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1. Les étudiants chinois en Europe et l’Etat-parti

Author:
Jérôme Doyon
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI)
Abstract:
Chinese Students in Europe and the Party-State -- Why do some Chinese students who choose to study abroad get involved in pro-regime organisations? How does this reflect the efforts of the People’s Republic of China to foster relationships of dependence and allegiance with its overseas nationals? Fieldwork conducted within branches of the Chinese Students and Scholars Association in France and the United Kingdom sheds light on the drivers of this form of long-distance authoritarian commitment. An analysis of how the association operates in two different European countries reveals how it adapts to the local environment while functioning as an enclave, isolated from host societies. The organisation’s primary objective is to maintain the Chinese partystate’s hold over its nationals outside national borders rather than influence or develop ties with foreign societies. However, students do not passively allow themselves to be co-opted, and the many pressures they experience can hinder efforts to mobilise them in support of the regime.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Political Science, and Students
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and France

2. What Lies Beneath: Hybrid Threats to Taiwan’s Submarine Cables and the Contest in the Information Domain

Author:
Aurelio Insisa
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Between 2023 and 2025, multiple disruptions affected Taiwan’s submarine cables, a critical yet vulnerable infrastructure essential to the island’s connectivity and security. Against the backdrop of China’s diplomatic, economic and military pressure targeting Taiwan, these disruptions are generally defined as “grey zone operations”. Yet, reframing them as hybrid threats allows for a better understanding of how specific threats to the infrastructure domain can spill over in the information domain. Disruptions to submarine cables may be exploited by threat actors to erode trust in domestic institutions and destabilise society. Uncertainty in the information domain emerging from these disruption presents opportunities for Taiwanese authorities to mobilise public support, international partners and resources to enhance infrastructure resilience. A strategic communications approach drawing on the experience of the EU can strengthen response through enhanced coordination among institutions, coherent messaging, constructive public engagement and improved awareness of information-domain contestation. An effective adoption of this approach may mitigate risks from threat actors while reinforcing the capacity of Taiwanese authorities to safeguard critical infrastructure and maintain societal trust.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Disinformation, Hybrid Threats, and Submarine Cable
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

3. With imports of around €900 million in 2025, is Kosovo moving toward a potential dependency on China’s supply chain?

Author:
Ramadan Ilazi
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
KCSS publishes new paper on Kosovo’s rising imports from China and supply‑chain risks Prishtina, February 20, 2026: The Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS) has published a new discussion paper in its Secure Futures Series examining whether Kosovo’s rapidly growing imports from China could be placing the country on a trajectory toward supply‑chain dependency, and what this might mean for Kosovo’s governance, resilience, and Euro‑Atlantic integration and alignment. Authored by Dr. Ramadan Ilazi, the paper notes that Kosovo imported approximately €920 million worth of goods from China in 2025, making China Kosovo’s third‑largest important partner after Germany, and Türkiye, despite Kosovo’s free trade agreement with Ankara, and no diplomatic relations with Beijing. The analysis highlights that Kosovo’s imports from China have expanded steadily and doubled over the past four years, with China now accounting for around 13 percent of Kosovo’s imports. “For KCSS, focusing on unwanted foreign influence in the Kosovo is about anticipating how economic exposure can translate into political leverage, and security and strategic vulnerabilities,” said Mentor Vrajolli, Executive Director of KCSS. “As Kosovo deepens trade ties with China, despite the absence of normal diplomatic relations, this trend deserves serious attention for its potential ramifications on Kosovo’s longer‑term positioning in relation to the United States and the European Union.” The paper situates Kosovo’s evolving trade pattern within the wider Western Balkans context, where several countries have already experienced politically contentious engagement with China through large‑scale infrastructure loans, procurement practices, and technology cooperation. It underscores that, unlike many of its neighbors, Kosovo has remained at political distance from Beijing, however, the paper argues that dependence can develop also quietly through market dynamics and supply chains. “The purpose is not to be alarmist,” said Dr. Ramadan Ilazi, author of the paper. “The concern is the direction of travel of our country, since imports from China have doubled since 2021, while Kosovo has almost no exports to China and no formal mechanisms for economic dispute‑resolution. In a system, such as China’s, where state and economy are not only closely intertwined, but in practice, one, economic cooperation is rarely politically neutral and especially when the country in question does not even recognise Kosovo and consistently supports Serbia’s position in international forums.” The paper points to relevant experiences, such as Lithuania’s trade disruption following tensions over Taiwan representation and South Korea’s economic exposure during the THAAD dispute, to illustrate how economic links can become instruments of pressure when political disagreements arise. The discussion paper also flags the broader normative dimension, arguing that Chinese engagement in the region has often operated in ways that can undercut rule‑of‑law standards, including through practices such as lex specialis in procurement in other Western Balkan contexts.
Topic:
Risk, Trade, Imports, Supply Chains, and Dependency
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, Kosovo, and Balkans

4. China's 2026-2030 Five-Year Plan: Continuing the Economic Model and Increasing Self-Reliance

Author:
Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:
The latest five-year plan, adopted in March this year by the Chinese parliament, identifies industrial modernisation and the pursuit of technological independence as key to China’s economic development. It mentions increased consumption and improved social conditions, but these are not priorities. The development of modern industries is intended to increase the competitiveness of Chinese companies relative to entities from developed countries, including Poland. The direction outlined by the plan is another argument for strengthening the protection of the EU single market and supporting an active EU industrial policy.
Topic:
Economics, European Union, Economic Development, Modernization, Industry, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Poland

5. Lee Jae-myung's Inter-Korean Policy

Author:
Oskar Pietrewicz
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:
South Korea’s attempts to improve relations with North Korea have been unsuccessful. Although this is mainly due to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) reluctance to resume contacts with the Republic of Korea (ROK), an additional problem has been caused by the inconsistent actions of President Lee Jae-myung’s administration, which has been in office since June last year. The administration’s goal of ‘peaceful coexistence’ effectively means accepting reunification as unlikely, a prospect that is losing support in South Korean society. To avoid an escalation of tensions on the Korean Peninsula, South Korea could seek to cooperate with countries that regularly engage with the DPRK, such as Poland.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Poland

6. Are Long-Term NATO–South Korea Defense Ties Possible? Transitioning From an Arms Exporter to a Trusted Defense Partner

Author:
Chung Min Lee
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
This study focuses on how the Republic of Korea (ROK), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Europe are forging closer defense and security ties and whether such a partnership can be sustained into the future. South Korea has demonstrated that it is capable of exporting and investing in European and NATO security; according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), South Korea supplied 6.5 percent of arms imports to European NATO states (NATO-Europe) in 2024, a similar level to France.1 Conversely, Europe accounted for about 10 percent of South Korea’s arms imports in the period 2020–2024 while the United States dominated with 86 percent of all arms sales to South Korea.2 Based on SIPRI data, South Korea ranked tenth in global arms sales at the end of 2024.3 The main challenge for South Korea rests on rethinking its longer-term approach to strengthening defense ties with NATO along three main pathways: Ensuring greater interoperability with NATO weapons systems by deepening its alignment with the NATO Standardization Agreement through various measures such as the Mutual Recognition for Military Airworthiness (July 2024) agreement and becoming a member of NATO’s Science & Technology Organization (March 2025) and vice versa, so that European systems can be readily adapted into Korean weapons platforms; Encouraging Korean defense firms to operate in Europe with European governments, militaries, and corporate partners to localize production in Europe, similar to the strong foothold Korean defense firms have established in Poland since 2022; and Integrating, to the extent possible, with NATO’s intelligence architecture, including enhanced cybersecurity and cyber defenses; greater intelligence sharing over emerging battle management environments (particularly after the Russia-Ukraine war comes to an end in the foreseeable future); and greater institutionalization of intelligence exchanges, including South Korean assessments of North Korea and China and NATO analyses of threats from Russia. South Korea aspires to become one of the top defense exporters by 2030. Based on its world-leading manufacturing capabilities in automobiles, shipbuilding, steel production, semiconductors, consumer electronics, and nuclear power plants, among other sectors, its ambitions are well within reach. South Korea supplies arms to three main regions—Europe, the Middle East (mainly Gulf states), and the Asia-Pacific. Key European and American defense companies have been leading providers of defense goods and services in the same regions since the end of World War II. Compared to their rivals, ROK defense firms offer definite advantages such as price competitiveness, rapid delivery schedules, and thorough maintenance, repairs, and overhauls (MROs) systems.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Partnerships, and Arms Sales
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and South Korea

7. Duterte’s Populist Foreign Policy as Illiberal Defiance: Consequences and Prospects

Author:
Aries A. Arugay
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Barely two months into his presidency of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte attended the 2016 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Vientiane, Laos. The former mayor of Davao City had just swept the presidential election to become the first executive from outside of the Manila-based political establishment. Rather than reading a scripted speech, he launched into an impromptu tirade about colonial atrocities by the United States. Duterte went on to defend his violent war on drugs and rebut the criticisms of his equally violent purge of suspected criminals.1 The world was shocked by the bad manners exhibited by Duterte, especially his insult to then U.S. president Barack Obama.2 This was the beginning of the shift in Philippine foreign policy toward a more populist, illiberal, and revisionist posture—one that would last until Duterte’s presidency ended in 2022. This essay advances two core arguments about how Duterte’s right-wing populism shaped Philippine foreign policy. First, Duterte’s foreign policy was not motivated by an ideology, so much as by a performance anchored in symbolic defiance, personalized diplomacy, and selective norm rejection.3 Second, Duterte’s populist revisionism ultimately collided with entrenched structural constraints, including the country’s enduring security dependence on the United States, institutional resistance within the bureaucracy, and the democratic political succession that brought the nonpopulist President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. to power. Taken together, these constraints exposed the limits of populist foreign policy in a small and militarily vulnerable state situated on the front lines of the U.S.-China rivalry. Since Duterte was elected, there has been widespread recognition that populism’s impact goes beyond national borders. In Europe, for instance, populists tended not to touch traditional foreign policy and security issues until the 2015 refugee crisis. The wave of populism that followed was marked by a contempt for the cosmopolitan European outlook that had long underpinned support for the European Union, liberal migration policies, and Europe’s reliance on the United States for its security.4 Populists on both the left and right are often skeptical of multilateral institutions because they restrain state power. Venezuela’s former president Hugo Chávez, for example, attempted to form alternative regional institutions in the Americas to counter U.S. hegemony.5 The revisionist impulse inherent in populism inclines its leaders toward foreign policy adventurism, even though abrupt shifts are uncommon given the durability of national strategic interests. Populist leaders also often exhibit a high risk tolerance—especially personalist leaders in command of highly concentrated state power.6 Moreover, they often see foreign policy as a means of weakening their political opponents and consolidating power at home. They also crave international recognition, which they pursue through “megaphone diplomacy” that foregrounds their personality and charisma.7 The burden of managing foreign relations is bearable for the populist up to the point that strategic reality intervenes, imposing itself in ways that leave scant room for performance. Populist politics, therefore, are unable to resist the water’s edge. This essay proceeds by tracing the right-wing populist currents in Philippine foreign policy under Duterte through three major international issues: disputes with China in the South China Sea, the attempted abrogation of the Visiting Forces Agreement with the United States, and the country’s withdrawal from the International Criminal Court (ICC). Respectively, each of these issues foregrounds one of the foundations of Philippine foreign policy that Duterte attempted to undermine: international law, the Philippines’ alliance with the United States, and human rights. The essay goes on to analyze how these foreign policy stances resonated with the revisionist orientations of countries that Duterte sought inspiration from—namely China and Russia. These revisionist narratives were reinforced in the Philippines through domestic disinformation networks that learned strategies from Russia and China.8 Finally, the essay highlights the implications of Duterte’s populist policies under the Marcos Jr. administration and examines the prospects of their revival in the future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Populism, and Illiberalism
Political Geography:
Asia and Philippines

8. Chinese Loans to Sub-Saharan African countries: BalancingDevelopment and Dependency

Author:
Ahmed Salim Vessah
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
Over the past two decades, China has become sub-Saharan Africa’s (SSA) foremost tradingpartner and the region’s main bilateral creditor, profoundly reshaping its financial and geopoliticallandscape. Between 2000 and 2022, Chinese lenders extended over USD 170 billion in loans toAfrican countries , with major recipients (such as Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and Zambia)each receiving between USD 5 and 40 billion. Today, China accounts for around 20% of SSA’sbilateral external debt , underscoring its strategic importance in the continent’s developmenttrajectory. This Policy Brief argues that while Chinese loans are instrumental in addressing Africa’smassive infrastructure deficit, they concurrently heighten debt vulnerabilities and geopoliticaldependence. The attractiveness of Chinese financing is best understood in relation to Africa’spersistent structural needs. According to the African Development Bank (AfDB, 2024) , SSA facesan annual infrastructure financing gap of USD 100-150 billion, far exceeding the capacity ofdomestic revenues and traditional donors. Chinese loans therefore stand out due to their speed of approval focus on large-scale physical infrastructure, and limited policy conditionality’s comparedto Western lenders. For many African governments, this makes Chinese credit an appealing andpragmatic alternative for accelerating development.
Topic:
Debt, Development, Infrastructure, Trade, and Dependency
Political Geography:
Africa, China, and Asia

9. The Impact of Purges in the Chinese Army on Its Effectiveness

Author:
Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:
Xi Jinping, as the Party’s secretary general, continues to strengthen his personal oversight of the Chinese armed forces, as evidenced by disciplinary actions against Zhang Youxia, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. Combined with the purges that began in 2022, the growing atmosphere of uncertainty, and the increasing pressure to demonstrate loyalty to Xi, this raises the risk that the authorities will misjudge the condition of their armed forces. This may increase the likelihood of escalation, for example, towards Taiwan.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Reform, Xi Jinping, Escalation, Loyalty, and Purge
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

10. Social protection in South Korea: Transition from the developmental to the universal welfare state

Author:
Huck-ju Kwon and Eunju Kim
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United Nations University
Abstract:
South Korea’s social protection system has undergone a profound transformation from a developmental welfare state, in which social protection policies were subordinated to the economic development goal, to a universal welfare state. This study traces this trajectory by examining six key programmes—Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance, National Health Insurance, National Pension, Employment Insurance, the National Basic Livelihood Security Scheme, and the Basic Pension—focusing on their functions, policy design, coverage expansion, and responses to new social risks. Findings show that initial programmes targeted formal-sector workers to support industrialization, but were gradually expanded to encompass broader populations. They were sequentially extended from large enterprises to small firms and then to the general population, with contribution rates increased incrementally to ensure administrative feasibility and fiscal sustainability. Democratization and electoral competition opened policy windows for universalization, while economic crises accelerated programme inclusivity. The analysis reveals that social protection facilitated structural economic transformation while progressively recognizing social rights. However, persistent labour market dualism, population aging, and high elderly poverty underscore the need for recalibrating Korea’s welfare system toward greater inclusivity and sustainability.
Topic:
Development, Welfare, and Social Protection
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

11. Growth without profits: how will ‘involution’ in China end?

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Jianwei Xu
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
This paper analyses China’s economic ‘involution’, a phenomenon characterised by intense competition in overcrowded markets such as electric vehicles (EVs), price wars, declining profit margins and ongoing resource misallocation via ‘zombie firms’. Using data from Chinese listed companies, we decompose firm profits and find that, while firm-level total factor productivity (TFP) has risen since 2020, markups are falling. More granularly, firms across the productivity spectrum are compressing their profit margins to compete for market share. The fact that even companies without productivity gains are lowering prices has contributed to a growing share of loss-making zombie firms, which survive on the back of bank support or government subsidies, hindering consolidation. China’s policy efforts emphasise anti-involution measures including regulation of predatory pricing and promotion of orderly exits, but they have not yet solved the fundamental problem, as unproductive firms continue to operate. For Europe, this has heightened the concern that China’s involution-driven growth model is fuelling export expansion through persistent low-price competition, increasing the likelihood that the EU will strengthen its trade-defence measures, alongside efforts to raise its own productivity.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Economic Growth, Trade, Trade Policy, and Global Economy
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

12. Tackling India's jobs plight: underutilised levers and lessons from China

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Rajeswari Sengupta
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Despite strong GDP growth and a favourable demographic profile, India faces an impending jobs crisis. A large share of the workforce remains employed in low-productivity agriculture, while many new labour market entrants are absorbed into the persistently large informal sector. By contrast, China’s rapid ascent was driven by manufacturing-led, export-oriented industrialisation, underpinned by large inflows of foreign direct investment and sustained technology transfer. India’s manufacturing base remains modest in contrast. The bulk of well-paid, formal employment continues to be concentrated in the high-skill services sector. This paper contrasts the development trajectories of these two economies and identifies several underutilised jobs-growth levers in India: manufacturing, goods exports, manufacturing-oriented foreign direct investment and innovation. All of these remain underdeveloped, yet together they offer a pathway to more labour-absorbing, durable growth. Leveraging them effectively would be central to achieving India’s ‘Viksit Bharat 2047’ ambition of attaining high-income status. The scale of India’s challenge to employ eight to ten million labour-market entrants per year implies that job creation must become an explicit policy priority. This calls for greater trade openness, particularly with Asia and Europe, to integrate India into Asia-centric global supply chains as an alternative to China. Labour market reform is equally critical, making the effective implementation of the new labour codes essential. Strengthening innovation ecosystems and realigning education and skills policies to support industrialisation are also key. Without these structural shifts, India’s current pattern of jobless growth risks transforming its demographic dividend into a long-term liability.
Topic:
Employment, Economic Growth, Fiscal Policy, Trade Policy, and Labor Market
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, and Asia

13. Debt sustainability in Japan and the case for a fiscal council

Author:
Tomomi Miyazaki, Marie-Sophie Lappe, and Roel Dom
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Japan combines the highest public debt ratio among advanced economies with a fiscal framework that has struggled to anchor fiscal policy. As monetary policy normalises and interest rates rise, concerns about debt sustainability have intensified. We assess Japan’s debt dynamics using stochastic debt sustainability analysis, and examine the institutional foundations of its fiscal framework. We show that debt outcomes are highly sensitive to growth assumptions. Under plausible baseline scenarios, debt does not stabilise without sustained primary surpluses and even optimistic growth assumptions require fiscal adjustment relative to the current structural primary balance. Japan’s challenge is institutional as well as economic: weak enforcement of fiscal rules and the absence of independent oversight undermine credibility. Strengthening fiscal institutions, particularly through an independent fiscal council, could support debt stabilisation.
Topic:
Economic Growth, Macroeconomics, Fiscal Policy, and Public Debt
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

14. To what extent can green infrastructure investment mitigate China’s clean-energy overcapacity?

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Haoxin Mu
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
China’s industrial policies have made it the global leader in the manufacturing of solar panels, wind turbines and other renewable technologies, but at the cost of severe overcapacity that is now compressing margins across the entire sector. This paper evaluates greater investment in power infrastructure as a potential solution to stimulate energy demand, reduce curtailment and alleviate the renewable tech manufacturing overcapacity problem. Using scenario analysis, we show that grid expansion provides meaningful near-term demand relief, though supply-side consolidation remains necessary to restore durable market equilibrium.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, Investment, Trade Policy, and Energy
Political Geography:
China and Asia

15. 'Trade is in our Blood': Momentum Builds in Asia for Expanding Rules-based Economic Cooperation

Author:
Jane Mellsop
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
The trade world experienced unprecedented upheaval in 2025, but Asia still sees the rules-based trading system as the strongest foundation for its future. Trade is “in the blood” in Asia, and these countries continue to forge ahead with trade arrangements with multiple partners—so-called plurilateral trade arrangements—to further integrate their economies, provide certainty for businesses, promote innovation, and enhance economic growth. However, it has not been all smooth sailing, particularly at a time when evolving trade policy of the United States is demanding significant attention from all economies. Regional plurilateral agreements, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) with 12 parties and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) with 15 parties, have brought benefits to their members; however, to remain relevant, they need to be updated to keep pace with emerging developments. For the CPTPP, this has not been easy given its broad membership with diverse interests that hampers progress toward consensus on ambitious upgrades. Expanding the membership of these agreements or even instituting novel dialogues with other trading blocs as the CPTPP has started with the EU and ASEAN, not only provides opportunities to access new markets and expand integration but also sends an important signal in support of rules-based trade at this critical time. Asia should not be complacent with the trade rules already in place. The region would benefit from harnessing the current moment when countries are focused on diversifying markets and suppliers to pursue new plurilateral cooperation and agreements in specific sectors, or to address specific trade challenges, such as critical minerals, an economic security framework, or green technology. The first two of these in particular are of interest to the current U.S. administration, though Asian countries would also need to consider how China might view any new arrangements. Importantly, countries are more willing now to consider formats other than legally binding comprehensive agreements to support greater economic integration with like-minded partners, such as agreed principles, guidelines, or concrete areas of cooperation to unlock trade and bring benefits to stakeholders, such as the new Future of Investment and Trade Partnership (FITP). While the current global trading context provides impetus for progressing plurilateral initiatives that deepen economic integration among partners, one challenge is the lack of an obvious leader in the region—country or person—to drive such initiatives forward. A group of like-minded countries, such as Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, and Singapore, could step up and lead the charge in support of increased plurilateral integration and the rules-based system. However, even with the best of intentions, countries will be constrained by their own limited resources for trade negotiations and implementation, while developing countries in particular need capacity building, including from high-quality investments, to make any trade deal successful. This report shares these insights and more from roundtable discussions and interviews with more than 60 experts from both inside and outside government from across Asia and the United States on how like-minded countries can preserve and enhance the rules-based trading system through plurilateral arrangements.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, Trade, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Asia and United States of America

16. Assetizing, Trading, Franchising: China's Strategy for Building a National Data Economy

Author:
Ran Guo
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
How can the state harness data as a driver of economic development? This paper examines China’s efforts to expand its data economy since 2022 through a combination of policy and market mechanisms. Two developments signaled this shift. First, the issuance of the Twenty Data Measures in December 2022 articulated a national framework for development-oriented data governance. Second, the establishment of the National Data Administration (NDA) in October 2023 designated a central authority responsible for coordinating data-related economic policymaking. Together, these moves reflect China’s distinctive policy vision — an institutional division of labor in China’s data governance regime, in which developmental functions are increasingly centralized under the NDA, while data security and privacy oversight remain with the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) and other agencies responsible for enforcing preexisting regulatory frameworks. The paper analyzes three policy experiments aimed at advancing China’s data economy: data assetization, which enables data to be valued and traded as a financial assets; state-owned data exchanges, which provide platforms for the controlled marketization of data; and public data franchising, which grants select entities exclusive rights to commercialize government-held public data. These experiments seek to integrate fragmented local data markets into a unified national market, addressing China’s persistent data fragmentation across jurisdictions and sectors, also called the “data island” problem. While early progress is evident, significant challenges remain, including uneven data quality, weak demand for data products, limited interoperability among domestic data markets, emerging monopolistic tendencies in data franchising, and unresolved privacy and security risks. Globally, China’s state-led data economy is often presented as an alternative to European Union and U.S. approaches to data governance, which tend to frame data governance primarily as a constraint on liberal markets rather than tools to support market construction and development. By examining China’s evolving data governance regime, this paper contributes to comparative debates on data governance and offers insights into why China’s approach may hold particular appeal in non-Western contexts, especially as emerging digital powers actively advance growth-centered political economies around data and AI.
Topic:
Governance, Economic Development, Artificial Intelligence, and Data
Political Geography:
China and Asia

17. What to Watch at China's Two Sessions in 2026

Author:
Neil Thomas and Lobsang Tsering
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
China’s annual “Two Sessions” convene from March 4 to approximately March 11. Thousands of delegates from across the nation will gather in Beijing for one of the most important events on the Chinese political calendar. This year is especially significant because the government will not only announce its annual economic targets but will also publish the 15th Five-Year Plan (FYP), outlining policy objectives for 2026–2030. Key watchpoints include: How fast does Beijing want the economy to grow this year? How quickly can it shift from old to new growth drivers? Which strategic emerging industries will receive policy support? Is China prioritizing high-tech competition with the United States at the expense of rebalancing toward consumption and services? What signals will Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, send about his personal priorities? Could there be personnel shakeups?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Economy, Strategic Competition, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

18. Beyond the Biotech Race — Right-Sizing U.S.-China Competition in a Human-Centered Industry

Author:
Jing Qian, Lizzi C. Lee, and Chris Li
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
U.S.-China biotech competition is often framed as a linear, zero-sum race at the technological frontier. A more accurate framework is asymmetric convergence. Biotechnology is not a single chokepoint technology like semiconductors but rather constitutes a multi-layered biomedical ecosystem spanning basic science, translational research, clinical trials, manufacturing, regulatory review, commercialization, data governance, and healthcare delivery. The United States and China are increasingly competing across the same ecosystem, but with different strengths at different layers of the value chain. The United States retains enduring structural advantages, but they require renewal. U.S. leadership remains strongest in foundational science, first-in-class discovery, academic medical centers, venture-backed translational research, deep capital markets, FDA credibility, global standard-setting, and the ability to attract and retain world-class scientific talent. These advantages have long made the United States the orchestrator of frontier biomedical innovation. But they are not self-sustaining. Funding instability, pressure on universities, uncertainty around regulatory capacity, and disruptive and overly restrictive immigration policies could weaken the talent and discovery engine that has historically powered American biotech leadership. China’s biotech rise is no longer simply a story of catch-up or imitation. China has become a systemic peer competitor in several operational domains, including research scale, clinical trial execution, biological manufacturing, asset formation, regional biotech clustering, and global out-licensing. Its strengths are most pronounced where biotechnology functions as an industrial and engineering system: scaling research output, executing trials quickly, mobilizing capital, integrating hospitals and manufacturing, and generating licensable assets at speed. China’s convergence is structural and likely to outlast any fixed policy window. Beijing’s progress is not merely the result of temporary subsidies or isolated breakthroughs. It reflects years of institutional adaptation, talent recruitment, regulatory reform, capital mobilization, data mercantilism, IP capture, and participation in global biomedical networks. Because these capabilities are embedded across multiple layers of the biotech value chain, they are unlikely to be reversed by any single policy tool or short-term action. Biotech should not be treated as exactly analogous to semiconductors. Export controls and “protect” and “restrict” measures may be necessary in specific areas involving sensitive data, dual-use capabilities, supply-chain vulnerabilities, or modalities of national security concern. But broad, undifferentiated restrictions in biotech risk weakening U.S. competitiveness, reducing visibility into global biomedical developments, disrupting supply chains, and slowing innovation in areas where patient outcomes are directly at stake. The United States needs an affirmative, layer-specific strategy. A more effective approach should distinguish among the different layers of the biotech ecosystem: preserve openness in basic science where it underpins U.S. leadership; apply targeted guardrails where national security risks are real; strengthen domestic capacity in biomanufacturing, translational research, and supply-chain resilience; lead in regulatory and data-governance standards; and maintain U.S. influence in global biomedical networks. Competition with China should be used as a catalyst to upgrade the U.S. biotech system. The central U.S. challenge is not only how to restrict China where risks are genuine, but how to compete from a position of renewed strength. This means reinvigorating NIH and NSF funding for basic science, improving translational efficiency, expanding biomanufacturing capacity, supporting clinical trial modernization, strengthening regulatory agility, and preserving America’s ability to attract global talent. Health and medicine remain among the few domains where bounded, de-risked cooperation is still strategically viable. Shared disease burdens, asymmetric capabilities, patient needs, and the humanitarian nature of biomedical innovation create conditions for narrow cooperation that few other sectors can match. Cancer, rare diseases, mental health, chronic illness, aging, pandemic preparedness, antimicrobial resistance, and ethical governance are systemic challenges that do not stop at national borders. A realistic cooperation agenda should be narrow, practical, and subject to clear guardrails. Potential areas include disease-specific clinical trial corridors, rare disease research, oncology pilots, mental health as a shared public health challenge, affordability and access, regulatory learning, and practical training in healthcare delivery and regulatory science. These channels should avoid unrestricted data sharing or sensitive technology transfer and instead focus on privacy protection standards, patient safety, implementation capacity, and measurable health outcomes. The central policy question is not whether the United States should compete with China in biotechnology. It must. The question is how to right-size that competition. A sound strategy should protect national security where risks are real, preserve U.S. scientific and industrial leadership where advantages remain decisive, invest in domestic capacity where vulnerabilities exist, and sustain carefully bounded cooperation where it serves American interests and improves human health.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Public Health, Strategic Competition, Medicine, Biotechnology, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

19. An Overview of U.S.-China Life Sciences Competition and Cooperation

Author:
Brendan Kelly and Craig Allen
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
After gaining attention in 2025, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and the broader life sciences sector are moving to the fore of U.S.-China economic and technology competition in 2026. The sector encapsulates all the myriad challenges and opportunities in the U.S.-China bilateral economic relationship, while also serving as a key test case for the Trump administration’s efforts to pursue a more balanced — and transactional — approach with China. Issues involved in the life sciences sector are wide-ranging: serious national security concerns (as biotechnology intersects with advanced AI tools) along with supply chain vulnerabilities, market access barriers for foreign products in China’s domestic market, cross-border data sharing challenges, increasing U.S.-China competition at the leading edge of technology, and growing concerns that the United States could lose its global share in a key sector it has traditionally dominated to Chinese firms benefitting from industrial policies and state support. Yet, despite these tensions, biopharma is one of the few areas in which U.S.-China linkages are growing. A surge of licensing deals over the past few years has cemented cooperation between U.S. pharmaceutical firms and Chinese biotechnology companies that are trialing Chinese-developed compounds in the U.S. market. At the same time, China has made rapid technological advances in the biotech sector, providing both new opportunities and a competitive threat for U.S. firms. Following intensifying U.S.-China competition and decoupling in semiconductors, the risk of a bifurcation of life sciences industry is nonetheless growing. In January 2025, the United States imposed its first export controls largely focused on China’s biotech threat. In December 2025, after two years of congressional deliberation, the BIOSECURE Act was passed into law, imposing phased-in restrictions intended to lessen supply chain reliance of U.S. biopharma firms on Chinese contract development and manufacturing organizations (CDMOs). On April 8, 2025, the Department of Justice announced data regulations that have materially tightened the rules governing the transfer of U.S.-origin clinical trial and genomic data to China. Finally, Members of Congress and advisory groups are also pushing to include the biotech sector in the U.S. outbound investment control regime. As with most U.S.-China economic issues, the commercial tensions also come back to China’s macro and trade imbalances — particularly its heavy focus on production and less on consumption, or in this case, the provision of healthcare to its own citizens. China’s imbalanced approach and discriminatory policies — seeking to expand access to global markets while limiting access for foreign firms in its own market — risk reinforcing decoupling if China does not reciprocate by extending the benefits of more open bilateral trade and investment. Often missing from discussions around biotechnology competition, however, is a focus on the obstacles to fairer competition for U.S. firms and products in the Chinese market. According to the U.S.-China Business Council (USCBC) 2025 Export Report, pharmaceuticals are the fourth largest U.S. export to China, growing rapidly until 2023 but declining since then. U.S. medical equipment exports to China also grew strongly, before stagnating the past few years. Together, pharmaceuticals and medical equipment account for roughly 10% of U.S. exports to China, with further potential if they were not held back by discriminatory measures and market access challenges. Notably, while most trade frictions focus on China’s surging exports, the European Union in 2025 completed a landmark investigation and found broad discrimination against foreign medical devices in China’s domestic market, leading the EU to limit China’s access to the EU’s procurement market in response. For U.S. stakeholders, the focus on supply chain vulnerability and heavy reliance on China is understandable — biotechnology’s dependence on complex global inputs and specialized manufacturing capacity makes reliance on China particularly acute, with recent disruptions in critical minerals supplies from China underscoring this risk. However, in seeking to win the “competition” in biotechnology, too little focus has been placed on finding the right balance for the United States to maximize benefits from commercial and scientific engagement with China in this field, while mitigating excessive supply chain reliance on China. With patient health outcomes — and potential access to future life-saving or life-improving drugs — at stake, finding the right balance in life sciences competition with China is more complex and arguably more pivotal than in other areas of advanced technology rivalry. This calls for a robust discussion in policy circles, publicly and bilaterally, to find the correct balance. Failure to do so risks damaging U.S. interests. At the same time, China similarly risks undermining its own interests — including China’s own access to global markets and technology — it does not allow more reciprocal sharing of the benefits of life sciences cooperation.
Topic:
International Cooperation, National Security, Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, Biotechnology, Economic Security, and Life Sciences
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

20. Russia–North Korea Military Cooperation in Response to China’s Tactical Ambiguity

Author:
Sungmin Cho
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
The alignment among China, North Korea, and Russia has emerged as one of the most consequential developments in contemporary international security. Russia and North Korea have significantly deepened their military cooperation, while China has adopted a more ambiguous stance toward these developments. North Korea has deployed at least 12,000 troops to support Russian forces in Ukraine and supplied large quantities of artillery rounds, rockets, and ballistic missiles, including ammunition of various calibers.1 When asked about these developments, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian stated that Russia and North Korea “are two independent sovereign states, and how they develop their bilateral relations is a matter for themselves.”2 Some Western analysts interpret this position as evidence that Beijing is uneasy about Russia and North Korea’s deepening military ties and therefore refrains from openly endorsing closer military cooperation between the two — an indication of potential fissures within the China–North Korea–Russia triangle. This report offers a different interpretation. Rather than viewing China’s ambiguity as evidence of fragmentation, it argues that deepening Russia–North Korea military cooperation stems in part from their own distrust of Beijing in the first place. Available evidence suggests that Pyongyang may have regarded China’s economic support as insufficient, while Moscow likely viewed Beijing’s reluctance to provide direct military assistance — along with its parallel efforts to stabilize relations with the United States and its allies for economic reasons — with unease. From the perspectives of Russia and North Korea, the most reliable strategy for keeping China closely aligned is to first deepen their own bilateral cooperation. Doing so increases Beijing’s concern about potential exclusion from strategic coordination while also intensifying U.S. and allied military cooperation. Together, these dynamics may push China toward closer alignment with Moscow and Pyongyang. This dynamic represents a structural dilemma in China’s strategy. On the one hand, Beijing demonstrates strategic clarity in opposing Western pressure alongside Russia and North Korea. On the other hand, it maintains tactical ambiguity to avoid being drawn directly into the conflicts that Moscow and Pyongyang face with the West.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Security, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Ambiguity, and Military Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America