Content Type: Working Paper / Political Geography: Russia

1. The EU is Reluctantly Getting Tougher with Putin

Author:: Emmanuel Navon
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Europeans surely remember what happens when you let an autocrat get away with grabbing territories hoping that the last bite will be the last one
Topic:: Diplomacy, Military Strategy, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

2. Understanding the Russia-Iran-Israel Triangle

Author:: Daniel Rakov
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: As Tehran invests efforts to improve relations with Russia, Israel will have to maintain a dialogue with Moscow to safeguard its military and diplomatic freedom of action.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Israel

3. Could Biden construct a new world order through détente with Russia?

Author:: Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Such a scenario would give the US a leg up against China’s totalitarianism and expansionist aims, and bridge the age-old schism with Russia
Topic:: Diplomacy, Hegemony, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

4. Israel’s Ukraine policy: ‘Right side of history’ vs national interest

Author:: Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: History has no right side and it does not evolve according to moral imperatives.
Topic:: Diplomacy, War, Military Strategy, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Intervention
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Middle East, and Israel

5. The Ukraine War: Preparing for the Longer-Term Outcome

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: It is far too early to predict the ultimate outcome of the Ukraine War, but it is all too clear that no peace settlement or ceasefire is likely to eliminate a long period of military tension between the U.S. – including NATO and its allies – and anything approaching President Putin’s future version of Russia, nor will any resolution of the current conflict negate the risk of new forms of war. It is equally clear that the U.S. and NATO need to act as quickly as possible to prepare for an intense period of military competition and must create a more secure deterrent and improve their capability to defend against Russia. In practice, NATO will need to make up for years of underfunding by each member country and for the cuts in force levels, readiness, and modernization that years of a U.S.-driven focus on burden-sharing – rather than funding NATO’s real military priorities – did little or nothing to address. NATO will need to find new ways to counter the massive problems in interoperability and differences in comparative warfighting that still exist between NATO’s 30 nations. This will need to be accomplished at a time when emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) are constantly changing the nature of deterrence and warfighting, when Russia is actively pursuing nuclear modernization rather than arms control, and when NATO’s more advanced forces are struggling to create new approaches to joint all-domain command and control (JADC2) – and all while doing so at a time when most member countries have limited capabilities to support their existing force structure. At best, developing and sustaining any coherent effort to deal with these issues will take at least five years to implement. It then will require constant updating on an annual basis as new types of technology, tactics, and command and control continue to reshape military needs and force plans. This, in turn, requires sustained political and popular support in the face of inflation and civil needs during a time when the momentum for military change created by the current fighting in Ukraine may have faded. In some ways, the only thing harder than crisis management is the lack of crisis management.
Topic:: War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

6. Government Internet Shutdowns Are Changing. How Should Citizens and Democracies Respond?

Author:: Steven Feldstein
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Governments worldwide continue to deploy internet shutdowns and network disruptions to quell mass protests, forestall election losses, reinforce military coups, or cut off conflict areas from the outside world. Data from the past few years show that incidences of global shutdowns have remained steadily high: 196 documented incidents in 2018, 213 incidents in 2019, and 155 in 2020. The first five months of 2021 recorded fifty shutdown incidents.1 Government-instigated internet shutdowns largely took place in relation to five event types: mass demonstrations, military operations and coups, elections, communal violence and religious holidays, and school exams. As Clément Voule, the United Nations special rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, pointedly observes: “Shutdowns are lasting longer, becoming harder to detect and targeting particular social media and messaging applications and specific localities and communities.”2 Events in Russia have put a finer point on internet shutdown trends. On March 4, 2022, Roskomnadzor, the Russian internet regulator, announced that it would block Facebook and Twitter and would ban new uploads to TikTok.3 On March 14, it added Instagram to the banned list.4 Russian authorities have also restricted access to a slew of news websites, including the BBC, Deutsche Welle, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Voice of America. Roskomnadzor claimed these measures were enacted in response to new limits imposed by platforms on Russian propaganda outlets—accusing Facebook of “discrimination.”5 The Kremlin’s crackdown is an ominous signal about where the shutdown struggle is headed in authoritarian countries. Despite these bleak trends, there is a growing international consensus—at least among liberal democracies—that protecting internet access is integrally linked to freedoms of expression and association and forms a crucial part of the global democracy and human rights agenda. This paper picks up on this emerging norm and probes several key questions: What can citizens do to evade authoritarian controls and regain internet access? How can democratic governments support these efforts and push back against governments that shut down and block the internet? The short answer is that there is a multitude of responses available to democracies and civil society organizations to push back against internet blackouts and network disruptions. Democracies can exert meaningful pressure against repressive governments to ease internet blocks, and citizens are able to exercise creative options to circumvent internet controls. The paper walks through different tools available to citizens to evade internet controls. It examines where internet shutdown trends are headed and incentives for particular regimes to adopt new modes of censorship. It then presents a multifaceted strategy for democracies, civil society organizations, and technology developers and companies to counter internet shutdowns.
Topic:: Government, Science and Technology, Democracy, and Internet
Political Geography:: Russia and Global Focus

7. The Russian Diaspora in the Baltic States: The Trojan Horse that never was

Author:: Sarah Coolican
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: Thirty years ago this month, the world shook as one of the only two Superpowers unexpectedly collapsed, creating enormous ramifications for the 25 million ethnic Russians who found themselves as non-titular citizens outside the borders of the newly formed Russian Federation. This ‘beached diaspora’ has been left marginalised and treated with fear, by the Baltic States in their nation-building policies and has left many to think of this community as ‘ripe’ for Russian influence. This Strategic Update will analyse Russian soft power policies and the development of ‘Russkii Mir’ as a tool for utilising this diaspora to further its foreign policy. Tools, which have been seemingly unaffected to a community of autonomy seeking citizens.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diaspora, and Regional Power
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Baltic States

8. Strategic Report

Author:: Zaid Eyadat and Moh'd Khair Eiedat
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic Studies (CSS)
Abstract:: This is not a historical nor chronological report. It is rather “a working paper”. The purpose of this rather brief report is to reflect on three major issues: first, what are the characteristics of the world we live in? How stable and predictable is it? Are those in power know what are they doing? Or is it the blind leading the blind? Is our sense of uncertainty and thus unpredictability a product of mental crisis related to one in a lifetime pandemic experience? or is it more structural with long historical span? The second question is how dangerous and out of control is the Middle east region? Or is it? The Abraham Accords promise a new dawn for the region? Paradise is just around the corner or the calm preceding the storm? The third question, where does Jordan fit in these wider circles of activities both global and regional? Deliberately we left out of the report any serious considerations of the economic aspect challenge facing Jordan which is both self-evident and widely recognized. Moreover, the emphasis is on the geostrategic aspects of security related to the global level, the regional level and that of Jordan. Let us first look at the world.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Power, Geopolitics, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Jordan

9. "Systemic Risks": A Conversation on Nuclear Technology and Deterrence with Dr. Vipin Narang

Author:: Dylan Land
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Fletcher Security Review (FSR): What do you perceive as the greatest threat to global nuclear security? Where do you see the greatest potential for the outbreak of nuclear war? Vipin Narang (VN): Rather than focusing on regions, I see three trends which I think we should be concerned about. One is the return of a great power arms race, and a lot of this was exacerbated in the Trump administration. Even as we head into the Biden administration—which extended the New START Treaty with Russia for five years—Russia and China are modernizing their nuclear forces at breakneck speed. They are worried primarily about U.S. missile defenses, which at this point are unconstrained. The United States has a variety of missile defense systems at the regional level which work pretty well, as well as the national missile defense system, which doesn’t…yet. You will often hear that the national missile defense system does not work very well and that is true—the success rate is around 60 percent in simulated tests. It may be difficult to ever get it to work perfectly or even well, but it is the prospect that the United States might get it to work that really drives modernization efforts in Russia and China.....
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Risk, Deterrence, and Interview
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Global Focus, and United States of America

10. EU Strategic Autonomy in the Shadow of Geopolitical Rivalry: A View from Moscow

Author:: Sergey Utkin
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The EU is determined to maintain the transatlantic bond, while Russia tends to interpret the EU’s strategic autonomy precisely as autonomy from the US. The Western unity effort is significantly strengthened by the poor state of the EU’s relations with Russia. Russia is ready to pay lip service to the idea of a more capable EU, but instead it sees opportunities in areas where bilateral cooperation with member states is possible. The EU-wide consensus is doomed to remain critical vis-à-vis Russia for the foreseeable future. The EU will increasingly focus on gaining autonomy from Russia, primarily in the energy field and in terms of hard security deterrence. The EU-Russia geopolitical tension, centred on the common neighbourhood, is long-term and might cause as yet unseen damage to the relationship if it is not handled carefully.
Topic:: Security, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Conflict, Regionalism, Autonomy, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

11. Russia’s Nationalities Policy before and after the 2020 Constitutional Amendments: Is the “Ethnic Turn” Continuing?

Author:: Veera Laine
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: In January 2020, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed a set of constitutional amendments, aiming to secure the continuity of his power in the years to come. At the same time, the amendments allowed ideological visions on national identity to be inscribed in the Constitution. Since summer 2020, the Constitution has enhanced the symbolic status of the Russian language, which is now not only the state language but also the language of those who speak it (i.e. of “ethnic” Russians or “Russian-speakers”), implicitly referred to as the state-founding people. These provisions, together with support for compatriots abroad, not only continue the turn observable since the 2010s in Russia’s nation-building from a civic vision towards an ethnic vision of nation, but also challenge the existing interpretations of state borders. The provisions on safeguarding the “historical truth” and establishing a single framework for education hinder the republics from pursuing their identity policies. This Working Paper argues that the amendments both adjust the earlier changes and signal new ones in the official discourse and nationalities policy.
Topic:: Corruption, Governance, Authoritarianism, Democracy, Constitution, and Leadership
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

12. Inserting India into U.S.-Israel Defence Technology Cooperation

Author:: Gateway House
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:: Over the last decade and a half, Israel and the U.S. have become India’s top arms suppliers, and a robust defence partnership is underway. Beyond pure defence trade, Israeli and U.S. defence companies have participated in the ‘Make in India’ initiative, focusing on technology transfers and the co-development and co-production of technologies. This is the moment for India to capitalise on these two critical, bilateral defence partners, and particularly the start-up innovation hubs of Silicon Valley and Tel Aviv. How can India insert itself into the U.S.-Israel defence technology cooperation corridor, and participate in the development of emerging technologies like quantum computing and artificial intelligence in defence? What benefit will the U.S. and Israel gain from a partnership with India? This paper studies the U.S.-Israel defence technology corridor, and suggests potential collaborations for India. It will necessitate the three innovation hubs of Silicon Valley, Tel Aviv and Bengaluru coming together to capitalise on their respective strengths and declared national technology priorities. Bringing a like-minded, tech-savvy democracy like India into the arc of the U.S.-Israel partnership will offer a trinity of benefits: a robust and tested edge in emerging technologies to the three militaries over their adversaries, develop interoperability, and reinforce their access to the Indian market. The greatest benefit will be for India, which has been set back by lengthy defence acquisition procedures, and will do better with a modern defence base at home. India will have to overcome the geopolitical hurdles of its defence relationship with Russia, and of Israel’s reported defence ties with China and Pakistan, to build a sturdy trilateral cooperation.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Science and Technology, Geopolitics, Arms Trade, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Russia, China, South Asia, India, Israel, and United States of America

13. Reinvigorating South Asian Nuclear Transparency and Confidence-building Measures

Author:: Lora Saalman
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:: This SIPRI Insights paper explores a series of nuclear transparency and confidence-building measures (CBMs) proposed by military, nuclear, political and regional experts from China, India, Pakistan, Russia and the United States to address nuclear challenges in South Asia. It categorizes these bilateral, trilateral and multilateral measures into doctrinal dialogues and joint threat assessment exercises; communication lines, pre-notification and de-alerting; and development and employment of strategic technologies. The paper then provides a spectrum of viability across which it identifies proposals with the greatest potential, moderate potential and the least potential for reinvigorating nuclear transparency measures and CBMs in South Asia.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, Nonproliferation, and Transparency
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Russia, China, South Asia, India, and United States of America

14. A Strategic Triangle in the Arctic? Implications of China–Russia–United States Power Dynamics for Regional Security

Author:: Ian Anthony and Fei Su
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:: This SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security paper examines security challenges arising from the Arctic activities of three actors with a substantial ‘footprint’—China, Russia and the United States—and how they might be addressed in existing and new frameworks. Arctic and non-Arctic states want to exploit commercial opportunities created by a changing physical environment. Arctic states agree that climate-related challenges can be addressed through cooperation within existing institutions. However, to ensure that increasing human activity stays within acceptable environmental and human security risk levels, non-Arctic states need to be engaged. The risk of unwanted escalation in military tension in the Arctic due to deteriorating relations among major powers over disputes arising elsewhere has grown to the point where it cannot be ignored. A steady increase in military investments in the Arctic, or Arctic operations, will continue, but there is no ready-made framework to address military security challenges. Issues that occupy a ‘grey zone’ between military and non-military security will have to be addressed as digital and transport infrastructure expand in the Arctic. However, there is little experience in how diverse state and non-state actors can manage cooperation and competition simultaneously.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Arctic, and United States of America

15. Energy: Factor of Stability or Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean?

Author:: Marika Karagianni
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: Security of critical economic and energy infrastructure has become a key element in the agenda of both the EU and NATO. The global balance between energy producers and energy importers needs also to be respected in order to secure the smooth operation of global economy and trade. Global energy organizations like OPEC and GAS OPEC see to that. Constructive, multilateral energy diplomacy via the reinforcement of the EMGF (East Med Gas Forum) is considered as the optimum solution to any destabilizing factor in the region. The Eastern Mediterranean has the potential to become a gas supply source for the EU in the future, alternatively to Russia, which is why it has been identified by Brussels as a future gas diversification source. The official strategy of Cairo is to develop indigenous natural gas resources, with the double aim to increase gas production rates and to export significant amounts to Europe in the immediate future. Egypt is bound to lead gas exports of the Eastern Mediterranean countries and diversification for Europe, through its LNG terminals. The East Med pipeline could follow later on.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Gas, Political stability, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North Africa, Egypt, and Mediterranean

16. Turkey’s Soft Power in the Balkans Reaching its Limits

Author:: Ekrem Eddy Güzeldere
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: With the EU putting the Western Balkan countries in an undefined waiting room, there was more room for maneuver for non-EU players. Turkey among others used this space to broaden its influence in the Balkans from politics to the economy, from culture to military cooperation, albeit from a very low starting point. The bilateral relations with all countries of the region are rather good, President Erdogan enjoys the recognition he is often lacking in other parts of the world. While the pandemic further harmed the EU’s image, it was mostly China and Russia who could fill the void with their own vaccines. Lacking its own vaccine so far, Turkey was much less visible. However, in the long-run, Turkey is not interested in an EU-Turkey confrontation over the Western Balkans, but that these countries join the EU. Through this, Turkey would increase the number of allies in a bloc where friends have become few.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Soft Power
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Turkey, and Balkans

17. Jordan: With Relations with Washington and Jerusalem Back in Order, a Flurry of Diplomatic Activity

Author:: Joshua Krasna
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:: Jordanian diplomacy has been invigorated in recent months, with Jordan taking a major and sometimes leading role in significant regional developments. The renewed intensity and prominence are associated with marked improvement in relations with the United States and Israel, following the leadership changes in both countries. King ʿAbdullah II seems to have received a fresh mandate from the Biden Administration to help promote regional changes aimed at reducing the influence of Iran and its allies, in an era of declining direct American engagement in the region.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Government, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Russia, Iraq, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, and United States of America

18. Turkish-Russian Relations: A Puzzle that Shakes the Middle East

Author:: Remi Daniel
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:: In this issue of Turkeyscope, Remi Daniel discusses several contemporary trends in the Russian-Turkish relationship. The dynamics of competition and cooperation between these two states affect the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Central Asia and North Africa in profound ways.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, Central Asia, Turkey, Middle East, Eastern Europe, and North Africa

19. The “Four Plus One”: The Changing Power Politics of the Middle East

Author:: Joshua Krasna and George Meladze
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:: In this inaugural MDC Occasional Paper, Josh Krasna and George Meladze analyze the structure of power in the Middle East during the past decade, mapping the main regional players and the interrelationships between them, and assessing the potential for future change in the politics of the region.
Topic:: Politics, Regional Cooperation, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

20. The OSCE as Sisyphus: Mediation, Peace Operations, Human Rights

Author:: Philip Remler
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Over the past decade, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has been returning to its origins as a Cold War–era Conference – a forum where states and blocs, often antagonistic to one another and espousing opposing ideals, can air their frictions and hostilities. The OSCE was created without legal personality and with the liberum veto of the consensus principle. These constraints stunted the growth of executive capabilities and bound the OSCE closely to the will of its participating States. That rendered most mediation efforts ineffective, especially where an OSCE state is both belligerent and mediator in the same conflicts. Peace operations have been more effective – notably the Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine – but the same factors have tightly constrained its activity. Though all participating States committed themselves to democratic governance, rule of law and respect for human rights, these ideals failed in much of the former Soviet Union, and autocrats have used the organisation’s lack of legal personality and the consensus principle to hobble the OSCE’s efforts. If the OSCE’s participating States want it to remain an Organization, not a Conference, they must take action to secure its executive autonomy.
Topic:: Human Rights, Peacekeeping, Democracy, Conflict, and OSCE
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

21. Countering Zero-Sum Relations in the Middle East: Insights from the Expert Survey

Author:: Flavio Fusco
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Building on emerging debates on the need to develop de-escalation mechanisms for the Middle East, the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and the Brussels-based Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS), with support from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, launched a one-year research and outreach project entitled “Fostering a New Security Architecture in the Middle East”. Connected to the research, an expert survey targeting European, US, Russian, Middle Eastern and Chinese experts and practitioners was conducted on key themes, principles and approaches associated with a potential new security architecture for the region. The results of the survey – first published in an edited book volume jointly published by IAI and FEPS in November 2020 – are analysed below, complete with tables and infographics on key themes associated with the research project and the search for new, inclusive mechanisms for dialogue and de-escalation in the Middle East.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Security, Foreign Policy, and Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Middle East, and United States of America

22. Russia in the Arctic—A Critical Examination

Author:: Eugene Rumer, Richard Sokolsky, and Paul Stronski
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Russia has big Arctic plans, but how they will be realized is uncertain. For the United States this will likely mean the return to a Cold War–like environment rather than a new chapter in great-power competition in the Arctic. Russia’s Arctic ambitions have attracted increasing attention in the West over the past decade as climate change opens up new opportunities in the region for navigation and exploration of its riches. For its part, Moscow casts a wary eye on what it sees as a challenge from the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to its position and ambitions there. The Kremlin’s rhetoric about Western encroachment has become more strident, in sync with its enhanced military posture and ambitious economic and infrastructure projects.
Topic:: NATO, Cold War, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, and Economy
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, North America, Arctic, and United States of America

23. Russian Government Moves to Assert Increasing Control Over Internet

Author:: John C. K. Daly
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Amidst growing political dissatisfaction, the Russian government is grappling with the apparent vulnerabilities of the country’s internet. On February 1, Dmitry Medvedev, the deputy chairperson of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, acknowledged during an extensive interview with Russian media what foreign analysts have long suspected: disconnecting Russia from the internet is possible (TASS, February 1). And as if to provide a rationale for such potential action, the previous week, the Federal Security Service’s (FSB) National Coordination Center for Computer Incidents (NKTsKI) reported a threat of possible cyberattacks by the United States and its allies against Russia’s critical infrastructure (Interfax, January 22).
Topic:: Government, Internet, and Repression
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

24. Growing Azerbaijani–Central Asian Ties Likely to Trigger Conflicts With Russia and Iran

Author:: Paul A. Goble
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Karabakh War (September 29–November 9) has had a transformative effect on the country. It not only changed the attitudes of its population, whose members now feel themselves to be heroes rather than victims (see EDM, January 21), but also bolstered the diplomatic weight and possibilities of the Azerbaijani government in its dealings with other regional states. In prosecuting a triumphant war against Yerevan, Baku demonstrated its own ability to act. But just as importantly, Azerbaijan has shown to peoples and governments in the Caucasus and Central Asia that it is a force to be reckoned with, in part thanks to its growing links with Turkey. Moreover, that alliance makes possible an appealing path to the outside world for all who join it. That reality is causing countries east of the Caspian to look westward to and through Azerbaijan in their economic planning and political calculations. At the same time, however, these developments are generating concerns in Moscow and Tehran, which oppose east-west trade routes that bypass their countries’ territories and instead favor north-south corridors linking Russia and Iran together. As a result, Azerbaijan’s recent successes in expanding links with Central Asia set the stage for new conflicts between Azerbaijan and its Turkic partners, on the one hand, and Russia and Iran, which have far more significant naval assets in the Caspian, on the other (see EDM, November 27, 2018 and February 20, 2020; Casp-geo.ru, December 24, 2019; Chinalogist.ru, November 21, 2019).
Topic:: Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, and Trade
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Central Asia, Middle East, and Azerbaijan

25. Moscow’s Hopes to Use Water as ‘New Oil’ Outraging Siberians

Author:: Paul A. Goble
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Given the Vladimir Putin regime’s past reliance on oil exports, it is perhaps no surprise that Moscow has been casting about for some other raw material it can sell abroad now that hydrocarbon prices have fallen and Russian government revenues along with them. But its apparent selection of water as “the new oil” that it can sell to water-short China is again outraging Russians. Indeed, the policy may soon lead to the repetition of protests against such projects that roiled the country east of the Urals in 2019 and 2020. And this could complicate Russia’s relations not just with China but with Mongolia and Central Asian countries as well. By focusing exclusively on the possibility of foreign profits rather than the concerns of its own population, the Putin regime—wittingly or not—is recapitulating some of the steps the Communist leaders fatefully took in the years preceding the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
Topic:: Natural Resources, Water, and Domestic Policy
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

26. Ukraine’s Sanctions Against Pro-Russian Oligarch Medvedchuk—All About Oil and Coal

Author:: Alla Hurska
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On February 19, the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (NSDC) imposed sanctions on Ukrainian tycoon and politician Viktor Medvedchuk and his wife, Oksana Marchenko (Pravda.com.ua, February 19). Medvedchuk is a leader and people’s deputy of the pro-Russian party Opposition Platform–For Life, the largest opposition faction in the Ukrainian parliament. Moreover, he is a close acquaintance of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The NSDC sanctions list also includes five Russian nationals and Ukrainian national Nataliya Lavreniuk. The latter is Marchenko’s friend and the common-law spouse of Taras Kozak (already under sanctions), a people’s deputy from the same political party and Medvedchuk’s business partner. Apart from targeting those eight individuals, sanctions were imposed on nineteen associated businesses, including firms that own aircraft and operate direct flights from Kyiv to Moscow as well as a number of joint stock companies registered in Russia, Moldova and Portugal (Pravda.com.ua, February 20). These measures came two weeks after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy ordered the shutdown of several television channels—ZIK, NewsOne and 112—connected to Kozak. The move was described by Zelenskyy as a necessary step to fight Russian propaganda. But according to the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) and the NSDC, these actions were motivated by more complex issues. Specifically, the three aforementioned TV channels were being financed by limited liability company trading house Don Coal (Rostov, Russia), which receives revenue from smuggling coal out of the Luhansk and Donetsk “people’s republics” (LPR/DPR) (Pravda.com.ua, February 4).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Oil, Sanctions, and Coal
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

27. Russia’s Iskander Missiles Fail in Karabakh but Cause Crisis in Armenia

Author:: Pavel Felgenhauer
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The Second Karabakh War, between Armenia and Azerbaijan, began on September 27, 2020, and ended on November 9, 2020, with a Russian-brokered and guaranteed agreement. The conflict claimed the lives of thousands of Armenian and Azerbaijani soldiers. But after 44 days of fierce fighting, it concluded with Yerevan soundly defeated: Armenia lost territory occupied during the First Karabakh War in 1992–1994 as well as over 30 percent of prewar Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast—a region of Soviet Azerbaijan majority populated by ethnic Armenians. Today, the rump self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR or “Artsakh”)—still controlled by Armenians and not recognized by anyone—is fully surrounded by Azerbaijani troops and territory. The rump Karabakh “republic’s” perimeter is guarded by some 2,000 Russian “peacekeepers” who also control the so-called Lachin corridor, the only highway left open from Armenia proper to Karabakh through the city of Lachin. The future of the rump NKR and its Armenian population is unclear. Baku refuses to discuss any special administrative status for the territory, insisting Armenians born in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast or their descendants must disarm and apply for Azerbaijani citizenships to stay as a minority inside Azerbaijan. In turn, the NKR leadership has declared Russian an official language alongside Armenian to avoid use of Azerbaijani Turkish (Izvestia, February 17). Officials in Stepanakert (Khankendi in Azerbaijani) apparently hope this may tempt Moscow to keep its peacekeepers in Karabakh permanently and maybe eventually agree to annex the NKR outright.
Topic:: Weapons, Conflict, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Eastern Europe, and Nagorno-Karabakh

28. Lawfare as part of hybrid wars: The experience of Ukraine in conflict with Russian Federation

Author:: Zakhar Tropin
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: War Studies University
Abstract:: The main objective of the article is to prove the need for the state to have a centralised legal strategy to ensure the protection of state interests on an international level during a hybrid conflict. Centralisation of control and the planning and implementation of legal actions on an international level are core elements of such a strategy, especially for actions under the jurisdiction of international institutions. This article provides an analysis of treaties and of the practice of adjudication in Ukraine during the conflict with the Russian Federation. The findings of the study show that the legal dimension of hybrid conflict has some sub-levels: legal actions of states in hybrid conflicts taken at interstate level; the level of enterprises controlled by the state; and the private level. The practice of Ukraine shows that the exercising of a multilevel legal encounter during a hybrid war faces a number of problems including the intersection of actions (sometimes even direct conflict), even among authorities involved in the legal protection of state interests; and problems with collecting and analysing the information necessary to protect state interests in the legal dimension; state authorities that are not directly involved in a legal encounter may exercise actions which will complicate the legal position of the state. One of the first steps taken by the state in a hybrid conflict is, therefore, to create special authority or entrust an existing one with the coordination of the functions of lawfare. The next step of such an authority is the strategic “programming” of the opponent’s legal actions with the aim of achieving an advantage in the legal dimension of a hybrid conflict.
Topic:: Conflict, Hybrid Warfare, and Lawfare
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

29. Did Alcohol Policy Really Cause the Postsocialist Mortality Crisis? Revisiting the Rebound and Affordability Hypotheses

Author:: Aytalina Azarova, Gabor Scheiring, Michael Ash, and Lawrence King
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:: This paper reexamines the argument that alcohol policies were the major factor behind the mortality crisis in postsocialist Russia. We show that the correlation between the Gorbachev anti-alcohol campaign (rebound hypothesis), alcohol prices in the 1990s (affordability hypothesis), and mortality reported in previous analyses is not robust to splitting oblasts into Far- East and the rest of Russia. Our analysis conducted on a sample of 534 towns in the European part of Russia also finds no robust evidence supporting the two hypotheses. In contrast, findings linking privatization to mortality are robust to controlling for the anti-alcohol campaign and the affordability of alcohol.
Topic:: Health, Political Economy, Mortality, Alcohol, and Affordability
Political Geography:: Russia and Soviet Union

30. Russia or the West – Which Should Jerusalem Choose?

Author:: Daniel Rakov
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: The Israeli government has not publicly expressed a position regarding the gathering of Russian forces on the Ukrainian border. Still, a renewed war between Russia and Ukraine could make it challenging to choose between its commitment to its Western allies and its important relationship with Russia.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, and Israel

31. Realpolitik Should Guide Israeli-Russian Relations

Author:: Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: When Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett this week meets Russian President Putin for the first time, Bennett must use a realpolitik language.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Governance, and Leadership
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Israel

32. What does the Deraa surrender mean for Iran and Russia in Syria?

Author:: Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: In the southwest, the outside powers of relevance are Iran and Russia. The arrangement in place from July 2018 until now was the product of an uneasy standoff between them.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Ceasefire
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Syria

33. What does Russian Mideast-related diplomatic activity signify?

Author:: Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: A flurry of Middle East-related Russian diplomatic activity is noteworthy because it reflects Moscow’s multi-faceted approach to the region.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Hegemony, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Middle East

34. The Israel-Russia-Syria deal: Cost, beneficiaries and future deals

Author:: Micky Aharonson
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: As Israel and Syria concluded a deal on the return of an Israeli woman from Syria, questions arise regarding the cost and what the future of such transactions with Russian mediation should be.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Hegemony, Conflict, Peace, and Mediation
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

35. Time to Update Israeli Policy Toward Syria

Author:: Aiman Mansour
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Israel should (silently) support a more flexible US policy towards the Syrian regime and the Russian presence in Syria, including the easing of sanctions on Syria, in order to decrease Assad’s dependence on Iranian support and to heighten the conflicts of interest between Moscow and Tehran.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Intervention
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Syria, North America, and United States of America

36. Can Russia live with an ongoing conflict in Syria? Mapping out Trends Among Russian Foreign Policy Elites

Author:: Andrey Baklanov and Leonid Isaev
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: September 30, 2020 marked five years since the start of the Russian Aerospace Forces operation in Syria. This was the first military operation Moscow launched far from its own borders since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Today Russia is not only militarily involved but is deeply invested in the conflict as it seeks to shape the course of the negotiation process and the post-conflict socio-political development of Syria. Russia’s grand strategy in Syria continues to evolve as it assesses its actions and goals in the light of current realities. In this paper we look at how the Russian academic community and diplomatic circles see the outlook of the Syrian negotiation process. We conducted in-depth interviews with representatives of these groups in order to understand their perspective on the Geneva process, the prospects of the Astana format, and the impacts on Russia of an ongoing conflict scenario in Syria.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Intervention
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

37. Reconciliation Initiatives in Daraa: A Testimony for Histor

Author:: Haytham Manna
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: The southern city of Daraa was the birthplace of the peaceful Syrian uprising that started in March 2012. This genuine Syrian movement was met with accusations of conspiracy and vandalism by the Government of Syria (GoS), whose aggressive responses provoked similar reactions from local population. The Houranian people (Daraa city residents), who are known for their peacefulness and sensitivity towards strangers, detested the militarization of the uprising, and they resisted the increasing presence of foreign armed elements (Hezbollah, Nusra Front, ISIS). The feeling of loss of their identity and space to outsiders was acute. The reconciliation with the GoS came about through negotiations with the Russians in mid-2018. Houran people took it as an opportunity to avoid a costly military confrontation with the GoS, restore peacefulness, and expel the foreign militias. This author was part of the negotiations and involved in deliberations at many junctures, and this testimony was prepared in consultation with the principal members of the reconciliation negotiations with the Russians and the GoS.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

38. Understanding Russia’s Endgame in Syria: A View from the United States

Author:: Mona Yacoubian
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: Inherently unstable, Russia’s “spheres of influence” endgame strategy will result in a fractured and volatile Syria. Neither Russia nor Turkey appears likely to withdraw from Syria in the near term. Iran will remain an important player, albeit without holding a territorial sphere of influence. Balancing against Moscow, Tehran will exploit opportunities where possible, deepening its influence through informal and covert efforts. In this endgame, Russia’s prickly partnership with Turkey in Syria likely will endure. As a Russian analyst noted, “Turkey and Russia need each other strategically.” While Moscow may acknowledge that Turkey’s presence in Syria is a long-term problem, Russia’s “spheres of influence” endgame strategy nonetheless accommodates the reality of a lasting Turkish presence.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Hegemony, Rivalry, and Intervention
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

39. US-Russia interactions in Syria and the future of the conflict in 2021

Author:: Nikolay Surkov
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: The future for Syria in 2021 looks bleak from the Russian perspective. Though the conflict entered a low-intensity phase of armed confrontations that characterised 2020 will likely continue in 2021. The temporary negotiated solution for north-western Syria reached in March 2020 is likely to hold but there exists a high probability of renewed fighting between the SAA and various Islamist groups. There will also be bickering between Russia, Turkey, Syria, and Iran due to their different visions for Idlib’s future. Tensions will likely also continue to grow in northern and north-eastern Syria, where US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces sporadically clash with pro-Turkish groups. Occasional US-Russian encounters on the ground are also highly likely in the region. Additionally, confrontations between Israel and Iran/Hezbollah forces stationed in Syria will likely continue and might escalate.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

40. Russia in the Mediterranean: Here to Stay

Author:: Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Russia’s strategy in the Mediterranean is an integral part of its strategy for the wider European theater, which has long been the principal arena of its foreign policy triumphs and setbacks. Europe’s dominant position on Russia’s foreign policy agenda is a product of its strategic culture, which is in turn shaped by geography, historical legacy, and an elite worldview that considers the West a threat to the domestic political order. It is impossible to understand Russia’s current posture in the Mediterranean without viewing it within this larger context and against the backdrop of the country’s centuries-old involvement in the region and retreat from it during the quarter century that followed the end of the Cold War. Since Russia’s 2015 intervention in Syria, alarms have been sounded about the Kremlin’s ambitions and military capabilities in the Mediterranean. These alarms have been unfounded.; Russian capabilities in the Middle East and the Mediterranean region are modest, and the Kremlin’s ambitions there are constrained by geography and geopolitics, limited resources, a transactional approach to relationships, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) formidable force posture on its southern flank. As much as Russia may aspire to regional domination, it lacks the means to achieve this goal. That said, the Russian military is now a presence to be reckoned with in the Eastern Mediterranean. It has complicated U.S./NATO planning and operations, and Moscow has developed good relationships with important regional powers. Given Russia’s limited means, its re-emergence in the region can be considered a success, but its effects should not be exaggerated. Moscow’s posture in the Mediterranean has been largely designed to protect its gains in Syria and defend against the threat that Russian leaders see from NATO land, air, and naval capabilities to the Russian heartland. The importance of Russia’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) “bubble” over Syria has at times been exaggerated. The systems that make up the bubble are limited in range and in a conflict with NATO would be vulnerable to countermeasures. Contrary to a widespread perception, Moscow’s ambitions in the Mediterranean are more than a matter of its vague pursuit to regain great power status—they are a product of enduring Russian national security requirements. The principal rationale for Russia’s return to the region has been the prospect of a military confrontation in the European theater and concerns about the vulnerability of its southern flank in a conflict with NATO. While Russia has sought, in fact, to regain its old Cold War footing—and has been skillful and opportunistic in exploiting openings to expand its footprint—it has acted with caution, avoiding undue risks and, most of all, an outright confrontation with the United States. The Kremlin may aspire to dominate the Mediterranean one day, but for now its aim is to deny this option to NATO. Russia is in the Mediterranean to stay, and its push for a greater naval, air, and land presence and increased political influence will continue as long as it remains locked in a tense standoff with NATO in Europe. This warrants heightened vigilance but not, as has often been the case, fears that Russia has replaced the United States/NATO as the key power broker in the region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Syria, and Mediterranean

41. A Difficult Balancing Act: Russia’s Role in the Eastern Mediterranean

Author:: Paul Stronski
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Russia’s assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean is part of its broader strategy for undermining the cohesion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) and thus complicating the Western alliance’s ability to operate, plan, and formulate policy. The Kremlin’s interests are geared toward enhancing dependencies on Russian gas and financial flows, cultivating governing elites, and stymieing the ability of NATO and, to a lesser extent, the EU to expand. While Moscow’s efforts in the region after its 2015 intervention in Syria are often described as a means to reassert Russia’s great power status, the Russian leadership more likely sees its actions there as part of a broader standoff with the West that stretches from the Atlantic to the Black Sea and from North Africa to the Arctic. This is certainly the case in Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus—three of the most vulnerable countries to Russian influence operations in the region due to a mix of relative geographic proximity to Russia, common cultural and historic legacies, and elites that have looked to Moscow and beyond to balance their countries’ foreign policies or gain leverage with transatlantic partners. While Europe today is generally thought of as more or less “unified,” this region is anything but. Economic turmoil, border and territorial disputes, migration flows, and a growing disenchantment with the EU and the United States have created numerous fissures within and between these three states, transforming them into receptive targets for Russia. They are also highly dependent on Russian hydrocarbons and keen to attract Russian investment and tourists. Russia uses a narrative of shared cultural and religious heritage, along with existing anti-American or Euroskeptic sentiment to cultivate the region’s populations, albeit not always successfully. Yet, its influence operations over the past decade have led to Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus being labeled as weak links in NATO or the EU, especially on key issues of concern to Moscow: expansion of Western political and security organizations, EU sanctions, and the promotion of democracy and good governance. However, while the behavior of some of these countries at times has proved troubling to Washington and Brussels, the Kremlin’s engagement there has not led any of them to formally break with their Western partners, although tensions between the latter and Turkey continue to grow. Russia has been skillful and successful in seeking opportunities to engage the region, cultivating rising political, economic, religious, or cultural decisionmakers in all three countries. It now has a clear presence in the Eastern Mediterranean that cannot be ignored. Russia has been able to compartmentalize its differences with Turkey to develop a working, albeit often unhappy, accommodation in Syria and the South Caucasus, even as the two countries operate largely as competitors in Libya and Ukraine. Ankara’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system exacerbated frictions with Washington, throwing NATO into an internal crisis and leading to Turkey’s expulsion the F-35 and Patriot missile programs. For Russia, the sale was not only a symbolic win for its arms industry; it succeeded in stoking fissures in the Western alliance and complicating its weapons development programs. Nonetheless, while the Russo-Turkish relationship might appear robust, it is neither deep nor wide, and it is largely dependent on the two countries’ authoritarian leaders. Russia’s engagement with Greece has been less successful. Once described as Moscow’s Trojan horse in Europe,1 Athens pivoted back sharply toward its European and NATO partners after the 2018 exposure of Russian attempts to interfere in Greek politics and to upend its rapprochement with North Macedonia. Despite its promises of financial assistance, Moscow lacks the economic clout to help address Greece’s decade-long financial crisis. President Vladimir Putin’s successful cultivation of his Turkish counterpart also unnerves many Greeks. Greece is a clear case of Russian overreach, but Moscow still has tools—hydrocarbons and cultural links—that it can use in the country should future opportunities arise. Like Greece, Cyprus remains wary of Russia’s enhanced security relationship with Turkey, which has opened the door to greater military cooperation with the United States, France, and other Western allies. Nicosia hoped that Moscow could come to the rescue during its 2012–2013 banking crisis, but the latter lacked the financial clout to do so and was not a viable alternative to a harsh EU bailout. As an offshore financial center, Cyprus is dependent on Russian financial flows, not all of them legal, to help prop up its economy, giving Moscow leverage that has paved the way for limited security cooperation, particularly in the form of naval port calls. Russia has increased its cultural outreach to the country, but much of this is geared toward the growing Russian-speaking expatriate community. In sum, Russia’s capabilities in the Eastern Mediterranean are modest, based largely on symbolic diplomacy, energy, financial promises, and the ability to cultivate elites, some of which are quite eager to engage with Moscow for personal or political gain. That approach, however, does not resonate widely beyond the narrow Russia-friendly constituencies in each country. Furthermore, there is not much ballast to these relationships, all of which have proven to be volatile, as the 2015 freeze in Russo-Turkish relations over Turkey’s downing of a Russian fighter or the post-2018 plummet in Greek-Russian relations illustrate. But, if Russia’s main goals are to stoke fissures within the West, to shore up vulnerabilities to NATO on its southern flank, and to be seen as a regional player, it has had success, especially considering its limited economic potential and the challenges it faces in balancing the competing interest of Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus. Russia also wants a seat at the table as a mediator in regional disputes, but that is mainly to preserve its own interests rather than to bring sustainable solutions. Moscow in fact is far more likely to take advantage of those challenges for economic or geopolitical gain than to try to remedy them. To manage Russia’s assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean, NATO and the EU should shift away from trying to combat every instance of Russian activity there, not all of which is malign. Instead, they should work to enhance local resilience and to stabilize countries in the wider Mediterranean such as Lebanon, Libya, and Syria. They should also help Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus address their economic, governance, political, and security challenges.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, Geopolitics, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Mediterranean

42. Grand Illusions: The Impact of Misperceptions About Russia on U.S. Policy

Author:: Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: A critical examination of U.S. policy misfires in dealing with Russia and its intentions and capabilities over the past several decades is long overdue. Three factors largely account for this problem. All of them continue to affect contemporary policymakers’ approach to a deeply troubled relationship with Moscow. By unpacking the analytical assumptions that underlie these misconceptions, President Joe Biden’s administration and other important policy players will be better equipped to ensure that U.S. policy going forward is grounded in the most realistic understanding of the challenge that Russia poses and the right kinds of tools that the United States should use to contend with it. The first factor is the lingering euphoria of the post–Cold War period. For many Western observers, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the implosion of Russian power demonstrated the permanent superiority of the United States. The perception that Russia’s decline was so deep and irreversible that it would no longer be able to resist Western initiatives made it difficult to accept Moscow’s pushback against Western policies. This was a particular problem when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) pursued several rounds of enlargement in the 1990s and early 2000s under U.S. leadership. U.S. leaders ignored Russia’s objections and underestimated the lengths to which Russian counterparts were prepared to go to secure the homeland against perceived threats. Second, American policymakers and experts have long paid too little attention to the drivers of Russia’s external behavior. Russian threat perceptions are part of an inheritance heavily shaped by geography and a history of troubled relations with other major European powers. They are compounded by the trauma of the loss of its empire, the lingering ideology of greatness, and a sense of entitlement based on its sacrifice in World War II. President Vladimir Putin stokes all of them for domestic political gain. Third, U.S. policymakers have not fully internalized the lessons of the two biggest crises of the Cold War—the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the Euromissile crisis of the early 1980s. In both cases, the Soviet Union went to great lengths to counter what its leaders perceived was a unilateral U.S. threat to the Soviet homeland that could not be tolerated. In 1962 they almost triggered a nuclear war. In 1987, they agreed to eliminate an entire class of intermediate-range nuclear weapons to secure the homeland from U.S. missiles. In both situations, U.S. missiles deployed in Europe would deny the Kremlin the advantage of strategic depth and decision time in a crisis. The lessons of those crises were ignored as anachronisms when NATO embarked on its eastward expansion on the assumption that it would no longer need to worry about, let alone maintain the necessary capabilities for the territorial defense mission. After all, Russia was permanently weakened. When Russia proved otherwise, the alliance was caught by surprise. In another surprise for the United States and its allies, Russian foreign policy has become increasingly assertive, adversarial, and ambitious over the past decade. In the post-Soviet space, the Middle East, Latin America, and parts of Africa, Russia has deployed a diverse tool kit rich in hard, soft, and gray zone power instruments to assert itself as a global power. Russian foreign policy agility and even daring have repeatedly caught the West by surprise and sparked fears of its return as a major threat to Western interests. In reality, Russian gains and tools used to accomplish Moscow’s objectives have not been all that impressive. But Russia has made up for it by capitalizing on mistakes made by the United States and its allies or moving into power vacuums left by them. Still, Russian muscle-flexing and agility in deploying its tool kit, certain to be enriched as new and even more disruptive technologies become available, will remain a top-tier challenge for the president and his senior national security aides. Russia will also remain a serious national security concern for the United States because of its nuclear arsenal and conventional and cyber capabilities—and because of the U.S. commitment to NATO, which is locked in a tense standoff with Russia, in close proximity to its heartland, for the foreseeable future. Getting Russia right—assessing its capabilities and intentions, the long-term drivers of its policy and threat perceptions, as well as its accomplishments—is essential because the alternative of misreading them is a recipe for wasted resources, distorted national priorities, and increased risk of confrontation. In responding to this challenge, it is important to set priorities and differentiate between primary and secondary interests. Europe is the principal theater of the East-West confrontation where Russian actions threaten Western security. Beyond Europe, Russia’s gains have been considerably less than often portrayed and pose a less serious challenge to U.S. interests. The continued tendency to dismiss Russia as a “has been” or declining power whose bark will always be worse than its bite can lead to the United States overextending itself, making unrealistic commitments, and risking a dangerous escalation with the one country that is still its nuclear peer competitor. The push to expand NATO without taking into account the possibility of Russia reemerging as a major military power was an example of such thinking, which is to be avoided in the future. At the same time, the scope and scale of the threat that Russia’s global activism poses to U.S. interests will depend largely on how Washington defines those interests in regions where Russia has expanded its footprint over the past decade. Absent a sober assessment of Russia’s gains and tools for power projection, the United States will position itself to needlessly chase after the specter of Russian expansionism in distant corners of the world where major U.S. interests are not at stake.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Power Politics, Geopolitics, Post Cold War, and Expansion
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

43. Less Than a Full Deck: Russia’s Economic Influence in the Mediterranean

Author:: Joanna Pritchett
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Russia’s intervention in Syria in 2015, and then subsequently in Libya, marked its return as a major actor in the Mediterranean. Much has been made of Russia’s use of all elements of statecraft, including diplomatic, ideological, military, and economic instruments, to advance its interests in this region, a vital shipping and transit corridor. A closer look at Russia’s economic tool kit in this region, however, suggests concerns about Russian economic capabilities are likely overstated. Russia’s most important economic tools in the Mediterranean are its energy resources, arms exports, and ability to launder money through corrupt networks. These tools have complemented Russia’s diplomatic and military activities, particularly in areas where economic systems and rule of law have been weaker. Where Russia has been successful, it has increased a country’s dependence on Russian money, oil and gas, and/or arms, giving it a say in a country’s policymaking, particularly on matters of importance to Russia, and a way to undermine U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) influence in the region. In particular, Russia’s unique economic tools have helped it manage its otherwise difficult relationship with Turkey, which depends on Russian oil and gas and is a new customer for Russian nuclear power and weapons systems. Turkey is a unique example in the Mediterranean where Russia already had a substantial trade and investment relationship beyond hydrocarbons, and then used these newer, more subversive tools to build its influence. These same tools have allowed Russia to gain more influence in Egypt, Algeria, and to some degree Cyprus over the last decade. These tools have proved of limited utility elsewhere, however, as they have not been backed by the traditional instruments of economic statecraft: trade in non-energy goods and services, foreign direct investment, and development assistance. Russia has trailed the United States and Europe, and in some cases China, in deploying these fundamental economic elements of foreign policy in the Mediterranean region. Based on economic data available, Russia’s bilateral trade with individual Mediterranean countries is low, its investment levels in most Mediterranean countries are insubstantial, and it is not giving large quantities of development assistance to the poorer countries along the Mediterranean’s eastern and southern rims. The lack of these traditional economic ties is surprising, given Russia’s military and diplomatic efforts to increase its influence in the region. Without them, Russia’s economic diplomacy in the region is highly based on symbolism and the relationships lack sustainability over the long term, which undercuts its geopolitical ambitions in the Mediterranean. If Russia’s ambitions in the Mediterranean region are limited to maintaining access, currying favor with key decisionmakers, and remaining a nuisance to NATO, then its current level of economic ties is likely sufficient. If Russia aims to grow its influence and clout with more countries in the region, however, its current economic tool kit does not appear to be large or sophisticated enough to achieve this. Economic statecraft is an important tool in any country’s foreign policy. Trade and investment deals link countries together in vital ways to improve living standards in each country. They also build relationships between people—politicians, business leaders, students, tourists—that promote mutual understanding and respect for each other’s cultures. The United States and the European Union (EU) have generally excelled in building these types of economic ties in the post–World War II era, and economic data show they continue to be the dominant economic powers in the Mediterranean. Continuing this leadership in the economy will likely ensure that Russian influence in the Mediterranean remains a manageable, if persistent, problem for the West.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Economy, Trade, Regional Power, and Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Mediterranean

44. Reassessing Russian Capabilities in the Levant and North Africa

Author:: Frederic M. Wehrey and Andrew S. Weiss
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Russia may be back in the Middle East, but is it a truly strategic player? The picture is decidedly mixed. After abandoning most of its presence in the Levant and North Africa during the late 1980s, the Kremlin has alarmed Western policymakers in recent years by filling power vacuums and exploiting the missteps of the United States and the European states. Moscow panders to the insecurities and ambitions of local regimes, trying to enrich itself along the way. While Russian activism is part of a broader push for great power status, most of its policies are rooted more in opportunism than grand strategy. Yet Russian influence is formidable in many respects. In war-wracked states like Syria and Libya, Moscow has adroitly deployed military forces and engaged with actors that are off-limits to Westerners, thus positioning itself as a significant power broker. In Egypt and Algeria, it has pursued arms deals that are unencumbered by human rights conditions. Russia’s economic footprint is expanding in fields ranging from infrastructure to tourism to energy, contributing, in some instances, to the region’s cronyism and corruption. At the same time, a closer look at Russian activism reveals that its ability to shape events in the Middle East is far more modest than is commonly assumed. Russia has neither the tools nor the willingness to tackle the region’s deep-seated socioeconomic and governance problems. In Syria, the limits of the Kremlin’s military commitment have been exposed amid clashes with other powerful, outside players and a hardening stalemate on the ground. For now, Moscow is simply not in a position to achieve its desired military or political outcomes absent a significant investment of new resources. Russian economic penetration is driven mainly by short-term objectives and a search for outsized financial rewards that sometimes fail to materialize or to make Moscow an attractive partner. Russian inroads are further limited by regional factors like fractured politics and capricious local actors, who, despite being plied with Russian attention and support, do not behave as docile proxies. In many instances, Middle Eastern rulers exert far more power in shaping the extent of Russian influence than conventional narratives suggest. Successive leaders of Egypt, for instance, have perfected the game of soliciting Russia’s attention to gain leverage over other patrons, namely the United States. For their part, Israeli leaders have worked hard to ensure that Russia does not throw major obstacles in the way of Israel’s ongoing campaign against Iranian military encroachment in Syria—yet they surely take note when Moscow does the bare minimum in raising concerns about the situation in Gaza. The limits of Russian influence are similarly noticeable in the heartbreaking economic crisis in Lebanon, where Moscow is little more than a bystander. With these limitations in mind, Washington should avoid viewing the region through a zero-sum, Cold War lens that sees every development as a net gain or loss for Moscow or minimizes the agency of local actors. In the context of multiple policy challenges across the globe and at home, U.S. decisionmakers need to prioritize the areas of Russian influence that necessitate a response. In so doing, they should avoid playing the arms sales game on Moscow’s terms or letting themselves be instrumentalized by autocratic Middle Eastern rulers who point to Russian overtures to seek leniency and support from Washington. U.S. and European policymakers have ample tools at their disposal that can frustrate or slow the more malign forms of Moscow’s inroads. Yet the net impact of such pushback on Russian resolve should not be overstated. Instead, Washington should focus its energies on its biggest comparative advantage vis-à-vis Moscow in the region: namely, its abundant sources of influence and leverage in the economic and security spheres, its still-potent soft power, and its leadership of multilateral diplomacy and the rules-based global order.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Economy, and Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, North America, and Levant

45. How Syria Changed Turkey’s Foreign Policy

Author:: Francesco Siccardi
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Between August 2016 and the present, Turkey has launched four military operations in northern Syria. Each operation has served specific objectives and was designed to respond to rapidly changing scenarios on the ground. It is possible to identify the key priorities that have informed Turkey’s Syria policy over the years. Boiled down to its core, the Turkish government’s activism in Syria has been driven by domestic politics and has helped Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) preserve power. Domestically, Ankara has used the Syrian conflict as a pretext to suppress the rights of the Kurds living in Turkey and limit their parliamentary representation to secure a landmark constitutional reform in 2017. In the following years, successive military operations in Syria have helped Erdoğan connect with increasingly nationalistic constituencies and drum up support around key electoral dates. Finally, after the failed coup in July 2016, the Turkish government’s Syria policy played a major role in rebuilding the credibility of the Turkish Armed Forces while redrawing the balance between civilian and military power. In foreign policy terms, Turkey’s military operations in Syria have resulted in increasingly tense relations with the United States. Washington’s support for the Syrian Kurds has alienated Ankara to an extent that U.S. policymakers failed to anticipate. The thorniest topic of the day in the U.S.-Turkey bilateral relation—Ankara’s decision to deploy the Russian S-400 missile system—is also deeply related to the Syrian crisis. This decision was made in the context of a strategic realignment between Turkey and Russia that has helped both countries pursue their respective objectives in Syria: the survival of Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad’s regime for Moscow and the weakening of the Syrian Kurds for Ankara. Finally, Ankara’s involvement in Syria has also given Turkey new leverage over the EU when it comes to the management of refugee flows. Solving the question of Syrian refugees in Turkey has been a priority of the Turkish government since the early stages of the Syrian civil war—and a main driver of Ankara’s policies toward both Syria and the EU. Overall, Ankara’s involvement in Syria has not only been a source of conflict—or rapprochement—with its traditional partners and neighbors across the region. It has also equipped Turkey with new tools for conducting a more aggressive, nationalistic foreign policy. The strategies Turkey has employed in Syria have boosted the country’s image and international role. These operations have secured a seat for Turkey at the negotiating table with Russia and the United States. Ankara has used these tools, these lessons learned, and its new capabilities to inform its revisionist foreign policy posture. Going forward, and with an eye on the country’s 2023 presidential election, Turkey will continue to use these tools to reinforce its position in the international arena.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Syrian War, and Military
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

46. Exploring India's Strategic Futures

Author:: Arzan Tarapore
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:: he method of major/minor trends developed in this report suggests that the roots of apparently surprising future behavior can be found in a close reading of a target state’s history. Using this method, the report outlines three unlikely but plausible alternative futures of India as a strategic actor. The first scenario envisions India as a Hindu-nationalist revisionist power hostile to Pakistan but accommodating of China; in the second, it is a militarily risk-acceptant state that provokes dangerous crises with China; and in the third scenario, India is a staunch competitor to China that achieves some success through partnerships with other U.S. rivals like Russia and Iran. These scenarios are designed not to predict the future but to sensitize U.S. policymakers to possible strategic disruptions. They also serve to highlight risks and tensions in current policy.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, China, Europe, India, Asia, and North America

47. US Nonproliferation Cooperation with Russia and China

Author:: Robert Einhorn
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:: The United States has at times worked cooperatively with Russia and China to promote shared nonproliferation objectives. But with no end in sight to the current precipitous decline in Washington’s bilateral relations with Moscow and Beijing, constructive engagement on today’s nonproliferation challenges has become increasingly problematic. Unless the United States and its two great power competitors can find a way to carve out areas of cooperation in otherwise highly adversarial relationships, the remarkably positive record of international efforts to prevent additional countries from acquiring weapons will be difficult to sustain. From sometimes partners to frequent foes, this Occasional Paper examines the history of US cooperation with Russia and China on key issues including Iran, North Korea, Syria, international nonproliferation mechanisms, and nuclear security. It also outlines the obstacles to future nonproliferation cooperation, as well as the growing proliferation threats that require such cooperation. Most importantly, it identifies several possible areas where the United States can hope to find common ground with both countries. With relationships with Russia and China reaching new lows and unlikely to improve for the foreseeable future, finding a way to for the United States to work cooperatively with both countries will not be easy. Bridges to constructive engagement have been burned and will be difficult to rebuild. However, the author points out that constituencies for cooperation remain in all three countries, including in government bureaucracies. “As hard as it may be to find common ground in otherwise highly adversarial relationships, it is imperative that the US administration in office after January 2021 make every effort to do so. Cooperation with America’s two great power rivals will not always guarantee success, but the absence of such cooperation will surely increase the risk of failure.”
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, United States of America, and North America

48. Defeating Threat Air Defences: the Return of the DEAD

Author:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: For the past two decades the US and its allies have faced a very limited surface-to-air threat in wars in which they have engaged. This is now changing as the worsening security environment and the emergence of near-peer rivals once again raises the spectre of a strongly contested air domain. A central element of the renewed challenge is the surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. China and Russia have fielded and continue to develop SAM systems across all range categories – and to offer many of these for export – that pose a credible threat to air operations. The US, and to an even greater extent the Europeans, have reduced emphasis and expenditure on what is known as the suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD) role. Counter-insurgency rather than counter-integrated air-defence operations have been the priority since the turn of the century. There is now, however, the renewed challenge of being able to carry out air operations in airspace defended by the latest generations of point-, short-, medium- and long-range SAM systems. Low-observable aircraft only offer a partial solution, particularly as the US and its allies will operate mixed fleets of stealthy and non-stealthy combat aircraft at least until around the middle of the century. The latter types of aircraft remain at greater risk from SAM threats than low-observable aircraft, and their operational utility will depend partly on the wider capacity to counter surface-based threat missile systems. SEAD is an asset-intensive capability, particularly in the early days of a conflict, and has traditionally involved dedicated platforms as well as fighter ground-attack aircraft. In SEAD operations in the 1990s, such as Operation Allied Force during the 1999 Kosovo conflict, up to one-third of strike missions were tasked against ground-based air defences. While the force mix will change as uninhabited systems are increasingly adopted in the inventory, a variety of crewed and uninhabited aircraft and associated weaponry will still be required for the task, and will be required in numbers greater than are available in current inventories if faced by a peer or near-peer threat. Collating what is known as an electronic order of battle against peer and near-peer rivals should once again become a priority, as should the capacity to counter, disable or destroy surface-to-air threat systems.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

49. From Russia With Love? Serbia's Lukewarm Reception of Russian Aid and Its Geopolitical Implications

Author:: Vuk Vuksanovic
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: As the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic reached the Balkans, Serbia has energetically taken its partnership with China to the next level. This happened as Belgrade embraced China’s “mask diplomacy” campaign of supplying medical equipment to the countries affected by the pandemic. However, while Russia has supplied aid to Serbia to combat the pandemic, it has not received the same attention from the Serbian leadership and public the way China did. Therefore, the pandemic has proven to be a potent ‘revealer’ and reminder of the lack of substance and depth of differences in the Serbo-Russian partnership.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Serbia, and Balkans

50. Dealing with Russia: Towards a Coherent Belgian Policy

Author:: Alexander Mattelaer and Laura Vansina
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Belgo-Russian relations are mired in paradox. For several years, the relationship between the Russian Federation on the one hand and the EU and NATO on the other has been characterized by mistrust. As a founding member of these multilateral organisations, Belgium has been a full part of the decision-making process that has formulated a hardening stance towards the Russian Federation. Yet on a bilateral level, Belgium has pragmatically upheld what is left of commercial cooperation and cultural exchanges. In order to deal with this paradox, Belgium should formulate a more coherent approach towards Russia that focuses on upholding the European order and security whilst maintaining dialogue and engaging the Russian Federation. This requires the new Belgian government to engage in a delicate balancing act that can be articulated in the forthcoming National Security Strategy, in the Belgian positions in the EU and NATO, and in the bilateral relationship with Moscow. This Egmont Paper aspires to provide both analytical background and novel ideas which can be used to such a purpose. When analysing Russian foreign policy, it can only be acknowledged that the annex- ation of Crimea in 2014 fundamentally challenged the rules-based international order. Yet to understand Russian behaviour, it is imperative to reach back in time to the late 1990s and early 2000s. Ever since, Russia’s main goal on the international stage has been the re-establishment of its Great Power status. To this end, it has sought to consolidate security buffers in the form of geographical and psychological depth. Most notably, it involved the promotion of the ‘Russian World’ (Russkiy Mir), the conduct of operations in the grey zone between war and peace, and a fair dose of strategic opportunism. Whilst perhaps understandable, this assertive foreign policy has negatively affected Belgian interests in a variety of ways. Belgo-Russian relations constitute a true kaleidoscope ranging from cooperation to conflict. Bilateral trade has largely recovered from the 2014-2015 shock resulting from the sanctions regime – even if the trade balance remains a negative one. Cultural and academic exchanges continue, in line with the little-known 1993 Belgo- Russian Treaty on Understanding and Cooperation. Yet politically, conflict has been on the increase. Russia has been actively challenging and contesting the multilateral framework that Belgium holds dear. In addition, Belgium has become the target of Russian disinformation and other grey zone operations. As it is unlikely that Russia will tone down its assertive foreign policy anytime soon, Belgium would do well to articulate a more coherent approach. This needs to clarify Belgian policy priorities, communicate Belgian positions towards the Russian government, and educate the domestic audience about the evolving relationship with the Russian Federation.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Belgium

51. Mapping the International Presence of the World’s Largest Arms Companies

Author:: Lucie béraud-Sudreau, Alexandra Marksteiner, Diego Lopes da Silva, Nan Tian, Alexandra Kuimova, Pieter D. Wezeman, and Siemon T. Wezeman
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:: Arms companies have a presence that reaches far beyond the countries in which they are headquartered. This is the result of the internationalization of the arms industry. This paper uses a new data set to examine the results of this internationalization in terms of the international presence of major arms companies. It presents a mapping comprising 400 foreign entities linked to the world’s largest arms companies. The mapping shows that the international presence of major arms companies continues to be influenced by geopolitical divisions and ties, and generally mirrors the geographical locations of the world’s biggest arms import markets. It also reveals that the international presence of major Chinese arms companies and the one Russian company included in the study remains limited. Appendix A lists the 25 largest arms-producing and military services companies in the world, ranked by their arms sales in 2019.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Spending, and Manufacturing
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

52. Mapping the International Presence of the World’s Largest Arms Companies

Author:: Lucie béraud-Sudreau, Alexandra Marksteiner, Diego Lopes da Silva, Nan Tian, Alexandra Kuimova, Pieter D. Wezeman, and Siemon T. Wezeman
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:: Arms companies have a presence that reaches far beyond the countries in which they are headquartered. This is the result of the internationalization of the arms industry. This paper uses a new data set to examine the results of this internationalization in terms of the international presence of major arms companies. It presents a mapping comprising 400 foreign entities linked to the world’s largest arms companies. The mapping shows that the international presence of major arms companies continues to be influenced by geopolitical divisions and ties, and generally mirrors the geographical locations of the world’s biggest arms import markets. It also reveals that the international presence of major Chinese arms companies and the one Russian company included in the study remains limited.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation and Military Spending
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Global Focus

53. Coming out and breaking out: The US, Iran and Europe go nuclear

Author:: Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: On the eve of the US elections, the nuclear deal (JCPOA) stands on the edge of the precipice. The US strategy of ‘maximum pressure’ has not (yet) achieved its implicit objective of 'regime change' but tanked Iran’s economy, caused its government to dig in and increased regional instability. The geopolitical consequences of US sanctions, EU prevarication and Iran’s deep presence throughout the Middle East have been equally profound. At the global level, they include nudging Iran towards China/Russia, the US alienating its European ‘partners’ and encouraging them to develop greater strategic autonomy. At the regional level, US sanctions risk creating an alternative economic regional order, ensuring Yemen remains a protracted war and making a regional security initiative more necessary, but less likely. It is not yet too late to turn the tide. The focus should now be on reducing regional tensions and especially the stress that sanctions have put on Iran’s population and government. Radical action looks more inviting when one stands against the wall, but the Middle East does not need more conflict than it already has. To do so, the EU should first support Iran with a large-scale Covid-19 humanitarian economy recovery package. As such measures are already sanctions-exempt, they will create few new tensions. An economic initiative should follow that grants preferential access to the EU’s internal market for industrial and agricultural goods from the entire Middle East (for Iran via an upgraded INSTEX). Such interventions will not resolve existing security dilemmas but can show there is an alternative to confrontation.
Topic:: Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, Nuclear Power, Elections, and European Union
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Yemen, and United States of America

54. Don’t be rude, don’t be docile! How to manage freedom of manoeuvre in tense bilateral diplomacy

Author:: Hans Mouritzen
Publication Date:: 11-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies
Abstract:: Bilateral diplomacy has become increasingly important in today’s multipolar world. A number of cases are analysed in this DIIS Working Paper, where Nordic countries have been ‘disciplined’ in bilateral diplomacy by the emerging great powers of Russia, China, or India. Compared to the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, with US unipolarity and EU normative power, the Nordics have experienced a narrowing of their freedom of manoeuvre. It is no longer possible, without significant costs, to criticise these great powers’ internal affairs or foreign policies based on allegedly universal values. In general, it is crucial for decision-makers not to overstep their state’s freedom of manoeuvre. But on the other hand, they should not be too docile and desist from occasionally challenging its limits. Trial balloons or parallel action with related countries might do exactly that.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Power Politics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Russia, China, India, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and United States of America

55. Russia in Africa: Is Great Power Competition Returning to the Continent?

Author:: Agnieszka Paczyńska
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Development Institute (DIE)
Abstract:: Since 2014 Russian economic, political and security engagement in Africa has grown significantly. This policy brief analyses the motives and recent changes in Russia's Africa policy, and discusses implications for German and European cooperation with Africa.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Power Politics, Investment, and Trade
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, China, and United States of America

56. Framing Russia’s Mediterranean Return: Stages, Roots and Logics

Author:: Dario Cristiani
Publication Date:: 08-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Russia’s return as a major geostrategic actor in the Mediterranean is one of the most significant trends characterising this area over the past few years. Part of a broader geopolitical pluralization of this space, Russia’s 2015 intervention in Syria marked a new phase in Moscow’s Mediterranean engagement. Based on a stringent logic of intervening where other powers leave strategic vacuums, Russia has succeeded to carve out an increasingly central role in Mediterranean equilibria, despite its limited resources. Russian diplomatic and economic support for the Syrian regime in Damascus had steadily increased since the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011. Yet, it was Moscow’s direct military intervention in September 2015 that signalled a decisive upgrade in engagement. Moscow’s military involvement shifted the tide of the conflict, proving decisive in avoiding the collapse of the Syrian regime, which is also backed by Iran and the Lebanese group Hezbollah.
Topic:: Civil War, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Economy, Military Intervention, and Syrian War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, and Syria

57. Nuclear Risk Reduction: Looking Back, Moving Forward, and the Role of NATO

Author:: Wilfred Wan
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: In a difficult geopolitical environment marked by increased tensions among nuclear-armed and nuclear-allied states, there has emerged an urgent and widespread call for the implementation of practical measures to reduce the risk of nuclear-weapon use – whether intentional or inadvertent. A concerted effort to take risk reduction forward must address the spectrum of use scenarios by drawing on past activities, building on existing agreements and considering innovative approaches. NATO will have a key role to play, given the nuclear nature of the Alliance and the involvement of its members in strategic and regional competition. Alliance activities past and present can provide insight relevant to the development of multilateral risk-reduction measures. At the same time, in highlighting the dynamism and multi-faceted nature of risk, they underline the scale of the challenge ahead.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Risk, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

58. Russia's Foreign and Security Policy in the Middle East: Entering the 2020s

Author:: Ekaterina Stepanova
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: As Russia has become a major external player in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region due to its military engagement in Syria since 2015, it has acted as a balancer and mediator in several regional controversies and has continued to serve as a security guarantor for the Syrian state. This course has brought Moscow some practical dividends, such as growing economic and military-technical cooperation with select MENA countries, and has spurred its broader international profile. However, entering the 2020s, the risks of more active engagement in the Middle East have also mounted, making Russia’s balancing act more difficult. In three cases where Russia’s involvement has been visible (Syria, Libya and the Israeli-Palestinian problem), evolving developments challenge Moscow’s acquired influence and multi-vector approach, but also create new opportunities for its engagement and mediation. Above all, the 2020 US–Iran crisis catalysed the urgent need for structured regional dialogue, especially across the Persian Gulf. While this requires direct interaction between the region’s main antagonists, the initial impulse to unlock the trans-Gulf impasse might need to come from the outside. A process-oriented blueprint for inclusive multilateral security in the Gulf proposed by Russia in 2019 is a step in the right direction, but to be activated it may need to come as part of some broader international initiative.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, Israel, Libya, Palestine, North Africa, and Syria

59. There Goes the Neighborhood: The Limits of Russian Integration in Eurasia

Author:: Paul Stronski
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Eurasia is squeezed between a rising China and an aggressive and unpredictable Russia. The United States should remain engaged with the region to help it resist Russian advances. Since 2014, Russia has redoubled its efforts to build a sphere of influence, operating frequently under the flag of Eurasian integration. Its undeclared war in Ukraine and hardball tactics vis-à-vis other neighbors demonstrate the lengths to which it is willing to go to undermine their independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Moscow has pushed hard to expand the membership and functions of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the formal vehicle for cross-regional integration of political and economic activity. However, Russia’s limited economic resources and lack of soft-power appeal; the engagement with the region by other outside powers, including the European Union, China, Turkey, and the United States; and societal change in neighboring states are creating significant long-term obstacles to the success of Russian neo-imperialist ambitions and exposing a large gap between its ends and means. Russia’s ambitions in Eurasia are buffeted by unfavorable trends that are frequently overlooked by analysts and policymakers. Russia’s own heavy-handed behavior contributes to both regional upheaval and instability as well as to the creation of diplomatic headwinds that constrain its own room for maneuver.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

60. Russia’s Stony Path in the South Caucasus

Author:: Philip Remler
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: As the battle between Armenia and Azerbaijan heats up, Russia struggles to contend with a vastly more complicated landscape in the South Caucasus. Since shortly after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia’s aims and policies in the South Caucasus have been constant, but its capabilities to project power and influence have fluctuated. Russia’s engagement with the entire Caucasus region is best characterized as a tide. Its power and influence began to ebb at the start of the Karabakh conflict—with the February 1988 massacre of Armenians in the Azerbaijani city of Sumqayit being the key galvanizing event.2 After that, the tide receded rapidly, leaving even Russian possessions in the North Caucasus without effective central control. The First Chechen War marked low tide, which only began to rise with the Second Chechen War, beginning in 1999. Until about 2004, Russia was too weak and internally divided to project power and influence in the wider Caucasus region in a meaningful way. To be sure, Russian influence was never gone completely, even during the lowest ebb of the tide. Russia still marshaled greater resources than the new states of the Caucasus could muster, and it threw its weight around. But in the 1990s, Russia did not have a unified governing apparatus, but rather a mass of competing clans among which regional actors could maneuver. For example, after the Soviet collapse, Moscow left the Russian military units in the Caucasus to their own devices. Those units served as mercenaries, arms suppliers, and logistics providers to both sides in the Karabakh conflict. It took a decade for Moscow to reassert its so-called power vertical in the Caucasus, symbolized by President Vladimir Putin’s success in 2004 in finally ousting chief of the general staff Anatoliy Kvashnin.3 Russia’s assertiveness in the region grew steadily thereafter, with sharp upticks after the 2008 war with Georgia and Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, History, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, Elites, and Soviet Union
Political Geography:: Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and South Caucasus

61. U.S.-Russian Relations in 2030

Author:: Richard Sokolsky and Eugene Rumer
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: U.S.-Russia relations will remain frosty for years, but even Cold Wars eventually thaw. The United States should prepare now to act decisively when this one finally does, even if it takes a decade. U.S.-Russian relations are at the lowest point since the Cold War. Almost all high-level dialogue between the two countries has been suspended. There are no signs that the relationship will improve in the near future. However, this situation is unlikely to last forever—even during the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union maintained a limited but meaningful dialogue; the two countries eventually will reengage, even if mostly to disagree, and new U.S. and Russian leaders could pursue less confrontational policies. What is the agenda that they will need to tackle then—perhaps as far in the future as 2030?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

62. Russia in the Asia-Pacific: Less Than Meets the Eye

Author:: Eugene Rumer, Richard Sokolsky, and Aleksandar Vladicic
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Russian foreign policy remains focused primarily on Europe. That said, Moscow’s diplomatic foray into Asia hinges on its burgeoning strategic partnership with China. Much has been written about Russia’s so-called pivot to the Asia-Pacific since its 2014 invasion of Ukraine and break with the West, but there is less to this supposed strategic shift than meets the eye. The country is and will remain a European—rather than an Asian—power by virtue of its history, strategic culture, demographics, and principal economic relationships.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Demographics, Diplomacy, History, Partnerships, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Asia-Pacific

63. Etched in Stone: Russian Strategic Culture and the Future of Transatlantic Security

Author:: Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Russia will remain a formidable adversary for the United States, yet they have a shared interest in avoiding outright war. Time and patience will be needed to rebuild the relationship. Russian strategic culture is a product of several key factors: a long history of wars and adversarial relations with other European powers; an open geographic landscape that puts a premium on strategic depth; and an elite given to embracing a narrative of implacable Western hostility toward Russia. Historically, Europe has been by far the most important geographic theater for Russia, and it remains so to the present day. The national narrative of Vladimir Putin’s Russia emphasizes the legacy of World War II in Europe and the critical role Russia played in the defeat of Germany. Both support the Kremlin’s claim to special rights in the affairs of the continent.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Culture, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

64. Russia Strives for an Oil and Gas Resurgence

Author:: Pavel K. Baev
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: As the global economy—animated by the arrival of multiple COVID-19 vaccines—hopes for the first signs of recovery, expectations also rise in Russia for an accompanying surge in demand for oil and natural gas and renewed prominence of energy geopolitics in foreign policy-making. President Vladimir Putin is a firm believer in hydrocarbons as the world’s main energy source and a sceptic of “green agendas,” even if Chinese President Xi Jinping has subscribed to the pledge to curtail emissions (TASS, September 30). Russia’s Energy Strategy 2035, approved in June 2020, sets ambitious goals for expanding oil and gas extraction and defines the shifts in the world markets toward carbon-neutral energy production as a major challenge (Vedomosti, May 19; see EDM, June 2). Mainstream Russian experts dismiss the European Union’s post-crisis recovery plans that include new incentives for developing zero-carbon-emission energy sources; defiantly, they project that Russian energy exports to the European market will continue to expand (Kommersant, December 3).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Energy Policy, Oil, Natural Resources, Gas, and Economy
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

65. Russia and Iraq Deepen Energy, Military Ties

Author:: John C. K. Daly
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: As the United States hastens its drawdown of troops in Iraq before the January 20 inauguration of President-elect Joseph Biden, Russia is seeking to fill the developing geopolitical vacuum there. On November 25, following discussions in Moscow with Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein, Russia’s top diplomat, Sergei Lavrov, remarked that Russian energy firms have invested billions of dollars in the Iraqi oil industry. “When it comes to energy, the largest Russian companies are working in Iraq together with their partners. These are Lukoil, Rosneft, Gazprom-Neft and Bashneft. All four have invested more than $13 billion in the Iraqi economy,” Lavrov told journalists (Interfax, November 25). He added that Moscow was also prepared to increase arms deliveries to Baghdad, stating, “We are ready to meet any Iraqi needs for Russian-made military products. Our country has traditionally played and continues to play a very important and significant role in ensuring Iraq’s defense capability and equipping its army and security forces, including in the context of continuing terrorist threats” (Mid.ru, November 25).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:: Russia, Iraq, Eurasia, and Middle East

66. Moscow Concerned About Turkish Influence on the Gagauz

Author:: Paul A. Goble
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Turkey’s success in the South Caucasus is echoing across the former Soviet space as well as inside the Russian Federation itself; and not surprisingly, Moscow is worried. Azerbaijan is now openly an ally of Turkey and has Turkish military forces on its territory, something Russia had previously said it would never allow. Three of the four Turkic-majority countries in Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan—have taken note of the change in the balance of forces in the region in Turkey’s favor and are increasingly looking toward Ankara for guidance. And some Turkic nations inside the Russian Federation, Volga Tatars in particular, have organized pro-Azerbaijani and pro-Turkic demonstrations, which, despite their small size, troubled the central authorities in Moscow (Vestnik Kavkaza, November 29). Except for Azerbaijan, of course, these all represent overwhelmingly long-term challenges. Central Asian countries are not about to make any dramatic geopolitical shifts unless and until additional robust transportation links through the Caucasus make that compelling; whereas the Turkic peoples within the Russian Federation, however strongly they may identify with such pan-Turkic impulses, have few possible outlets for acting on them.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, and Caucasus

67. Veiled Counter-Balancing: The Peacekeeping ‘Arrangement’ Between Turkey and Russia in Karabakh

Author:: Can Kasapoglu
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In the wake of Azerbaijan’s successful offensive against the dug-in Armenian forces in Karabakh and surrounding Azerbaijani districts, the defense ministers of Turkey and Russia, General (ret.) Hulusi Akar and General Sergei Shoigu, respectively, met on November 11 and penned a memorandum of understanding to broker the ceasefire process in the war-torn region. According to the deal, Ankara and Moscow have, in principle, agreed to establish a joint peace-monitoring headquarters. The Russian foreign policy community has been extremely uneasy to see the Turkish Armed Forces suddenly operating in the South Caucasus, once considered Moscow’s undisputed hinterland (Milliyet, December 3).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Peacekeeping, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Armenia, and Nagorno-Karabakh

68. Increasing Nuclear Threats through Strategic Missile Defense

Author:: Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:: Growing concerns about third-country nuclear threats led the United States to withdraw from the ABM Treaty’s constraints on the size and scope of ballistic missile defense arsenals in 2002. Inaccurate and alarmist projections of “rogue state” ICBM threats were critical in winning support for the decision to withdraw from the treaty and to sustain the multi-billion dollar annual price tag for developing, deploying, and expanding strategic missile defenses. But 18 years after Washington abandoned the treaty, North Korea is the only rogue state that could pose a near-term nuclear threat against the American homeland—and U.S. missile defense interceptors and radars have not even delivered high confidence of being able to protect against this threat. Meanwhile, the absence of limits on U.S. strategic missile defenses and prudent, worst-case concerns in Moscow and Beijing about their future expansion are fueling resistance to additional nuclear arms reductions and stability measures. The end result is that the exponential threats posed by Russia and China are getting worse and the chances of a disastrous nuclear arms race are increasing. This analysis argues that the nuclear threat confronting the United States is multilateral, three-dimensional, and interrelated. Unless the United States acknowledges the role of missile defenses in this complicated reality, it will not be able to realize the full benefits that arms control offers.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

69. Alternative Approaches to Information-Age Dilemmas Drive U.S. and Russian Arguments about Interference in Domestic Political Affairs

Author:: Pavel Sharikov
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:: This paper investigates differences in Russian and American approaches to challenges of the information age, and explores some destabilizing effects on bilateral relations. The governments and societies in Russia and the United States base political and economic decisions about the development and use of information technology on different principles; in a globalized, interconnected world Russia’s collectivistic approach clashes with American individualistic approach. This exacerbates numerous problems in Russia-U.S. relations, including reciprocal allegations of information attacks as a form of interference in domestic affairs. Alternative approaches to information-age dilemmas make Russia and the United States particularly sensitive to different ways of using information technology to impact electoral processes and domestic politics, with little understanding of each other’s narratives and national priorities.
Topic:: Elections, Information Age, Disinformation, and Election Interference
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

70. Iran's Influence in the Middle East

Author:: Jadranka Polovic
Publication Date:: 08-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:: The Middle East as one of the most heterogeneous and politically conflicting regions in the world and has long been at the center of international interest. Faced with sectarian wars and comprehensive social crises for decades the Middle East, due to its geostrategic importance and especially the imperative of controlling the region’s vast energy resources, has once again become a battle ground for major powers whose interests affect the concentration of participants in the region. The competition between global powers and growing influence of Russia and China, who undermine the US power and European Union’s influence and also undermine established alliances in the Middle East, undoubtedly require a rethinking of Western strategies for the region. A series of geopolitical challenges, especially after September 11 attacks against the United States, as a result of military interventions and civil wars (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria) and uprisings (Arab Spring) and thus the collapsed regional order, confronted the international community with the changing nature of security threats, as well as with the new balance of power of regional and international actors in the Middle East. Among the many aspects of the Middle East conflicts, the fundamental issue of regional security today is the Sunni-Shiite conflict, which has since the invasion of Iraq in 2003 directly defined the approaches and policies of great powers and significantly changed regional dynamics. In this context, Iran’s role is particularly significant. Namely, over the last two decades, Iran has consolidated its goals in the Persian Gulf and strategically expanded its influence to other countries in the Middle East, primarily Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. The growing influence of Shiite Iran, and its close relations with Shiite communities in the region with which it forms a strategic coalition, have become a key geopolitical challenge for the international community.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Energy Policy, International Cooperation, Natural Resources, and Hegemony
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Asia, North America, and United States of America

71. Saudi-Russia oil war is a game theory masterstroke

Author:: Antoine Halff
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:: On the face of it, the idea of Saudi Arabia and Russia starting an oil price war in the middle of a global pandemic is as dumb as it gets. From a game theory perspective, it is a masterstroke. Analysts have called the breakdown of Opec+ and the lifting of the supply cuts that kept the oil market balanced in the last two years anything from a spectacular blunder to collective suicide. A new model of the oil market led by the inventors of mean-field game theory, Fields Medal laureate Pierre-Louis Lions and Jean Michel Lasry, suggests otherwise.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Oil, Natural Resources, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Saudi Arabia

72. A Saudi-U.S.-Russia Oil Deal Is Not a Good Idea

Author:: Christof Ruhl
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:: Oil markets are sending confusing signals at a time when more confusion is the last thing anyone needs. When Russia walked out on OPEC+ rather than contribute to more output cuts, Saudi Arabia turned on the crude taps. Whatever Riyadh’s intention, this “price war” was quickly made meaningless by the impact of the new coronavirus on global oil demand. The price collapse has been beyond anything anyone could have imagined. Now, storage room for crude is becoming scarce. Analysts warn darkly that plunging prices may threaten global economic stability. Equities follow the oil price news. Everyone seems to agree that prices should stop falling; and yet no one seems to argue that a very low oil price is exactly what the world’s economy needs to recover. The combination of price war and pandemic is also creating strange bedfellows. Some American shale producers are advocating that their country blocks Saudi oil imports, others want to talk to OPEC. President Donald Trump’s government has expressed an interest in cooperating on global oil supplies with Saudi Arabia and Russia; it’s nudging OPEC+ to reconvene, or an even wider group of producers to meet. Could we be witnessing the emergence of an unholy alliance of Saudi Arabia, Russia and the U.S., to “manage volatility,” and incidentally shore up the price of oil?
Topic:: Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, Oil, and Natural Resources
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, North America, and United States of America

73. Putting A Spoke In The Wheel: Russian Efforts To Weaken U.S.-led Alliance Structures In Northeast Asia

Author:: James D. J. Brown
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: Russia is widely accused of employing a range of instruments—both overt and covert—to undermine Western unity. However, to what extent is Russia engaged in comparable activities to weaken the South Korean and Japanese alliances with the United States? This paper answers this question by assessing Moscow’s actions in the domains of diplomacy, information, the military, and the economy. It finds that Russia is indeed aiming to encourage Seoul and Tokyo to distance themselves from Washington and from each other. In particular, Moscow is committed to deterring U.S. allies from facilitating the deployment of additional units of U.S. missile defense systems within the region. Across the four domains, it is only in the economic field that Russia is found to lack leverage. Overall, Moscow has achieved several tactical victories, but has yet to seriously damage U.S.-led alliance structures within the region. All the same, Seoul and Tokyo must remain watchful of Moscow’s activities, especially since there are signs of increased cooperation between Russia and China in exploiting wedge issues between the United States and its allies, thereby potentially combining China’s economic weight with Russia’s skills in influence operations.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Economy, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, and United States of America

74. Terrorism in Afghanistan: A Joint Threat Assessment

Author:: Teresa Val
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EastWest Institute
Abstract:: Terrorism in Afghanistan: A Joint Threat Assessment is intended to serve as an analytical tool for policymakers and an impetus for joint U.S.-Russia action. The report provides an overview of the security situation and peace process in Afghanistan, taking into account U.S. and Russian policies, priorities and interests; surveys the militant terrorist groups in and connected to Afghanistan and explores the security interests of various regional stakeholders vis-à-vis Afghanistan. Challenges relating to border management, arms trafficking and terrorist financing in Afghanistan are also briefly addressed.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Counter-terrorism, and Peace
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Russia, United States, Europe, Middle East, and North America

75. Hard security dynamics in the Baltic Sea region: From turbulence to tense stability

Author:: Matti Pesu
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: This Briefing Paper looks into the fundamentals of the Baltic Sea security landscape in the early 2020s. It argues that three interconnected security dynamics shape the present, ‘post-2014’ security environment in Northeastern Europe. That is to say, Russia’s assertive behaviour in the region and in Europe more broadly, NATO’s reassurance and deterrence measures in the area, and Finland’s and Sweden’s closer integration into the Western defence network all affect hard se- curity dynamics in the Baltic Sea region. These three dynamics underlie the tense regional stability that emerged after a period of alarmism and turbulence in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s ac- tions in Ukraine. Fundamentally, the stability is the product of the interplay between the three dynamics. In other words, NATO’s reassurance and deterrence measures accompanied by Finland’s and Sweden’s in- tegration into the Western security and defence system act as a counterweight to Russia’s actions in the region, creating a balance of power holding Russia’s ambitions in check. Investigating the sources of regional balance is rele- vant for multiple reasons. The region remains a poten- tial hotspot between Russia and the West and, thus, it merits close and continuous attention. Moreover, the word ‘stability’ frequently features in foreign policy parlance in Northern Europe, particularly in Finland and Sweden. Given this rhetorical proclivity, attention needs to be paid to the factors that actually constitute stability and the state of hard security in the Baltic Sea area. The paper consists of three analytical parts. First, it provides a brief historical overview of the twists and turns in the regional security landscape from the early post-Cold War era to today. The second part introduces the three dynamics in detail, followed by an analysis of how they are interconnected. The paper concludes by contemplating how regional stability could best be preserved in the 2020s.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Baltic Sea

76. The Covid-19 pandemic in Russia: No applause for Putin’s political play?

Author:: Veera Laine and Jussi Lassila
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: In Russia, the confirmed Covid-19 infections have been suspiciously few. The official numbers do not reflect reality as there has been no systematic testing at any phase of the epidemic. Now, however, the number of cases has risen rapidly, and the new situation has an effect on the Kremlin’s position in the eyes of the people.
Topic:: Leadership, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Eastern Europe

77. Turbulence in arms control: Open Skies Treaty became a victim of the great power competition

Author:: Jyri Lavikainen
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Non-compliance and disputes between Russia and the US resulted in the US exiting the Open Skies Treaty. If Russia withdraws in response, European countries will lose an important source of intelligence.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Intelligence, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, Europe, and North America

78. Towards the 2021 Duma election: The Russian opposition needs strong leaders

Author:: Jussi Lassila
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Peopleʼs grievances were not reflected in Russia’s regional elections this year. The Kremlin is reaping the benefits of increasingly blatant electoral fraud and citizensʼ political apathy.
Topic:: Authoritarianism, Elections, Rigged Elections, and Opposition
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Eastern Europe

79. Finnish foreign policy during EU membership: Unlocking the EU’s security potential

Author:: Matti Pesu, Tuomas Iso-Markku, and Juha Jokela
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: This FIIA Finnish Foreign Policy Paper looks at the evolution of Finnish foreign and security policy during the country’s 25 years as an EU member. The paper aims to trace how – and with what kind of consequences – Finnish foreign and security policy has interacted with EU foreign policy during the membership period. More specifically, the study examines the interlinkage between Finnish and EU foreign policy in relation to three different topics: the policy towards and relations with Russia, security and defence, and Finland’s broadening international agenda. The paper argues that the Finnish policy vis-à-vis the three domains is marked by different patterns of continuity and change. However, the rise of a protective agenda in the Finnish policy towards Russia, Finland’s increased boldness in advancing the EU’s security and defence dimension, and the recent emphasis on the Union’s role as a bulwark against geo-economic threats all indicate that the EU’s role in enhancing Finnish security has become a top priority. Indeed, Finland is currently endeavouring to unlock the EU’s potential as a security community.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Finland, and Scandinavia

80. Digital authoritarianism in China and Russia: Common goals and diverging standpoints in the era of great-power rivalry

Author:: Elina Sinkkonen and Jussi Lassila
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: China and Russia are jointly advancing their shared interests in the international arena and are building up cooperation in the tech sector. Despite far-reaching plans, the asymmetry of cooperation in favour of China is increasingly at odds with Russia’s national goals in digital technology. Differences in resources and standpoints are also reflected in the implementation of digital surveillance. China’s surveillance system is sophisticated and extensive whereas Russia’s is largely inconsistent and emerging, as evidenced by the fact that there was virtually no control of the internet in Russia until 2012. While advanced surveillance in authoritarian countries is worrying, technology in strategic sectors is also a key field of increasingly disconcerting great-power competition. As a result of strategic competition, the world is faced with the risk of technological decoupling, which would contribute to further fragmentation of the international community and deepening of existing rivalries.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Authoritarianism, Digital Economy, and Surveillance
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

81. Uzbekistan’s new Central Asia policy: The economic rationale and political implications of good neighbourliness

Author:: Kristiina Silvan
Publication Date:: 11-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Under the leadership of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, Uzbekistan has embarked on a moderate reform programme that aims to achieve socio-economic growth without undoing the country’s authoritarian political system. The programme has implications beyond Uzbekistan’s borders because it has changed the way Uzbekistani foreign policy is formulated and implemented. Uzbekistan’s former isolationist stance has shifted to a foreign policy opening, which is most noticeable in the improvement of its relations with its neighbours. This Working Paper analyzes “good neighbourliness”, the key concept of Uzbekistan’s new Central Asia policy. It details the amendment of Uzbekistan’s bilateral relations with its neighbours and points to the positive reception of Uzbekistan’s new regional policy in Russia, China, and the West. The paper argues that while “good neighbourliness” is a pragmatic strategy rooted in economic rationality, the policy’s regional implications are substantial. It is laying the necessary foundation for sustainable Central Asian co-operation from within in a way that is acceptable to the Central Asian states and big non-regional actors alike.
Topic:: Regional Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Authoritarianism, Reform, and Leadership
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Central Asia, Asia, and Uzbekistan

82. Russian pipelines and EU energy security: Utilizing the externality elements of the EU’s regulatory framework

Author:: Michalis Mathioulakis
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: Russia and the EU have been entangled in the harsh effects of asymmetrical interdependence and the security threats it generates. Russia’s economy is linked directly to the form and volume of trade directed from the EU towards the Russian economy, while the EU economy is linked to the flow of Russian gas and oil directed towards European businesses and households. Growing concerns on EU’s dependency on energy imports led the European Commission to release its Energy Security Strategy (2014), aiming to secure stability and abundancy of energy supply while simultaneously examining the effects of discrepancies from Russian gas imports to the European energy systems. In contrast, Russia’s primary concern is to secure the necessary energy revenues that could enable Moscow to project and exercise its hard power to areas with strategic interest by striving to gain greater leverage within the European energy markets. Russia’s security objectives in relation to its energy export capacity are expressed primarily through materialisation of two major natural gas pipeline systems, namely the Nord Stream 2 and the TurkStream pipelines. This paper by Michalis Mathioulakis, Research Associate of ELIAMEP; Energy Strategy Analyst and Academic Director of the Greek Energy Forum, examines the strive between the two international actors in redetermining their future relations and the role of Russian gas pipelines and the EU’s regulatory framework in shaping the two actors’ common future.
Topic:: Security, Energy Policy, European Union, and Regulation
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

83. Greek-Russian Relations: A Potential to Mend Strained Ties

Author:: George Tzogopoulos
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: The relationship between Greece and Russia requires a careful management following the diplomatic crisis of the 2018 summer. The visit of Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to Athens offers an opportunity for a sincere dialogue between the two countries. Greece and Russia can either agree on their disagreements or search for a new way forward based on realism and common interests. A sincere dialogue should leave illusions aside and concentrate on joint interests.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Greece

84. European defence policy in an era of renewed great-power competition

Author:: Douglas Barrie, Lucie béraud-Sudreau, Henry Boyd, Nick Childs, Bastain Giegerich, James Hackett, and Meia Nouwens
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: In 2019, European governments’ combined defence spending, when measured in constant 2015 US dollar terms, surpassed the level reached in 2009, before the financial and economic crisis led to a series of significant defence-spending cuts. However, a different strategic paradigm – one that Europe is struggling to adjust to and which is once more a concern for European governments – has re-appeared in this past decade: great-power competition. Russia attempted to change international borders in Europe through the use of force in 2014 by annexing Crimea and continues to support an armed insurgency in eastern Ukraine. Moscow’s challenge to Euro-Atlantic security exists in multiple dimensions: as both a conventional military and also a hybrid-warfare issue, with Russia working to dislocate existing societal alignments and disrupt political processes in Western states. The poisoning of a former Russian intelligence officer (and of his daughter) in the United Kingdom, attributed by the British government to Russia, underlines further how much the character of conflict has changed. How to manage the challenge Russia poses without simply reverting to Cold War logic remains a worrying problem for governments in NATO and the European Union member states. Meanwhile, European security establishments are beginning to recognise the growing political, economic and military influence of a rising China. Although less of an immediate challenge, China’s growth in these areas has possible profound consequences in the long run. Indeed, in December 2019, NATO declared: ‘We recognise that China’s growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance.’2 For the United States, China has already become the pacing military threat. The US Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, released in June 2019, opens with the assertion that ‘the Indo-Pacific is the Department of Defense’s priority theater’. In other words, the European theatre is not. European analysts and officials have begun to wonder whether the US might begin to see Europe through an Asian lens, seeking to generate European commitments to the Indo-Pacific region, or at the very least getting Europeans to take on greater responsibility for their own security and thereby freeing up US resources. Although there will be some elements of the US military presence in Europe that are indispensable to US military action in other regions of the world, that might not be enough to sustain Washington’s firm commitment to European security in the future, regardless of who occupies the White House. Significantly, not even the US has the capability to fight two major wars simultaneously any more, meaning binary choices regarding focus are inevitable. As some observers have argued, Europeans need to urgently assess what Washington’s choices in this regard – and their implications for Europe – might look like. Considering both how to deter Russia and what a European contribution to containing China might entail represents a major challenge for Western European nations, which have relegated defence to a secondary position, as almost a discretionary activity. European states partially demobilised in the 1990s and early 2000s, intellectually and in terms of their force structures, in response to the end of the Cold War. For example, according to IISS data, in 1990 West Germany alone was thought to be able to field 215 combat battalions and the UK 94. Today it is a fraction of that. However, security challenges relating to regional instability, crisis management and transnational terrorism – which all dominated the previous two decades – have not disappeared. On the contrary, all these still demand attention and the investment of European resources. While there is a growing recognition among Europe’s analytical community, and some governments, that things cannot simply continue as before in terms of regional security and defence, coherence and resolve among core actors in the Euro-Atlantic sphere have weakened. The US administration has intensified its call for better transatlantic burden sharing, at the same time displaying a cavalier attitude to the collective-defence commitment enshrined in NATO. France’s President Emmanuel Macron has also expressed severe doubts about the viability of NATO’s collective-defence mission. In addition, the British decision to leave the European Union in 2020 implies that the EU has lost one of its most militarily experienced and one of its most capable member states. There is a tendency among many observers and some politicians to argue that European NATO and EU member states need to clarify the political dimension of their defence ambition, via-à-vis greater strategic autonomy, before resolving the problem of how to meet this ambition militarily, at what cost and in what time frame. Indeed, at times, the debate about European strategic autonomy seems to focus more on the degree of independence from the US that its various proponents would like to achieve and less on the military requirement that autonomy is meant to respond to. It is now widely accepted across Europe that Europeans need ‘to do more’ for their own security and defence. Most of the intellectual energy allocated to this aspiration is spent on achieving better coordination – and even a level of integration – among European armed forces. This is useful, but only if it is directed at building capability to provide for the defence of Europe. The existing military capabilities of the European NATO member states fall short when compared to the force requirements generated by the political–military level of ambition as defined by NATO, or for that matter the EU.5 However, this should not be an excuse to lower the level of ambition, nor should the assumption that Europeans are unable to defend themselves be declared an inevitability. Defence output is the result of political, financial and military choices by governments. To think systematically about the challenge of providing capabilities that can meet Europe’s emerging military requirements, The International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hanns Seidel Foundation convened a group of thinkers and practitioners from Germany and the UK. The group took seriously the US assertion that Europe needs to be able to provide for its own defence. If Europeans can achieve this, they will be valuable partners to the US in upholding and strengthening the liberal international order on which Euro-Atlantic prosperity and security depend. Meeting twice in 2019, the group discussed threat assessments, debated European capability gaps and scoped potential approaches to addressing them. The following pages draw on the group’s deliberations but do not represent a consensus position.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Military Spending
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, Asia, and North America

85. Mongolia's Response to Increasing U.S.-China-Russia Rivalry in Asia

Author:: Alicia Campi
Publication Date:: 08-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Dr Alicia Campi, President of the Mongolia Society, explains that “The [“Third Neighbor”] policy was reinterpreted in content and meaning to include cultural and economic partners as diverse as India, Brazil, Kuwait, Turkey, Vietnam, and Iran. With increased superpower rivalry in its region, Mongolia has expanded this basic policy.”
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Partnerships, and Economy
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Turkey, India, Mongolia, Asia, Kuwait, Brazil, North America, and United States of America

86. The Visegrád Four and the Security of NATO’s “Eastern Flank”

Author:: Eoin Micheál McNamara
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute of International Relations Prague
Abstract:: Eoin Micheál McNamara in his Policy Paper called The Visegrád Four and the Security of NATO’s “Eastern Flank” expresses the argument that there is considerable scope for the V4 states to improve their contribution to NATO’s collective defence posture. Based on this fact, he argues the different strategic positions of each V4 member within the NATO membership related to Russian influence.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

87. Time to Exist and Resist: the European Union and Russian Political War

Author:: Mark Galeotti
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute of International Relations Prague
Abstract:: In March 2019, the European Parliament formally voted on a resolution that “Russia can no longer be considered a strategic partner.” This was a non-binding political resolution, though, and it is still unclear what is behind the EU’s Russia policy. A particular problem in formulating EU-wide responses to Russian political war is the breadth of opinion between member states and organizational culture – and often institutional requirement – for consensus or unanimity.
Topic:: European Union, Political Science, and European Parliament
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

88. It’s that time of the decade again: some considerations for NATO’s eighth Strategic Concept

Author:: Jeffrey H. Michaels
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: In the Declaration that emerged from the Decem- ber 2019 London Leaders Meeting, NATO Secre- tary General Jens Stoltenberg was tasked to present Foreign Ministers with “a forward-looking reflection process under his auspices, drawing on relevant exper- tise, to further strengthen NATO’s political dimension including consultation”. This new tasking has been largely attributed to French President Emmanuel Ma- cron’s remark the previous month that the Alliance was suffering from “brain death”. Speaking at a press conference alongside Stoltenberg, Macron elaborated on his comment, complaining the Alliance was overly focused on “cost-sharing or burden-sharing” whereas too little attention was being placed on major policy issues such as “peace in Europe, the post-INF, the re- lationship with Russia, the issue of Turkey, who is the enemy?”3
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Collective Defense
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, Turkey, and North America

89. The case for NATO’s global partnership with India

Author:: Abdurrahman Utku Hacioglu
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: India is a country rarely discussed in any of NA- TO’s operational activities, regional dialogues, or global partnerships. This rarity, however, is likely to change because of shifting political and economic trends, emerging threats from outside NATO’s tradi- tional Euro-Atlantic area, and the necessity to adapt to changing circumstances. Taking account of the emerging multi-polarity in the Asia-Pacific and the US resistance to change, India will become a key country to counter-balance China’s and Russia’s growing influ- ence, to project stability and strengthen security in the Asia-Pacific region in the near future. NATO should take advantage of the opportunity, consider India as a key strategic partner, and include India within NA- TO’s growing strategic partnership framework as a “Partner Across the Globe”.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Collective Defense
Political Geography:: Russia, North Atlantic, India, Asia, and North America

90. Recalibrating NATO Nuclear Policy

Author:: Andrea Gilli
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: The continuing role of nuclear weapons for NATO security was the focus of a Workshop for early- to mid-career nuclear strategists convened at the NATO Defense College in July 2019, and organized and run by Andrea Gilli. The articles in this volume, which were drafted by several of the speakers at the event, highlight a number of the most critical challenges to NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy and propose recommendations for further NATO action. Carrie Lee provides detailed analysis on the development of hypersonic missile systems by great powers, assesses their unique characteristics and reviews the potential implications of these systems on strategic stability and deterrence. Jacek Durkalec dives deep into Russia’s nuclear strategy and doctrine and proposes some additional steps that NATO can take to be more effective in deterring Russia. Katarzyna Kubiak examines the security challenges posed by the end of the INF Treaty and assesses a range of nuclear response options that NATO could consider. Finally, Harrison Menke reviews Russia’s integration of conventional and nuclear forces in its defence strategy and argues that NATO should take steps to better align its own conventional and nuclear forces and operations in order to enhance deterrence.
Topic:: NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Collective Defense
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

91. Global Ukrainian Studies in the Making: An Interview with Serhii Plokhy

Author:: Serhii Plokhy
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Toynbee Prize Foundation
Abstract:: It is only in the past decade that Ukrainian history has begun to be researched in the context of international or global history. The American historian Serhii Plokhy, Mykhailo S. Hrushevs'kyi Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University and director of the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, is a prominent exponent of this approach. His books The Gates of Europe: A History of UkraineandChernobyl: History of a Tragedy analyze the major problems of the Ukrainian past from a transnational perspective. His latest book, Forgotten Bastards of the Eastern Front: An Untold Story of World War II, deals with the establishment of United States Air Force bases in the Poltava region of Soviet Ukraine in 1944—the only place where Soviet and American troops lived and fought side by side during the war, putting the anti-Nazi alliance to the test. Plokhy's research interests include the early modern history of Ukraine, twentieth-century international history, and intellectual history. I spoke with Serhii Plokhy about the integration of Ukrainian history into global history, the colonial status of Ukraine, and environmental history.
Topic:: History, Military Affairs, World War II, and Air Force
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, Ukraine, and Soviet Union

92. The Use of Cyberspace in the Context of Hybrid Warfare. Means, Challenges and Trends

Author:: Cholpon Abdyraeva
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: This paper aims to introduce the state of art on hybrid warfare and seeks to address the conceptual confusion regarding an ever-expanding concept of hybrid warfare. By doing so, this paper simultaneously attempts to assess the growing significance of cyber and information domains within the hybrid warfare, which can be clearly illustrated by the example of the Russian hybrid warfare strategy. The Russian approach to hybrid warfare has considerably broadened the scope of hybrid warfare and changed the focus of debates from military to non-military components of hybrid warfare. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is: 1) to produce a deeper insight into hybrid warfare, including related trends, and 2) to assess the role and impact of cyber and information warfare with a particular focus on Russia. This paper can serve as an introduction that guides policy makers with expert opinions, and as such, intends to motivate further investigation in this field.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Internet, Conflict, and Hybrid Warfare
Political Geography:: Russia and Global Focus

93. Structural Shifts and Regional Security: A View from Israel

Author:: Ehud Eiran
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Israel is still holding to its traditional security maxim. Based on a perception of a hostile region, Israel’s response includes early warning, deterrence and swift – including pre-emptive – military action, coupled with an alliance with a global power, the US. Israel is adjusting these maxims to a changing reality. Overlapping interests – and perhaps the prospect of an even more open conflict with Iran – led to limited relationships between Israel and some Gulf states. These, however, will be constrained until Israel makes progress on the Palestine issue. Israel aligned with Greece and Cyprus around energy and security, which may lead to conflict with Turkey. Russia’s deployment in Syria placed new constraints on Israeli freedom of action there. The US’s retrenchment from the Middle East is not having a direct effect on Israel, while the Trump administration’s support for Israel’s territorial designs in the West Bank may make it easier for Israel to permanently expand there, thus sowing the seeds for future instability in Israel/Palestine. The EU could try and balance against such developments, but, as seen from Israel, is too divided to have a significant impact. Paper produced in the framework of the FEPS-IAI project “Fostering a New Security Architecture in the Middle East”, April 2020.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Gas, and Hezbollah
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Greece, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Cyprus, United States of America, and Mediterranean

94. Perspectives on the future of Idlib

Author:: Kirill Semenov
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: The situation in Idlib poses a challenge to the Assad government. Damascus has neither the forces nor the means to resolve the problem. Moreover, any operation conducted against the Syrian moderate opposition and the radical alliance “Hayat Tahrir al-Sham” (HTS) concentrated in this region could be significantly problematic for the government. Turkey seeks to establish a protectorate or security zone in Idlib to accommodate those fleeing regime-held areas and prevent a new refugees flow into Turkey. The gains achieved by the Turkish operation in Idlib by the establishment of the security zone has potentially been lost as a result of the subsequent Russian backed Syrian government offensive, which has created a problem for Turkey with hundreds of thousands heading toward the Turkish border and threatening to exasperate what is already a costly refugee problem for Ankara. In order for Turkey to address issues in Idlib, including IDPs and economic problems, it first needs to deal with the HTS, ideally finding a way to dissolve the group. This could potentially be an area of cooperation for Moscow and Ankara. This may be necessary to prevent a deterioration in the security situation and long-term destabilisation of the area.
Topic:: Security, Refugees, Economy, Political stability, Displacement, Syrian War, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and Transition
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, and Idlib

95. Operation Peace Spring: Objectives, Current Situation and its Future

Author:: Serhat Erkmen
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: The Peace Spring Operation (PSO), launched on 9 October 2019, was Turkey’s military/diplomatic/political offensive against the People's Defence Units (YPG) in Syria and beyond and was triggered by key dynamics in the country. The first was the redeployment of US troops in the northeast of Syria; second was the expansion of Russia’s area of influence towards the east of the Euphrates; third was the launch of a new phase of the Assad government’s operation in Idlib; forth was a re-evaluation of YPG’s patron-client relationship with the United States and the European Union. Turkey sought to prevent the formation of a Kurdish state and to address the Syrian refugee issue. While Turkey was able to achieve some strategic gains via the PSO, many challenges remain which prevent Ankara from achieving all its objectives. This paper argues that PSO should be analysed in the context of Turkey’s two former operations in Syria, Euphrates Shield Operation (ESO) and Olive Branch Operation (OBO).
Topic:: Military Intervention, Conflict, Syrian War, Transition, and YPG
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

96. Russian views on the Constitutional Committee and the political process in Syria

Author:: Nikolay Sukhov
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: The Russian leadership believes that the Constitutional Committee (CC) is a key factor in a political settlement in Syria. Russia hopes that the West, primarily the EU, adhering to the principle of “no reconstruction without a political transition”1, would regard the launch of the CC as the beginning of this political process and increase humanitarian aid to Syrians living in government- controlled territory. Russia's position on the constitution issue differs from that of the Syrian government. However, glimmer of hope could come from events in northeast Syria2, which has strengthened position of the opposition in the CC. Yet, neither Russia, nor Syria, are ready to recognise this reality. The Russian leadership is not likely to promote rapprochement between the Syrian government and the opposition on reform issues, as Russia perceives these to be the internal affairs of Syria. In Russia, it is perceived that the constitutional, and later, the political process based on the new constitution, could facilitate the return of refugees. The next step after the adoption of the new constitution should be legislative reform, which would bring Syrian legislation into line with the constitution. The topic of legislative reform in Syria could become bargaining tool for Europe in negotiations with Russia. If Europe wishes to stabilise the situation in Syria and the Middle East, it should first participate in reconstruction efforts by reviving the economy, and thereby Syrian civil society. This would be an indirect stimulation of political reforms. In this case, European leaders need to develop a long-term strategy aimed at improving Syrian society, preventing radical ideas, terrorism and possible new waves of migration to Europe. Russia could contribute to the implementation of European initiatives as the interests of Russia and Europe to stabilise Syria and the region coincide.
Topic:: Constitution, Syrian War, Negotiation, and Peace
Political Geography:: Russia, Middle East, and Syria

97. Multipolarity in Practice: Understanding Russia’s Engagement With Regional Institutions

Author:: Paul Stronski and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Over the past two decades, and especially since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the Kremlin has intensified its engagement with international institutions. This paper evaluates the drivers of this involvement, Russian views of three of these organizations, and Moscow’s success in achieving its objectives.
Topic:: International Relations, Regional Cooperation, Multilateralism, and Institutions
Political Geography:: Russia and Global Focus

98. Russia at the United Nations: Law, Sovereignty, and Legitimacy

Author:: Philip Remler
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The central task for Russian foreign policy in the era of President Vladimir Putin has been to regain the undisputed recognition that Russia is a world power like the Soviet Union before it, a status to which Russia feels entitled.1 The United Nations (UN) is Russia’s most important venue for putting its global aspirations and achievements on display. Russia’s status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council boosts its claim to be part of a global oligarchy and grants it the power to veto or undermine initiatives that it deems contrary to its interests. The concepts underlying Russia’s use of the UN to promote its aspirations form the subject of this paper. Russia, like the Soviet Union before it, devotes great resources to its missions at the UN, especially New York and Geneva. It traditionally cultivates extensive expertise among its mission members, appointing them to UN postings several times over their careers and leaving them in place for long periods. Russian diplomats are noted for their abilities in drafting highly technical UN documents in English—none more so than Sergey Lavrov, currently Russia’s foreign minister and formerly its permanent representative to the UN from 1994 to 2004.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, Power Politics, Law, Geopolitics, and Legitimacy
Political Geography:: Russia and United Nations

99. Security Assistance in the Middle East: A Three-Dimensional Chessboard

Author:: Robert Springborg, F.C. "Pink" Williams, and John Zavage
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The United States, Russia, and Iran have chosen markedly different approaches to security assistance in the Middle East, with dramatic implications for statebuilding and stability. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is the world’s testing ground for the effectiveness of security assistance provided by global and regional powers. That security assistance has contributed to the intensity and frequency of proxy wars—such as those under way or recently wound down in Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq—and to the militarization of state and substate actors in the MENA region. Security assistance is at the core of struggles for military, strategic, ideological, and even economic preeminence in the Middle East. Yet despite the broad and growing importance of security assistance for the region and for competition within it between global and regional actors, security assistance has been the subject of relatively little comparative analysis. Efforts to assess relationships between the strategic objectives and operational methods of security assistance providers and their relative impacts on recipients are similarly rare.
Topic:: Security, Geopolitics, Political stability, and State Building
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

100. Toward Accountable Nuclear Deterrents: How Much is Too Much?

Author:: George Perkovich
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: For decades, policy debates in nuclear-armed states and alliances have centered on the question, “How much is enough?” What size and type of arsenal, and what doctrine, are enough to credibly deter given adversaries? This paper argues that the more urgent question today is, “How much is too much?” What size and type of arsenal, and what doctrine, are too likely to produce humanitarian and environmental catastrophe that would be strategically and legally indefensible? Two international initiatives could help answer this question. One would involve nuclear-armed states, perhaps with others, commissioning suitable scientific experts to conduct new studies on the probable climatic and environmental consequences of nuclear war. Such studies would benefit from recent advances in modeling, data, and computing power. They should explore what changes in numbers, yields, and targets of nuclear weapons would significantly reduce the probability of nuclear winter. If some nuclear arsenals and operational plans are especially likely to threaten the global environment and food supply, nuclear-armed states as well as non-nuclear-weapon states would benefit from actions to physically reduce such risks. The paper suggests possible modalities for international debate on these issues. The second initiative would query all nuclear-armed states whether they plan to adhere to international humanitarian law in deciding if and when to detonate nuclear weapons, and if so, how their arsenals and operational plans affirm their intentions (or not). The United Kingdom and the United States have committed, in the words of the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, to “adhere to the law of armed conflict” in any “initiation and conduct of nuclear operations.” But other nuclear-armed states have been more reticent, and the practical meaning of such declarations needs to be clarified through international discussion. The two proposed initiatives would help states and civil society experts to better reconcile the (perceived) need for nuclear deterrence with the strategic, legal, and physical imperatives of reducing the probability that a war escalates to catastrophic proportions. The concern is not only for the well-being of belligerent populations, but also for those in nations not involved in the posited conflict. Traditional security studies and the policies of some nuclear-armed states have ignored these imperatives. Accountable deterrents—in terms of international law and human survival—would be those that met the security and moral needs of all nations, not just one or two. These purposes may be too modest for states and activists that prefer the immediate prohibition and abolition of nuclear weapons. Conversely, advocates of escalation dominance in the United States and Russia—and perhaps in Pakistan and India—will find the force reductions and doctrinal changes implied by them too demanding. Yet, the positions of both of these polarized groups are unrealistic and/or unacceptable to a plurality of attentive states and experts. To blunt efforts to stifle further analysis and debate of these issues, the appendix of this paper heuristically rebuts leading arguments against accountable deterrents. Middle powers and civil society have successfully put new issues on the global agenda and created political pressure on major powers to change policies. Yet, cooperation from at least one major nuclear power is necessary to achieve the changes in nuclear deterrent postures and policies explored here. In today’s circumstances, China may be the pivotal player. The conclusion suggests ways in which China could extend the traditional restraint in its nuclear force posture and doctrine into a new approach to nuclear arms control and disarmament with the United States and Russia that could win the support of middle powers and international civil society. If the looming breakdown in the global nuclear order is to be averted, and the dangers of nuclear war to be lessened, new ideas and political coalitions need to gain ascendance. The initiatives proposed here intended to stimulate the sort of analysis and debate from which such ideas and coalitions can emerge.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Environment, Nuclear Power, Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Russia, China, India, Global Focus, and United States of America

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