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1. Les étudiants chinois en Europe et l’Etat-parti

Author:
Jérôme Doyon
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI)
Abstract:
Chinese Students in Europe and the Party-State -- Why do some Chinese students who choose to study abroad get involved in pro-regime organisations? How does this reflect the efforts of the People’s Republic of China to foster relationships of dependence and allegiance with its overseas nationals? Fieldwork conducted within branches of the Chinese Students and Scholars Association in France and the United Kingdom sheds light on the drivers of this form of long-distance authoritarian commitment. An analysis of how the association operates in two different European countries reveals how it adapts to the local environment while functioning as an enclave, isolated from host societies. The organisation’s primary objective is to maintain the Chinese partystate’s hold over its nationals outside national borders rather than influence or develop ties with foreign societies. However, students do not passively allow themselves to be co-opted, and the many pressures they experience can hinder efforts to mobilise them in support of the regime.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Political Science, and Students
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and France

2. What Lies Beneath: Hybrid Threats to Taiwan’s Submarine Cables and the Contest in the Information Domain

Author:
Aurelio Insisa
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Between 2023 and 2025, multiple disruptions affected Taiwan’s submarine cables, a critical yet vulnerable infrastructure essential to the island’s connectivity and security. Against the backdrop of China’s diplomatic, economic and military pressure targeting Taiwan, these disruptions are generally defined as “grey zone operations”. Yet, reframing them as hybrid threats allows for a better understanding of how specific threats to the infrastructure domain can spill over in the information domain. Disruptions to submarine cables may be exploited by threat actors to erode trust in domestic institutions and destabilise society. Uncertainty in the information domain emerging from these disruption presents opportunities for Taiwanese authorities to mobilise public support, international partners and resources to enhance infrastructure resilience. A strategic communications approach drawing on the experience of the EU can strengthen response through enhanced coordination among institutions, coherent messaging, constructive public engagement and improved awareness of information-domain contestation. An effective adoption of this approach may mitigate risks from threat actors while reinforcing the capacity of Taiwanese authorities to safeguard critical infrastructure and maintain societal trust.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Disinformation, Hybrid Threats, and Submarine Cable
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

3. With imports of around €900 million in 2025, is Kosovo moving toward a potential dependency on China’s supply chain?

Author:
Ramadan Ilazi
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
KCSS publishes new paper on Kosovo’s rising imports from China and supply‑chain risks Prishtina, February 20, 2026: The Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS) has published a new discussion paper in its Secure Futures Series examining whether Kosovo’s rapidly growing imports from China could be placing the country on a trajectory toward supply‑chain dependency, and what this might mean for Kosovo’s governance, resilience, and Euro‑Atlantic integration and alignment. Authored by Dr. Ramadan Ilazi, the paper notes that Kosovo imported approximately €920 million worth of goods from China in 2025, making China Kosovo’s third‑largest important partner after Germany, and Türkiye, despite Kosovo’s free trade agreement with Ankara, and no diplomatic relations with Beijing. The analysis highlights that Kosovo’s imports from China have expanded steadily and doubled over the past four years, with China now accounting for around 13 percent of Kosovo’s imports. “For KCSS, focusing on unwanted foreign influence in the Kosovo is about anticipating how economic exposure can translate into political leverage, and security and strategic vulnerabilities,” said Mentor Vrajolli, Executive Director of KCSS. “As Kosovo deepens trade ties with China, despite the absence of normal diplomatic relations, this trend deserves serious attention for its potential ramifications on Kosovo’s longer‑term positioning in relation to the United States and the European Union.” The paper situates Kosovo’s evolving trade pattern within the wider Western Balkans context, where several countries have already experienced politically contentious engagement with China through large‑scale infrastructure loans, procurement practices, and technology cooperation. It underscores that, unlike many of its neighbors, Kosovo has remained at political distance from Beijing, however, the paper argues that dependence can develop also quietly through market dynamics and supply chains. “The purpose is not to be alarmist,” said Dr. Ramadan Ilazi, author of the paper. “The concern is the direction of travel of our country, since imports from China have doubled since 2021, while Kosovo has almost no exports to China and no formal mechanisms for economic dispute‑resolution. In a system, such as China’s, where state and economy are not only closely intertwined, but in practice, one, economic cooperation is rarely politically neutral and especially when the country in question does not even recognise Kosovo and consistently supports Serbia’s position in international forums.” The paper points to relevant experiences, such as Lithuania’s trade disruption following tensions over Taiwan representation and South Korea’s economic exposure during the THAAD dispute, to illustrate how economic links can become instruments of pressure when political disagreements arise. The discussion paper also flags the broader normative dimension, arguing that Chinese engagement in the region has often operated in ways that can undercut rule‑of‑law standards, including through practices such as lex specialis in procurement in other Western Balkan contexts.
Topic:
Risk, Trade, Imports, Supply Chains, and Dependency
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, Kosovo, and Balkans

4. China's 2026-2030 Five-Year Plan: Continuing the Economic Model and Increasing Self-Reliance

Author:
Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:
The latest five-year plan, adopted in March this year by the Chinese parliament, identifies industrial modernisation and the pursuit of technological independence as key to China’s economic development. It mentions increased consumption and improved social conditions, but these are not priorities. The development of modern industries is intended to increase the competitiveness of Chinese companies relative to entities from developed countries, including Poland. The direction outlined by the plan is another argument for strengthening the protection of the EU single market and supporting an active EU industrial policy.
Topic:
Economics, European Union, Economic Development, Modernization, Industry, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Poland

5. Lee Jae-myung's Inter-Korean Policy

Author:
Oskar Pietrewicz
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:
South Korea’s attempts to improve relations with North Korea have been unsuccessful. Although this is mainly due to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) reluctance to resume contacts with the Republic of Korea (ROK), an additional problem has been caused by the inconsistent actions of President Lee Jae-myung’s administration, which has been in office since June last year. The administration’s goal of ‘peaceful coexistence’ effectively means accepting reunification as unlikely, a prospect that is losing support in South Korean society. To avoid an escalation of tensions on the Korean Peninsula, South Korea could seek to cooperate with countries that regularly engage with the DPRK, such as Poland.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Poland

6. Are Long-Term NATO–South Korea Defense Ties Possible? Transitioning From an Arms Exporter to a Trusted Defense Partner

Author:
Chung Min Lee
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
This study focuses on how the Republic of Korea (ROK), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Europe are forging closer defense and security ties and whether such a partnership can be sustained into the future. South Korea has demonstrated that it is capable of exporting and investing in European and NATO security; according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), South Korea supplied 6.5 percent of arms imports to European NATO states (NATO-Europe) in 2024, a similar level to France.1 Conversely, Europe accounted for about 10 percent of South Korea’s arms imports in the period 2020–2024 while the United States dominated with 86 percent of all arms sales to South Korea.2 Based on SIPRI data, South Korea ranked tenth in global arms sales at the end of 2024.3 The main challenge for South Korea rests on rethinking its longer-term approach to strengthening defense ties with NATO along three main pathways: Ensuring greater interoperability with NATO weapons systems by deepening its alignment with the NATO Standardization Agreement through various measures such as the Mutual Recognition for Military Airworthiness (July 2024) agreement and becoming a member of NATO’s Science & Technology Organization (March 2025) and vice versa, so that European systems can be readily adapted into Korean weapons platforms; Encouraging Korean defense firms to operate in Europe with European governments, militaries, and corporate partners to localize production in Europe, similar to the strong foothold Korean defense firms have established in Poland since 2022; and Integrating, to the extent possible, with NATO’s intelligence architecture, including enhanced cybersecurity and cyber defenses; greater intelligence sharing over emerging battle management environments (particularly after the Russia-Ukraine war comes to an end in the foreseeable future); and greater institutionalization of intelligence exchanges, including South Korean assessments of North Korea and China and NATO analyses of threats from Russia. South Korea aspires to become one of the top defense exporters by 2030. Based on its world-leading manufacturing capabilities in automobiles, shipbuilding, steel production, semiconductors, consumer electronics, and nuclear power plants, among other sectors, its ambitions are well within reach. South Korea supplies arms to three main regions—Europe, the Middle East (mainly Gulf states), and the Asia-Pacific. Key European and American defense companies have been leading providers of defense goods and services in the same regions since the end of World War II. Compared to their rivals, ROK defense firms offer definite advantages such as price competitiveness, rapid delivery schedules, and thorough maintenance, repairs, and overhauls (MROs) systems.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Partnerships, and Arms Sales
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and South Korea

7. Duterte’s Populist Foreign Policy as Illiberal Defiance: Consequences and Prospects

Author:
Aries A. Arugay
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Barely two months into his presidency of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte attended the 2016 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Vientiane, Laos. The former mayor of Davao City had just swept the presidential election to become the first executive from outside of the Manila-based political establishment. Rather than reading a scripted speech, he launched into an impromptu tirade about colonial atrocities by the United States. Duterte went on to defend his violent war on drugs and rebut the criticisms of his equally violent purge of suspected criminals.1 The world was shocked by the bad manners exhibited by Duterte, especially his insult to then U.S. president Barack Obama.2 This was the beginning of the shift in Philippine foreign policy toward a more populist, illiberal, and revisionist posture—one that would last until Duterte’s presidency ended in 2022. This essay advances two core arguments about how Duterte’s right-wing populism shaped Philippine foreign policy. First, Duterte’s foreign policy was not motivated by an ideology, so much as by a performance anchored in symbolic defiance, personalized diplomacy, and selective norm rejection.3 Second, Duterte’s populist revisionism ultimately collided with entrenched structural constraints, including the country’s enduring security dependence on the United States, institutional resistance within the bureaucracy, and the democratic political succession that brought the nonpopulist President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. to power. Taken together, these constraints exposed the limits of populist foreign policy in a small and militarily vulnerable state situated on the front lines of the U.S.-China rivalry. Since Duterte was elected, there has been widespread recognition that populism’s impact goes beyond national borders. In Europe, for instance, populists tended not to touch traditional foreign policy and security issues until the 2015 refugee crisis. The wave of populism that followed was marked by a contempt for the cosmopolitan European outlook that had long underpinned support for the European Union, liberal migration policies, and Europe’s reliance on the United States for its security.4 Populists on both the left and right are often skeptical of multilateral institutions because they restrain state power. Venezuela’s former president Hugo Chávez, for example, attempted to form alternative regional institutions in the Americas to counter U.S. hegemony.5 The revisionist impulse inherent in populism inclines its leaders toward foreign policy adventurism, even though abrupt shifts are uncommon given the durability of national strategic interests. Populist leaders also often exhibit a high risk tolerance—especially personalist leaders in command of highly concentrated state power.6 Moreover, they often see foreign policy as a means of weakening their political opponents and consolidating power at home. They also crave international recognition, which they pursue through “megaphone diplomacy” that foregrounds their personality and charisma.7 The burden of managing foreign relations is bearable for the populist up to the point that strategic reality intervenes, imposing itself in ways that leave scant room for performance. Populist politics, therefore, are unable to resist the water’s edge. This essay proceeds by tracing the right-wing populist currents in Philippine foreign policy under Duterte through three major international issues: disputes with China in the South China Sea, the attempted abrogation of the Visiting Forces Agreement with the United States, and the country’s withdrawal from the International Criminal Court (ICC). Respectively, each of these issues foregrounds one of the foundations of Philippine foreign policy that Duterte attempted to undermine: international law, the Philippines’ alliance with the United States, and human rights. The essay goes on to analyze how these foreign policy stances resonated with the revisionist orientations of countries that Duterte sought inspiration from—namely China and Russia. These revisionist narratives were reinforced in the Philippines through domestic disinformation networks that learned strategies from Russia and China.8 Finally, the essay highlights the implications of Duterte’s populist policies under the Marcos Jr. administration and examines the prospects of their revival in the future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Populism, and Illiberalism
Political Geography:
Asia and Philippines

8. Chinese Loans to Sub-Saharan African countries: BalancingDevelopment and Dependency

Author:
Ahmed Salim Vessah
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
Over the past two decades, China has become sub-Saharan Africa’s (SSA) foremost tradingpartner and the region’s main bilateral creditor, profoundly reshaping its financial and geopoliticallandscape. Between 2000 and 2022, Chinese lenders extended over USD 170 billion in loans toAfrican countries , with major recipients (such as Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and Zambia)each receiving between USD 5 and 40 billion. Today, China accounts for around 20% of SSA’sbilateral external debt , underscoring its strategic importance in the continent’s developmenttrajectory. This Policy Brief argues that while Chinese loans are instrumental in addressing Africa’smassive infrastructure deficit, they concurrently heighten debt vulnerabilities and geopoliticaldependence. The attractiveness of Chinese financing is best understood in relation to Africa’spersistent structural needs. According to the African Development Bank (AfDB, 2024) , SSA facesan annual infrastructure financing gap of USD 100-150 billion, far exceeding the capacity ofdomestic revenues and traditional donors. Chinese loans therefore stand out due to their speed of approval focus on large-scale physical infrastructure, and limited policy conditionality’s comparedto Western lenders. For many African governments, this makes Chinese credit an appealing andpragmatic alternative for accelerating development.
Topic:
Debt, Development, Infrastructure, Trade, and Dependency
Political Geography:
Africa, China, and Asia

9. The Impact of Purges in the Chinese Army on Its Effectiveness

Author:
Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:
Xi Jinping, as the Party’s secretary general, continues to strengthen his personal oversight of the Chinese armed forces, as evidenced by disciplinary actions against Zhang Youxia, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. Combined with the purges that began in 2022, the growing atmosphere of uncertainty, and the increasing pressure to demonstrate loyalty to Xi, this raises the risk that the authorities will misjudge the condition of their armed forces. This may increase the likelihood of escalation, for example, towards Taiwan.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Reform, Xi Jinping, Escalation, Loyalty, and Purge
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

10. Social protection in South Korea: Transition from the developmental to the universal welfare state

Author:
Huck-ju Kwon and Eunju Kim
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United Nations University
Abstract:
South Korea’s social protection system has undergone a profound transformation from a developmental welfare state, in which social protection policies were subordinated to the economic development goal, to a universal welfare state. This study traces this trajectory by examining six key programmes—Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance, National Health Insurance, National Pension, Employment Insurance, the National Basic Livelihood Security Scheme, and the Basic Pension—focusing on their functions, policy design, coverage expansion, and responses to new social risks. Findings show that initial programmes targeted formal-sector workers to support industrialization, but were gradually expanded to encompass broader populations. They were sequentially extended from large enterprises to small firms and then to the general population, with contribution rates increased incrementally to ensure administrative feasibility and fiscal sustainability. Democratization and electoral competition opened policy windows for universalization, while economic crises accelerated programme inclusivity. The analysis reveals that social protection facilitated structural economic transformation while progressively recognizing social rights. However, persistent labour market dualism, population aging, and high elderly poverty underscore the need for recalibrating Korea’s welfare system toward greater inclusivity and sustainability.
Topic:
Development, Welfare, and Social Protection
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

11. Growth without profits: how will ‘involution’ in China end?

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Jianwei Xu
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
This paper analyses China’s economic ‘involution’, a phenomenon characterised by intense competition in overcrowded markets such as electric vehicles (EVs), price wars, declining profit margins and ongoing resource misallocation via ‘zombie firms’. Using data from Chinese listed companies, we decompose firm profits and find that, while firm-level total factor productivity (TFP) has risen since 2020, markups are falling. More granularly, firms across the productivity spectrum are compressing their profit margins to compete for market share. The fact that even companies without productivity gains are lowering prices has contributed to a growing share of loss-making zombie firms, which survive on the back of bank support or government subsidies, hindering consolidation. China’s policy efforts emphasise anti-involution measures including regulation of predatory pricing and promotion of orderly exits, but they have not yet solved the fundamental problem, as unproductive firms continue to operate. For Europe, this has heightened the concern that China’s involution-driven growth model is fuelling export expansion through persistent low-price competition, increasing the likelihood that the EU will strengthen its trade-defence measures, alongside efforts to raise its own productivity.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Economic Growth, Trade, Trade Policy, and Global Economy
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

12. Tackling India's jobs plight: underutilised levers and lessons from China

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Rajeswari Sengupta
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Despite strong GDP growth and a favourable demographic profile, India faces an impending jobs crisis. A large share of the workforce remains employed in low-productivity agriculture, while many new labour market entrants are absorbed into the persistently large informal sector. By contrast, China’s rapid ascent was driven by manufacturing-led, export-oriented industrialisation, underpinned by large inflows of foreign direct investment and sustained technology transfer. India’s manufacturing base remains modest in contrast. The bulk of well-paid, formal employment continues to be concentrated in the high-skill services sector. This paper contrasts the development trajectories of these two economies and identifies several underutilised jobs-growth levers in India: manufacturing, goods exports, manufacturing-oriented foreign direct investment and innovation. All of these remain underdeveloped, yet together they offer a pathway to more labour-absorbing, durable growth. Leveraging them effectively would be central to achieving India’s ‘Viksit Bharat 2047’ ambition of attaining high-income status. The scale of India’s challenge to employ eight to ten million labour-market entrants per year implies that job creation must become an explicit policy priority. This calls for greater trade openness, particularly with Asia and Europe, to integrate India into Asia-centric global supply chains as an alternative to China. Labour market reform is equally critical, making the effective implementation of the new labour codes essential. Strengthening innovation ecosystems and realigning education and skills policies to support industrialisation are also key. Without these structural shifts, India’s current pattern of jobless growth risks transforming its demographic dividend into a long-term liability.
Topic:
Employment, Economic Growth, Fiscal Policy, Trade Policy, and Labor Market
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, and Asia

13. Debt sustainability in Japan and the case for a fiscal council

Author:
Tomomi Miyazaki, Marie-Sophie Lappe, and Roel Dom
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Japan combines the highest public debt ratio among advanced economies with a fiscal framework that has struggled to anchor fiscal policy. As monetary policy normalises and interest rates rise, concerns about debt sustainability have intensified. We assess Japan’s debt dynamics using stochastic debt sustainability analysis, and examine the institutional foundations of its fiscal framework. We show that debt outcomes are highly sensitive to growth assumptions. Under plausible baseline scenarios, debt does not stabilise without sustained primary surpluses and even optimistic growth assumptions require fiscal adjustment relative to the current structural primary balance. Japan’s challenge is institutional as well as economic: weak enforcement of fiscal rules and the absence of independent oversight undermine credibility. Strengthening fiscal institutions, particularly through an independent fiscal council, could support debt stabilisation.
Topic:
Economic Growth, Macroeconomics, Fiscal Policy, and Public Debt
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

14. To what extent can green infrastructure investment mitigate China’s clean-energy overcapacity?

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Haoxin Mu
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
China’s industrial policies have made it the global leader in the manufacturing of solar panels, wind turbines and other renewable technologies, but at the cost of severe overcapacity that is now compressing margins across the entire sector. This paper evaluates greater investment in power infrastructure as a potential solution to stimulate energy demand, reduce curtailment and alleviate the renewable tech manufacturing overcapacity problem. Using scenario analysis, we show that grid expansion provides meaningful near-term demand relief, though supply-side consolidation remains necessary to restore durable market equilibrium.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, Investment, Trade Policy, and Energy
Political Geography:
China and Asia

15. 'Trade is in our Blood': Momentum Builds in Asia for Expanding Rules-based Economic Cooperation

Author:
Jane Mellsop
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
The trade world experienced unprecedented upheaval in 2025, but Asia still sees the rules-based trading system as the strongest foundation for its future. Trade is “in the blood” in Asia, and these countries continue to forge ahead with trade arrangements with multiple partners—so-called plurilateral trade arrangements—to further integrate their economies, provide certainty for businesses, promote innovation, and enhance economic growth. However, it has not been all smooth sailing, particularly at a time when evolving trade policy of the United States is demanding significant attention from all economies. Regional plurilateral agreements, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) with 12 parties and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) with 15 parties, have brought benefits to their members; however, to remain relevant, they need to be updated to keep pace with emerging developments. For the CPTPP, this has not been easy given its broad membership with diverse interests that hampers progress toward consensus on ambitious upgrades. Expanding the membership of these agreements or even instituting novel dialogues with other trading blocs as the CPTPP has started with the EU and ASEAN, not only provides opportunities to access new markets and expand integration but also sends an important signal in support of rules-based trade at this critical time. Asia should not be complacent with the trade rules already in place. The region would benefit from harnessing the current moment when countries are focused on diversifying markets and suppliers to pursue new plurilateral cooperation and agreements in specific sectors, or to address specific trade challenges, such as critical minerals, an economic security framework, or green technology. The first two of these in particular are of interest to the current U.S. administration, though Asian countries would also need to consider how China might view any new arrangements. Importantly, countries are more willing now to consider formats other than legally binding comprehensive agreements to support greater economic integration with like-minded partners, such as agreed principles, guidelines, or concrete areas of cooperation to unlock trade and bring benefits to stakeholders, such as the new Future of Investment and Trade Partnership (FITP). While the current global trading context provides impetus for progressing plurilateral initiatives that deepen economic integration among partners, one challenge is the lack of an obvious leader in the region—country or person—to drive such initiatives forward. A group of like-minded countries, such as Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, and Singapore, could step up and lead the charge in support of increased plurilateral integration and the rules-based system. However, even with the best of intentions, countries will be constrained by their own limited resources for trade negotiations and implementation, while developing countries in particular need capacity building, including from high-quality investments, to make any trade deal successful. This report shares these insights and more from roundtable discussions and interviews with more than 60 experts from both inside and outside government from across Asia and the United States on how like-minded countries can preserve and enhance the rules-based trading system through plurilateral arrangements.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, Trade, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Asia and United States of America

16. Assetizing, Trading, Franchising: China's Strategy for Building a National Data Economy

Author:
Ran Guo
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
How can the state harness data as a driver of economic development? This paper examines China’s efforts to expand its data economy since 2022 through a combination of policy and market mechanisms. Two developments signaled this shift. First, the issuance of the Twenty Data Measures in December 2022 articulated a national framework for development-oriented data governance. Second, the establishment of the National Data Administration (NDA) in October 2023 designated a central authority responsible for coordinating data-related economic policymaking. Together, these moves reflect China’s distinctive policy vision — an institutional division of labor in China’s data governance regime, in which developmental functions are increasingly centralized under the NDA, while data security and privacy oversight remain with the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) and other agencies responsible for enforcing preexisting regulatory frameworks. The paper analyzes three policy experiments aimed at advancing China’s data economy: data assetization, which enables data to be valued and traded as a financial assets; state-owned data exchanges, which provide platforms for the controlled marketization of data; and public data franchising, which grants select entities exclusive rights to commercialize government-held public data. These experiments seek to integrate fragmented local data markets into a unified national market, addressing China’s persistent data fragmentation across jurisdictions and sectors, also called the “data island” problem. While early progress is evident, significant challenges remain, including uneven data quality, weak demand for data products, limited interoperability among domestic data markets, emerging monopolistic tendencies in data franchising, and unresolved privacy and security risks. Globally, China’s state-led data economy is often presented as an alternative to European Union and U.S. approaches to data governance, which tend to frame data governance primarily as a constraint on liberal markets rather than tools to support market construction and development. By examining China’s evolving data governance regime, this paper contributes to comparative debates on data governance and offers insights into why China’s approach may hold particular appeal in non-Western contexts, especially as emerging digital powers actively advance growth-centered political economies around data and AI.
Topic:
Governance, Economic Development, Artificial Intelligence, and Data
Political Geography:
China and Asia

17. What to Watch at China's Two Sessions in 2026

Author:
Neil Thomas and Lobsang Tsering
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
China’s annual “Two Sessions” convene from March 4 to approximately March 11. Thousands of delegates from across the nation will gather in Beijing for one of the most important events on the Chinese political calendar. This year is especially significant because the government will not only announce its annual economic targets but will also publish the 15th Five-Year Plan (FYP), outlining policy objectives for 2026–2030. Key watchpoints include: How fast does Beijing want the economy to grow this year? How quickly can it shift from old to new growth drivers? Which strategic emerging industries will receive policy support? Is China prioritizing high-tech competition with the United States at the expense of rebalancing toward consumption and services? What signals will Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, send about his personal priorities? Could there be personnel shakeups?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Economy, Strategic Competition, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

18. Beyond the Biotech Race — Right-Sizing U.S.-China Competition in a Human-Centered Industry

Author:
Jing Qian, Lizzi C. Lee, and Chris Li
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
U.S.-China biotech competition is often framed as a linear, zero-sum race at the technological frontier. A more accurate framework is asymmetric convergence. Biotechnology is not a single chokepoint technology like semiconductors but rather constitutes a multi-layered biomedical ecosystem spanning basic science, translational research, clinical trials, manufacturing, regulatory review, commercialization, data governance, and healthcare delivery. The United States and China are increasingly competing across the same ecosystem, but with different strengths at different layers of the value chain. The United States retains enduring structural advantages, but they require renewal. U.S. leadership remains strongest in foundational science, first-in-class discovery, academic medical centers, venture-backed translational research, deep capital markets, FDA credibility, global standard-setting, and the ability to attract and retain world-class scientific talent. These advantages have long made the United States the orchestrator of frontier biomedical innovation. But they are not self-sustaining. Funding instability, pressure on universities, uncertainty around regulatory capacity, and disruptive and overly restrictive immigration policies could weaken the talent and discovery engine that has historically powered American biotech leadership. China’s biotech rise is no longer simply a story of catch-up or imitation. China has become a systemic peer competitor in several operational domains, including research scale, clinical trial execution, biological manufacturing, asset formation, regional biotech clustering, and global out-licensing. Its strengths are most pronounced where biotechnology functions as an industrial and engineering system: scaling research output, executing trials quickly, mobilizing capital, integrating hospitals and manufacturing, and generating licensable assets at speed. China’s convergence is structural and likely to outlast any fixed policy window. Beijing’s progress is not merely the result of temporary subsidies or isolated breakthroughs. It reflects years of institutional adaptation, talent recruitment, regulatory reform, capital mobilization, data mercantilism, IP capture, and participation in global biomedical networks. Because these capabilities are embedded across multiple layers of the biotech value chain, they are unlikely to be reversed by any single policy tool or short-term action. Biotech should not be treated as exactly analogous to semiconductors. Export controls and “protect” and “restrict” measures may be necessary in specific areas involving sensitive data, dual-use capabilities, supply-chain vulnerabilities, or modalities of national security concern. But broad, undifferentiated restrictions in biotech risk weakening U.S. competitiveness, reducing visibility into global biomedical developments, disrupting supply chains, and slowing innovation in areas where patient outcomes are directly at stake. The United States needs an affirmative, layer-specific strategy. A more effective approach should distinguish among the different layers of the biotech ecosystem: preserve openness in basic science where it underpins U.S. leadership; apply targeted guardrails where national security risks are real; strengthen domestic capacity in biomanufacturing, translational research, and supply-chain resilience; lead in regulatory and data-governance standards; and maintain U.S. influence in global biomedical networks. Competition with China should be used as a catalyst to upgrade the U.S. biotech system. The central U.S. challenge is not only how to restrict China where risks are genuine, but how to compete from a position of renewed strength. This means reinvigorating NIH and NSF funding for basic science, improving translational efficiency, expanding biomanufacturing capacity, supporting clinical trial modernization, strengthening regulatory agility, and preserving America’s ability to attract global talent. Health and medicine remain among the few domains where bounded, de-risked cooperation is still strategically viable. Shared disease burdens, asymmetric capabilities, patient needs, and the humanitarian nature of biomedical innovation create conditions for narrow cooperation that few other sectors can match. Cancer, rare diseases, mental health, chronic illness, aging, pandemic preparedness, antimicrobial resistance, and ethical governance are systemic challenges that do not stop at national borders. A realistic cooperation agenda should be narrow, practical, and subject to clear guardrails. Potential areas include disease-specific clinical trial corridors, rare disease research, oncology pilots, mental health as a shared public health challenge, affordability and access, regulatory learning, and practical training in healthcare delivery and regulatory science. These channels should avoid unrestricted data sharing or sensitive technology transfer and instead focus on privacy protection standards, patient safety, implementation capacity, and measurable health outcomes. The central policy question is not whether the United States should compete with China in biotechnology. It must. The question is how to right-size that competition. A sound strategy should protect national security where risks are real, preserve U.S. scientific and industrial leadership where advantages remain decisive, invest in domestic capacity where vulnerabilities exist, and sustain carefully bounded cooperation where it serves American interests and improves human health.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Public Health, Strategic Competition, Medicine, Biotechnology, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

19. An Overview of U.S.-China Life Sciences Competition and Cooperation

Author:
Brendan Kelly and Craig Allen
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
After gaining attention in 2025, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and the broader life sciences sector are moving to the fore of U.S.-China economic and technology competition in 2026. The sector encapsulates all the myriad challenges and opportunities in the U.S.-China bilateral economic relationship, while also serving as a key test case for the Trump administration’s efforts to pursue a more balanced — and transactional — approach with China. Issues involved in the life sciences sector are wide-ranging: serious national security concerns (as biotechnology intersects with advanced AI tools) along with supply chain vulnerabilities, market access barriers for foreign products in China’s domestic market, cross-border data sharing challenges, increasing U.S.-China competition at the leading edge of technology, and growing concerns that the United States could lose its global share in a key sector it has traditionally dominated to Chinese firms benefitting from industrial policies and state support. Yet, despite these tensions, biopharma is one of the few areas in which U.S.-China linkages are growing. A surge of licensing deals over the past few years has cemented cooperation between U.S. pharmaceutical firms and Chinese biotechnology companies that are trialing Chinese-developed compounds in the U.S. market. At the same time, China has made rapid technological advances in the biotech sector, providing both new opportunities and a competitive threat for U.S. firms. Following intensifying U.S.-China competition and decoupling in semiconductors, the risk of a bifurcation of life sciences industry is nonetheless growing. In January 2025, the United States imposed its first export controls largely focused on China’s biotech threat. In December 2025, after two years of congressional deliberation, the BIOSECURE Act was passed into law, imposing phased-in restrictions intended to lessen supply chain reliance of U.S. biopharma firms on Chinese contract development and manufacturing organizations (CDMOs). On April 8, 2025, the Department of Justice announced data regulations that have materially tightened the rules governing the transfer of U.S.-origin clinical trial and genomic data to China. Finally, Members of Congress and advisory groups are also pushing to include the biotech sector in the U.S. outbound investment control regime. As with most U.S.-China economic issues, the commercial tensions also come back to China’s macro and trade imbalances — particularly its heavy focus on production and less on consumption, or in this case, the provision of healthcare to its own citizens. China’s imbalanced approach and discriminatory policies — seeking to expand access to global markets while limiting access for foreign firms in its own market — risk reinforcing decoupling if China does not reciprocate by extending the benefits of more open bilateral trade and investment. Often missing from discussions around biotechnology competition, however, is a focus on the obstacles to fairer competition for U.S. firms and products in the Chinese market. According to the U.S.-China Business Council (USCBC) 2025 Export Report, pharmaceuticals are the fourth largest U.S. export to China, growing rapidly until 2023 but declining since then. U.S. medical equipment exports to China also grew strongly, before stagnating the past few years. Together, pharmaceuticals and medical equipment account for roughly 10% of U.S. exports to China, with further potential if they were not held back by discriminatory measures and market access challenges. Notably, while most trade frictions focus on China’s surging exports, the European Union in 2025 completed a landmark investigation and found broad discrimination against foreign medical devices in China’s domestic market, leading the EU to limit China’s access to the EU’s procurement market in response. For U.S. stakeholders, the focus on supply chain vulnerability and heavy reliance on China is understandable — biotechnology’s dependence on complex global inputs and specialized manufacturing capacity makes reliance on China particularly acute, with recent disruptions in critical minerals supplies from China underscoring this risk. However, in seeking to win the “competition” in biotechnology, too little focus has been placed on finding the right balance for the United States to maximize benefits from commercial and scientific engagement with China in this field, while mitigating excessive supply chain reliance on China. With patient health outcomes — and potential access to future life-saving or life-improving drugs — at stake, finding the right balance in life sciences competition with China is more complex and arguably more pivotal than in other areas of advanced technology rivalry. This calls for a robust discussion in policy circles, publicly and bilaterally, to find the correct balance. Failure to do so risks damaging U.S. interests. At the same time, China similarly risks undermining its own interests — including China’s own access to global markets and technology — it does not allow more reciprocal sharing of the benefits of life sciences cooperation.
Topic:
International Cooperation, National Security, Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, Biotechnology, Economic Security, and Life Sciences
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

20. Russia–North Korea Military Cooperation in Response to China’s Tactical Ambiguity

Author:
Sungmin Cho
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
The alignment among China, North Korea, and Russia has emerged as one of the most consequential developments in contemporary international security. Russia and North Korea have significantly deepened their military cooperation, while China has adopted a more ambiguous stance toward these developments. North Korea has deployed at least 12,000 troops to support Russian forces in Ukraine and supplied large quantities of artillery rounds, rockets, and ballistic missiles, including ammunition of various calibers.1 When asked about these developments, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian stated that Russia and North Korea “are two independent sovereign states, and how they develop their bilateral relations is a matter for themselves.”2 Some Western analysts interpret this position as evidence that Beijing is uneasy about Russia and North Korea’s deepening military ties and therefore refrains from openly endorsing closer military cooperation between the two — an indication of potential fissures within the China–North Korea–Russia triangle. This report offers a different interpretation. Rather than viewing China’s ambiguity as evidence of fragmentation, it argues that deepening Russia–North Korea military cooperation stems in part from their own distrust of Beijing in the first place. Available evidence suggests that Pyongyang may have regarded China’s economic support as insufficient, while Moscow likely viewed Beijing’s reluctance to provide direct military assistance — along with its parallel efforts to stabilize relations with the United States and its allies for economic reasons — with unease. From the perspectives of Russia and North Korea, the most reliable strategy for keeping China closely aligned is to first deepen their own bilateral cooperation. Doing so increases Beijing’s concern about potential exclusion from strategic coordination while also intensifying U.S. and allied military cooperation. Together, these dynamics may push China toward closer alignment with Moscow and Pyongyang. This dynamic represents a structural dilemma in China’s strategy. On the one hand, Beijing demonstrates strategic clarity in opposing Western pressure alongside Russia and North Korea. On the other hand, it maintains tactical ambiguity to avoid being drawn directly into the conflicts that Moscow and Pyongyang face with the West.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Security, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Ambiguity, and Military Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

21. Global Public Opinion on China: China’s Standing in Southeast Asia’s Swing States

Author:
Kevin Zongzhe Li
Publication Date:
07-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Public opinion toward China across Southeast Asia's swing states has remained net positive over the past two decades, but has steadily declined. The regional average declines from roughly +33 in the 2000s, to +26 in the 2010s, and +20 in the 2020s. The trajectory reflects greater sensitivity to security risks, as China's economic weight and geopolitical presence expanded. The analysis identifies three distinct patterns across the region. In maritime frontline states such as the Philippines and Vietnam, sovereignty confrontations in the South China Sea have been followed by sharp and, sometimes, durable shifts in public sentiment. In maritime tension states such as Indonesia and Malaysia, frictions are present but more tightly managed; public opinion fluctuates but does not experience sustained rupture. In non-frontline states such as Thailand and Singapore, attitudes are comparatively stable, shaped primarily by economic interdependence, domestic political context, and social factors. Attitudes toward China across Southeast Asia's swing states reflect the interaction of economic exposure and sovereignty pressure. Where China is encountered primarily through economic engagement, baseline sentiment tends to remain positive; where territorial disputes become politically salient, attitudes shift more sharply. Public opinion does not move uniformly across Southeast Asia, nor does it point toward simple alignment with or against China. General public perceptions may diverge from the more security-focused views reflected in elite surveys of regional policy, business, and academic communities. While elite responses often emphasize strategic rivalry and risk, public opinion appears to evolve more gradually and remains strongly influenced by economic and social exchange.
Topic:
Economics, Territorial Disputes, Public Opinion, Geopolitics, Elites, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Asia, Vietnam, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand

22. The Factors That Matter: A Formula for Understanding China’s Use of Force Calculus Over Taiwan

Author:
Lyle Morris
Publication Date:
07-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
As the United States and China enter a prolonged period of instability and tension, how and under what circumstances China may use force, or, alternatively, be deterred from using force, has become of crucial importance to U.S. policymakers seeking to avoid conflict with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). While the United States can draw on its experience gauging threats and making difficult strategic calculations during the Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union, the emerging strategic rivalry with China is still in its early stages. The question of how to deter conflict with the PRC will be an increasingly important factor in the strategic calculations in Beijing and Washington, especially in times of heightened instability and crisis between the two powers. This, in turn, raises enormous and complex questions for U.S. policy regarding U.S.-China strategic stability, U.S.-China crisis management, and strategic and conventional deterrence vis-à-vis China. In spite of this emergent challenge, critical gaps remain in the Western understanding of PRC deterrence concepts. Most importantly, and most urgently, there is little understanding of how or why China may be deterred from resorting to military force in the event of a serious confrontation with the United States. To address these critical gaps, this paper explores China’s approach to deterrence in the military and diplomatic domain, in order to inform U.S. understanding of how it might deter China in a crisis or conflict. In particular, this paper introduces a set of key variables that matter most to China’s leadership in contemplating using force to “reunify” Taiwan with mainland China. This study develops a methodological formula that can be used by policy-makers and academics interested in understanding what has deterred Chinese leaders from using force against Taiwan, and what might cause China to change its calculus.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Affairs, Deterrence, Regional Security, and Use of Force
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

23. From Growth to Visibility: Bureaucratic Incentives After China's Cadre Evaluation Reforms

Author:
Zhuoran Li
Publication Date:
07-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
President Xi Jinping has spent more than a decade trying to reform the incentive system of China's bureaucracy, especially the incentives for local governments. Xi launched sweeping reforms of the cadre evaluation system—reducing the emphasis on GDP growth, expanding performance assessments to include social welfare and environmental protection metrics, and strengthening inspections of policy implementation. These reforms were intended to shift bureaucratic incentives away from short-term political performance and toward more balanced governance. Yet a different pattern has emerged. Local governments, especially at the level of township and county, have increasingly devoted resources to highly visible "spotlight projects" (亮点工程) designed to attract the attention of higher-level leaders in municipalities and provinces. This outcome is not a failure of implementation but an unintended consequence of Xi's reforms. By broadening evaluation criteria while tightening fiscal and administrative constraints, the reforms changed how local officials compete for promotion. Instead of maximizing GDP growth, officials increasingly compete by producing politically visible success stories that signal competence and alignment with central priorities. Because these projects also enhance the political standing of provincial and municipal leaders, they are reinforced by complementary incentives at multiple levels of the bureaucracy. The result is not the disappearance of performative governance, but its transformation.
Topic:
Governance, Rural, Economic Development, Bureaucracy, and Local Government
Political Geography:
China and Asia

24. Europe’s “Wake-Up Call”

Author:
Philippe Le Corre
Publication Date:
07-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
The European Union's relationship with China is undergoing a transformation. While the EU remains committed to economic engagement, it is increasingly prioritizing economic security, industrial resilience, and technological sovereignty over market access. This shift reflects mounting concerns over widening trade imbalances, China's state-supported industrial expansion, growing dependence on Chinese critical minerals and green technologies, and the erosion of Europe's manufacturing base. This paper argues that the EU and China will go through a very tense period over trade, but that Europe’s lasting competitiveness will depend on addressing structural challenges—including productivity, innovation, energy costs, investment, and industrial coordination—that predate the current deterioration in EU-China relations. Ultimately, China's growing economic influence has become not only an external challenge but a catalyst for Europe's reassessment of its own economic model and long-term industrial strategy.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Innovation, Trade, and Economic Security
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

25. Strategic Shift in China's Primary Aluminum Industry

Author:
Landon Thomas
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
In late 2024, the Chinese government surprised global markets by rescinding export tax rebates for steel, copper, and – most notably – aluminum products. Seen by many as a proactive step to diffuse trade tensions with its major trading partners, this paper argues that the policy speaks to a broader strategy on the part of the Chinese government. Namely, to incentivize aluminum producers to focus less on exports and more on supplying fast growing sectors such as photovoltaics and electric vehicles, both of which rely heavily on aluminum inputs. Although aluminum exports have declined modestly since the policy’s implementation, it remains unclear whether increased domestic absorption will ultimately translate into greater productivity and efficiency gains across the sector.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, Economy, Tax Systems, Trade Policy, Industry, and Aluminum
Political Geography:
China and Asia

26. Implementing Effective U.S.-China Economic Engagement Channels

Author:
Brendan Kelly and Scott Shaw
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
As the state of U.S.-China relations has undergone significant fluctuations over the past decade, so has the structure and frequency of economic engagements between the two countries. The number and scale of such dialogues came under heavy criticism from Republican and Democratic China hawks alike—with one notable critic famously tying the rise of U.S.-China dialogues to the rise of the U.S. trade deficit with China. Some of this criticism misses the mark, however, and underestimates the value of select, well-conceived communication channels. A valid question is whether these dialogues lost the forest for the trees. U.S. officials consistently struggled to move the needle on big trade and investment issues, absent large carrots and sticks, such as WTO accession or significant tariffs. The U.S. government needs to exercise discipline in ensuring that dialogue mechanisms advance U.S. national interests and are not used by China to distract from or delay meaningful progress on core issues. Washington must also be clear-eyed that such dialogues or engagements will likely not “change China” or spur big policy and structural changes. Yet it is equally problematic that from the early stages of the pandemic in 2020 through mid-2023, the governments of the world’s two largest economies, with the world’s most complex trading relationship, had almost no engagement on economic and commercial issues. Just as national security experts emphasize the importance of U.S.-China military-to-military communications to mitigate misunderstandings and security crises, sustained channels for commercial and financial dialogues are critical for managing economic frictions. It is therefore remarkable that for multiple years the two sides lacked any such mechanisms to address commercial, financial and other economic issues. In its last year and a half, the Biden administration broadly addressed these areas through its Economic, Financial and Commercial Issues Working Groups, alongside technical consultations on issues such as export control enforcement, trade secrets, and anti-money laundering. These channels, with select cabinet-level meetings, enabled the U.S. to pursue “competitive actions”—such as export controls, tariffs, and sanctions—while maintaining a largely stable relationship. The Biden administration struggled, however, to make significant progress on the broader obstacles facing U.S. firms and exports in China, even as it was able to resolve certain company-specific issues and defuse some tensions arising from policy misunderstandings. After a sharp deterioration in bilateral economic ties in spring 2025—with tariffs essentially reaching trade embargo levels and export controls shutting down production lines in each economy—the second Trump administration has arrived at a tentative equilibrium with China on trade and technology issues. The Trump administration has an opportunity to strengthen this equilibrium, mitigate volatility, and advance U.S. interests by rebuilding and institutionalizing selective channels on key economic and technology issues. The goal should not be to return to the previous broad dialogue architecture, but rather to establish narrow mechanisms that support U.S. de-risking, reinforce policy discipline, and, with modest expectations, derive economic benefits for the U.S. from the relationship. Cabinet-level relationships with China’s top economic decisionmakers—that also address bureaucratic mismatches and silos in the two systems—are of utmost importance as the leadership dynamics and policy agendas of both governments continue to evolve. Communication mechanisms on macroeconomic, financial sector, and commercial issues have been essential—and as economic and national security issues have moved to the foreground, channels to discuss sanctions, export controls, and investment issues have become necessary as well. The Boards of Trade and Investment proposed by the two governments in recent discussions could serve as an organizing structure for most of these channels, depending on their participants and agenda. This paper reviews the historical evolution of U.S.-China economic dialogues and the key lessons learned—to suggest targeted areas where ongoing communications under these mechanisms can be most important, how these should be structured, and how to make U.S. economic statecraft toward China most effective. We appreciate the insightful inputs and comments on the paper from Craig Allen, Wendy Cutler and Paul Haenle.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, Macroeconomics, Trade, Donald Trump, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

27. National Security Without Consensus: Taiwan’s Domestic Politics Through 2028

Author:
Simona Grano
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
In the past year, President Lai Ching-te’s administration has faced growing domestic political fragmentation alongside intensifying external pressure. Lai’s announcement of a substantial increase in Taiwan’s defense budget, including discussion of enhanced missile defense capabilities, was blocked repeatedly in the Legislative Yuan by the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), highlighting deep divisions over security policy and relations with China. At the end of March 2026, Taiwan’s ruling and opposition parties finally agreed to allow the special defense budget to enter legislative review, though each party presented its own version.1 Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan finally passed a watered-down version of the special defense budget bill on May 8. While many observers frame expanded defense spending as a necessary response to rising external threats, resistance by the opposition reflects a set of politically salient concerns. Among segments of the electorate aligned with the KMT, skepticism persists regarding the effectiveness of increased spending in altering the cross-Strait military balance, frustration over the prolonged freeze in official dialogue with Beijing, and uncertainty linked to U.S. policy — ranging from delays in arms deliveries to broader questions surrounding strategic ambiguity and economic-security trade-offs. In this complicated context, President Lai launched a series of “Ten Talks” from June to August 2025, hoping to use national unity, defense, and identity to build public support for a more robust defense posture. However, rising parliamentary fragmentation and partisan polarization, heightened by the KMT’s shift in leadership and the election of Cheng Li-wun, have so far undercut the government’s ability to finance and implement major defense initiatives (including the proposed multi-layer T-Dome). Such domestic dynamics will play a central role in influencing Taiwan’s domestic and external strategy from now until the 2028 elections. Against this backdrop, the People’s Liberation Army decided to launch a large-scale joint exercise “Justice Mission–2025” on December 29, 2025, mobilizing forces and encircling Taiwan in one of the most wide-ranging displays of force so far employed by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The drills took place in the aftermath of Trump’s decision to allow a major arms sale to Taiwan and after the explicit Japanese statements linking a Taiwan contingency to Japan’s own security and survival. Beijing views such developments as external “intrusions” into internal matters with the potential to accelerate the ‘internationalization’ of the Taiwan issue. Together, these dynamics illustrate how China’s growing reliance on military pressure overlaps with Taiwan’s internal political constraints, reinforcing Beijing’s narrative that China’s military pressure is necessary and justified (in view of the external developments), while simultaneously undermining its claim that Taiwan remains a purely internal matter. This paper argues that Taiwan’s greatest security risk has shifted from threat awareness to political coordination, with domestic fragmentation now constituting the primary bottleneck to defense and security policies ahead of 2028.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Elections, Domestic Politics, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

28. Seeking Agency in Uncertainty: Asian Middle Powers and the Fragmenting Global Order

Author:
Farwa Aamer and Emma Chanlett-Avery
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
The concept of middle powers is not new. What is new, however, is the speed, coordination, and strategic intent with which middle powers, across Asia and the West, are recalibrating their foreign policies. This acceleration reflects growing uncertainty in the global system: the perceived drift and unpredictability of U.S. leadership under the Trump 2.0 administration, intensifying strategic competition between the United States and China, and the fragmentation of the post–Cold War order. Countries increasingly find themselves navigating between two systemic pressures: avoiding entrapment in great power rivalries and safeguarding national autonomy, economic resilience, and security interests. In this emerging order, resistant to simple bipolar or multipolar labels, middle powers are neither passive balancers nor quiet bystanders. They are actively constructing a dense network of partnerships, pursuing selective alignments, and diversifying strategic dependencies. Rather than choosing sides, many are hedging to secure national interests: deepening security ties with Washington while sustaining economic engagement with Beijing, expanding mini-lateral frameworks, and strengthening cross-regional linkages that reduce overreliance on any single pole of power. The growing emphasis on economic security, supply chain resilience, technological cooperation, and defense interoperability reflects a broader shift from ideological alignment to pragmatic, interest-driven statecraft. This paper revisits the concept of Asian middle power diplomacy and assesses the forces driving today’s intensified hedging behavior. It examines why urgency around partnerships and alliance diversification has increased, not only among key Asian middle powers themselves but also in their expanding engagement with actors such as the Gulf states, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. Through select country-by-country analysis, the paper evaluates how leading middle powers, in both Asia and beyond, are redefining strategic autonomy, which partnerships warrant close attention, and how these evolving alignments are reshaping the contours of the global order. Finally, it assesses the implications of a more assertive, networked middle power landscape for the United States, and what a strengthened middle power layering means for the future architecture of international politics.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Engagement, International Order, Hedging, and Middle Powers
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

29. China’s Property Rebalancing: The Long Road to a New Development Model

Author:
Lizzi C. Lee and David Zhang
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
China’s property downturn is now in its fifth year, impairing household, developer, and local government balance sheets. Since peaking in 2021, property investment has nearly halved, dragging on fixed-asset investment, weakening related employment, and exerting a sustained drag on broader economic growth. Beijing’s response has prioritized risk containment over a return to debt-fueled property stimulus. This is captured by the “new property development model,” a long-term blueprint to turn real estate from a growth engine into a source of baseline construction demand and a more socially oriented housing system. Policymakers are currently trapped in a “dual mandate”: stabilizing the property market in the short term while pursuing a longer-term shift toward a smaller, less speculative, and more affordable housing system. In the near term, however, falling property values erode household wealth and weaken confidence, complicating Beijing’s broader consumption-rebalancing goals. The structural transition is complicated by local fiscal constraints. Revenue from selling land-use rights dropped by over 50% between 2021 and 2025, yet local governments face financial obligations to subsidize housing demand and fund the construction of new affordable housing. The most probable trajectory is a tightly managed, prolonged correction, with a true market bottom deferred. As the sector structurally downsizes, its drag on GDP should gradually fade, a cost Beijing likely sees as worth bearing in order to lock in a smaller role for property in the economy. The economy faces the severe downside risk of a deflationary spiral driven by wealth and job destruction. Further declines in home prices would deepen the hit to household balance sheets, while the property downturn is already inflicting significant job losses across construction and related sectors. China’s current transition blueprint lacks mechanisms to fully absorb this structural unemployment and balance-sheet degradation. Any definitive signs of an uncontrolled deflationary spiral would likely force Beijing to deploy stronger market rescue operations.
Topic:
Development, Government, Economy, Investment, Unemployment, and Property Market
Political Geography:
China and Asia

30. China’s Strategy in the Ukraine War and the Shaping of a Post-Conflict Order

Author:
Pierre Andrieu
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Despite ongoing peace talks spearheaded by U.S. President Donald Trump, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continues with seemingly no end in sight. While China might not play a primary role in peace negotiations, it nonetheless has an important stake in the outcome of the conflict. This paper seeks to assess Beijing’s calculus and potential role in brokering peace in the Ukraine conflict within the context of great power diplomacy among Moscow, Washington, Kyiv, and Brussels. Faced with Russia’s unrelenting military campaign, Washington, Brussels and Beijing have each adopted distinct positions on the war. The United States, as the key peace broker, continues to shift its policies to accommodate competing peace deal demands from Kyiv and Moscow. Meanwhile, the EU is increasingly aligning itself with Ukraine’s position, while China promotes neutral diplomatic initiatives that merely amplify a pro-Russian stance. Because China’s initiatives largely align with Russia’s position on the war, they have done little to realistically support ceasefire efforts. Rather, they are designed to portray Beijing as a principled international actor committed to peace and non-escalation. At the same time, these positions have not prevented China from establishing significant and highly pragmatic relations with Kyiv, particularly in trade and commerce. Politically, however, China’s stance has distanced Beijing from Kyiv’s key objectives regarding the terms and conditions of a ceasefire. Accordingly, this article seeks to answer the following questions: What are China’s intentions toward Ukraine amid an ongoing stalemate in peace negotiations? And how are China’s diplomatic proposals being received in capitals around the world?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Negotiation, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

31. Unpacking China’s 2025 Retail Data: Provincial Divergence and Three Structural Challenges

Author:
Lizzi C. Lee, Huiyan Li, and Shengyu Wang
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Despite overall lackluster growth, China’s 2025 retail data shows signs of a structural shift, a redistribution of domestic demand from the coastal to central and western regions, and from first-tier to lower-tier cities. Demographic structure and migration patterns shape consumption. Provinces with balanced age profiles and slower aging outperform other provinces, underscoring the role of demographic vitality in sustaining demand. Consumption upgrading is diffusing geographically but remains uneven. Higher-quality consumption and domestic brand strength are spreading beyond top-tier cities, yet purchasing power and innovation capacity remain concentrated in coastal hubs. Household income growth is a necessary foundation for stronger consumption, but not sufficient. The Beijing case — rising incomes alongside falling retail sales — shows how wealth effects can break the income-to-consumption link. The property sector remains the central structural drag. Although price declines have moderated in some regions, weak transaction volumes and uneven recovery sustain negative wealth effects. Local initiative and bureaucratic KPI design will shape the outcome. Subnational experimentation has generated promising cases for stimulating demand, but durable rebalancing depends on incentive reform. Rigid outcome-based targets risk distorting behavior and undermining the very reforms they seek to advance. A more household-driven growth model could gradually reduce export dependence and ease trade pressures. Yet current progress is limited and uneven. Core structural imbalances remain unresolved.
Topic:
Economy, Economic Growth, Retail, Consumer Behavior, Income, and Property Market
Political Geography:
China and Asia

32. Guided Autonomy: America Watching in Xi’s China

Author:
Guoguang Wu
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
U.S.–China relations have undergone significant changes in the past decade, moving from deep interdependence to strategic rivalry, and, meanwhile, China’s policy toward the United States has transformed under Xi Jinping. China’s policymaking mechanism has also evolved, and understanding this shift is critical to understanding the broader U.S.–China relationship. This article examines China’s U.S. policymaking and policy consultation system under Xi Jinping. How does policy consultation on foreign relations work in China? What are the most influential policy research institutions in China's America watch? How do they influence China's U.S. policy?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Xi Jinping, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

33. What Happened at China's Two Sessions in 2026?2026

Author:
Neil Thomas, Lizzi C. Lee, and Lyle Morris
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Last week, Beijing wrapped up its annual Two Sessions — the parallel meetings of China’s legislature, the National People’s Congress (NPC), and its top political advisory body, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). Highlights of this year’s gathering included Premier Li Qiang’s Government Work Report, several closely watched appearances by President Xi Jinping, the removal of several officials from civilian posts and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ahead of the meeting, and the release of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (FYP), a blueprint for the country’s development from 2026 to 2030. Below, experts from the Center for China Analysis (CCA) assess the key takeaways across several issue areas. Last week, CCA also co-hosted a webinar on the Two Sessions with the South China Morning Post featuring Lizzi C. Lee, Lyle Morris, and Neil Thomas.
Topic:
Government, Domestic Politics, Xi Jinping, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

34. Walking on Two Legs: The Socialism of Chinese Modernisation

Author:
Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Publication Date:
09-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Abstract:
The Chinese experience shows that true national independence demands both technological advancement and the constant realignment of economic power, proving that market mechanisms can be directed toward human need rather than profit.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, Science and Technology, Modernization, and Socialism
Political Geography:
China and Asia

35. Fiscal consolidation and political instability

Author:
Philipp Heimberger and Anna Matzner
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
This paper analyses how fiscal consolidation shocks affect political instability in advanced economies. Using data on fiscal tightening in 17 OECD countries from 1980 to 2020, we estimate dynamic effects in a local projection framework employing a narrative-based instrumental variable approach that isolates exogenous fiscal changes motivated by deficit reduction. Fiscal consolidation carries substantial short-term political costs: it lowers government approval and increases the likelihood of protests and major government crises. These effects are temporary and dissipate over time. The decline in government approval is largely accounted for by the deterioration in macroeconomic conditions following fiscal adjustment. Consistent with this mechanism, consolidations implemented during economic downturns lead to markedly larger declines in approval and a higher probability of government crises, while effects are muted in stronger economic conditions. Turning to the tax-spending composition, we find that approval declines more sharply when adjustments only rely on spending cuts. Overall, our findings provide new evidence on the political costs of fiscal tightening and point to the importance of economic conditions and policy design.
Topic:
Economics, Political stability, Macroeconomics, Austerity, Demonstrations, Labor Strike, and Fiscal Consolidation
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and United States of America

36. China: From Systemic Rival to Systemic Threat

Author:
Andrew Small and Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
For the United States and Europe, dealing with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is now a challenge of such wide-ranging nature that it will cut across almost the entire transatlantic agenda of the incoming Trump administration. From addressing Beijing’s role as the “decisive enabler” for Russia’s war of aggression to rethinking the way that US-EU trade and technology ties need to be organized, China policy no longer occupies a separate silo but conditions every element of the security and economic landscape. Under the Biden administration, Europe and the United States undertook an unprecedented effort not only to coordinate their approaches to the PRC itself, but also to advance on other fronts where the China challenge was the main motivating factor, such as EU-US efforts to negotiate agreements on steel, aluminum, and critical minerals. The two sides’ analysis has grown much closer, and in some areas, this translated into tangible results—whether conveying common red lines to Beijing on the delivery of lethal aid to Moscow and the use of force against Taiwan or tightening controls on advanced semiconductor equipment exports. Overall, however, progress still fell short of the high stakes. Some EU member states treated the Biden administration’s partner-friendly approach as a holiday from difficult strategic choices on China rather than an optimal window in which to make them. EU-level efforts to build more effective approaches on economic security, trade defense, and cyber security were often slow-rolled or undercut by major capitals. There were also areas in which the Biden administration allowed domestic political considerations to undermine efforts to build a common strategic economic approach among US partners—particularly the use of national security tools against US allies, whether the blocking of Nippon’s takeover of US Steel or the initial retention (and suspension rather than lifting) of Section 232 tariffs against the EU. While the two sides are certainly more closely aligned and better coordinated, moving in the right direction is no longer enough. If Europe and the United States are unable to achieve results in several critical areas in the next few years, it will come at a growing cost to their security and economic interests, as well as to the broader transatlantic relationship. Success, on the other hand, would put a new set of foundations under it. Three issues are likely to loom over the agenda for the incoming Trump administration: the threat of the “Second China Shock” to US and European industry; Beijing’s deepening coordination with Russia and other authoritarian states; and intensifying PRC pressure on Taiwan.
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Trade, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

37. China Building Up BRICS as Important Foreign Policy Tool

Author:
Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
BRICS is useful for China in its rivalry with the U.S., mainly as a tool to influence developing countries. It is also an important element of strategic cooperation with Russia and a platform for dialogue with India. China does not care about BRICS integration, instead it wants to consolidate the group’s participants to further China’s goals.. The EU’s response to this should include effective support for developing countries and a subjective approach to their demands for global governance.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, BRICS, Rivalry, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

38. Overcoming silos for One Health: key determinants of One Health governance platforms in low- and lower middle-income countries

Author:
Christoph Strupat
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
This study addresses a critical gap in One Health governance literature by providing a comprehensive review of cross-sectoral One Health governance platforms in low- and lower-middle-income countries across Asia and Africa. These platforms are pivotal for building resilience and improving governance at the human–animal–environment interface. Using a scoping review methodology, the study identifies 34 One Health platforms established across 52% of these countries, with a primary focus on zoonotic diseases and a growing emphasis on antimicrobial resistance and food safety. A polycentric governance lens was applied to analyse the interplay of authority, resources and information in shaping platform functionality. Key findings highlight that authority imbalances and single-sector dominance undermine stakeholder engagement, insufficient financial and human resources hinder operational capacity. Further­more, weak data-sharing protocols limit timely coordination and evidence-based decision-making. The review identifies critical entry points for enhancing platform efficacy: clarifying governance frameworks, investing in cross-sectoral human capacity-building and strengthening data-sharing infrastructures with robust protocols and interoperable platforms.
Topic:
Development, Governance, and Public Health
Political Geography:
Africa and Asia

39. The Fight Over Gender Equality in South Korea

Author:
Cecilia Hyunjung Mo and Soosun You
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
As more South Korean men perceive marriage as unattainable, their politics disfavor gender equality and reinforce sexism. These attitudes likely make marriage less appealing to women, which in turn fuels backlash among men.
Topic:
Demographics, Survey, Marriage, Gender, and Gender Equality
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

40. Forecasting Nuclear Escalation Risks: Cloudy With a Chance of Fallout

Author:
Jamie Kwong, Anna Bartoux, and James M. Acton
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Forecasting—that is, estimating the probability of specified events’ occurring—can contribute to efforts to better understand and address the challenge of managing escalation.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Forecast, Escalation, and Risk Assessment
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

41. China Decoupling Beyond the United States: Comparing Germany, Japan, and India

Author:
Joshua Sullivan and Jon Bateman
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Key U.S. partners are moving toward less technological integration with China. But their specific paths diverge significantly based on domestic circumstances and varied relationships with Beijing.
Topic:
International Relations, Science and Technology, Economy, Regional Integration, and Decoupling
Political Geography:
Japan, China, India, Asia, Germany, and United States of America

42. Why Did Inflation Rise and Fall So Rapidly? Lessons from the Korean War

Author:
Joseph Gagnon and Asher Rose
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
The speed of both the rise and fall of US inflation in 2021–23 took many economists by surprise. This paper shows that the rise of COVID era inflation reflects three independent shocks: a plethora of pandemic-related shifts in demand patterns and supply disruptions; the largest commodity price surge in 40 years caused by the Ukraine war; and strong monetary and fiscal responses to the pandemic, which kept labor markets tight. This paper documents the transmission of these shocks through the main components of private consumption: durable goods, nondurable goods, and services. The rapid fall of inflation reflects the credibility of the Federal Reserve’s commitment to low inflation, something that was not apparent during the inflationary shocks of the 1970s but that was important during the Korean War inflation of 1950–51. Another similarity with the Korean War episode is the temporary surge in demand for durable goods.
Topic:
Economy, Inflation, Korean War, COVID-19, and Goods and Services
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

43. Managing an Aging Society: Learning the Right Lessons from Japan

Author:
Jacob Funk Kirkegaard
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
As the world and especially other Asian and European economies enter the accelerated process of aging that Japan experienced from the mid-1990s onwards, learning the right policy lessons from Japan’s response is crucial. This paper argues that, overall, Japan has done relatively well by implementing a response that—even if often belatedly so—has mitigated some of the worst economic effects of aging. Japan has successfully raised domestic labor utilization and immigration levels, integrated its economy more with the rest of the world, and implemented a fiscal policy based on debt expansion that has seen debt costs decline. Other advanced Asian economies and China now face aging processes materially faster than Japan’s and will age simultaneously rather than alone like Japan. In addition, many advanced economies will age during a period of much slower global economic growth and less rather than more global trade and investment opening than what Japan faced from the mid-1990s. These less benign international economic and political circumstances mean that many advanced economies will likely not age with the same relative political and economic stability seen in Japan in the last 30 years. In time, this paper argues, “Japanification” will no longer mean a slowly developing economic disaster but will come to mean competent management of a very difficult economic transition.
Topic:
Debt, Demographics, Labor Issues, Immigration, Fiscal Policy, Aging, and Productivity
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

44. The Effects of US-China Cooperation on Fentanyl Markets and Overdose Deaths

Author:
Marcus Noland, Julieta Contreras, and Lucas Rengifo-Keller
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
Drug overdose is the leading cause of death among Americans aged 15–44, exceeding heart disease, cancer, suicide, vehicular accidents, and COVID-19 in 2023. Most drug deaths are associated with fentanyl. This paper uses data on illicit drug prices to estimate reduced-form price equations of fentanyl, oxycodone, and alprazolam based on supply and demand, including hedonic characteristics. The results are used to estimate the relationship between fentanyl prices and overdoses. They suggest that the Chinese embargo on fentanyl shipments to the United States beginning in May 2019 raised street prices for a limited period, reducing fentanyl overdose deaths in the United States by roughly one-quarter over a three- to five-month period after the announcement.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Drugs, Opioid Crisis, Cooperation, and Fentanyl
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

45. Radical novelties in critical technologies and spillovers: how do China, the US and the EU fare?

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero, Michal Krystyanczuk, and Robin Schindowski
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Critical technologies including artificial intelligence, semiconductors and quantum computing are attracting attention because of their indispensable nature and their role in national security strategies. We compare China, the United States and the European Union in these technologies and their subfields. We use large language models (LLMs) to identify which patents in these technologies can be considered most groundbreaking (not patented before) and worth replicating. These are ‘radical novelties.’ We find that the US clearly dominates quantum. Chinese and EU progress is similar. The US does slightly better than China in AI with clear dominance in generative AI, but China stands out in some important subfields, such as aerial vehicle technology. China dominates in a larger number of semiconductor fields but not in the highest value added, which is related to design. In a second step we assess how quickly radical novelties in these three technologies are transferred from one economic area to another and within each economic area. We find that the fastest transmission overall is for AI. The EU is by far the slowest in replicating radical novelties from the US and China, while the US and China tend to replicate European novel patents relatively quickly. Radical novelties are also replicated quickly between China and the US which is surprising given US controls on exports of critical technologies to China. Our findings are concerning for Europe because it does not produce enough critical patents in these technologies and because it is slower in replicating patents from the US and China.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Economy, Trade, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

46. Which companies are ahead in frontier innovation on critical technologies? Comparing China, the European Union and the United States

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero, Michal Krystyanczuk, and Robin Schindowski
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Competition in critical technologies is attracting increasing attention not only because of the foundational nature of these technologies for other types of innovation, but also because of their role in the United States national security strategy. In this paper, we look into which entities in China, the European Union and the US innovate at the technology frontier in the three most important critical technologies – artificial intelligence, quantum computing and semiconductors – based on identification of the most radical novel patents in these technologies and their subsectors. Working with these pathbreaking patents, we look into the origin of the companies that file the largest numbers of them. US innovators dominate the innovation frontier for quantum computing and, to a lesser extent, AI, with Chinese innovators doing better in semiconductors. European innovators lag in all, but perform relatively better in quantum computing, in which they rank similarly to Chinese innovators. Furthermore, the innovation ecosystem is quite different across geographies. In the US, tech companies top the rankings of critical novelties and are highly concentrated: as many as three companies are in the top rankings of all of the three critical technologies. Frontier innovators in the field in which the EU competes most equally – quantum – are mostly research centres and not companies. China lies somewhat in between in all three domains.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, Semiconductors, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

47. India-China rapprochement: what are the long-term prospects?

Author:
Nayanima Basu and Alicia Garcia-Herrero
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
China-India relations, which have long been fraught, were further complicated by the 2020 military standoff on the Himalayan border. The political disruption had a significant impact on Chinese companies’ presence in India. And yet, India’s dependence on Chinese imports has increased since. The Indian economy is decelerating at a challenging time for Prime Minister Modi, who governs in a coalition. China could offer a partial solution to India’s economic woes by providing manufacturing FDI and creating jobs. The Modi-Xi ‘rapprochement’ after their encounter at the October 2024 BRICS summit signals that relations could improve. India may be willing to accept targeted investment from China, but relations are unlikely to fully normalise, particularly since the 2025 India-Pakistan military stand-off. There are three main reasons for this. First, the Indian army remains cautious about the situation at the border and security risks relating to China. Second, the United States under President Trump will exert pressure on Modi not to depend further on China. This is even more relevant in the context of Trump’s threat to impose tariffs on India. Third, Indian public opinion on China and the Belt and Road Initiative remains negative. India is predicted to experience greater growth than China in the coming decades, meaning China could lose its upper hand in economic relations between the two countries. This, however, will depend on how dependent India might have become on China for imports or for jobs through FDI and other channels. The militarised border, India’s asymmetric economic dependence on China and China’s leadership in the Global South will still shape the relationship even if the Indian economy grows to a similar size to China’s. India-China ‘rapprochement’ is possible but will remain fragile and unlikely to be maintained in the long run.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Governance, Economy, Economic Growth, Investment, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia

48. Charting a Path in the Uncharted Domain

Author:
Jennifer Hong Whetsell
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
The Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) is rising as a prominent player in the space domain. The size of its space program makes its current position as an emerging space power even more impressive and promising. The United States, one of South Korea's closest political and defense allies, and South Korea share a considerable history in space cooperation since the late 1980s. Despite the long history of collaboration between the United States and South Korea, fundamental differences have slowed their progress toward a deeper and more meaningful cooperation in this domain. As space becomes an integral aspect of national security and a coveted frontier for scientific endeavor and exploration, the two capitals have much to gain through enhanced cooperation. “Charting a Path in the Uncharted Domain” examines the landscape of South Korea’s space ecosystem and provides a broad overview of its accomplishments and challenges in the space domain. It then highlights significant milestones of space cooperation between Washington and Seoul and analyzes the cooperative landscape, noting areas of differences and opportunities for enhanced cooperation. The paper then presents recommendations for U.S. and ROK policymakers to help overcome those barriers and strengthen their cooperation in the space domain.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Space
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

49. ASEAN Caught Between China’s Export Surge and Global De-Risking

Author:
Asia Sociey
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
ASEAN, long a beneficiary of China’s rapid growth and global supply chain integration, now faces mounting pressures as Chinese industrial overcapacity spills into the region. ASEAN has thus far largely stayed out of growing global trade tensions around China’s industrial policies, much as it did during earlier U.S.-China trade disputes, while benefiting from investment and trade from all sides and deeper integration into Chinese supply chains that support growing exports to global markets. However, ASEAN faces increasing pressures from four key trends, each of which is accelerating, pointing to a more challenging time ahead for ASEAN policymakers and businesses. These developments are increasingly putting ASEAN in the middle of economic challenges and global reactions to China and its industrial overcapacity. China’s exports to ASEAN are growing rapidly, exceeding its exports to the United States and the European Union (EU) since 2023, and up a further 12% in 2024. While most of this growth has been in intermediate goods, supporting ASEAN’s own exports to advanced economies, increasingly it is also in final goods, displacing local industry and jobs. Meanwhile, ASEAN exports to China have declined 3% since 2022, contributing to growing trade deficits and incipient trade tensions. China’s industrial overcapacity, in lower-end as well as advanced manufacturing sectors—manifesting in surging volumes of artificially low-priced Chinese exports—is displacing ASEAN exports to third markets, threatening the region’s broader industrial health and development. ASEAN is increasingly becoming the key offshore manufacturing base for Chinese companies, particularly in the clean energy sector. While this investment can support the region’s energy transition and enhance global competitiveness in these important technologies, these products are at the center of overcapacity tensions with China, threatening to put ASEAN in the crosshairs of global trade responses. While ASEAN has benefited from integration into Chinese supply chains, the United States, the EU, and other economies, including Japan and India, are intensifying their scrutiny of exports from Chinese companies operating in or processed through third countries. ASEAN governments now face a double balancing act: managing growing economic integration with China while contending with mounting pressure from advanced economies to reduce reliance on Chinese supply chains. At the same time, ASEAN must balance leveraging Chinese cheap imports and growing investments to drive industrial growth against the risk of these inputs overwhelming domestic industries and limiting their own industrial development. These tensions ASEAN faces are already building and are likely to be sharpened and accelerated under new Trump administration tariffs and China’s decoupling efforts. These evolving tensions also cast doubt on the extent to which China can meaningfully shift exports to ASEAN and other emerging markets as it faces growing trade restrictions from the United States and the EU. To address these challenges, ASEAN must prioritize strengthening trade tools and enhancing regional coordination to manage import surges, while continuing to invest in its own competitiveness. Diversifying its supply chains from increasing reliance on China will be critical to reducing vulnerabilities. Leveraging institutional frameworks under the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) and the Regional and Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) can help ASEAN navigate external pressures while safeguarding its industrial growth. At the same time, the U.S. and other major economies should proactively engage ASEAN on their overcapacity and de-risking concerns related to China, to help ASEAN remain a key partner in their own supply chain diversification efforts.
Topic:
Exports, Manufacturing, Industry, ASEAN, Supply Chains, Regional Economy, and De-Risking
Political Geography:
China and Asia

50. China-Russia Relations Since the Start of the War in Ukraine

Author:
Asia Sociey
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
In the 19th century, like Western powers and Japan, Russia participated in the “Scramble for China”; however, unlike the others, it never returned the vast territories it annexed. After a long and turbulent history of Sino-Russian relations, Mikhail Gorbachev launched the Soviet “turn to Asia” policy in July 1986 with his Vladivostok speech. Addressing the Chinese directly, he declared: “I would like to dwell on the most important issue in our relations. These relations are extremely important for several reasons, starting from the fact that we are neighbors, that we share the world’s longest land border, and that we, our children, and grandchildren are destined to live near each other ‘forever and ever.’”1 This policy was reaffirmed by President Vladimir Putin after he came to power in 2000, reinforced during the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and further intensified following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. That year, China and Russia signed lengthy and grandiloquent declarations celebrating their “no-limits friendship,” prominently showcased during commemorations in Moscow marking the 80th anniversary of victory over Nazi Germany. Yet this no-limits friendship, while rhetorically expansive, has never been formalized and contains several clear limitations — limitations the current U.S. administration has unsuccessfully attempted to exploit. This paper examines the China-Russia relationship and its often-contradictory evolution. The strategic dynamic between these two Eurasian powers has produced a partnership further solidified by Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, despite Beijing’s attempts to mediate the conflict. While the strength of this partnership may make it appear unbreakable, it should not preclude continued dialogue between China and the West — particularly the European Union and its member states. The EU–China summit held in Beijing on July 24, however, did not yield the expected results in this regard.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, European Union, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

51. Xi’s Personal Priorities: What Matters Most to China’s Leader?

Author:
Neil Thomas and Lobsang Tsering
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Time is a politician’s most precious resource. Every decision to attend a meeting, launch an initiative, or deliver a speech involves trade-offs. Unlike budgets or personnel, time cannot be expanded or replenished. How a leader allocates their time reveals their priorities. Xi Jinping is acutely aware of this reality. “To realize the China Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, we must race against time,” he declared in January 2020. State media claimed that on an “ordinary day,” Xi sleeps just six hours and works through every meal. Li Zhanshu, Xi’s former chief of staff, summarized his work tempo in one word: “fast.” This urgency helps explain why Xi wants to become the “chairman of everything,” replacing collective leadership with personalized rule, sidelining colleagues, and centralizing decision-making within Chinese Communist Party (CCP) bodies under his direct control. Yet even a leader as powerful and driven as Xi cannot do everything. So how does Xi spend his time? It is impossible to know for sure, but a useful proxy could be official statements about actions that he has taken “personally” (qinzi). In particular, CCP media have mentioned several policies that Xi has “personally planned, personally arranged, and personally promoted” (qinzi mouhua, qinzi bushu, qinzi tuidong). The Center for China Analysis has compiled a database of these policies. Analysis suggests that Xi pays special attention to regional development projects, internal CCP governance, and environmental protection. Notably absent are indications of personal involvement in key political economy issues such as consumption, demographics, healthcare, public finance, and welfare reform. For policymakers and businesses seeking leverage or opportunity in China, understanding Xi’s priorities is a critical starting point.
Topic:
Leadership, Domestic Politics, Xi Jinping, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

52. The People’s Republic of Wellness: Why Beijing Worries About Well-Being

Author:
G. A. Donovan
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Wellness is booming in China as more people engage in activities that promote healthier living, emotional balance, and spiritual growth. Interest in living well has grown steadily as living standards rise and China undergoes radical social and economic change. More people are facing financial distress amid a slowing economy, and younger generations struggle with intense academic pressure and limited employment opportunities. Wellness trends gained steam during the COVID-19 pandemic, which accelerated the shift from materialism toward a search for spirituality and meaning. Maintaining a harmonious and stable social environment is central to the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy. Beijing recognizes the value of many popular wellness trends and actively encourages those that align with its interest in fostering citizens’ well-being and improving public morale. As people struggle to manage the stress of daily living and define wellness and the good life on their own terms, building a harmonious society has become a major challenge for China’s leaders. In an attempt to manage this friction, they increasingly focus propaganda efforts on highlighting the country’s economic and technological achievements and their assertiveness in the trade conflict with the United States.
Topic:
Economy, Public Health, Society, and Well-Being
Political Geography:
China and Asia

53. A New Triangle: The Interplay Between China and EU-India Relations

Author:
Philippe Le Corre
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
China has shaped the U.S.-India relationship for decades.1 Today, another significant triangle is emerging: the China-EU-India relationship. Indian and European leaders are strengthening ties. Both view China as a formidable economic and security rival while regarding the United States as a key security partner (and, for Europe, a long-standing ally). What is the current state of EU-China and EU-India relations? As India’s influence and economic appeal grow, could it become a viable alternative to China for European business leaders and policymakers? How is Brussels incorporating India into its strategies to address a potential crisis in Asia or the broader Indo-Pacific? Twenty-five years ago, the European Union viewed China as a top priority for business, cultural exchanges, and diplomacy. Following the introduction of Beijing’s open-door policy in 1978 and with strong encouragement from Chinese authorities, European companies flocked to China. Initially, many Europeans used Hong Kong as an intermediary for business, but by the mid-1990s, Guangdong Province and Shanghai became key gateways to the Chinese market, particularly for Germany and France.2 Trade and investment surged, especially after China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, which was widely supported by European political and business elites. Today, China remains the EU’s largest trading partner, with substantial European investments across the mainland. In contrast, India was long viewed as a potential partner, but only a few EU member states took steps to forge a strategic partnership with New Delhi. European investments in India were — and still are — limited, with many corporations citing challenges such as inadequate infrastructure, market access barriers, and bureaucratic red tape, which make it difficult to operate in most Indian states. However, the mood has begun to shift. On the EU side, the European Commission’s 2019 China strategy characterized Beijing as “a partner, a competitor, and a systemic rival.” The COVID-19 pandemic, which disrupted direct links between Europe and China from 2020 to 2022, caused significant strain. This was followed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, an event many on the continent perceive as having Beijing’s tacit support. Additional factors, including an increasingly authoritarian regime at home and a more assertive China abroad, have contributed to European perceptions,3 as explained at length by the Center for China Analysis’s latest Global Public Opinion on China project.4 This, in turn, has affected the EU-China relationship, which has been gradually downgraded from the “honeymoon” period of 1995–2015. On the other hand, the strengthening EU-India relationship is a relatively recent development, driven by several factors that have emerged in the wake of the pandemic. These include the rise of the ambitious Bharatiya Janata Party under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who first took office in 2014 and is now serving his third term, as well as a broader diversity of partnerships between the EU and India. Other factors influencing EU-India relations include the growing assertiveness of the People’s Republic of China and the United States’ shift away from multilateralism during President Donald Trump’s first term (2017–2021). Since January 2025, the increasing probability of a break in the transatlantic alliance under the new Trump administration is leading the EU to look for new partners, including in the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, India’s robust GDP growth — 6.6% in 2025 and a projected 6.7% in 2026 — has attracted European businesses.5 In a global environment defined by multipolarity, could the previously low-profile EU-India relationship evolve into a closer partnership? With EU-China relations facing significant challenges, might India emerge as a viable alternative Asian partner for Europe? The current EU-India relationship is described as “strategic.” In reality, it is partial and uneven, and there are major differences in the nature of relations between India and individual EU member states. Meanwhile, how does Beijing view its competitor in the Global South as it seeks to win over Europe’s support? This paper explores the dynamics of the interaction among these three powers in the rapidly changing geopolitical context. It examines India’s political and economic challenges in the context of the EU-China relationship, how the EU-India relationship is evolving, and whether an EU-India partnership could take center stage if tensions with China escalate. European countries have kept strong ties with the Global South, and some see a strong India as a potential bridge for fostering cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, and European Union
Political Geography:
China, Europe, India, and Asia

54. EU-Taiwan Relations: Navigating PRC Pressure, U.S.-China Competition, and Trump’s Foreign Policy

Author:
Simona Grano
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
This paper first explores the growing relationship between the European Union and Taiwan by focusing on recent interactions. It then discusses the broader geopolitical implications of Trump’s “America First” policy and how the U.S.-China competition impacts the EU’s ability to strategically balance the China-Taiwan dynamic. The paper demonstrates how a number of variables, including Europe’s strategic interests in the region, the U.S. position on China, and the U.S.-EU relationship under the second Trump administration, will influence ties between the EU and Taiwan. The shift in EU-Taiwan ties has gone largely unnoticed. The EU has started paying more attention to Taiwan’s security, shifting away from its former focus on China for its importance in trade and investment. This shift is partly due to supply chain and security concerns and partly due to growing political apprehension about China’s long-term goals. In the coming years, Europe will be influenced by the Trump administration when deciding how to handle Taiwan. The EU will have to find a balance between the need for steady access to vital technology and U.S.-EU relations. At the same time, the EU and the United States seem to have entered a critical phase in their bilateral relationship, especially concerning the war in Ukraine and Washington’s warming relationship with Moscow. This indeterminate situation may also impact the EU’s relationship with both Taiwan and China, the consequences of which will take several months to fully gauge.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, Donald Trump, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

55. ASEAN Caught Between China’s Export Surge and Global De-Risking

Author:
Brendan Kelly and Shay Wester
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
ASEAN, long a beneficiary of China’s rapid growth and global supply chain integration, now faces mounting pressures as Chinese industrial overcapacity spills into the region. ASEAN has thus far largely stayed out of growing global trade tensions around China’s industrial policies, much as it did during earlier U.S.-China trade disputes, while benefiting from investment and trade from all sides and deeper integration into Chinese supply chains that support growing exports to global markets. However, ASEAN faces increasing pressures from four key trends, each of which is accelerating, pointing to a more challenging time ahead for ASEAN policymakers and businesses. These developments are increasingly putting ASEAN in the middle of economic challenges and global reactions to China and its industrial overcapacity. China’s exports to ASEAN are growing rapidly, exceeding its exports to the United States and the European Union (EU) since 2023, and up a further 12% in 2024. While most of this growth has been in intermediate goods, supporting ASEAN’s own exports to advanced economies, increasingly it is also in final goods, displacing local industry and jobs. Meanwhile, ASEAN exports to China have declined 3% since 2022, contributing to growing trade deficits and incipient trade tensions. China’s industrial overcapacity, in lower-end as well as advanced manufacturing sectors—manifesting in surging volumes of artificially low-priced Chinese exports—is displacing ASEAN exports to third markets, threatening the region’s broader industrial health and development. ASEAN is increasingly becoming the key offshore manufacturing base for Chinese companies, particularly in the clean energy sector. While this investment can support the region’s energy transition and enhance global competitiveness in these important technologies, these products are at the center of overcapacity tensions with China, threatening to put ASEAN in the crosshairs of global trade responses. While ASEAN has benefited from integration into Chinese supply chains, the United States, the EU, and other economies, including Japan and India, are intensifying their scrutiny of exports from Chinese companies operating in or processed through third countries. ASEAN governments now face a double balancing act: managing growing economic integration with China while contending with mounting pressure from advanced economies to reduce reliance on Chinese supply chains. At the same time, ASEAN must balance leveraging Chinese cheap imports and growing investments to drive industrial growth against the risk of these inputs overwhelming domestic industries and limiting their own industrial development. These tensions ASEAN faces are already building and are likely to be sharpened and accelerated under new Trump administration tariffs and China’s decoupling efforts. These evolving tensions also cast doubt on the extent to which China can meaningfully shift exports to ASEAN and other emerging markets as it faces growing trade restrictions from the United States and the EU. To address these challenges, ASEAN must prioritize strengthening trade tools and enhancing regional coordination to manage import surges, while continuing to invest in its own competitiveness. Diversifying its supply chains from increasing reliance on China will be critical to reducing vulnerabilities. Leveraging institutional frameworks under the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) and the Regional and Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) can help ASEAN navigate external pressures while safeguarding its industrial growth. At the same time, the U.S. and other major economies should proactively engage ASEAN on their overcapacity and de-risking concerns related to China, to help ASEAN remain a key partner in their own supply chain diversification efforts.
Topic:
Economic Growth, Exports, ASEAN, Supply Chains, and De-Risking
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Southeast Asia

56. What to Watch at China’s Two Sessions in 2025

Author:
Neil Thomas and Jing Qian
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
The annual Two Sessions is the closest thing to a carnival in Chinese politics. Thousands of leaders, bureaucrats, experts, reporters, and celebrities from across the country flock to Beijing for a week of political pageantry. While the premier’s annual “state of the union” address is more restrained than its American counterpart — U.S. President Donald Trump is scheduled to address a joint session of Congress just a day earlier — it remains a key indicator of China’s economic direction. The Two Sessions refers to the concurrent annual meetings of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), which opens on March 4, and the National People’s Congress (NPC), which begins on March 5. These meetings are expected to conclude on or around March 11. Both institutions answer to the Chinese Communist Party, led by General Secretary Xi Jinping. The CPPCC National Committee, with 2,169 members, serves as the overarching organization of the United Front system, which mobilizes various social groups to support and advise the Party. Meanwhile, the NPC, with 2,977 delegates, functions as a single-chamber parliament that is, at least notionally, the supreme organ of state power. Anticipation surrounding this year’s event has been heightened by a rare “symposium on private enterprises” that Xi hosted on February 17, attended by some of the country’s top entrepreneurs. This uncommon symposium, last held in 2018, raised hopes for China’s struggling economy — particularly following the January return of President Trump, a self-proclaimed “tariff king” who has already imposed an additional 10% levy on Chinese imports. Now, attention shifts to how much Beijing is willing to boost stimulus, support businesses, and respond to Trump’s trade policies. The Two Sessions is expected to reveal a more pro-growth agenda compared to last year, with approximate targets of 5% for GDP growth, 4% of GDP for the fiscal deficit ratio, and 2% for consumer inflation. Further stimulus will come from roughly 3 trillion yuan in ultralong special treasury bonds and 4.5–5 trillion yuan in local government special-purpose bonds. Measures to boost consumer spending and encourage private-sector innovation will also be introduced. While Beijing aims to stabilize growth, it is unlikely to unleash the proverbial “bazooka” stimulus, as it needs to conserve fiscal resources for a potential trade war. Similarly, sweeping structural reforms remain improbable as the government remains committed to Xi’s vision of high-tech industrial self-reliance.
Topic:
Reform, Economic Growth, Domestic Politics, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

57. China’s Middle Class Searches for Faith and Meaning

Author:
John Osburg
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Members of China’s urban middle class — long assumed to be the most secular segment of Chinese society — are turning to religion and spirituality in greater numbers. Rejecting officially sanctioned religious institutions and state-promoted ideology, many urbanites are seeking alternatives considered less tainted by party-state interference. Independent Christian churches, Tibetan Buddhist teachers, and New Age workshops are attracting increasing numbers of affluent, well-educated urban Chinese looking for authentic spiritual experiences and a sense of community, some of whom mix aspects of different religions to create their own personal spiritual practices. Growing interest in religious communities at the margins of state control reflects the failure of official ideology to provide spiritual comfort and the party-state’s lack of moral authority. Attempts by Beijing to co-opt religious institutions through “Sinicization” have undermined their spiritual authority. “Boss Christians” fund their own churches to gain social status and legitimize their wealth, while a growing number of intellectuals see Christian values as a model for reforming China’s government and society. Members of China’s elite who convert to Tibetan Buddhism say they value its purity and intellectually rigorous philosophy, which they contrast to the corrupted, diluted teachings of Han Chinese Buddhism.
Topic:
Religion, Christianity, Secularism, Buddhism, Middle Class, and Society
Political Geography:
China and Asia

58. China’s Views on Escalation and Crisis Management and Implications for the United States

Author:
Lyle Morris
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
China lacks experience dealing with military crises and has attempted to compensate by investing considerable intellectual capital to develop theories and strategies for managing escalation with potential adversaries. China’s military strategists believe that if a crisis breaks out, it can be “controlled,” and escalation can be “managed” by applying scientific principles and advanced military technology. People’s Liberation Army strategists have developed a conceptual framework for managing crises called “effective control” (youxiao kongzhi) — a flexible, graduated tool designed to guide political and military action during times of tension. Due to an overreliance on theoretical underpinnings, China believes it can control all facets of military escalation. This could make China’s leaders overconfident in their ability to prevail in a conflict and increase the risk of escalation in a military confrontation between China and the United States. The writings of Chinese military strategists omit how China’s behavior may be perceived — or misperceived — by an adversary. Absent is an acknowledgment that China’s actions, such as in space or cyberspace, may be viewed as provocative and grounds for the tit-for-tat escalation that Beijing seeks to avoid. Further research is necessary to explore the actions that China’s military may employ to manage escalation and how adversaries may interpret them.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Crisis Management, Escalation, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

59. How China Collateralizes

Author:
Anna Gelpern, Omar Haddad, Sebastian Horn, Paulina Kintzinger, Bradley C. Parks, and Christoph Trebesch
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
This paper is the first comprehensive analysis of the secured lending practices of Chinese creditors in emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs). We present a new dataset and detailed case studies of collateralized public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) loans from Chinese state-owned institutions in EMDEs between 2000 and 2021. Almost half of China's total PPG loan portfolio to EMDEs is effectively collateralized - amounting to $420 billion in collateralized debt across 57 countries. We document that Chinese lenders use techniques adapted from export and project finance to build multi-layered legal safety nets, which help ensure that risky EMDE loans will be repaid. As security, they use liquid, easily accessible assets, such as cash in bank accounts located in China. They rarely take infrastructure project assets as collateral, but often rely for repayment on established commodity revenue streams unrelated to the project. Typically, EMDE governments and state-owned enterprises commit to route foreign currency proceeds from commodity sales through bank accounts controlled by the lender. The cash balances in these accounts can be very large; in low-income, commodity-exporting countries, they average more than 20% of annual PPG debt service to all external creditors. The same revenue source can secure multiple successive borrowings over many years. Our findings reveal a previously undocumented pattern of revenue ring-fencing, where a significant share of commodity export receipts never reaches the exporting countries. Revenues routed overseas secure priority repayment for the creditor; they remain out of public sight and largely beyond the borrower’s reach until the secured debts are repaid. These findings raise new concerns about debt transparency, fiscal management, fiscal autonomy, and the quality of macroeconomic surveillance, particularly in commodity-exporting EMDEs.
Topic:
Economics, Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Financial Markets, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Fiscal Policy, Sovereign Debt, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Asia, and Americas

60. Identifying Mutual Interests: How Donor Countries Benefit from Foreign Aid

Author:
Tobias Heidland, Maximilian Michael, Moritz Schularick, and Rainer Thiele
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
Official development assistance (ODA) is widely studied for its impact on recipient countries, but its effects on donor countries remain underexplored. To address this gap systematically, we develop a conceptual framework for understanding when foreign aid generates measurable returns for donor countries as well as those cases when donor and recipient interests align—what we term mutual interest ODA. We categorize potential donor benefits into three domains: economic, geopolitical, and security-related, and distinguish these benefits by their timing and degree of directness. We then systematically survey the empirical evidence on donor benefits, assessing the empirical credibility and magnitude of estimated effects and pointing out research gaps. We find consistent evidence of substantial donor benefits across all three domains. A key insight is that aggregate aid flows often mask significant variation: The returns to donors depend critically on the type of aid, delivery modality, and recipient context. These findings have important implications for both academic and policy debates on the effectiveness, political sustainability, and future direction of development aid.
Topic:
Climate Change, Globalization, Health, International Trade and Finance, Migration, Political Economy, Foreign Aid, and Sustainable Development
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Asia, and Americas

61. The Bandung Spirit

Author:
Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Abstract:
In 1955, the leaders of former Global South colonies met in Bandung, Indonesia, brought together by a common spirit for national liberation and cooperation. Seventy years later, is there any trace of it left?
Topic:
Development, International Cooperation, History, Global South, and Internationalism
Political Geography:
Africa, Indonesia, and Asia

62. The Joy of Reading

Author:
Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Abstract:
Reading and popular literacy programmes have played an important role in revolutionary processes, from the Mexican, Chinese, and Russian revolutions in the early twentieth century to today.
Topic:
Revolution, Literacy, and Reading
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, Latin America, and Mexico

63. Current Status of ASEAN Data Governance and Its Implications for the Digital Economy Framework Agreement

Author:
Shota Watanabe, Ema Ogura, and Keita Oikawa
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
The transition to data-driven societies has heightened the importance of balancing the free flow of data with robust data protection for privacy, intellectual property, trade secrets, and national security. While different countries have introduced various data governance frameworks, including comprehensive privacy laws, differences in regulations across borders hinder data flow, increasing compliance costs and limiting business expansion, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises. The concept of Data Free Flow with Trust (DFFT), introduced at the G20 in 2019, aims to address this balance by promoting interoperability while respecting national sovereignty. In ASEAN, however, regulatory fragmentation further complicates cross-border data flow. Variations in data localisation policies and personal data governance amongst ASEAN Member States (AMS) create significant challenges for businesses. For instance, differences in requirements for sensitive data, data subject rights, and security measures necessitate additional compliance efforts for companies operating in multiple jurisdictions. Moreover, non-personal data regulations, such as restrictions on supply chain and research and development (R&D) data sharing or mandatory technology transfers, impede global R&D collaboration and discourage investment in certain countries. This study provides a comprehensive analysis of data-related regulations in ASEAN and proposes policy recommendations for the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA), set for 2025. It highlights the need for transparency, regulatory alignment, and various mechanisms to ensure smoother cross-border data flow, ultimately fostering regional digital integration.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Economy, ASEAN, and Data Governance
Political Geography:
Asia

64. Trajectory of Southeast Asian Production Fragmentation

Author:
David Christian and Lili Yan Ing
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
This paper examines recent trends in production fragmentation within ASEAN’s manufacturing sector in the context of shifting global trade dynamics and rising economic nationalism. Using the OECD’s Trade in Value Added (Ti VA) database, we construct two key indicators: (i) the input fragmentation ratio (FRI), which measures overall reliance on intermediate inputs, and (ii) the import fragmentation ratio (FRM), which captures the extent of cross-border input sourcing. Our analysis reveals that, unlike North America and Europe, ASEAN has not experienced a decline in input fragmentation since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). However, signs of import defragmentation have emerged since 2010. We also find notable variation in fragmentation patterns across countries and industries. These results highlight the need for further research into the drivers of these trends, including investment and production relocation to ASEAN, market positioning, industry specialisation, and technological factors.
Topic:
Manufacturing, Resilience, Global Value Chains, ASEAN, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
Asia

65. China's Investment Pivot and Africa’s Industrial Prospects: Any Hope for African “Flying Geese”?

Author:
Charles Kenny
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development (CGD)
Abstract:
This paper examines the changing shape of Chinese investment in Africa, as it evolves from large scale infrastructure toward small scale manufacturing. It looks at the opportunity for the region in the context of a deepening manufacturing labor shortage in China; discusses barriers to that opportunity in both China and the Africa region; and the potential response of Western countries. It may be possible for at least some economies in Africa to benefit from a combination of Chinese investment in manufactured export and processed commodity industries and preferential access to economies including the US and China if geopolitics allow, but there are many reasons this could fail and the geopolitics are increasingly hostile. A backup plan for regional growth would be wise.
Topic:
Debt, Investment, Trade, Industry, and Development Policy
Political Geography:
Africa, China, and Asia

66. The Fragmentation Paradox: De-risking Trade and Global Safety

Author:
Thierry Mayer, Isabelle Mejean, and Mathias Thoenig
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:
We develop a model of international trade and geopolitical disputes, embedding a diplomatic game of escalation to conflict within a quantitative model of trade. Bilateral disputes arise exogenously, and rival countries engage in negotiations to avoid war. In equilibrium, negotiations may fail, resulting in conflict. All welfare-relevant geoeconomic factors, such as the realized costs of war, the concessions to prevent it, and the probability of escalation, depend on the opportunity cost of war, itself shaped by observed trade flows. We provide a simple procedure to estimate these factors in a model of trade calibrated to current data. This approach is then used to quantify the geoeconomic factors characterizing the US-China relationship, both historically and under various ``decoupling'' scenarios. We find that the growing US dependence to Chinese products and markets over the past thirty years has increased the cost of geopolitical disputes with China for the US. In this context, decoupling from China through increased tariffs may offer geopolitical benefits. Yet, the analysis highlights a fundamental security dilemma: because export and import dependencies influence bargaining power in negotiations, decoupling may reduce the diplomatic concessions needed to maintain peace but can paradoxically raise the risk of escalation by weakening incentives for restraint.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Geopolitics, Economy, Risk, Fragmentation, Geoeconomics, and Decoupling
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

67. Machinery production networks that bridge East Asia and Europe: A case against ‘near-shoring’ in the post-COVID-19 era

Author:
Mitsuyo Ando, Kazunobu Hayakawa, and Fukunari Kimura
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
This study examines recent changes in international production networks facing various risks. We primarily investigate how import sources of the European Union (EU) countries in machinery industries have changed from the pre-pandemic to the post-pandemic period using monthly and annual international trade data at the finely disaggregated level, with a particular focus on East Asia. We confirm that Factory Asia experienced a much smaller negative impact and had a more rapid recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic compared with Factory America and Factory Europe, showing its robust and resilient nature. At least until 2023, the inter-regional linkages of East Asia as a supplier did not weaken. Moreover, we reveal that the two directions of links between East Asia and the EU are asymmetric. East Asian countries are important suppliers for the EU, particularly in general and electrical machinery industries, and the relative importance of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China, in particular, as EU import sources strengthened further in the post-pandemic period. We also demonstrate that EU countries increased imports from longer-distance countries, indicating no quantitative evidence of intensifying near-shoring in machinery industries in the post-COVID-19 era. Furthermore, we demonstrate that EU countries have prioritised friend-shoring from an economic perspective but not necessarily from a political perspective when purchasing machinery products in the post-pandemic period.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, European Union, COVID-19, Production, and Near-Shoring
Political Geography:
Europe, East Asia, and Asia

68. Beyond the Pivot: Expanding South Korea’s Global Role and G7 Cooperation in a New Era

Author:
Tereza Novotná
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
South Korea’s engagement with the G7 reflects a pragmatic response to a fragmented international environment. As the G7 has evolved into a forum for high-level political coordination, Seoul has emerged as a quasi-regular and consequential partner without pursuing formal membership. Under President Yoon, G7 outreach was framed as part of South Korea’s emergence as a global pivotal state; under President Lee, this approach has been largely sustained, though recalibrated through pragmatic diplomacy. G7 participation complements, rather than substitutes for, South Korea’s alliance with the US and its partnerships with NATO and the European Union, while offering a flexible venue for agenda-setting on global governance, technology and security. A less visible but politically significant benefit lies in the G7’s contribution to sustaining JapanKorea normalisation by lowering coordination costs. Stress-tested by US volatility and North Korea’s growing alignment with Russia, the G7 provides South Korea with strategic leverage.
Topic:
International Relations, NATO, Governance, European Union, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and G7
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

69. How Does China View the Western Balkans, Kosovo, and the Normalization Dialogue?

Author:
Ramadan Ilazi, Delmin Saljunovic, and Matt Delvoye
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
A mix of ideological and pragmatic approaches shapes China’s engagement in the Western Balkans. While the region of the Western Balkans is not central to Beijing’s foreign policy, it offers a critical discursive and geopolitical space through which China challenges the West and tests elements of its broader international relations strategy. In other words, China aspires to rival the West in the Balkans, primarily through economic competition in an effort to preach its political values over international order (or its view of the world) as a model that is, according to the Chinese, better than the model of regional and European integration that the Western Balkans pursues jointly with the West. In this context, Kosovo stands out as an important case. For China, Kosovo is not simply a state that is contested by Serbia but means through which it articulates its opposition to the West and liberal democracy while consolidating its alliance with Serbia. This paper argues that China’s stance on Kosovo is not driven by legal principle but by political utility. Kosovo is treated as a “Western project” to be delegitimized rather than a dispute to be resolved. The paper is structured into five sections. It begins with sections one and two by outlining a conceptual discussion of Chinese foreign policy, aiming to provide a foundation for understanding the underlying principles that drive Chinese foreign policy philosophy. Section three discusses China’s presence in the Western Balkans and discusses the path dependency approach of Chinese foreign policy. Section four presents a discourse analysis of Chinese foreign policy to examine the specific language China employs when discussing Kosovo, Serbia, and the normalization process, based on an analysis of 82 texts totaling over 30,000 words, that include official statements, speeches and interviews from officials largely from 2008 to 2024. Section five adopts a more critical, attitudinal perspective, situating China’s approach within its broader interests in the Western Balkans. Drawing from official Chinese statements, UN Security Council speeches, MFA briefings, and diplomatic visits, the paper traces China’s positioning toward Kosovo, a subject which, to date, has been largely unexplored in Kosovo. At its core, the paper also identifies a consistent pattern of rhetorical distance paired with alignment with Serbia. The main findings of the paper are threefold. First, China’s discourse on Kosovo is grounded in a legalistic framework in appearance or rhetoric and opportunistic in practice. However, even in its legalistic appearance China always ignores ICJ’s opinion on Kosovo’s independence in 2010. Second, China’s foreign policy toward the Western Balkans is not neutral, but explicitly aligned with Serbia, both rhetorically and technically, and this makes Serbia a key platform for Chinese influence in our region, as other studies have shown.1 Third, despite its support for the EU-led normalization dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia in principle, China undermines the process by refusing to endorse its objectives, distancing itself from the notion of “normalization,” and promoting a status quo that favors ambiguity over resolution. For China, Kosovo is not an issue that needs to be resolved, but a Western design liberal-democratic project that needs to fail. In other words, China’s position on Kosovo has largely remained the same since 1998, and viewing Kosovo’s “solution” in a way that best fits interests of Sebia, which, as this paper seeks to show, is largely because of Taiwan.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Normalization, International Order, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Kosovo, and Western Balkans

70. How Does the Serbian Security Doctrine View Kosovo, the West, Russia, and China?

Author:
Ramadan Ilazi
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
This paper analyzes Serbia’s security doctrine as outlined in its National Security Strategy (2021), focusing on how it perceives Kosovo, the West (EU, NATO, and the US), Russia, and China. Serbia’s security posture is shaped by a balancing act— engaging both the West (EU, U.S., NATO) security structures while at the same time maintaining strong strategic relations with Russia and China. Despite its proclaimed military neutrality, Serbia’s security doctrine reflects an aggressive posture toward Kosovo, a skeptical stance on the West, and a deepening strategic alignment with Moscow and Beijing. The strategy frames Kosovo’s independence as a direct challenge to Serbia’s territorial integrity and national security. Serbia’s security apparatus is engaged in diplomatic efforts, intelligence operations, and hybrid warfare to undermine Kosovo’s sovereignty and prevent its international recognition. While Serbia rejects NATO membership, it cooperates with NATO through the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Serbia maintains strong defense and energy ties with Russia, benefiting from diplomatic backing on Kosovo while avoiding Western sanctions on Moscow. China is emerging as a key economic and security partner, providing investments in infrastructure, digital surveillance, and military technology. Serbia has significantly expanded its military capabilities, acquiring weapons from Russia and China while participating in joint drills with both NATO and CSTO. The adoption of the Total Defense concept—mobilizing the entire population and resources for national security—raises concerns about escalation and arms races in the Western Balkans. Serbia’s strategy frames Western influence as a security challenge, particularly regarding media, civil society, and foreign-backed democratization efforts. The West is seen as a hybrid threat, accused of interfering in Serbia’s internal affairs, while Russia and China are portrayed as strategic allies. Serbia’s approach contributes to a geopolitical divide in the Western Balkans, where Kosovo is aligned fully with the West, while Serbia hedges between the EU and authoritarian states, as well as grappling internally with authoritarian practices. Serbia’s influence campaigns portray Kosovo as a source of instability, using disinformation, cyber-attacks, and lobbying efforts to stall Kosovo’s state-consolidation process as well as EU and NATO aspirations. Kosovo’s reactive foreign policy and languishing partnership with the U.S., and the EU create an enabling environment for Serbia’s efforts against Kosovo’s statehood.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and Kosovo

71. Climate Change and Livestock in India: Impacts, Adaptation, and Policy Needs for Marginalized Communities

Author:
Shouvik Chakraborty, Debanjana Dey, and Anjana Thampi
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
This study examines the complex relationship between climate change and livestock holding patterns in India, focusing on coastal regions and marginalized communities. The research investigates whether landless and marginalized households, who constitute the majority of livestock holders in rural India, are adequately equipped to adapt to climate uncertainties. Analyses of Livestock Census data reveal a significant shift in livestock holding patterns in coastal India, with a 2.7 percent decline in the bovine population and a 22.1 percent increase in the sheep and goat populations between 2012 and 2019. This trend indicates an emerging adaptation strategy as farmers shift toward smaller ruminants, indicating greater resilience to heat stress and extreme weather conditions. We find that while large and medium landowners possess the financial resources to implement advanced adaptation strategies, marginal and landless households remain highly vulnerable due to their limited resources and heavy dependence on bovine livestock. The research concludes that region-specific livestock policies supporting indigenous breed development, traditional adaptation practices, and direct economic assistance are urgently needed to protect the livelihoods of these communities and prevent a rise in food insecurity among already undernourished populations. Furthermore, effective adaptation requires integrating local knowledge systems with scientific approaches to develop climate-resilient livestock management practices suitable for India’s diverse agro-ecological regions.
Topic:
Climate Change, Political Economy, Adaptation, and Livestock
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, and Asia

72. China Facing Domestic Economic Challenges and Trade War with the U.S.

Author:
Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:
A session of China’s parliament in March confirmed that the main source of the country’s economic growth in 2025 is to be state-supported industrial production, including the development of the high-tech sector, along with increasing domestic consumption and exports. The shape of China’s economic policy will be influenced by, among other things, the course of the trade conflict with the United States. For the EU, China’s economic plans imply the need to further protect the single market and increase competitiveness.
Topic:
Economy, Economic Growth, Trade Wars, and Industry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

73. Rethinking Aid in a Contested World

Author:
Stefan Dercon
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
Development aid faces a crisis of budgets, legitimacy, and political alignment. Framed in recent decades as technocratic and benevolent, aid has always been political, shaped by donor and recipient incentives. Its post–Cold War expansion reflected a permissive era of unipolarity and globalization, when Western foreign policy, business, and security establishments provided broad support. That equilibrium has now collapsed. Multipolar rivalry, protectionism, and fragmented domestic coalitions have left aid vulnerable, shallowly supported, and increasingly driven by narrow donor interests. The paper calls for recognition of the need for a globalization 2.0 that enables poorer countries to grow, warning that without such a framework, remaining aid will become more fragmented and ineffective. It also cautions against a euphemistic reliance on “mutual interest,” as evidence of genuine donor–recipient benefits is limited; trade facilitation and post-conflict stabilization are rare exceptions. Finally, the paper advances four propositions: aid must be selective, avoid entrenching dependency, balance short-term results with long-term system building, and support reformers willing to challenge the status quo. Only by acknowledging its political nature and aligning incentives within a reconfigured global order can aid remain relevant to development.
Topic:
Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Markets, Political Economy, Foreign Aid, and Sustainable Development
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Asia, South America, and North America

74. The Great Equalizer: Effects of Chinese Official Finance on Economic Complexity across Recipient Countries

Author:
Jan Denninger and Lennart Kaplan
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
This paper analyzes whether Chinese aid and other forms of official finance affect structural transformation in low- and-middle income countries. Specifically, we employ an instrumental variables (IV) approach to causally analyze the effect on the Economic Complexity Index of 98 recipient countries over the 2002-2016 period. Economic complexity is defined as the diversity and sophistication of the goods an economy produces. The results reveal that Chinese official financing (OF) does not have statistically significant effects at the aggregate level; however, its effectiveness varies across sectors and recipients. A sectoral perspective shows that Chinese OF to recipients’ production sectors has a significantly negative effect on their economic complexity. These effects are most pronounced for high-complexity recipients, suggesting that China primarily targets industries below existing levels of complexity, thereby impeding potential structural transformation. In contrast, low-complexity recipients experience positive complexity effects from Chinese social sector projects, especially from those related to education. Given that China is known for its demand-driven approach of lending, recipients should push for an adjustment in the composition and allocation of Chinese OF to render structural transformation more likely.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, Foreign Aid, and Complexity
Political Geography:
China and Asia

75. Balancing the Scales of Trade: Zambia-China Relations in a Dynamic Global Economy

Author:
Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis & Research (ZIPAR)
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (ZIPAR)
Abstract:
Over the past two and a half decades, Sino-Zambian trade relations have transformed into a multifaceted economic partnership, evolving from foundational political alliances to a dynamic framework of economic collaboration. The diplomatic ties established on October 29, 1964, between Zambia and China provided the initial platform for engagement, exemplified by landmark projects like the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA). However, the turning point in bilateral economic relations occurred following China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, which marked a new era of global economic integration and elevated trade and investment between the two countries In this context, this paper examines the evolving bilateral trade and investment relationship between Zambia and China, highlighting key findings regarding the structural features and composition of trade. China has emerged as Zambia’s top trading partner, with Zambia mainly exporting raw mineral commodities and primary goods while importing Chinese manufactured products. Furthermore, the trade and investment structure reveal a high degree of sectoral concentration, particularly in the mining sector, which has dominated both Chinese investments and imports from Zambia. This has positioned China as a major source of foreign direct and portfolio investment, particularly in the mining sector, leaving a small fraction of their total investments going to other economic sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing and tourism. Global developments such as, Climate change, the global clean energy transition and shifting geopolitical alignments are reshaping the relationship between Zambia-China trade and investment frameworks. These developments challenge traditional trade frameworks, such as the comparative advantage and gravity theory of international trade, to explain the evolving trade dynamics. China’s structural changes in its real estate market and demographic pressures from an aging population, is projected to continue shaping its future economic growth trajectory. Consequently, the second section of this paper assesses the implications of China’s economic performance on Zambia, with particular attention to shifts in Chinese investment strategies. Emerging trends suggest that policy swing toward global clean energy transition agenda will shape the future economies, especially mineral resource dependent countries. Likewise, the analysis identifies risks and opportunities associated with resource-dependent economies like Zambia, given the changing scales of trade arising from China’s gradual shift in trade and investment priorities. Therefore, this paper begins by assessing the economic relationship between Zambia and China, focusing on bilateral trade, investment flows, and auxiliary connections such as construction projects and the role of Chinese investments in Zambia. It then examines recent trends and forecasts for Zambia-China economic relations, balancing short-term cyclical factors with long-term structural developments. Finally, we conclude by outlining policy recommendations to enable Zambia to adapt to the evolving dynamics of its engagement with China, with the aim of promoting favorable balance of trade.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Investment, Trade, and Economic Development
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Asia, and Zambia

76. Putting a Price on Carbon in ASEAN and East Asia: Are Consumers Willing to Pay?

Author:
Ayu Pratiwi Muyasyaroh, Venkatachalam Anbumozhi, Kaliappa Kalirajan, and Veerapandian Karthick
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Carbon pricing is a policy tool designed to account for the external costs of carbon emissions, such as damage to crops, healthcare costs, and property loss due to climate change. It attaches a price to these costs and allocates responsibility to the sources of emissions. This approach helps incentivise the reduction of carbon emissions and encourages the adoption of technologies aimed at achieving a net zero economy. Revenue generated from carbon pricing can be reinvested by companies to support sustainable practices, including employee benefits and health insurance. While a few countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and East Asia have implemented carbon pricing mechanisms, there is limited understanding of individual preferences regarding these mechanisms at the national and regional levels. The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism of the European Union aims to standardise carbon prices for internationally traded products. However, there is a lack of knowledge about preferences for such policy instruments across key stakeholders and countries. A survey has been conducted to elicit stakeholders’ preferences and willingness to pay (WTP) for a carbon price in ASEAN and East Asia. The overall proportion of ‘yes’ answers to the WTP question was around 70%. Mean WTP corresponds to an additional price of US$10–US$15. The analysis of more than 500 consumer responses revealed that several modifiers impact the choice of higher and lower WTP additional costs for climate actions. Amongst the consumer groups, academia and household residents are more concerned about climate change and its harmful consequences but have less knowledge and lower appreciation of external pressures such as the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. This, coupled with the already high electricity price, could have resulted in the lower WTP by the private sector respondents. Three null hypotheses on the effects of WTP on carbon emission reductions, revenue recycling, and regional cooperation are tested. The low WTP underscores the urgency of measures to overcome market size and technical and financing constraints, and to address regulatory hurdles that raise transaction costs, to achieve industrial competitiveness.
Topic:
ASEAN, Carbon Emissions, Green Economy, Net Zero, and Carbon Pricing
Political Geography:
Asia

77. US-China Rivalry: Constructing Virtual Borders in Cyberspace Through War of Narratives

Author:
Dibakar De, NagaLaxmi M Raman, and Sitakanta Mishra
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Cyberspace has redefined national borders, prompting a rethink of traditional concepts of territoriality. In this digital realm, nations can leverage technological advancements to expand their influence beyond physical borders. This article begins by discussing the rapid emergence of narratives in cyberspace, before exploring the concept of territoriality in a virtual landscape and the roles played by both state and non-state actors. The rest of the article explores a range of aspects, including covert operations, fintech policies, divisions in emerging technologies such as AI, tech diplomacy, export control, and space-based digital infrastructure, to establish the notion of ideological and political fragmentation within cyberspace. Finally, it discusses the various strategies employed by the US, China and other actors to exploit the fragmentation of cyberspace for their own national benefit.
Topic:
Borders, Digital Revolution, Rivalry, Cyberspace, Public Diplomacy, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

78. Towards a Trade War in 2025: Real Threats for the World Economy, False Promises for the US

Author:
Antoine Bouët, Leysa Maty Sall, and Yu Zheng
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:
Using the MIRAGE-Power model, we simulate a trade war initiated in 2025 by the new US administration. The central scenario consists in a 60 percentage point tariff increase on all US imports from China, a 10 percentage point tariff increase on all products from other partners, except Canada and Mexico, and reciprocal tariff retaliation. World GDP and world trade decrease respectively by 0.5% and 3.4% in volume, with significant losses for the US and China, and gains for Canada and Mexico. A substantial reallocation of bilateral goods trade flows is taking place at global level. Additional scenarios show that: details of the tariff reform matter; the discriminatory tariff treatment of China benefits other trading partners; trade retaliation increases US economic losses; if Non-Tariff Measures are included in this trade war, the consequences are worse; if Canada and Mexico are included in the trade war, both experience significant losses in terms of GDP and trade. Last, we show that the US will not be able to replace the federal income tax with tariff revenues, even with a revenue-maximizing tariff.
Topic:
GDP, Economy, Tariffs, Trade Wars, Trade, and Retaliation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

79. The Republic of Korea’s Contributions to Pacific Maritime Governance

Author:
Wooyeal Paik
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
The Republic of Korea (ROK) has a significant interest in Pacific maritime governance owing to its reliance on maritime trade, its security concerns in the Indo-Pacific region, and how the ROK’s Indo-Pacific Strategy intersects with its aspirations to become a “Global Pivotal State,” a term coined by the Yoon Suk Yeol government. The ROK's objectives and actions in Pacific maritime governance can be understood through its strategic perspectives, policies, contributions, and the challenges it faces. There are two ROK objectives related to Pacific maritime governance. The first is to ensure freedom of navigation. As a major trading nation, South Korea is highly dependent on sea routes connecting the Korean peninsula to the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and the Malacca Strait for its exports and imports, including critical energy and other resources. Safeguarding freedom of navigation in the West Pacific along with so-called “like-minded” countries is vital to its economic security, often labeled as protecting supply chains. Second, regional stability and security via enforcing alliance and alignment are critical. South Korea aims to contribute to maritime stability, particularly in response to increasing tensions involving regional power competition between China and the United States alongside Japan. In particular, the hegemonic challenger, China, has aggressively grown its military presence in the West Pacific. For South Korea, guarding against North Korea’s ever-growing military threat remains a priority. Strengthening alliances and security partnerships among like-minded countries in the region is critical. South Korea seeks to enhance security cooperation with key regional players such as the United States, Japan, Australia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Pacific Island countries such as Fiji to promote maritime governance.
Topic:
Governance, Maritime, Freedom of Movement, Regional Security, and Regional Stability
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and Indo-Pacific

80. Asean y la UE. Estrategias y oportunidades para Indonesia y España

Author:
Dayu Nirma Amurwanti and Alodia Pérez
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:
Este documento analiza el potencial de fortalecer las relaciones entre la Unión Europea (UE) y la ASEAN, destacando el rol estratégico de España e Indonesia. Ambos bloques comparten valores como el multilateralismo y enfrentan desafíos comunes como el cambio climático, la tensión entre EE. UU. y China, y la necesidad de integración comercial. España e Indonesia, potencias marítimas y economías emergentes, pueden liderar iniciativas en defensa, comercio, digitalización, educación e innovación. Se propone revitalizar la cooperación bilateral, avanzar en nuevos acuerdos de defensa y vigilancia marítima. Además, se destaca la urgencia de concluir el Acuerdo de Asociación Económica UE-Indonesia, promoviendo el comercio y la inversión verde. En educación y cultura, se plantea intensificar los intercambios universitarios e investigaciones conjuntas. Finalmente, se sugiere elevar la relación bilateral a una Asociación Estratégica y fomentar una agenda común en foros multilaterales para un orden global más justo y cooperativo.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, European Union, Geopolitics, Economy, Multilateralism, and Industry
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, Spain, United States of America, and ASEAN

81. Asean and the EU. Strategic opportunities for Indonesia and Spain

Author:
Dayu Nirma Amurwanti and Oviedo Pérez
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:
This document analyzes the potential for strengthening relations between the European Union (EU) and ASEAN, highlighting the strategic role of Spain and Indonesia. Both blocs share values such as multilateralism and face common challenges, including climate change, tensions between the U.S. and China, and the need for trade integration. Spain and Indonesia, as maritime powers and emerging economies, can lead initiatives in defense, trade, digitalization, education, and innovation. The document proposes revitalizing bilateral cooperation and advancing new agreements in defense and maritime surveillance. It also emphasizes the urgency of concluding the EU-Indonesia Economic Partnership Agreement to promote trade and green investment. In the fields of education and culture, it suggests intensifying university exchanges and joint research. Finally, it recommends elevating the bilateral relationship to a Strategic Partnership and promoting a shared agenda in multilateral forums for a more just and cooperative global order.
Topic:
Climate Change, Geopolitics, Economy, Multilateralism, Industry, ASEAN, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:
Europe, Indonesia, Asia, Spain, Southeast Asia, and ASEAN

82. The Japan, China, Iran Triangle: Strategic Implications for Israel

Author:
Eyal Ben-Ari
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
As Japan balances between Iran and the West and China deepens its ties to Tehran, Israel faces a shifting landscape demanding new regional approaches
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

83. The Tehran–Moscow–Beijing Triangle

Author:
Yaakov Lappin
Publication Date:
11-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The revisionist bloc reshaping global power balances—and the dangers it poses for Israel and the West.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Sanctions, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Asia, and Palestine

84. China’s De-dollarisation Initiatives: Strategies and Constraints

Author:
Zongyuan Zoe Liu
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
A decade ago, renminbi internationalisation was a hot topic; today, it’s part of a broader, more strategic push toward de-dollarisation – accelerated by Western sanctions on Russia. While China’s efforts to globalise its currency began earlier, the risk of financial exclusion has intensified its urgency. Beijing’s approach is pragmatic and multi-pronged: it is deepening engagement with regional and non-Western partners developing renminbi-based infrastructure for cross-border payments, and leveraging its dominance in clean energy supply chains to promote renminbi pricing in key commodities. These strategies aim to enhance the renminbi’s role in trade and settlement while persistent structural factors – shallow capital markets and limited investor confidence – remain stumbling blocks for China’s currency becoming a global store of value. That may just be fine with Beijing, at least in the near to medium term. No evidence suggests China plans to dethrone the US dollar or replace the US dollar with the renminbi as the global dominant currency. China’s immediate goal is to insulate itself from financial sanctions in the dollar-based system. In a world where access to American banks and US dollar can be weaponised, China regards a functional alternative for cross-border settlement as a strategic necessity. With a trade-dependent economy and a leadership wary of volatility, China’s priority is currency stability, not supremacy.
Topic:
Political Economy, Governance, Currency, and Financial Services
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

85. China-EU@50: Assessing the Ups and Downs of the Relationship

Author:
Nicola Casarini
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In Europe there co-exist concurrent, and often contradictory, images of China, which explains why Sino-European economic relations continue to thrive notwithstanding the political coldness of the last years. While the EU’s leadership views Xi Jinping’s China as a ‘systemic rival’ and the main enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Beijing continues to be seen also as an opportunity by EU companies, universities and civil society groups. China’s dual image – that of a daunting challenge and a formidable opportunity – has characterised the Sino-European relationship since the mid-1970s.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Economy
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

86. China's Quiet Footprint: Mapping Chinese Influence on Local Politics and the Economic Landscape in Kosovo

Author:
Adelina Hasani
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
China’s strategy to exert influence in Kosovo primarily centers on economic engagement and disinformation campaigns. However, recently, China has also shown a tendency to organize meetings with local authorities and develop cooperation across various fields, including the economy, culture, and the arts. Despite not recognizing Kosovo’s independence and lacking formal diplomatic relations, China engages through indirect channels, particularly trade, with the tendency to create municipal partnerships and connections with local businesses. This approach aligns with the Tao Guang Yang Hui principle, China’s grand strategy emphasizing the pursuit of national interests while avoiding overt confrontation. In contrast to Russia’s aggressive approach, China quietly expands its influence through soft power mechanisms, minimizing political friction while steadily deepening its economic presence. This approach is rooted in the Tao Guang Yang Hui principle or China’s grand strategy that emphasizes maintaining a low profile while quietly pursuing national interests. Under this doctrine, China seeks incremental gains while avoiding actions that might draw suspicion, provoke resistance, or force political commitments that could undermine its domestic priorities. This stands in sharp contrast to Russia’s more overtly assertive and confrontational strategy. Although China and Russia are often grouped together as external or malign influences in Kosovo, their strategies and objectives differ significantly. Russia pursues a confrontational approach, seeking to maintain a network of allies and proxies across the Western Balkans to counterbalance Western and U.S. influence. Rather than engaging directly in Kosovo, Russia treats the country as a geopolitical flashpoint, advancing its interests through regional partnerships and political alignment. In contrast, China’s approach follows its Tao Guang Yang Hui grand strategy, emphasizing subtle, long-term influence. It utilizes tools such as foreign direct investment, trade, business partnerships, and municipal-level cooperation, depending on what is feasible. By bypassing national institutions and often engaging directly with local actors, China minimizes political pushback while gradually deepening its presence and influence. This paper examines the contrasting strategies of Russia and China in Kosovo, with a particular focus on China’s expanding role through economic cooperation and its growing engagement with local-level institutions. Drawing comparisons with China’s broader involvement across Western Balkan countries - where its presence is often more visible and influential, such as in Serbia - the analysis highlights how China adapts its global grand strategy to regional and local contexts. Although China does not maintain diplomatic relations with Kosovo, lacks investments, and Kosovo is not part of the Belt and Road Initiative’s 16+ framework, China remains active in trade cooperation and increasingly seeks partnerships at the local level, particularly in economic, cultural, and artistic fields. The paper explores how China builds relationships with municipalities and businesses, often operating discreetly, to expand its soft power and influence public perception, especially at the community level. China’s presence in the Western Balkans has increased steadily over the past decade, particularly through its Belt and Road Initiative, which serves as the primary vehicle for engaging countries in the region. Beyond economic motives, these investments are part of a broader geopolitical strategy that tends to shape global norms and institutions and secure support from smaller states such as those in the Western Balkans in international fora like the UN. This growing influence should also be seen in the context of rising global tensions, where a bifurcated world order, reminiscent of the Cold War, is taking shape. With the war in Ukraine and sanctions on Russia, China has intensified efforts to challenge U.S. financial dominance. Western Balkans thus emerge not only as a strategic corridor into Europe but also as a critical region where China’s expanding influence may directly challenge the EU and broader Western presence. This research analyzes China’s soft influence in the Western Balkans through the lens of its grand strategy, with a particular focus on Kosovo. The analysis begins by exploring how China’s grand strategy is formulated at the global level and how it is adapted regionally, particularly in Kosovo, where China does not maintain diplomatic relations. A key objective is to shed light on China’s approach in the region, especially its efforts to build influence through business ties and local-level engagement. By unpacking China’s global strategy and examining its localized application, the study aims to inform the development of a clear, context-specific response by the government of Kosovo to mitigate China’s influence, particularly that which is pursued through non-transparent means.
Topic:
Grand Strategy, Disinformation, Foreign Influence, and Economic Engagement
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, Kosovo, and Balkans

87. When Citizen Action for Accountability Boosts Legislative Oversight: The Multiply-Ed Experience in the Philippines

Author:
Joy Aceron and Abrehet Gebremedhin
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Accountability Research Center (ARC), American University
Abstract:
The Philippines has long been confronting an education crisis. This was exacerbated by Covid-19, which prevented tens of millions of public school students from going to school. As a response, the national government developed a new education system to enable learners to continue learning amid the global health emergency. Such drastic changes in the education system and long-standing systemic problems in education governance prompted accountability checks to be undertaken in state and society to ensure responsiveness to learners and effectiveness in bringing forth education reforms. This Accountability Note on education reform in the Philippines presents an empirical pathway by which two distinct but complementary bodies have interfaced for a shared agenda of systemic education reform. These two parallel processes—an independent, citizen-led civil society organization, Multiply-Ed, and a congressional oversight committee, the Education Commission II (EDCOM II)—emerged with overlapping findings, actions, and agendas, showing the value of synergy between citizen-led action and government oversight. We demonstrate that accountability processes within the state and society can converge and reinforce each other even when there is no normalized collaboration. Common issues are tackled, institutional interfacing paves the way for information and knowledge to be shared, and commitment to the overarching shared goal of education reform is reaffirmed. However, even beyond converging findings, independent citizen-led monitoring like that conducted by Multiply-Ed has a distinct added value for the education sector. Through its movement-based approach to accountability, Multiply-Ed has identified an action-oriented reform agenda overlooked by legislative oversight mechanisms, that can help advance and sustain the reforms. This Accountability Note provides key takeaways for both social constituencies and government duty-bearers seeking to identify and address shared agendas through accountability. • Independent accountability efforts of state oversight bodies such as EDCOM II and citizen-led monitoring initiatives like Multiply-Ed can produce shared agendas and findings that are mutually reinforcing and may lead to progress towards common goals. • In the case of the interface between civil society accountability efforts and government oversight in the education sector in the Philippines, a shared agenda of enhancing the role of local governments, ensuring timely access to learning resources, ensuring teaching quality, and providing an adequate budget for education has been reinforced. • By bringing in the perspectives of citizens through platforms such as school governance councils, independent citizen-led monitoring provides a distinct added value beyond state oversight, offering solutions that are action-oriented and systemic, and sustain accountability amid the dynamics of political elites. • Mutually-reinforcing agendas and processes shared between civil society accountability actors and government oversight bodies can be key to harnessing state-society synergy, and pivotal in enabling progress towards power-shifting reforms.
Topic:
Civil Society, Education, Governance, Reform, and Accountability
Political Geography:
Asia and Philippines

88. Upwelling: Fishers Organizing for their Rights and Sustainable Fisheries

Author:
Judy Gearhart and Connor Moynihan
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Accountability Research Center (ARC), American University
Abstract:
Fishers face increased risks to their lives and livelihoods. Climate change and overfishing are sending fishers out to sea for longer periods of time or at distances beyond the capacity of their vessels. In response, fishers are pursuing new strategies to organize, build power, and defend their rights. This paper presents lessons from fisher organizing in diverse sectors. It aligns with the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 188 (C 188) on Work in Fishing, which defines fishers as all those working in marine capture, from artisanal fisherfolk to workers on the distant water fleet (DWF). The research reviews organizing trends in six countries and identifies common challenges and factors contributing to fisher organizing. In all six countries—Ecuador, Ghana, Indonesia, Mexico, Taiwan, and Thailand—new organizing initiatives have recently emerged. This research considers a range of dynamics that affect fisher organizing and their ability to access information, seek remedy, and influence policy outcomes. It provides insights from interviews with organizers and other fishery experts. The findings highlight areas where more work and strategizing are needed to build stronger and more influential fisher organizations.
Topic:
Climate Change, Sustainability, Labor Rights, and Fisheries
Political Geography:
Africa, Indonesia, Taiwan, Asia, Latin America, Mexico, Thailand, Ghana, and Ecuador

89. Ten Dimensions of Network Strengthening: Lessons from Health Rights Advocates in Guatemala, Mexico, and the Philippines

Author:
Julia Fischer-Mackey, Joy Aceron, Hilda Argüello Avendaño, Benilda Batzín, Francisco Gómez Guillén, and Rosaura Medina
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Accountability Research Center (ARC), American University
Abstract:
Maintaining and strengthening networks of volunteers is central to the health rights advocacy work of four civil society organizations (CSOs) in Guatemala, Mexico, and the Philippines who have worked through networks to improve reproductive, maternal, newborn, child, and adolescent healthcare (RMNCAH) services for marginalized communities. Their experience shows that networks of volunteers that represent marginalized populations and have the skills to engage with public authorities at different levels of government can confront the political and policy issues necessary to improve RMNCAH care. This Accountability Note captures the reflections of these CSOs on ten dimensions of network strengthening that they consider critical to their efforts to strengthen volunteer networks.
Topic:
Civil Society, Advocacy, Public Health, Marginalization, and Volunteers
Political Geography:
Asia, Philippines, Latin America, Mexico, and Guatemala

90. China Trying to Strengthen Dialogue with India

Author:
Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:
China sees India as its main rival in Asia. However, the Chinese authorities are maintaining a dialogue with the Indian government, recently even signalling a conciliatory attitude. In this way, they want to prevent an escalation in bilateral relations and try to influence India’s relations with the U.S. and the European Union in a way that is beneficial to China. Although China’s attempts to strengthen dialogue with India are tactical in nature, even a short-term improvement in bilateral relations poses a challenge for the EU. Attempts to reduce Europe’s dependence on China, in which India is to play an important role, are now in question.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
China, Europe, South Asia, India, Asia, and United States of America

91. China Launches the International Organisation for Mediation

Author:
Stefania Kolarz and Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:
China is introducing the International Organisation for Mediation (IOMed), which became operational on 29 August, as a complement to the international dispute resolution system. In practice, it is another initiative to gather countries of the Global South around China and intended to be a counterweight to international institutions they consider to be dominated by Western countries.
Topic:
Global South, International Institutions, Dispute Resolution, and International Organization for Mediation (IOMed)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

92. Reforming the EU Energy Market to Increase Competitiveness and Resilience

Author:
Kinga Dudzińska
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:
Intensifying tensions in global trade and China’s growing competitive advantage mean that the European Union faces an urgent need to provide more decisive support for the development of its own economy. The implementation of the electricity market reform (EMD), approved in May 2024, is of particular importance. It was initiated in response to the need to reduce energy prices, which directly impact, among other things, the investment attractiveness of the EU and its competitiveness. Maintaining energy market stability and subsidy guarantees may, however, make it difficult to achieve the EU’s ambitious climate goals, which the European Commission is even tightening.
Topic:
Climate Change, Development, European Union, Electricity, Resilience, Economic Competition, and Energy Markets
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

93. China Cautious about Participation in UN Peacekeeping, also in Ukraine

Author:
Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:
The Chinese contingent in UN peacekeeping operations is the largest among the permanent members of the Security Council. The deaths of Chinese soldiers on these missions, as well as the low effectiveness of some of the operations, have made China cautious about its involvement in further ventures and seeking to change their operational rules. Together with the general distrust of China by the Ukrainian authorities and European states because of its support for Russia, the experience with peacekeeping will significantly affect the Chinese calculations regarding the potential deployment of Chinese troops to Ukraine after a possible ceasefire.
Topic:
United Nations, Peacekeeping, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

94. ASEAN’S Digital Future: Strengthening Malaysia’s Leadership in Submarine Cable Governance and IMO Advocacy

Author:
Raaga Manjari Annathurai
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Maritime Institute of Malaysia
Abstract:
As Malaysia assumes the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) chairmanship in 2025, its leadership comes at a crucial time when digital infrastructure and connectivity are more critical than ever. This coincides with Malaysia’s role in the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Council for the 2024–2025 term, reinforcing its commitment to maritime and digital governance on both regional and global scales. Among the many priorities under Malaysia’s chairmanship, ensuring the resilience, security, and efficient governance of submarine cables is paramount. These cables serve as the Critical Information Infrastructure (CNI) of international telecommunications, driving economic growth, digital transformation, and cross-border connectivity. Malaysia’s strategic geographical position in the region and robust regulatory framework place it in a pivotal role in spearheading efforts to enhance ASEAN’s submarine cable governance and regional connectivity. As home to some of the busiest submarine cable routes in the world, these undersea communication networks in the region play a crucial role in enabling seamless internet access, financial transactions, and cloud computing services. As digitalisation accelerates across the region, the demand for robust and well-protected submarine cable systems continues to rise. However, regulatory inconsistencies, environmental risks, and geopolitical tensions pose significant threats to the uninterrupted functioning of these cables. Malaysia, as the ASEAN 2025 chair, is uniquely positioned to lead regional efforts to address these challenges and establish a more harmonised regulatory framework.
Topic:
Communications, Governance, ASEAN, and Submarine Cable
Political Geography:
Malaysia and Asia

95. Is inequality always unfair? Experimental evidence on preferences for redistribution in Mozambique and Viet Nam

Author:
Ines A. Ferreira, Rachel M. Gisselquist, and Finn Tarp
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United Nations University
Abstract:
Knowledge of the factors driving people’s views on redistribution in the Global South remains limited. While these societies occupy top positions in inequality rankings, redistribution levels tend to be lower. We combine survey and experimental data from Mozambique and Viet Nam to test whether redistributive preferences vary depending on the source of inequality, focusing on two channels, fairness views and communication. First, we confirm the finding that inequality resulting from differences in merit is more accepted than inequality due to luck or factors outside of individual control. We also observe heterogeneity in fairness views. Second, we extend the analysis to consider whether allowing for communication between a receiver, who can suggest a distribution, and a dictator, who makes the final decision, affects redistribution preferences. We find that the relevance of the source of inequality remains. However, whether the expectation of the receiver is met by the dictator varies across samples and depends on the source of inequality. Overall, our results provide important insights into the universality of fairness views and point to the need for more analysis across contexts with different institutional and economic backgrounds.
Topic:
Inequality, Global Focus, Redistribution, and Fairness
Political Geography:
Africa, Asia, Mozambique, and Viet Nam

96. European exports in geopolitical storms

Author:
Niclas Poitiers, Madalena Barata da Rocha, and Nicolas Boivin
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The global trading system is undergoing profound changes, and current developments in the US and China will have significant implications for the European economy. Both countries were at the heart of globalisation but are now becoming less dynamic export markets. Chinese economic growth is expected to slow down as pressures on the economy accumulate. In the United States, trade policy has taken a sharp inward turn. For the EU, these shifts point to structurally weakening demand growth from two of its largest trading partners, which together account for nearly 30 percent of all EU-generated value-added exports. However, in this paper we show that the growth of EU exports is driven to a much greater extent by demand in other markets, and we argue for a stronger policy focus on the 70 percent of EU value added in trade with other partners. While reduced demand from the US or China would pose challenges – especially for highly exposed sectors like pharmaceuticals – there remains substantial scope for the EU to diversify and expand trade with the rest of the world. The EU already has an extensive network of trade agreements, covering 74 percent of trade with partners other than the US and China. Deepening these relationships and forging new partnerships should be priorities. Offering a stable and rules-based trade regime can help offset losses from reduced integration with the US and China.
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Trade Policy, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

97. Two decades of Chinese industry subsidies

Author:
Shuhui Xiang, Xinran Yin, and Yuan Zi
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Trade and Economic Integration, The Graduate Institute (IHEID)
Abstract:
This paper constructs a new database based on China's WTO subsidy notifications (2001–2022) and provides the first systematic overview of China's industrial subsidies over the past two decades. Five findings emerge. First, subsidies expanded rapidly, but direct fiscal support stabilized around 0.8 percent of GDP after 2008. Second, China has employed more subsidies than its income level would suggest, with striking policy persistence. Third, subsidies and tax incentives for FDI have declined, while those targeting specific industries and promoting innovation have grown. Fourth, wealthier and more trade-oriented provinces provide more local subsidies. Finally, subsidies are concentrated in a few sectors, and measures based on counts versus values reveal different patterns. These patterns reveal how China's subsidy strategy has evolved, offering insights to state-led development in the 21st century.
Topic:
Development, Economics, Innovation, WTO, and Subsidies
Political Geography:
China and Asia

98. "We Must Depend Entirely on Ourselves": Policy, Politics, and U.S.–China Relations at the Fourth Plenum

Author:
Neil Thomas
Publication Date:
11-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
What kind of deal does Xi Jinping want with Donald Trump? Twelve hours after the two leaders met in Busan last Thursday, I sat in a New York ballroom packed with hundreds of executives, policymakers, and foreign-affairs experts. When a speaker asked who believed China and the United States would reach a “comprehensive trade deal” by the end of Trump’s term, half the room raised their hands. I was surprised. Beijing is not chasing a grand bargain; it is seeking a truce to buy time and build leverage. Xi’s diplomatic messaging contrasts with his domestic rhetoric. In South Korea, he told Trump that “China’s development should go hand in hand with your vision to Make America Great Again,” and that “our two countries can totally help each other to succeed and prosper.” In Beijing, at the Fourth Plenum of the Communist Party’s 20th Central Committee, which ran from October 20–23, he called for “upholding the multilateral trading system” but also said China must “win the strategic initiative amid fierce international competition.” The plenum confirmed Beijing’s continued focus on strengthening self-reliance. It issued authoritative “Proposals” (jianyi 建议) for China’s next five-year plan, which will be drafted by the State Council and released by the National People’s Congress at the Two Sessions next March. As anticipated by the Center for China Analysis (CCA), Xi’s top priorities remain “building a modernized industrial system” and “self-reliance and self-strengthening in science and technology.” Xi’s bargaining position is strong: the Party reaffirmed its call to “unite more closely around the Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core.” Yet politics intruded on the polished optics in an unusually obvious way. State-media cameras could not hide rows of empty seats in the meeting hall — belonging to scores of officials absent because they were dead, disgraced, or under investigation. The image captured a paradox of Xi’s power: complete control, but constant purges. This article shows how the Fourth Plenum advanced Xi’s drive to build technological self-reliance, tighten political control, and centralize decision-making ahead of the 21st Party Congress in late 2027. The contrast between his conciliatory tone in Busan and his assertive message in Beijing signals confidence, not weakness, and underscores that his economic agenda remains defined by strategic competition with the United States. For Washington, this means hardened industrial rivalry rather than market opening: U.S. firms should expect more state direction, tougher conditions for trade and investment, and continued expansion of China’s export-control regime. Both sides now prize self-reliance over interdependence — but Xi is betting that his strategic resolve will outlast Trump’s.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Industrial Policy, Bilateral Relations, Governance, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

99. China’s Next Move: Economic Priorities and Policy Shifts for 2026

Author:
Lizzi C. Lee and Jing Qian
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
China approaches the 2025 Central Economic Work Conference (CEWC) at a pivotal moment. The economy expanded by 5.3% in the first half of the year on the back of exports, fiscal stimulus, and consumption boosts, but underlying weaknesses became more pronounced as stimulus faded and structural pressures intensified by the third quarter. As the operational bridge between the 14th and 15th Five-Year Plans — and a waypoint toward China’s 2035 development goals — this year’s CEWC must link near-term macro stabilization with medium-term structural priorities. Fiscal policy will remain Beijing’s primary lever for near term stabilization, with spending increasingly directed toward healthcare, childcare, education, and eldercare — public-service sectors central to raising productivity and unlocking durable consumption. Boosting domestic demand will require not only fiscal support but also improved service-sector capacity, higher labor mobility, and more accessible public goods. Without these, consumption cannot become a reliable engine of growth. Support for the property market is expected to remain targeted and restrained, reflecting limited appetite to revive a property–driven growth model constrained by demographics and excess supply. Policy signals may emphasize fostering more orderly competition — reducing local protectionism, curbing “involution,” strengthening fair-competition enforcement, and discouraging subsidy-driven or zero-sum expansion. Industrial Policy 2.0 is emerging, focused on modernizing traditional industries while accelerating strategic sectors such as renewables, aerospace, advanced batteries, new materials, low-altitude economy, AI, and biomanufacturing. A central challenge is the private sector’s still-weak confidence. High liquidity has not translated into investment or hiring because constraints now lie in profitability, expectations, and policy predictability rather than capital availability. Without renewed private-sector participation, neither consumption nor innovation nor industrial upgrading can gain sustained traction. Execution risk remains significant. Translating CEWC priorities into outcomes requires alignment between central intent and local implementation, overcoming fiscal strains, uneven administrative capacity, and misaligned incentives at the subnational level — especially amid a more unsettled geopolitical environment. An appendix accompanies this report, providing a concise overview of what the CEWC is, how its official readout is produced, and how to interpret the subsequent documents and policy signals that follow.
Topic:
Economics, Industrial Policy, Fiscal Policy, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:
China and Asia

100. Healthy China 2030 & APEC Opportunities: “Health-First” Domestic Reform, Biotech Innovation, and International Cooperation

Author:
Lizzi C. Lee, Chen Liu, and Jing Qian
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
“Health” has moved to the center of China’s governance agenda and, increasingly, to the core of Asia-Pacific regional cooperation. This paper argues that Healthy China 2030 is more than a public health initiative. It is a flagship political project designed to address the twin pressures of demographic aging and chronic disease while positioning China as an emerging, resilient global leader in innovative development. In alignment with China’s other long-term blueprints, including the Five-Year Plans and the Made in China 2025 industrial strategy, Healthy China 2030 promotes the state’s capacity for resilience and sustainable economic development. Domestically, China’s health reforms remain hampered by weak primary care, bureaucratic fragmentation, and misaligned incentives, placing its demographic transition under ever-increasing pressure. This is a global challenge faced by other Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) economies and most countries across the world. In China, the urgency is even greater. To address these significant challenges, Beijing is simultaneously pushing at the frontiers of biotech innovation, regulatory reform, the return of scientific talent, and advances in artificial intelligence (AI). These initiatives have transformed China into a credible and leading force in novel therapies, generating cost-effective products with huge potential benefits for the international community, society, and global health markets. However, this progress is still somewhat limited by the risks of fragile financing, rigid institutions, and geopolitical uncertainty. Against this dynamic backdrop, APEC emerges as a central bridge: a pragmatic, consensus-driven platform through which health cooperation can advance even amid unstable geopolitical rivalries. Shared global pressures of demographic burdens, escalating healthcare costs, and risks of potential pandemic disease create strong incentives for collective action. APEC has the capacity to transform fragmented national experiments into shared resilience through joint regulatory reviews, integrated regional data-sharing frameworks, and financing mechanisms for biotech and other initiatives. Such alignment also offers China the chance to project constructive leadership in the run-up to its chairing of APEC 2026. By demonstrating how domestic reforms and biotech advances can translate into regional public goods, China can showcase to the world the tangible results of Healthy China 2030 as contributions to Asia-Pacific prosperity rather than as instruments of competition — whether those come from digital health platforms, chronic disease management models, or cost-effective biomedical innovations. The wider region stands to benefit from a framework that both strengthens collective health security and accelerates regulatory and technological convergence. By pooling data, expertise, and financing through APEC mechanisms, member economies can scale best practices in preventive care, aging policy, and biotechnology, reducing duplication and closing capacity gaps between developed and developing economies. In turn, this can foster a more resilient and inclusive regional health ecosystem — one that aligns economic integration with human well-being. For the world, it opens a rare domain of intersection, where U.S.-China collaboration and U.S.-China–led multilateral cooperation can advance with fewer political frictions and yield substantial shared gains in economics, science, and public health. A cooperative APEC agenda on health innovation and governance provides a model for tackling transnational challenges as a whole: even amid strategic competition, joint stewardship of human welfare remains not only possible but also mutually beneficial.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Reform, Innovation, and Biotechnology
Political Geography:
China and Asia