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152. The Lebanese Front: Assessing the Threat of All-Out War
- Author:
- Al Jazeera Center for Studies
- Publication Date:
- 07-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Al Jazeera Center for Studies
- Abstract:
- Indicators point to a heightened risk of war between Israel and Hezbollah, with Israel leading efforts to restore security in its northern region for resident return and to deter Hezbollah from its borders. However, high war costs and US opposition could limit escalation.
- Topic:
- Hezbollah, Armed Conflict, Escalation, and 2023 Gaza War
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, Lebanon, and United States of America
153. The US Presidential Election: Unprecedentedly High Stakes
- Author:
- Al Jazeera Center for Studies
- Publication Date:
- 08-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Al Jazeera Center for Studies
- Abstract:
- A combination of unexpected factors has led to the nomination of Kamala Harris as a replacement for Joe Biden, ushering the US elections into a new phase. This development could enhance the mechanism of political integration, but it might also lead to further exclusion, which could cause extremism and chaos, and weaken institutions.
- Topic:
- Domestic Politics, Institutions, Donald Trump, Polarization, Presidential Elections, Kamala Harris, and Political Integration
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
154. Turkish-Syrian Rapprochement: A Path Studded with Conflicting Aims
- Author:
- Al Jazeera Center for Studies
- Publication Date:
- 08-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Al Jazeera Center for Studies
- Abstract:
- Turkish President Erdoğan has expressed his desire to meet with Syrian President Assad after years of hostility. However, reconciliation is complex due to conflicting goals: Erdoğan seeks to legitimise arrangements securing his gains, while Assad demands a full Turkish withdrawal from Syrian affairs.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Syrian War, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Rapprochement, and Bashar al-Assad
- Political Geography:
- Turkey, Middle East, and Syria
155. Israel and the Palestinian support fronts: Setting a new balance of deterrence
- Author:
- Al Jazeera Center for Studies
- Publication Date:
- 08-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Al Jazeera Center for Studies
- Abstract:
- Netanyahu insists on violating the rules of engagement established since 7 October 2023, relying on military solutions to achieve his political goals and Israel's strategic objectives. However, this can only be realised if the link between Palestinian resistance in Gaza and its external support fronts is severed.
- Topic:
- Hezbollah, Houthis, Hamas, Benjamin Netanyahu, Armed Conflict, 2023 Gaza War, and Rules of Engagement
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, Yemen, Palestine, Gaza, and Lebanon
156. Tit for tat: A turn in the Russian-Ukrainian war
- Author:
- Al Jazeera Center for Studies
- Publication Date:
- 09-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Al Jazeera Center for Studies
- Abstract:
- Ukrainian forces are expanding their incursion into Russia's Kursk Oblast, a surprise not seen since World War II. The Russian response has been traditional and disorganised. If Russia fails to repel the advance, Ukraine could regain control over the conflict and set new negotiation terms.
- Topic:
- Security, Armed Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Incursion
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
157. Inside the ICBM Lobby: Special Interests or the Public Interest?
- Author:
- William D. Hartung
- Publication Date:
- 08-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- The nuclear weapons lobby is one of the most powerful forces in the military industrial complex. 1 The lobby’s current priority is advocating for the $315 billion Sentinel program to build a new Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). The program has faced controversy over both its utility and its cost, including a cost increase of a whopping 81 percent since 2020. The key champions of the Sentinel program are the Senators from Montana, North Dakota, Utah and Wyoming — states that are home to major ICBM bases or host major work on the Sentinel program. The group — known as the Senate ICBM Coalition — stresses the Sentinel’s purported role in strengthening nuclear deterrence as well as its creation of jobs in the states they represent. However, other members of Congress and ex–defense officials have raised urgent concerns about the Sentinel program, questioning the deterrence rationale that undergirds it and raising the alarm over the risk of accidental nuclear usage. Despite claims about Sentinel’s economic benefits, it remains unclear how many jobs the program will actually create. Weapons contractors — led by the Sentinel’s prime contractor, Northrop Grumman — play a central role in the ICBM lobby. Since 2018, members of the strategic forces subcommittees of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees have received $3.8 million from the 11 major Sentinel contractors. In total, ICBM contractors have donated $87 million to members of Congress in the last four election cycles alone. Contractors’ influence efforts are aided by the fact that senior government officials and members of Congress often secure jobs in the arms industry when they leave government; this provides them the opportunity to lobby former colleagues. In all, the 11 ICBM contractors have spent $226 million on lobbying in the past four election cycles. They currently employ 275 lobbyists, the vast majority of whom have passed through the revolving door from influential positions in government. The Sentinel program should be scrutinized as part of a larger reassessment of U.S. nuclear policy. The 2023 report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States endorses the program and calls for a comprehensive nuclear weapons build-up, including the possible placement of multiple nuclear warheads on ICBMs — a highly aggressive strategic posture that has not been in place since the Cold War. A high number of Commission members have ties to the nuclear weapons industry, including its co–chair Jon Kyl, who was once a lobbyist for Sentinel prime contractor Northrop Grumman. Congress must weigh the dubious benefits of the Commission’s proposals against the significant risks and costs its recommendations would entail if carried out.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Grand Strategy, Military-Industrial Complex, Militarism, and Sentinel Program
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Asia, and United States of America
158. A Saudi Accord: Implications for Israel-Palestine Relations
- Author:
- Jeremy Pressman
- Publication Date:
- 07-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- The Biden administration and Israel’s Netanyahu government have both expressed support for the idea of a trilateral agreement in which Saudi Arabia would normalize diplomatic relations with Israel in exchange for the United States providing significant benefits to Saudi Arabia, such as security guarantees. A major selling point has been the claim that such an agreement could pave the way to settling the bitter Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has again erupted into a central threat to peace in the Middle East. However, given the experience of the Trump administration’s Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between four Arab states and Israel with the hope of moving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to a resolution, deep skepticism is warranted. The Abraham Accords did nothing to advance Palestinian-Israeli conflict resolution. Even before October 7, there was no hint of Israeli moderation in response to the accords. Since October 7, we have witnessed the largest Palestinian terrorist attack in Israeli history, followed by Israel’s destruction of Gaza and the killing of thousands of Palestinians in response. This conflict risks destabilizing the entire Middle East. This brief reviews the relevant history and incentives around the claimed relationship between Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution and Israeli-Arab normalization agreements. It concludes that a U.S.-brokered normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia would be counterproductive to Israeli-Palestinian peace. Indeed, recent history suggests that Saudi Arabia and the United States would be wasting potential leverage for influencing Israeli policy and that the regional approach unhelpfully diverts attention away from the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory. Rather than pursue the already failed approach of seeking peace through the normalization of relations between Israel and third-party countries, a better route would include using U.S. leverage to directly drive Israeli-Palestinian peace. To do this, the U.S. should: 1.) Use its leverage through military aid to secure a permanent ceasefire in Gaza as a matter of urgency; 2.) Refocus on the core issues of Israeli-Palestinian peace, such as occupation, and demand genuine, substantive concessions from the Israeli government; and 3.) Fully integrate the use of U.S. leverage, such as arms sales and military assistance, into the pursuit of these goals.
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, National Security, Hegemony, Conflict, Donald Trump, Joe Biden, and Administration
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, United States of America, and UAE
159. Right-Sizing the Russian Threat to Europe
- Author:
- George Beebe, Mark Episkopos, and Anatol Lieven
- Publication Date:
- 07-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- Western leaders, including U.S. President Joe Biden, have frequently framed the invasion of Ukraine as the first step in a Russian plan of broader European conquest. However, a close examination of Russian intent and military capabilities shows this view is dangerously mistaken. Russia likely has neither the capability nor the intent to launch a war of aggression against NATO members — but the ongoing brinkmanship between Russia and the West still poses serious risks of military escalation that can only be defused by supplementing military deterrence with a diplomatic effort to address tensions. An analysis of Russian security thinking demonstrates that Putin’s stated views align with long-standing Russian fears about Western encroachment, given Russia’s lack of natural barriers to invasion. As Putin has come to view NATO as increasingly hostile to Russia, aggressive Russian action in defense of its claimed “sphere of influence” has become a factor in European security. However, contrary to many Western analyses, this does not mean that Russia views future wars of aggression against NATO member states as in its security interest. This does not imply naivete about the danger of Russian aggression, as reflected most recently in its illegal invasion of Ukraine. But it highlights the fundamental differences between Russia’s perceptions of Ukraine, which it has long regarded as both critical to its national security and integral to its history and culture, and its views of NATO countries, where the cost-benefit balance of aggression for Russia would be very different. Understanding Russian incentives also requires assessing Russia’s actual military capabilities compared to NATO. As frequently reiterated by NATO leadership, such an assessment shows that Russia is at a decisive conventional military disadvantage against the NATO alliance. While Russia would do damage in a conventional war with NATO, it would almost certainly suffer a devastating defeat in such a conflict absent nuclear escalation. NATO has a greater than three-to-one advantage over Russia in active-duty ground forces. NATO also has even greater advantages in the air and at sea. The alliance has a ten-to-one lead in military aircraft and a large qualitative edge as well, raising the probability of total air superiority. At sea, NATO would likely have the capacity to impose a naval blockade on Russian shipping, whose costs would dwarf current economic sanctions. While Russia has clear military superiority over individual NATO states, especially in the Baltics, it is extremely unlikely it could exercise this advantage without triggering a broader war with the entire NATO alliance. However, NATO’s powerful military deterrent alone cannot create stability in Europe. Paradoxically, an excessive reliance on military deterrence is likely to increase instability by inducing Russia to rely increasingly on its nuclear force as its primary basis for deterrence. Unlike conventional forces, Russia and NATO possess roughly the same amount of nuclear weapons. Washington must work to defuse this increasingly unstable dynamic by restoring diplomatic lines of communication between Russia and the West.
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, NATO, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America
160. Foreign Lobbying in the U.S.
- Author:
- Ben Freeman and Nick Cleveland-Stout
- Publication Date:
- 07-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- This brief takes a deep dive into a newly available tranche of data tracking foreign influence in the U.S. political process. The new data was released in early 2024 following reforms to the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), which made access to all foreign registrants’ political activities and campaign contributions publicly available. The brief unearths a complex web of foreign influence in the United States — with countries like Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Azerbaijan reaping the benefits of massive political influence campaigns. Influence operations today often follow a standard playbook: outside countries use firms based in Washington to lobby active members of Congress in pursuit of various aims — such as receiving U.S. weapons, currying American favor in regional conflicts, and more general reputation laundering. In 2022 and 2023, FARA registrants reported $14.3 million in political contributions and nearly 130,000 political activities. This relationship between lobbyists representing foreign countries and U.S. policymakers in itself is concerning, raising questions of whether politicians are really prioritizing the interests of their constituents, and of all Americans. To make matters worse, authoritarian regimes represent a majority of the most active countries — including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which placed first and fourth, respectively, among the countries most engaged in political activities under FARA from 2022–23. Greater FARA transparency is certainly a welcome development, but still more can be done to help Americans understand the who, what, and how of the foreign lobbying industry. For one, FARA registrants should be required to report a unique identifier for each office contacted, making it easier to determine lobbyists’ contacts. Greater language specificity in the descriptions of political activities is also needed. In addition, Congress could pass legislation that would introduce civil fines on the underreporting of political activities, although such a step should be accompanied by protections against the abuse of the FARA process.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Democratization, Conflict, and Military-Industrial Complex
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and United Arab Emirates
161. Implications of a Security Pact with Saudi Arabia
- Author:
- Paul R. Pillar
- Publication Date:
- 06-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- The Biden administration is seeking a deal in which Saudi Arabia would extend full diplomatic recognition to Israel in exchange for the United States providing Saudi Arabia a security guarantee, assistance in developing a nuclear program, and more unrestricted arms sales. Such an arrangement would further enmesh the United States in Middle Eastern disputes and intensify regional divisions. It would work against a favorable pattern of regional states working out their differences when the United States leaves them on their own — illustrated by the Chinese-brokered détente between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Besides being an authoritarian state lacking shared values with the United States, Saudi Arabia under Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) has aggressively pursued regional dominance, most notably with its highly destructive war in Yemen. A U.S. security guarantee could motivate MBS to engage in even riskier behavior and draw the United States into conflicts in which it has no stake, such as the sectarian dispute that had led Saudi Arabia to break relations with Iran. An expanded Saudi nuclear program would have a military as well as an energy dimension, with MBS having openly expressed interest in nuclear weapons. Granting the Saudi demand for help in enriching uranium would be a blow to the global nonproliferation regime as well as a reversal of longstanding U.S. policy. A race in nuclear capabilities between Iran and Saudi Arabia may result. Meeting MBS’ demands would not curb Saudi relations with China, which are rooted in strong economic and other interests. The United States could compete more effectively with China in the region not by taking on additional security commitments but instead by emulating the Chinese in engaging all regional states in the interest of reducing tensions. Normalization of diplomatic relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia would not be a peace agreement, given the already extensive security cooperation between them. Even the gift of normalization with Riyadh would be unlikely to soften Israel’s hard-line positions regarding the war in Gaza and the larger Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and instead would only reduce further Israeli motivation to resolve that conflict.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, National Security, Conflict, Normalization, Joe Biden, and Military
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America
162. Private Finance and the Quest to Remake Modern Warfare
- Author:
- Michael Brenes and William D. Hartung
- Publication Date:
- 06-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- Official Washington is all in on promoting a new type of warfare based on military applications of AI and other emerging technologies. This determination was on full display last year when the Biden administration unveiled the “Replicator” initiative, an attempt to develop swarms of high-tech weapons systems at relatively low cost, and in numbers capable of overwhelming any potential adversary. But the history of so-called miracle weapons offers ample reasons to doubt Replicator’s supposedly transformative potential. Previous innovations, from the “electronic battlefield” in Vietnam to drone warfare in the Global War on Terrorism, did not, in fact, revolutionize war as we know it. Cutting-edge technology is no substitute for sound strategy or a realistic assessment of what military force can achieve. Unfortunately, so far, at least, these lessons from history have been no match for the boosterism of venture capital (VC) firms that pride themselves on disrupting industries and overturning conventional wisdom. While estimates of total VC funding of emerging military technology vary widely, it is clear that private investments in emerging weapons technologies are large and growing, driven by a handful of major Silicon Valley players, including Peter Thiel’s Founders Fund and Andreessen-Horowitz. Companies backed by these firms, including Palantir, Anduril, and SpaceX, have already landed major contracts for weapons systems that incorporate next-generation technology. These firms and their allies in the Pentagon and Congress are determined to move full speed ahead on the development and deployment of weapons based on AI and other technological innovations, despite many unanswered questions about the costs and risks involved. While the bulk of Pentagon funding still goes to the “big five” contractors — Lockheed Martin, RTX (formerly Raytheon), Boeing, General Dynamics, and Northrop Grumman — VC-backed startups aspire to become the future of military contracting, and they hope that AI and other emerging technologies will be their ticket. These startups may prove to be more nimble and innovative than the bloated, top-heavy firms that currently dominate the arms industry, but they should not be allowed to operate with impunity. Congress must establish ground rules that prevent military startups from exploiting the procurement process in ways that pad their bottom lines while providing flawed systems — outcomes that we have seen all too often from their traditional rivals. What is most important, the rush to profit from emerging military tech cannot be allowed to short-circuit the careful scrutiny and wide-ranging public debate that must precede any move toward a brave new world of autonomous warfare in which human intervention in the kill chain is significantly reduced, if not eliminated. This brief offers policymakers a framework for ensuring that unsupported promises to “reinvent” warfare don’t exacerbate the cycle of corruption and waste that has all too often plagued the Pentagon’s procurement process, to the detriment of our safety and security.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Finance, Grand Strategy, and Warfare
- Political Geography:
- North America, Global Focus, and United States of America
163. Rethinking the U.S.–Belarus Relationship
- Author:
- Mark Episkopos
- Publication Date:
- 05-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- Belarus is commonly seen as a Russian outpost on NATO’s eastern flank, with its president, Aleksandr Lukashenko, cast as a categorical opponent of Western interests. This narrative became ascendant in the West after Russia’s full–scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. However, a fuller examination of Belarusian foreign policy under President Lukashenko reveals a more nuanced picture of a country that, despite its historic ties to Russia, has consistently demonstrated a willingness to engage with the West. Lukashenko has sought to pursue what he calls a “multi–vector foreign policy,” straddling the great powers to best safeguard Belarus’s national sovereignty and its interests. This multi–pronged approach has shifted decidedly in recent years, however, with Lukashenko drifting into the Russian camp, as evidenced by Minsk providing logistical support and safe passage to Russian troops in its war on Ukraine, and allowing Russian tactical nuclear weapons on Belarussian soil. But these policies did not occur in a vacuum. They were, rather, a direct result of American efforts to isolate Belarus through a maximum pressure campaign which began in the aftermath of the 2020 re–election of Lukashenko. Western policies aimed at isolating Minsk have had the counterproductive effect of pushing Lukashenko closer to Moscow and Beijing, in an effort to counteract what he sees as a Western program of driving regime change in Belarus. Western governments, particularly Washington, should recognize that maximum pressure will backfire by pushing Belarus closer to Moscow. An alternative strategy based on resetting relations with Belarus and enabling the return of Lukashenko’s multi–vector foreign policy holds the promise of preventing the further integration of Belarus and Russia and possibly even reversing some of Putin’s moves to pull Belarus into the Russian orbit. To execute this strategy, the United States should: Explicitly disavow regime change and the training of anti–Lukashenko dissidents as U.S. policy goals in direct talks with Belarussian officials, conditioned on Belarussian assurance that it will not use its territory as a staging ground for attacks on NATO Establish a piecemeal approach for sanctions relief with Belarus as progress is made toward resetting relations Pursue bilateral cooperation with Belarus, including the resumption of energy trade, American investment, and other cultural arrangements. Pursuing the soft reset prescribed in this paper will not be easy, but the alternatives would leave the United States in a weaker strategic position by needlessly heightening Minsk’s dependence on its Russian neighbor. Steps toward reaching a new understanding with Belarus can instead bolster eastern European stability and enhance NATO’s eastern deterrent posture.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, NATO, National Security, Bilateral Relations, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eastern Europe, Belarus, and United States of America
164. Subsidizing the Military-Industrial Complex: A Review of the Secretary of Defense Executive Fellows (SDEF) Program
- Author:
- Brett Heinz and Ben Freeman
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- For nearly 30 years, an obscure Department of Defense (DoD) program has given Pentagon contractors a taxpayer-subsidized opportunity to influence U.S. military policy, creating massive conflicts of interest — yet little scrutiny. This research brief offers a first of its kind look at the DoD’s Secretary of Defense Executive Fellows (SDEF) program, which sends U.S. military officers to work at major corporations for a year, and then return and provide recommendations to the DoD for how it might improve. Military contractors benefit disproportionately from the SDEF program. Twenty-nine percent of all SDEF fellows have gone to the nation’s top 50 government contractors, with 15 percent going to the “big five” military contractors alone. None of the 317 fellows in the program’s history has ever served at a public sector institution. Decades of SDEF recommendations have consistently focused on reforms that would both benefit corporations and bolster their influence over the DoD, including calls for a greater share of the agency’s budget to be given to military contractors, reduced oversight, greater private outsourcing of agency responsibilites, and the loosening of international arms trade regulations. SDEF also keeps the revolving door between public service and private profit spinning. Forty-three percent of SDEF fellows went on to work for a government contractor at some point in their post-military career. In consistently failing to distinguish between what’s best for corporate executives and what’s best for the American people, the SDEF program represents a dangerous embrace of the military-industrial complex. Whereas Dwight D. Eisenhower warned against the “conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry” whose “total influence” can be seen in “every office of the Federal Government,” the SDEF program explicitly advocates for it. SDEF has become a reliable method for corporations to disguise self–interested policy aspirations as helpful recommendations for DoD. If this program is to continue, DoD must act forcefully to address and minimize the unsettling conflicts of interest embedded within SDEF by: Enforcing a “one defense contractor per year” rule; Barring fellows from working in “government relations” roles; Exploring post–employment restrictions for former fellows; Re–balancing orientations away from undue corporate influence and political bias; Rationalizing program size.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military-Industrial Complex, and Militarism
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
165. The U.S.–Japan–South Korea Trilateral Partnership: Pursuing Regional Stability and Avoiding Military Escalation
- Author:
- James Park and Mike M. Mochizuki
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- A trilateral partnership is emerging in northeast Asia. Building off last August’s Camp David summit between the countries’ leaders, the United States, Japan, and South Korea are now engaging militarily in an unprecedented fashion, shaping an alignment aimed to counter North Korea and China. Efforts to discourage North Korean and Chinese aggression are necessary, particularly considering Japan and South Korea’s physical proximity to the two countries. But the emerging trilateral arrangement between the United States, Japan, and South Korea could backfire and increase the risk of conflict if it focuses exclusively on military deterrence. The United States, Japan, and South Korea should instead pursue a more balanced arrangement — one that promotes stability on the Korean peninsula, credibly reaffirms long standing policy over the Taiwan issue, and disincentivizes China from pursuing its own trilateral military partnership with North Korea and Russia. To deter North Korea, the United States, South Korea, and Japan are relying on strike capabilities and military coordination to retaliate against North Korean aggression. This approach, however, will likely induce North Korea to increase its nuclear weapons and upgrade its missile capabilities. With this in mind, the three countries should roll back policy rhetoric and joint military exercises that might further provoke rather than deter North Korea, especially anything geared towards regime destruction. At the same time, the United States, Japan, and South Korea have in recent years become more reluctant to endorse the original understandings they each reached with China about Taiwan. For the sake of reassurance, the three countries together should clearly confirm in official statements their One China policies and declare that they oppose unilateral changes to the status quo by any side, do not support Taiwan independence, and will accept any resolution of the Taiwan issue (including unification) achieved by peaceful and non–coercive means. Each country’s respective relationship with Taiwan should also remain strictly unofficial. Another concerning aspect associated with this trilateral is the possibility of a corresponding alliance formation of Russia, China, and North Korea. To disincentivize this development, the United States, Japan, and South Korea should leverage their blossoming relationship to assuage Chinese fears of strategic containment, particularly through economic and diplomatic engagement that rejects the creation of a broadly exclusionary bloc in the region.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, Escalation, Regional Security, Great Powers, and Regional Stability
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America
166. Stabilizing the Growing Taiwan Crisis: New Messaging and Understandings are Urgently Needed
- Author:
- Michael D. Swaine
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- The U.S.–China relationship appears to have stabilized since the November 2023 meeting between U.S. president Joe Biden and China’s president Xi Jinping in San Francisco. The reality, however, is that the features and trends pushing both countries toward a confrontation over Taiwan persist, fueling a dangerous, interactive dynamic that could quickly overcome any diplomatic thaw between the world’s foremost powers. These underlying forces — increased levels of domestic threat inflation in both the United States and China, the worst–casing of the other side’s motives and intentions, and the resulting erosion in the confidence of the original understanding over Taiwan reached in the 1970s — threaten to push Beijing and Washington into a crisis over Taiwan that both sides say they want to avoid. To defuse this worrying dynamic, both the United States and China must reaffirm long standing policy on Taiwan, while also undertaking a set of specific actions to further stabilize the relationship between the two countries. The Biden administration should explicitly reject extreme rhetoric towards China and deviations from longstanding policy on Taiwan, such as the framing of Sino–American competition as a titanic struggle between democracy and authoritarianism, and the contention that an independent Taiwan is strategically crucial to overall Asian security. The administration can further inject stability into U.S.–China interactions over Taiwan by re–affirming and clarifying the One China policy through a series of statements, including: The United States opposes any Chinese effort to coerce Taiwan or compel unification through force. However, the United States would accept any resolution of the cross–Strait issue that is reached without coercion and that is endorsed by the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The United States recognizes that the defense of Taiwan is primarily the responsibility of the people of Taiwan. Relatedly, and in accordance with the U.S.–China normalization agreement, Washington is committed to maintaining only unofficial relations with Taiwan and has no desire to alter this commitment. The United States Government reiterates that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China’s internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan. These statements should be made in combination with actions that bolster cooperative engagement with China, such as the initiation of a combined civilian and military Track 1.5 dialogue with Beijing. We believe that this type of reassurance would lead to corresponding commitments from China that would improve stability in the Taiwan Strait, such as reductions in provocative military exercises and potentially high level Chinese declarations that reject coercive measures towards Taiwan and a specific timeline for reunification. The recent improvements to the Sino–American relationship shouldn’t go to waste. The United States and China should go beyond the mere appearance of stabilization and revitalize the original understanding over Taiwan. Otherwise, they risk a continuous spiral towards full–scale conflict.
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Realism, Regional Stability, and Restraint
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America
167. Ukraine, Gaza, and the International Order
- Author:
- Faisal Devji
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- The ongoing crises in Ukraine and Gaza show the urgent need for a new internationalism that comes to grips with the increasing independence of middle and smaller powers around the world. Such a vision must reject the effort to re-impose a failed framework of unilateral U.S. primacy, or an effort to shoehorn multiplying regionally specific conflicts into an obsolete model of “great power competition” that recalls the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. In both Ukraine and the Middle East, the United States has been unable to impose its will either militarily or diplomatically. Smaller nations have successfully defied American–backed military force. Even more concerning, a significant share of the global community has failed to follow the U.S. diplomatic lead and support the U.S. interpretation of international norms. But opposition to the United States has not been supported by a superpower peer competitor to the United States, along the lines of a Cold War model. The current emerging world order is instead characterized by “regionalization,” a situation where middle and even small powers around the world feel free to circumvent or even defy U.S. interpretations of global norms based on more local interests and regional security concerns. The stage was set for the current situation by the U.S. attempt to assert unilateral power during the War on Terror in ways that appeared to give the United States alone a de facto exemption from global norms and institutions. These actions reduced the legitimacy of the post–World War Two international order that the United States had helped to create, and led many in the international community to seek alternatives to a system that seemed to grant the United States almost arbitrary power to define the rules. The U.S. foreign policy establishment must come to grips with the newly deglobalized and regionalized world order. A failure to do so poses a grave threat to U.S. power and influence, as relationships with key emerging powers such as India, or even traditional U.S. allies in Europe and Asia are not immune from the kind of de–globalizing and regionalizing forces seen in Ukraine and the Middle East.
- Topic:
- Cold War, International Law, National Security, Hegemony, Grand Strategy, Armed Conflict, International Order, Russia-Ukraine War, and 2023 Gaza War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, Israel, Eastern Europe, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America
168. Paths to Crisis and Conflict Over Taiwan
- Author:
- Michael D. Swaine and James Park
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- Taiwan is the most likely flashpoint for a U.S.–China conflict, unmatched in its combustible mix of conflicting interests, high stakes, and eroding trust and assurances. A full–blown war over Taiwan has become a startling possibility. Suspicion, threat inflation, zero–sum framing, and worst–casing are increasingly dominant factors in U.S.–China interactions over Taiwan, driven by preconceived ideas of the other’s intentions based on history and ideology, and domestic pressures in each country to prioritize military deterrence and even aggression. Amidst this emerging threat of direct conflict, numerous scholars, experts, and military strategists have focused on how to discourage China from invading Taiwan through military force alone — warfighting perspectives that typically share glaring and mutually reinforcing faults that, if overlooked, may only help to pave the path toward conflict. Analysts’ emphasis on military deterrence tends to obscure the utmost importance of political reassurances to avert conflict, particularly the United States reaffirming and recommitting to its original understanding of the One China Policy; this fixation on the military dimension feeds into the destabilization of the Taiwan issue, brought about by heightened suspicions of the other side’s intentions. Policymakers and pundits, in turn, tend to underestimate the possibility of inadvertent escalation, driven by an environment of distrust, pressure in Washington and Beijing to appear tough on the other, and a lack of comprehensive crisis management mechanisms. By examining the common analytical blindspots regarding a conflict over Taiwan, this report sheds new light on how the political and social dynamics fueling mutual hostility between Beijing and Washington could play a much more decisive role in a future crisis over Taiwan, rather than factors that earn far more attention, such as calculations about military capability and resolve. Averting a destructive crisis will require the United States and China to build off recent diplomatic progress to restore a deeper mutual understanding concerning Taiwan through policies and actions including: Mutual recognition of the interactive nature of the growing crisis over Taiwan, to which Beijing, Washington, and Taipei contribute. A clearer, more credible U.S. commitment to its successful, long–standing stance on Taiwan: the One China Policy and strategic ambiguity. Continued U.S. rejection of both unilateral Taiwan independence and any unambiguous commitment to Taiwan’s defense. A credible Chinese affirmation of its continued commitment to peaceful unification without any specific deadline. The development of a broad–based crisis communication mechanism that includes both military and civilian dialogue.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, Crisis Management, Joe Biden, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America
169. Responsibly Demilitarizing U.S.–Mexico Bilateral Security Relations
- Author:
- Aileen Teague
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- These are trying times for U.S.–Mexico relations. As America’s opioid epidemic reaches unprecedented proportions, U.S. politicians have begun to advocate unilateral military action against Mexican drug cartels in sovereign Mexican territory. This approach would not only do extraordinary damage to one of America’s most vital international relationships, but also carry a real risk of importing violence to the United States. The calls for military action have infuriated Mexico’s leaders, who in turn criticize America’s broken and inhumane border security and Washington’s inability to curb the seemingly insatiable demand for drugs in the United States. The basis for the neighboring nations’ security cooperation, the 2008 Mérida Initiative, seems to have failed, largely failing to stem the tide of violence and instability in Mexico, or to halt the cross border flow of migrants, guns, and drugs. The result is poor regional security and a deteriorating bilateral relationship. There is reason to hope that the Plan Mérida’s replacement, the U.S.–Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities, will strengthen bilateral cooperation and help put security relations on a path to demilitarization. However, since the State Department announced the framework in 2021, little progress has been made in developing the shape and contents of this program. The continued failure to articulate how the Bicentennial Framework will represent a meaningful break from failed policies in the past suggests militarized enforcement may still dominate security relations for years to come. This status quo poses grave risks to both countries. But through the Bicentennial Framework, U.S. policymakers have the potential to make meaningful changes in bilateral security relations by: Rejecting U.S. unilateralist measures against Mexico Developing more robust policies to halt U.S. arms flow to Mexico Reducing the military’s role in enforcement functions and redirecting military entities toward civil action and development Supporting Mexico–led development programs By decreasing the scope of militarization in regional security policies through an appropriately designed Bicentennial Framework, the United States and Mexico can achieve healthier and more balanced relations, and eliminate the risk of a worst-case scenario: unilateral U.S. military intervention next door.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, Global South, Borders, Restraint, and Security Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- North America, Mexico, Global Focus, and United States of America
170. What if? The Effects of a Hard Decoupling from China on the German Economy
- Author:
- Julian Baqaee, Julian Hinz, Benjamin Moll, Moritz Schularick, Feodora A. Teti, Joschka Wanner, and Sihwan Yang
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- Abstract:
- How would the German economy cope with a hard economic decoupling from China? The authors study a scenario where the global economy fragments into three distinct blocs: the G7 economies and their allies, China and her allies, as well as neutral countries. German trade with China would have to be entirely rerouted to countries within the "Western" block and neutral countries. The authors quantify the costs of such a worst-case hard decoupling using the (Baqaee and Farhi 2021) multi-sector model of the world economy. The key finding is that a total cut-off of trade relations with China would have severe but not devastating effects on the German economy. The welfare loss for Germany (relative to a no-cut-off baseline) would be around 5 percent of Gross National Expenditure (GNE) over the first few months and around 4 percent over the first year, plus additional short run costs due to business-cycle amplification effects. In the medium and long run, the costs would fall to a permanent loss in the 1–2 percent range. Less extreme decoupling or gradual de-risking scenarios (“small yard, high fence") would incur smaller costs. The single most influential assumption relates to the “trade elasticity,", i.e., the ease and speed with which trade can be reorganized away from China to neutral countries and within the “Western” block. The authors´ findings, in particular the critical dependence of economic costs on the time horizon over which adjustments take place, provide some rationale for embarking on a gradual de-risking trajectory to avoid a costly and politically contentious hard decoupling dictated by geopolitical events.
- Topic:
- Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Sanctions, Geoeconomics, Decoupling, and De-Risking
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and Germany
171. Paying Off Populism: EU-Regionalpolitik verringert Unterstützung populistischer Parteien
- Author:
- Robert Gold and Jakob Lehr
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- Abstract:
- How to break the populist wave? With the elections to the European Parliament ahead, and the Presidential Elections in the US looming, this question bothers policymakers in many Western democracies. Our study shows that regional policies effectively decrease populist support. Specifically, EU Regional Policy investing into the development of lagging-behind regions decreases the vote share obtained by right-fringe populist parties by 15–20 percent. Moreover, regional policy investments increase trust in democratic institutions, and decreases discontent with the EU.
- Topic:
- Political Economy, European Union, Populism, and Regional Integration
- Political Geography:
- Europe
172. Foul Play? On the Scale and Scope of Industrial Subsidies in China
- Author:
- Frank Bickenbach, Dirk Dohse, Rolf Langhammer, and Wan-Hsin Liu
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- Abstract:
- China makes extensive use of subsidies in order to take a leading role on the global markets in the green technology sectors of electric vehicles, wind turbines and railway rolling stock. According to DiPippo et al. (2022) and recent OECD studies, the industrial subsidies in China are at least three to four times or even up to nine times higher than in the major EU and OECD countries. According to a very conservative estimate, industrial subsidies in China amounted to around EUR 221 billion or 1.73% of Chinese GDP in 2019. According to recent data of 2022, direct government subsidies for some of the dominant Chinese manufacturers of green technology products had also increased significantly - the electric car manufacturer BYD alone received EUR 2.1 billion. The authors point out that Chinese companies are benefiting from further support measures, including subsidized inputs, preferential access to critical raw materials, forced technology transfers, the strategic use of public procurement and the preferential treatment of domestic firms in administrative procedures. The authors recommend the EU to use its anti-subsidy proceeding against BEV imports from China to enter into negotiations with the Chinese government and persuade it to abolish public support measures that are particularly harmful to the EU.
- Topic:
- Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Foreign Direct Investment, European Union, Business, Renewable Energy, Industry, Subsidies, and Electric Vehicles
- Political Geography:
- China and Europe
173. African Sovereign Defaults and the Common Framework: Divergent Chinese Interests Grant Western Countries a “Consumer Surplus”
- Author:
- Eckhardt Bode
- Publication Date:
- 05-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- Abstract:
- • China has become a major player in sovereign lending towards Africa during the past two decades but has recently been faced with increasing defaults. A new African debt crisis is looming. • Differences in the motives of sovereign lending between China and Western creditor countries contribute to preventing effective global sovereign debt management under the “Common Framework for Debt Treatment” in this looming African debt crisis. Chi-nese lending during the past two decades was motivated primarily by its own economic interests while most of the Western countries’ lending appears to be at odds with their self-interests but is not yet well-understood. • Debt settlements under the Common Framework that involve China are less generous than past settlements with the Paris Club alone. This is an obstacle to a rapid and sus-tainable economic recovery of financially distressed African countries. • Western countries derive a kind of “consumer surplus” from the agreements under the Common Framework because they are prepared to make greater concessions than Chi-na. They could transfer this hypothetical surplus as additional (conditional) Official De-velopment Assistance to the defaulted African countries to alleviate social hardship.
- Topic:
- Emerging Markets, International Trade and Finance, Financial Markets, Lending, Economic Crisis, Sovereign Debt, Consumer Behavior, and Geoeconomics
- Political Geography:
- Africa and China
174. Build Carbon Removal Reserve to Secure Future of EU Emissions Trading
- Author:
- Wilfried Rickels, Mathias Fridahl, Roland Rothenstein, and Felix Schenuit
- Publication Date:
- 05-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- Abstract:
- • A carbon central bank (CCB) that translates carbon removals into allowances would transform the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) from a fiat allowance to a gold standard system, ensuring unchanged net emissions on the path to net-zero greenhouse gas (GHG) targets. • Meeting such expectations would require a CCB with a clear commitment to a net-zero GHG target, but also with the capacity to manage the market on the path to that target. • This requires a strong institutional framework, which could be achieved by integrating the CCB into the European Central Bank (ECB), building on its reputation and capacity. • Given the long lead time to set up such an institution, the European Commission should already take the first steps to fulfil the other requirement, namely building up a large carbon removal certificate (CRC) reserve, which would provide the CCB with the credibility to stabilize the market in the future. • To fill the CRC reserve, the EU should emulate the US approach by immediately initiating resultbased carbon removal procurement as a first key step of a sequential approach to integrated carbon removal into climate policy. • This could be achieved by developing a centralized procurement program, supporting existing procurement programs, such as Sweden’s or Denmark’s, and incentivizing additional EU member states to initiate procurement. • An important prerequisite for this is the ability to bank CRCs that are not yet eligible for compliance with near-term EU climate targets and use them in later crediting periods.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, European Union, Carbon Emissions, Net Zero, and Carbon Central Bank
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Global Focus
175. EU-China Trade Relations: Where Do We Stand, Where Should We Go?
- Author:
- Alexander Sandkamp
- Publication Date:
- 05-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- Abstract:
- • In the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic, China’s share in European trade has fallen continuously. Nevertheless, the country remains the EU’s largest source of imports (20.5 percent in 2023) and its third largest export destination (8.7 percent). • This apparent dominance of China is put into perspective when incorporating intra-EU trade. For example, Germany – Europe’s largest economy – sent 6.1 percent of its ex-ports to China, but 55 percent to EU members states. For imports, the Chinese and Euro-pean shares are 11.5 percent and 52.7 percent, respectively. • Decoupling the EU from China (i.e. almost eliminating bilateral trade) would permanent-ly reduce European real income by 0.8 percent in the long-run. In terms of gross domes-tic product in 2023, the EU would forego 136 billion EUR of value added every year. Short-term effects are likely to be stronger. • China dominates global production of important products such as laptops and mobile phones as well as raw materials including Germanium and Gallium that are critical for the green energy transition. A trade disruption might thus both delay the energy transi-tion and increase its costs. • To reduce specific dependencies, the EU should intensify its efforts to diversify procure-ment by increasing the attractiveness of alternative suppliers. Finding the courage to move forward in the negotiation of free trade agreements with potential strategic part-ners such as Australia and the Mercosur countries would strengthen the EU’s geopolitical position and increase prosperity among partners.
- Topic:
- Globalization, International Trade and Finance, European Union, Geoeconomics, and Decoupling
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and Germany
176. EU-NATO relations in a new threat environment: Significant complementarity but a lack of strategic cooperation
- Author:
- Tuomas Iso-Markku
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
- Abstract:
- The relationship between the EU and NATO has traditionally been characterised by a degree of ambiguity and competition but also by attempts at coordination and cooperation. In the context of Russia’s war on Ukraine, the EU and NATO have played crucial and mutually complementary roles, taking advantage of their respective strengths. However, there are also many areas in which their efforts overlap and closer cooperation would be necessary. Thus far, only small steps in this direction have been taken. Ideally, the EU and NATO would work together to develop a more strategic outlook on issues such as developing Europe’s military capabilities, strengthening the security and defence of membership aspirants as well as managing crises beyond EU and NATO territory. Formal relations between the EU and NATO remain complicated. However, there are ways to work around the existing obstacles to EU-NATO cooperation, not least in the capitals of EU and NATO member states.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, and Threat Assessment
- Political Geography:
- Europe
177. Nuclear arms control policies and safety in artificial intelligence: Transferable lessons or false equivalence?
- Author:
- Eoin Micheál McNamara
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
- Abstract:
- Multiple nuclear arms control treaties have collapsed in recent years, but analogies associated with them have returned as possible inspiration to manage risks stemming from artificial intelligence (AI) advancement. Some welcome nuclear arms control analogies as an important aid to understanding strategic competition in AI, while others see them as an irrelevant distraction, weakening the focus on new frameworks to manage AI’s unique and unprecedented aspects. The focus of this debate is sometimes too narrow or overly selective when a wider examination of arms control geopolitics can identify both irrelevant and valuable parallels to assist global security governance for AI. Great power leaders frequently equate AI advancement with arms racing, reasoning that powers lagging behind will soon see their great power status weakened. This logic serves to intensify competition, risking a spiral into more unsafe AI practices. The global norm institutionalization that established nuclear taboos can also stigmatize unethical AI practices. Emphasizing reciprocal risk reduction offers pragmatic starting points for great power management of AI safety. This research is part of the Reignite Multilateralism via Technology (REMIT) project, funded by the European Union’s Horizon Europe research and innovation programme under Grant Agreement No. 101094228.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Cybersecurity, Economic Policy, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and United States of America
178. Japan’s multi-layered security strategy: Deterrence, coalition-building and economic security
- Author:
- Bart Gaens
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
- Abstract:
- At the end of 2022, Japan announced substantial changes to its defence posture with the publication of a new National Security Strategy, a National Defence Strategy, and a Defence Buildup Programme. These included a boosted defence budget and the addition of deterrence through counterstrike capabilities. The policy shift is partly driven by the war in Ukraine, even if it can also be seen in the light of a much longer process of incremental changes. Furthermore, the new defence policy should be viewed in a broader context as part of Japan’s evolving multi-layered security strategy. In addition to deterrence, other central pillars of this multi-layered strategy include coalition-building through alignment, Official Security Assistance for developing countries, a normatively pragmatic engagement with the Global South, and economic security. Japan’s enhanced capabilities and increasingly proactive stance on coalition-building and alignment policy offer opportunities for cooperation, including with the EU and NATO. However, a more robust defence posture is offset by domestic challenges, including institutionalized self-imposed restrictions, political opposition, public opinion, economic and fiscal factors, and a greying population.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Aging, Deterrence, Economic Security, and Coalition
- Political Geography:
- Japan and Asia
179. China as the second nuclear peer of the United States: Implications for deterrence in Europe
- Author:
- Jyri Lavikainen
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
- Abstract:
- China’s nuclear build-up will make it a nuclear peer adversary of the United States in the 2030s. The US will have to deter both Russia and China, as well as other regional adversaries, with forces geared to engage in one major war at a time. If two major wars occur either simultaneously or sequentially, US military capability will be put under great stress. In the event of a second war, the US may find itself in a situation of conventional military inferiority, which it might have to compensate for with greater reliance on nuclear weapons. Since the US remains the ultimate guarantor of European security, its deterrence challenges elsewhere affect European security as well. Thus, even the possibility of war in the Indo-Pacific is a European security issue. European NATO allies can help mitigate the two-peer problem by permanently taking on a greater share of the burden of Europe’s conventional defence. At the same time, the effectiveness of NATO’s nuclear capability must be enhanced. A strategic defeat for Russia in the war in Ukraine would postpone Russia’s ability to pose a military threat to Europe. Ukraine’s NATO membership would further serve to reduce the threat of another major war in Europe.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America
180. Foreign investments, de-risking and the EU’s green transition: Mining critical minerals in Finland
- Author:
- Elina Sinkkonen and Marco Siddi
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
- Abstract:
- The EU is highly dependent on imports of critical and strategic raw materials, both at the extraction and the processing stages. Many of the key supply chains for these materials are dominated by China. In addition, the EU is also dependent on China for many green technologies, such as battery production. The EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act (2023) sets concrete targets for reducing dependencies in the green transition by 2030. Considering both the level of existing dependencies in critical and strategic raw materials and the fact that the Act does not provide any new funding instruments, the feasibility of reaching the set targets is questionable. The Finnish mining sector presents an interesting case that illustrates the scarcity of domestic financing. Most metal ore mines in Finland are owned by foreign companies, and similar trends apply to the refining and recycling of materials. If the EU wishes to mitigate the risks of becoming dependent on authoritarian countries, foreign investments in sectors relevant to the green transition should be subject to investment screening. For example, the Finnish Act on the Screening of Foreign Corporate Acquisitions does not cover greenfield investments such as investments in building battery factories.
- Topic:
- European Union, Mining, Supply Chains, Green Transition, Raw Materials, Critical Raw Materials (CRM), and De-Risking
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Finland
181. EU support for Ukraine: The paradox of insufficient assistance
- Author:
- Tyyne Karjalainen
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
- Abstract:
- Since Russia started its aggression against Ukraine in 2014, EU member states have lacked the political will to firmly contest Russia’s imperialism in the shared neighbourhood. This was concretized in the rejection of Ukraine’s EU path and the failure to build Ukraine’s military capabilities before 2022. The EU’s response to Russia’s full-scale invasion has been more successful than expected considering its limited capabilities and some past failures of international security assistance. The West is, however, failing to equip Ukraine to win the war. This paradox of insufficient aid leaves Ukraine in limbo, whereby it is enabled to continue the defence effort but without adequate means to succeed. In theory, the EU backs Ukraine’s strategy of non-negotiation with Russia, but the limited military support is pushing Kyiv towards peace talks. EU capitals continue to disagree over the extent to which Russia’s imperialist policies need to be suppressed, and whether small concessions could help to end the war in Europe. Even in the scenario where Ukraine emerges from the war as a truly sovereign state, the risk of future Russian interference, combined with Ukraine’s particular vulnerabilities and the likely challenges of post-war reconstruction, cast a shadow over its immediate future.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, European Union, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Ukraine
182. India’s critical minerals strategy: Geopolitical imperatives and energy transition goals
- Author:
- Dhanasree Jayaram and Ramu C. M.
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
- Abstract:
- India ranks fourth in the world in terms of installed renewable energy capacity, with goals to further increase non-fossil fuel-based electric power capacity to 50% by 2030 and achieve net-zero emissions by 2070. However, its goals are dependent on a reliable and sustainable supply of critical minerals. Geopolitically, India’s critical minerals strategy is influenced by international dynamics and its systemic rivalry with China. India is therefore cooperating and collaborating with the United States, Australia, the European Union, Argentina, Chile, the Quad, the G20, and other actors to secure reliable supply chains for critical minerals. India is implementing regulatory and structural reforms to boost domestic production by increasing private investment and auctioning critical mineral blocks. At the same time, it requires immense financial and technological investment to advance this domestic strategy. To mitigate the risks associated with supply chain disruptions, India is set to strengthen its complementary two-pronged approach of boosting domestic production and pursuing international partnerships.
- Topic:
- Security, Geopolitics, Supply Chains, Energy, Green Transition, and Critical Minerals
- Political Geography:
- South Asia and India
183. The rise of the far right in the European Union: Gaining power not through a sweeping victory, but through creeping normalisation
- Author:
- Nils Fabian Müller
- Publication Date:
- 05-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
- Abstract:
- In the 2024 EU elections, far-right parties are expected to win more seats in the European Parliament than ever before. At the national level, too, far-right parties are entering more and more EU governments. Despite these gains, the centre-right European People’s Party, rather than the far right, is likely to play the central role in the EU institutions in the next legislature. The EU’s consensus-based system is a safeguard against the sudden seizure of power by far-right parties. But once they have achieved a certain position, the same system makes it difficult for others to form majorities without them. The EU is therefore facing not a sweeping but a creeping gain in far-right power, as centrist political parties become more open to cooperation, and far-right positions are slowly normalised in political discourse. Paradoxically, the very mechanisms that are supposed to protect national sovereignty (such as unanimity requirements in the Council) are the ones most likely to allow far-right parties to influence EU policy, even if they represent only a minority of EU citizens.
- Topic:
- Elections, European Union, Far Right, and European Parliament
- Political Geography:
- Europe
184. Russia’s presidential election: Signalling repression and demobilizing opposition
- Author:
- Margarita Zavadskaya
- Publication Date:
- 05-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
- Abstract:
- Autocrats such as Vladimir Putin use elections strategically to demonstrate their capability to secure the necessary votes. This primarily benefits the regime’s inner circle and rent-seeking elites who rely on Putin’s presidency for their wealth. Although a notable proportion of the Russian population regards the election and Putin’s leadership as legitimate, their support for Russia’s military actions in Ukraine is waning. Only a slim majority backs the continuation of the conflict. Despite the oppressive political environment, opposition initiatives such as “Noon against Putin” manifest ongoing resistance. These actions were reflected in vote tallies abroad, where support for Putin was dramatically lower than in Russia. The post-election period is likely to see the persistence of Russia’s current domestic and foreign policies, with the potential for increased societal and economic tensions. The declining support for the war could further complicate the regime’s efforts to maintain a unified front. This could potentially impact Russia’s global standing and internal stability.
- Topic:
- Authoritarianism, Elections, Democracy, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Eurasia
185. The Joint Expeditionary Force in Northern Europe: Towards a more integrated security architecture?
- Author:
- Antti Pihlajamaa
- Publication Date:
- 05-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
- Abstract:
- The Joint Expeditionary Force – a UK-led defence cooperation format of ten European countries – has gained political momentum since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Since the late 2010s, the JEF has shifted its focus towards hybrid issues, increasingly in Northern Europe. While its role in the hybrid sphere is potentially fruitful, the JEF should be wary of taking on too wide a range of tasks. The JEF’s role as a “sub-threshold” actor could complement NATO’s collective defence efforts below Article 5. Hence, the JEF should be more coherently integrated into the Northern European security architecture. Obstacles to JEF-NATO integration have now been removed, as all JEF nations are also members of the alliance. A more explicit division of labour between the JEF and NATO would help Northern European countries to handle the current security environment comprehensively. Such a security architecture, covering all dimensions of the conflict spectrum, would be particularly beneficial for Finland, which shares a long common border with Russia.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Security, Defense Cooperation, and Joint Expeditionary Force
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom, Europe, Finland, and Baltic States
186. Indonesia’s growing clout: Domestic, regional, and global drivers
- Author:
- Bart Gaens and Olli Ruohomäki
- Publication Date:
- 06-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
- Abstract:
- While Indonesia still stands out as one of the stronger democracies in Southeast Asia, its democratic credentials remain flawed. Nevertheless, public support for the current administration has remained high thanks to sustained economic growth, welfare measures and large infrastructure projects. Indonesia has continued to bolster its international status through ASEAN, even if its position is one among equals. Within the organization, Jakarta has aimed to play the role of democracy promoter and bridge-builder. While China’s influence in the country has grown, Indonesia has sought a middle ground within the great-power competition, also pursuing partnerships with European countries, Japan, Russia, and the Gulf countries in order to diversify its political and economic relations. This offers opportunities for the EU. However, Europe’s declining image in Indonesia, colonial history and perceived double standards are obstacles to strengthening EU-Indonesia relations. Challenges remain for Indonesia in its quest to become a global player. The country will need to contribute solutions to both regional and global issues, and its hedging game and strategic autonomy in foreign-policy choices may become complicated due to increasing global expectations and responsibilities.
- Topic:
- Democracy, Geopolitics, Economic Policy, and Strategic Autonomy
- Political Geography:
- Indonesia and Southeast Asia
187. China’s approach to AI standardisation: State-guided but enterprise-led
- Author:
- Junhua Zhu
- Publication Date:
- 08-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
- Abstract:
- AI standardisation is a major battleground in the international AI race, in which states compete against each other for standard-setting power. China sees AI standardisation as a sector in which it could become a norm-maker rather than a norm-taker. The global landscape of AI standardisation is undergoing a phase of reconstruction. The US and China are discussing new bilateral standardisation frameworks, while the significance of pre-existing multilateral standardisation frameworks is declining. The Chinese approach to AI standardisation is found to be heavily reliant on the corporate sector, following an enterprise-led and state-guided pattern. The state cooperates closely with the private sector in a community of practice, acting as a catalyst in the early stage, a supporter in the mid-stage, and a supervisor in the later stage of the AI standardisation process. Enhancing a contextualised understanding of the fast-changing landscape of AI standardisation in China is critical for European policymakers to safeguard Europe’s competitiveness, preserve European values, and engage in dialogue on global AI governance.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, European Union, Economic Policy, Artificial Intelligence, and Standardization
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
188. EU migration policy and calls for the externalisation of asylum: Intensifying partnerships, exploring new models
- Author:
- Saila Heinikoski
- Publication Date:
- 09-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
- Abstract:
- After years of negotiations, the EU has adopted the Pact on Migration and Asylum, and recently concluded migration partnerships with Tunisia, Mauritania and Egypt. While the Pact addresses internal migration rules within the Union, in practice the focus seems to be shifting towards the external dimension of migration. The security situation in Europe reinforces the need to build stronger partnerships. The aim is not to push the countries from which people most often migrate to Europe into partnerships with countries that may ally themselves against Europe, for example by instrumentalising migration. Even before the European Parliament elections, EU member states and political groups started to push the idea of transferring the asylum procedure to third countries. This was notably stated in a letter sent to the Commission in May 2024, signed by 15 member states. Examples of the externalisation of asylum procedures include the outsourced Rwanda model eventually abandoned by the UK, the offshoring model being implemented in Albania by Italy, and the proposed return hub model, whereby rejected asylum-seekers would be transferred to a third country if they cannot be directly returned to their countries of origin.
- Topic:
- European Union, Partnerships, Refugees, Asylum, Migration Policy, and Externalization
- Political Geography:
- Europe
189. Russia’s wartime ideology: Radicalization, rent-seeking and securing the dictator
- Author:
- Jussi Lassila
- Publication Date:
- 09-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
- Abstract:
- Anti-Western propaganda and the indoctrination of citizens, especially young people, have gradually intensified since the early days of Putin’s rule. However, their radicalization during the war is indicative of the regime’s need for manipulative control rather than reflective of broad support for the regime’s worldview. The most significant shift in the Kremlin’s wartime propaganda has been its codification in school education since the summer of 2022. This timing reveals more about the regime’s need to justify the war and its consequences than it does about any consistent long-term strategy. Key actors behind the ideological codification are opportunistically exploiting the current context. Meanwhile, ideological radicals face little opposition, as most citizens show limited interest in their activities. Despite the regime’s indoctrination practices, the indifference of society suggests that the conditions for a strong anti-Western consensus after Putin will be weak. Such a consensus can only emerge if the future regime, like the current one, is able to maintain satisfactory material conditions and a tolerable daily life alongside its ideological views, whatever they may be.
- Topic:
- Authoritarianism, Radicalization, Democracy, Ideology, Post-Soviet Space, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
190. Europe’s development and peacebuilding cuts: Securing short-term interests, risking long-term security
- Author:
- Katariina Mustasilta
- Publication Date:
- 10-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
- Abstract:
- Development cooperation budgets are tightening in the EU amid economic pressures and a focus on security and defence. Two broad shifts are taking place in EU and member state investments in peacebuilding and conflict prevention: a general decline in funding and decreasing attention to conflict-affected regions and countries in particular. Local and international conflict prevention and peacebuilding actors need to frame their work to align with the EU’s economic, security and geopolitical interests in order to remain relevant in an era of strategic competition. The implications of the shifts in funding will depend on how changes are implemented and under what types of strategies. A general risk is that policy decisions will be based on a short-term and largely reactive rationale at the expense of a long-term perspective on Europe’s interests.
- Topic:
- Security, Development, International Cooperation, European Union, Crisis Management, and Peacebuilding
- Political Geography:
- Europe
191. Unpacking Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023)
- Author:
- Eugene Chen
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center on International Cooperation (CIC)
- Abstract:
- The approval of a framework for the financing of African Union (AU) peace support operations (PSOs) by the United Nations (UN) Security Council on December 21, 2023, with the adoption of resolution 2719, represents significant progress in the development of the UN-AU partnership in peace and security as well as a commitment from the Security Council to support the adequate, predictable, and sustainable financing of AU-led PSOs. At the same time, the achievements of the negotiators in reaching this outcome should not obscure the additional work that lies ahead to interpret, implement, and build on the resolution.
- Topic:
- Security, United Nations, Peacekeeping, UN Security Council, and African Union
- Political Geography:
- Africa
192. Strengthening Violence Prevention at the UN: 11 Overlooked Facts
- Author:
- Céline Monnier and Joanne Richards
- Publication Date:
- 05-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center on International Cooperation (CIC)
- Abstract:
- This policy brief argues that UN and member state efforts to prevent violence are often ineffective because why violence occurs is not well understood. The authors highlight the critical role of risk and protective factors in violence prevention work and outline 11 facts that are frequently overlooked when policymakers attempt to stop violence from occurring. To increase the effectiveness of prevention efforts, policymakers should be aware of these critical points and incorporate risk and protective factor analysis into existing UN diagnostic tools and inter-governmental processes.
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, United Nations, Peacebuilding, and Violence Prevention
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
193. Adapting BINUH to Meet Haiti’s Evolving Challenges
- Author:
- Sophie Rutenbar
- Publication Date:
- 07-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center on International Cooperation (CIC)
- Abstract:
- The UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) is struggling to remain relevant amid major shifts in Haiti’s political, security and humanitarian landscape, including the deployment of a Security Council-mandated multinational security support mission to assist the National Police. The renewal of BINUH’s mandate represents an opportunity to realign its role and resources to better address Haiti’s evolving challenges. By enhancing political engagement, coordination, and thematic expertise, and by mitigating risks associated with the MSS, BINUH can play a more effective and relevant role in supporting Haiti’s path to stability and development. The next few months are critical, and the UN must be agile and responsive to ensure the success of the MSS and the broader international efforts in Haiti.
- Topic:
- Security, United Nations, Peacekeeping, and Crisis Management
- Political Geography:
- Caribbean and Haiti
194. Calculable Losses? Arms Transfers to Afghanistan 2002–21
- Author:
- Matt Schroeder
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Small Arms Survey
- Abstract:
- Following the Taliban’s assumption of control in Afghanistan in August 2021, uncertainty has persisted about the scale, scope, and specific elements of the arsenal it captured from the previous regime. A new report from the Small Arms Survey, based on hitherto unpublished official data, provides the most refined picture to date of the arsenals captured by the Taliban. Calculable Losses? Arms transfers to Afghanistan 2002–21—a new Briefing Paper from the Small Arms Survey’s Contributing to Preventing Arms Proliferation from, within, and to Afghanistan project—analyses the publicly available data on arms exports to Afghanistan, identifies gaps in this data, and provides previously unreleased data obtained from the US government.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Taliban, and Weapons
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America
195. Continuity and Change: Extremist-used Arms in Mali
- Author:
- Holger Anders
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Small Arms Survey
- Abstract:
- Mali has faced more than a decade of armed violence perpetrated by extremists, resulting in thousands of victims among national and international armed forces, UN peacekeepers, and civilians. Continuity and Change: Extremist-used Arms in Mali—a new Briefing Paper from the Small Arms Survey’s Security Assessment in North Africa (SANA) project—investigates the arms, ammunition, explosives, and other materiel used in extremist attacks in Mali from 2015 to 2022, and the sources and pathways through which they were obtained.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Violent Extremism, Weapons, and Armed Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Mali, and Sahel
196. Meaningful Partners: Opportunities for Collaboration between Women, Peace and Security, and Small Arms Control at the National Level
- Author:
- Callum Watson
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Small Arms Survey
- Abstract:
- National actors working in small arms control and on women, peace, and security (WPS) share commitments to reduce suffering, maintain peace and security, and contribute to the realization of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Yet, while these cross references are increasingly commonplace in the international policy framework, this does not often translate into harmonized references in national action plans (NAPs) on WPS and small arms control. Meaningful Partners: Opportunities for Collaboration between Women, Peace and Security, and Small Arms Control at the National Level—a Briefing Paper from the Small Arms Survey’s Gender-Responsive Arms Control project—identifies potential avenues for future work to better harmonize efforts related to WPS and small arms control, and improve the effectiveness of both policy areas in achieving their objectives.
- Topic:
- Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Women, Sustainable Development Goals, and Peace
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
197. A Political Economy of Tripoli’s Abu Salim: The Rise of the Stability Support Apparatus as Hegemon
- Author:
- Adam Hakan
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Small Arms Survey
- Abstract:
- Once a hotbed of pro-Qaddafi resistance, Abu Salim is now a stronghold dominated by Abdelghani al-Kikli (widely known as ‘Ghaniwa’) and his Stability Support Apparatus (SSA). Ghaniwa has consolidated power over Abu Salim—the main southern gateway into the Libyan capital of Tripoli—through violence. A Political Economy of Tripoli’s Abu Salim: The Rise of the Stability Support Apparatus as Hegemon—a new Briefing Paper from the Small Arms Survey’s Security Assessment In North Africa (SANA) project—examines how Ghaniwa’s methods have reshaped Abu Salim’s political economy, and how the hegemonic nature of this military consolidation has allowed the SSA to take on an outsized role in Libya’s broader political and economic spheres.
- Topic:
- Political Economy, Hegemony, Armed Forces, and Instability
- Political Geography:
- Libya, North Africa, and Tripoli
198. Exploiting Evidence, Improving Protection: Weapons Technical Intelligence in UN Peace Operations
- Author:
- Emile LeBrun and David Lochhead
- Publication Date:
- 06-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Small Arms Survey
- Abstract:
- Over the last decade, UN peacekeepers and their beneficiaries have been the targets of threats from hostile actors armed with small arms and light weapons, rockets and mortars, IEDs, and related weapons. Assessing and countering these threats requires peacekeepers to have the capacity to focus on hostile actors’ access to and (mis)use of weapons and the destabilising effects of arms proliferation. Exploiting Evidence, Improving Protection: Weapons Technical Intelligence in UN Peace Operations is a new Briefing Paper from the Small Arms Survey’s Security Assessment in North Africa (SANA) project. The paper discusses the current and possible future deployment of weapons technical intelligence (WTI) roles and activities in UN—as well as hybrid and non-UN—peacekeeping operations. It also examines the contributions that WTI could make, if leveraged, for situational awareness, force protection, and mandate implementation, including the protection of civilians and human rights investigations.
- Topic:
- Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, United Nations, Peacekeeping, Weapons, and Protection
- Political Geography:
- North Africa
199. The Influence of the UN at the Country Level: The Case of Sri Lanka from 2007 to 2011
- Author:
- Neil Buhne
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Institute for the Study of International Development, McGill University (ISID)
- Abstract:
- Assessments of the effectiveness of the UN often assume that there is one “United Nations,” when in fact there are many different “United Nations”: one of these is the UN at the country level, whose work is often undervalued or overlooked. As the experience in Sri Lanka from 2007 to 2011 demonstrates, the UN despite internal and external limitations, can have unique influence on a country’s crisis response and development path, because of its role in most countries as the “locally based international organization” transparently embedded in a country and society. Through that, it may be able to influence a country across the range of needs related to peacebuilding, human rights, crisis response/humanitarian assistance, and development/recovery. If there is stronger recognition and support for that role, the UN can be a better “influencer,” helping countries to prevent crises and/or respond to them in ways which improve their citizens’ lives. The experience in Sri Lanka demonstrates both the limits on what a UN Country Team can do “locally,” and what more a UN country team can do to influence the possibilities a country has.
- Topic:
- United Nations, International Development, Crisis Management, Peacebuilding, and Humanitarian Response
- Political Geography:
- South Asia and Sri Lanka
200. Climate Adaptation Finance: The Gap Between Needs and Resources Continues to Grow
- Author:
- Jamal Saghir and Ede Jorge Ijjasz-Vasquez
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Institute for the Study of International Development, McGill University (ISID)
- Abstract:
- Our recent research on the state and trends of climate adaptation finance needs, gaps, and trends globally and in Africa provides new insights that call for greater urgency in adaptation action and financing. The global adaptation funding gap continues to widen because the understanding of needs shows much higher levels of investment required, and the rate of increase of adaptation financing is insufficient. In this policy brief, we review global climate finance trends, the growing funding gap in climate adaptation finance globally and in Africa, financial instruments used for climate adaptation, and challenges and recommendations to improve the tracking of climate adaptation finance.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Climate Finance, International Development, Funding, and Adaptation
- Political Geography:
- Africa and Global Focus