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Begin New Search Political Geography China Content Type Working Paper Publishing Institution Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies

21. Managing Tensions in the South China Sea: Comparing the China-Philippines and the China-Vietnam Approaches

Author:
Li Jianwei
Publication Date:
04-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
Although disputes in the South China Sea are in general under control since 2009, developments show that China-Philippines and China-Vietnam are two key relationships that have experienced incidents leading to fluctuating levels of tension in the South China Sea region. This study reviews the evolution of these two relationships in relation to bilateral disputes in the South China Sea and the respective approaches to managing these disputes, with emphasis on the post-2009 period. By comparing the China-Philippines and China-Vietnam approaches, it intends to analyse the differences/similarities and their implication on the management of the South China Sea disputes, as well as their bilateral relations in a broader sense.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Vietnam, Philippines, and South China

22. The Revival of the Silk Roads (Land Connectivity) in Asia

Author:
Pradumna B. Rana and Wai-Mun Chia
Publication Date:
05-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
This paper argues that contrary to popular belief, in the bygone era, there was not one but two Silk Roads in Asia – the Northern and the less well-known South-western Silk Road (SSR). The SSR connected South/Central Asia with southern China and present day Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). After enjoying a rich history of around 1,600 years, the Silk Roads went into disrepair. Now, for various economic, security, and political reasons, land connectivity is once again making a comeback in Asia. These include the (i) ―Go West‖ and the recent ―New Silk Roads‖ policies of China; (ii) ―Look East‖ policies of South Asia; (iii) opening of Myanmar, a node between South Asia and East Asia; and (iv) growing importance of supply-chain trade. The focus has, however, been mainly on reviving the Northern Silk Road with relatively few actions being initiated to revive the SSR. Mirroring the on-going efforts in the Greater Mekong Sub-region and the Central Asian region, this paper proposes four economic corridors for Pan-Asian connectivity that is to connect South/Central Asia with southern China and ASEAN. The paper argues that the revival of land connectivity in Asia is making Maritime Asia of the past, more continental-based. One implication is that regional institutions focusing solely on Maritime Asia, such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), may be losing some of their relevance vis-à-vis say the more continental-based China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The other is that the influence of the West in Asia‘s security may be declining relative to that of China, India, and Russia.
Topic:
Security, Globalization, and Trade
Political Geography:
Russia, China, India, and Asia

23. Examining China’s Assertiveness through the Eyes of Chinese IR Scholars

Author:
Huiyun Feng and Kai He
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
Since the 2008 global financial crisis, China‟s diplomacy has moved towards a more confident or even assertive direction in international politics. Economically, the Chinese Premier refused to re-value the Chinese currency as the United States requested and instead started to lecture about U.S. economic mismanagement during the 2008 financial meltdown (Pomfret, 2010). Diplomatically, China responded furiously to Obama‟s decision of arms sales to Taiwan and meeting the Dalai Lama in early 2010, threatening to place sanctions on American companies. Politically, China reluctantly cooperated with Western countries, especially the United States, to punish either North Korean or Iranian provocations to the international order. Many other examples, from the Copenhagen Conference to the diplomatic standoffs between China and its neighbours, have also been listed as indications of China‟s assertive behaviour since 2008 (Swaine, 2010, 2011; Swaine and Fravel 2011; Perlez 2012; Ross 2012; He and Feng 2012). In particular, the 2012 Scarborough Shoal crisis with the Philippines, the still on-going flare-ups with Japan on the Senkaku/Diaoyu disputes, and the recently intensified tension with Vietnam in the South China Sea seemingly have further intensified regional concerns over China‟s rise. It is worth noting that some scholars have started to question the validity of the discourse regarding China‟s assertiveness in diplomacy. For example, through critically examining the “assertiveness” meme in the U.S. pundit and academic circles, Johnston questions: “How new and assertive is China‟s new assertiveness?” (Johnston, 2013). Although the extent and the nature of the assertiveness are still debatable, it is clear that China‟s foreign policy has shifted to a new direction, albeit temporarily. The goal of this paper is not to debate the temporal origins or intensity of China‟s assertiveness. Instead, it focuses on examining the perceptual roots of China‟s policy changes. As David Shambaugh (1991) points out, behaviour is principally a function of perception. In order to make sense of Chinese behaviour, we need to dig into the mindset of Chinese leaders. However, it is difficult to gauge what political leaders really perceive due to the political hierarchy and the complex nature of the decision-making process in any state system, especially China. In this research we examine Chinese leaders‟ perceptions and attitudes regarding Chinese foreign policy through the eyes of China‟s International Relations (IR) scholars. We use Chinese IR scholars as a “proxy measure” to make sense of Chinese leaders‟ perceptions because Chinese IR scholars serve as the mediator between the Chinese leadership and the general public (Shambaugh, 1991; Saunders, 2000). Based on an original opinion survey of Chinese IR scholars at the annual conference of the Chinese Community of Political Science and International Studies (CCPSIS) in Beijing in July 2013, we empirically test the perceptual roots of Chinese scholars‟ preference for an assertive diplomacy. In particular, we examine two competing arguments about China‟s assertiveness. Some scholars suggest a “power perception” argument in which China‟s assertiveness is rooted in Chinese leaders‟ changing perceptions regarding its power status versus the United States. In other words, as the 1 United States and other Western countries were troubled by their economic downturn, Chinese leaders became overly confident with China‟s rise and thereby started to say “no” to the United States as well as show its “teeth” to its neighbours (Nye, 2010; Green, 2010). Others advocate a “policy reaction” argument, which attributes China‟s assertiveness to a nationalist reaction to unfriendly international forces, especially from the West, which threatened to block China‟s rise. Continuous economic growth also instigated the rise of nationalism in Chinese society, which in turn pushed the Chinese government to react to Western criticisms and “plots” with more fury and toughness (Carr, 2010; Small, 2010; Swaine, 2011; Ross, 2012). In other words, China‟s assertiveness in diplomacy grew from an intentional reaction to the strategic pressure from the United States and the outside world. There are three parts in the paper. First, we briefly introduce our original survey conducted in the summer of 2013. Second, we develop two hypotheses based on the current debate about China‟s assertive diplomacy and test them by using the structural equation modeling (SEM) technique. We suggest that both the “power perception” and “policy reaction” arguments make sense in explaining China‟s assertiveness in diplomacy. However, our findings suggest that a more pessimistic perception regarding Chinese power is more likely to be associated with a preference for an assertive foreign policy. In other words, it is not a confident or an overly confident China but a lack of confidence instead, which is more likely to trigger an assertive foreign policy in China. In the conclusion section we discuss the implications of our findings for China‟s future international relations
Topic:
Diplomacy, Imperialism, International Cooperation, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
United States, China, Iran, Middle East, Asia, and North Korea

24. CHINA’S GLOBAL AGRICULTURAL STRATEGY: AN OPEN SYSTEM TO SAFEGUARD THE COUNTRY’S FOOD SECURITY

Author:
Cheng Guoqiang and Zhang Hongzhou
Publication Date:
10-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
National food security will continue to be the top strategic issue confronting Chinese policymakers. In the next two decades of rapid income growth, China‟s total demand for agricultural products will increase in the face of diminishing water and land resources, and the task of feeding the 1.3 billion Chinese people will be even more challenging. The authors suggest that a global agricultural strategy is the strategic choice for China because it enables China to safeguard national food security and at the same time, tackle its rising domestic demand for agricultural resources in the face of environmental pressures.
Topic:
Agriculture, Environment, Water, Food, and Food Security
Political Geography:
China and Asia

25. Nuclear Deterrence: The Wohlstetter-Blackett Debate Re-visited

Author:
Rajesh Basrur
Publication Date:
04-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
The Cold War debate between Albert Wohlstetter and Patrick Blackett over the requirements of effective deterrence is of profound relevance half a century later. The two thinkers offered systematic arguments for their maximalist (Wohlstetter) and minimalist (Blackett) positions. How we conceive of these requirements shapes the kinds of nuclear weapons doctrines, forces and postures we adopt. Whereas the Wohlstetter-Blackett debate was based largely on deductive logic, the opposing arguments can today be assessed on the basis of evidence drawing from nearly seven decades of strategic behaviour between nuclear rivals. An analysis of major confrontations in five nuclear dyads – United States-Soviet Union, United States-China, Soviet Union-China, India-Pakistan, and United States-North Korea – clearly offers much stronger support for Blackett?s minimalist case than for Wohlstetter?s maximalist one. Effective deterrence does not require second-strike capability as defined by Wohlstetter and the nuclear balance has no effect on a state?s capacity to deter. Consequently, the central tenets of orthodox nuclear deterrence theory and doctrine are shown to be without foundation. For policymakers, the optimal forces and postures required for effective deterrence are therefore less demanding and the hurdles in the path of arms control and at least partial disarmament less difficult to cross.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Cold War, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Power Politics
Political Geography:
Pakistan, United States, China, India, and North Korea

26. Managing Tensions in the South China Sea: Comparing the China-Philippines and the China-Vietnam Approaches

Author:
Li Jianwei
Publication Date:
04-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
Although disputes in the South China Sea are in general under control since 2009, developments show that China-Philippines and China-Vietnam are two key relationships that have experienced incidents leading to fluctuating levels of tension in the South China Sea region. This study reviews the evolution of these two relationships in relation to bilateral disputes in the South China Sea and the respective approaches to managing these disputes, with emphasis on the post-2009 period. By comparing the China-Philippines and China-Vietnam approaches, it intends to analyse the differences/similarities and their implication on the management of the South China Sea disputes, as well as their bilateral relations in a broader sense.
Topic:
Security, Bilateral Relations, and Territorial Disputes
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Vietnam, and Philippines

27. Examining China's Assertiveness through the Eyes of Chinese IR Scholars

Author:
Kai He and Huiyun Feng
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
China's assertive diplomacy in recent years has ignited intense debates among International Relations (IR) scholars. Some argue that China's assertive behavior is rooted in its perception of increasing power and capabilities. Others suggest that it is U.S. policies that triggered China's assertive reactions. Relying on an original survey of China's IR scholars conducted in Beijing in 2013 and using structural equation modeling (SEM), we empirically examine Chinese IR scholars' attitude towards Chinese power versus the United States, their perceptions of U.S. policy in Asia, and their preference for an assertive Chinese foreign policy. We find that both the power perception and policy reaction arguments make sense in accounting for Chinese IR scholars' attitude regarding China's assertive diplomacy. However, our research suggests that a more pessimistic view on Chinese power is more likely to be associated with a preference for an assertive foreign policy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Emerging Markets
Political Geography:
China and East Asia

28. China's Economic Restructuring: Role of Agriculture

Author:
Zhang Hongzhou
Publication Date:
05-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
While China has achieved extraordinary economic success in the past decades, its economic structural risks have increased significantly as well. As Chinese top leaders have repeatedly emphasized, economic restructuring is a critical task facing China's economy. To restructure China's economy, the country needs to find a new engine for growth to replace the export and investment led growth model, address social inequality and protect the environment. The key approaches identified by the Chinese government include urbanization, upgrading the manufacturing sector and developing strategic industries. However, through in-depth analysis, this paper finds that the effectiveness of these measures remains in question as they fail to target at all the root causes of China's economic problems.
Topic:
Economics, Environment, Globalization, Industrial Policy, International Trade and Finance, and Social Stratification
Political Geography:
China and Israel

29. The Influence of Domestic Politics on Philippine Foreign Policy: The case of Philippines-China relations since 2004

Author:
Aileen S. P. Baviera
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
This paper sets out to explore the role of domestic politics in the shaping and implementing of Philippine foreign policy and its relations with China. It examines how domestic politics have driven Philippine foreign policy behaviour towards China; whether the Philippine Government has successfully managed the domestic drivers in promoting the state's interests in its relations with China, and whether there are major constraints that have prevented the attainment of more desirable outcomes in the bilateral ties. It looks at three cases: the Philippines-China joint marine seismic undertaking in the South China Sea; China's participation in the national broadband network project and a railway project; and Philippine reactions to China's execution of three Filipino drug mules.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Narcotics Trafficking
Political Geography:
China, Israel, and Philippines

30. By Invitation, Mostly: the International Politics of the US Security Presence, China, and the South China Sea

Author:
Christopher Freise
Publication Date:
08-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
Much attention has been devoted to the Obama Administration's “Pacific Pivot” and the vocal reassertion of an upgraded security, economic, and diplomatic presence in East Asia by the United States. Commentators have ascribed various rationales to these efforts, including speculation that this is part of a “containment” strategy towards China, a reaction to the US presidential election cycle, or, more benignly, an effort to forestall concerns of American withdrawal from the region. These explanations have some elements of truth, but also fall short of fully describing or understanding the strategic rationale behind these moves.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Economics
Political Geography:
United States, China, Israel, and Asia

31. Dealing with the "North Korea Dilemma":China's Strategic Choices

Author:
You Ji
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
Pyongyang's adventurism during 2010 such as the Yeonyeong shelling has further complicated the already strained Sino-DPRK relations, despite closer interaction between the two countries. The biggest challenge to Beijing was to shake the foundation of China's DPRK policy, defined as maintaining the status quo by crisis aversion, with the emphasis on ad hoc guidance for immediate crisis management. Chinese analysts criticised Beijing's lack of an effective overarching strategy toward Pyongyang. Clearly its current approach of accommodation vis-à-vis Kim Jong-Il may not be sustainable. This principle not only symbolises Beijing's buffer zone mentality concerning the North's regime survival but also its difficulty in finding any feasible substitute. Beijing does see the high cost of continued support for an unpredictable neighbour.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Israel, and North Korea

32. Global Norm Diffusion in East Asia: How China and Japan Implement the Responsibility to Protect

Author:
Jochen Prantl and Ryoko Nakano
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
This paper addresses the problem of global norm diffusion in international relations with particular reference to the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) in East Asia. Exposing the limits of previous work on norm localisation, the authors propose a norm diffusion loop framework. Rather than understanding norm diffusion as a linear top-down process, the authors demonstrate that the reception to RtoP has evolved in a far more dynamic way which can best be described as a feedback loop. This paper first looks into the processes and causal mechanisms that helped to construct RtoP as an emerging transnational soft norm; then, it analyses the challenges of diffusing RtoP from the global to the regional and domestic levels; and, finally, it examines the variation of norm effects across states within the same region, focusing in particular on how RtoP has shaped Chinese and Japanese policy responses.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Power Politics
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Israel, and Asia

33. Rising Power… To Do What? Evaluating China's Power in Southeast Asia

Author:
Evelyn Goh
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
Drawing on China's relations with its relatively weak neighbours in Southeast Asia where we ought to find evidence of China getting other states to do what they otherwise would not have done, this paper asks how and how effectively China has converted its growing resources into influence over other states, their strategic choices and the outcomes of events. First, it adopts the framework of structural and relational power, further disaggregating the latter into persuasion, inducement and coercion as modes of exercising power. Second, it accounts for the reception to power by offering an analytical framework based on variations in the alignment of the extant preferences of the subjects and wielders of power, which determine the degree to which alterations are necessary as part of an exercise of power. The analysis identifies key cases particularly demonstrating three categories of Chinese power: its power as 'multiplier' when extent preferences are aligned; its power to persuade when pre-existing preferences are debated; and its power to prevail in instances of conflicting preferences. It finds that the first two categories of power have been most prevalent, while there have been very few instances where Southeast Asian states have done what they would otherwise not have done as a result of Chinese behaviour. These findings suggest that even though China's power resources have increased significantly, the way in which it has managed to convert these resources into control over outcomes is uneven.
Topic:
Foreign Policy and Power Politics
Political Geography:
China and Southeast Asia

34. The Korean War June-October 1950: Inchon and Stalin in the "Trigger vs. Justification"; Debate

Author:
Tan Kwoh Jack
Publication Date:
01-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
China's decision to enter the Korean War in 1950 is a historical puzzle: why would China, a much weaker country, enter into a military confrontation with the United States, a superpower? The rationale for Chairman Mao Zedong's intervention in Korea carries strategic lessons for the contemporary crisis on the Korean Peninsula, as well as for Sino-American relations. Utilizing newly declassified Russian documents made available at the Cold War International History Project from 1994- 2004, this paper critically assesses this new evidence concurrently with the existing literature that has emerged so far, and seeks to contribute to the “trigger vs. justification” debate surrounding China'sentry. Three shortcomings of this debate are identified: 1) whether Mao would have intervened had the US military stopped at the 38 th parallel is difficult to determine; 2) Mao' s vacillations up till the very last minute cast doubt on the justification argument i.e. offensive intervention driven by revolutionary ideology and politics; and 3) as a result, this ignores the complex dimensions of decision-making and interaction between Stalin and the Chinese leadership, as well as within the Chinese leadership itself. This paper argues that one significant variable overlooked heretofore is the American landings at Inchon on 19 September 1950. This is followed by in-depth analyses of the following three main interactions that Inchon engendered – 1) the policy shifts within the Truman administration; 2) the Stalin-Mao manoeuvres; and 3) the debates and dilemmas within the Chinese Politburo. This paper concludes that it was Inchon, along with additional pressure from Stalin, and not the crossing of the 38 th parallel, that triggered China's eventual entry into Korea.
Topic:
Security and War
Political Geography:
China and Asia

35. Environmental Management and Conflict in Southeast Asia – Land Reclamation and its Political Impact

Author:
Kog Yue-Choong
Publication Date:
01-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
Land-scarce Singapore has no choice but to carry out massive reclamation to cope with its population growth and economic development. The ability for Singapore to continue to carry out its reclamation to enlarge its territory is tied to its survival as a competitive economy. Land reclamation works have been carried out in Singapore since the late 19th century when Singapore was a British colony. After Singapore was separated from Malaysia in 1965, massive land reclamation has been ongoing almost non-stop since then without giving rise to any dispute with its neighbours. Dredged sea sand has been used for reclamation in Singapore long ago, initially the sea sand come from seabed within Singapore's territory and later from Malaysia and Indonesia. But for the first time in 2002, such reclamation works have figured in volatile ties between Singapore and Malaysia when Malaysia protested vehemently about the trans-boundary environmental impact of Singapore's reclamation works. At the same time, Indonesian leaders imposed an export ban of sea sand from Indonesia to Singapore because they felt that sea sand was being shipped to enlarge Singapore's territory at environmental costs that surpassed the economic benefits from selling the sand. This paper will review the reclamation efforts by Singapore and the perceived threat that it poses to neighbouring countries including Malaysia and Indonesia in the context of the concerns over environmental degradation, territorial rights and the tensions engendered in the relations among these countries. This paper will argue that the dispute between Singapore and Malaysia as well as Singapore and Indonesia should not be securitised. Instead, such non-traditional security issues should be viewed as 'desecuritised'. This need is particularly acute in this uncertain time because of the threats of terrorism and the challenge of escalation in economic rivalry brought about by globalisation and the opening of China and India.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Environment, and Politics
Political Geography:
China, Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Singapore, and Southeast Asia

36. China's Political Commissars and Commanders: Trends Dynamics

Author:
Srikanth Kondapalli
Publication Date:
10-2005
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
Political Commissars and Commanders in the Chinese military played a significant role for more than seven decades. Several commonalities, differences and relative influences of these two in the military hierarchy existed, though both were tasked to pursue political and strategic goals set by thee Communist Party in the internal matters or external dimensions of China. Even as the Commanders' role remained vital in the current phase of military modernisation, professionalism and power projection, the role of the Political Commissars is expected to be enhanced with the launching of "three wars"- media, legal and psychological warfare - from 2003.
Topic:
Security and Politics
Political Geography:
China

37. Maritime Disputes In The South China Sea: Strategic And Diplomatic Status Quo

Author:
Ralf Emmers
Publication Date:
09-2005
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
The Working Paper argues that the maritime disputes over the South China Sea are characterised by a strategic and diplomatic status quo. China does so far not have the necessary power projection to impose naval hegemony in the South China Sea. None of the ASEAN claimants can rely on sufficient naval power or an external military alliance to impose their claims in the Spratly Islands. A similar situation of status quo exists on the diplomatic front. China and the ASEAN countries have been negotiating for years to conclude a code of conduct for the South China Sea. The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea is based on a multilateral dimension as well as on a convergence of views on the need to peacefully manage the dispute. While a step in the right direction, the declaration is only an interim political agreement and it is still to be seen whether the parties will sign a detailed and binding code of conduct for the South China Sea. The Working Paper starts by reviewing the nature of the maritime disputes. It then describes the security environment in the South China Sea by examining the changing strategic conditions of the disputes. Its final section discusses the long diplomatic road toward the 2002 Declaration. The Working Paper concludes that the South China Sea has remained primarily a political rather than a military issue thanks to China's desire to accomodate the Southeast Asian countries and the limited naval capabilities available to the different claimants.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, International Relations, and Diplomacy
Political Geography:
China

38. Great Powers and Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies: Omni-Enmeshment, Balancing and Hierarchical Order

Author:
Evelyn Goh
Publication Date:
07-2005
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
The small and medium-sized states in Southeast Asia have undergone significant geostrategic changes with the end of the Cold War and the rise of China. There has been a lively debate over the last decade about whether these countries would balance against or bandwagon with China, and how their relations with the other major powers in the region would change. Recent works that argue against the simple dichotomy of balancing versus bandwangoning are correct in asserting that Southeast Asian countries do not want to choose between the two major powers, the U.S. and China. But this paper goes further to present the results of an empirical study that fleshes out the conceptual thinking that underlies this avoidance strategy. It finds that instead of merely adopting tactical or time-buying policies, key Southeast Asian states have actively tried to influence the shaping of the new regional order. It argues that key Southeast Asian states in fact have (a) distinct coneptualisations of two main pathways to order in the region–omni-enmeshment of major powers and complex balance of influence; and (b) a concrete vision of the preferred power distribution outcome, which is a hierarchical regional order.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
China and Southeast Asia

39. Civil-Military Relationship And Reform In The Defence Industry

Author:
Arthur S. Ding
Publication Date:
06-2005
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
Three factors have contributed to China's defence industry reform. They are Deng Xiaoping's resolute will to push defense industry reform, overall reform toward marker economy system and the military's consciousness for the need of the defense industry reform. As time has gone by, direction for China's defense industry reform was gradually defines, and that created an environment conducive for innovation and to adapt to the changing economic environment. Many measures have been adopted, and the core idea being a gradual increase in competition in the economic sector. The implication for the civil-military relationship is that there might exist a consensus in both civilian and military sectors with regard to defense industry reform.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Civil Society, and Government
Political Geography:
China

40. The Security Of Regional Sea Lanes

Author:
Joshua Ho
Publication Date:
05-2005
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
The emergence of China and India as major global players will not only transform the regional geopolitical landscape but will also mean an increased dependence on the sea as an avenue for trade and transportation of energy and raw materials. Within the region, the Malacca Straits, Sunda Straits, and the Lombok Straits are the main sea lanes through which trade, energy, and raw material resources flow. Indeed, the strategic importance of the regional lanes was recognised by the late Michael Leifer but the threats indetified at that time were primarily those that concerned the safety of navigation, the control of the freedom of passage by the coastal state as well as the interruption of passage in the sea lanes by an external naval power like the Soviet Union. The threats that Michael Leifer had identified has faded into insignificance and new threats to safety of shipping have arisen in their place, and these include piracy and the spectre of maritime terrorism.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia