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101. NATO’s Resilience: The first and last line of defence

Author:
Johnny Hall and Hugh Sandeman
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
Ahead of NATO’s Madrid Summit in June 2022, Hugh Sandeman and Jonny Hall confront the political challenges posed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the alliance’s 2021 Strengthened Resilience Commitment, especially in creating collective standards when resilience remains the responsibility of individual member states. The authors find that resilience is a psychological mindset as well as a material factor, and NATO’s ‘whole-of-society’ approach should be framed within the concept of ‘deterrence by denial’ to potential threats. This Strategic Update is based on a discussion hosted by LSE IDEAS in January 2022 on ‘How can NATO define and develop practical objectives for enhancing the resilience of member states?’ Participants in the discussion were: General Sir James Everard, Dr Tomas Ries, Susan Scholefield, Peter Watkins, Professor Gordon Barrass, General Sir Richard Barrons, Professor Christopher Coker, and Tom McKane. This Strategic Update reflects points made during the discussion, but no participant is in any way committed to its specific content, and the views expressed here are attributable solely to the authors.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

102. Strategies for Order in a Disorderly World

Author:
Aaron McKeil
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
In the wake of the invasion of Ukraine, Aaron McKeil aims to clarify debates between realism and liberalism, as applied theories. While he finds that each position is not without merits, under scrutiny neither is found to offer a sufficient strategy for order in a disorderly world.
Topic:
International Relations, Realism, Liberalism, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Ukraine

103. The Long Shadow of the Soviet Union: Demystifying Putin’s Rhetoric Towards Ukraine

Author:
Björn Alexander Düben
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
As tensions between Russia and Ukraine reach an almost-tipping point, Björn Alexander Düben analyses the historical and geopolitical rhetoric Putin and his government have deployed against the post-Maidan Ukraine since 2014. Asking, can this be seen as another Russian assertion of dominance in the post-Soviet region, could there be reasons closer to home, or why tensions across the border seem to once again be at a breaking point? From global oil prices to regime consolidation, an analysis into the words of Russia’s elites could unveil what future Europe is steering towards.
Topic:
Geopolitics, History, Conflict, Soviet Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

104. Can Chancellor Scholz Save the West? The New German Government and Global Geopolitics

Author:
Maximilian Terhalle
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
In the wake of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s departure from the German Chancellorship, her successor, Olaf Scholz, inherits a Germany which has been lacking in strategic vision and an acute foreign policy for a considerable amount of time. Maximilian Terhalle asks, can Chancellor Scholz provide this vision for his country, and imbue NATO and the EU with a coherent and unified foreign policy in the face of threats from China, Russia, and a divided ‘West’?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, Geopolitics, Olaf Scholz, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Germany

105. Cyberattacks Integral to Russia's Political and Military Strategies

Author:
Aleksandra Kozioł
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
To destabilise democratic countries that support Ukraine, Russia employs cyberattacks on the target state’s public institutions and critical infrastructure. These activities have clearly intensified since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022 and is in line with the implementation of Russian military strategy. In this context, it would be beneficial within the EU and NATO to develop joint action plans to respond to future threats in cyberspace.
Topic:
NATO, Infrastructure, European Union, Cybersecurity, Cyberspace, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

106. Russian Attacks May Prompt Increased Refugee Flows from Ukraine

Author:
Maria Piechowska
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Russia is continuing its intensive attacks on critical infrastructure in Ukraine. These are deliberate actions that violate international humanitarian law and are aimed at breaking the morale of Ukrainian society. Power outages mean that many towns and villages are not only without heating but also without water. Further devastation and the difficulty of repairs could trigger a humanitarian catastrophe. Most of the population will try to survive the winter in their current residences or by resettling in smaller towns. Increased refugee movement across borders, especially to Poland, is also possible.
Topic:
Refugees, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

107. The Waning India-Russia Partnership is an Unexpected Effect of the War in Ukraine

Author:
Patryk Kugiel
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
twitter The Waning India-Russia Partnership is an Unexpected Effect of the War in Ukraine 174 08.11.2022 India has not condemned Russia for its aggression against Ukraine, which stems from historical ideological ties, as well as their strategic and military cooperation. However, the war has led to unfavourable changes from India’s point of view—the weakening of Russia, the collapse of its cooperation with the West, and a growing dependence on China. As a result, Russia is diminishing in importance as a key partner of India, including a supplier of weapons and technology. In the long run, closer cooperation between India and the U.S. and EU countries in the field of security and energy will help to move India away from Russia.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Partnerships, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, South Asia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and India

108. The impact of the Ukraine crisis on international trade

Author:
Zsolt Darvas and Catarina Martins
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
We study the economic implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, by scrutinising global trade volumes and commodity prices, trade balances and bilateral trade flows between major economic powers and Russia. We find that energy prices increased more in 2021 than in 2022, suggesting that the war and the sanctions were not the most important drivers. Nevertheless, International Monetary Fund forecast revisions from October 2021 to October 2022 suggest that the volume of global trade in goods and services declined by 3.4 percent, energy prices increased by about 100 percent, and the prices of non-energy commodities by 8 percent. The war could be an important driver of these forecast revisions, though other factors were also at play. While forecasts for important industrial production input costs were not revised, soaring energy prices deteriorated the trade balance of countries importing energy. Only half of the increase in Russia’s trade surplus was related to soaring energy prices. The other half resulted from the collapse of Russian imports, which will likely undermine the Russian economy’s productive capacity over time. Falling Russian exports of goods other than mineral fuels suggest Russia’s productive capacity has already weakened. Russia’s trade has been reoriented from advanced economies to China, India and Turkey, but this has only partially compensated for the decline in trade with advanced countries. We find that sanctions had an impact on trade. There is no evidence of European and US companies circumventing sanctions by re-routing sanctioned goods to Russia via China and Turkey. The UK and the US have already stopped importing fossil fuels from Russia, and such imports by the EU have declined. With the EU’s Russian seaborne crude petroleum import ban taking effect in December 2022 and the refined petroleum ban coming to effect in February 2023, Russia’s revenues from fossil fuel exports to the EU are set to shrink significantly, with limited options for redirecting exports to other countries. The three main policy-relevant implications from our research are: The war and the sanctions are not the most important drivers of energy price; The direct aim of sanctions seems to have been achieved; The capacity of the Russian state to finance the war from fossil fuel revenues is bound to shrink. The dataset used for most charts of this working paper is regularly updated and is available in the Russian foreign trade tracker
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Sanctions, Fossil Fuels, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

109. Rising from the Ashes: The Future of Arms Control

Author:
Victor Mizin and Yue Yuan
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
This paper employs a comparative approach to provide an initial comprehensive analysis of the political interactions, contemporary nuclear policies, and military strategies and capabilities of China, Russia, and the United States in the context of the unstable international security landscape. At a time when the global arms control regime is teetering on the brink of disintegration, the authors aim to offer practical and feasible policy recommendations for remodeling the arms control regime from the Chinese and Russian perspectives. The authors stress the need to revive “traditional” arms control and advocate the search for ways to control emerging military technologies. This paper endeavors to present a two-pronged vision proposed by representatives of two major global players.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

110. Latin America Reacts to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Ariel González Levaggi and Nicolás Albertoni
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
Abstract:
The post-Cold War international order drastically changed after the Russian military intervention in Ukraine. Now Latin America must face an international order marked by competition between great powers, fragmentation, and crisis. Latin American countries' relationships with Russia will bear an additional cost. Although Moscow will lose political, economic, and diplomatic influence, observers should not overlook the Russian push to strengthen its military presence in the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Order, Russia-Ukraine War, and Invasion
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Latin America

111. Cyber Operations in Ukraine: Russia’s Unmet Expectations

Author:
Gavin Wilde
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
A review of academic, doctrinal, and journalistic writing covering the last three decades of Russian military theorizing on cyber-related issues yields three hypotheses that may explain the mismatch between the expectations of many Western observers and the reported impact of Russian cyber operations in the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.1 By exploring the unique and oft-overlooked facets of Moscow’s conceptualization of “cyber,” this paper provides a foundation for better assessing Russia’s performance in cyberspace in Ukraine in early 2022, along with a more nuanced understanding of its capabilities and possible expectations going forward. These hypotheses are as follows: Russia’s Information Operations Troops—a rough analog to Western military cyber commands—remains in its infancy and appears optimized more for counterpropaganda than for offensive cyber operations. The operational command structure over offensive cyber operations, meanwhile, remains murky and is possibly more political than military in nature. Russia’s premier offensive cyber capacities are housed within agencies focused on intelligence and subversion—the key tool kits used against Ukraine since 2014—rather than combined-arms warfare. Moscow’s secretive and poorly executed February 2022 invasion precluded optimal performance in the initial period of the war, which is particularly pivotal in Russian thinking about effectiveness in the information domain. These are each examined through Russia’s own information warfare prism, which differs in crucial ways from Western conceptions of “cyber”—foremost in that it is more expansive, encompassing and emphasizing the psychosocial impacts of information and communication technologies on both the polity and the public.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Russia-Ukraine War, and Electronic Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

112. Russia’s Wartime Cyber Operations in Ukraine: Military Impacts, Influences, and Implications

Author:
Jon Bateman
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
This paper examines the military effectiveness of Russia’s wartime cyber operations in Ukraine,1 the reasons why these operations have not had greater strategic impact, and the lessons applicable to other countries’ military cyber efforts. It builds on previous analyses by taking a more systematic and detailed approach that incorporates a wider range of publicly available data. A major purpose of this paper is to help bridge the divide between cyber-specific and general military analysis of the Russia-Ukraine war. Most analysis of Russian cyber operations in Ukraine has been produced by cyber specialists writing for their own field, with limited integration of non-cyber military sources and concepts. Conversely, leading accounts of the war as a whole include virtually no mention of cyber operations.2 To begin filling the gap, this paper places Russian cyber operations in Ukraine within the larger frame of Moscow’s military objectives, campaigns, and kinetic activities.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

113. Russia’s National Security Narrative: All Quiet on the Eastern Front

Author:
Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The two defining features of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy have been an increasingly adversarial relationship with the West and an increasingly close partnership with China. These drivers have been the salient feature of official Russian national security documents for the past three decades. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. national security community has viewed Russian strategic thinking as misguided because it failed to see China as the real threat to Russia. This view ignores the Kremlin’s preoccupation with Europe as the most important strategic theater where its interests are at stake, and where they are threatened by the West’s superior capabilities and ambitions. This view also ignores how unimportant—relative to Europe—the Asia-Pacific is for Russia. Russia’s partnership with China is secured, however, by a set of coherent and complementary strategic rationales, which supersede frequent concerns in the Russian strategic community at large about China and its growing capabilities and intentions vis-à-vis Russia. Those concerns appear to have little impact on Russian policy. Notwithstanding those concerns in Russia’s unofficial national security discourse, China’s footprint on its foundational national security and foreign policy documents is invisible—and China, as a source of military threat to Russia, does not appear to be part of the Kremlin’s calculus. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has long been the pacing challenge of Russian military modernization, and the main contingency for which it has been preparing has been future conflict in the European theater. For the Putin regime, there is no alternative to Russia’s “no limits” partnership with China. Moreover, even if Putin were no longer on the scene, a successor regime would have powerful economic, geopolitical, demographic, and military-strategic incentives to maintain this partnership. An adversarial relationship with China would pit Russia against two superior powers in two widely separated geographic theaters. The war in Ukraine has cemented the Russian-Chinese partnership for the foreseeable future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Ukraine

114. My Country, Right or Wrong: Russian Public Opinion on Ukraine

Author:
Denis Volkov and Andrei Kolesnikov
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
When Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine on February 24, Western governments, including the United States, immediately condemned what they described as “Vladimir Putin’s war.”1 Surely, this formulation was no accident. It was aimed, first and foremost, at drawing a distinction between the actions of the Kremlin and the attitudes of ordinary Russians. There was optimism that ordinary Russians would not countenance a war against a neighboring country.2 But hopes of Russian grassroots opposition to the war were swiftly dashed. Indeed, public opinion polls have consistently shown overwhelming support (70 percent or higher) for what Moscow calls its “special military operation” in Ukraine. Contrary to expectations, Putin’s popularity has also seen a boost, similar to what happened in the immediate wake of the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Partly in response to these indicators, figures like Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy have called for a visa ban for all Russian passport holders, with an exception for people whose safety is at risk or who are vulnerable to political persecution.3 According to Zelenskyy, “[T]he most important sanctions are to close the borders—because the Russians are taking away someone else’s land” and Russians should “live in their own world until they change their philosophy.” He added, “The population picked this government and they’re not fighting it, not arguing with it, not shouting at it.” Such sentiments are echoed in calls by some European politicians, such as Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin, for an EU ban on tourist visas. “It’s not right that at the same time as Russia is waging an aggressive, brutal war of aggression in Europe, Russians can live a normal life, travel in Europe, be tourists. It’s not right,” Marin said in mid-August.4 At the same time, a careful reading of popular Russian attitudes toward the war reveals important nuances that all too often are overlooked. First and foremost is the fact that rather than consolidating Russian society, the conflict has exacerbated existing divisions on a diverse array of issues, including support for the regime. Put another way, the impression that Putin now has the full support of the Russian public is simply incorrect. A more careful reading of sociological data, including conversations with focus group participants and quantitative research, presents a far more complex picture of Russian society.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Conflict, Vladimir Putin, Society, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

115. Russia and India: A New Chapter

Author:
Rajan Menon and Eugene Rumer
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russian-Indian relations are undergoing a major change. Throughout the Cold War, the relationship rested on three pillars: Soviet arms sales to India; shared public-sector-heavy economic philosophy and extensive Soviet aid; and the Soviet Union–India vs. United States–Pakistan–China geopolitical alignment. The fall of the Soviet Union, the rise of India and China, the U.S.-China tensions, the deepening of U.S.-India ties, and the Russian-Chinese partnership intensified by Russia’s break with the West and the war against Ukraine have had a profound effect on Russian-Indian relations. Of the three pillars of the Moscow–New Delhi relationship, only one remains: the arms trade. Russia remains a major supplier of weapons to India, and Russian equipment still makes up a vast portion of Indian Armed Forces’ force structure; but Russia is facing competition in the Indian arms market. India’s desire to diversify its supply of weapons and develop its own defense industry has resulted in declining Russian arms deliveries to India in recent years. Russia’s break with the West because of its war against Ukraine has accelerated its pivot toward China. Against the backdrop of U.S.-China and China-India tensions, Russia’s position as China’s junior partner will make it harder for Russia to preserve partnership with India. Moscow’s leverage versus both New Delhi and Beijing is shrinking as they have greater capabilities of their own than they had previously and have new partners that offer more than Russia. Still, the Russian-Indian partnership will continue. For India, Russia remains an important supplier of weapons and, most recently, oil. India has not joined the West’s sanctions on Russia. By doing so, it has demonstrated its independent foreign policy. For Russia, India is an important market for arms and oil. The Indian-U.S. security relationship is relatively new, whereas India-Russia ties have endured for over two generations. India has no reason to forsake the benefits of this relationship. Nor does Russia. It has been said that Moscow plays a weak hand well, but sustaining strong security ties with both China and India will become more difficult for it. The question is how China will react to Russian arms sales to India, and what Russia will do if pressed by China to curtail them. For reasons of geographic proximity, economic ties, and personal relations between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, the odds favor Beijing over New Delhi to have a bigger say in Moscow.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cold War, History, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, South Asia, Eurasia, Ukraine, India, and United States of America

116. Networks and Competitive Advantage in a Contested World

Author:
Jennifer Kavanagh
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In an increasingly multipolar world and amid challenges from China, Russia, and elsewhere, the United States faces a complex set of foreign policy demands and the real risk of becoming overextended. Networks—of states, businesses, and individuals—offer policymakers a way to prioritize and reduce global commitments while advancing core U.S. interests. Leveraging the right networks in the right ways can extend U.S. influence, support the economic and physical security of Americans, and compete with adversaries at sustainable cost. Today’s policymakers understand the power of networks but need more guidance on how to build and employ them as tools of competition in a contested world rather than a world of open borders and markets. Influence networks—networks primed to spread and amplify U.S. power, enhance U.S. competitiveness, and protect national interests—have three characteristics. They are attraction networks, organized around places and issues where countries and corporations are already interacting, meeting common needs with customized resources. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), for instance, is organized around a shared need for infrastructure across the Global South and embeds Chinese influence by tailoring agreements to each partner’s local conditions. The United States has used attraction effectively in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, but most U.S. foreign investment has been centralized and top-down. They are gated networks with clear criteria for entry, access, and exit. Gates capture network power and direct it toward specific goals. The European Union (EU) has used gated economic markets to build significant regulatory power and geopolitical relevance. The United States has tended toward universalism but employs gates in some security networks, like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and is turning toward gates in economic networks with friendshoring initiatives in some industries. Finally, they are distributed networks that have robust ties between members throughout the network, allowing influence to flow quickly along more pathways and facilitating collective action. The United States has often relied on less resilient hub-and-spoke networks to retain control. U.S. Indo-Pacific security alliances are hub-and-spoke, while NATO is more distributed, enabling more rapid, coordinated responses and wider spread of U.S. influence. Networks with these characteristics can help policymakers tackle their hardest problems. For example, better use of influence networks can support U.S. efforts to prioritize and fully resource the more significant challenge posed by China by pushing forward changes that advance European security autonomy and by building and mobilizing needed, distributed networks in the Indo-Pacific theater. Influence networks can inform U.S. strategies for building ties to hedging states that offer access to key resources or strategic locations—for example, by focusing on shared local needs of potential partners and U.S. comparative advantages and by creating distributed business or civil society partnerships. Finally, influence networks provide ways to approach the Russia-China relationship that support U.S. security and economic interests, including avoiding the isolation of either. These examples begin to illustrate how influence networks can improve U.S. strategies toward foreign policy challenges by offering policymakers a way to prioritize commitments, capitalize on U.S. strengths, and avoid overextension that harms U.S. interests. Additional exploration and application of these networks will investigate these and other foreign policy challenges in more depth.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Networks, Strategic Competition, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

117. Space Traffic Management: Time for Action

Author:
Mir Sadat and Julia Siegel
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Outer space has long been characterized as “contested, congested, and competitive.” More than four thousand eight hundred active satellites currently orbit Earth, representing over forty nations, and nearly twenty-five thousand satellites are projected to join by 2030. Moreover, spacefaring entities are testing the limits of space exploration: Visionary space companies are aiming to launch space tourism programs and send humans to space within the decade, and governments and militaries are increasing activity in cislunar space—the sphere formed by the Earth-Moon radius—to leverage advantageous orbital regions. As humanity expands its frontiers deeper into the galaxy, the threats to US and allied space capabilities will continue to increase. Yet, despite the proliferation of space activity, the ability of international and national bodies to track and regulate space objects—often referred to as space traffic management (STM)—reflects a past era wherein few actors conducted limited operations in space. The current state of STM can be more aptly described as space situational awareness (SSA), or the mere knowledge of objects in orbit. Global actors (including national governments, corporations, and international organizations) track space objects and notify satellite operators when the probability of collision is notable. While collision avoidance maneuvers are standard when there is a one in ten thousand chance of collision, it is ultimately up to the operators to determine whether and when they will move. The limits of this decentralized approach to SSA were illustrated in September 2019 when a European Space Agency satellite veered off path to avoid a Starlink satellite whose operator missed an email notification signaling a high probability of collision.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, National Security, and Space
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and United States of America

118. The Ukraine War: Preparing for the Longer-Term Outcome

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
It is far too early to predict the ultimate outcome of the Ukraine War, but it is all too clear that no peace settlement or ceasefire is likely to eliminate a long period of military tension between the U.S. – including NATO and its allies – and anything approaching President Putin’s future version of Russia, nor will any resolution of the current conflict negate the risk of new forms of war. It is equally clear that the U.S. and NATO need to act as quickly as possible to prepare for an intense period of military competition and must create a more secure deterrent and improve their capability to defend against Russia. In practice, NATO will need to make up for years of underfunding by each member country and for the cuts in force levels, readiness, and modernization that years of a U.S.-driven focus on burden-sharing – rather than funding NATO’s real military priorities – did little or nothing to address. NATO will need to find new ways to counter the massive problems in interoperability and differences in comparative warfighting that still exist between NATO’s 30 nations. This will need to be accomplished at a time when emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) are constantly changing the nature of deterrence and warfighting, when Russia is actively pursuing nuclear modernization rather than arms control, and when NATO’s more advanced forces are struggling to create new approaches to joint all-domain command and control (JADC2) – and all while doing so at a time when most member countries have limited capabilities to support their existing force structure. At best, developing and sustaining any coherent effort to deal with these issues will take at least five years to implement. It then will require constant updating on an annual basis as new types of technology, tactics, and command and control continue to reshape military needs and force plans. This, in turn, requires sustained political and popular support in the face of inflation and civil needs during a time when the momentum for military change created by the current fighting in Ukraine may have faded. In some ways, the only thing harder than crisis management is the lack of crisis management.
Topic:
War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

119. Government Internet Shutdowns Are Changing. How Should Citizens and Democracies Respond?

Author:
Steven Feldstein
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Governments worldwide continue to deploy internet shutdowns and network disruptions to quell mass protests, forestall election losses, reinforce military coups, or cut off conflict areas from the outside world. Data from the past few years show that incidences of global shutdowns have remained steadily high: 196 documented incidents in 2018, 213 incidents in 2019, and 155 in 2020. The first five months of 2021 recorded fifty shutdown incidents.1 Government-instigated internet shutdowns largely took place in relation to five event types: mass demonstrations, military operations and coups, elections, communal violence and religious holidays, and school exams. As Clément Voule, the United Nations special rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, pointedly observes: “Shutdowns are lasting longer, becoming harder to detect and targeting particular social media and messaging applications and specific localities and communities.”2 Events in Russia have put a finer point on internet shutdown trends. On March 4, 2022, Roskomnadzor, the Russian internet regulator, announced that it would block Facebook and Twitter and would ban new uploads to TikTok.3 On March 14, it added Instagram to the banned list.4 Russian authorities have also restricted access to a slew of news websites, including the BBC, Deutsche Welle, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Voice of America. Roskomnadzor claimed these measures were enacted in response to new limits imposed by platforms on Russian propaganda outlets—accusing Facebook of “discrimination.”5 The Kremlin’s crackdown is an ominous signal about where the shutdown struggle is headed in authoritarian countries. Despite these bleak trends, there is a growing international consensus—at least among liberal democracies—that protecting internet access is integrally linked to freedoms of expression and association and forms a crucial part of the global democracy and human rights agenda. This paper picks up on this emerging norm and probes several key questions: What can citizens do to evade authoritarian controls and regain internet access? How can democratic governments support these efforts and push back against governments that shut down and block the internet? The short answer is that there is a multitude of responses available to democracies and civil society organizations to push back against internet blackouts and network disruptions. Democracies can exert meaningful pressure against repressive governments to ease internet blocks, and citizens are able to exercise creative options to circumvent internet controls. The paper walks through different tools available to citizens to evade internet controls. It examines where internet shutdown trends are headed and incentives for particular regimes to adopt new modes of censorship. It then presents a multifaceted strategy for democracies, civil society organizations, and technology developers and companies to counter internet shutdowns.
Topic:
Government, Science and Technology, Democracy, and Internet
Political Geography:
Russia and Global Focus

120. What the First Week of Fighting in Ukraine Tells Us About a Potential Insurgency

Author:
Alec Worsnop
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
While the Russian advance in Ukraine has been slower than expected, its overwhelming conventional superiority gives it the upper hand. Despite the valiant resistance of many Ukrainians, Russia will probably conquer all or a portion of the country. However, the first week of the conflict has provided some useful information about the prospects for an insurgent campaign in the wake of a Russian occupation.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

121. Cutting Putin’s energy rent: ‘smart sanctioning’ Russian oil and gas

Author:
Georg Zachmann, Guntram Wolff, Agata Łoskot-Strachota, Simone Tagliapietra, Axel Ockenfels, Ricardo Hausmann, and Ulrich Schetter
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
In the wake of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, major sanctions have been imposed by Western countries, most notably with the aim of limiting Russia’s access to hard international currency. However, Russia remains the world’s first exporter of oil and gas, and at current energy prices this provides large hard currency revenues. As the war continues, European governments are under increased pressure to scale-up their energy sanctions, following measures taken by the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. Given the inelasticity of Russia’s oil and gas supply, the most efficient way for Europe to sanction Russian energy would not be an embargo, but the introduction of an import tariff that can be used flexibly to control the degree of economic pressure on Russia.
Topic:
Oil, Sanctions, Gas, Vladimir Putin, and Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

122. On the Design of Effective Sanctions: The Case of Bans on Exports to Russia

Author:
Ricardo Hausmann, Ulrich Schetter, and Muhammad A. Yildirim
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:
We analyze the effects of bans on exports at the level of 5’000 products and show how our results can inform economic sanctions against Russia after its invasion of Ukraine. We begin with characterizing export restrictions imposed by the EU and the US until mid May 2022. We then propose a theoretically-grounded criterion for targeting export bans at the 6-digit HS level. Our results show that the cost to Russia are highly convex in the market share of the sanctioning parties, i.e., there are large benefits from coordinating export bans among a broad coalition of countries. Applying our results to Russia, we find that sanctions imposed by the EU and the US are not systematically related to our arguments once we condition on Russia’s total imports of a product from participating countries. Quantitative evaluations of the export bans show (i) that they are very effective with the welfare loss typically ∼100 times larger for Russia than for the sanctioners. (ii) Improved coordination of the sanctions and targeting sanctions based on our criterion allows to increase the costs to Russia by about 60% with little to no extra cost to the sanctioners. (iii) There is scope for increasing the cost to Russia further by expanding the set of sanctioned products.
Topic:
Sanctions, European Union, Exports, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

123. Cutting Putin’s Energy Rent: ‘Smart Sanctioning’ Russian Oil and Gas

Author:
Ricardo Hausmann, Agata Łoskot-Strachota, Axel Ockenfels, Ulrich Schetter, Simone Tagliapietra, Guntram Wolff, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:
Following the Russian aggression against Ukraine, major sanctions have been imposed by Western countries, most notably with the aim of limiting Russia’s access to hard international currency. However, Russia remains the world’s first exporter of oil and gas, and at current energy prices this provides large hard currency revenues. As the war continues, European governments are under increased pressure to scale-up their energy sanctions, following measures taken by the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. This piece argues that given the inelasticity of Russia’s oil and gas supply, for Europe the most efficient way to sanction Russian energy would not be an embargo, but the introduction of an import tariff that can be used flexibly to control the degree of economic pressure on Russia.
Topic:
Economics, Oil, Sanctions, Exports, Currency, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and North America

124. Everything Counts: Building a Control Regime for Nonstrategic Nuclear Warheads in Europe

Author:
Miles A. Pomper, William Alberque, Marshall L. Brown Jr., William M. Moon, and Nikolai Sokov
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Biden administration insisted in arms control talks with Russia that a follow-on agreement to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) should cover all nuclear weapons and that such an agreement should focus on the nuclear warheads themselves. This would represent a significant change from previous agreements, which focused on delivery vehicles, such as missiles. The United States has been particularly interested in potential limits on nonstrategic nuclear warheads (NSNW). Such weapons have never been subject to an arms control agreement. Because Russia possesses an advantage in the number of such weapons, the US Senate has insisted that negotiators include them in a future agreement, making their inclusion necessary if such an accord is to win Senate approval and ultimately be ratified by Washington. In the wake of Russian nuclear threats in the Ukraine conflict, such demands can only be expected to grow if and when US and Russian negotiators return to the negotiating table.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

125. Russian-Turkish Relations and Implications for U.S. Strategy and Operations

Author:
Hanna Notte and Chen Kane
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Russia and Turkey’s complex relationship has significant implications for U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) strategic interests. The two states cooperate, deconflict, and compete in multiple theatres within Turkey’s extended neighborhood, which straddles United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM), United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), and United States European Command (USEUCOM) areas of responsibility (AORs). 1 Their bilateral strategic trade has created mutual dependencies and vulnerabilities across multiple sectors, such as natural gas, nuclear energy, and tourism. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has many implications for the Russia-Turkey relationship. While engaging actively with Russia and stoking fears that its commercial ties with Moscow could serve Russia’s evasion of Western sanctions, Turkey has also provided TB2 Bayraktar drones to Ukraine, invoked the Montreux Convention, and offered itself as a mediator on various operational issues in the Russia-Ukraine war. As a result of these steps, Turkey’s leverage over both Russia and NATO allies has increased since February 2022. From a U.S. perspective, the implications have been mixed as Turkey has translated its increased leverage into foreign policy steps that threaten to undermine U.S. interests and NATO cohesion. Turkey remains of significant importance to the United States in enabling its interests in the three aforementioned AORs, preventing third actors like China and Iran from operating in the “seams,” and generating an enhanced, unified, and credible NATO capability and capacity in response to Russian aggression. It follows that Turkey’s interplay with Russia in its extended neighborhood has far-reaching implications for the United States and NATO. This study aims to shed light on this relationship, its likely trajectory over the coming decade, its implications for U.S. strategic interests, and how the United States and NATO might shape the Russia- Turkey interplay to their advantage.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, North America, and United States of America

126. Understanding Russia’s perception of international agency in the context of the war against Ukraine

Author:
Andrey Makarychev
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has dominated international politics in 2022 and this looks likely to continue for the foreseeable future. But how did we get to this point in the first place? The core argument presented here is that Russian foreign policy agency – the intention and the ability to act as transgressor and challenger to the liberal international order, defined as the space for norms-based multilateralism – played the key role in the full-fledged restart of the war in Ukraine in February 2022. Taking a critical look at the five pillars of Russian agency, this inaugural CEPS Explainer concludes that the current model of Russia’s international agency is a precarious and vulnerable construct that is unlikely to survive the regime currently sat in the Kremlin.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Multilateralism, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

127. Russia’s Climate Action and Geopolitics of Energy Transition: The Uncertain and Unsettling Outlook following Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Kamila Godzinska and Maria Pastukhova
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has profoundly altered the outlook for Russia’s energy transition and created uncertainties on the global path towards net zero. In response to global economic shifts, Russia had begun taking steps towards decarbonisation, albeit without plans to depart from its hydrocarbon-based economic model in any substantial way. The new political, trade and financial environment induced by Russia’s act of aggression has damaged its potential to maintain the once-emerging momentum. Russia’s actions and the Western response are also reconfiguring global energy relations, with profound economic and geopolitical consequences that may, unless managed, undermine international cooperation on the energy transition and slow down progress on climate change mitigation.
Topic:
Climate Change, Sanctions, Geopolitics, and Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Eastern Europe, and Balkans

128. Putin vs Monnet: European Resilience, Energy and the Ukraine War

Author:
Nathalie Tocci
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
As the Ukraine war escalates with no end in sight, Europe’s resilience is put to test. Nowhere is this clearer than in the energy sphere, where the crisis first created the perfect timing for Russia’s invasion and then became weaponised against Europe in the broader confrontation with the West. In this confrontation, two interpretations of resilience come to the fore: Vladimir Putin and Jean Monnet’s, with the former emphasising pain endurance and the latter transformation through crisis. The jury is out on whether Putin or Monnet will win the day, and whether and how the European Union will prove and strengthen its resilience. But at the height of this crisis, my bet today is squarely on Jean Monnet.
Topic:
Climate Change, Politics, European Union, Institutions, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

129. The Russian Economy Is Muddling Through the Sanctions War

Author:
Oleg Buklemishev
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The transatlantic campaign of sanctions against Russia after its aggression of Ukraine is unprecedented in scale and scope, involving not only dozens of democratic states but also many non-state actors. It imposes considerable barriers and additional cost to the functioning of the Russian economy, which is bound to undertake deep restructuring with far-reaching consequences for production and consumption processes. The current appreciation of the rouble and inflationary slowdown are not signs of improvement but rather the direct effects of the stabilisation measures undertaken and, in fact, bode ill for further economic development. Numerous problems have started to surface this summer and optimistic assessments on the basis of initial resilience of the Russian economy look premature. Russia currently lacks a strategic plan of economic restructuring under the new environment. The future course of events will depend on whether the private sector leads this restructuring with minimal losses or the government imposes its normative prospective, tilting the result farther from economic equilibrium.
Topic:
Sanctions, European Union, Economy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

130. Can the West Afford to Let the World Go Hungry? Overcoming Challenges to Establishing a Humanitarian Corridor in the Black Sea

Author:
Isak Runarsson
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
While economic interdependencies do not prevent war, witnessed most recently by Russia’s naked war of conquest in Ukraine, the costs of war in a globalised world spread far and wide. Russia has taken the world’s food markets hostage by blockading Ukrainian ports in the Black Sea. The resulting food price increases make a humanitarian crisis in the world’s poorest countries increasingly likely; this, in turn may lead to regime fragility and turmoil in the international system. The question of lifting the blockade by establishing a human corridor into the port of Odessa has recently been much discussed. There are challenges to any such effort, both strategic and operational. Yet a careful analysis reveals that the costs and risks of non-intervention are greater than the risks of intervening. An international naval force, co-led by the EU or its member states and Turkey is the best option for such a mission.
Topic:
Security, Food Security, Hunger, Maritime, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Black Sea

131. Gender Issues in Russia

Author:
Marina Pisklakova-Parker
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Gender inequality in the Russian Federation has been growing in the past few years due to the lack of a clear state policy addressing the problem and a rise in propaganda of so-called “traditional values”, which are patriarchal attitudes towards role division for women and men. This has resulted in the increased vulnerability of women, including the growth of violence against women, discrimination at work and lack of opportunities in politics. As the Covid-19 pandemic demonstrated, this patriarchal role division has made women even more vulnerable, doubling their load of household work and increasing domestic violence. Women’s organisations are at the forefront of providing services to victims of violence, educating the public and advocating for change. The recent so-called “special operation” in Ukraine has also demonstrated that women in Russia are actively protesting, organising themselves to help the Ukrainian people and building resistance.
Topic:
Women, Inequality, NGOs, COVID-19, Gender, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

132. The US–Italy Economic Relations in a Divided World

Author:
Adriana Castagnoli
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In 2021, bilateral trade returned to the sustained pace it had prior to the Covid pandemic. Direct investment also grew – crucially, not just Italian investment in the United States but the other way round too. While Italy’s economic ties with Russia and China remain potential hotspots, Rome has never questioned its Atlantic orientation. Nevertheless, possible austerity policies following sanctions against Russia could spread social discontent that populist parties can exploit for consensus purposes in the 2023 general election, rekindling anti-Americanism rooted in different segments of Italian society.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Foreign Direct Investment, Economic Policy, Trade, and Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Italy, and United States of America

133. Russian Youth: Their Attitude to the Ruling Elite and Political Processes

Author:
Denis Volkov
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Young Russians are different from older generations. They are confident Internet users and thus have access to independent media and are exposed to free information and a variety of opinions. They show greater disillusionment with authorities, a greater degree of Westernisation of their tastes and more openness to the world. These differences are well observed in the results of the long-term sociological surveys undertaken by the Levada-Center, an independent polling centre in Moscow. Amidst the ongoing conflict between Russia and the West, Russian youth finds itself pressured between the Russian authorities on the one side, and sanctions from Western countries aimed at isolating Russia from the outside world.
Topic:
Sanctions, Public Opinion, Youth, Elites, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

134. The Implications of the Ukraine War for Israel

Author:
Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
For Israel, this is evidence that its self-reliance doctrine must be nourished with no illusions about foreign support in times of crisis. Moreover, Turkey probably sees NATO more positively since it borders Russia, pushing Ankara toward the West.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, Middle East, and Israel

135. The “New Uzbekistan”: Turkey’s New Partner in the Pan-Turkist Organization of Turkic States

Author:
Hay Eytan Cohan Yanaroack
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Tashkent’s increasingly critical approach toward Russia and its deepening role in the Organization of Turkic States has positioned the country as Ankara’s most important bridgehead in Central Asia.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Central Asia, and Turkey

136. The differences between Western and non-Western US allies in the Ukraine war

Author:
Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
For mid-level regional powers, avoiding non-essential friction with a major power like Russia is seen as an imperative, particularly in a situation where consistent support from their US patron is by no means a given.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Diplomacy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

137. Japan and the War in Ukraine

Author:
Eyal Ben-Ari
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Two weeks after the war began, Japan announced that its new National Security Strategy scheduled to be published this year would recategorize Russia from “partner” to “security challenge,” thus placing it alongside China and North Korea.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Europe, and Asia

138. Russia’s threat against the Jewish Agency is a Bargaining Measure

Author:
Daniel Rakov
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Israel should prepare for a prolonged crisis. The Russians might want to delay or accelerate the legal process to exploit the elections period. The verdict will not constitute the final word. The government is advised to navigate the crisis behind the scenes: publicity might accelerate escalation.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Israel, and North America

139. Ukraine War Distracts US from China, Legitimizes Nuclear Bombs

Author:
Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is distracting the US from the Chinese threat and erodes the nuclear taboo.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Conflict, Rivalry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, North America, and United States of America

140. It is in America’s Interest to End the War in Ukraine

Author:
Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Continuing the war harms the West and endangers its battle to attain other critical strategic objectives.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

141. Putin and Erdogan Meet in Sochi: Another Challenge to the Western Bloc

Author:
Bat Chen Druyan Feldman, Gallia Lindenstrauss, and Arkady Mil-Man
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
The Presidents of Russia and Turkey held a four-hour meeting recently in Sochi, along the shores of the Black Sea, and discussed a range of subjects, from trade and energy to involvement in different combat arenas. What are the two leaders’ respective interests in their dialogue – and what should Israel conclude from the deepening cooperation between Ankara and Moscow?
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Hegemony, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Turkey

142. The Iranian-Russian-Turkish Summit in Tehran

Author:
Raz Zimmt, Gallia Lindenstrauss, Bat Chen Druyan Feldman, and Arkady Mil-Man
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
The three-way summit between Presidents Raisi, Putin, and Erdogan intended to present a unified front against the Western axis, which imposes various levels of sanctions on the three states. But despite the cordial photos and warm handshakes, there are serious disputes between Tehran, Moscow, and Ankara. They are rivals no less than they are partners, and it is doubtful whether their meeting will lead to any substantive gains
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Hegemony, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Turkey, and Middle East

143. The War in Ukraine: More Western Aid and Fear of Escalation

Author:
Eldad Shavit and Shimon Stein
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
The United States and other NATO countries have thus far not deviated from their policy regarding the war in Eastern Europe – military and economic assistance, with no boots on the ground. Yet the more the war continues, and while there is a chance of significant escalation, does this policy stand to change?
Topic:
Military Strategy, Conflict, Escalation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

144. The Russia-Ukraine War: Where Do We Go from Here?

Author:
Zvi Magen and Sophie Kobzantsev
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
Two months after the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the goal of a short campaign has clearly not been achieved. Russia now seeks to achieve gains while suspending the negotiations with Kyiv – both to improve its position in advance of future negotiations, and to deliver the message to the West that “you cannot stop us.”
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

145. Investigation of Russia's Crimes in Ukraine: A Turning Point for the International Criminal Court?

Author:
Ori Beeri and Pnina Sharvit Baruch
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
The Chief Prosecutor at The Hague has already begun to investigate actions taken by Russia in the Ukrainian arena, while accelerating judicial proceedings and bureaucracy. This reflects a change of approach, which includes the prioritization of recent events, as part of an effort to strengthen the status of the Court. How will this affect the investigation of the war in Eastern Europe – and the investigation concerning Israel?
Topic:
Military Strategy, Conflict, International Crime, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Global Focus

146. Walking a Fine Line: Turkey’s Mediation between Russia and Ukraine, and Relations with the West

Author:
Remi Daniel and Gallia Lindenstrauss
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
Turkey’s reaction to the Russian aggression in Ukraine was among the more moderate responses heard from NATO members. With an eye to the post-war situation, Ankara is trying to walk a tightrope and not overly provoke either side. What lies behind this Turkish policy, and is it viable?
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Conflict, and Mediation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, and Ukraine

147. The Ukrainian Civil Front – An Interim Assessment

Author:
Meir Elran, Uri Bar-Yosef, and Zvi Magen
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
Most of Ukraine’s civilian population demonstrates a high degree of steadfastness during the war, rallying around the flag – and around the president. Nonetheless, the challenge to Ukrainian national resilience remains high, given the huge waves of migration, the losses in the hinterland, and the severe damage to national infrastructure and the local economy – which could have decisive effects on Ukraine’s ability to recover from the war
Topic:
Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

148. After the Russian “Ruse,” China Looks for New Friends

Author:
Galia Lavi
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
With the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it would seem that Beijing and Moscow should be a united front against the West. But in actuality, China has been surprised by the scale of the Russian aggression and is now rethinking its position in the geopolitical arena. How will this affect the Middle East?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

149. MF Dollars for Dictators? The Allocation of SDR to Moderate and Isolated Countries

Author:
Haggy Etkes
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
“The International Monetary Fund assisted radical regimes, including the Russian government and the Taliban in Afghanistan”: This claim was made given the allocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDR) by the IMF to states in the region. Is there truth to this charge?
Topic:
Economics, International Cooperation, Finance, and IMF
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, Europe, and Middle East

150. Intelligence and the War in Ukraine: The Limited Power of Public Disclosure

Author:
Ofek Reimer
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
Months before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the West began to disclose intelligence material on Putin’s plans – thereby using a policy tool that brings with it both advantages and risks. What did the intelligence disclosures achieve, and what might Israel learn from this experience?
Topic:
Defense Policy, Intelligence, Military Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine