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1. Time to change track Assessing the UN’s conflict mediation strategy for Syria from 2019 to 2023

Author:
Malik al-Abdeh and Lars Hauch
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The United Nations (UN) has become largely irrelevant to diplomatic efforts to resolve the Syria conflict. This report shows that the primary reason has been the fact that the main conflict parties never wanted to resolve the Syrian conflict by other than military means. Yet, the report also highlights secondary reasons within this unfavourable context, namely: the frames, methods and choices of the UN Special Envoy and his team at times misjudged or poorly corresponded with the realities of the conflict. Moreover, the capacity of the Office of the Special Envoy (OSE) remained too limited. The report suggests that the time is ripe for the OSE to reinvent itself as a principled thought leader and to develop an operational framework that brings a safe, calm and neutral environment (SCNE) closer as a practical conflict management modality.
Topic:
Diplomacy, United Nations, Syrian War, and Mediation
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

2. Beyond Turkey’s ‘zero problems’ policy Motives, means and impact of the interventions in Syria, Libya and the South Caucasus

Author:
Nienke van Heukelingen and Bob Deen
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Since the Arab uprisings in 2011, but especially after the failed coup d’état in 2016, Turkey’s foreign policy has shifted from ‘zero problems’ to the pursuit of strategic depth and autonomy in its neighbourhood. In 2020, Syria, Libya and the South Caucasus became three theatres for Ankara’s new hard-power tactics, a policy that may well be here to stay (at least until the elections in 2023). This policy brief explores the strategic motives, the means of intervention and the impact of Turkish operations in these three conflict areas. While Turkey’s strategic considerations, modalities and consequences vary greatly from case to case, certain parallels can be drawn. They reveal an overall pattern of a much more assertive Turkey that is increasingly willing to deploy a combination of political and military means to secure its strategic objectives in its immediate neighbourhood.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Hard Power
Political Geography:
Turkey, Libya, Syria, and South Caucasus

3. Politicking in Doha: But will the Syrian opposition shift to more pragmatic diplomacy?

Author:
Malik al-Abdeh and Lars Hauch
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC) and the Syrian Negotiation Commission (SNC) are in dire need of internal renewal and a new political strategy given the deadlock of UN-led peace negotiations. A forthcoming opposition gathering on 4 February in Doha with more than 80 Syrian opposition leaders, activists and academics might offer an opportunity to do so. However, the event’s public face is Riyad Hijab, who is no longer part of the SOC and is seen as pursuing an internal leadership takeover. It is likely that the event will be part of a series that seeks to create a new centre of opposition without creating a new opposition body. Yet, neither Hijab’s internal politicking nor possible legitimacy/efficiency gains from implementation of a parallel SOC internal reform plan will generate a new political strategy for the opposition. This requires creative and pragmatic diplomacy that focuses on, for example, negotiating crossline arrangements between all conflict parties that improve local security and facilitate travel, trade and aid to improve the desperate situation of the Syrian people — in line with the UN’s call for a ‘safe, calm and neutral environment’ (SCNE). The habits of dialogue and compromise that can gradually develop in this manner could be leveraged at a later stage to address the more complex issues of power sharing and reconstruction once an appropriate window of opportunity has opened up.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Syrian War, and Peace
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, and Doha

4. A new conflict management strategy for Syria: Creating a Safe, Calm and Neutral Environment

Author:
Malik al-Abdeh and Lars Hauch
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The search for peace in Syria faces a deep crisis. The battlefield has reached a stalemate, the Constitutional Committee never emerged from its cul-de-sac, and the UN’s ‘step-for-step’ approach suffers from flawed conceptual underpinnings as well as a lukewarm reception. Meanwhile, Syria remains divided into three areas that risk drifting further apart amid deteriorating humanitarian conditions. This reality on the ground should serve as a marker for recalibrating Western policy on Syria beyond the current focus on sanctions, accountability, and humanitarian aid. Western policy makers – mostly those from the US, European Union and Turkey – must base a much-needed new conflict management strategy on three ‘ground truths’: 1) the conflict is largely frozen and Syria is likely to remain divided into competing areas of control that are supported, or overseen, by external powers for the foreseeable future; 2) questions of national legitimacy and power sharing are not currently solvable and must be temporarily put on the back burner; c) diplomatic efforts to stabilise Syria and prevent partition are likely to be more effective when they focus on restoring practical connectivity between the different areas of control in terms of flows of people, goods and trade/aid/investment, as well as education. Such a strategy can take shape by operationalising the UN-sanctioned concept of a ‘safe, calm and neutral environment’ (SCNE) via a clear set of principles for engagement, a detailed stakeholder/interest mapping of the various conflict parties, and a focus on pragmatic measures to improve daily conditions. The objective of such a strategy is to enable a durable return to relatively normal life for Syrians still living in the country, and to create linkages between the country’s war-torn parts that can open windows of opportunity in the longer term for a political process reflecting the intention of UNSCR 2254.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Diplomacy, Syrian War, Peace, and Conflict Management
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

5. A new momentum for EU-Turkey cooperation on migration

Author:
Nienke van Heukelingen
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This policy brief considers how to move forward with the (financial element of the) EU-Turkey statement agreed in 2016, under which the first tranche of 3 billion euros will end mid-2021. In order not to reverse the progress achieved and to continue the work on improving the resilience of the 4.1 million refugees in Turkey, there is an urgent need for the European Union and Turkey to agree on a new financial framework. One that builds on the current, generally successful framework – the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRiT) – but which would divide the burden between Turkey and the EU more equally. Both blocs would, moreover, do well to look into the possibilities of extending the area of cooperation to Idlib. In that area, which is currently under Turkey’s military control, almost three million internally displaced persons (IDPs) currently lack adequate shelter and essentials, which could potentially lead to various displacement scenarios. Neither of those decisions will be easy and will require serious support from all EU member states, but the fact is Turkey remains essential in pursuing the EU’s core interest: preventing another refugee flow into Europe.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Migration, European Union, Refugees, and Borders
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

6. Band-aids, not bullets: EU policies and interventions in the Syrian and Iraqi civil wars

Author:
Erwin van Veen and Nancy Ezzeddine
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Engaging in the conflict cycle in other countries to gain outcomes favourable to one’s own interests is akin to playing in the champions league of foreign policy. Doing this effectively and responsibly requires a coherent and full-spectrum political strategy as well as the diplomatic, financial, developmental and military means to deliver it. It is clear from the scope of the security interests articulated in the European Union’s (EU) Global Strategy (2016) and its many associated foreign policy statements that the EU intends to meet these requirements. However, study of EU institutional policies and interventions in the Syrian and Iraqi civil wars highlights that it falls well short of doing so. As a result, EU institutions are not well placed to intervene effectively in high intensity conflicts with existential features such as these two civil wars. With this problem in mind, the core recommendation of the paper is to increase the effectiveness of EU interventions in high-intensity conflicts by institutionalising full-spectrum decision making, policy implementation and force deployment modalities for the EU as a whole, as well as for EU coalitions of the willing. The parallel existence of such tracks will enable the EU to act jointly in conflicts where Member States have more or less compatible foreign policy preferences with matching intensity preferences, and to act in part in conflicts where Member States have more or less compatible foreign policy preferences with a mixed distribution of intensity preferences (like Iraq or arguably Syria). EU foreign policy inaction, including institutional paralysis, will continue to occur where Member States’ foreign policy preferences are largely not compatible and have high-intensity preferences.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, European Union, Military Intervention, Conflict, and Institutions
Political Geography:
Iraq, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

7. Henchman, Rebel, Democrat, Terrorist: The YPG/PYD during the Syrian conflict

Author:
Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This report analyses the role of the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the associated Democratic Union Party (PYD) during the Syrian civil war. The purpose of our research is to obtain a better understanding of the nature, objectives and methods of the YPG/ PYD as a combined paramilitary and rebel force that is involved in a quasi-statebuilding project during an internationalised civil war. We start by examining the critical factors that enabled the swift rise of the YPG: informal arrangements with the Assad regime, support from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and a pragmatic partnership with the US against Islamic State. This sets the scene for an inquiry into how core YPG strategies to maintain its dominance once it was established – coercive, deal-making, identity and basic service strategies – both shape the group’s behavior and result from its current organization. Finally, we dissect a number of major challenges to future YPG rule, such as its relation with the PKK, intra-Kurdish reconciliation, the US presence in northeast Syria and its interaction with the Arab populations over which it rules. Based on our analysis, we anticipate a scenario of ‘muddling through’ in which unconditional support from the US will continue at current levels, combined with an abiding US military presence. This will provide the YPG/ PYD with a security umbrella against both regime forces and Turkey, continue the status quo of the YPG/ PYD ruling northeast Syria in authoritarian fashion, make the civil war more ethno-sectarian in nature and prolong the conflict. While such a scenario is arguably more attractive for northeast Syria than a return of the regime, it is also unlikely to improve the area’s current underdevelopment. It will keep other external actors, like the EU, away and allow the PKK to continue to take its share of the area’s revenues. The primary audience of the report are Western opinion-, policy- and decision-makers engaged with the Syrian civil war and we hope it will help them to craft policies and initiate interventions that are feasible and appropriate to the situation in northeast Syria.
Topic:
Conflict, Syrian War, and YPG
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, United States of America, and European Union

8. Fruitless cherry picking?: EU engagement with the Syrian opposition (Etilaf)

Author:
Lars Hauch
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This policy brief examines the EU’s engagement and relationship with Syria’s main political opposition umbrella, the Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (Etilaf), which was founded in late 2012. It discusses the EU’s engagement strategies with the Etilaf and their impact on its development in the context of the Syrian conflict. The brief highlights that the EU did not substantiate the international legitimacy it granted the organisation early on during the conflict with policies that would have allowed it to expand its domestic legitimacy and capabilities. This policy contributed to developments in which the Etilaf rapidly lost its original potential. While the Etilaf today faces a range of structural and operational challenges that need to be addressed, the brief nevertheless recommends EU institutions and Member States to increase their support for the Etilaf and the Interim Government linked with it, if a number of conditions can be met. Such support will help maintain and develop these bodies into a viable centre of political opposition to the Assad regime. Practically speaking, this objective can be pursued by piloting conditional EU support to areas of northwestern and northern Syria that are nominally under the control of the Interim Government. It also requires building a partnership with Turkey to jointly support local Syrian administration(s) in the same areas.
Topic:
Politics, European Union, Conflict, Syrian War, Bashar al-Assad, and Opposition
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, and Syria

9. Turkey’s interventions in its near abroad: The case of Idlib

Author:
Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The trigger for the Turkish Operation Spring Shield in northern Idlib in February 2020 was to prevent the Syrian conflict – especially extremists and refugees – spilling over into Turkey as the result of a new regime offensive. A deeper driver of the operation was Ankara’s desire to draw a line against further regime advances that might jeopardise Turkish territorial gains across northern Syria. Millions of Syrian internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the Islamist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) were the main – although unintended – beneficiaries of the operation. Tactically, Operation Spring Shield was a success because of a surge in Turkish military resources in northern Idlib, Ankara’s willingness to use them, and the speed with which Turkey acted. Strategically, it helped a great deal that Russia decided to stand aside for a few days. Russian-Turkish diplomacy resumed after battlefield conditions had shifted in Turkey’s favour and Syrian regime forces were stopped in their tracks. In the short term, Operation Spring Shield can be considered as having brought a measure of humanitarian and geopolitical stabilisation by clarifying Turkey’s red lines to Damascus, Tehran and Moscow, and by bringing about a new equilibrium between Russiansupported forces and Turkish forces in Syria. The operation did not negatively affect Turkey’s relationship with its NATO partners, the EU or the US. This was in part because the operation highlighted the limitations of the Astana process – a diplomatic initative in which Turkey, Iran and Russia pursue opposing aims vis-à-vis the Assad regime – from which these actors are excluded. In the medium term, the impact of Operation Spring Shield will depend on the permanence of the Turkish presence, the level of Turkish developmental investment and the evolution, as well as the place, of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in the future governance of northern Idlib.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Refugees, Military Intervention, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria