301. Improving Resolution Options for Systemically Relevant Financial Institutions
- Publication Date:
- 10-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Abstract:
- There are critical holes in the existing regulatory framework for handling large complex financial institutions that become impaired. First, regulators may not have the legal authority to do what is necessary to resolve a distressed institution's problems, including selling some divisions, closing or liquidating others, renegotiating or abrogating some contracts, and finding parties to manage what is left. Second, even if regulators have the necessary authority over part of the institution, they may not have authority over the whole firm. Holding companies, for example, often have subsidiaries that are incorporated in multiple countries and therefore governed by different legal codes. Third, regulators are unlikely to be aware of all the interconnections within the institution, and between the institution's various subsidiaries and other firms. This uncertainty makes it difficult for regulators to know the best way to restructure a financial institution or, indeed, whether restructuring is even feasible without enormous disruption.
- Topic:
- Economics, Markets, and Financial Crisis