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Begin New Search Publishing Institution Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations Publication Year within 3 Years

1. Resource curse or darling: Rethinking EU energy interests in Kazakhstan

Author:
Giulia Cretti and Louise Van Schaik
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
With its abundant natural resources and potential for renewable energy production, Kazakhstan – one of world’s most important fossil fuel producers – will play an increasingly prominent role in EU energy security. In the Central Asian Republic, geopolitical players like Russia and China have long-standing security and economic interests and compete with the EU for access to resources. To build a sustainable energy partnership with Kazakhstan that moves beyond a fossil fuel-interdependent relationship, the EU needs to further operationalise its green energy diplomacy based on local needs. This policy brief highlights two key areas of mutually beneficial cooperation: green hydrogen and critical raw materials. The EU could support Kazakhstan with developing its own clean industry locally, which would facilitate domestic decarbonisation and socioeconomic development rather than simply the export of raw materials. Moreover, investments in the Kazakh renewable energy sector need to go hand in hand with a gradual phase-out of oil and gas investments from European energy companies. This would reduce the security risks of continued fossil fuel dependency on the stability of the country.
Topic:
Natural Resources, European Union, Partnerships, Energy, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Central Asia and Kazakhstan

2. Beyond the EU enlargement paradox

Author:
René Cuperus and Saskia Hollander
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This Clingendael report analyses the so-called ‘EU enlargement paradox’, which refers to the notion that EU enlargement is both inevitable and impossible at the same time. It is inevitable for geostrategic reasons, given Putin’s Russian imperial revisionism. But at the same time, EU enlargement is impossible for political institutional reasons. At the moment, neither the eligible candidate countries, nor the EU at large, nor the electorates in key EU Member States are ‘enlargement fit’. How could the Dutch government deal with this paradox? This paper aims to set the scene for the forthcoming debate in the Netherlands on the future of EU enlargement. To serve as a basis for risk analysis, it provides a systematic overview of various trade-offs on five policy domains: 1) geopolitics, security and defence; 2) rule of law and democracy; 3) economy and budget; 4) migration and free movement of persons; and 5) EU institutional structure. The report draws on findings from the latest Clingendael Barometer survey, which analysed Dutch public opinion towards enlargement along these dimensions.
Topic:
Public Opinion, European Union, Regional Integration, Survey, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Europe and Netherlands

3. How the Aid Fund for Northern Syria can upgrade humanitarian aid and EU geopolitical engagement

Author:
Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
UN bureaucratic inertia, weak leadership, Stockholm syndrome and a laissez-faire attitude by donors have allowed structural problems with humanitarian aid delivery in Syria to persist for too long. These problems include regime capture of aid, dependency on Damascus to deliver aid cross-border and, more recently, too much focus on lifesaving aid. The coming humanitarian funding crunch demands that these problems are finally addressed at pain of a rapid increase in the misery of millions of Syrians. This will have consequences both in terms of local predation and international migration. The Aid Fund for Northern Syria (AFNS) could be the vehicle to break existing molds due to its more diverse governance structure, independence of both Damascus and the UN, greater focus on Early Recovery and an innovative, if emergent, localisation strategy. As a bonus, it can support a pragmatic conflict management strategy for northern Syria based on the ‘safe, calm and neutral environment’ concept of the 2012 Geneva Communiqué and UNSCR 2254. Donors should consider the practical actions proposed in this brief to put their money where their mouths are.
Topic:
Humanitarian Aid, European Union, Geopolitics, and Donors
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, and Syria

4. How Dutch farmers’ protests evolved into political mobilisation

Author:
Camille van Hees, Louise Van Schaik, and Pieter Zwaan
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The early signs of the now omnipresent polarisation between farmers’ interests and environmental goals began to appear in the Netherlands in 2019. That year saw both the launch of the European Green Deal as the EU’s overarching growth strategy and the establishment of a political party representing farmers’ interests in the Netherlands, the Farmer-Citizen Movement (BBB). Five years later, the Green Deal has lost its appeal and the BBB is likely to enter government, although electorally the party seems past its peak. Farmers are now protesting across Europe and many oppose, in particular, EU environmental policies they consider overly bureaucratic and damaging to their business. The European Christian democrats (EPP) have clearly repositioned themselves as representatives of agricultural interests. They are keen to keep the rural vote, which is also sensitive to other more conservative and right-wing issues. In the Netherlands, this became clear in the most recent general elections where populist parties managed to attract a large part of the (rural) vote and where Geert Wilders’ anti-migration Freedom Party (PVV) became the biggest with about 25%. In this policy brief, we will zoom in on the events that shaped the rise of the BBB and led to the current political situation in the Netherlands. On that basis, this policy brief looks at how the Dutch case could be a prologue for the forthcoming European Parliament elections.
Topic:
Protests, Political Movements, Mobilization, Green Deal, and Farmers
Political Geography:
Europe and Netherlands

5. A scramble for legitimacy: Iraq’s political elites since the October 2019 protests

Author:
Marsin Alshamary
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Iraqi political elites exhibited a variety of responses to the 2019 October protests, the largest demonstrations in post-2003 Iraq. Muqtada al-Sadr, a cleric-turned politician and leader of the Sadrist movement, vacillated between attempting to co-opt and repressing the protests. Other Shi’a political elites portrayed the predominantly Shi’a protestors as foreign agents and encouraged violent repression. Yet others who urged reform and response went largely unheard. Iraq’s political system emerged largely unscathed from the protests, even though the threat of recurrence inspired the new government to undertake limited service-oriented reforms. However, traditional political elites continue to view reformists, including the politicians that emerged from the protest movement, as illegitimate usurpers of governing power they feel rightly belongs to them.
Topic:
Reform, Domestic Politics, Protests, Elites, Muqtada al-Sadr, and Shiite
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

6. Stabilisation and the Central Sahel

Author:
Ekaterina Golovko and Kars de Bruijne
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The international community hasn’t been successful in its efforts to support ‘stabilisation’ in the central Sahel. To learn lessons from recent engagement, this policy brief seeks to make three contributions to an already long list of ‘strategic misfits’. First, that ‘stabilisation responses’ are built on the wrong assumption “to bring back the state” and “expand state presence”, without serious work on how to reform the state that had to be brought back. Second, that external actors – and in particular Western governments – consistently overestimated their ability to influence and effect real change in the region and have to become more modest in their objectives. Third, that there is an urgent need to apply these lessons to the new area of policy attention: coastal countries of West Africa and the fight against violent extremism. This policy brief calls for a stronger reflection on what decades of largely failing Sahelian policy can tell us about how to engage with Coastal West Africa.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Countering Violent Extremism, and Stabilization
Political Geography:
Africa and Sahel

7. Freedom isn’t Free: A cost-benefit analysis of support for Ukraine

Author:
Bob Deen and Roman de Baedts
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
More than ten years after the Russian annexation of Crimea and two years after the large-scale invasion, Ukraine is still holding its own against Russia. This is not only due to the courage and efforts of the Ukrainians themselves, but also thanks to the extensive military, economic, and financial support packages from Europe and the US. For 2024, the government had allocated three billion euros for military support to Ukraine in the fight against Russian aggression and also pledged an additional three billion for 2025. Following the UK, France, and Germany, the Netherlands has entered into a ten-year security cooperation agreement with Ukraine to ensure long-term support. The recently released AIV briefing note and a recent parliamentary letter also advocate for sustained support. However, this Western support is no longer a certainty or uncontested. Particularly in the US, but also in some European NATO countries, calls to halt support to Ukraine are slowly gaining more traction. The American support package of sixty billion dollars was stuck in the House of Representatives for months, causing significant difficulties for the Ukrainian armed forces. President Biden has scaled back his rhetoric from “as long as it takes” to “as long as we can”. New commitments for new aid to Ukraine stalled at the end of 2023 (with a nearly ninety percent drop), while promised ammunition quantities fell far short. A warning from French President Macron that a Western military intervention should not be ruled out received little support from his foreign counterparts. Although the issue of Western ‘boots on the ground’ also requires further attention, it is not addressed within this memo, and ‘support’ encompasses both economic and material assistance, but without the deployment of Western troops in Ukraine. Following Putin’s ‘election victory’ in March, the Kremlin escalated its war rhetoric. Government officials are now openly discussing ‘war,’ whereas previously, using that word could land one in prison. This fits into the rhetoric where NATO, rather than Ukraine, is portrayed as the aggressor. Additionally, the Russian Ministry of Defence announced the formation of two new combined arms Army Corps and accelerated the recruitment of new military personnel. Meanwhile, the Russian war industry is gearing up, producing large quantities of ammunition and equipment for the Russian war effort. The extensive import of artillery ammunition from North Korea and drones from Iran, among other capabilities, further complements Russian stocks. The consequences on the battlefield are already noticeable, as seen in the loss of the city of Avdiivka in February, and developments along the front since. Meanwhile, pressure on Ukrainian troops at the front is mounting. In an interview at the end of March, President Zelensky stated that Ukraine will have to cede more land if Western material support continues to be lacking. The renewed Northern front after the second Russian Kharkiv offensive is likely to further stretch Ukrainian defences and resilience in the near future. Despite overwhelming support in the Dutch parliament for continued support for Ukraine, there are nonetheless questions about the duration and scope of future assistance. The question regarding the costs and benefits of providing political, economic, and military support by the Dutch government is extremely relevant in this context. This constitutes more than a simple calculation where profit or loss is expressed in Euros. It also involves security risks and geopolitical and moral costs and benefits that cannot always be quantified in one-dimensional figures. It is therefore essential to adopt a broader understanding of costs and benefits, reasoned from the perspective of Dutch national security interests and the impact of international support on the outcomes of the conflict. An important consideration here is the extent to which support for Ukraine contributes to a military victory, a military loss, or a protracted conflict.
Topic:
Armed Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

8. Exploring the risk of violent extremism along the border between Northern Benin and Nigeria

Author:
Kars de Bruijne
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
For over a decade, researchers and politicians feared a link between extremist groups in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin. Since 2014, studies have pointed to Benin’s unfortunate potential to serve as a geographical hinge. So far, evidence has been largely absent. While violent extremism in northern Benin is typically regarded as a “spillover” from the Sahel our report “Dangerous Liaisons: Exploring the risk of violent extremism along the border between northern Benin and Nigeria” warns that a large violent extremism problem has emerged in North West Nigeria that now threatens Benin. In the cross-border Borgou region (Benin), a collaboration between Nigerian and Sahelian insurgents is in the making along Benin’s border with Nigeria. These signals are extremely concerning, and action is needed. Nigeria and Benin should cease the d’entente between Talon and Tinubu and intensify cooperation. This should take the form of information exchange, arranging hot-pursuit and consider joint action. But also Western donors and programming need to break stove-piped responses in the Sahel and Lake Chad respectively. The two conflicts appear to merge and a more united and flexible response is needed.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Violent Extremism, and Borders
Political Geography:
Africa, Nigeria, and Benin

9. Examining the interplay between elites and social movements in Jordan

Author:
Matteo Colombo
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This Policy Brief offers insights into the bargaining process that both reflects and sets limits for political change in Jordan. It argues that neither permissiveness to organise protests nor their actual occurrence improves the prospects of meaningful political reforms. Instead, protests usually serve as a strategic tool in the interests of particular elites. In Jordan, elites and social movements commonly develop vertical ties instead of different social movements working together to press for change bottom-up, as is more usual elsewhere. Broadly, Jordan’s political context makes it possible for elites and political authorities to co-opt social movements by supporting limited changes that respond to their demands, as long as these fit within the prevailing political settlement. Ultimately, protests tend to reinforce the status quo rather than challenging it. Social movements are therefore faced with the dilemma of accepting co-optation to facilitate incremental changes, or to stick to a more radical stance that risks being ineffective or even triggering repression. But mounting economic headwinds mean that some reform of Jordan’s political system is inevitable if political instability is to be avoided. Mechanisms such as referendums and popular initiatives can provide a viable path forward if they are designed to operate on the frontiers of the existing framework and respect the position of the monarchy. Such initiatives can engage citizens more directly in reform processes and ensure their voices are heard in a more meaningful way. Jordan’s dependence on foreign funding provides European policy makers with a lever to condition continuous support on steps in this direction.
Topic:
Social Movement, Reform, Domestic Politics, Protests, Elites, and Cooptation
Political Geography:
Middle East and Jordan

10. Israel against Iran: regional conflict scenarios in 2024

Author:
Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Four scenarios capture the main dynamics of conflict between Israel and the US on the one hand, and Iran and the axis of resistance on the other. They are: ‘a fight for the status quo’, ‘shifting red lines’, ‘limited war’ and ‘total war’. The first two scenarios amount to muddling through under the permanent threat of escalation, which could happen due to unintended yet possibly catastrophic incidents. The more warlike scenarios signify a shift to high-intensity war across large parts, or all, of the region. As 7 October 2023 created tighter linkages between the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories and the regional conflict between Israel/US and Iran, the violent dynamics of either issue can trigger each scenario. Meanwhile, scenario pathways lie so close to each other that tipping points can swiftly transform one scenario into another. Together, the scenarios point to the need to develop conflict prevention measures between Israel, the US and Iran – such as hotlines, protocols that spell out red lines and tolerable action/reaction bandwidths or even demilitarised zones – between now and the US presidential elections in November. The core strategic objectives of the conflict parties suggest that progress is possible. Israel seeks to restore the security of its northern border without an all-out war against Hezbollah or Iran. It also intends to continue occupation. It does not care enough about normalisation with Saudi Arabia to discontinue annexation, which means it will not alter the regional security order to an extent that could truly threaten Iran. Tehran, in turn, seeks good relations with the Persian Gulf states, recognition as a regional power and the isolation of Israel. The US wishes to uphold Israel’s security by reducing the risk of Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran, but without triggering a region-wide, high-intensity conflict. A precarious balance might be achieved, for example if Israel halts the in-your-face elements of its expanding occupation, a reinforced UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) takes up position on both sides of the Israeli-Lebanese border, US sanction enforcement against Iran is somewhat loosened and the axis of resistance, including Iran, observes a longer-term ceasefire regarding Israel.
Topic:
Security, Conflict, Regional Politics, and Axis of Resistance
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine