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81. Transatlantic Policies on China: Is There a Role for Türkiye?

Author:
Sinan Ülgen and Temur Umarov
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Türkiye is an important transatlantic actor in Sino-Western competition. It can add value to Western efforts aimed at synchronizing policies toward a rising China. And yet, at present, Ankara’s policies on China are not harmonized with those of its partners in the West.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Transatlantic Relations, Strategic Competition, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
China, Turkey, Middle East, and Asia

82. Japan’s Aging Society as a Technological Opportunity

Author:
Ken Kushida
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Japan’s extreme demographic aging and shrinking is an economic and societal challenge, but also a technological opportunity for global leadership. Technological trajectories of worker automation and worker skill augmentation within Japan are already being shaped by the country’s demographics. Software, robotics, and other technology deployments are transforming the nature of work in a wide range of sectors in Japan’s economy, and across types of work such as blue-collar, white-collar, agriculture, manufacturing, and services. Specific ways in which Japan’s demographics shape technological trajectories include market opportunities, acute labor shortages, and favorable political and regulatory dynamics. The private sector is driving technology deployments in industrial sectors hit hard by Japan’s aging population, ranging from construction and transportation to medical care and finance, with strong government support in each of the domains. Demographically driven technological trajectories play to Japan’s strengths in implementing, deploying, and improving technologies rather than generating breakthrough innovations. Japan’s demographically driven technological trajectory can be an important platform for international technology cooperation, fitting with the top U.S.-Japanese political leadership agreements on fostering strong innovation and technology collaboration ties. Japan’s start-up ecosystem, often in partnership with large incumbent firms, will be critical in deploying new technologies by defining new markets and providing new offerings. An effective analysis goes beyond broad demographic numbers to delve into specific pain points of particular segments of society to better capture their situations and roles in shaping market opportunities that drive technological adoption. This introductory paper: (1) defines key analytical concepts; (2) surveys some of Japan’s key demographic shifts; and (3) highlights cases from agriculture, construction, transportation, healthcare, eldercare, land, and housing ownership.
Topic:
Demographics, Science and Technology, Innovation, and Aging
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

83. Negotiating the India-China Standoff: 2020–2024

Author:
Saheb Singh Chadha
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
India and China have been engaged in a standoff at their border in eastern Ladakh since April–May 2020. Over 100,000 troops remain deployed on both sides, and rebuilding political trust will take time.
Topic:
Security, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, and Asia

84. Non-meritocrats or choice-reluctant meritocrats? A redistribution experiment in China and France

Author:
Margot Belguise, Yuchen Huang, and Zhexun Mo
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP)
Abstract:
Recent experimental evidence contends that meritocratic ideals are mainly a Western phenomenon. Intriguingly, the Chinese public does not appear to differentiate between merit- and luck-based inequalities, despite China’s historical emphasis on meritocratic institutions. We propose that this phenomenon could be due to the Chinese public’s greater reluctance to make an active choice in realstake redistribution decisions. We run an incentivized redistribution experiment with elite university students in China and France, by varying the initial split of payoffs between two real-life workers to redistribute from. We show that, compared to French respondents, Chinese respondents consistently and significantly choose more non-redistribution across both highly unequal and relatively equal status quo scenarios. Additionally, we also find that Chinese respondents do differentiate between merit- and luck-based inequalities, and do not redistribute less than the French, excluding the individuals who engage in non-redistribution choices. Chinese respondents are also as reactive as the French towards scenarios with noisy signals of merit, such as inequalities of opportunities. Ultimately, we contend that the reluctance to make an active choice is indicative of diminished political agency to act upon redistribution decisions with real-life stakes, rather than apathy, inattention, having benefited from the status quo in Chinese society or libertarian preferences among the Chinese. Notably, our findings show that Chinese individuals’ reluctance to make a choice is particularly pronounced among those from families of working-class and farming backgrounds, while it is absent among individuals whose families have closer ties to the private sector.
Topic:
Labor Issues, Class, Institutions, Redistribution, and Meritocracy
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and France

85. Bureaucrats and the Korean export miracle

Author:
Philipp Barteska and Jay Euijung Lee
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP)
Abstract:
Does bureaucratic capacity matter for growth miracles? This paper investigates how much the effect of an industrial policy during South Korea’s growth miracle depends on bureaucratic capacity. We find that the bureaucrats implementing the policy greatly change its effect on exports – the variable targeted by the policy and key to South Korea’s economic success. These bureaucrats manage offices that promote exports on appointments to 87 countries between 1965, when South Korea was one of the world’s poorest countries, and 2000. We exploit the three-yearly rotation of managers between countries to show that increasing bureaucrat ability by one standard deviation causes a 37% increase in exports. This effect is comparable to the policy’s average effect – estimated from office openings. Hence, this industrial policy entirely depends on bureaucratic capacity: It has no effect when implemented by a bureaucrat one standard deviation below average. We find evidence for a key mechanism via which better bureaucrats increase exports: transmitting information about market conditions. Under better bureaucrats South Korean exports increase more strongly with a country’s import demand – taking advantage of this demand. Finally, we investigate whether bureaucrat experience increases South Korean exports. We isolate quasi-random variation in experience: a product’s import demand growth during the bureaucrat’s first appointment. Such experience increases exports in subsequent appointments of this bureaucrat. This highlights that organizational capacity grows endogenously, implying a novel channel for path dependence in organizational capacity.
Topic:
Exports, Economic Development, and Bureaucracy
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

86. Migration or stagnation: Aging and economic growth in Korea today, the world tomorrow

Author:
Michael A. Clemens
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
South Korea faces an unprecedented economic crisis driven by rapid population aging, as it approaches a future of negative economic growth. This paper examines the full range of possible policy responses with the potential to restore dynamism to the Korean economy. Contrary to many prior analyses, I find that enhanced labor migration to Korea is necessary, sufficient, and feasible. Migration is necessary because in the best forecasts we have, no other class of policy has the quantitative potential to meaningfully offset aging. Migration is sufficient because enhanced temporary labor migration by itself would offset most of Korea’s demographic drag on growth over the next 50 years. And migration is feasible because the levels of migration and timescale of the transition would resemble that already carried out by Malaysia and Australia. Many advanced economies will follow in Korea’s demographic footsteps in decades to come, and have much to learn from the decisions that the Korean government makes now.
Topic:
Demographics, Migration, Labor Issues, Economic Growth, and Aging
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

87. Korea’s Trade Policy Agenda in an Uncertain US Trade Environment

Author:
Alan Wm. Wolff and Han-Koo Yeo
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
This paper addresses how South Korea, a mid-sized ally of the United States, can best navigate clearly identifiable risks, crafting a positive and pragmatic international trade policy. Korea is heavily dependent on the United States for its defense. It is clear that US trade policy has recently shifted toward being more self-centered, a policy unlikely to be reversed any time soon. The United States is on the threshold of a presidential election that makes it unpredictable in its trade policy, which may become directly harmful to Korean economic prospects if there is a change in leadership. US trade policies under President Joseph Biden have been primarily aimed at onshoring rather than friendshoring, but they have not been actively hostile or threatening. If there is a second Donald Trump term, Korea might not be excluded from substantially increased tariffs—whether for protection, revenue, or leverage—despite the Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). At the same time that Korea is watchful of developments in the United States, it needs to pay attention to its neighbor, China, the world’s largest trading economy, a country that has practiced trade coercion against it. South Korea is the world’s 13th-largest economy. It is a strong proponent and practitioner of free trade. It is one of a group of midsize free market democracies aligned with the United States that, ranked by GDP, includes Japan, Germany, and France (and therefore with others, the European Union), the United Kingdom, Canada, Italy, and Australia. The future of the global trading system that the market-oriented countries wish to enjoy is increasingly dependent on this group of midsize economies and the European Union. Korea has thrived in large part through its open trade policy that has made it the country with the world’s greatest number of free trade agreements (including with both the United States and China, as well as with the European Union). It shares strong economic security interests with the United States: It has its own K-CHIPS Act, which provides substantial subsidies to its semiconductor industry. It invests very substantially in critical minerals and batteries, as does the United States. Korea also collaborates with the United States in the production of vaccines to meet future pandemics.
Topic:
Climate Change, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Investment, Trade, Economic Security, Semiconductors, Steel, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

88. The International Economic Implications of a Second Trump Presidency

Author:
Warwick McKibbin, Megan Hogan, and Marcus Noland
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
The paper explores policies promoted by former president and now candidate Donald Trump that would potentially affect the global economy. We focus on immigration policy, trade, and erosion of the Federal Reserve Board’s political independence. Each policy has differing macroeconomic and sectoral impacts on the United States and other countries. We find, however, that all the policies examined cause a decline in US production and employment, especially in trade-exposed sectors such as manufacturing and agriculture, as well as higher US inflation. The trade policies do little to improve the US trade balance; however, the erosion of Fed independence does so by causing capital outflows, a significant depreciation of the dollar, and higher unemployment toward the end of 2028, which worsen American living standards. Scenarios combining individual policies show that the changes cause a large inflationary impulse and a significant loss of employment (particularly in manufacturing and agriculture) in the US economy. The negative impact of a contraction in global trade is significant for countries that trade with the United States the most. The adverse effect is offset for some economies by the positive effects of an inflow of foreign capital that would otherwise have gone into the US economy. An online dashboard contains a full set of macroeconomic and sectoral results for all countries.
Topic:
Migration, Central Bank, Trade Policy, Donald Trump, and Deportation
Political Geography:
China and Asia

89. China’s influence at the United Nations: words and deeds

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero, Théo Storella, and Pauline Weil
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
We investigate China’s influence at the United Nations by focusing on the promotion of its narratives (words) and its voting behaviour (deeds). For the former, we assess the extent to which China’s global initiatives have become embedded in UN discourse compared to Western initiatives. For the latter, we assess the degree to which countries, regions and voting coalitions align their UN General Assembly votes with China compared to the US. When it comes to words, China’s global initiatives are sometimes louder than the West’s. More specifically, the Belt and Road Initiative has had a much greater impact on UN discourse than any Western initiative. Other Chinese global initiatives do not clearly stand out from those of the West, with the Global Compact for Migration mentioned more frequently at the UN than any Chinese initiative other than the BRI. We also find that Chinese initiatives are more self-referential. Thematically, both Chinese and Western initiatives are very focused on security as well as aid and human rights. Moving to voting patterns, countries’ income levels are a key determinant of alignment in voting. Poorer countries are much more aligned with China than with the US. North America and the European Union, in that order, are generally more aligned with the US than with China and these trends are much more stable than one could expect given China’s growing economic influence.
Topic:
United Nations, Bilateral Relations, Governance, European Union, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

90. Xi Transforms the Party: Senior Cadre Selection in a New Era

Author:
Mark Stokes, Eric Lee, Cathy Fang, and Marek Haar
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
Due to the challenges associated with the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) rise, anticipating who will lead the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is a major concern. General Secretary Xi Jinping has reshuffled the deck around norms for succession. With old patterns woven out of the CCP’s banner, studying the new framework for promoting new senior leaders and the sub-factional politics lying underneath will aid in identifying who will lead the CCP and govern the PRC in the future. To that end, this report offers a summary of the leader promotion process within the CCP, a guide to identifying rising CCP leadership in the future, and a map of the current six sub-factions competing for Xi’s favor.
Topic:
Domestic Politics, Xi Jinping, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

91. The East China Sea Dispute: China’s and Japan’s Assertiveness from Mao to Xi

Author:
Andrew Chubb
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Xi Jinping came to power in 2012 amid a serious foreign policy crisis following the Japanese government’s nationalization of three of the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The move was aimed at blocking Shintaro Ishihara’s Tokyo municipal government from purchasing the uninhabited islands from their private owner and constructing a harbor and other infrastructure that would further inflame tensions. Although Beijing understood Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda’s goal was to prevent an even worse crisis, it nonetheless responded by sending maritime law enforcement ships into the Japanese-controlled territorial seas around the islands, backed by a furious propaganda wave that unleashed violent anti-Japanese protests in dozens of cities across China. The result was a fundamental change in the sovereign territorial seas around the islands from Japanese control to overlapping control — a situation that continues to bring ships and aircraft from both sides into close contact on the water, increasing the risk of an accident that could bring about armed conflict. How much of China’s behavior in the East China Sea is attributable to Xi Jinping? To what extent have Sino-Japanese action-reaction dynamics been at play versus longer-term processes of the shifting distribution of power in the region or changes in domestic politics? How important have the hydrocarbon deposits that originally touched off the dispute been, and to what extent have the area’s fisheries — or fisherfolk — been protagonists? This paper assesses these questions using a systematic time-series dataset of both sides’ patterns of behavior over the long term, from its origins in the early 1970s to the Xi era. It visualizes the historical trajectory of the Sino-Japanese disputes in the East China Sea, charting each side’s key moves across domestic, diplomatic, and physical domains and the balance between military, administrative, political, and resource motivations behind them. Quantifying the changes in China’s and Japan’s behaviors in the disputed area from 1970 to 2015 reveals six key dynamics: The East China Sea dispute began over oil and gas resources but switched toward a contest for military and administrative control as China rapidly expanded its naval and coast guard presence in the mid-2000s. China’s policy was already trending in an increasingly assertive direction well before Xi took power. China’s gray-zone assertiveness dates back to the mid-1990s, while coercive methods started in the mid-2000s. The key change Xi has overseen is China’s increasingly militarized — but also regularized — presence in the disputed area. Japanese actors have triggered several acute periods of tension with provocative moves, but China has driven the long-term arc, with its shifts from “shelving” the dispute in the 1970s to greater assertiveness from the mid-1990s to regular coercion from the mid-2000s. The two significant periods of non–Liberal Democratic Party rule in Japan have both preceded surges of Chinese assertiveness followed by Japanese pushback, raising questions about China’s calculations regarding domestic politics in Japan. Despite several high-profile propaganda campaigns and diplomatic blitzes, most of China’s moves have been in the physical domain on the water, while Japan has focused on diplomacy and domestic administrative moves. Xi’s precise role in the escalation around the disputed islands in September 2012 remains unclear, but his centralization of power since the 18th Party Congress has coincided with a regularization of China’s assertive behaviors. A less powerful leader might, like Xi’s predecessors, find it more difficult to prevent substate actors from taking destabilizing actions in the area, as occurred several times in the 2000s.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, History, Maritime, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, and East China

92. Who Briefs Xi Jinping? How Politburo Study Sessions Help to Decode Chinese Politics

Author:
Neil Thomas and Feifei Hung
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
China’s politicians are lifelong learners. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) calls itself a “learning party” (xuexi dang) because its members participate in regular study sessions. These are designed to enhance organizational discipline and to instill practical knowledge. Even the Party’s top leaders, the 24 members of the Politburo, dedicate a half-day almost every month to the “collective study” (jiti xuexi) of a topic chosen by General Secretary Xi Jinping. This practice is unusual compared to most Western governments. It is rare that a U.S. president would convene their cabinet for lectures on employment policy, political theory, or World Trade Organization reform — all recent topics of Politburo study sessions. So why do Party leaders spend so much of their limited time doing collective study? What do they study? Who briefs from? How can we use this information to better understand Beijing? This paper first explains the nature and importance of Politburo study sessions. It then uses a unique dataset to analyze changes in topics and briefers over time before presenting case studies of how sessions focused on technology and foreign affairs relate to policymaking. The conclusion summarizes our findings about the value and limits of using these sessions to decode Chinese politics.
Topic:
Domestic Politics, Xi Jinping, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

93. The United Front, Comprehensive Integration, and China’s Nonmilitary Strategy Toward Taiwan

Author:
Guoguang Wu
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Global opinions have increasingly considered the potential danger of war in the Taiwan Strait should China take military action to invade the island in pursuit of its plan for “full unification of the motherland.” These are legitimate concerns, as such danger increases with the growth of both China’s national power and Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s global ambitions. Military action should not, however, devalue Beijing’s military-backed, nonmilitary strategy to reclaim Taiwan. What, in practice, is the specific purpose of Beijing’s nonmilitary strategy? How do nonmilitary and military means mutually support each other in China’s overall reunification strategy? As the Taiwan populace seemingly drifts further away in terms of a shared Chinese identity and rejects future unification, why does China still deem nonmilitary means optimal for dealing with Taiwan? This paper addresses these questions by first discussing how China’s Taiwan strategy consists of both military and nonmilitary elements, highlighting how Xi has upgraded the latter by “putting the people at the center” of “peaceful reunification” while simultaneously preparing military action and how the nonmilitary strategy follows the spirit of the united front political strategy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It then investigates one of China’s latest nonmilitary initiatives to deal with Taiwan, namely, the “cross-strait integrated development demonstration zone” in Fujian, and analyzes the strategic implications of those various measures for promoting “comprehensive integration.”1 The third section explores how the CCP defines the situation in the Taiwan Strait as a continuation of civil war and, accordingly, employs both military and nonmilitary strategies for winning said war. By considering how the two strategies complement one another, it also explains why CCP leadership has strengthened nonmilitary means, such as integration, despite prior ineffectiveness. The paper concludes that nonmilitary measures will not ultimately lead to “peaceful reunification” but are instead intended to mask Beijing’s overall capabilities to deal with Taiwan.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, Regional Integration, Economic Development, and Identity
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

94. Ishiba Takes the Helm: A New Kind of Leader for Japan

Author:
Asia Sociey
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP’s) leadership elections are normally staid and predictable affairs. But scandals in the LDP and former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s radical decision to dissolve powerful party factions disrupted business as usual. In an unusually dramatic election on September 27, Shigeru Ishiba emerged as the new party president — and automatically became prime minister of Japan. Ishiba, a long-standing fixture in the ruling LDP who had run for the position four times before, surprised many observers by defeating eight other contenders including powerful party veterans, popular “young Turks,” and a prominent female lawmaker. He immediately called for a general election on October 27 as an opportunity to secure a mandate for his policies during the often short-lived “honeymoon” for a new prime minister. For the United States, Ishiba brings a strong commitment to the security relationship, albeit from an approach and perspective that have the potential to disrupt the current progress in modernizing the alliance. He has advocated for a more equal partnership and for revisiting the foundational documents that govern the status of the U.S. troops stationed throughout the archipelago. It is an open question whether that element of his campaign rhetoric will translate into governing policies; indeed, he has already appeared to walk back some of his positions, including calling for an “Asian NATO” ahead of the general election. With the U.S.-Japan alliance at the center of many regional security arrangements, any significant change to the bilateral relationship could alter the stability and order of the broader Indo-Pacific.
Topic:
Elections, Leadership, Domestic Politics, Prime Minister, and Fumio Kishida
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

95. On U.S.-China Relations & Climate

Author:
Kate Logan and Li Shuo
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Climate change, and how to confront it, is one of the most politicized issues in the American political system. Regardless of how U.S. politicians talk about climate change, its effects are increasingly dire for Americans and the entire world — including many vulnerable populations in Asia. With the United States and China accounting for around 40% of annual greenhouse gas emissions globally, the speed and scale of their collective emissions reductions will largely determine the future magnitude of economic and human damages. Moreover, how the United States and China implement climate policy and interact will also shape geopolitics, especially for Asian economies that depend on fossil fuels or those rich in minerals and technologies needed for clean energy. The nature of climate change as a common global challenge previously enabled the United States and China to forge a uniquely cooperative relationship on the issue. U.S.-China joint action famously laid the groundwork for the landmark Paris Agreement in 2015, while tempering bilateral tensions. Former President Donald Trump’s subsequent withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, however, irrevocably damaged this cooperation, along with global trust in the United States as a climate leader. And the recent emergence of U.S. economic competitiveness with China as a rare area of bipartisan consensus has further complicated the issue, as U.S. policy responses aiming to limit China’s global dominance in essential clean technologies including solar panels and electric vehicles are seen as counterproductive to the global clean energy transition. Despite this, President Joe Biden and his vice president, Kamala Harris — now the Democratic presidential nominee — have supported climate cooperation as a critical area of U.S.-China convergence. This is the backdrop against which this year’s U.S. election is playing out: two parties that largely align in their view of China as the top U.S. competitor, but who hold starkly polarized views toward climate policy as an economic enabler, in Harris’s and the Democrats’ case, or as a barrier to growth that must be dismantled, as Trump and his supporters contend. The stakes are high — for U.S.-China relations, as well as for the health and safety of our planet.
Topic:
Climate Change, Politics, Bilateral Relations, Carbon Emissions, and Vulnerability
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

96. On Science & Tech Diplomacy

Author:
Akshay Mathur and Helen Zhang
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
A new era of intergovernmental science and technology cooperation has emerged, driven by the United States and its Asian partners in the Indo-Pacific such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, Singapore, and India. As science and technology take primacy in the modern economy, countries are introducing laws and policies to build new sovereign capabilities, protect sensitive innovations and industries, and govern cross-border cooperation. This essay examines the key trends we have observed in the United States and select Asian countries in the Indo-Pacific, the nature of agreements being inked, and the likely direction of cooperation under the next U.S. administration.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, Science and Technology, and Trade
Political Geography:
Japan, India, Taiwan, Asia, South Korea, Australia, Singapore, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

97. On U.S.-China Relations & Political Economy

Author:
Lizzi C. Lee and Neil Thomas
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Communist leaders may not like electoral democracy but there are few events they will pay more attention to this year than the U.S. presidential election on November 5. General Secretary Xi Jinping says U.S.-China ties are “the most important bilateral relationship in the world,” and Chinese officials, scholars, and netizens are anxious to glean insights about Republican Party candidate and former President Donald Trump and Democratic Party candidate and current Vice President Kamala Harris. For Beijing, the stakes are high. The presidencies of first Trump and now Joe Biden saw the United States adopt a posture of “strategic competition” toward China that has significantly impacted the ruling Chinese Communist Party’s external environment and domestic priorities. Trump imposed tariffs on most Chinese imports to the United States, which Biden ramped up in key industries including electric vehicles. Biden introduced extensive export controls aimed at curbing China’s chip industry, which could be expanded to other sectors. Trump and Biden have both elevated U.S. support for Taiwan; strengthened restrictions on inbound and outbound investment with China; and sanctioned hundreds of Chinese government agencies, state-owned enterprises, private firms, and individuals. Biden has further prioritized working with U.S. allies and partners on economic, political, and security policies to blunt China’s influence. Both countries seek “guardrails” against crisis and conflict, but bilateral diplomacy is increasingly fraught and multilateral cooperation on global challenges is increasingly difficult. This essay analyzes the China policies of both candidates, focusing on the diplomatic and economic dimensions of U.S.-China relations, highlighting how a second Trump administration could deliver acute shocks but potential openings while Harris would likely bring continuity with Biden’s approach. It argues that Beijing has no clear preference between the two candidates. Therefore, neither election outcome would fundamentally change China’s international strategy, although the result would produce different tactical responses. It concludes with recommendations for how both Washington and Beijing can safeguard global stability while preserving national sovereignty regardless of who succeeds Biden.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Political Economy, Sovereignty, Bilateral Relations, Elections, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

98. On Alliances in Northeast Asia

Author:
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Duyeon Kim, and Yuka Koshino
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Over the past two years, delegations to Washington from Japan and South Korea have one predominant question for their interlocutors: What would a Trump 2.0 administration mean for their countries and for U.S. global leadership more broadly? Both Asian capitals appreciate the upgrades to their bilateral pacts with the United States under the Biden administration’s alliance-centric foreign policy, and express anxiety about the possible return of Trump as commander-in-chief. Even before his election in 2016, Trump had expressed open disdain for U.S. alliances and that skepticism could be amplified in a second term by his “America First” approach. With Kamala Harris now at the top of the Democratic ticket, Washington analysts assume broad continuity in her foreign policy approach, although nuances may yet emerge. But while a Harris election and a second Trump presidency contrast sharply on policy and style, the views from Seoul and Tokyo point to enduring elements of American foreign policy that are likely in either outcome. In many ways, Trump and Harris share an approach to U.S. economic engagement in the Indo-Pacific. Upon taking office in 2017, Trump fractured the Obama administration’s core economic pillar of the so-called rebalance to Asia by withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. This divorce drew dismay particularly from Japan; Tokyo had seen the 12-nation free trade pact as its primary tool to blunt China’s rising economic sway over the region and to reinforce its Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy (FOIP). The Biden-Harris administration has similarly expressed little enthusiasm for re-joining the reformed version that Japan salvaged after the U.S. withdrawal, and its signature regional economic policy, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IFEP) lacks the market access that the region’s economies crave. Japan and South Korea also had misgivings about the passage of domestic economic legislation such as the Inflation Reduction Act that would have penalized South Korean and Japanese investment in the United States. “Friend-shoring” rhetoric aside, both Seoul and Tokyo see either leader forging an industrial policy that defaults to protectionist trade practices. Both Japan and South Korea are also concerned about diminishing American leadership of the world and the ascendance of illiberal, authoritarian blocs. Biden and the Democratic Party have generally promoted U.S. alliances as underpinning a world order that promotes stability and the rule of law. Yet during Biden’s presidency, wars in Europe and the Middle East have flared, threatening to distract Washington from its Indo-Pacific priorities and driving deep divisions in public opinion both domestically and internationally. Trump and his Republican colleagues, on the other hand, mostly disapprove of U.S. military involvement in international conflict and fidelity to international alliances, particularly NATO. A Trump administration could undermine the rules-based system by brokering deals with authoritarian leaders, neglecting multilateral institutions that seek to quell conflict, and reinforcing the rising ideological isolationism in U.S. politics. Trump and Biden policy convergences aside, Seoul’s and Tokyo’s experiences with each president are starkly different. A Trump presidency would almost certainly present deeper challenges to each country and disrupt the web of security partnerships that both countries view as broadly stabilizing. How Trump would approach the China challenge is likely to be the central question: Will he be relatively supportive of U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific if he sees them as amplifying U.S. power and deterrence? Or will he seek to cut his own deals with Beijing that excludes allies’ interests? Would he demand multifold increases in the burden-sharing agreements supporting the U.S. military presence in the region that allies would resist? A separate set of questions arises considering a Democratic victory. Would Harris opt to continue Biden’s approach to alliances? Would her administration see the Indo-Pacific as equally important to the trans-Atlantic partnership? Would Harris’s foreign policy team have a different view of how to handle strategic competition with China? All of these yet-unanswered questions loom large for Japan and South Korea over the coming months.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, Alliance, Donald Trump, Strategic Competition, Presidential Elections, and Kamala Harris
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, and Northeast Asia

99. On U.S.-China Relations & Security

Author:
Lyle Morris and Wu Xinbo
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
In the run-up to the November 2024 U.S. presidential election, national security issues are playing a key role in the campaigns of the two candidates — Democrat Kamala Harris and Republican Donald Trump. In particular, since China has been identified as the United States biggest “strategic competitor” during both the Trump and Biden administrations, a key question is how will the trajectory of U.S.-China relations will be affected under a Harris or a Trump presidency? This article explores how both candidates will approach China if elected president. In particular, both authors will present U.S. and Chinese perspectives of how both candidates will influence bilateral relations, with a particular focus on national security. The central question to be considered is this: Will there be any discernible changes to U.S. policy towards China under a Harris or a Trump presidency? If so, what changes might be expected? Both authors agree that there will be few differences at the macro level in the China strategies of Harris and Trump: “strategic competition” has become deeply ingrained as the guiding principle within the U.S. national strategy towards China. Furthermore, national security has seeped into U.S. trade and investment policy toward China in recent years, to include greater U.S. export controls on high-technology commodities. Thus, it is likely that both candidates will continue policies that nest national security considerations within an overall economic approach toward China. However, we may expect tactical differences in both candidates’ policies regarding trade and U.S. approaches to alliances. Harris will likely continue policies under a Biden administration that prioritize the central role that U.S. alliances in Asia and Europe play in the world. While Trump will likely inject uncertainty into the role of alliances within strategic competition with China. He will also likely adopt a much more aggressive stance on trade, to possibly include heavy tariffs on China, that may destabilize an already unstable bilateral relationship.
Topic:
Security, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, and Presidential Elections
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

100. On the Road of Excess: How Startups Are Driving China’s Electric Vehicle Boom

Author:
G. A. Donovan
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
A complex mix of ingredients came together to create China's electric vehicle boom, but government subsidies alone cannot explain the emergence of the industry's sophisticated ecosystem and vast manufacturing capacity. An alternate explanation is that Chinese carmakers could scale up and rapidly expand production of electric vehicles because they have access to the deep pools of flexible financing provided by capital markets, sovereign wealth funds, and private equity and venture capital investors, both in China and from overseas. China’s electric vehicle startups have raised billions from investors eager to finance potential unicorns in innovative, environmentally friendly industries. Taking inspiration from Tesla, Google, and other Silicon Valley pioneers, the founders of these startups have relied on rising valuations to attract new investment to sustain their operations despite years of losses. However, many of China's electric vehicle startups now find it hard to raise funds as their valuations have plummeted, and the market forces that drove the industry's breakneck growth may now be slowing it down.
Topic:
Investment, Manufacturing, Subsidies, and Electric Vehicles
Political Geography:
China and Asia