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1. India's G20 Presidency: Opportunity to Resume Engagement in the Arctic

Author:
Anurag Bisen
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The Arctic lies at the intersection of several issues with global consequences such as climate change, increased accessibility to and availability of resources, and global strategic contestation that have made the region increasingly relevant to the world. Temperatures in the Arctic continue to rise at four times the global annual average, driving many of the changes under way there, most prominently sea-level rise and the thawing of permafrost, which impact both local ecosystems and the global climate system. International scientific cooperation and data monitoring and sharing are crucial to understanding the impact of climate change, counteracting its negative effects, and enhancing living conditions and economic activity. Apart from a few limited pockets of cooperation that still exist, cooperation between Russia and the West with regard to the Arctic has largely been put on hold since the start of the conflict in Ukraine. The current absence of research and data sharing among scientists is threatening to jeopardise scientists’ understanding of the warming trends in the Arctic, exacerbating the environmental emergency the region in particular is facing. One of the few channels that still exists for constructive dialogue on a range of Arctic-related issues is the GCSP’s “‘High North Talks”’, through which discreet exchanges on various important issues continue. Among other things, the G20 agenda includes climate change, sustainable development and the environment, all of which are under threat due to the cessation of Artic-related scientific engagement. The G20 also represents a rare platform where engagement between Russia and the West has not yet ceased. The suspension of dialogue and scientific exchange vis-à-vis the Arctic is driven by a deep distrust that needs to be overcome by an interlocutor that is acceptable to all stakeholders. India's theme for its G20 presidency resonates strongly with the Arctic and its impact on the world. The resumption of Arctic-related scientific exchange is an easy deliverable with global benefits that India, which has the necessary legitimacy, credibility and relevance, should use its G20 presidency to strive for.
Topic:
Climate Change, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Science and Technology, G20, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
India, Asia, and Arctic

2. China’s Provinces as Global Actors: Evidence from China-Africa Relations

Author:
Charlotte Lenz
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
With the launch in the early 2000s of China’s ‘Going Global’ Strategy, Chinese provinces became one group of actors participating in China’s South-South relations. In this Strategic Update, Charlotte Lenz investigates the role of Chinese provinces as foreign policy actors and explains their internationalisation strategies, challenging the prevalent perception of China as a unitary actor on the world stage. Drawing on evidence from Africa-China relations, the report identifies two strategies employed by Chinese provinces in pursuit of their foreign policy interests: (1) Formal and informal “twinning” as a collaborative model between central and local actors, wherein central actors design policies and provincial governments execute projects; (2) and “clustering” according to a sectoral logic of investment and diplomacy in which a certain Chinese province engages a certain foreign country. Despite ongoing bureaucratic centralisation under Xi Jinping, provinces continue to pursue their own internationalisation strategies to help meet local economic and employment targets. Understanding their agency, interests and limitations is thus key to deriving a better understanding of China’s evolving global presence.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Investment, and Internationalization
Political Geography:
Africa, China, and Asia

3. Centrality and Community: ASEAN in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership

Author:
Soo Yeon Kim
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
This paper examines the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) role in the formation of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement. The RCEP project proceeded as trade governance has shifted from the multilateral trade regime under the World Trade Organization to free trade agreements and where the geopolitics of Asia has cast a shadow on the progress of regional integration efforts. The analysis in this paper focuses on ASEAN centrality, both as a concept and practice, in influencing the launch and progress of RCEP. Conceptually, ASEAN centrality is about the capacity of the 10-member group to help launch negotiations for the RCEP agreement and to shape its provisions for governing trade. In practice, the RCEP agreement consolidates and significantly unravels the numerous overlapping trade agreements between ASEAN, 38 in all between individual ASEAN members and its five RCEP partners, Australia, China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand. The paper also examines the relationship between the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and RCEP. RCEP provides for further tariff liberalisation between ASEAN members and its five RCEP partners and thus expands the zone of preferential treatment for goods exported from ASEAN and other RCEP members. RCEP also consolidates rules of origin requirements under one agreement, providing for diagonal cumulation and common rules of cumulation for agreement partners. The RCEP provisions can greatly facilitate production and trade along regional supply chains, thus accelerating the progress of the AEC as a single market and production base. Moving forwards, RCEP and ASEAN’s place in it, is likely to be shaped by challenges and opportunities from the Comprehensive and Progressive Transpacific Partnership and the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) initiative. The ASEAN members with overlapping membership in the IPEF and RCEP will be pivotal in determining areas of cooperation. Regional integration will thus continue to be shaped by ASEAN centrality, and its progress will shape the ASEAN community.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, International Trade and Finance, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Asia and ASEAN

4. Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership: Economic Backgrounds of ASEAN and Its Dialogue Partners

Author:
Keita Oikawa, Fusanori Iwasaki, and Shujiro Urata
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
We overview the economic backgrounds of the countries participating in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations and two Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Dialogue Partners – the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) – to understand their economic relationships before the signing of the RCEP and their economic interests in the RCEP. We discover that the 16 countries participating in RCEP negotiations vary in terms of economic size, income level, growth pattern, share of trade in the economy, and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. Additionally, both lower- and higher-income ASEAN Member States (AMS) have received a large amount of FDI, in contrast to Japan and the Republic of Korea (henceforth, Korea), which have seen more FDI outflows from their countries than inflows. In terms of bilateral FDI inflows and outflows, as a centre for regional FDI, Singapore attracts FDI from developed countries (including the US and the EU) and reinvests it in India and other AMS. As an FDI hub, Singapore promotes liberalised regional markets to attract advanced country investors. By examining bilateral trade relationships, we find that as the centre of manufacturing in the world, ASEAN and China have participated in international production networks that also include Japan and Korea since 2000. Japan and Korea have maintained competitiveness in intermediate goods in the region’s production networks, while China notably exports final products to the US and the EU. Amongst the 16 countries participating in RCEP negotiations, India has not had a significant presence in the production networks. Indeed, India has expanded its bilateral trade deficit with China, which probably caused India to withdraw from RCEP negotiations to protect its manufacturing industry. Simulation results of the impacts of the RCEP, using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model (Global Trade Analysis Project model), show that the countries participating in RCEP negotiations – particularly the less developed AMS – would gain greatly from lowering services trade costs and investment liberalisation. India would also gain significantly from the RCEP. In contrast, countries not participating in RCEP negotiations (the US and the EU) would experience small negative impacts of the RCEP through trade diversion effects.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, International Trade and Finance, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Asia and ASEAN

5. How Preferential are RCEP Tariffs?

Author:
Kazunobu Hayakawa
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
This study discusses the extent to which the tariffs provided in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) are preferential. RCEP does not necessarily adopt a common concession rule in tariffs, and the speed and depth of tariff reduction/elimination also differ by country. We show that RCEP tariffs become the best choice in trading some specific products with some specific countries in some specific years. Furthermore, there are some specific cases where the use of RCEP tariffs becomes beneficial even if RCEP tariffs are not lower. Therefore, we demonstrate that RCEP tariffs are beneficial in specific types of supply chains. In short, this study aims to enhance our comprehensive understanding of how preferential RCEP tariffs are compared with other types of available tariffs.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Tariffs, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Asia and ASEAN

6. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement and Europe: Impact and Implications

Author:
Haans Gunther Hilpert
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
In the first 2 decades of the millennium, European Union (EU) trade policy underwent historic changes, amongst them an explicit pivot to Asia. Along with continued firm support of the rules-based World Trade Organization (WTO)-centred multilateral trading system, important new directions in the EU’s trade policy included a turn to competitive bilateralism, a strong focus on values, an ambition to protect and to promote European trade standards as well as the politicisation of trade policy. Asia’s outwards looking economic growth, the increasing trade interdependence in Asia as well as the various bilateral and multilateral trade agreements in the region, notably amongst them the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), attracted the EU’s attention, and have helped cause and drive these changes. There was no particular Asian influence on the EU’s own regionalisation, however. Meanwhile, trade and investment relations between Europe and Asia have intensified greatly over this period. But the EU has been slow and late to formulate a comprehensive strategy for the Indo-Pacific region. In spite of some notable successes, the EU’s trade policy remains fragmented with differentiated approaches for each trading partner. Opinions on the RCEP’s relevance and importance for Europe are divided. RCEP sceptics point to the overall shallow nature of the agreement. RCEP optimists emphasise the future potential of trade and investment integration within the newly established RCEP economic area and warn of the discriminatory effects for Europe’s economy and businesses. So, Europe’s business will have to invest in the new RCEP free trade zone to overcome trade diversion risks and to benefit from the RCEP market integration. More worrying from Europe’s perspective is RCEP’s potentially negative policy impacts: a relative loss in the EU’s trading power, the risk of Europe being sidelined in the make-up of future trade rules, and RCEP’s future impact on rules based multilateralism and the WTO. The EU has various trade policy options with regard to the Indo-Pacific trade area and RCEP in particular. The most promising options include the conclusion of free trade agreements with as many RCEP member countries as possible, with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations as a group (as a region-to-region agreement), with other trading partners (from the Indo-Pacific or from other world regions), or with the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Transpacific Partnership area.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, Regional Cooperation, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Asia and ASEAN

7. The Story of RCEP: History, Negotiations, Structure, and Future Directions

Author:
Aladdin D. Rillo, Anna Maria Rosario D. Robeniol, and Salvador Buban
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
This paper is about the story of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), including the history, dynamics of negotiations, and structure of this multilateral framework. Issues related to ASEAN centrality, sensitivities of negotiations, and other challenges are also highlighted and analysed. Nearly a decade in the making, RCEP represents a significant achievement for the region. As an ASEAN-led process, RCEP supports not only the region’s market integration but as well as ASEAN’s economic relations with the rest of the world, particularly with the 5 RCEP FTA Partners. Beyond the impact of RCEP in supporting the multilateral trading system, it is also intended to address the current challenges in the region, including the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. Thus, the narrative of RCEP provides a comprehensive overview of, and considers the potential implications for, trade in the region; for economic integration, and for the future of trade policy.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, Regional Cooperation, Regionalism, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Asia and ASEAN

8. Comparison of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and Other Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)

Author:
Innwon Park
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
This study evaluates the desirability of RCEP by comparing it with other mega-lateral FTAs. Evaluating the member-specific scale effects of the FTAs, we find that RCEP will generate significantly larger gains compared with the CPTPP. Evaluation of the provision-specific depth effects of RCEP suggests the possibility of positive gains but these gains may not be significant compared with those derived from the CPTPP. The existing CGE model analyses reveal that RCEP will generate greater gains than the CPTPP. RCEP will be more desirable for China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea and the estimated gains for ASEAN will notably increase as the model explicitly specifies the diagonal ROO cumulation scheme. Considering the sequence of implementing FTAs, we find that the CPTPP will generate greater gains for dual members, but the marginal gains enjoyed by RCEP members will not be substantial.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, Free Trade, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Asia and ASEAN

9. Australia’s Interests in East Asia’s Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership

Author:
Shiro Armstrong
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement was seen as important for Australia economically and politically from its inception. RCEP economies account for roughly two-thirds of Australia’s total trade and being part of an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-led initiative that progressed broader East Asian economic integration was consistent with the structure of Australia’s trade interests and with Australia’s support for the multilateral trading system. Australia has a track record of pursuing regional cooperation that supports multilateral trade and for supporting regional integration that is outward oriented. RCEP became more important economically, politically, and strategically throughout its negotiations. It furthered East Asian economic integration that avoided fragmentation but also to entrench the ASEAN Economic Community project. Concluding RCEP took on greater importance and urgency as a ballast against the rising protectionism globally in the latter half of 2010. The ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand Free Trade Area (AANZFTA) included an economic cooperation agenda focused on capacity building that was seen as a success for its members and shaped Australia’s approach and support towards economic cooperation being a pillar of RCEP. Negotiations for RCEP were chaired and led by Indonesia and ASEAN. Australia played a proactive role in pushing for high standards – credible market access commitments and new rules – in negotiations. Australia was one of the RCEP member countries that was also negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in parallel. The interest in the TPP was to keep the United States productively engaged in the region and to further rule-making and liberalisation amongst the TPP members. Having overlapping membership between the TPP and RCEP would mean that there was less chance of significant divergence or inconsistencies between them, although the approach differed. The deterioration of Australia’s economic and political relationship with China makes the RCEP framework potentially more important for facilitating the rebuilding of trust and confidence.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Asia, Australia, and ASEAN

10. Heyday of Asian Regionalism? The Implications of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership for the United States

Author:
Mireya Solís
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
This paper analyses the implications of the entry into force of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) for the United States (US). Traditionally, trade policy has been central to the United States’ aim to position itself as a Pacific power and architect of the evolving regional economic architecture. Over the years, however, US trade strategy has evolved in distinct ways: from an emphasis on bilateral trade negotiations and open regionalism (in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation [APEC] forum) to the pursuit of a high-standard transregional trade agreement (in the Trans-Pacific Partnership [TPP]); and more recently under the Trump administration the pursuit of unilateralism and the resort to tariffs as a form of leverage vis-à-vis competitors (China) and partners (allies in Europe and Asia) alike. When the RCEP negotiations launched, there was little concern in US policymaking circles that the emerging trade grouping in Asia could be disadvantageous for the US given that the TPP project was an effective vehicle to advance the US vision for quality economic integration and to cement its position in the dynamic Asian region. However, the US withdrawal from the TPP and the successful conclusion of the RCEP talks (even with the absence of India) have changed that calculus. This paper identifies three main implications of RCEP for the United States at this juncture: growing marginalisation from intra-Asian trade, diminished rulemaking capabilities as alternative standards disseminate widely in the region, and lessened diplomatic clout as the United States struggles to incorporate trade liberalisation into its Asia policy. A fourth possible consequence – a renewed interest in joining the Comprehensive and Progressive for Trans-Pacific Partnership – has not materialised. Instead, the Biden administration is developing an Indo-Pacific Economic Framework that will not include market access negotiations but will focus instead on issues such as supply chain resilience, infrastructure, and the digital economy. The ability of the United States to offer a compelling plan of economic engagement with the region is in question, raising the spectre of marginalisation whilst Asian regionalism makes strides.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Regionalism, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Asia, North America, United States of America, and ASEAN

11. South Korea's Public Diplomacy during the COVID-19 Pandemic: Seeking Status as an Authority in Global Governance

Author:
Kadir Ayhan
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic caught almost all countries unprepared. Some countries, including South Korea (hereafter Korea), managed to deal with the pandemic relatively more successfully than others and had a proactive global posture from early on, including providing aid, and public diplomacy campaigns. In this paper, I explore Korea’s COVID-19-related public diplomacy activities and its aims. I analyze Korea’s COVID-19 humanitarian aid trends, its policy documents, and the tweets related to the pandemic posted by the country’s official public diplomacy account. I find that the pandemic catalyzed what Korea had already been aiming to do, which is improve its global status to be among top authorities across various issue-areas. Due to the nature of the pandemic, Korea’s public diplomacy has been themed around international cooperation and solidarity. I suggest that Korea should hold onto its international cooperation emphasis on public diplomacy, to form the basis for its status-seeking as an authority in global governance in the post-pandemic era.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Domestic Policy, COVID-19, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and Global Focus

12. Biden, Israel, and China: Making a Difficult Threesome Work

Author:
Steven R. David
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
It is wrong to expect Israel, a middle-level economy, to decouple from China when far wealthier countries (including the United States) show no signs of following suit. Israeli companies should not be subject to restrictions not placed on companies elsewhere, including the United States itself.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Trade and Finance, Hegemony, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Israel, Asia, North America, and United States of America

13. Normalization between Turkey and Israel: Will it Last?

Author:
Gallia Lindenstrauss and Remi Daniel
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
The decision by Turkey and Israel to normalize their relations stems from several processes that brought the Turkish side to push for normalization and the Israeli side to respond affirmatively. Yet alongside the serious motivations of the two sides to continue this process, there are issues that could become obstacles. Among them are the developments between Israel and the Palestinians, Turkey-US relations, the dynamics of Turkey's integration in processes related to the Abraham Accords, and the nature of future Israeli plans regarding gas exports. Nonetheless, coping with challenges related to these issues will be easier with senior diplomatic representation present in both countries.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Normalization, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, and Asia

14. China below the Radar: Israel-US Strategic Dialogue on Technology

Author:
Assaf Orion and Shira Efron
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
The statements issued by President Biden during his visit to the Middle East include little mention of China. However, close reading reveals that between the lines, China is quite present in the agreements reached by the President and Israel and Saudi Arabia. The dialogue on technology cooperation announced by Jerusalem and Washington, which is related directly to the Great Power competition, signals a new stage in partnership between the countries: Israel alongside the United States, even if not against China
Topic:
Diplomacy, Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Israel, Asia, North America, and United States of America

15. Arresting Nuclear Adventurism: China, Article VI, and the NPT

Author:
Henry Sokolski and Andrea Beck
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Given the current crisis in Ukraine, it’s tempting to consider focusing on Chinese compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to be an academic indulgence. Giving into this inclination, however, would be a mistake. As dangerous as Russia currently is, China will be more threatening in the long run. As we are learning with Russia’s violation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, enforcing binding understandings is critical lest violators run roughshod over law and good order. This is true with Russia’s behavior in Ukraine. It is no less so with China’s nuclear weapons buildup and its repeated refusal to join in good faith negotiations to limit its nuclear weapons activities, which is required by Article VI of the NPT. This buildup and refusal clearly flies in the face of China’s legal NPT obligations. The question is what might bring Beijing back into compliance. To get the answers, NPEC held a battery of workshops last fall, followed by a week-long diplomatic simulation. The game participants included U.S., Japanese, and Australian former and current officials and staff as well as outside experts. The group concluded that Beijing is unlikely to comply willingly with the NPT anytime soon, but that U.S. and international security would still be best served by spotlighting Beijing’s nuclear adventurism and suggesting diplomatic off-ramps to arrest its nuclear buildup.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Peace, and Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

16. PRC Foreign and Military Policy, 1977-81: Shades of Mao, the Imprint of Deng

Author:
Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
Abstract:
This Working Paper is a draft chapter for a book on the poorly understood CCP elite politics of the early post-Mao period, tentatively entitled Hua Guofeng, Deng Xiaoping, and the Dismantling of Maoism. Conventional wisdom pictures the period up to the December 1978 Third Plenum as a struggle between Hua and Deng, reflecting neo-Maoist v. reformist tendencies, and won by Deng at the plenum. In fact, there was broad consensus between them, Hua was more proactive in key areas, and there is no evidence of anything approaching a power struggle. This paper, however, deals with an area where elements of accepted views of Deng hold up. In essence, Deng held both the foreign policy and particularly PLA portfolios, notably where they concerned the crucial relationships with the US, Soviet Union, Japan, and Vietnam. In external relations Deng was broadly regarded to have performed brilliantly, while Hua was thought a mere cypher. Overall, Hua was clearly secondary in external relations, but he took the bold step of initiating relations with revisionist Yugoslavia, made the most telling proposal in the high-level negotiations with the US, and deeply impressed dominant European leaders Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Schmidt. Deng’s foreign policy outlook was deeply influenced by Mao, he could push Mao’s “horizontal line” concept to counterproductive extremes, almost losing the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, and rather than brilliantly negotiating US normalization, the Chinese side was slow to grasp the outcome that was always there. Most significant, and revealing of the underlying dynamic of CCP politics, was the war against Vietnam. This was truly Deng’s war, opposed by not only Hua, but also by a broad array of senior civilian and PLA officials, including surviving marshals. This was essentially the first time since his return to work in 1977, in contrast to persuading his colleagues through intense effort, that Deng simply asserted his authority. Neither here or elsewhere, was argument decisive as it had generally been under Hua’s leadership to that point. What was decisive was Deng’s enormous prestige as the most outstanding of the surviving “old revolutionaries” who achieved the success of 1949. It was the same factor that allowed Deng’s quiet coup against Hua at the turn of 1979-80, with no significant resistance from Hua or anyone else, and with no explanation being made in any official forum until well after the fact.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Politics, Governance, Leadership, and Normalization
Political Geography:
China and Asia

17. Could Biden construct a new world order through détente with Russia?

Author:
Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Such a scenario would give the US a leg up against China’s totalitarianism and expansionist aims, and bridge the age-old schism with Russia
Topic:
Diplomacy, Hegemony, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

18. Inside China’s Techno-Security State

Author:
Tai Ming Cheung
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
Since coming to power, Xi Jinping has significantly elevated the importance of national security and technological innovation in the country’s overall priorities. He has invested considerable time, effort, and political capital to establish an expansive techno-security state based upon his strategic and ideological vision. This brief examines the five major methods Xi’s administration has undertaken to develop its techno-security state: developing a national security state, innovation-driven development, military strengthening, military-civilian fusion, and economic securitization.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Industrial Policy, International Security, Innovation, Strategic Competition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

19. US-Taiwan Deterrence and Defense Dialogue: Responding to Increased Chinese Aggressiveness

Author:
Jeffrey Ordaniel
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Taiwan is already under attack by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) politically, economically, psychologically, and militarily—the latter through more aggressive Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) gray zone military operations short of actual direct conflict. This multidimensional threat requires a multidimensional response in ways that complement and enhance military deterrence. PRC behavior represents a global problem that demands a global response. PRC pressure on Taiwan has increased considerably over the past year, even before Beijing used the visit by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi as an excuse to further ramp up pressure. The August 2022 PLA military exercise around Taiwan appears aimed at further creating a “new normal” that could reduce warning times should Beijing invade. However, such PRC actions are not “normal.” They are unilateral, destabilizing, and, in some instances, illegal changes to the status quo. Such Chinese pressure tactics, combined with the “wake up call” provided by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, have sensitized the citizens and governments of Taiwan, the United States, and the international community to the growing possibility—if not probability—of a PRC invasion and have increased public perceptions about the need and willingness to defend Taiwan democracy. The PRC’s nuclear build-up is also a great cause of concern. This concern is driven not by the threat of nuclear war (given US nuclear superiority) but by the possibility of nuclear blackmail aimed at discouraging Washington from getting involved in a Taiwan confrontation. Taiwanese are concerned about crisis escalation (especially to the nuclear level) but worry more about the PRC deterring the United States. The United States, working closely with allies and other like-minded states, should be more proactive and less reactive in responding to increased PRC aggressive behavior. With the US Department of Defense (DoD) in the lead, the US Government needs to better assess Chinese strengths and weaknesses vis-à-vis Taiwan with an eye toward countering strengths and exploiting weaknesses, while also examining ways to broaden the challenge along multiple fronts in cooperation with various allies and partners. Think tanks can and should supplement this analysis. While continued strong support for Ukraine is important to demonstrate Western resolve and prevent more Russian territorial gains, the PRC remains the “pacing threat” and thus should remain the focus of US national security policy and defense procurement strategy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Deterrence, Dialogue, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

20. Tracking Chinese Aid through China Customs: Darlings and Orphans after the COVID-19 Outbreak

Author:
Andreas Fuchs, Lennart Kaplan, Krisztina Kis-Katos, Sebastian Schmidt, Felix Turbanisch, and Feicheng Wang
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, China's mask and vaccine diplomacy have been widely discussed, but the debate relies on a few stylized data points. This article introduces a systematic way to measure China's foreign aid in almost real-time through official customs records of exported aid goods. Our results show significant shifts in China's aid after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. First, medical aid skyrocketed after the outbreak. It was initially dominated by face masks and other protective equipment and later by vaccines. This came at the expense of non-medical aid, which was 16.3 percent below its pre-pandemic level. Second, China's aid became global, clearly extending beyond the Global South. Third, in the aftermath of the initial outbreak in March 2020, China's aid became less responsive to both recipient need and political friendship, which can be mainly attributed to the rise of aid through non-government sources. However, in the vaccine diplomacy period of 2021, economic needs and political factors have regained their original importance.
Topic:
Development, Diplomacy, Public Health, Vaccine, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia