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2. Understanding the Russia-Iran-Israel Triangle
- Author:
- Daniel Rakov
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- As Tehran invests efforts to improve relations with Russia, Israel will have to maintain a dialogue with Moscow to safeguard its military and diplomatic freedom of action.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Stability
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Israel
3. Could Biden construct a new world order through détente with Russia?
- Author:
- Efraim Inbar
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Such a scenario would give the US a leg up against China’s totalitarianism and expansionist aims, and bridge the age-old schism with Russia
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Hegemony, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America
4. Israel’s Ukraine policy: ‘Right side of history’ vs national interest
- Author:
- Efraim Inbar
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- History has no right side and it does not evolve according to moral imperatives.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, War, Military Strategy, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Intervention
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, Middle East, and Israel
5. The Ukraine War: Preparing for the Longer-Term Outcome
- Author:
- Anthony H. Cordesman
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- It is far too early to predict the ultimate outcome of the Ukraine War, but it is all too clear that no peace settlement or ceasefire is likely to eliminate a long period of military tension between the U.S. – including NATO and its allies – and anything approaching President Putin’s future version of Russia, nor will any resolution of the current conflict negate the risk of new forms of war. It is equally clear that the U.S. and NATO need to act as quickly as possible to prepare for an intense period of military competition and must create a more secure deterrent and improve their capability to defend against Russia. In practice, NATO will need to make up for years of underfunding by each member country and for the cuts in force levels, readiness, and modernization that years of a U.S.-driven focus on burden-sharing – rather than funding NATO’s real military priorities – did little or nothing to address. NATO will need to find new ways to counter the massive problems in interoperability and differences in comparative warfighting that still exist between NATO’s 30 nations. This will need to be accomplished at a time when emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) are constantly changing the nature of deterrence and warfighting, when Russia is actively pursuing nuclear modernization rather than arms control, and when NATO’s more advanced forces are struggling to create new approaches to joint all-domain command and control (JADC2) – and all while doing so at a time when most member countries have limited capabilities to support their existing force structure. At best, developing and sustaining any coherent effort to deal with these issues will take at least five years to implement. It then will require constant updating on an annual basis as new types of technology, tactics, and command and control continue to reshape military needs and force plans. This, in turn, requires sustained political and popular support in the face of inflation and civil needs during a time when the momentum for military change created by the current fighting in Ukraine may have faded. In some ways, the only thing harder than crisis management is the lack of crisis management.
- Topic:
- War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
6. Government Internet Shutdowns Are Changing. How Should Citizens and Democracies Respond?
- Author:
- Steven Feldstein
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- Governments worldwide continue to deploy internet shutdowns and network disruptions to quell mass protests, forestall election losses, reinforce military coups, or cut off conflict areas from the outside world. Data from the past few years show that incidences of global shutdowns have remained steadily high: 196 documented incidents in 2018, 213 incidents in 2019, and 155 in 2020. The first five months of 2021 recorded fifty shutdown incidents.1 Government-instigated internet shutdowns largely took place in relation to five event types: mass demonstrations, military operations and coups, elections, communal violence and religious holidays, and school exams. As Clément Voule, the United Nations special rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, pointedly observes: “Shutdowns are lasting longer, becoming harder to detect and targeting particular social media and messaging applications and specific localities and communities.”2 Events in Russia have put a finer point on internet shutdown trends. On March 4, 2022, Roskomnadzor, the Russian internet regulator, announced that it would block Facebook and Twitter and would ban new uploads to TikTok.3 On March 14, it added Instagram to the banned list.4 Russian authorities have also restricted access to a slew of news websites, including the BBC, Deutsche Welle, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Voice of America. Roskomnadzor claimed these measures were enacted in response to new limits imposed by platforms on Russian propaganda outlets—accusing Facebook of “discrimination.”5 The Kremlin’s crackdown is an ominous signal about where the shutdown struggle is headed in authoritarian countries. Despite these bleak trends, there is a growing international consensus—at least among liberal democracies—that protecting internet access is integrally linked to freedoms of expression and association and forms a crucial part of the global democracy and human rights agenda. This paper picks up on this emerging norm and probes several key questions: What can citizens do to evade authoritarian controls and regain internet access? How can democratic governments support these efforts and push back against governments that shut down and block the internet? The short answer is that there is a multitude of responses available to democracies and civil society organizations to push back against internet blackouts and network disruptions. Democracies can exert meaningful pressure against repressive governments to ease internet blocks, and citizens are able to exercise creative options to circumvent internet controls. The paper walks through different tools available to citizens to evade internet controls. It examines where internet shutdown trends are headed and incentives for particular regimes to adopt new modes of censorship. It then presents a multifaceted strategy for democracies, civil society organizations, and technology developers and companies to counter internet shutdowns.
- Topic:
- Government, Science and Technology, Democracy, and Internet
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Global Focus
7. Russian Government Moves to Assert Increasing Control Over Internet
- Author:
- John C. K. Daly
- Publication Date:
- 02-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- Amidst growing political dissatisfaction, the Russian government is grappling with the apparent vulnerabilities of the country’s internet. On February 1, Dmitry Medvedev, the deputy chairperson of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, acknowledged during an extensive interview with Russian media what foreign analysts have long suspected: disconnecting Russia from the internet is possible (TASS, February 1). And as if to provide a rationale for such potential action, the previous week, the Federal Security Service’s (FSB) National Coordination Center for Computer Incidents (NKTsKI) reported a threat of possible cyberattacks by the United States and its allies against Russia’s critical infrastructure (Interfax, January 22).
- Topic:
- Government, Internet, and Repression
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Eurasia
8. Growing Azerbaijani–Central Asian Ties Likely to Trigger Conflicts With Russia and Iran
- Author:
- Paul A. Goble
- Publication Date:
- 02-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Karabakh War (September 29–November 9) has had a transformative effect on the country. It not only changed the attitudes of its population, whose members now feel themselves to be heroes rather than victims (see EDM, January 21), but also bolstered the diplomatic weight and possibilities of the Azerbaijani government in its dealings with other regional states. In prosecuting a triumphant war against Yerevan, Baku demonstrated its own ability to act. But just as importantly, Azerbaijan has shown to peoples and governments in the Caucasus and Central Asia that it is a force to be reckoned with, in part thanks to its growing links with Turkey. Moreover, that alliance makes possible an appealing path to the outside world for all who join it. That reality is causing countries east of the Caspian to look westward to and through Azerbaijan in their economic planning and political calculations. At the same time, however, these developments are generating concerns in Moscow and Tehran, which oppose east-west trade routes that bypass their countries’ territories and instead favor north-south corridors linking Russia and Iran together. As a result, Azerbaijan’s recent successes in expanding links with Central Asia set the stage for new conflicts between Azerbaijan and its Turkic partners, on the one hand, and Russia and Iran, which have far more significant naval assets in the Caspian, on the other (see EDM, November 27, 2018 and February 20, 2020; Casp-geo.ru, December 24, 2019; Chinalogist.ru, November 21, 2019).
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, and Trade
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Iran, Central Asia, Middle East, and Azerbaijan
9. Moscow’s Hopes to Use Water as ‘New Oil’ Outraging Siberians
- Author:
- Paul A. Goble
- Publication Date:
- 02-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- Given the Vladimir Putin regime’s past reliance on oil exports, it is perhaps no surprise that Moscow has been casting about for some other raw material it can sell abroad now that hydrocarbon prices have fallen and Russian government revenues along with them. But its apparent selection of water as “the new oil” that it can sell to water-short China is again outraging Russians. Indeed, the policy may soon lead to the repetition of protests against such projects that roiled the country east of the Urals in 2019 and 2020. And this could complicate Russia’s relations not just with China but with Mongolia and Central Asian countries as well. By focusing exclusively on the possibility of foreign profits rather than the concerns of its own population, the Putin regime—wittingly or not—is recapitulating some of the steps the Communist leaders fatefully took in the years preceding the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
- Topic:
- Natural Resources, Water, and Domestic Policy
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Eurasia
10. Ukraine’s Sanctions Against Pro-Russian Oligarch Medvedchuk—All About Oil and Coal
- Author:
- Alla Hurska
- Publication Date:
- 02-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- On February 19, the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (NSDC) imposed sanctions on Ukrainian tycoon and politician Viktor Medvedchuk and his wife, Oksana Marchenko (Pravda.com.ua, February 19). Medvedchuk is a leader and people’s deputy of the pro-Russian party Opposition Platform–For Life, the largest opposition faction in the Ukrainian parliament. Moreover, he is a close acquaintance of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The NSDC sanctions list also includes five Russian nationals and Ukrainian national Nataliya Lavreniuk. The latter is Marchenko’s friend and the common-law spouse of Taras Kozak (already under sanctions), a people’s deputy from the same political party and Medvedchuk’s business partner. Apart from targeting those eight individuals, sanctions were imposed on nineteen associated businesses, including firms that own aircraft and operate direct flights from Kyiv to Moscow as well as a number of joint stock companies registered in Russia, Moldova and Portugal (Pravda.com.ua, February 20). These measures came two weeks after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy ordered the shutdown of several television channels—ZIK, NewsOne and 112—connected to Kozak. The move was described by Zelenskyy as a necessary step to fight Russian propaganda. But according to the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) and the NSDC, these actions were motivated by more complex issues. Specifically, the three aforementioned TV channels were being financed by limited liability company trading house Don Coal (Rostov, Russia), which receives revenue from smuggling coal out of the Luhansk and Donetsk “people’s republics” (LPR/DPR) (Pravda.com.ua, February 4).
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Oil, Sanctions, and Coal
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
11. Russia’s Iskander Missiles Fail in Karabakh but Cause Crisis in Armenia
- Author:
- Pavel Felgenhauer
- Publication Date:
- 02-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- The Second Karabakh War, between Armenia and Azerbaijan, began on September 27, 2020, and ended on November 9, 2020, with a Russian-brokered and guaranteed agreement. The conflict claimed the lives of thousands of Armenian and Azerbaijani soldiers. But after 44 days of fierce fighting, it concluded with Yerevan soundly defeated: Armenia lost territory occupied during the First Karabakh War in 1992–1994 as well as over 30 percent of prewar Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast—a region of Soviet Azerbaijan majority populated by ethnic Armenians. Today, the rump self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR or “Artsakh”)—still controlled by Armenians and not recognized by anyone—is fully surrounded by Azerbaijani troops and territory. The rump Karabakh “republic’s” perimeter is guarded by some 2,000 Russian “peacekeepers” who also control the so-called Lachin corridor, the only highway left open from Armenia proper to Karabakh through the city of Lachin. The future of the rump NKR and its Armenian population is unclear. Baku refuses to discuss any special administrative status for the territory, insisting Armenians born in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast or their descendants must disarm and apply for Azerbaijani citizenships to stay as a minority inside Azerbaijan. In turn, the NKR leadership has declared Russian an official language alongside Armenian to avoid use of Azerbaijani Turkish (Izvestia, February 17). Officials in Stepanakert (Khankendi in Azerbaijani) apparently hope this may tempt Moscow to keep its peacekeepers in Karabakh permanently and maybe eventually agree to annex the NKR outright.
- Topic:
- Weapons, Conflict, and Crisis Management
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, Eastern Europe, and Nagorno-Karabakh
12. The OSCE as Sisyphus: Mediation, Peace Operations, Human Rights
- Author:
- Philip Remler
- Publication Date:
- 04-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- Over the past decade, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has been returning to its origins as a Cold War–era Conference – a forum where states and blocs, often antagonistic to one another and espousing opposing ideals, can air their frictions and hostilities. The OSCE was created without legal personality and with the liberum veto of the consensus principle. These constraints stunted the growth of executive capabilities and bound the OSCE closely to the will of its participating States. That rendered most mediation efforts ineffective, especially where an OSCE state is both belligerent and mediator in the same conflicts. Peace operations have been more effective – notably the Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine – but the same factors have tightly constrained its activity. Though all participating States committed themselves to democratic governance, rule of law and respect for human rights, these ideals failed in much of the former Soviet Union, and autocrats have used the organisation’s lack of legal personality and the consensus principle to hobble the OSCE’s efforts. If the OSCE’s participating States want it to remain an Organization, not a Conference, they must take action to secure its executive autonomy.
- Topic:
- Human Rights, Peacekeeping, Democracy, Conflict, and OSCE
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
13. Countering Zero-Sum Relations in the Middle East: Insights from the Expert Survey
- Author:
- Flavio Fusco
- Publication Date:
- 01-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- Building on emerging debates on the need to develop de-escalation mechanisms for the Middle East, the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and the Brussels-based Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS), with support from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, launched a one-year research and outreach project entitled “Fostering a New Security Architecture in the Middle East”. Connected to the research, an expert survey targeting European, US, Russian, Middle Eastern and Chinese experts and practitioners was conducted on key themes, principles and approaches associated with a potential new security architecture for the region. The results of the survey – first published in an edited book volume jointly published by IAI and FEPS in November 2020 – are analysed below, complete with tables and infographics on key themes associated with the research project and the search for new, inclusive mechanisms for dialogue and de-escalation in the Middle East.
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, Security, Foreign Policy, and Politics
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Middle East, and United States of America
14. Russia in the Arctic—A Critical Examination
- Author:
- Eugene Rumer, Richard Sokolsky, and Paul Stronski
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- Russia has big Arctic plans, but how they will be realized is uncertain. For the United States this will likely mean the return to a Cold War–like environment rather than a new chapter in great-power competition in the Arctic. Russia’s Arctic ambitions have attracted increasing attention in the West over the past decade as climate change opens up new opportunities in the region for navigation and exploration of its riches. For its part, Moscow casts a wary eye on what it sees as a challenge from the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to its position and ambitions there. The Kremlin’s rhetoric about Western encroachment has become more strident, in sync with its enhanced military posture and ambitious economic and infrastructure projects.
- Topic:
- NATO, Cold War, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, and Economy
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, North America, Arctic, and United States of America
15. Jordan: With Relations with Washington and Jerusalem Back in Order, a Flurry of Diplomatic Activity
- Author:
- Joshua Krasna
- Publication Date:
- 10-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
- Abstract:
- Jordanian diplomacy has been invigorated in recent months, with Jordan taking a major and sometimes leading role in significant regional developments. The renewed intensity and prominence are associated with marked improvement in relations with the United States and Israel, following the leadership changes in both countries. King ʿAbdullah II seems to have received a fresh mandate from the Biden Administration to help promote regional changes aimed at reducing the influence of Iran and its allies, in an era of declining direct American engagement in the region.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Government, and Bilateral Relations
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Iraq, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, and United States of America
16. Turkish-Russian Relations: A Puzzle that Shakes the Middle East
- Author:
- Remi Daniel
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
- Abstract:
- In this issue of Turkeyscope, Remi Daniel discusses several contemporary trends in the Russian-Turkish relationship. The dynamics of competition and cooperation between these two states affect the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Central Asia and North Africa in profound ways.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Central Asia, Turkey, Middle East, Eastern Europe, and North Africa
17. The “Four Plus One”: The Changing Power Politics of the Middle East
- Author:
- Joshua Krasna and George Meladze
- Publication Date:
- 10-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
- Abstract:
- In this inaugural MDC Occasional Paper, Josh Krasna and George Meladze analyze the structure of power in the Middle East during the past decade, mapping the main regional players and the interrelationships between them, and assessing the potential for future change in the politics of the region.
- Topic:
- Politics, Regional Cooperation, and Geopolitics
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America
18. EU Strategic Autonomy in the Shadow of Geopolitical Rivalry: A View from Moscow
- Author:
- Sergey Utkin
- Publication Date:
- 02-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- The EU is determined to maintain the transatlantic bond, while Russia tends to interpret the EU’s strategic autonomy precisely as autonomy from the US. The Western unity effort is significantly strengthened by the poor state of the EU’s relations with Russia. Russia is ready to pay lip service to the idea of a more capable EU, but instead it sees opportunities in areas where bilateral cooperation with member states is possible. The EU-wide consensus is doomed to remain critical vis-à-vis Russia for the foreseeable future. The EU will increasingly focus on gaining autonomy from Russia, primarily in the energy field and in terms of hard security deterrence. The EU-Russia geopolitical tension, centred on the common neighbourhood, is long-term and might cause as yet unseen damage to the relationship if it is not handled carefully.
- Topic:
- Security, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Conflict, Regionalism, Autonomy, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Europe
19. Russia’s Nationalities Policy before and after the 2020 Constitutional Amendments: Is the “Ethnic Turn” Continuing?
- Author:
- Veera Laine
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- In January 2020, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed a set of constitutional amendments, aiming to secure the continuity of his power in the years to come. At the same time, the amendments allowed ideological visions on national identity to be inscribed in the Constitution. Since summer 2020, the Constitution has enhanced the symbolic status of the Russian language, which is now not only the state language but also the language of those who speak it (i.e. of “ethnic” Russians or “Russian-speakers”), implicitly referred to as the state-founding people. These provisions, together with support for compatriots abroad, not only continue the turn observable since the 2010s in Russia’s nation-building from a civic vision towards an ethnic vision of nation, but also challenge the existing interpretations of state borders. The provisions on safeguarding the “historical truth” and establishing a single framework for education hinder the republics from pursuing their identity policies. This Working Paper argues that the amendments both adjust the earlier changes and signal new ones in the official discourse and nationalities policy.
- Topic:
- Corruption, Governance, Authoritarianism, Democracy, Constitution, and Leadership
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Europe
20. Inserting India into U.S.-Israel Defence Technology Cooperation
- Author:
- Gateway House
- Publication Date:
- 04-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
- Abstract:
- Over the last decade and a half, Israel and the U.S. have become India’s top arms suppliers, and a robust defence partnership is underway. Beyond pure defence trade, Israeli and U.S. defence companies have participated in the ‘Make in India’ initiative, focusing on technology transfers and the co-development and co-production of technologies. This is the moment for India to capitalise on these two critical, bilateral defence partners, and particularly the start-up innovation hubs of Silicon Valley and Tel Aviv. How can India insert itself into the U.S.-Israel defence technology cooperation corridor, and participate in the development of emerging technologies like quantum computing and artificial intelligence in defence? What benefit will the U.S. and Israel gain from a partnership with India? This paper studies the U.S.-Israel defence technology corridor, and suggests potential collaborations for India. It will necessitate the three innovation hubs of Silicon Valley, Tel Aviv and Bengaluru coming together to capitalise on their respective strengths and declared national technology priorities. Bringing a like-minded, tech-savvy democracy like India into the arc of the U.S.-Israel partnership will offer a trinity of benefits: a robust and tested edge in emerging technologies to the three militaries over their adversaries, develop interoperability, and reinforce their access to the Indian market. The greatest benefit will be for India, which has been set back by lengthy defence acquisition procedures, and will do better with a modern defence base at home. India will have to overcome the geopolitical hurdles of its defence relationship with Russia, and of Israel’s reported defence ties with China and Pakistan, to build a sturdy trilateral cooperation.
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, Science and Technology, Geopolitics, Arms Trade, and Defense Industry
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan, Russia, China, South Asia, India, Israel, and United States of America