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1. Only game in town? Inequality and demand for democracy in Africa – a micro perspective

Author:
Thomas Isbell
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
In this paper, the author explores whether perceived inequality is associated with demand for democracy among Africans. Past research has diverged on whether macro-level inequality should increase or decrease support for democracy, with some arguing that people might see democracy as a solution to inequality, and others that people might see it as a cause. I advance this literature by using a perceptual measure of inequality from Afrobarometer: how people feel their living situation compares to others’ in their country. I find that perceived equality is significantly associated with greater demand for democracy, while perceptions of relative deprivation and relative advantage are both associated with lower democratic demand. These effects are largely significant above and beyond the effect of absolute poverty and known predictors of support for democracy, such as free and fair elections and level of education.
Topic:
Education, Elections, Democracy, Inequality, and Social Order
Political Geography:
Africa

2. Partisanship in a young democracy: Evidence from Ghana

Author:
Alexander Stoecker
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
While past studies have put forward many reasons why partisanship in young African democracies should be considered weak and meaningless, this paper casts doubt on this notion by presenting evidence of strong and stable patterns of partisanship among ordinary citizens. Based on survey data from Ghana, I exploit the variation introduced by the political turnovers of 2008 and 2016 to compare perceptions and attitudes of party supporters when their preferred party is in power and when it is not. The results indicate a pronounced partisan divide, suggesting that partisanship is meaningful and prompts motivated reasoning among citizens. On the one hand this can be seen as evidence for a stable party landscape and thus a more mature democracy, but on the other hand partisan polarization may also obstruct effective governance. Furthermore, the analysis of attitudes toward democratic principles uncovers a worrying double standard that could negatively affect the consolidation of democracy. A simple heterogeneity analysis reveals that while partisan identities seem to exist alongside ethnic identities, the latter still strongly determine the strength of party attachment in Ghana. Future research on political behaviour needs to acknowledge the presence of these partisan motives and continue to investigate the impact of partisanship on the further development of democratic institutions in African democracies.
Topic:
Democracy, Ethnicity, Political Parties, Identity, and Partisanship
Political Geography:
Africa and Ghana

3. Party footprints in Africa: Measuring local party presence across the continent

Author:
Matthias Krönke, Sarah J. Lockwood, and Robert Mattes
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
The conventional view holds that most of Africa’s political parties are organizationally weak, with little grassroots presence. Yet few studies are based on systematically collected data about more than a handful of parties or countries at any given point. In this paper, we focus on one crucial aspect of party organization – the local presence that enables political parties to engage with and mobilize voters – and use Afrobarometer data to develop the Party Presence Index, the first systematic, cross-national measure of local party presence in Africa. We then apply the index to a series of substantive questions, confirming its value and demonstrating its potential to add significantly to our understanding of grassroots party organization.
Topic:
Governance, Democracy, Local, Political Parties, and Community
Political Geography:
Africa

4. Corruption Crossroads? Rising Perceptions of Graft Weaken Citizen Trust, Threaten Botswana’s Democratic Standing

Author:
Thomas Isbell and Batlang Seabo
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Corruption is widely considered one of the greatest impediments to sustainable development in African countries (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2016; Bratton & Gyimah-Boadi, 2016). Corruption hinders macro-economic growth by weakening governance structures and diluting the positive effects of investments. At the micro level, corruption can trap the poorest, who are least likely to have alternatives to state provision of services, in a downward spiral (Peiffer & Rose, 2014). Botswana has long been considered one of Africa’s least corrupt countries and top performers in democratic practice and good governance. But while Transparency International’s (2019) Corruption Perceptions Index continues to rank Botswana as best on the continent, other observers have questioned this reputation (Mogalakwe & Nyamnjoh, 2017; Good, 2017). Allegations have focused on, among other things, high-level corruption in military procurement contracts under former President Ian Khama, close ties between members of the ruling party and the agricultural sector, and charges that well-connected suspects are often cleared by the courts (Motlogelwa & Civillini, 2016; Konopo, 2017; Good, 2017; Norad, 2011; Sebudubudu 2014; Gasennelwe, 2018). Recent corruption scandals have reached the highest levels of government, including the alleged looting of the National Petroleum Fund (Kgalemang, 2019; Motshegwa, Mutonono, & Mikazhu, 2019), and are still before courts of law (Shuma, 2020). In this paper we use Afrobarometer survey data to explore citizens’ perceptions of corruption in Botswana. We find that far more people see corruption increasing than decreasing and that perceptions of corruption in the Presidency and Parliament have risen sharply over the past decade. Fewer Batswana approve of how the government is handling the anti-corruption fight, and while many believe ordinary people can help fight corruption, a majority say that people risk retaliation if they report corruption to the authorities. A correlation analysis suggests that perceptions of corruption, especially in the Presidency, are strongly associated with less popular trust in public institutions and less satisfaction with democracy.
Topic:
Corruption, Governance, Democracy, and Citizenship
Political Geography:
Africa and Botswana

5. Democratic Dividend: The Road to Quality Education in Africa

Author:
Matthias Krönke
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Education is a powerful tool to fight poverty, enable upward socioeconomic mobility, and empower people to live healthier lives. But while the global adult literacy rate continues to increase, from 81% in 2000 to 86% in 2018 (World Bank, 2019), the challenge of access to quality education remains particularly severe in Africa. Even before the COVID-19 crisis, globally one out of five children aged 6-17 years were not in school; more than half of these children live in sub-Saharan Africa. Additionally, many African pupils attend schools that are inadequately equipped, creating a difficult learning environment. For example, more than half of the schools in sub-Saharan Africa do not have access to basic drinking water, handwashing facilities, the Internet, or computers (United Nations, 2019). COVID-19 may exacerbate these challenges as pupils lose school time, unequal access to online learning heightens inequalities, and health care and social-safety costs and economic losses put pressure on limited resources. Africans are aware of education challenges. Across 34 African countries surveyed by Afrobarometer between late 2016 and late 2018, one in five respondents (21%) cited education as one of the most important problems their governments should address, placing it among citizens’ top five priorities (Coulibaly, Silwé, & Logan, 2018). Not surprisingly, younger people placed substantially greater emphasis on education than their elders. At a global level, the United Nations (UN) has highlighted the importance of quality education by including it in its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). SDG 4 calls for governments to “ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all.” To this end, the UN outlines specific targets to be achieved by 2030, including ensuring that “all youth and a substantial proportion of adults, both men and women, achieve literacy and numeracy.” An important step toward this goal is that by 2030, all girls and boys should be able to “complete free, equitable and quality primary and secondary education” (United Nations, 2019). Many African governments have made important commitments to universal education. Of the 34 countries surveyed by Afrobarometer in 2016/2018, 33 have made school attendance compulsory (for periods ranging from five to 11 years), and 33 provide free primary education. (See Appendix Table A.2 for details.) Many governments also commit substantial portions of their yearly budgets to improving education. For example, in Côte d’Ivoire, eSwatini, Ghana, Malawi, Senegal, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe, more than 25% of total government expenditures go to education (World Bank, 2020). Afrobarometer surveys point to slow but steady progress as fewer Africans go without formal education and more attend school beyond the primary grades. But in some countries, two-thirds of adults still have no formal schooling, and significant gender gaps continue to disadvantage girls and women. Overall, just a slim majority of Africans think their government is doing a good job on meeting educational needs. Factors that contribute to these evaluations include whether citizens find it easy to obtain school services and whether they think schools are transparent about their budgets and responsive to reports of teacher misconduct. More fundamentally, our analysis finds that more democratic countries are seen as better able to provide public education. Citizens are more likely to be satisfied with government performance on education if immediate avenues of transparency and accountability at the school level are embedded in a broader political system that encourages these qualities.
Topic:
Education, Poverty, Democracy, and Inequality
Political Geography:
Africa

6. Is there an anti-politics of electricity? Access to the grid and reduced political participation in Africa

Author:
Jennifer N. Brass, Kirk Harris, and Lauren M. MacLean
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Almost all African states face pressure to deliver improved public services to their citizens. In both emerging democracies and persistent authoritarian regimes, politics profoundly shapes how states distribute public goods such as roads, schools, health clinics, and electricity access (Briggs, 2014; Dixit & Londregan, 1996; Harding & Stasavage, 2014; Kramon & Posner, 2013; Min, 2015; Weingast, Shepsle, & Johnsen, 1981). But in addition to questions of how politics shapes distributive outcomes, scholars have recently turned to a new question: How does variation in public service provision subsequently shape political participation (Bodea & LeBas, 2016; Harding, 2015)? Here, the findings are less clear. Where some authors find that the receipt of public service provision stimulates participation (Bleck, 2015; Wantchekon, Klašnja, & Novta, 2015), others caution that service provision may actually undermine engagement or have no effect (Croke, Grossman, Larreguy, & Marshall, 2015; Kam & Palmer, 2008; Mattes & Mughogho, 2009). Most of this literature has focused on the political effects of the delivery of social welfare services, especially education. Meanwhile, the political effects of electricity provision have been largely overlooked. Electricity provision is important for political outcomes for several reasons. Historically, in some African countries, electricity provision was tightly linked to the independence struggle and to rights of citizenship (MacLean, Gore, Brass, & Baldwin, 2016). Yet despite these expectations, African countries continue to have the lowest rates of electrification in the world. Only about one-third of Africans have access to electricity (International Energy Agency, 2014), and only two-thirds live in a community with any grid access (Oyuke, Penar, & Howard, 2016), and these rates are much lower in rural areas in most countries (Leo, Morello, & Ramachandran, 2015).
Topic:
Education, Democracy, Public Policy, Public Sector, Electricity, and Public Health
Political Geography:
Africa

7. Africans want Open Elections – Especially if they Bring Change

Author:
Michael Bratton and Sadhiska Bhoojedhur
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Observers now commonly assert that multiparty elections are institutionalized as a standard feature of African politics (Posner & Young, 2007; Bratton, 2013; Cheeseman, 2018; Bleck & van de Walle, 2019). By this they mean that competitive electoral contests are the most commonplace procedure for choosing and changing political leaders across the continent. As a result of a wave of regime transitions in the 1990s, the vast majority of African countries abandoned one-party systems and military rule in favour of democratic constitutions that guarantee – at least on paper – civil and political rights, civilian control of the military, and legislative and judicial oversight of the executive branch of government. Almost all countries have introduced a regular cycle of elections (usually every five years), and many have placed constitutional limits on the number of terms that African presidents can serve (usually two). Today, encouraged by the African Union’s African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, all political leaders feel compelled to pay at least token respect to a new set of continent-wide electoral standards. In short, elections are now embedded in the formal rules that govern politics on the continent. But the institutionalization of elections requires more than an international proclamation, an aspirational constitution, and a tightly drafted framework of statutes and regulations. It also requires political actors at all levels of the political system to grant value to open elections as the preferred method for selecting leaders and holding them accountable. In other words, politicians and citizens alike must make sincere commitments to hold elections dear and to offer vigorous protection if electoral procedures are ever threatened. Yet there is already evidence that some African presidents are all too ready to abandon presidential term limits (Dulani, 2011) – a reversal, for example, that Togo’s Parliament ratified in May 2019. And political leaders are too often tempted to manipulate election processes and outcomes in order to retain power (Cheeseman & Klaas, 2018) – as Joseph Kabila demonstrated in the December 2018 general election in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).1 Under these circumstances, much of the burden for protecting open and competitive elections falls to the ordinary citizens of Africa. The political commitments of the man and woman in the street represent the last line of defense should leaders take it upon themselves to violate widely accepted electoral norms. Accordingly, several key questions arise: Do Africans actually support elections? Do they regard African elections as free and fair? Do high-quality contests boost the value that citizens attach to elections? This Pan-Africa Profile offers affirmative answers to all these questions. Drawing from recent Afrobarometer survey data covering more than 30 countries across Africa’s main geographical regions, we find that Africans want open elections and, for the most part, think they are getting them. Importantly, popular support for elections is driven by the perceived freedom and fairness of the balloting process. Digging deeper, we find that the quality of elections – and thus popular support – is seen to hinge on whether elections bring about leadership alternation, which we define as a change not only of the top ruler but also of the ruling party. This “change effect” suggests that the political preferences of the general public are just as essential as formal political rules – if not more so – to the health of democracy in Africa.
Topic:
Elections, Democracy, Leadership, and Transparency
Political Geography:
Africa

8. Democracy in Africa: Demand, Supply, and the ‘Dissatisfied Democrat’

Author:
Robert Mattes
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
The increasing threat to democracy from populist movements and authoritarian leaders occupies a prominent place in current political debate. Yet political scientists who study this question reach contrasting conclusions, often because they use different measures and standards of democracy. Some say the world is in a democratic recession, with countries experiencing recent declines in the quality of democracy outnumbering those where it has improved (Diamond, 2015; Lührmann, Mechkova, & Wilson, 2017; Economist, 2018; Freedom House, 2018). Others see no such decline (Levitsky, 2015) or trendless variation (Jiménez, 2017; Skaaning & Jiménez, 2017). In Africa, Freedom House has tracked a significant retreat in political rights, civil liberties, and the overall quality of democracy. The biggest shifts have occurred among countries previously rated as “partly free,” many of which have retreated to “not free” status. Analysts have observed that this is often the result of hybrid regimes using counter-terrorism legislation to shrink democratic spaces (Temin, 2017) or of governments responding to increased electoral competition by restricting opposition parties and critical civil society organizations (Cheeseman, 2019). On the other hand, the V-Dem Institute finds more positive than negative change in Africa (Lührmann et al., 2018). African public opinion seems to embody this sense of divergence. While Yasha Mounk (2018) has claimed to find a systematic decline in citizens’ attachment to democracy across most of the established democracies in North America and Western Europe, Africans’ responses to questions posed by Afrobarometer over the past decade present a more varied and complex picture. At the most general level, the picture seems relatively clear and simple: The typical African is strongly committed to democracy and opposed to authoritarian rule, and has remained so for more than a decade. However, this image of solid democratic commitment changes radically if we narrow our focus to only those people who consistently express pro-democratic preferences across several different survey questions – those whom Afrobarometer describes as “demanding democracy” (Bratton, Mattes, & Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). Under these more demanding criteria, fewer than half of all Africans qualify as committed democrats. And levels of commitment vary sharply depending on a person’s demographic category and level of political engagement. The picture becomes even more complex when we look at specific countries or take a longer-term view. In some countries, publics are strongly committed to democracy, while in others people are largely indifferent. Similarly, some societies are developing more favourable views of democracy over time, while others are moving in the opposite direction. These trends in individual countries may matter even more than trends on the continent as a whole. The same kind of complexity emerges when we examine people’s evaluations of democracy. A slight majority of the Africans we interviewed say their country is a democracy, and somewhat fewer people are satisfied with the way democracy works – two indicators that Afrobarometer combines to measure the perceived “supply of democracy.” Overall, Africans say they get less democracy than they want. But in some countries, the perceived supply of democracy is greater than demand. And while this supply is increasing in some countries, it is declining in others. What does this mix of results mean for the survival of Africa’s multiparty regimes and the deepening of democracy? Of course, a great deal will depend on factors other than what citizens think, such as the degree to which democratic values are embraced by a country’s leaders and elites, as well as the extent to which countervailing institutions (legislature, courts) constrain the executive. But we argue that popular demands also have the power to drive countries toward democracy, and that this is most likely under certain conditions of high, but unmet, popular demand. In particular, this report concludes by highlighting the specific importance of citizens who are not only deeply committed to democracy but who also adopt a critical perspective toward their country’s current leaders and institutions – in other words, those citizens who demand democracy but do not think they are getting it. We describe these citizens as “dissatisfied democrats.” To the extent that citizens’ commitment to democracy matters for the survival and quality of democracy, evidence suggests that it is these dissatisfied democrats who matter most. While fewer than one in six Africans qualify as dissatisfied democrats in our most recent round of surveys, they make up much larger proportions in some countries in which electoral processes are deeply flawed and opposition forces are harassed, suggesting a continuing struggle between the forces of democracy and autocracy. However, dissatisfied democrats are in especially short supply in other places where the space for opposition has recently narrowed, offering little evidence that further restrictions will meet popular resistance.
Topic:
Governance, Public Opinion, Elections, Democracy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Africa

9. Do electoral systems affect how citizens hold their government accountable? Evidence from Africa

Author:
Sarah J. Lockwood and Matthias Krönke
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
This paper asks whether a country’s choice of electoral system affects the methods citizens use to try to hold their government accountable. A large body of literature suggests that electoral system type has an impact on voting behaviour, but little work has been done on its effects on other strategies for democratic accountability, such as contacting an elected representative and protesting. Using data from 36 African countries, we find that the type of electoral system has a significant relationship with these forms of participation. Citizens in proportional representation (PR) systems are significantly more likely to protest than those in majoritarian ones, while those in majoritarian systems are more likely to contact their elected representatives. We argue that this is because the connection between citizens and representatives in majoritarian systems is clearer, closer, and more responsive, making contact an effective strategy and providing an efficient "safety valve" when citizens want to hold their government to account. The lack of a similar connection in most PR systems, in contrast, leads citizens to turn to protest with greater regularity.
Topic:
Government, Elections, Democracy, and Accountability
Political Geography:
Africa

10. Bounded Autonomy: What Limits Zimbabweans’ Trust in their Courts and Electoral Commission?

Author:
Matthias Krönke
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
After the Constitutional Court upheld the election results of 30 July 2018, Zimbabwe’s leading opposition party ended its online public response with the following message to newly confirmed President Emmerson Mnangagwa: “You can rig the elections. You can capture ZEC [Zimbabwe Electoral Commission]. You can capture [the] judiciary. But you will never capture the people. Their will shall prevail. The people shall govern!” (Movement for Democratic Change, 2018). While some might dismiss it as partisan rhetoric, the MDC statement points to critical issues for Zimbabwe’s democracy – the autonomy, and perceived autonomy, of the country’s courts and electoral commission. This policy paper analyzes public trust in these two institutions. Though intended to act as independent custodians of the Constitution and the electoral process, both the judiciary and the electoral commission are frequently accused of being beholden to political leaders. This year’s election is not the first to be accompanied by allegations of vote rigging, intimidation, and politically tainted court decisions. Allegations of bias are frequently leveled against judges from the High Court and Supreme Court, even between election cycles. Yet previous analysis of Afrobarometer data has shown that Zimbabwe’s courts are among the most trusted on the continent (Logan, 2017). And trust in the ZEC has doubled since 2010. How do these seemingly contradictory views fit together? Our analysis of public opinion data suggests that citizens trust these two institutions within bounds. For court cases involving only ordinary citizens and technical electoral issues such as the rollout of the biometric voter registration (BVR), the judiciary and the ZEC enjoy substantial public confidence. But faced with politically sensitive issues, they no longer find broad popular support. Afrobarometer survey data show clear differences in trust levels among citizens over time and along party lines. Public confidence in the judiciary is heavily dependent on whether it is perceived to hold the president and the powerful elite that surrounds him to account. Similarly, trust in the electoral commission depends less on its ability to handle managerial tasks in preparation for Election Day and more on its ability to ensure an accurate count of ballots and the resolution of post-election conflicts.
Topic:
Corruption, Elections, Democracy, Courts, and Autonomy
Political Geography:
Africa and Zimbabwe

11. Slowly growing or stunted? How Delivery of Electoral, Political, and Economic Goods Impacts Support for Democracy in Uganda

Author:
Francis Kibirige
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
After nearly a decade of growth, popular demand for democracy in Africa has shown signs of weakening (Mattes & Bratton, 2016; Lührmann et al., 2017; Cheeseman, 2017)). In Uganda, recent Afrobarometer survey data show that although citizens’ preference for democracy consistently outstrips their perception of how much democracy they’re actually getting, satisfaction with the way their democracy works is on a decade-long slide. In survey responses, Ugandans’ preference for democracy fluctuates around election years, increasing before and decreasing after general elections. At the same time, the disparity between popular preference for and satisfaction with democracy, defined in this paper as the “democracy satisfaction gap,” is growing, from 5 percentage points in 2000 to 34 percentage points in 2017. These patterns pose a number of questions, including what causes popular preference for democracy to fluctuate around election years and whether indeed Ugandans understand and appreciate democracy. Survey data suggest that Ugandans have grown in their knowledge of democracy with the passage of time (Mattes, Kibirige, & Sentamu, 2010). Similarly, the proportion of Ugandans who are “committed democrats” – meaning they prefer democracy over any other form of government and consistently reject authoritarian rule – has increased sharply, although women, less educated citizens, and rural residents lag behind in this group. Our analysis suggests that a preference for democracy is stronger among citizens who perceive the quality of Uganda’s elections as poor, those who are dissatisfied with the government’s delivery of political or economic goods, those who believe strongly in democratic values, and those who are more cognitively engaged in civic and political life.
Topic:
Civil Society, Economics, Governance, Elections, and Democracy
Political Geography:
Uganda and Africa

12. The Autocratic Trust Bias: Politically Sensitive Survey Items and Self-censorship

Author:
Marcus Tannenberg
Publication Date:
11-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Because of a perceived risk of repressive action, some survey questions are likely sensitive in more autocratic countries while less so in more democratic countries. Yet survey data on potentially sensitive topics are frequently used in comparative research despite concerns about comparability. In a novel approach to examining the comparability of politically sensitive questions, I employ a multilevel analysis with more than 140,000 respondents in 36 African countries to test for systematic bias when survey respondents believe (fear) that the government, rather than an independent research institute, has commissioned the survey. The findings indicate that fear of the government induces a substantial and significant bias on questions regarding the citizen-state relationship in more autocratic countries, but not in more democratic countries. Moreover, respondents who think the government commissioned the survey do not answer differently on innocuous, apolitical questions than respondents who believe the survey to be independent, regardless of regime type. This has practical implications for the comparative use of survey data.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Democracy, Research, Domestic Politics, and Survey
Political Geography:
Africa

13. Public Trust in Elections: The Role of Media Freedom and Election Management Autonomy

Author:
Nicholas Kerr and Anna Lührmann
Publication Date:
03-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
As multiparty elections have become a global norm, scholars and policy experts regard public trust in elections as vital for regime legitimacy. However, very few cross-national studies have examined the consequences of electoral manipulation, including the manipulation of election administration and the media, on citizens’ trust in elections. This paper addresses this gap by exploring how autonomy of election management bodies (EMBs) and media freedom individually and conjointly shape citizens’ trust in elections. Citizens are more likely to express confidence in elections when EMBs display de facto autonomy and less likely to do so when mass media disseminate information independent of government control. Additionally, we suggest that EMB autonomy may not have a positive effect on public trust in elections if media freedom is low. Empirical findings based on recent survey data on public trust in elections in 47 countries and expert data on de facto EMB autonomy and media freedom support our hypotheses.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Elections, Democracy, and Media
Political Geography:
Africa

14. Still no Alternative? Popular Views of the Opposition in Southern Africa’s One-Party Dominant Regimes

Author:
Rorisang Lekalake
Publication Date:
02-2017
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Following decades of authoritarian rule, multiparty democracy re-emerged in a “wave” of democratization in sub-Saharan Africa during the early 1990s. Twenty-nine countries in the region held founding elections – first competitive elections after an authoritarian period – between 1989 and 1994, of which 16 led to full democratic transitions (Bratton, 1997). Notable successes include Namibia (1989), Cape Verde (1991), Ghana (1992), and South Africa (1994), which a generation later are ranked among Africa’s politically “free” countries (Freedom House, 2016). While this period was initially classified as part of Huntington’s (1991) “third wave” of democratization, some political scientists consider it part of a distinct “fourth wave” of general regime change because most of these political openings did not result in full democratic transitions (see McFaul, 2002). Today, African political regimes vary widely, from the liberal democracies cited above to repressive autocracies (Diamond, 2015). Given the importance of party competition to a healthy democracy, a major criticism of African political regimes concerns their relatively few electoral alternations. Although the number of political alternations in sub-Saharan Africa increased from three in 1961-1989 to 39 in 1990-2012, the latter number represents only 23% of election results during this period (Carbone, 2013). Even among multiparty democracies, many African countries have yet to experience a single peaceful alternation of power.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Democracy, Political Parties, Opposition, and Partisanship
Political Geography:
Africa

15. Do Africans Still Want Democracy?

Author:
Robert Mattes and Michael Bratton
Publication Date:
11-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Judging by media headlines, democracy appears to be under stress everywhere from leaders like Vladimir Putin in Russia, Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey, and Yoweri Museveni in Uganda. Yet social scientists know there is often a mismatch between what can be gleaned from news reports or social media and real, underlying trends. To take just one example, media attention to wars in Syria and Iraq suggests rising conflict around the world. Yet compared to previous centuries and especially since the end of the Cold War, both international and civil conflicts are at record lows (Human Security Report Project, 2014). A similar contrast exists between media-fueled perceptions and actual trends in global poverty. The common wisdom suggests worsening living conditions on an overpopulated planet, whereas evidence-based indicators demonstrate that, between 1990 and 2010, the global rate of extreme poverty was cut in half (Economist, 2013). Might the same type of discrepancies exist with regard to democracy? Especially in Africa, where many presidents cling to power (as in Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe), manipulate elections (as in Burundi, Gabon, and Zambia), or ignore institutions of public accountability (as in South Africa), one might reasonably conclude that democracy in Africa is only a façade erected to please a credulous audience in the rest of the world. Yet this viewpoint would miss the fact that more than half of all Africans today live in functioning multi-party electoral democracies that are demonstrably freer than the military or one-party regimes that previously dominated the continent. At the same time, the post-1990 gains that African countries registered in terms of civil liberties and political rights peaked in 2006, at least according to expert judgments offered by Freedom House.
Topic:
Governance, Public Opinion, Democracy, and Partisanship
Political Geography:
Africa

16. Evaluating Botswana’s Performance on National Vision 2016

Author:
Rorisang Lekalake
Publication Date:
06-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
On 30 September 2016, Botswana will mark its 50th year of independence from the United Kingdom, a significant occasion for both celebration and reflection. An important part of this reflection has focused on Botswana’s transition from National Vision 2016, the blueprint that has guided the country’s development for the past two decades, to National Vision 2036, in tandem with the global move from the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals to Sustainable Development Goals (Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, 2016a). A presidential task force is leading national consultations on National Vision 2036, a first draft of which is due for presentation, debate, and approval during the 2016 parliamentary winter session (Botswana Press Agency, 2016)). A final document is expected to replace Vision 2016 in September. In monitoring progress toward Vision 2016’s four long-term goals (sustained development, rapid economic growth, economic independence, and social justice) and seven development “pillars,” the Vision 2016 Council has generally relied on a variety of regional and international indicators of objective data, such as per capita gross national income (GNI) or the Human Development Index (HDI) on the economic front and indicators of governance and democracy from the Mo Ibrahim Foundation and Freedom House on the political front (Vision 2016 Council, 2016). In addition, the council conducted a public opinion survey in 2010 to gain an understanding of ordinary citizens’ evaluations of the document itself and of the country’s progress on its development indicators. This paper aims to complement that study by providing updated analysis from the latest Afrobarometer survey (2014) in Botswana, in addition to longitudinal data and supplementary insights from the Afrobarometer questionnaire’s broader focus. What are Batswana’s evaluations of the progress made toward each of the National Vision 2016 development pillars? Which areas should the government prioritize moving forward into a post-2016 development agenda? The analysis applies the Vision 2016 Council survey’s benchmarks to Afrobarometer findings to evaluate success or failure on all seven pillars: an educated, informed nation; a prosperous, productive, and innovative nation; a compassionate and caring nation; a safe and secure nation; an open, democratic, and accountable nation; a moral and tolerant nation; and a united and proud nation. Positive evaluations by 67% or more of citizens constitute “good” performance, 50%-66% is “average,” 34%-49% is “poor,” and less than 33% is “critical” (Vision 2016 Council, 2010, p. 6.). Overall, the results show that the country has done fairly well in a number of areas, particularly in improving access to education and maintaining social cohesion, but continues to struggle to distribute national wealth among all of its citizens. Consequently, political leaders and ordinary Batswana will continue to face many of the same economic challenges identified in 1997 as the country moves into the next phase of national development.
Topic:
Development, Education, Governance, Public Opinion, Democracy, and Social Justice
Political Geography:
Africa and Botswana

17. Botswana's Democratic Consolidation: What Will it Take?

Author:
Rorisang Lekalake
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Botswana is Africa’s oldest continuous democracy, having enjoyed decades of peaceful multipartyism since independence in 1966. However, this success is tempered by growing concerns that the country’s remarkable stability has come at the cost of further political development. Significant weaknesses in Botswana’s democracy include low civic participation, relatively weak opposition and civil society sectors, and a lack of incumbent turnover in 11 consecutive free and fair elections. Despite these challenges, Botswana has maintained its reputation as an African success story due to the scale, pace, and endurance of its socioeconomic and political development, particularly given setbacks elsewhere in the region. Democracy is one of Botswana’s four founding principles and is a pillar of its National Vision 2016, which has driven development plans since 1997 (Presidential Task Group, 1997).1 The Vision 2016 Council’s evaluation of the country’s progress on this front is largely positive, citing high rankings on international benchmarks relative to other African countries (Botswana Vision 2016 Council, 2015). Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), for example, ranks Botswana as the least corrupt country in sub-Saharan Africa, while Freedom House has classified the country as “free” since 1973. In recent years, however, the country’s CPI score has declined (Transparency International, 2015), and in 2009, Freedom House downgraded Botswana’s political rights rating as a result of “decreased transparency and accountability in the executive branch under President Seretse Khama Ian Khama’s administration” (Freedom House, 2015a).
Topic:
Corruption, Development, Governance, Democracy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Africa and Botswana

18. Ethiopians’ Views of Democratic Government: Fear, Ignorance, or Unique Understanding of Democracy?

Author:
Robert Mattes and Mulu Teka
Publication Date:
05-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
As part of Afrobarometer's Round 5 surveys in 35 African countries, its partner ABCON PLC Consulting House interviewed 2,400 adult Ethiopians in August 2013. Analysis of the collected data raised significant questions about the comparability of Ethiopia results with those from other surveyed countries, particularly with regard to attitudes toward democracy. These questions are laid out and explored in this working paper. In light of these questions, Afrobarometer has not included Ethiopia results in multi-country analyses. We advise caution in any attempt to compare responses to democracy-related questions from Ethiopia with those from other African countries. Analysts are advised to use the Ethiopia data set only in a stand-alone setting or to limit their comparative analysis to items that are not focused on democracy.
Topic:
Development, Government, Public Opinion, and Democracy
Political Geography:
Africa and Ethiopia

19. The Viability of Political Opposition in Africa: Popular Views

Author:
Michael Bratton and Carolyn Logan
Publication Date:
08-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
How competitive are African political regimes? Why do opposition parties often struggle to gain a foothold? In many countries, an incumbent ruling party dominates the political arena, essentially reducing elections to a one-horse race and limiting day-to-day governance to a closed shop. In these countries it is unclear whether opposition political parties are sufficiently viable – either alone or in electoral alliance – to amass enough votes to win and exercise political office. This paper addresses the question of opposition viability from the perspective of ordinary African citizens. Do citizens desire real choices at the ballot box? Do they differentiate ruling and opposition parties, and if so, how? And how do they perceive the role of the political opposition in the long periods between elections? Do they wish opposition parties to play the classic democratic role of holding rulers accountable? And what explains the perceived viability of political opposition?
Topic:
Corruption, Democracy, Opposition, and Partisanship
Political Geography:
Africa

20. MDC-T defeat in Zimbabwe: Was it only due to Intimidation?

Author:
Stephen Ndoma
Publication Date:
08-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
In the relatively peaceful harmonized elections of July 2013, Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe overwhelmingly defeated challenger Morgan Tsvangirai, 61% to 34%. Mugabe’s party, the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), also won 158 of the country’s 210 parliamentary seats, giving it more than a two-thirds majority in the lower House of Assembly, as well as a large majority of local council seats. Some parts of Zimbabwean society and the international community were shocked by the outcome, given the strong performance of Tsvangirai and his Movement for Democratic Change–Tsvangirai (MDC-T) in previous elections. In fact, Tsvangirai had outpolled Mugabe in the first round of the March 2008 presidential elections before withdrawing from a runoff that he described as a “violent sham” that endangered his supporters. The inconclusive 2008 elections led to the power-sharing Government of National Unity (GNU), established in February 2009, under which Mugabe retained the presidency while Tsvangirai became prime minister. The GNU was expected to steer Zimbabwe through its transition and eventually be terminated after the holding of free, fair, and credible elections. Following voters’ overwhelming endorsement of a new Constitution in March 2013, the results of the July 2013 elections left many observers shaking their heads in disbelief. The MDC-T charged electoral chicanery and described the outcome as “heavily manipulated” and “illegitimate.” One of the reasons for the ZANU-PF victory most frequently cited by the MDC-T and some civil society organisations is that the use of political intimidation and violence in election campaigns has worked against the MDC-T’s march toward State House. What accounts for the resurgence of the ZANU-PF and the dismal performance of the MDC-T? Is fear of political violence the only salient factor in the MDC-T’s loss in the watershed elections? Using data from Afrobarometer surveys in Zimbabwe, this paper argues that fear of political violence, though real, is not the most important explanatory variable accounting for the opposition’s defeat. Instead, most voters were casting their ballots on the basis of their changing evaluations of the principals, Tsvangirai and Mugabe.
Topic:
Elections, Democracy, Transition, Rigged Elections, and Partisanship
Political Geography:
Africa and Zimbabwe