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Begin New Search Topic Economics Content Type Research Paper Publishing Institution Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)

1. The Political Economy of Law Enforcement

Author:
Matías Dewey, Cornelia Woll, and Lucas Ronconi
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
The legal order is the legitimate foundation of liberal democracy. Its incomplete enforcement of the law can therefore appear dysfunctional, reflecting weak institutions, state capture, and corrupt practices. This paper casts doubt on such categorical assessments by systematically examining the reasons for and intentions behind incomplete enforcement. It argues that law enforcement is part of the political process that is deeply affected by the constellation of actors concerned. Choices over law enforcement produce social order that is analytically distinct from the production of legal norms and their formal implementation. By analyzing different types of partial enforcement, its rationales, and intended effects, we propose an approach that studies law enforcement as an integral part of public policy analysis and of the study of socioeconomic orders.
Topic:
Economics, International Political Economy, Law Enforcement, Law, Police, and Legal Sector
Political Geography:
Europe and Global Focus

2. An Obituary for Austerity Narratives? An Experimental Analysis of Public Opinion Shifts and Class Dynamics during the Covid-19 Crisis

Author:
Emanuele Ferragina and Andrew Zola
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
The Covid-19 pandemic is disrupting the international political economy context unlike any event since World War II. As a consequence, the French government has, at least momentarily, reversed decades of fiscal consolidation policies sedimented around austerity narratives by instating a costly emergency furlough scheme for a third of the workforce. This crisis provides a natural setting to investigate the relations among an emerging “critical juncture” in political economy, public preferences, and the salience of austerity narratives. We collected panel data and administered two experiments to test if citizens’ viewpoints are sensitive to the trade-off between health and economics, still receptive to austerity narratives, and conditioned by socioeconomic status in supporting them. We find public viewpoints were highly swayable between health and economic concerns at the first peak of the epidemic outbreak in April 2020, but they were not influenced by the austerity narratives during the phase-out of the lockdown in June, with the exception of the upper class. Overall, public support is shifting in favor of increased social spending, and austerity might no longer inhabit the majority’s “common sense.” We conclude with further implications for the study of class and conflict in a post-pandemic world.
Topic:
Economics, Political Economy, Public Opinion, Class, Macroeconomics, and Austerity
Political Geography:
Europe and France

3. The Ambiguous Consensus on Fiscal Rules: How Ideational Ambiguity Has Facilitated Social Democratic Parties’ Support of Structural Deficit Rules in the Eurozone

Author:
Andreas Eisl
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
In recent years, all eurozone member states have introduced national fiscal rules, which put limits on public deficits and debt. Fiscal rules reduce the fiscal policy discretion of politicians and affect their capacity to use public budgets for macroeconomic steering and redistribution. While such institutional discretion constraints run against the traditional policy preferences of social democratic parties, it is puzzling why they supported national fiscal rule reforms during the European debt crisis. This paper argues that the concept of structural deficit rules, central to reform efforts across the eurozone, allowed for the formation of an ambiguous consensus between center-right and center-left parties. While conservative and liberal parties are generally supportive of institutional discretion constraints, structural deficit rules – in contrast to nominal deficit rules – allowed social democratic and other left-wing parties to link such rules with their broader policy preferences of Keynesian countercyclical policymaking and the protection of tax revenues across the economic cycle to ensure the state’s capacity for redistribution. Drawing on three country case studies (Germany, Austria, France), this paper shows how the concept of structural deficit rules facilitated – at least discursively – the support for discretion-constraining institutions among social democratic and other left-wing parties. In theoretical terms, this study also advances research on the role of ambiguity in political decision-making, (re-)conceptualizing three forms of ambiguity underlying ambiguous consensus: textual ambiguity, institutional ambiguity, and ideational ambiguity
Topic:
Economics, Macroeconomics, Fiscal Policy, Eurozone, Political Parties, Public Debt, and Fiscal Deficit
Political Geography:
France, Germany, and Austria

4. The Great Separation: Top Earner Segregation at Work in High-Income Countries

Author:
Olivier Godechot, Paula Apascaritei, István Boza, Lasse Folke Henriksen, and Are Skeie Hermansen
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
Analyzing linked employer-employee panel administrative databases, we study the evolving isolation of higher earners from other employees in eleven countries: Canada, Czechia, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Norway, Spain, South Korea, and Sweden. We find in almost all countries a growing workplace isolation of top earners and dramatically declining exposure of top earners to bottom earners. We compare these trends to segregation based on occupational class, education, age, gender, and nativity, finding that the rise in top earner isolation is much more dramatic and general across countries. We find that residential segregation is also growing, although more slowly than segregation at work, with top earners and bottom earners increasingly living in different distinct municipalities. While work and residential segregation are correlated, statistical modeling suggests that the primary causal effect is from work to residential segregation. These findings open up a future research program on the causes and consequences of top earner segregation.
Topic:
Economics, Political Economy, Labor Issues, Income Inequality, Class, and Labor Market
Political Geography:
Europe

5. Growth Models and the Footprint of Transnational Capital

Author:
Patrick Kaczmarczyk
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
The definition of various growth models is the latest innovation of comparative capitalism (CC) research. Yet, the literature has its weaknesses in explaining the dynamics within and the interdependencies between different growth models. I argue that this weakness stems inter alia from an inadequate conceptualization of transnational corporations (TNCs). I provide empirical evidence on the footprint of international capital in the global economy and outline how including TNCs as a unit of analysis can help us to better understand economic outcomes. This leads to several implications for the growth models literature, which I conclude my argument with.
Topic:
Economics, International Political Economy, Global Political Economy, Economic Growth, Transnational Actors, Multinational Corporations, and Macroeconomics
Political Geography:
Global Focus

6. Primary Dealer Systems in the European Union

Author:
Jenny Preunkert
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
States require money to function and therefore every government has to continuously raise new funds. On the financial markets, governments cannot be sure that auctions of their debt will be sufficiently attractive to financial investors, which is why governments usually enter into cooperative agreements with selected banks. The best known and most widespread form of cooperation is the primary dealer system. Primary dealers are banks that agree to participate regularly in government debt auctions and to act as formalized market makers on government debt markets. The article analyzes European primary dealer systems and asks why banks are willing to participate in these systems. I will show that both domestic and foreign banks use their status as primary dealers to build long-term relationships with one or more European governments and to gain an advantage on the global stage. In Bourdieu’s terms, primary dealer banks use their financial capital to accumulate social and symbolic capital.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, Financial Markets, Banks, and Macroeconomics
Political Geography:
Europe and European Union

7. Towards a Political Economy of Monetary Dependency: The Case of the CFA Franc in West Africa

Author:
Kai Koddenbrock and Ndongo Samba Sylla
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
This paper focuses on the most neglected case of monetary dependency: the CFA franc. This currency arrangement was born in 1945, during the colonial era, but it still operates in the same ways more than 70 years later in fourteen countries in Africa, mostly former French colonies. Engaging with the seminal African scholarship by Joseph Pouemi on internal and external monetary repression and the emergent literature on “financial subordination,” we introduce the notion of the “chain of monetary dependency,” consisting of an external and an internal part. We argue that the CFA franc provides an extreme but paradigmatic example of this chain. The CFA franc is paradigmatic because of the very strong external repression of monetary and financial policy through US dollar and euro dependence. Internally, the CFA franc arrangement radicalizes the constraints imposed on all central bank policies and bank-firm relations in the Global South and makes it more difficult to pursue growth strategies geared towards the well-being of the broader population.
Topic:
Economics, International Political Economy, Monetary Policy, and Currency
Political Geography:
France

8. Structural Exchange Pays Off: Reciprocity in Boards and Executive Compensations in US Firms (1990–2015)

Author:
Olivier Godechot, Joanne Horton, and Yuval Millo
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
We study the influence of the corporate board network on executive pay for 3,395 US firms over the period from 1990 to 2015. Drawing on structural anthropology and social exchange theory, we identify three elementary structures through which the interlocking network captures an obvious form of objective reciprocity between executives from different firms: restricted exchange, when two executives sit on each other’s respective boards; delayed exchange, when y sits on the board of x after the end of x’s mandate on the board of y ; and generalized exchange, when x sits on the board of y, who sits on the board of z, who sits on the board of x. Our results suggest that these ties, although not very common, are more frequent than those calculated by chance. We also find that the three structures of reciprocity have a positive impact on executive pay, especially on bonuses and total cash. We use the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) as a natural experiment to confirm our first findings. The impact on pay disappears after 2004, once these types of exchanges are constrained. Although linked to executive pay, these structures are not tied to any indicator of firm performance. This leads us to interpret them as a rent extraction phenomenon.
Topic:
Economics, Political Economy, Income Inequality, Business, and Public Sector
Political Geography:
United States

9. Explaining Variation in Public Debt: A Quantitative Analysis of the Effects of Governance

Author:
Andreas Eisl
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
This paper examines the main political influence factors accounting for the variation in public debt accumulation on a global scale. This allows for a reassessment of the recent focus on a regime type theory of public debt and for a test of an alternative governance theory. I argue that political stability, the rule of law, the control of corruption, government effectiveness, and regulatory quality promote lower public debt accumulation by reducing the incentives for governments to “borrow from the future,” by increasing state capacity to collect taxes and effectively use public funds, and by providing more security and equity to private investment, inducing higher economic growth and tax revenues. Both theories are tested against a number of controls stemming from theories of public choice, theories of governmental distributional conflict, as well as from politico-institutional and macroeconomic explanations of public debt accumulation. Applying different specifications of quantitative models, the two governance indicators political stability and regulatory quality show consistent effects on public debt accumulation, partly confirming the proposed governance theory. Furthermore, the paper can reproduce a public debt-reducing effect of more democratic regime types across a number of model specifications – though without a high degree of robustness.
Topic:
Corruption, Economics, International Political Economy, Regulation, Rule of Law, Macroeconomics, and Public Debt
Political Geography:
Global Focus

10. How to Make a Deal: The Role of Rankings and Personal Ties in Creating Trust in the M&A Market

Author:
Valérie Boussard, Olivier Godechot, and Nicolas Woloszko
Publication Date:
06-2016
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
This paper examines the selection of intermediaries in the French mergers and acquisitions (M&A) market, which is an opaque environment. Buyers and sellers cope with uncertainty as to the value of exchanged assets. They thus rely on the help of experts in order to secure deals. But as the valuators might be prone to opportunism, firms need to find a way to trust them. We identify two trust devices: social ties and public rankings. We explore whether these personal and impersonal devices are substitutes, independent or complementary. We study the French M&A market through a mixed-method approach, with both an ethnographic study (76 interviews) and the statistical analysis of 694 M&A deals in France in 2010. We show that both previous contacts and league table rankings of firms contribute to trust and to dealmaking. These trust devices are all the more likely to be used if the deal is risky, especially within the sell side (more at risk). We also find that firms tend to make deals only with other firms at the same level in the league tables: high-status firms tend to make deals together. Finally, we find some evidence of substitution between rankings and personal ties, especially for low-value deals.
Topic:
Economics, International Political Economy, Macroeconomics, and Corporations
Political Geography:
France