that the United States fund and build additional icebreakers. The report also finds that the United States needs greater investment in Alaskan infrastructure, including deepwater ports, roads, and reliable telecommunications, to support economic development and a sustained security presence in the region. Currently, "almost no marine infrastructure is in place within the U.S. maritime Arctic."
- Topic:
- Climate Change, International Trade and Finance, Infrastructure, Hegemony, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, Arctic, and United States of America
35. Follow the External (Balance of Payments) Breakevens of the Oil Exporters
- Author:
- Brad W. Setser
- Publication Date:
- 07-2017
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Abstract:
- The global impact of oil’s fall from $100 plus to under $50 a barrel has not gotten as much attention as I think it deserves. For most oil exporters, it has been a profound shock—one that forced such a massive contraction in imports that it pulled down global trade (far more than the trade remedies that tend to dominate the ‘trade” news). A few countries adjusted quickly and relatively efficiently (Russia), though not painlessly. A few have struggled to adapt—notably, because of its large external debt, poor policies, and growing political crisis, Venezuela.
- Topic:
- Oil and Global Political Economy
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
36. Southeast Asian Perspectives on U.S.–China Competition
- Author:
- Aaron Connely
- Publication Date:
- 08-2017
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Abstract:
- In April 2016, the Lowy Institute and the Council on Foreign Relations' International Institutions and Global Governance program held a workshop on Southeast Asian perspectives on U.S.–China competition, which informed this publication. That workshop was made possible in part by the generous support of the Robina Foundation. This report is a collaboration between the Lowy Institute and the Council on Foreign Relations. The views expressed in this report are entirely the authors' own and not those of the Lowy Institute, the Council on Foreign Relations, or the Robina Foundation.
- Topic:
- Governance and Global Political Economy
- Political Geography:
- China and America
37. Managing a Smaller U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve
- Author:
- Jennifer Harris
- Publication Date:
- 07-2017
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Abstract:
- Comprising roughly 700 million barrels of crude oil stored in caverns throughout Texas and Louisiana, the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) was established by Congress in the mid-1970s in response to the 1973–74 Arab oil embargo and ensuing oil price shocks. Its purpose was to insulate the United States from crude oil supply disruptions. In the decades since, despite significant changes in global oil markets, the basic logic and design of the SPR have remained largely unchanged.
- Topic:
- Global Political Economy
- Political Geography:
- America
38. Interactive: Oil Exporters' External Breakeven Prices
- Author:
- Brad Sester and Cole Frank
- Publication Date:
- 07-2017
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Abstract:
- The 2014 fall in global oil prices, from over $100 a barrel to around $50 a barrel, reduced the export proceeds of the world’s main oil- and gas-exporting economies by about $1 trillion. After a decade of largely uninterrupted high oil prices, this dramatic swing has tested the economic resiliency and political adaptability of oil-exporting countries. One of the best single measures of the resilience of an oil- or gas-exporting economy is the oil price that covers its import bill—the external breakeven price.
- Topic:
- Oil and Global Political Economy
- Political Geography:
- America
39. Geostrategic Implications of China’s Twin Economic Challenges
- Author:
- William Norris
- Publication Date:
- 06-2017
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Abstract:
- The Chinese government has embarked on an effort to reorient its economy from an investment- and export-driven model toward one predicated on a larger role for consumption and market forces. At the same time, China is also experiencing a new normal of much slower economic growth. The economic downturn and concomitant structural shift in China’s economy has already begun affecting its foreign policy. Security, not economics, is becoming one of President Xi Jinping’s—and China’s—top strategic priorities.
- Topic:
- Global Political Economy
- Political Geography:
- China
40. The Case for Reforming Section 702 of U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law
- Author:
- Laura K. Donohue
- Publication Date:
- 06-2017
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Abstract:
- On December 31, 2017, section 702 of the 2008 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act (FAA) will expire. Section 702 governs the domestic interception of foreigners’ communications, when the targets are believed to be outside the United States. Although externally directed, this statute is being used by agencies to monitor, collect, and search U.S. citizens’ communications for foreign intelligence and criminal activity. Congress has an opportunity to amend section 702 to safeguard U.S. national security, protect citizens, and comply with the Constitution.
- Topic:
- Global Security
- Political Geography:
- America