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1. Sino-Russian relations in a geopolitical Europe

Author:
Pierre Andrieu
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The close relationship between Russia and China is by no means a solid, long-term alliance, but rather a temporary rapprochement, that has been strengthened by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The fragility of this relationship, based on history and structural imbalances, persists and reinforces mutual mistrust. For the European Union, while all discussions with an aggressive and threatening Russia have disappeared, China remains both “a cooperation and negotiation partner, an economic partner and a systemic rival” with whom we need to maintain a sustained dialogue, commensurate with a Europe that has begun to assert its geopolitical dimension in the last two years.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Rapprochement, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Europe

2. The Future of Nuclear Proliferation after the War in Ukraine

Author:
Nicholas L. Miller
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
In the context of deep changes to the international security environment, especially the war in Ukraine, the risks of nuclear proliferation seem quite high, especially in the Middle East and East Asia. Four categories of factors have been identified that might trigger an escalation. Firstly, changes in the international security environment, including heightened competition among major powers, could increase pressure for proliferation in regions like Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Secondly, the declining ability of the United States to enforce non-proliferation regimes may lead allies to seek nuclear capabilities due to concerns over U.S. reliability. Thirdly, failures by nuclear powers to uphold disarmament commitments and the emergence of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons could undermine non-proliferation norms. Lastly, the war in Ukraine highlights the potential use of nuclear threats in conflicts, reinforcing the perception of nuclear weapons as crucial for national security. While there are reasons to anticipate growing proliferation risks, historical precedent suggests that these risks can be managed. Concerns over U.S. reliability and disarmament failures have been addressed through coercion and reassurance in the past. Additionally, the impact of conventional wars supported by nuclear deterrence has been contained. While some risk factors are novel, such as the decline of the U.S. nuclear industry and the emergence of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, their decisive impact remains uncertain. The implications for the Middle East and East Asia vary. Allies like Japan and South Korea may be convinced to remain non-nuclear due to U.S. security assurances, while adversaries like Iran could be incentivized to pursue nuclear capabilities amid declining effectiveness of U.S. sanctions. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it may pressure Saudi Arabia to follow suit, potentially leading to regional proliferation dynamics. Thus, great powers and the international community need to step in to manage proliferation triggers by maintaining a focus on nonproliferation in their statecraft.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, International Security, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

3. India-Russia Relations in Troubled Times: Steady but Stagnating

Author:
Aleksei Zakharov
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
This paper examines the trajectory of India-Russia relations post-February 2022. The war in Ukraine emerged as a significant challenge for bilateral ties, presenting new obstacles to political and diplomatic relations and intensifying the previous difficulties in developing economic cooperation. Moscow and New Delhi have demonstrated divergent approaches to the advancement of their strategic partnership. While Russia has rushed into reinventing the old friendship with India, the latter has acted with greater discretion. New Delhi has demonstrated a nuanced approach to navigating the Russia-Ukraine conflict, staying on good terms with Moscow and the West. India’s record imports of Russian crude and other commodities, at times in defiance of Western sanctions, have allowed for a considerable boost in bilateral trade. While this “oil connection” may benefit both the Indian and Russian economies, it should not be misperceived as a leap forward in partnership. The structural challenges appear to still prevent the two sides from reinvigorating the economic ties. Furthermore, their geopolitical understanding is waning, and their defense cooperation is currently in a state of limbo. As long as the war in Ukraine persists, India seems to be prioritizing maintaining the status quo in its relationship with Russia over pursuing new initiatives. This may help to prevent the two sides from drifting apart too far in the near term but is unlikely to lead to any substantive progress in their relationship.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Vladimir Putin, and Narendra Modi
Political Geography:
Russia, South Asia, and India

4. Understanding the Energy Drivers of Turkey’s Foreign Policy

Author:
Francesco Siccardi
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Turkey has an energy dependence problem. For the past two decades, Ankara’s energy needs have been on the rise, and they are projected to continue on an upward trajectory until at least 2035. Yet, the country is not endowed with the proven natural resources to support its energy needs, and so it imports almost all of the energy it consumes. This reliance on energy imports creates economic and security constraints for Ankara. On the economic front, strategic decisions to diversify Turkey’s energy market impact the direction and pace of the country’s economic development. On the security front, dependence on foreign energy exposes Turkey to external shocks and creates vulnerabilities that affect the country’s international posture. To Turkish policymakers, this is hardly breaking news. For many decades, successive governments have been considering ways to diversify the country’s energy portfolio with the objective of ensuring access to affordable, reliable energy supplies. Domestically, this goal has translated into continued investments in locally produced power, such as the development of natural gas fields under the Black Sea and the opening of nuclear and coal-fired power plants across the country. Externally, the aim of diversification has led Ankara to forge a wide range of international partnerships and preserve relations with both Western purchasers of Turkish exports and key energy providers, including Russia and countries in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood. What is more, Ankara pursues its energy diplomacy against the backdrop of a broader geopolitical strategy of bolstering Turkey’s status as a regional power based on its geographic position and connections. At the heart of this strategy is a grand plan to establish Turkey as a major natural gas hub that will put the country at the center of regional energy trade. This policy has ramifications for Ankara’s relations with its close and more distant neighbors. Turkey is surrounded by energy-rich countries, and one of its primary objectives when reaching out to them is to secure the conditions for a steady inflow of energy resources—typically, natural gas and oil. This objective can lead to the development of durable economic partnerships, such as with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Iran; but it can also spark conflicts of different degrees of intensity, such as with Turkey’s Eastern Mediterranean neighbors and Iraq. Beyond its immediate neighborhood, Ankara’s gas diplomacy is consequential for relations with Russia—with which Turkey has been strengthening its energy relations beyond hydrocarbons—and with Europe. On the demand side of Ankara’s natural gas market equation, European countries are thirsty for non-Russian hydrocarbons in the short and medium term and for green energy in the longer term. Turkey has the potential to provide both, as long as it comes up with strong policies that support these energy transitions. To do so, the Turkish government will need to shift its approaches not only to energy but also to geopolitics. Ankara will have to present itself as a reliable energy partner for Europe and ramp up its investment in clean energy technologies. Delinking Turkey’s economic development from its dependence on hydrocarbons will benefit Ankara financially while bringing it closer to its European allies. Building a long-lasting energy partnership with Europe remains one of Turkey’s greatest challenges.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, and Economy
Political Geography:
Russia, Iraq, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Caucasus, Middle East, Libya, North Africa, and Egypt

5. Getting Off the Back Foot: Guiding Principles for a Proactive Western Strategy on Belarus

Author:
Artyom Shraibman
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
For decades, the West has been unable to build an effective strategy on Belarus due to the country’s limited geopolitical importance, an inexorably deeper dependence on Moscow, and the glaring absence of leverage over Minsk’s strategic decisionmaking. This paper proposes a different paradigm for approaching the issue. Instead of passively reacting to Minsk’s actions, the West should broaden its planning horizon and create more specific incentives for Belarus to follow a different trajectory in the future. The overriding goal of a more proactive Western strategy should be the eventual emergence of a democratic Belarus that is no longer fully dominated by Moscow in the military and political realms. Such an ambitious goal would have tangible and lasting benefits for the new European security landscape amid the prospect of a long war in Ukraine. Skepticism in Western policy circles about the viability of such a scenario is entirely understandable. Yet it is not entirely clear whether Western policymakers have registered the significant differences between Russia and Belarus at the societal level and divergent strategic interests of the Russian and Belarusian regimes. At the same time, it is essential for Western policymakers to keep their expectations in check and to avoid an overestimation of their capabilities. The Belarusian crisis cannot be resolved in the foreseeable future by Western efforts alone. Moreover, there should be no illusions about the fact that Belarus, much like Ukraine, holds a special place in the worldview of the Russian ruling elite and President Vladimir Putin personally. The Kremlin’s long-standing obsession with keeping the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) away from Russia’s borders plays into the same attachment to keeping the Belarusian regime in as tight an embrace as possible. Therefore, until Moscow either changes its foreign policy priorities under a new leadership or simply becomes unable to keep Minsk under its control, it would be naïve to expect that the Russian leadership will simply offer any Belarusian government greater leeway to shift its geopolitical orientation. At the same time, it is conceivable that a qualitative increase in military assistance to Ukraine and a more effective economic pressure campaign against Russia could disrupt Belarus’s trajectory and make Minsk more amenable to the incentives that the West can already offer. But an overnight breakthrough seems highly unlikely. This paper, therefore, focuses on more realistic recommendations with longer-term effects.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eastern Europe, and Belarus

6. Using the financial system to enforce export controls

Author:
Benjamin Hilgenstock, Elina Ribakova, Guntram Wolff, and Anna Vlasyuk
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Russian imports of battlefield goods that are subject to export controls, including from Western producers, have surged since mid-2022 and reached levels close to those prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russia thus continues to be able to acquire critical foreign components that it needs for its military industry. These imports occur via mainland China, Hong Kong, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, while other countries including Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic have also seen massive increases in imports from the EU and other coalition countries that likely end up in Russia. The implementation and enforcement of export controls faces major challenges, which are multifaceted and centre around complex supply chains, lack of transparency in documentation and opaque financial structures. The issues are familiar from anti money laundering (AML) and countering financing of terrorism (CFT) frameworks, where much progress has been made in the last two decades. A similar approach could help in rendering export controls effective. We propose: First, financial institutions could be tasked to play a role in the monitoring of the trade in export-controlled goods and the blocking of illicit transactions, building on their experience with due diligence in financial transactions. Second, non-financial companies could learn from banks’ efforts in the AML/CFT sphere to implement proper due-diligence procedures and to ensure export controls compliance. Public-sector investigations and appropriate fines are critical to increase the incentives for firms to act. Technology sanctions are going to be part of the economic statecraft toolbox for the foreseeable future. The Russia case will test their effectiveness and credibility, or lack thereof.
Topic:
Sanctions, European Union, Exports, Trade, Imports, Financial Systems, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

7. The Price of War

Author:
Jonathan Federle, André Meier, Steffen Müller, Willi Mutschler, and Moritz Schularick
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
In an integrated global economy, the economic fallout of war is not confined to the country where the conflict is fought but spills over to other countries. We study the economic effects of large interstate wars using a new data set spanning 150 years of data for more than 60 countries. War on a country’s territory typically leads to an output decline of 30 percent and a 15 percentage point increase in inflation. We find large negative effects also for countries that are geographically close to the war site, irrespective of their participation in the war. Output in neighboring countries falls by more than 10 percent over 5 years, and inflation rises by 5 percentage points on average. Negative spillovers decline with geographic distance and increase in the degree of trade integration with the war site. For very distant countries, output spillovers can turn positive so that wars create winners and losers in the international economy. We rationalize these findings in an international business cycle model, calibrated to capture key features of the data. As the war destroys capital in the war site and productivity falls, trade with nearby economies decreases, generating an endogenous supply-side contraction abroad.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, War, Business, Geoeconomics, Russia-Ukraine War, Spillovers, and Supply Shocks
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Global Focus

8. Nuclear Verification’s Holy Grail: Verifying Nuclear Warheads — a new approach

Author:
Miles Pomper, William Moon, Marshall Brown, Ferenc Dalnkoki-Veress, Dan Zhukov, Dick Gullickson, and Yanliang Pan
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
This study is the culmination of four years of work to think through what would be required to track and monitor nuclear warheads in a verification process. It first began in 2021, shortly after President Joe Biden of the United States and President Vladimir Putin of Russia extended the New START Treaty until February 2026; the two presidents also announced the launch of bilateral strategic stability talks. This positive moment in the U.S.-Russian relationship, which became almost unimaginable after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, was the original impetus for the project. It also launched in the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, commonly known as the INF Treaty. The Russians had been violating the Treaty with the production and deployment of the 9M729 missile, also known in NATO parlance as the SSC-8. All NATO allies concurred with the withdrawal, which the United States completed in August 2019. The effort began with two strands of activity. The study team knew that when the United States and Russia decided to return to the negotiating table, the United States would place a high priority on seeking direct limits on warheads. Prior treaties had focused on controlling and eliminating missiles but had not focused directly on the warheads that armed them. It had long been a goal of the United States to seek direct limits on warheads, in order to more accurately constrain a Russian preponderance in warheads designated for theaterand shorter-range systems.1 However, if such an agreement were negotiated, the European allies would be ill-equipped to participate. On-site inspections under the INF Treaty had ended on May 31, 2001, so it had been twenty years since the allies had had to participate in verification activities. Most had lost expertise and institutional memory; some had never participated at all. “Raising the IQ” of the NATO allies about participating in arms control implementation was thus the first strand of activity. The second strand grew up around a conviction in the study team that the well-practiced verification techniques that had been exercised in INF and strategic arms control treaties since the 1980s could be augmented with new technology and innovative techniques. Thus emerged the emphasis on using cryptography to underpin a unique warhead tracking system. This work took advantage of some of the finest experts in the field of cryptography at Stanford University, and also the extensive experience gained during the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s many years of work to strengthen warhead protection, control and accounting in Russian Ministry of Defense nuclear warhead storage facilities. This work, which spanned a period of over fifteen years from 1995- 2013, provided the study team with a great depth of knowledge about the normal operating procedures in Russian military warhead facilities. This deep knowledge was vital to developing a concept for the tracking system, providing it with a realism and accuracy that otherwise would not have been possible. These two strands of work culminated in 2022 in a significant study, “Everything Counts: Building a Control Regime for Non-Strategic Nuclear Warheads in Europe.”2 However, the team realized that only one element of warhead verification had been touched—the broad outlines of a system for maintaining and exchanging information over the life of an agreement. Other verification elements such as on-site inspections and particular verification technologies had not been considered. They therefore resolved to expand the scope of work to imagine an entire closed system for nuclear warhead verification. With the cryptographic element as its foundation, the team reviewed the extensive experience of treaties, agreements and other activities such as exhibitions and joint experiments that had been built up over the many years of U.S.-Soviet and Russian cooperation on nuclear weapons control. From this, they created a comprehensive menu of measures that could be considered for a future warhead control regime, calibrating the measures according to the level of their intrusiveness.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Russia and United States of America

9. The Future of NATO’s Nuclear Posture and Arms Control in Today’s More Dangerous World

Author:
Miles Pomper, David Santoro, and Nikolai Sokov
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Since the late 1960s, NATO has sought to balance two objectives—maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent while supporting efforts to buttress strategic stability through arms control and advance nonproliferation and disarmament through the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty process. The success of this strategy was most evident in the dual-track strategy of deployments and negotiations that led to the signing and implementation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987. The end of the Cold War also led to substantial cuts in U.S. and Russian strategic systems. Since then, NATO Allies have regularly voiced their support for continuing to pursue these two objectives, including supporting the goal enunciated by U.S. President Barack Obama in 2009 “to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”1 In the last decade, however, Russia’s malign behavior has undermined NATO arms control efforts to the point that it appears traditional arms control will be effectively dead when the New START agreement—already suspended by Russia—expires in 2026. Russian’s invasion of Ukraine, its repeated nuclear saber-rattling in that conflict, and the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons to Belarus has also forced the alliance to look to ways to enhance its deterrence, including its nuclear deterrence. Meanwhile, the massive increase in China’s nuclear arsenal and its growing partnership with Russia, is generating additional pressure to increase U.S. nuclear forces as well as questions about the ability of the U.S. to provide extended deterrence simultaneously to Allies in Europe and Asia. Those doubts have been reinforced by political developments in the United States—and in the war in Ukraine—that have raised anxieties about a decoupling of European and U.S. deterrence and defense and led to fresh discussion of a potential “Eurodeterrent.” Meanwhile, developments in North Korea and Iran—and their increasingly close ties with Moscow—further threaten the viability of the already shaky nuclear and missile nonproliferation regimes and have eroded longstanding cooperation between Washington and Moscow to manage nuclear nonproliferation risks in third countries. In response to these developments, Allies and experts, such as the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, have proposed various adaptations to the alliance’s nuclear posture, including to its nuclear sharing arrangements. This report examines these deterrence proposals, particularly considering how they support the alliance’s other longstanding objectives of arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. The paper begins with some background on US/NATO nuclear policy from the end of the Cold War to the further invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. It then delves into changes in Russian nuclear doctrine, Moscow’s nuclear behavior during the Ukraine War, and the Kremlin’s views on future arms control. The report next discusses China’s nuclear modernization and views on arms control and the reaction among NATO and Asian Allies and the international community to these changes. It then discusses potential future U.S. and NATO posture options, including those already being undertaken by NATO or proposed by the US. Congressional Strategic Posture Commission and the State Department’s International Security Advisory Board. It concludes with an analysis of the potential impact of various options on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation and offers some policy recommendations.
Topic:
NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

10. Iran-Russia Defense Cooperation: Current Realities and Future Horizons

Author:
Hanna Notte and Jim Lamson
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Key Takeaways: (1) Big leap forward. Against the backdrop of Russia’s war against Ukraine, the Iran-Russia defense relationship has moved past the previous client-patron dynamic, with Iran emerging as an important provider of defense technology to Russia. Bilateral cooperation has expanded both in degree and in kind. In pre-existing areas of cooperation—such as electronic warfare, space, cyberspace, and military-to-military contacts—engagement has accelerated or deepened. Since 2022, Iran and Russia have also cooperated in entirely new areas. Those have included Iran’s provision of uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), UAV production technology, and UAV training to Russia, alongside Iran’s multifaceted support for Russia’s ground war and assistance with expertise on evading sanctions. (2) The gloves are off. Since February 2022, what were historically key drivers of defense cooperation—a shared animosity toward the United States and the international order it promotes (including in the Middle East), and each side’s interest in military technology that the other side can offer—have increased in importance. Key constraints—Russia’s susceptibility to U.S. or Western pressure, causing it to limit cooperation with Iran; Russian concerns with adhering to nonproliferation norms and export control regimes; Russian reputational concerns over collaborating with Iran; Iran’s inability to pay for Russian technology; or historical mistrust—have become less relevant with Moscow’s growing dependence on Iran and its increased enmity toward the United States and Europe. (3) Growing institutionalization. Amid a general increase in numbers of mutual visits and high-level engagements among military and defense officials, Iran and Russia have taken steps to further institutionalize their defense relationship. Those have included work on a new strategic cooperation agreement to replace the one from 2001, forays into joint production of some weapon systems, and joint efforts to develop the International North-South Transport Corridor and other infrastructure that should provide a further boost to defense cooperation. (4) Thinking about the future in three steps. We propose a three-step methodology to think through the contours of bilateral defense cooperation over the next three to five years. It involves a) extrapolating from current trend lines, drivers, and constraints; b) drawing up inventories of future military needs for each country and identifying the areas in which the other country could help meet those needs; and c) accounting for potential high-impact scenarios and developments that may trigger dramatic shifts in cooperation. The latter include various scenarios of war in the Middle East, the end of Russia’s military campaign against Ukraine, and regime change in either Russia or Iran. (5) Neither a transactional relationship nor a military alliance. Present trend lines and drivers suggest that the relationship is no longer purely transactional and will probably not lapse back into the patron-client dynamic that characterized it prior to 2022, even once the war in Ukraine ends. Iran and Russia each have specific military-technical needs that the other might help meet. That said, beyond Russia’s campaign against Ukraine, Iranian needs from Russia will be greater than Russian needs for advanced technology from Iran. Other constraints—chiefly both countries’ challenges in procuring advanced components because of sanctions, Russia’s aversion to antagonizing the Gulf Arab states, and Russia’s enduring technological superiority in key areas—will also likely continue to act as brakes on the defense relationship, precluding it from developing into a full-fledged military alliance.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Nonproliferation, Russia-Ukraine War, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Eurasia, and Middle East

11. Russia, The Global South and Multilateral Nuclear Diplomacy after the Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Hanna Notte
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 had a detrimental impact on multilateral nuclear diplomacy. The war caused an earthquake in procedure, paralyzing processes at the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations First Committee, and meetings dealing with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This was the case even as Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling and occupation of Ukrainian nuclear power plants, and Europe’s recommitment to nuclear weapons, demonstrated the ongoing need for nuclear dialogue. States from the Global South tended to navigate cautiously vis-à-vis Russia across the multilateral nuclear negotiating forums. Amid greater difficulties in forging common positions on nuclear issues related to the Ukraine war, these states were also frustrated with what they perceived as a deprioritization of their interests in multilateral nuclear diplomacy. Western states, especially during the first year of the war, were seen as exercising unwelcome pressure on the Global South to take sides against Russia. Russia, meanwhile, pursued a dual strategy, undermining nonproliferation efforts and chipping away at trust in legacy institutions, while also leveraging these forums in pursuit of greater alignment with states in the Global South. The implications of these different dynamics for the health of the nuclear order may take some time to fully play out, but will likely be profound.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, Multilateralism, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Global Focus, and Global South

12. Democratic Russian Civil Society Outside Russia? A Window of Opportunity for Support

Author:
Nicolas Bouchet
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Russia has large sources of wealth and military power and is controlled by an autocratic, kleptocratic regime willing to devote these to aggression toward its neighbors, most violently in Ukraine. It is in the interest of Europe and the United States to support Russians who can help the country become more peaceful and democratic, alongside anti-regime measures. Repression has made supporting democratic actors in Russia extremely difficult but not impossible. That goal must now be complemented. Around 1 million people have left Russia since it invaded Ukraine in 2022. This opens a window of opportunity for unimpeded access to a large number of Russians to aid the spread of democratic ideas; raising the prospect of a democratic civil society developing outside the country. Europe and the United States need a strategy to support the democratic potential of the recent emigrants. Their largest concentrations are in the South Caucasus, Central Asia, the Western Balkans as well as Israel, Türkiye, the EU and the United States. The bulk of the emigrants are young adults who are richer, more educated, and more politically interested or active than the average citizen in Russia. For most, the motivations for leaving mixed political, economic, and lifestyle factors, and for many also unwillingness to be drafted into the military. The majority have democratic, anti-regime, and antiwar views. The emigrants include long-standing and newly civically and politically active individuals. A large share continue engagement abroad in diverse organizations and initiatives. Their activities focus on rebuilding civil society organizations (CSOs) and media abroad, supporting democratic actors and spreading independent information in Russia, and antiwar initiatives. They provide help to new emigrants and aim to build up their communities. These activities are carried out from one or more host countries, building transnational networks. There are new grassroots actions and initiatives by emigrants who had less or no direct experience of activism in Russia. Emigrant groups mostly operate through horizontal, fluid networks. Many of these are small and informal, but there are larger, more structured ones. Emigrant communities also offer a space for critical debate about the need for democratic change and the link between this and Russia’s colonial/imperial heritage and aggression. The recent emigrants’ activities face many challenges, including those in operating networks reliant on online resources; in connecting digital and non-digital activism; and in planning beyond the short term without sufficient resources. They are hampered by reliance on small (often part-time) core teams and volunteers. Many activists experience financial precarity, employment insecurity, and burnout. Security is a major concern due to the risk of infiltration, destabilization, and cyber and physical attacks by Russia’s security apparatus. The situation for emigrants has become more restrictive or less safe in some host countries. Individuals and organizations that oppose the Russian regime are also affected by restrictive international measures against it, such as ones against money laundering and the monetization of online content, or the denial of access to financial, professional, and commercial services. As Russians have realized that emigration will be for a longer term, the phase of settling in a host country became more prominent than the earlier exit phase. For many, this includes the need to move from the first host country, with those more politically active more likely to look for one with a safer, more enabling environment. This will largely mean seeking to move to an EU or other Western country. The non-EU countries easiest for Russians to access are also the ones where their prospects are more uncertain, whereas the EU countries are harder to access but offer more certain prospects. Russia in the 1990s showed how an unpredicted democratic opening can fail to lead to lasting or deep change. Today, alongside aiding political and nongovernmental actors, democracy-support providers should also try to help Russian society evolve in a democratic direction. The new emigrant activities are seeds for a democratic civil society abroad that is closely connected to, and supportive of, the one in Russia. Three principles should underpin a strategy to support the democratic potential of the recent Russian emigration: shifting emphasis to the settling phase of emigration, prioritizing connectivity within the emigration, and helping weave a civil society abroad. To foster the development of a democratic civil society among Russian emigrants, assistance musttarget the building of a wider community that can be more effective and serve as a model in Russia. For this, the landscape of Russians outside Russia can be seen as four concentric circles, based on their degree of direct political activity: the political opposition in exile; the civil society sector of democracy, human rights, and media organizations; the community of emigrants since 2022, and in particular the new grassroots actors and initiatives emerging within it; and the older, multigeneration Russian diaspora. A democracy support strategy for Russian emigrants should not be open-ended but time-bound, with a pragmatic approach in an uncertain environment. It can be assessed in 2030, when President Vladimir Putin’s current term as president is due to end, which could be a time of political turbulence. The strategy can be initially implemented within the next 12–24 months, with annual review of support offered to civil society, especially at the grassroots, with the potential to grow and to reach out to the apolitical emigrants. Support should consist of mostly small, short-term assistance to actors and initiatives that would have until 2030 to show that they have impact and longer-term potential. It is crucial to support the widest range of diverse, dispersed actors of different sizes so that they can keep operating. The focus should not be only on formal organizations but also on more bounded initiatives and projects. Part of the assistance should focus on enabling politically and civically active emigrants to connect physically and virtually across locations, and to focus on flexible networking suited to their mobility challenges. Funders need to think widely in terms of locations and formats for delivering support. Using different, sometimes unconventional, ways of engaging emigrant actors is a necessity. Support should not rely only on usual formats, not least since new ones for activities are emerging from within the emigrant landscape. Such support is also key for encouraging and amplifying the critical thinking in the emigrant landscape as well as connections to new antiwar and anti-imperialist initiatives—a prerequisite for any democratic progress in Russia. Connections are what make a society more than a collection of groups. For the development of a democratic civil society outside Russia, support should be directed not only within the individual circles of the emigration but also at connections between them. The primary focus should be on relations between the second (established CSOs) and third (new grassroots actors) circles to prevent the diverse civically and politically active emigrants and groups being in silos. Contacts with recent emigrants could also eventually encourage changes in attitudes within the older diaspora toward the Russian regime or democratic civic engagement in general.
Topic:
Civil Society, Democracy, Refugees, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

13. The End of Russia’s “Unipolar Moment” in the South Caucasus

Author:
Irakli Sirbiladze
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine has exposed Russia’s weaknesses and ended its “unipolar moment” in the South Caucasus. This has affected the calculations of the three states in a region where Moscow traditionally had the upper hand over local and competing outside actors. Prior to the war, Russia had been able sustain its security, political, and economic leverage over Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, yet the extent of its influence varied over time and depending on the leadership in each country. Moscow was Armenia’s key ally, bringing the country into its security, political, and economic space. Russia also enjoyed close political and business ties with Azerbaijan, underpinned by shared authoritarianism. Baku joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) but stayed out of Russian-led security institutions. Moscow’s role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict gave it particular security leverage over Baku and Yerevan. Russia’s leverage with Georgia has fluctuated. The country joined the CIS but not other Russian-led organizations. Political ties started to erode in the early 2000s, especially following the 2003 Rose Revolution. The 2008 war weakened Russia’s leverage as Georgia left the CIS and cut diplomatic ties. Economic relations have improved since 2012 even as Tbilisi continued to seek EU and NATO membership. The war in Ukraine has weakened Russia’s sway over the region, accelerating what had started with the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War as Moscow sided with Azerbaijan rather than its treaty ally Armenia. This led to growing difference with Yerevan and convergence with Baku. Armenia is now looking for alternative security partners and engaging with the EU and the United States. Azerbaijan is taking advantage of Moscow’s focus on Ukraine to fully achieve its objectives, including the early departure of Russian peacekeepers from its territory. Georgia receiving EU candidate status could have reduced Russia’s leverage but its ruling party’s antidemocratic and anti-West turn keeps favoring Moscow’s influence. Western economic sanctions have further undermined Russia’s hold over the South Caucasus states: it needs them more to connect and trade with Asian markets. The new geo-economic reality favors the three countries and Moscow can now hardly use economic tools against them. Russia’s waning influence has made it one among other players in the South Caucasus. It can no longer ignore the role of China, the EU, Iran, Türkiye, and the United States there. The emerging geopolitical and geo-economic plurality in the region has made Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia more daring and transactional in their engagement with all outside powers. This has implications for the three countries in terms of peace and security, democracy, and geopolitical orientation. Azerbaijan is likely to remain undemocratic and to keep engaging with all powers transactionally to maintain national and regime security. Armenia finds itself in a complicated state of insecurity that affects democratization and makes multi-alignment its default foreign policy orientation. Georgia, whose democratic decline is the result of its own politics, is likely to sustain its multi-aligned and transactional foreign policy posture if the current government stays in power, while an opposition victory in the coming elections might turn the country back to democracy and a West-oriented foreign policy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Democracy, Geopolitics, and Unipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, South Caucasus, and Black Sea

14. Dirty Warfare? The Application of International Law to Attacks on Nuclear Power Plants in the Conduct of Hostilities

Author:
Julia Vassileva
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine poses multiple threats to international security, with nuclear safety and nuclear weapons returning to the forefront of global politics. Alongside verbal threats of using tactical nuclear weapons, Russia’s invasion plans have included attacks on nuclear power plants (NPPs), such as the shelling of the Zaporizhzhia complex in Ukraine. These actions raise critical questions about the application of international law to military operations involving NPPs and liability for resulting nuclear damage. This paper examines the scope of international law in such scenarios and concludes with implications from the perspective of strategic studies and NATO nuclear policy.
Topic:
International Law, Weapons of Mass Destruction, International Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

15. Artillery in Present and Future High-Intensity Operations

Author:
Elio Calcagno, Bryan Clark, Sam Cranny-Evans, Alessandro Marrone, Nicolò Murgia, and Eugenio Po
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The Ukraine war has highlighted among NATO allies the importance of planning for protracted, large-scale, and high-intensity conflicts. In this context, artillery capabilities have regained significance, with a clear emphasis on survivability, quality, quantity, range, but also on adequate munition stocks and production capacity. However, successful integration into a wider array of capabilities (including long range precision fires) and advanced Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities are crucial for an effective artillery force. Meanwhile, in the maritime domain, recent events in the Red Sea have shown how naval artillery is gaining a prominent role as a cost-effective solution to defence from drone and swarming threats.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Procurement, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, United Kingdom, Ukraine, France, Italy, and United States of America

16. How external actors seek to influence the Western Balkans?

Author:
Harun Nuhanović
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
The Western Balkans, a region with a complex history and significant geopolitical value, finds itself at the crossroads of influence from major external powers—Russia, China, and Turkey. Each of these countries extends its reach through various domains such as economics, culture, religion, politics, and security, exploiting both state and non-state mechanisms to cement their influence. This report delves into the strategies employed by these state actors, highlighting their individual and collective impacts on the strategic landscape of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia, and Montenegro. The findings reveal how these external influences pose both opportunities and significant risks, shaping the regional dynamics and the future integration of these states into larger international frameworks such as the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Turkey, Kosovo, and Western Balkans

17. The War in Ukraine: Reality Check for Emerging Technologies and the Future of Warfare

Author:
Jean-Marc Rickli and Federico Mantellassi
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 marked the beginning of one of the most intense and brutal state-on-state conflicts opposing two modern militaries in recent memory. Despite Russia’s qualitative and quantitative advantages, Ukraine’s armed forces have so far put up strong resistance, foiling Russian plans of a quick victory and turning the conflict into a bloody war of attrition. Due to its scale and the nature of its belligerents, the conflict can provide us with a glimpse into what the future of warfare might look like and help us recentre the burgeoning conversation about the future of warfare in the current reality, especially as it relates to the presence and impact of emerging technologies. The war therefore offers us a way to understand how digital and off-the-shelf technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) impact conflicts of this scale and how relevant they are to current modern warfare. The war can also help us see how new actors become involved in warfare, what new means of influencing nation states are becoming available, and which new tools armed forces can use to affect battlefield outcomes. Importantly, it can help us gauge their importance relative to more traditional aspects of warfare. The analysis is structured in four main parts. This introduction is followed by a short contextualisation to situate the analysis in the wider conversation about emerging technologies and the future of warfare (Part 2). Part 3 provides a short overview of the conflict so far, dividing it into six phases. Part 4 surveys the main elements of the conflict in Ukraine, outlining what emerging technologies have been present and critically assessing their role in the war. Part 5 delves into some implications for the future of warfare that can be understood from the dynamics analysed thus far, especially as they relate to the place of emerging technologies in future conflicts and their role in determining battlefield outcomes. We argue that while some new technologies have come to characterise modern warfare, the Russo-Ukrainian conflict shows that many features of warfighting remain unchanged. Emerging technologies, such as AI and cheaper technological alternatives to traditional armaments, such as drones, are undoubtedly starting to change the battlefield and will play an increasingly larger role in future conflicts. Cyberspace and the globalised digital information space are bringing new actors and new means to exert influence, provide nations’ armed forces with new tools, and make battlefields increasingly globalised and complex. However, the conflict also shows that traditional aspects of warfare will not decrease in importance or be sidelined. Conflicts remain a contest of wills and adaptation, where ammunition supplies, the quantity of traditional armaments such as tanks, and both the number and quality of personnel and the logistical and organisational ability to bring all these elements to bear all remain the most important determinants of success. While technology is playing an increasing role in this equation, it remains unable to determine the outcome of a conflict on its own.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Drones, Artificial Intelligence, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

18. One year of war in Ukraine

Author:
Christian Leffler
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
It has been just over one year since Russia began its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine. In that year, the EU has stepped up and provided copious amounts of support to Ukraine – economic and military, as well as providing a safe haven for millions of Ukrainians who have fled the fighting. As the conflict has now entered its second year, this CEPS Explainer dives deep to analyse what has defined the first year and then expands on what the EU needs to concretely do in the second if Ukraine is to have any hope of triumphing over the invaders. This will require vision, courage and boldness from European leaders. The alternative if they fail? A rules-based international order replaced by a ruthless multipolar world defined by competing spheres of influence.
Topic:
European Union, Armed Conflict, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

19. De-colonising the Azerbaijan-Armenian Conflict: Breaking the Knot of Security and Dependence

Author:
Leila Alieva
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The recent military operation in the Nagorno Karabakh area reflects a broader regional transformation. Its essence is in the second attempt (with the first one in Azerbaijan 30 years ago) of changing the security paradigm, this time in Armenia, leading to de-colonisation of relations in the region. The core of this change is liberation from the dependence on Russia’s almost two centuries old patronage, with Nagorno Karabakh conflict evolving as a tool of this dependence. With all the contradictions over the territory between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and difference in current political systems, the countries seem at last to arrive to the same conclusion of Russia and her control of the Karabakh elite being one of the obstacles to the peaceful relations, reforms and integration in the West. The power balance in the region, affected by such factors as Turkey’s greater involvement, distraction of the West, Russia’s increasing isolation, besides power change in Armenia, has also contributed to the “window of opportunity” for a change of paradigms. The role and influence of the EU and the US in this process, including in deterring potential military developments, will be dependent on the perception of them by the parties as non-partisan brokers, promotion of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan as independent subjects of international relations and consistency in support of democracy.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, Mediation, and Interdependence
Political Geography:
Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh

20. Turkey’s Watershed Elections: A Matter of Leadership

Author:
Alessia Chiriatti
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
It has been said numerous times in the last months that the upcoming 14 May elections in Turkey will be a historical watershed for the country. A crunch point that has not yet been widely explored in these months, though, is that of leadership mechanisms and the consequences of a possible change at the helm of the country, for both its democratic transition and the trust that regional allies (EU and NATO countries above all) can place in the country. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s erratic leadership appears to be on a tightrope, challenged by Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the head of the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), the largest opposition party leading the Nation Alliance (Millet İttifakı). Due to the osmotic relationship between domestic (related to social cleavages) and regional (mainly securitised) dynamics, what the new leadership of Turkey will be, will also affect the future posture of the country and the willingness (or lack thereof) of other States to establish a trusting relationship with it.
Topic:
Elections, Leadership, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Domestic Policy, and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Eastern Europe, and Balkans