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Begin New Search Content Type Special Report Publishing Institution Center for a New American Security (CNAS) Publication Year within 3 Years

1. How Finnish and Swedish NATO Accession Could Shape the Future Russian Threat

Author:
Nicholas Lokker, Jim Townsend, Heli Hautala, and Andrea Kendall-Taylor
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a major strategic blunder. Not only will Russia emerge from the war economically and militarily weakened, but its brutal invasion has undercut Moscow’s geopolitical position, including by triggering nearby countries to take new steps to provide for their security and defense. Most notably, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine compelled Finland and Sweden to apply for NATO membership— leading to an expansion of the very alliance that Russia purports to be opposing in Ukraine. While it is unclear exactly when Finland and Sweden will join NATO—this will depend on when Hungary and Turkey, the last remaining allies to ratify the accession protocols, finalize the process—it is clear that there is no going back to the status quo ante. NATO allies should expect Russia to react to Finland and Sweden joining the organization beyond the cool response that followed their announcement. Their accession into NATO will permanently reshape the European security architecture, which Moscow is likely to see as a threat to its own security and therefore use as a basis for adjusting it calculus. Even though Moscow has not explicitly retaliated against Finland and Sweden for joining NATO beyond expressing displeasure, the Kremlin is nonetheless likely to respond, including in ways that will pose challenges to the alliance in both the near and long term. This memo discusses how Finland’s and Sweden’s entry into NATO will shape Europe’s security landscape, how Russia is likely to see these changes and respond, and how the allies can address the future challenges stemming from these changing dynamics.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Regional Security, Russia-Ukraine War, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Finland, and Sweden

2. Atomic Strait: How China’s Nuclear Buildup Shapes Security Dynamics with Taiwan and the United States

Author:
Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This report examines the intersection of China’s nuclear modernization and cross-Strait tensions, especially how they might play out during a crisis, contingency, or conflict involving China, Taiwan, and the United States. Beijing is rapidly modernizing its nuclear arsenal to make it larger and more sophisticated. Changes include an increase in warhead numbers from more than 400 today to potentially 700 by 2027 and more beyond, consolidating a nuclear triad, developing new delivery systems, and digging at least 300 new missile silos. Some factors still could constrain the growth of China’s arsenal or the policies that shape the way Chinese leaders employ it. They range from fissile material stocks to competing military spending priorities, considerations about China’s international reputation, and upholding Beijing’s claimed No First Use policy. But nearly all those constraining factors either already have weakened or could do so in the near future. China’s expanding nuclear arsenal suggests that the force will be designed to fulfill new missions. Some part of Beijing’s buildup surely is meant to bolster its second-strike retaliatory capability in the face of what China perceives as shifts in U.S. conventional and nuclear capabilities and policies. China’s long-term goal for the expansion, however, could be more ambitious and potentially even include seeking to build an arsenal on par with Washington’s and Moscow’s. Meanwhile, China continues to ramp up pressure on Taiwan using political, economic, and military tools. Beijing’s campaign could provoke more crises in the coming years. The three major roles that nuclear weapons could play for China when dealing with cross-Strait crises or conflicts are: to shield China from U.S. nuclear coercion, to threaten Chinese nuclear use to try to forestall U.S. intervention, and to conduct a limited Chinese nuclear detonation in an attempt to force U.S. and Taiwanese capitulation. The report concludes with recommendations for U.S. policymakers. It calls for carrying out U.S. nuclear modernization plans to deter China but avoiding nuclear arms racing as a strategy in itself. It recommends incorporating nuclear elements into contingency planning and scenario exercises related to Taiwan, both unilaterally and with allies and partners. The report then calls for improving Taiwan’s conventional military capabilities while maintaining a consistent U.S. policy on cross-Strait issues and ensuring Taiwan forgoes pursuing indigenous nuclear weapons. Finally, the report argues in favor of pushing forward tough-minded bilateral engagement with Beijing on strategic stability and security issues while crafting a multilateral arms control strategy that builds coalitions to incentivize China to join and impose costs on Beijing if it opts to stay outside of key agreements.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

3. Avoiding the Brink: Escalation Management in a War to Defend Taiwan

Author:
Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Hannah Dennis
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States is entering an unprecedented multipolar nuclear era that is far more complex and challenging than that of the Cold War. This report examines potential triggers, thresholds, and targets for Chinese nuclear use as well as options for the United States and its allies and partners to avoid and manage escalation. It uses the results of two exploratory tabletop exercises (TTXs) focused on how China’s expanding nuclear arsenal could impact the risk of nuclear escalation in a conventional conflict over Taiwan. From these two TTXs, the authors derived tentative insights into how nuclear escalation in a war over Taiwan might unfold and identified areas where further research is needed. First, the expansions and improvements projected for China’s nuclear forces will provide it with a wider range of coercive options. With a secure second-strike capability and more diverse theater nuclear options, China may be willing to brandish its nuclear weapons to attempt to deter the United States from entering a war. There are few incentives to conduct nuclear strikes early in such a conflict, but a war over Taiwan might well lead to a protracted war between the great powers—another area where more study will be critical. The authors also found that American policymakers today might not find the PRC’s nuclear threats credible because of its smaller arsenal size and historic policy of no first use (NFU). Furthermore, the authors found that attempts to degrade key conventional capabilities might lead either side to cross the other’s red lines, setting off an escalatory spiral and transforming a regional conflict into a great-power war. Both the United States and China will have to weigh the value of eliminating certain targets with the risk of crossing an adversary red line. Last, the authors found an asymmetry between the targets available to the United States and China in a Taiwan contingency. With fewer categories of targets to strike and types of capabilities with which to strike them, the United States may have fewer options to manage escalation. All these findings merit further study. The two TTXs, conducted in summer 2022, pitted a U.S. Blue team against a Chinese Red team in a war over Taiwan. The two wargames were designed as a controlled comparison to focus on the impact of one specific variable—the size and composition of the PLA’s nuclear arsenal—on the Red team’s decision-making and its propensity to deliberately escalate and on the Blue team’s ability to defend its allies and partners while managing escalation. By holding most other factors constant but changing Red’s nuclear force structure, the authors aimed to concentrate on the role that nuclear weapons played. In TTX 1, the players had a notional 2027 order of battle with a nuclear arsenal of about 700 warheads, diverse in yield and delivery system type and range. The second TTX, set in 2030, included a similarly diverse Red arsenal of over 1,000 nuclear warheads. After analyzing the results of both exercises, the authors contextualized and expanded the findings through research on existing literature on nuclear deterrence and escalation.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Escalation
Political Geography:
Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

4. Democracy under Threat: How the Personalization of Political Parties Undermines Democracy

Author:
Erica Frantz, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Joseph Wright, Jia Li, Carisa Nietsche, Nicholas Lokker, and Nicolas Rice
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
In 1998, Viktor Orbán was elected the prime minister of Hungary in free and fair elections. He was supported by the Fidesz party—a movement he founded in 1988 that became a political party in 1990. After losing reelection in 2002, Orbán returned to the prime ministership in 2010 having internalized the lesson that surviving in Hungarian politics “requires strong leadership and absolute control over the party.”1 From 2002 to 2010, Orbán increased his influence within Fidesz, including by changing the party constitution to give himself control of the selection of local party leaders, all parliamentary candidates, and the leader of the party’s parliamentary group. Orbán’s increasing influence within the party paved the way for his efforts over the next decade to remove checks on his power. His control over the party, along with Fidesz’s constitutional majority, enabled Orbán to change Hungary’s constitution in ways that weakened executive constraints, including from the Constitutional Court, the election commission, independent media, and civil society. Orbán’s disproportionate power within the political system allowed him to dismantle democracy in the years that followed, pushing Hungary into authoritarianism. This pattern of democratic decay is not unique to Hungary. Freedom House reports that democracy has been in decline for the last 16 consecutive years, with much of the deterioration occurring in countries classified as democracies.2 In some instances these declines left democracy compromised but intact (as in Poland). In other cases, the declines gave way to the onset of authoritarianism (as in Serbia). Importantly, along with the decline in democracy, there has been a clear change in the way that democracies are breaking down.3 Before 2000, coups were the primary way that democracies failed. Since 2000, however, incumbent takeovers—or the ability of democratically elected leaders to dismantle democracy from within—have grown more prevalent. In the 2010s, 64 percent of the democracies that broke down did so due to incumbent power grabs, while only 36 percent of those that collapsed did so because of a coup.4 Simply put, the greatest threat to democracy now comes from democratically elected leaders.
Topic:
Democracy, Political Parties, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

5. Against All Odds: Supporting Civil Society and Human Rights in Taliban-Controlled Afghanistan

Author:
Lisa Curtis, Annie Pforzheimer, and Jan Muhammad Jahid
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Eighteen months after taking power, the Taliban is intensifying its repression of Afghan civil society and cracking down on the rights and freedoms of all Afghans, especially those of women and girls. The Taliban’s harsh approach to governing the country is repressing millions of people and fueling civil unrest, promoting extremism, and laying the foundation for the reemergence of a terrorist hotbed that will almost undoubtedly become a threat to global peace and security in the years to come. Humanitarian needs in Afghanistan remain immense, and the country will require large amounts of international aid for the foreseeable future to avoid famine and other health challenges. Twenty-three million Afghans (or nearly 60 percent of the population) currently require food assistance, and unusually cold winter temperatures this year have caused further hardship and death. The Taliban’s December 2022 order barring Afghan women from working for nongovernmental organizations led some international humanitarian organizations to suspend operations, complicating aid distribution, especially to women-headed families. The abolition of democratic institutions—the Parliament, judiciary, free press—and key government ministries and departments charged with protecting human rights demonstrates that the Taliban is adhering to the same extremist policies that marked their first stint in power from 1996 to 2001. The Taliban rules by fear and intimidation; torture, kidnapping, illegal detention, and extra-judicial killings are part of daily life in Afghanistan. The Taliban’s rollback of women’s rights has been swift and comprehensive. Among the most devastating anti-female policies, which will have far-reaching negative impacts on Afghanistan’s social and economic development and relations with the world, are the edicts forbidding girls from attending secondary school or university. Women and girls in today’s Afghanistan also are prohibited from accessing parks or gyms, leaving home without a male companion, and working outside the home—except in the health sector—and have been publicly flogged for not adhering to the strict behavioral edicts. Women demonstrators have been arbitrarily jailed and subject to torture and death.
Topic:
Civil Society, Human Rights, and Taliban
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and South Asia

6. Disarming the Bomb: Distilling the Drivers and Disincentives for Iran's Nuclear Program

Author:
Jonathan Lord, Arona Baigal, Hunter Streling, and Stewart Latwin
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Negotiations to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), known commonly as the Iran nuclear deal, reached an impasse this past year. Further, Iran made parallel decisions to brutally crack down on a nationwide protest movement and to inject itself into the conflict in Ukraine by furnishing Russia with weapons. These decisions may have rendered the impasse insurmountable. U.S. President Joe Biden has not retreated from the U.S. policy that it will never allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon. However, Iran’s maximalist demands at the negotiating table, along with its domestic and foreign activities, have made it politically impossible for the United States and Europe to pursue further negotiation. Further complicating the situation and perhaps rendering the JCPOA increasingly obsolete, critical provisions of the original deal will expire in 2025 and 2030.1 The United States and the international community must consider how to constrain Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear deterrent in a post-JCPOA world, in which Iran has never been closer to achieving a bomb. The CNAS Middle East Security Program designed and ran a scenario exercise in October 2022 to identify key factors that might accelerate or decelerate Iran’s nuclear program in 2024. Additionally, the exercise explored how Iran, the United States, Israel, and the Gulf nations could prioritize their own national security objectives with respect to Iran’s nuclear program, along with the potential actions each might take to accomplish those objectives. The exercise examined two scenarios. Scenario 1 explored key countries’ policy actions and perspectives if the United States and Iran failed to reenter the JCPOA. Scenario 2 explored key countries’ policy actions and perspectives if the United States and Iran successfully renegotiated a return to compliance with the JCPOA and faced the imminent expiration of elements of the deal. Overall observations from the exercise suggest that Iran’s leadership’s primary concern is self-preservation. Pursuing a nuclear program is secondary and ultimately serves to advance the primary objective (self-preservation). U.S. policymakers face many challenges in rallying partners against Iran while prioritizing a negotiated approach to curtail Iran’s nuclear program.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Negotiation, Deterrence, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

7. India-China Border Tensions and U.S. Strategy in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Lisa Curtis and Derek Grossman
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
India-China border intrusions and clashes have become more frequent and threaten to lead to all-out conflict between the two Asian giants. In recent years, China has upped the ante in its border disputes with India through infrastructure development, military deployments, capability enhancements, and periodic efforts to encroach into territory controlled by India. The first deadly border clash between the two countries in 45 years occurred on June 15, 2020, in the Galwan River Valley, where 20 Indian troops and at least four Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops were killed. More recently, on December 9, 2022, Chinese and Indian forces clashed along the disputed border in the mountains near Tawang in the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh after an estimated 300 Chinese PLA soldiers tried to cross the border. While the Chinese and Indian militaries have since pulled back forces from the most contentious standoff sites where the 2020 buildup occurred and established temporary buffer zones, both sides retain high numbers of troops forward deployed along the disputed frontier, and there are several flashpoints that could erupt into another border crisis at any time. The most recent clash that took place near Tawang is a reminder that, even though recent attention has been focused on the Ladakh region, there are multiple trigger points along the 2,100-mile-long Line of Actual Control (LAC) that bear monitoring.1 With both China and India enhancing infrastructure and introducing new and advanced weapons systems on their sides of the disputed border, combined with forward deployments and heightened lack of trust, the chances for continued standoffs that could erupt into local or even full-blown conflict remain high.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:
China, India, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

8. Russia-China Defense Cooperation

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Nicholas Lokker
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Russia’s war in Ukraine has been a critical test of the depth of Sino-Russian relations. Since Russia’s invasion, China has remained an essential partner for Moscow. Although there have been limits to what Beijing has been willing to do for Russia, China has served as a vital lifeline for the Kremlin including by parroting Russian talking points about the war, increasing purchases of Russian oil and gas, and continuing to export microchips and other component parts to Moscow cut off by the West. Warnings by senior U.S. officials that China is contemplating providing Russia with lethal military aid in support of its war against Ukraine underscore the depth of their partnership.1 Emerging reports that Chinese companies have provided rifles and dual-use equipment such as drone parts and body armor only add credibility to these warnings.2 Although it remains unclear at the time of writing whether China will ultimately decide to send lethal aid to Russia, the last year has provided further evidence that Russia and China are deeply aligned and that the persistence and evolution of their partnership will continue to pose challenges that the United States and its allies must navigate. This working paper will focus on the challenges that Russia-China military cooperation poses to the United States and its allies and partners. This aspect of their relationship has been one of the most consequential dimensions of their deepening partnership. Already, China has obtained key capabilities from Moscow such as Su-27 and Su-35 fighter aircrafts, S-300 and S-400 air defense systems, and anti-ship missiles, which bolster China’s military posture in the Indo-Pacific.3 Russia too has benefited from a large market for its arms sales and access to technological components it can no longer access following the imposition of Western sanctions in 2014—a need that has grown exponentially since Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Meanwhile, more frequent and elaborate joint exercises have signaled to onlooking countries the two partners’ mutual support for each other’s security priorities and willingness to push back against the United States. In the context of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine and increasing U.S.-China tensions in the Indo-Pacific, it has become even more urgent to understand how future military cooperation between Russia and China could evolve and what it would mean for the United States and its partners. This memo examines this aspect of the partnership, including what is driving it, how it has evolved following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and the implications for the United States and its allies and partners.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Military Affairs, Russia-Ukraine War, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

9. Instead of Politicizing Afghanistan, Stand Up for Women and Girls

Author:
Lisa Curtis
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Ahuman rights calamity is unfolding in Afghanistan. In its latest move to repress half of the country’s population, the Taliban mandated that Afghan women can no longer work for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). The United Nations (U.N.) condemned the Taliban for forcing the international organization to make an “appalling choice” between continuing its operations without employing Afghan women, which would violate the U.N. charter, or withdrawing from the country, which would deepen the humanitarian crisis.1 Following a U.N.-led international meeting in Doha in early May, U.N. Secretary General António Guterres signaled that the U.N. would likely continue operating in Afghanistan despite the harsh Taliban edict.2 This follows several other outrageous Taliban edicts, including keeping girls out of secondary school and young women from attending university; preventing women from leaving their homes without a male companion; and prohibiting women from going to parks or gyms or holding jobs, except in the health sector.3 Yet rather than stand up for Afghan women and girls in the face of such repressive policies, American leaders—Republicans and Democrats alike—are busy in a blame game about which political party is responsible for the U.S. failure in Afghanistan. Republican congressional leaders have held hearings on Afghanistan that focus on the Biden administration’s poor handling of the August 2021 withdrawal but largely ignore what is happening to women and girls in the country. One exception to Republican leaders’ inaction on the plight of Afghan women was Congressman Mike McCaul’s chairing of a roundtable on the issue that featured remarks by former Afghan Ambassador Roya Rahmani.4 For its part, the Biden administration recently published a review of the Afghan withdrawal that laid blame on the Trump administration for the Biden administration’s own failures.5 For instance, the Biden administration chose to bind itself to the Trump-era Doha deal made between the United States and the Taliban that called for U.S. troop withdrawal by May 2021. The Biden administration could have delayed a troop withdrawal and negotiated a harder bargain with the Taliban. The administration would better serve American interests by focusing on implementing policies that support women and girls, like conditioning engagement with the Taliban on the reopening of schools and universities to women.
Topic:
Human Rights, Taliban, and Women
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and South Asia

10. “Production Is Deterrence”: Investing in Precision-Guided Weapons to Meet Peer Challengers

Author:
Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Hannah Dennis
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This report explores whether the fiscal year (FY) 2024 U.S. defense budget request for key conventional precision-guided munitions (PGMs) aligns with the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) by prioritizing weapons needed for the “pacing challenge” China poses and dealing with the “acute threat” from Russia, while taking risk in lower priority areas. The FY24 presidential budget request builds on the shift that began in FY23 to support the NDS: increasing buys of key long-range and antiship missiles to prepare for a fight in the Pacific, starting to fill the cruise missile defense gap, bolstering production of the land-attack weapons needed in Europe, and test-running multiyear procurement and large lot procurement for key munitions to strengthen the defense industrial base. In the Department of Defense’s (DoD) budgeting process, ships, aircraft, and vehicles tend to be prioritized, leaving missiles and munitions with inadequate funding. Moreover, the Pentagon does not take a holistic approach to procuring key conventional PGMs, making it difficult to assess the joint portfolio. If the United States is going to effectively compete with China and Russia, that needs to change. To deter and—if deterrence fails—defeat China, the DoD needs large stockpiles of standoff missiles, maritime strike weapons, and layered air and missile defenses. The authors conclude that after years of underinvestment, the DoD is buying more long-range and medium-range missiles, which would be essential in a China war fight. While historically the Pentagon has overinvested in bombs and missiles to attack targets on the land and neglected antiship weapons, the FY24 budget saw a notable uptick in air-launched antiship weapons. For the past decade, the DoD has consistently invested in air defenses, but its purchases have focused on expensive ballistic missile defense interceptors, while neglecting cruise missile defenses. The FY24 budget reverses this trend. Additionally, the DoD is investing in PGMs to arm Ukraine and replenish American and allied stores of weapons that are needed to counter Russia. Except for surface-to-air missiles, the weapons for Ukraine are relatively short-range land-attack PGMs that U.S. forces do not need in the Indo-Pacific. A large portion of the funding for these weapons is coming from Ukraine supplemental appropriations, not the base defense budget. Supplemental appropriations are also resourcing significant investments in U.S. production lines, but the DoD has made only moderate progress rebuilding American stockpiles of the PGMs given to Ukraine.
Topic:
Security, Budget, Weapons, Deterrence, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America