On the following pages, the reader will find a comprehensive summary of the 1993 International Negotiation Network (INN) Consultation, "Resolving Intra-National Conflicts: A Strengthened Role for Intergovernmental Organizations."
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, International Cooperation, and United Nations
This report summarizes the papers and discussions from a conference held at the Kellogg Institute on "The State, Markets and Development." The first section addresses theoretical issues while the second presents the case studies discussed at the conference.
Topic:
Development, Markets, Economic Growth, and State
Political Geography:
Asia, South America, Central America, and Caribbean
This paper briefly reviews and critically assesses Juan Linz's arguments about the perils of presidentialism. We largely agree with Linz that presidentialism as it is normally practiced is less likely than parliamentarism to sustain democratic government. Nevertheless, we introduce a number of caveats into the argument. Although we agree with most aspects of Linz's four major criticisms of presidentialism, we disagree with one of them: we argue that presidentialism is less oriented towards winner-takes-all results than Westminster parliamentary systems. We also claim that presidentialism has some advantages that partially offset its drawbacks. These advantages can be maximized by paying careful attention to differences among presidential systems; we build a case for presidencies with weak legislative powers. Presidentialism also appears to be more viable with parties that are at least moderately disciplined, and it is especially problematic with highly fragmented multiparty systems and with congressional elections that occur more frequently than presidential elections. Finally, we argue that switching from presidentialism to parliamentarism could exacerbate problems of governability in countries with very undisciplined parties. All of these points suggest that even if Linz is largely correct in his argument that parliamentary government is more conducive to stable democracy, a great deal rests on what kind of parliamentarism and what kind of presidentialism are implemented.
Topic:
Government, Governance, Democracy, and Presidential Elections
The meeting in Alma Ata of the Commission on Radio and Television Policy marked a new and important stage in the collaboration between the United States and the former Soviet Union. I was proud to serve as co-chairman, together with Eduard Sagalaev. The Commission now has been enlarged to include the major television stations of newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union and the head of an organization of independent stations. It is a unique body.
This report is a summary of the inaugural consultation of the International Negotiation Network (INN), held at The Carter Center of Emory University CCEU), in Atlanta, Georgia, January 14-17, 1992. The consultation brought together over 200 invited guests from 40 countries and more than 150 organizations or governments. It was made possible through the generous support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, and shaped in part by that foundation's president, David Hamburg, who has served as one of the INN's advisors.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Human Rights, and Sovereignty
The first meeting of the Commission on Television Policy culminated a project that began with basic research on the impact of television on the electoral process in many countries. From this research, a Working Group developed a document presenting a wide range of options and trade-offs in broadcast practice and rules worldwide. With this reference document, Commissioners from the United States and the independent states from the territory of the former Soviet Union began their discussions at The Carter Center on November 15 and 16, 1991.
Germany's foreign economic policy places enormous weight on formal European institutions. In contrast, Japan has not had an institutionalist orientation in regard to its East Asian neighbors. This paper addresses the question of why Germany and Japan differ so greatly on this issue of regional economi. institutions. It suggests that the differences observed in German and Japanese interests in regard to such arrangements constitute a puzzle if they are examined from the perspective of liberal ideas about the functional bases of international collaboration, or from the viewpoint of realist propositions about hegemony and cooperation and about the impact of polarity on state preferences. The paper also puts forward a realist-inspired analysis (focusing on American power in the post-Cold War era as well as American national strategy in the early years of that conflict) that might help account for the strong German bias in favor of regional economic institutions and the equally pronounced Japanese aversion to date for such arrangements.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cold War, and International Organization
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, America, Europe, Israel, East Asia, Asia, and Germany