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1. Regional Financial Arrangements and the International Monetary Fund: Sustaining Coherence in Global Financial Governance

Author:
C. Randall Henning
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
Cooperation and competition among regional financial arrangements (RFAs) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) increasingly determine the effectiveness of the global financial safety net (GFSN), which many observers fear is becoming fragmented. Overlap among these crisis-fighting institutions has important benefits but also pitfalls, including with respect to competition, moral hazard, independence, institutional conflict, creditor seniority and non-transparency. The study reviews the RFAs in Latin America, East Asia and Europe to assess their relationships with the IMF and address these problems. Among other things, it concludes: institutional competition, while harmful in program conditionality, can be beneficial in economic analysis and surveillance; moral hazard depends critically on institutional governance and varies substantially from one regional arrangement to the next; secretariats should be independent in economic analysis, but lending programs should be decided by bodies with political responsibility; and conflicts among institutions are often resolved by key member states through informal mechanisms that should be protected and developed. Findings of other recent studies on the GFSN are critiqued. Architects of financial governance should maintain the IMF at the centre of the safety net but also develop regional arrangements as insurance against the possibility that any one institution could be immobilized in a crisis, thereby safeguarding both coherence and resilience of the institutional complex.
Topic:
Governance, Surveillance, Strategic Competition, and IMF
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, Asia, South America, Australia, North America, and Global Focus

2. Reforming Finance: Macro and Micro Perspectives

Author:
Pierre Siklos
Publication Date:
02-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
Reforms of the financial system in the wake of the global financial crisis are incomplete. Beyond reforms, good judgment is essential in a crisis. Short-termism in finance cannot be completely controlled by regulation and supervision. Financial crises are inevitable but need not be as virulent at the global financial crisis. Central banks will have to rethink their policies and how they interact with other agencies partially responsible for maintaining financial system stability.
Topic:
Economics, Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Financial Crisis, Governance, and Reform
Political Geography:
Europe

3. The 2014 Survey of Progress in International Economic Governance

Author:
Domenico Lombardi, Barry Carin, and David Kempthorne
Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
The annual CIGI Survey of Progress in International Economic Governance assesses progress in four dimensions of international economic governance: macroeconomic and financial cooperation; cooperation on financial regulation; cooperation on trade; and cooperation on climate change. Governance related to these dimensions is scored on the following progress scale: 0%-19% represents "major regression"; 20%-39% represents "some regression"; 40%-59% indicates "minimal progress"; 60%-79% characterizes progress; and 80%-100% represents "major progress." Recognizing the difficulty of making objective judgments given the complexity of the issues, the results are offered as a range of subjective opinions from CIGI experts with diverse backgrounds.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economics, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Governance
Political Geography:
United States and Europe

4. Sovereign Debt Crisis Management: Lessons from the 2012 Greek Debt Restructuring

Author:
Miranda Xafa
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
The 2012 Greek debt exchange was a watershed event in the euro area debt crisis. It generated fears of contagion and was viewed as a threat to the euro itself. Although it achieved historically unprecedented debt relief, amounting to €106 billion (55 percent of GDP), it was “too little, too late” in terms of restoring Greece's debt sustainability. There is a heated debate as to whether the debt restructuring should have taken place sooner, when Greece's adjustment program was agreed to in May 2010. This paper argues that a deep haircut up front, under threat of legislative action, would have been seen as unnecessary and deeply coercive. But delaying the restructuring beyond mid-2011, when it became clear that Greece's debt was unsustainable, was unjustified. The delay reduced the stock of privately held debt subject to a haircut, possibly making an official debt restructuring inevitable down the road. Initial fears that the Greek debt restructuring would pose a serious threat to the euro area's financial stability proved to be exaggerated. On the contrary, it demonstrated that an orderly default involving a pre-emptive debt restructuring is possible in a monetary union, provided appropriate firewalls are in place to limit contagion risks. With crisis management institutions and procedures now in place in the euro area, and with much stricter fiscal surveillance, the Greek experience is likely to remain unique in the history of debt restructurings; however, some lessons can be learned from its specific features.
Topic:
Debt and Governance
Political Geography:
Europe and Greece

5. Sovereign Debtors in Distress: Are Our Institutions Up to the Challenge?

Author:
Susan Schadler
Publication Date:
08-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
Global economic developments over the past two years have dashed hopes that the risks of sovereign debt crises have been tamed. The turmoil in Europe has, of course, been the most acute of these developments, but growing national fiscal imbalances, anemic prospects for growth and the expanding reach of private financial markets to newly emerging economies are potent, if less immediately threatening, signs of the risks ahead. After lying dormant for almost a decade, pressing questions about whether global institutions are capable of containing the costs of debt crises are again being raised.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, Globalization, Political Economy, Financial Crisis, and Governance
Political Geography:
Europe

6. From Bretton Woods to the Euro: How Policy-Maker Overreach Fosters Economic Crises

Author:
Pierre Siklos
Publication Date:
08-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
This paper considers the relevance of the Bretton Woods system for the prospects of reform of the international monetary system and in the context of the ongoing euro area financial crisis. It explores the challenges that must be met in attempting to reform the present international monetary system and euro area policies. After considering what resonates, and what does not, from the Bretton Woods regime of fixed exchange rates, it examines some of the key lessons from that era. The paper concludes that policy makers at Bretton Woods promised too much in terms of the stability and durability of the policy regime, and did not give sufficient thought to how the arrangement devised in the 1940s would actually function. They failed to instill the logic of collective action among their members. In particular, the Bretton Woods system failed because the agreement paid virtually no attention to governance issues. Finally, in terms of the current situation in the euro zone, policy makers have failed to recognize that the problems are not purely economic; domestic political considerations are important too. A political-economy approach is required for the design of new international monetary arrangements. The same principles apply today when we contemplate the survival of the euro zone. Politicians need to be more realistic and less ambitious, lest they create the preconditions for the next global crisis.
Topic:
Economics, Global Recession, Financial Crisis, and Governance
Political Geography:
Europe

7. Fiscal Asymmetries and the Survival of the Euro Zone

Author:
Paul R. Masson
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
The independence of the European Central Bank (ECB), seemingly guaranteed by its statutes, is presently under attack. The ECB has been led to acquire large amounts of government debt of the weaker euro zone members, both to help contain their interest costs and to help protect the solvency of banks throughout the zone that hold their debt. This paper presents a model of a dependent central bank that internalizes the government's budget constraint. Using a Barro-Gordon framework, the model embodies both the desire to stimulate output and to provide monetary financing to governments. As a result of the inability to pre-commit to first-best policies, the central bank produces excess inflation — a tendency partially reduced in a monetary union. The model implies that not only shock asymmetries, but also fiscal asymmetries, are important in the membership calculus of desirable monetary unions. On the basis of this framework, calibrated to euro zone data, the current membership is shown not to be optimal: other members would benefit from the expulsion of several countries, notably Greece, Italy and France. A narrow monetary union centred around Germany is sometimes mooted as a preferable alternative, especially if it could guarantee central bank independence. However, simulation results suggest that such a narrow monetary union would not be in Germany's interest: though better than the euro zone with a dependent central bank, it would not internalize enough trade to make it more attractive than the resumption of monetary autonomy by Germany.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, Monetary Policy, and Governance
Political Geography:
Europe, Greece, France, Germany, and Italy