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1. Les étudiants chinois en Europe et l’Etat-parti

Author:
Jérôme Doyon
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI)
Abstract:
Chinese Students in Europe and the Party-State -- Why do some Chinese students who choose to study abroad get involved in pro-regime organisations? How does this reflect the efforts of the People’s Republic of China to foster relationships of dependence and allegiance with its overseas nationals? Fieldwork conducted within branches of the Chinese Students and Scholars Association in France and the United Kingdom sheds light on the drivers of this form of long-distance authoritarian commitment. An analysis of how the association operates in two different European countries reveals how it adapts to the local environment while functioning as an enclave, isolated from host societies. The organisation’s primary objective is to maintain the Chinese partystate’s hold over its nationals outside national borders rather than influence or develop ties with foreign societies. However, students do not passively allow themselves to be co-opted, and the many pressures they experience can hinder efforts to mobilise them in support of the regime.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Political Science, and Students
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and France

2. What Lies Beneath: Hybrid Threats to Taiwan’s Submarine Cables and the Contest in the Information Domain

Author:
Aurelio Insisa
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Between 2023 and 2025, multiple disruptions affected Taiwan’s submarine cables, a critical yet vulnerable infrastructure essential to the island’s connectivity and security. Against the backdrop of China’s diplomatic, economic and military pressure targeting Taiwan, these disruptions are generally defined as “grey zone operations”. Yet, reframing them as hybrid threats allows for a better understanding of how specific threats to the infrastructure domain can spill over in the information domain. Disruptions to submarine cables may be exploited by threat actors to erode trust in domestic institutions and destabilise society. Uncertainty in the information domain emerging from these disruption presents opportunities for Taiwanese authorities to mobilise public support, international partners and resources to enhance infrastructure resilience. A strategic communications approach drawing on the experience of the EU can strengthen response through enhanced coordination among institutions, coherent messaging, constructive public engagement and improved awareness of information-domain contestation. An effective adoption of this approach may mitigate risks from threat actors while reinforcing the capacity of Taiwanese authorities to safeguard critical infrastructure and maintain societal trust.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Disinformation, Hybrid Threats, and Submarine Cable
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

3. With imports of around €900 million in 2025, is Kosovo moving toward a potential dependency on China’s supply chain?

Author:
Ramadan Ilazi
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
KCSS publishes new paper on Kosovo’s rising imports from China and supply‑chain risks Prishtina, February 20, 2026: The Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS) has published a new discussion paper in its Secure Futures Series examining whether Kosovo’s rapidly growing imports from China could be placing the country on a trajectory toward supply‑chain dependency, and what this might mean for Kosovo’s governance, resilience, and Euro‑Atlantic integration and alignment. Authored by Dr. Ramadan Ilazi, the paper notes that Kosovo imported approximately €920 million worth of goods from China in 2025, making China Kosovo’s third‑largest important partner after Germany, and Türkiye, despite Kosovo’s free trade agreement with Ankara, and no diplomatic relations with Beijing. The analysis highlights that Kosovo’s imports from China have expanded steadily and doubled over the past four years, with China now accounting for around 13 percent of Kosovo’s imports. “For KCSS, focusing on unwanted foreign influence in the Kosovo is about anticipating how economic exposure can translate into political leverage, and security and strategic vulnerabilities,” said Mentor Vrajolli, Executive Director of KCSS. “As Kosovo deepens trade ties with China, despite the absence of normal diplomatic relations, this trend deserves serious attention for its potential ramifications on Kosovo’s longer‑term positioning in relation to the United States and the European Union.” The paper situates Kosovo’s evolving trade pattern within the wider Western Balkans context, where several countries have already experienced politically contentious engagement with China through large‑scale infrastructure loans, procurement practices, and technology cooperation. It underscores that, unlike many of its neighbors, Kosovo has remained at political distance from Beijing, however, the paper argues that dependence can develop also quietly through market dynamics and supply chains. “The purpose is not to be alarmist,” said Dr. Ramadan Ilazi, author of the paper. “The concern is the direction of travel of our country, since imports from China have doubled since 2021, while Kosovo has almost no exports to China and no formal mechanisms for economic dispute‑resolution. In a system, such as China’s, where state and economy are not only closely intertwined, but in practice, one, economic cooperation is rarely politically neutral and especially when the country in question does not even recognise Kosovo and consistently supports Serbia’s position in international forums.” The paper points to relevant experiences, such as Lithuania’s trade disruption following tensions over Taiwan representation and South Korea’s economic exposure during the THAAD dispute, to illustrate how economic links can become instruments of pressure when political disagreements arise. The discussion paper also flags the broader normative dimension, arguing that Chinese engagement in the region has often operated in ways that can undercut rule‑of‑law standards, including through practices such as lex specialis in procurement in other Western Balkan contexts.
Topic:
Risk, Trade, Imports, Supply Chains, and Dependency
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, Kosovo, and Balkans

4. China's 2026-2030 Five-Year Plan: Continuing the Economic Model and Increasing Self-Reliance

Author:
Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:
The latest five-year plan, adopted in March this year by the Chinese parliament, identifies industrial modernisation and the pursuit of technological independence as key to China’s economic development. It mentions increased consumption and improved social conditions, but these are not priorities. The development of modern industries is intended to increase the competitiveness of Chinese companies relative to entities from developed countries, including Poland. The direction outlined by the plan is another argument for strengthening the protection of the EU single market and supporting an active EU industrial policy.
Topic:
Economics, European Union, Economic Development, Modernization, Industry, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Poland

5. Lee Jae-myung's Inter-Korean Policy

Author:
Oskar Pietrewicz
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:
South Korea’s attempts to improve relations with North Korea have been unsuccessful. Although this is mainly due to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) reluctance to resume contacts with the Republic of Korea (ROK), an additional problem has been caused by the inconsistent actions of President Lee Jae-myung’s administration, which has been in office since June last year. The administration’s goal of ‘peaceful coexistence’ effectively means accepting reunification as unlikely, a prospect that is losing support in South Korean society. To avoid an escalation of tensions on the Korean Peninsula, South Korea could seek to cooperate with countries that regularly engage with the DPRK, such as Poland.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Poland

6. Are Long-Term NATO–South Korea Defense Ties Possible? Transitioning From an Arms Exporter to a Trusted Defense Partner

Author:
Chung Min Lee
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
This study focuses on how the Republic of Korea (ROK), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Europe are forging closer defense and security ties and whether such a partnership can be sustained into the future. South Korea has demonstrated that it is capable of exporting and investing in European and NATO security; according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), South Korea supplied 6.5 percent of arms imports to European NATO states (NATO-Europe) in 2024, a similar level to France.1 Conversely, Europe accounted for about 10 percent of South Korea’s arms imports in the period 2020–2024 while the United States dominated with 86 percent of all arms sales to South Korea.2 Based on SIPRI data, South Korea ranked tenth in global arms sales at the end of 2024.3 The main challenge for South Korea rests on rethinking its longer-term approach to strengthening defense ties with NATO along three main pathways: Ensuring greater interoperability with NATO weapons systems by deepening its alignment with the NATO Standardization Agreement through various measures such as the Mutual Recognition for Military Airworthiness (July 2024) agreement and becoming a member of NATO’s Science & Technology Organization (March 2025) and vice versa, so that European systems can be readily adapted into Korean weapons platforms; Encouraging Korean defense firms to operate in Europe with European governments, militaries, and corporate partners to localize production in Europe, similar to the strong foothold Korean defense firms have established in Poland since 2022; and Integrating, to the extent possible, with NATO’s intelligence architecture, including enhanced cybersecurity and cyber defenses; greater intelligence sharing over emerging battle management environments (particularly after the Russia-Ukraine war comes to an end in the foreseeable future); and greater institutionalization of intelligence exchanges, including South Korean assessments of North Korea and China and NATO analyses of threats from Russia. South Korea aspires to become one of the top defense exporters by 2030. Based on its world-leading manufacturing capabilities in automobiles, shipbuilding, steel production, semiconductors, consumer electronics, and nuclear power plants, among other sectors, its ambitions are well within reach. South Korea supplies arms to three main regions—Europe, the Middle East (mainly Gulf states), and the Asia-Pacific. Key European and American defense companies have been leading providers of defense goods and services in the same regions since the end of World War II. Compared to their rivals, ROK defense firms offer definite advantages such as price competitiveness, rapid delivery schedules, and thorough maintenance, repairs, and overhauls (MROs) systems.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Partnerships, and Arms Sales
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and South Korea

7. Duterte’s Populist Foreign Policy as Illiberal Defiance: Consequences and Prospects

Author:
Aries A. Arugay
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Barely two months into his presidency of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte attended the 2016 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Vientiane, Laos. The former mayor of Davao City had just swept the presidential election to become the first executive from outside of the Manila-based political establishment. Rather than reading a scripted speech, he launched into an impromptu tirade about colonial atrocities by the United States. Duterte went on to defend his violent war on drugs and rebut the criticisms of his equally violent purge of suspected criminals.1 The world was shocked by the bad manners exhibited by Duterte, especially his insult to then U.S. president Barack Obama.2 This was the beginning of the shift in Philippine foreign policy toward a more populist, illiberal, and revisionist posture—one that would last until Duterte’s presidency ended in 2022. This essay advances two core arguments about how Duterte’s right-wing populism shaped Philippine foreign policy. First, Duterte’s foreign policy was not motivated by an ideology, so much as by a performance anchored in symbolic defiance, personalized diplomacy, and selective norm rejection.3 Second, Duterte’s populist revisionism ultimately collided with entrenched structural constraints, including the country’s enduring security dependence on the United States, institutional resistance within the bureaucracy, and the democratic political succession that brought the nonpopulist President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. to power. Taken together, these constraints exposed the limits of populist foreign policy in a small and militarily vulnerable state situated on the front lines of the U.S.-China rivalry. Since Duterte was elected, there has been widespread recognition that populism’s impact goes beyond national borders. In Europe, for instance, populists tended not to touch traditional foreign policy and security issues until the 2015 refugee crisis. The wave of populism that followed was marked by a contempt for the cosmopolitan European outlook that had long underpinned support for the European Union, liberal migration policies, and Europe’s reliance on the United States for its security.4 Populists on both the left and right are often skeptical of multilateral institutions because they restrain state power. Venezuela’s former president Hugo Chávez, for example, attempted to form alternative regional institutions in the Americas to counter U.S. hegemony.5 The revisionist impulse inherent in populism inclines its leaders toward foreign policy adventurism, even though abrupt shifts are uncommon given the durability of national strategic interests. Populist leaders also often exhibit a high risk tolerance—especially personalist leaders in command of highly concentrated state power.6 Moreover, they often see foreign policy as a means of weakening their political opponents and consolidating power at home. They also crave international recognition, which they pursue through “megaphone diplomacy” that foregrounds their personality and charisma.7 The burden of managing foreign relations is bearable for the populist up to the point that strategic reality intervenes, imposing itself in ways that leave scant room for performance. Populist politics, therefore, are unable to resist the water’s edge. This essay proceeds by tracing the right-wing populist currents in Philippine foreign policy under Duterte through three major international issues: disputes with China in the South China Sea, the attempted abrogation of the Visiting Forces Agreement with the United States, and the country’s withdrawal from the International Criminal Court (ICC). Respectively, each of these issues foregrounds one of the foundations of Philippine foreign policy that Duterte attempted to undermine: international law, the Philippines’ alliance with the United States, and human rights. The essay goes on to analyze how these foreign policy stances resonated with the revisionist orientations of countries that Duterte sought inspiration from—namely China and Russia. These revisionist narratives were reinforced in the Philippines through domestic disinformation networks that learned strategies from Russia and China.8 Finally, the essay highlights the implications of Duterte’s populist policies under the Marcos Jr. administration and examines the prospects of their revival in the future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Populism, and Illiberalism
Political Geography:
Asia and Philippines

8. Chinese Loans to Sub-Saharan African countries: BalancingDevelopment and Dependency

Author:
Ahmed Salim Vessah
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
Over the past two decades, China has become sub-Saharan Africa’s (SSA) foremost tradingpartner and the region’s main bilateral creditor, profoundly reshaping its financial and geopoliticallandscape. Between 2000 and 2022, Chinese lenders extended over USD 170 billion in loans toAfrican countries , with major recipients (such as Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and Zambia)each receiving between USD 5 and 40 billion. Today, China accounts for around 20% of SSA’sbilateral external debt , underscoring its strategic importance in the continent’s developmenttrajectory. This Policy Brief argues that while Chinese loans are instrumental in addressing Africa’smassive infrastructure deficit, they concurrently heighten debt vulnerabilities and geopoliticaldependence. The attractiveness of Chinese financing is best understood in relation to Africa’spersistent structural needs. According to the African Development Bank (AfDB, 2024) , SSA facesan annual infrastructure financing gap of USD 100-150 billion, far exceeding the capacity ofdomestic revenues and traditional donors. Chinese loans therefore stand out due to their speed of approval focus on large-scale physical infrastructure, and limited policy conditionality’s comparedto Western lenders. For many African governments, this makes Chinese credit an appealing andpragmatic alternative for accelerating development.
Topic:
Debt, Development, Infrastructure, Trade, and Dependency
Political Geography:
Africa, China, and Asia

9. The Impact of Purges in the Chinese Army on Its Effectiveness

Author:
Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:
Xi Jinping, as the Party’s secretary general, continues to strengthen his personal oversight of the Chinese armed forces, as evidenced by disciplinary actions against Zhang Youxia, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. Combined with the purges that began in 2022, the growing atmosphere of uncertainty, and the increasing pressure to demonstrate loyalty to Xi, this raises the risk that the authorities will misjudge the condition of their armed forces. This may increase the likelihood of escalation, for example, towards Taiwan.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Reform, Xi Jinping, Escalation, Loyalty, and Purge
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

10. Social protection in South Korea: Transition from the developmental to the universal welfare state

Author:
Huck-ju Kwon and Eunju Kim
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United Nations University
Abstract:
South Korea’s social protection system has undergone a profound transformation from a developmental welfare state, in which social protection policies were subordinated to the economic development goal, to a universal welfare state. This study traces this trajectory by examining six key programmes—Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance, National Health Insurance, National Pension, Employment Insurance, the National Basic Livelihood Security Scheme, and the Basic Pension—focusing on their functions, policy design, coverage expansion, and responses to new social risks. Findings show that initial programmes targeted formal-sector workers to support industrialization, but were gradually expanded to encompass broader populations. They were sequentially extended from large enterprises to small firms and then to the general population, with contribution rates increased incrementally to ensure administrative feasibility and fiscal sustainability. Democratization and electoral competition opened policy windows for universalization, while economic crises accelerated programme inclusivity. The analysis reveals that social protection facilitated structural economic transformation while progressively recognizing social rights. However, persistent labour market dualism, population aging, and high elderly poverty underscore the need for recalibrating Korea’s welfare system toward greater inclusivity and sustainability.
Topic:
Development, Welfare, and Social Protection
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea