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351. Resolving The Korean Conflict

Author:
David Santoro and Anton Khlopkov
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Much ink has been spilled on the return to major-power competition in recent years, singling out three states: the United States, Russia, and China. For good reasons: the relationships between these three states have become increasingly complicated, notably between the United States and Russia and between the United States and China. What’s more, there are few signs that the current trajectory could change for the better. If anything, we can expect these relationships to become more, not less, complicated.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Diplomacy, and Peace
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, and Korean Peninsula

352. Russian-Syrian Business Cooperation: Challenges and Prospects

Author:
Igor A. Matveev
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
In order to achieve the goals of the “Rebuild Syria” strategy, Damascus has been trying to attract investment from friendly countries, viewing business cooperation with Russia as a cornerstone of such efforts. Moscow has not yet made a final choice between a comprehensive “broad” approach, aimed at building a long-term economic presence in Syria, and a “narrow approach” of outsourcing the country’s reconstruction to selective Russian companies capable of securing rapid compensation for Russia’s expenditures during the Syrian war. Currently the second approach seems to prevail. The modalities of the Russia-Syria business cooperation are based on the “government-to-government” (G2G), “business-to-government” (B2G) and “business-to-business” (B2B) formats with the first two being preferable for Russian partners. Traders and industrialists from Russia encounter opportunities and challenges in Syria, related to the need of Damascus to restore and modernise the national economy amidst the disruption of the territory and to socioeconomic life, disconnection from the global financial system, Western sanctions against Moscow and Damascus, a history of unsuccessful B2B practices and over-bureaucracy in Syria, hence a preference for G2G and B2G. Future mutual economic ties depend on the evolution of the environment around Syria, reconciliation inside the country and the improvement of the domestic business climate. Moscow is making an effort to push the UN, the EU and GCC states to become donors; although Syria-Russia-EU coordination on other matters seems unlikely due to the latter’s negative political image inside Syria and Damascus’s reliance on Russia and Iran.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Business, Syrian War, Reconciliation, and Transition
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, and Syria

353. Russian and Iranian Economic Interests In Syria (Pre-2010 and intra-war period)

Author:
Hamidreza Azizi and Leonid Issaev
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Discussion paper for the workshop on: “The Politics and Modalities of Reconstruction in Syria”, Geneva, Switzerland, 7-8 February 2019. There has historically been low levels of trade and investment from both Russia and Iran with Syria, with trade in military items being a notable exception. While the trade relationship between Syria and its two main allies predates the conflict, levels of trade had been remarkably low before the crisis, in contrast to mainstream perceptions. Yet, these figures cannot be confirmed due to unavailability of a comprehensive record of the Syrian bilateral relationship with Iran and Russia. Internationally imposed sanctions have discouraged Russian and Iranian companies from doing business with Syria. Lacking any other resources, the only way that Syrian could repay debts to its allies would be to grant exclusive access to energy and natural resources. This however would reduce the public revenue needed to rebuild state institutions, and also encourage foreign rivalry over economic opportunities. As Syria lacks any coordination mechanism for post-war economic reconstruction, Russia and Iran have set their eyes on the energy sector, where Russia has the upper hand. Yet, cooperation is also possible in other sectors, such as Syria’s rail sector. In order to understand the Russian and Iranian economic relationship with Syria, two factors should be considered. First is the informal relationship between Syria and its two allies, which has taken the form of unofficial agreements and trade. These would be important when sanctions are lifted. The second factor is military exports to Syria, expected to be large, given the scale of war and Syrian reliance on Russia and Iran. Due to lack of official data, this paper will not consider both issues.
Topic:
Economics, Sanctions, Conflict, Syrian War, Investment, and Trade
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Middle East, and Syria

354. Russian views on refugees return and stabilization in Syria

Author:
Nikolay Surkov
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Discussion paper for the workshop on: “The Politics and Modalities of Reconstruction in Syria”, Geneva, Switzerland, 7-8 February 2019. When the major fighting in Syria had stopped, Russia immediately began a campaign of repatriation of Syrians who had fled to neighbouring countries. The Russian government developed a special programme focusing on rehabilitating infrastructure and job creation inside Syria. Its implementation was entrusted to the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD), working in cooperation with the Syrian authorities to assess the damage and provide necessary materials and equipment. While the programme achieved a measure of success in terms of reconstruction, the security of the returnees remained an issue. Russia has been willing to cooperate with the West for funding reconstruction efforts, so long as they relaxed their political conditionality. It also looked to the Gulf countries as an attractive, yet uncertain option.
Topic:
Refugees, Political stability, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, and Syria

355. Putin’s Not-So-Secret Mercenaries: Patronage, Geopolitics, and the Wagner Group

Author:
Nathaniel Reynolds
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia’s return to the global stage as a major power relies on an array of diplomatic, information, security, and economic tools that help the Kremlin punch above its weight. One of the newest instruments in that toolbox is the Wagner Group—a shadowy band of mercenaries loyal to the Kremlin and controlled by Yevgeniy Prigozhin, a member of President Vladimir Putin’s coterie. Russian and Western media have been following the group’s expanding footprint from Ukraine and Syria to Sudan, the Central African Republic, and now possibly Libya and Venezuela. But despite the significant attention, Western understanding of Wagner’s role and capacity is still incomplete at best. This is partly due to Moscow’s relentless disinformation campaigns and efforts to deny responsibility for Wagner’s operations. Adding to the confusion is a false perception that Wagner is a private military company (PMC) no different than Western outfits like Academi (formerly Blackwater) and DynCorp International. A detailed analysis of the group—including its origins, ties to the Putin regime, political and economic drivers, and capabilities—is essential for Western policymakers to better gauge the threat Wagner poses and how to respond. The group may not offer the Kremlin entirely new ways to wage war or build influence, but its existence is emblematic of how a more assertive Russia often—and at times implausibly—tries to evade responsibility for actions beyond its borders. Wagner is also a window into the broader dynamics of the Putin regime, including how it harnesses the ambitions and self-interests of elites like Prigozhin to create deniable and flexible tools. The West should not overreact to the challenge from Wagner, but a multilateral, low-cost campaign to shed light on the group and constrain its options will reduce the risk.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Conflict, Vladimir Putin, and Wagner Group
Political Geography:
Russia

356. Late to the Party: Russia’s Return to Africa

Author:
Paul Stronski
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
After a decades-long absence, Russia is once again appearing on the African continent. The Kremlin’s return to Africa, which has generated considerable media, governmental, and civil society attention, draws on a variety of tools and capabilities. Worrying patterns of stepped-up Russian activity are stirring concerns that a new wave of great-power competition in Africa is now upon us. U.S. policymakers frequently stress the need to counter Russian malign influence on the continent. On a visit to Angola in early 2019, Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan said that “Russia often utilizes coercive, corrupt, and covert means to attempt to influence sovereign states, including their security and economic partnerships.”1 Advocates for a more forceful Western policy response point to high-visibility Russian military and security cooperation in the Central African Republic and the wide-ranging travels of Russian political consultants and disinformation specialists as confirmation that Russia, like China, represents a major challenge in Africa. Yet is that really the case? Are Russian inroads and capabilities meaningful or somewhat negligible? Hard information is difficult to come by, but any honest accounting of Russian successes will invariably point to a mere handful of client states with limited strategic significance that are isolated from the West and garner little attention from the international community. It remains unclear whether Russia’s investments in Africa over the past decade are paying off in terms of creating a real power base in Africa, let alone putting it on a footing that will expand its influence in the years to come. Nevertheless, Russia increasingly looks to Africa as a region where it can project power and influence. President Vladimir Putin will welcome leaders from across the continent to Sochi in late October for the first Africa-Russia summit, a clear indication of the symbolic importance that Africa holds for the Kremlin right now.2 It is clear that Russian inroads there would be far more limited but for the power vacuums created by a lack of Western policy focus on Africa in recent years. That state of affairs gives Russia (and other outside powers) an opportunity to curry favor with the continent’s elites and populations. More than anything else, it is opportunism that propels Russia’s relatively low-cost and low-risk strategies to try to enhance its clout and unnerve the West in Africa, just as in Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East.
Topic:
International Affairs, Power Politics, Democracy, Geopolitics, and Peace
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, North America, and United States of America

357. Russia in the Middle East: Jack of All Trades, Master of None

Author:
Eugene Rumer
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The 2015 Russian military intervention in Syria was a pivotal moment for Moscow’s Middle East policy. Largely absent from the Middle East for the better part of the previous two decades, Russia intervened to save Bashar al-Assad’s regime and reasserted itself as a major player in the region’s power politics. Moscow’s bold use of military power positioned it as an important actor in the Middle East. The intervention took place against the backdrop of a United States pulling back from the Middle East and growing uncertainty about its future role there. The geopolitical realignment and instability caused by the civil wars in Libya and Syria and the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia have opened opportunities for Russia to rebuild some of the old relationships and to build new ones. The most dramatic turnaround in relations in recent years has occurred between Russia and Israel. The new quality of the relationship owes a great deal to the personal diplomacy between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, but Russia’s emergence as a major presence in Syria has meant that the Israelis now have no choice but to maintain good relations with their new “neighbor.” Some Israeli officials hope that Moscow will help them deal with the biggest threat they face from Syria—Iran and its client Hezbollah. So far, Russia has delivered some, but far from all that Israel wants from it, and there are precious few signs that Russia intends to break with Iran, its partner and key ally in Syria. Russian-Iranian relations have undergone an unusual transformation as a result of the Russian intervention in the Syrian civil war. Their joint victory is likely to lead to a divergence of their interests. Russia is interested in returning Syria to the status quo ante and reaping the benefits of peace and reconstruction. Iran is interested in exploiting Syria as a platform in its campaign against Israel. Russia lacks the military muscle and the diplomatic leverage to influence Iran. That poses a big obstacle to Moscow’s ambitions in the Middle East.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Geopolitics, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

358. A Spoiler in the Balkans? Russia and the Final Resolution of the Kosovo Conflict

Author:
Maxim Samorukov
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The biggest point of contention in the Balkans is back on Europe’s front burner. For decades, Serbia was mired in a conflict with Kosovo, its breakaway province that unilaterally declared independence in 2008 after violent ethnic clashes and international intervention in the late 1990s. Last year, a protracted diplomatic effort to end the conflict was unexpectedly boosted when then U.S. national security adviser John Bolton announced that U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration was ready to consider changes to the Serbia-Kosovo border as part of a settlement. The Serbian government welcomed the idea, giving rise to hopes that a negotiated solution to the Balkan conflict is now potentially within reach. Still, any final settlement is very much an uphill battle. Many Kosovar leaders are not enthusiastic about the proposed border correction, which would entail swapping areas in northern Kosovo populated mainly by ethnic Serbs for Serbian municipalities dominated by ethnic Albanians. Germany and other members of the European Union (EU) have disapproved strongly, arguing that redrawing boundaries may open a Pandora’s box, with unpredictable ripple effects.2 On top of all that, it is increasingly clear that Russia, which has long held great sway over the region, may not actually want the conflict resolved at all. So long as Serbia does not formally recognize Kosovo’s independence, it must rely on Russia’s veto power in the United Nations (UN) Security Council to prevent full international recognition of what it regards as a breakaway province. That dependency gives Russia a nontrivial degree of influence, both in the region and within Serbia itself. The Kremlin fears that ending the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo will diminish Russia’s stature in Serbia and severely undermine its clout in the Balkans. Moscow is well-positioned to derail the resolution process. Russian President Vladimir Putin enjoys unchecked popularity across most of Serbian society, and the Russian political and national security establishment maintains close ties with its counterparts among Serbia’s political and security elites, who tend to strongly oppose any compromise with Kosovo. From all appearances, Moscow also hopes to use its influence over the Kosovo issue as leverage in its acrimonious relationship with the West.
Topic:
United Nations, Conflict, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:
Russia, Kosovo, Serbia, Balkans, and United States of America

359. Nuclear Enrichment: Russia’s Ill-Fated Influence Campaign in South Africa

Author:
Andrew Weiss and Eugene Rumer
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Amid the widespread attention the Kremlin’s recent inroads in Africa have attracted, there has been surprisingly little discussion of South Africa, a country which, for nearly a decade, unquestionably represented Russia’s biggest foreign policy success story on the continent. As relations soared during the ill-starred presidency of Jacob Zuma (2009–2018), the Kremlin sought to wrest a geopolitically significant state out of the West’s orbit and to create a partnership that could serve as a springboard for expanded influence elsewhere in Africa. Moscow’s strategy was multifaceted, capitalizing on well-established close ties with Zuma, a former African National Congress senior intelligence official with extensive Soviet bloc connections. Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior officials pursued a series of initiatives, such as the inclusion of South Africa in the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) grouping and the launch of ambitious forms of cooperation between state-backed energy interests primarily in the nuclear sector. Yet relations were undermined by the Kremlin’s propensity to overreach, to lean too heavily on the legacy of Cold War–era relationships forged with leaders of national liberation movements, and to take advantage of cultures of corruption. The controversy arising from a massive $76 billion nuclear power plant construction deal triggered strong pushback and legal challenges from South Africa’s institutional checks and balances, civil society groups, and independent media. Key parts of the Russian national security establishment view civil nuclear power exports as an important tool for projecting influence overseas while creating revenue streams for sustaining intellectual and technical capabilities and vital programs inside Russia itself. Yet such cooperation is often a two-edged sword. On the one hand, costly projects such as the one pushed by Zuma typically make little economic sense for the purchasing country, spurring uncomfortable questions about who stands to benefit. On the other hand, heavily subsidized projects pursued mainly for geopolitical reasons risk saddling Russia’s nuclear power monopoly Rosatom with burdens it can ill afford. Ongoing investigations of high-level corruption during the period of so-called state capture under Zuma shed remarkable light on how the Kremlin operates in Africa and other parts of the world. In retrospect, the sustainability of Moscow’s embrace of South Africa was highly questionable due to its paltry tool kit. Russian involvement in the South African economy is miniscule compared to that of other trading partners such as the EU, China, the United States, India, and the UK, accounting for a mere 0.4 percent of South Africa’s foreign trade. While the Soviet Union was an important patron during the anti-apartheid struggle, modern-day Russia offers little in the way of practical assistance for helping South Africa deal with its deep-set economic and societal challenges.
Topic:
Energy Policy, National Security, Geopolitics, and Nuclear Waste
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, and South Africa

360. International Cooperation: Is the Multilateral System Helping?

Author:
David M Malone and Rohinton P. Medhora
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
This paper includes essential history of how the multilateral world has evolved over the last 150 years, followed by an examination of several types of multilateral systems: the United Nations and related organizations (including the World Bank group and the International Monetary Fund), and the World Trade Organization; regional organizations; and cross-cutting multilateral or plurilateral groupings with more limited, generally consultative purposes, such as the Group of Seven and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India and China). It concludes with some reflections on the implications for multilateralism of a defection from its attractions and principles by key actors.
Topic:
International Cooperation, World Trade Organization, World Bank, Multilateral Relations, IMF, and BRIC
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, India, Asia, Brazil, South America, and North America

361. Commerical Space: Space Controls and the Invisible Hand

Author:
Brian G. Chow
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
This article reviewed three major projections of the global space industry by Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and Bank of America Merrill Lynch and extracted the trands that would significantly impact the design of both the domestic and international space traffic management (STM) schemes. If found that, in the next two decades, the United States will have the largest market share in practically every space industrial sector. It suggests how the United States, as well as the West, can use its market power to incentivize Russia and Chinna to fall in line with a STM that provides peace and prosperity to all. It also proposed five measures as building blocks for developing standards, practices, regulations and laws for such STM.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Space, Public Sector, and Private Sector
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, North America, and United States of America

362. Working paper on the relations between Russia and China

Author:
Jens Bastian
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Working paper by the independent economic analyst Jens Bastian, focusing on relations between China and Russia is published by ELIAMEP. More specifically, in the text entitled “The Embrace Between the Russian Bear and the Panda Bear: An Emerging Sino-Russian Axis” it is argued that: “The depth and momentum of Sino-Russian strategic cooperation is deepening and accelerating. Defense and security, the various bilateral energy arrangements, the synergies resulting from the combination of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), reflect the wider range of joint activities of the two states”.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Eurasia

363. The Embrace Between a Russian Bear and the Panda Bear. An Emerging Sino-Russian Axis

Author:
Jens Bastian
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
During a three-day official visit to Moscow in June 2019 the Chinese President Xi Jinping described Russia’s Vladimir Putin as his “best friend”. While China-US relations are deteriorating over bitter trade disputes, the imposition of tit-for-tat tariffs and intellectual property rights, the Sino-Russian partnership is evolving and deepening in areas such as security and defense, bilateral energy cooperation as well as the Kremlin’s expanding participation in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Both Beijing and Moscow are building an alliance shaped by shared grievances and based on mutual strategic convenience. Against this background the following report argues that the strategic realignment underway between the Kremlin and Beijing is not one of equal partners. Status matters between the leadership of both countries. Moscow cannot compete with China’s sweeping investment efforts and infrastructure projects in the context of the BRI. What is increasingly emerging in this relationship is a junior role for Moscow and senior status for Beijing. The trade balance is heavily tilted in China’s favor. Chinese banks are key lenders to Russia. The energy cooperation is defined by China being able to command prices from Russia below market rates. Most importantly, China’s BRI is a multi-decade vision, spacing continents and backed up by sheer unlimited financial resources which Russia cannot even contemplate to match. With Russia and China strengthening their cooperation across policy fields, individual countries and sub-regions in continental Europe are faced with new and challenging strategic choices. As Moscow consolidates its economic footprint in Serbia and Montenegro, Beijing expands its presence across Central and Eastern Europe in the context of the 17+1 network. Policy makers are thus faced with daunting options. Some see Beijing as the more promising alternative, while others are tempted to seeking accommodation with both Russia and China.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Trade, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

364. The Russian Role in World Affairs: A View from Israel

Author:
Eran Lerman
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
It would undoubtedly serve Israel’s interest for Russia to draw closer to the US on a wide range of issues, and above all, on Iran.
Topic:
Hegemony, Strategic Stability, Strategic Interests, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Israel

365. The Fighting Continues in Northern Syria

Author:
Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The Kurds vow to defend themselves—alone if necessary—against Syria, Turkey and Russia.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

366. Russia-Israel Relations: Expectations and Reality

Author:
Micky Aharonson
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Syria remains the main point of contention between the two countries.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

367. Russian Forces in Syria and the Building of a Sustainable Military Presence: Towards a Restructuring of the Syrian Army?

Author:
Alimar Lazkani
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
The Syrian Army has inherited a few of the norms and customs the French used for running army affairs following the French occupation. These did not include any provisions on regulating the army. After the Baa’th Party came to power, particularly after Hafez Assad had assumed office, the norms and customs guaranteeing minimum rights for army soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and officers faded gradually, leaving room for cronyism and allegiance to individuals and to the regime as the sole guarantor for the military to gain their rights. Leaders of military units became almost governors of their own units where nothing could take place without their blessings The Russians became fully in charge of the Syrian Army and started to instil rules and regulations that would ensure discipline and transform the army to a professional force capable of actual missions on the ground. Such rules included entrenching among Syrian soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and officers’ allegiance to Russian military officers and meant to subdue and prevent them from exercising their authority. This has established the Russians as the de facto leaders in the minds of members of the Syrian army. This has mainly shifted the responsibility for all the atrocities committed by the Assad forces under the Russian leadership to the Russians together with the regime’s officers and leaders. Despite their inability to make decisions, they are responsible, in terms of political structure and posturing, for all cases of genocide, chemical attacks, displacement, starvation and other violations. It has therefore become difficult in the Syrian context to separate between the Russian leadership and the Syrian Army, except in terms of differentiating between the leader and the follower, a divide that Russia has been working on consolidating in the media and in its diplomacy as an entity “assisting to achieve peace and combat terrorism”, while it undoubtedly deserves the description of “occupier” with its ability to run a lot of important issues on Syrian soil.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Genocide, Political structure, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

368. Russian Forces in Syria and the Building of a Sustainable Military Presence: What About Iranian-backed Syrian Militias?

Author:
Alimar Lazkani
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
There is constant talk of the “soft conflict” between Iran and Russia in Syria. Most research and media reports focus on the areas of influence and control of each party. Without going into the relationship between Iranian and Russian forces on Syrian soil, in which the Iranian of influence weakened following the entry of Russian troops, it is important to distinguish the nature of these two forces to help identify the characteristics of this conflict, which are not limited to areas of influence. In fact, there is a clear difference between Iranian and Russian interests as well as strategy on two major issues. The first is the relationship with Israel. While Russia sees Israel as a strategic ally in the region, Iran gains its regional legitimacy by emphasizing the continuity of conflict with it. The second is the way each party sees the future of Syria, and its own role in it. Iran is not capable of establishing a centralized state in Syria because of its ideological hostility to the Sunni majority there. Therefore, a state based on sectarian militias will be the cornerstone of Iran’s continued presence on Syrian soil as it has the capacity to manage militias with no national project. Russia, on the other hand, has a vision of a centralized state that is based on the fundamental pillar of a disciplined and dutiful army. Thus, the “soft conflict” involves not only the geographical divvying-up of Syria, but also fundamental matters related to the structure of Syria’s security and military system. This paper is the second part of a broader study of Russia’s policy of establishing a military influence in Syria. It will look at the Syrian militias that Iran has fostered and supported, and Russia’s approach in dealing with them on the ground. However, it does not consider non-Syrian militias on Syrian soil brought by the Iranians, such as Hezbollah, the Fatemiyoun, the Zainabiyoun, and other Shia militias because of their close association with Iranian politics and their temporary posting in specific conflict areas, making them a foreign presence on Syrian soil.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Military Intervention, Sunni, and Shia
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

369. Europe Is the Key Player in Syria: An Alternative Template for Transition

Author:
Bassma Kodmani
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
As long as military means prevailed in deciding the fate of Syria, the European Union could not alone induce any decisive change in the dynamics of the conflict, and Assad was vindictively seeking to prove that the European Union’s ability to influence the conflict was nil. Assad’s luck was that Putin was determined to prevent his fall and threw his full weight behind him to maintain his rule. When the guns finally fall silent, should the key countries of Europe and the EU itself simply accept as “a sad reality” the fact that the Syrian regime is back in full control of the country? Will they channel funds for humanitarian, post-emergency and early recovery purposes through the State’s financial system knowing full well that European tax payers’ money might be massively diverted to end in the pockets of Assad’s family and the kleptocracy around him,1 and serve to pursue his sectarian scheme of changing the demographics of Syria along religious and ethnic lines? Framing the discussion in terms of accepting Assad and rehabilitating him or not is disempowering for the EU. It assumes that military force alone is what determines the outcome of the conflict and the political fate of the country. If it follows this rationale, Europe would be annihilating everything it stands for; it would serve as a helping hand in Assad’s strategy to bury the civil society groups it helped organize and silence the democratic forces and all those within the different sectors of society who want a Syria that resembles Europe in terms of its values and its political system on the other side of the Mediterranean. The EU’s declared position that there will be no reconstruction without political transition in Syria is an honorable one, but this position still needs to be operationalized if the EU is to turn it into a policy and use its full clout to shape the resolution of the conflict.
Topic:
Europe Union, Humanitarian Intervention, Military Intervention, and Economic Policy
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, and Syria

370. The Erosion of Strategic Stability and the Future of Arms Control in Europe

Author:
Corentin Brustlein
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The instruments of cooperative security created during and since the Cold War to foster mutual confidence and reduce the risks of war, inadvertent escalation, and arms races, in and around Europe, have come under increasing strain. The European security architecture has been – and is being – weakened by renewed geopolitical competition, technological and military developments, and states violating or bypassing international law, or walking away from previous commitments. Against this backdrop, it is crucial to reassess the meaning and requirements of crisis and strategic stability in Europe. This report looks at some current and future sources of strategic instability, and focuses in particular on how the Russian way of waging modern conflict could, through the importance given to strategic ambiguity and operational opacity, fuel escalatory dynamics in Europe. It argues that strengthening strategic stability in Europe requires a two-pronged approach, combining a sustained effort to reinforce deterrence and defense in Europe with new confidence- and security-building and arms control measures to reduce reciprocal fears, incentives to escalate rapidly during a crisis, and risks of conventional and nuclear war in Europe.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

371. The NATO/US-Turkey-Russia Strategic Triangle: Challenges Ahead

Author:
Nilsu Gören
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
Turkey and NATO are experiencing a mutual crisis of confidence. Turkish policy makers lack confidence in NATO guarantees and fear abandonment—both prominent historical concerns. At the same time, policy makers within the alliance have begun to question Turkey’s intentions and future strategic orientation, and how well they align with NATO’s. One important factor contributing to this mistrust is Turkey’s recent dealings with Russia. Turkey is trying to contain Russian military expansion in the Black Sea and Syria by calling for a stronger NATO presence at the same time that is seeking to diversify its security strategy by improving ties with Russia and reducing its dependence on the United States and NATO. Turkey’s contradictory stance is no more apparent than in its evolving policy regarding the Syrian civil war. The threat topography of NATO’s southern flank reflects a complex web of state and non-state actors involved in asymmetric warfare. The Turkish shoot down of a Russian jet in 2015 highlighted the complexity and helped to precipitate military dialogue between NATO and Russia in Syria. Since then, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan seem to have overcome their strategic differences in their preferred outcome for Syria and have de-escalated the tensions following several rounds of peace talks headed by Russia, Turkey, and Iran and involving some, but not all, factions involved in the Syrian conflict. Yet several important questions about Turkish security policy and its impact on Turkish-U.S./NATO relations remain. What are the security implications of Turkey’s military actions on the southern flank? How is the continued fight against extremism in the region, including ISIS, likely to affect relations? And how should the West respond to Turkey’s security ties with Russia, including the Russian sale of advance military equipment to Ankara? The answers to all of these questions depend in part on whether Turkey’s behavior with Russia in Syria is a tactical move or a strategic shift away from NATO. Understanding these dynamics is key to devising policies and actions to minimize security risks between the U.S., NATO, and Russia. This paper argues that Turkey has economic and political interests in developing closer relations with Russia, but that these interests are not as strong as Turkey’s strategic alliance with the West, and NATO in particular. Turkish policymakers, who lack confidence in NATO, are pursuing short-term security interests in Syria as a way to leverage Western acquiescence to their interests regarding the Kurdish populations in Syria and Iraq. These objectives, however, are not aligned with Russia’s security objectives and do not add up to a sustainable long-term regional security strategy. In the short term, Turkey’s contradictory approaches to relations with NATO and Russia are likely to lead to ambiguity and confusion in the regional security architecture, with Syria being the most visible example of this disarray. To combat this approach, U.S. leadership and NATO should work to convince Turkey that the alliance takes Turkish security concerns in Syria seriously and to minimize the risks of Turkey’s acts as a spoiler in the region. For instance, addressing Turkish concerns over Washington’s arming of the Kurdish rebel group, the YPG, in northern Syria, will go a long way to resolving the key issue motivating Turkey’s decision to partner with Russia.
Topic:
NATO, National Security, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Turkey, and Syria

372. The Militarization of the Arctic is Not Certain

Author:
Rachael Gosnell
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
While concern about renewed international competition in the Arctic has attracted significant attention, the continuation of cooperation and adherence to international rules and norms of behavior is a far more likely outcome. The magnitude of activity in the region remains below historic Cold War levels and accounts for a very small percentage of overall global military activity. Further, stakeholders have thus far exhibited adherence to international law, and venues for dialogue offer an alternative to an Arctic security dilemma. Sound adherence to the principles of deterrence, international norms, and continued cooperation in forums such as the Arctic Council will ensure the region remains stable into the future.
Topic:
International Cooperation and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Arctic

373. Nord Stream 2: A Boon or a Threat to European Energy Security?

Author:
David Koranyi
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
There has been much controversy around Nord Stream 2, a planned extension of the undersea gas pipeline stretching from Russia to Germany. By lying down two extra pipes in addition to the two already in operation since 2011-2012, the second phase would see the doubling of the capacity of the route, from 55 to 110 billion cubic meters (bcm) and commence operations in 2019 at a cost of 9.5 billion euros. This would mean that over 70% of Russian gas exports could be channeled through a single pipeline through Germany. Nord Stream 2, coupled with constructing the �irst two lines of Turkish Stream (with a capacity of 31.5 bcm) would also allow for the complete circumvention of the Ukrainian transit route.
Topic:
European Union, Gas, and Trade
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, and Germany

374. Poland, US bases and geopolitical games

Author:
Robert Barić
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
Recent Polish proposal for financing permanent US military presence in Poland isn't motivated only to counter current Russian aggressive posture. This offer is a part of a wider Poland strategy for achieving long term security. In pursuing this strategy, Warsaw risks not only to undermine NATO cohesion, but also to deepen growing East-West divide inside the EU.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Imperialism, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Eastern Europe, and Poland

375. Holy Rus challenged: The conflict between Churches in Ukraine has consequences for Russia, Ukraine and the Orthodox world

Author:
Veera Laine
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The initiative to create an autocephalous national Orthodox Church in Ukraine, proposed by the political leadership of he country, now seems more likely than ever before. The Russian Orthodox Church duly risks losing its economic support and status in the Orthodox world, which has political implications for Russia as well.
Topic:
Religion, Catholic Church, and Secularism
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

376. The Challenges of NATO Nuclear Policy: Alliance management under the Trump administration

Author:
Robert Bell
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
In no aspect of NATO’s deterrence and defense posture is the challenge of Alliance management more demanding than in its nuclear dimension. This is especially the case at a time when Russia’s aggressive actions and threatening behavior have fundamentally changed the security environment in Europe, and President Donald Trump’s approach to NATO has presented challenges of its own. In this context, it is crucial that Allies understand the positions that they have agreed on in terms of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation (ADN), as well as nuclear weapons policy, doctrine and posture. Considering the security benefits they receive in return for the United States’ extension of its nuclear deterrent to its NATO Allies, these states must also distinguish between the nuclear-related roles and responsibilities they are expected to take on and those with regard to which they have the option to ‘opt out’. For its part, the Trump Administration must appreciate that if all Allies are expected to close ranks behind the enhancements to NATO’s nuclear posture that are needed in order to respond to Russia’s threatening behavior, many will require an equally robust arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation posture as a quid pro quo.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and Atlantic Ocean

377. Russia-India relations: Long-term obstacles remain despite sectoral achievements

Author:
Marcin Kaczmarski
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Despite concrete achievements in energy and military-technical cooperation, long-term trends, such as Russia’s growing dependence on China, India’s tilt towards the US, and tense Sino-Indian relations are not conducive to closer strategic cooperation between Moscow and New Delhi.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Energy Policy, and International Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, India, and Asia

378. Crimea 2.0: Will Russia seek reunification with Belarus?

Author:
Arkady Moshes
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
While speculation about whether Russia may repeat the Crimean scenario in Belarus should not be totally dismissed, exaggerated alarmism would not be appropriate either. Rather, Moscow’s policy is aimed at making sure that Belarus and its leadership remain critically dependent on Russia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Empire, and Annexation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Belarus, and Crimea

379. The European Dimension of Nuclear Deterrence: French and British policies and future scenarios

Author:
Bruno Tertrais
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
While the idea of a “European nuclear deterrent” has a long history, it has recently made a comeback in the light of Russian aggression on the continent, growing tensions in the transatlantic relationship since the election of Donald Trump, as well as the British decision to leave the European Union. Voices are being heard in Germany in particular, arguing for stronger European nuclear autonomy. This paper analyses how the French and British deterrents could play a broader and stronger role in ensuring the security of the continent. Discarding the idea of a single “European deterrent”, it suggests possible credible pathways to enhance European nuclear cooperation based on French and possibly British forces, preferably outside the EU context. Furthermore, it suggests that future US decisions and policies towards Europe will be a critical factor in defining the range of realistic scenarios and outcomes.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, European Union, Deterrence, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, United Kingdom, Europe, France, and North America

380. The Sino-Russian and US-Russian relationships: Current developments and future trends

Author:
Marcin Kaczmarski, Mark Katz, and Teija Tiilikainen
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The great-power system has been in constant change since the end of the Cold War. The US became the hegemonic power, and under its shelter, the European Union was able to transform into a European-wide political body. Soon, a group of leading regional powers started to question the universalist aspirations of the Western-led international order. Two members of this club in particular were not satisfied with the role of a regional hegemon and had more global ambitions. China has already become the largest trading nation globally, and Chinese foreign policy has assumed an assertive tone. China has both the potential to challenge US hegemony, as well as the political will to use it. Russia’s project to achieve a global great-power status, on the other hand, is inspired by its historical identity and its alleged humiliation by the West after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia longs for recognition of its great-power status in particular from the US. This report focuses on relations between China and Russia on the one hand and the US and Russia on the other. It analyses the current developments and future trends in these relationships, as well as their implications for the EU.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Hegemony
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, Asia, and North America

381. Russian Norm Entrepreneurship in Crimea: Serious Contestation or Cheap Talk?

Author:
Betcy Jose and Christoph H. Stefes
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Abstract:
Western actors have long dominated the political processes and discourses that shape global norms impacting interstate behaviour. Yet, more recently, powerful autocratic regimes such as China and Russia have seemingly challenged democracies, emerging as potential contesters of international norms. What might be the outcome of this contestation? This paper broadly explores this query by investigating Russia’s humanitarian justifications for its Ukrainian incursion. It examines whether Russia’s claim of humanitarian intervention is more than a petty attempt to disguise pure power politics. Is Russia contesting Western understandings of humanitarian interventions in order to reshape our ideas of permissible violations of sovereignty norms to protect vulnerable populations? Using Atlas.ti, we also explore global responses to Russia’s humanitarian claims. Our initial findings indicate that the Ukrainian intervention enabled Russia to contest Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and to champion an alternative version of humanitarian intervention with some limited success.
Topic:
Imperialism, Military Strategy, Authoritarianism, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Crimea

382. Strategic deterrence redux: Nuclear weapons and European security

Author:
Leo Michel and Matti Pesu
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
One of the most notable consequences of the end of the Cold War was the diminished role of nuclear weapons in international relations. The world’s primary nuclear weapon powers, the United States and the Russian Federation, made considerable reductions in their nuclear forces. The climax of the process was the New START Treaty signed in 2010. Now, the optimism that characterized the first decades of the post-Cold War era is rapidly evaporating. Geopolitical competition again dominates global and regional security dynamics. Nuclear powers are modernizing their forces and introducing novel systems that may affect strategic stability. At the same time, existing arms control regimes are crumbling. This report takes stock of recent developments in deterrence in general, and nuclear deterrence in particular. Its main ambition is to understand how deterrence has changed in light of certain post-Cold War trends. To this end, the report introduces the basic principles of deterrence. It also explores the nuclear-related policies and capabilities of the four nuclear weapon states most directly involved in European security affairs – Russia, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. Importantly, the report also analyses the implications of the recent trends in strategic deterrence for Northern Europe. This report is part of a research project conducted by the FIIA entitled ‘New Challenges for Strategic Deterrence in the 21st Century’. The project is part of the implementation of the Government Plan for Analysis, Assessment and Research 2018.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, United Kingdom, Europe, France, and North America

383. Bulgaria and Black Sea Security

Author:
Siemon T. Wezeman and Alexandra Kuimova
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
The Black Sea region is experiencing a changing military balance. The six littoral states (Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine) intensified their efforts to build up their military potential after Russia’s takeover of Crimea and the start of the internationalized civil war in eastern Ukraine in 2014. As a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Bulgaria aims to support NATO’s security objectives of increasing military spending, enhancing defence capacities and developing interoperability. Bulgaria contributes to NATO’s military activities in the Black Sea region and regularly hosts and participates in exercises with NATO partners. However, Bulgaria also tries to remain on good terms with Russia by way of bilateral economic and political cooperation.
Topic:
Security, Military Affairs, Nuclear Power, Arms Trade, Disarmament, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Bulgaria, and Black Sea

384. The Russians are… Leaving?

Author:
Anna Geifman
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
A controlled military disentanglement, while bound to afford Putin even greater popularity at home and perhaps rebuild his popular image abroad, by no means implies that he is about to relinquish his growing influence in the Middle East.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Military Affairs, and Empire
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Middle East

385. Moscow meetings on Avoiding Nuclear Destabilization

Author:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:
On 6-7 December 2018, Pugwash organized a seminar, “Avoiding Nuclear Destabilization”, and other side meetings in Moscow in cooperation with the Russian Pugwash Committee and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. This was interconnected with the Russian Congress of Political Scientists organized by the Russian Political Science Association, MGIMO-University under the Russian Foreign Ministry, and the Financial University under the Government of Russia, which allowed some Congress participants to take part in the Pugwash debates. These consultations with Russian experts were designed to seek out reaction in Moscow and the Russian strategic community to the US Administration’s announcement to withdraw from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and survey current opinion on the future of arms control.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Denuclearization, and INF Treaty
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

386. Waking Up to the Iranian Threat

Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
With the weakening of ISIS, the growing strength of Russia in Syria, and the continuing retraction of American involvement in the region – Iran apparently feels emboldened enough to escalate its confrontation with Israel.
Topic:
Terrorism, Military Strategy, Counter-terrorism, and ISIS
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Syria, North America, and United States of America

387. Hot Winds of the Cold War

Author:
Uzi Rubin
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
In his recent “State of the Nation” address, Russian President Putin unveiled six new strategic, advanced weapon systems. The important point about these impressive weapons is their ability to penetrate the global missile defense system that according to Putin is being deployed by the United States. But, such a system does not exist and is not even being planned. It is not surprising that the US responded to Putin’s speech with indifference. Putin’s speech reveals, more than anything else, the continuing Russian trauma from the “Star Wars” initiative of President Reagan
Topic:
Military Strategy, Weapons, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

388. European Policy after the Poisoning in Britain: Rhetoric or Action?

Author:
Micky Aharonson
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
In spite of the impressive international front against Russia following the former spy’s poisoning in Britain, its activity seems to be limited mainly to rhetoric and diplomatic gestures, which will not achieve Russia’s isolation
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Intelligence, and Assassination
Political Geography:
Britain, Russia, and Europe

389. The Great Distraction of Punitive Airstrikes

Author:
Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Don’t congratulate the administration on avoiding Russian retaliation. The humanitarian crisis in Syria remains, and the real collision course here is between Israel and Iran.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

390. War’s Future: The Risks and Rewards of Grey-Zone Conflict and Hybrid Warfare

Author:
David Carment
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Today’s geopolitical conflicts, especially among great powers, involve a desire to fundamentally revise the order of alliances as well as solidify new norms of conduct. The purpose of our paper is to delineate two distinct phenomena in international affairs – hybrid warfare, which emphasizes the tactical level and grey-zone conflicts, which incorporates a long-term strategic dimension into international disputes. We argue that hybrid warfare can be a tactical subset of grey-zone conflict deployed under certain conditions and in varying degrees. We examine four case studies: China’s application of ‘unrestricted warfare’, Russia’s strategy of ‘hybrid balancing’, ‘regional hybridism’ practiced by Israel and ‘restricted hybridism’ applied by Canada/NATO globally. We conclude that the solution to challenges from Russia and China is not a military one but a political and collective one based on baseline requirements for building resilience. Israel, on the other hand, is largely uninterested in the revision of order of alliances and will continue to utilize its tactical advantage vis-à-vis regional neighbors to achieve victories in short conflicts. We conclude that NATO (and Canada) should work more closely with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the European Union to effectively extend security guarantees to its members. In doing so Canada and likeminded countries will involve the costs of engaging in hybrid warfare and the subsequent erosion of democratic accountability.
Topic:
NATO, War, Geopolitics, and Hybrid Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Middle East, Canada, Israel, and Asia

391. Will Israel Once Again Turn its Back on Those Who Have Been on its Side?

Author:
Eran Lerman and Nir Boms
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Israel may soon face a dilemma. The “arrangement” with Russia as to the future of Syria may stave-off an Iranian presence but will pose an existential danger to the groups of rebels near the border – groups which have worked closely with the IDF to prevent direct friction with hostile elements on the line of contact. It is vital that the solutions to this challenge demonstrate to future partners that Israel does not turn its back on those who have assisted it facing a common threat.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, and Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

392. The Fall of Dera’a

Author:
Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
It remains deeply open to question as to whether Putin has either the will or the capability to prevent Iranian deployment in the border area.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Conflict, and Borders
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Israel

393. Diplomacy Backed by Military Force

Author:
Eran Lerman
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
How the wise use of force facilitates diplomatic processes in the Israel-Egypt-Hamas and Israel-Russia-Syria triangles
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Hamas
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, Middle East, Israel, Syria, and Egypt

394. Erdogan’s Dilemma

Author:
Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Turkey faces few good options as the Idlib offensive looms.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Leadership, Conflict, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

395. The American Interpretation of Russia’s Conduct: The Case of Syria

Author:
Micky Aharonson
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The US is failing to appreciate the significance of the leverage points that the Syrian arena provides for Russia. This leverage allows Russia to exact a heavy toll for the measures the US is demanding.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

396. The Real Story behind the Repatriation of Syrian Refugees

Author:
Micky Aharonson
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Russia is actively promoting international involvement in the reconstruction of Syria as a humanitarian effort aimed at creating the conditions for refugees to return, but in practice this will reinforce the foundations of Assad’s rule and territorial control. The US is in no hurry to respond, but the Russian initiative will not remain unanswered.
Topic:
Human Rights, Refugees, Humanitarian Crisis, and Repatriation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

397. As the Middle East Turns: Domestic Unrest, Changing Partnerships, and an Unreliable United States

Author:
Joshua Krasna
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
In the Mideast of today, the US is largely irrelevant, when it is not disruptive, and is certainly not providing clear leadership. With the current disarray in DC, it does not look like this will change any time soon.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Leadership, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America

398. Common Objectives, Separate Interests

Author:
Yaakov Amidror
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The downing of a Russian plane by Syrian artillery after an Israeli strike proves how vital it is to maintain open lines of communications between Israel and Russia. The IDF may have to exercise more restraint, but it will still do what it must.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Communications, Military Strategy, Missile Defense, and Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

399. Complications in Russian-Israeli Relations: Israel’s Aerial Freedom of Operation in Syria will be Preserved

Author:
Omer Dostri
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Russia’s accusations against Israel that it is responsible for the downing of its plane is meant primarily for a domestic audience. Until now, Russia has made sure to behave with restraint in the Syrian arena and to operate based on its strategic interests. One of those interests is the Russian desire to minimize Iranian involvement in Syria.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

400. The Next Arena of Conflict: The Eastern Mediterranean

Author:
Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Iran, Turkey, Russia and other bad actors threaten Western and Israeli security in this strategic zone.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, and Mediterranean