Content Type: Policy Brief - CIAO Search Results

51. From Tunis to Baghdad: Can platform-based politics take root?

Author:: Carrie Schenkel and James Storen
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The organization of political parties has served multiple distinct roles in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). In many cases, regimes use them to create a light veneer of democratic legitimacy for authoritarianism; in other cases, parties exist to represent one identity group or are centered around a singular individual. In rare cases, but with a few successful examples, parties exist to represent an ideology. Rarer still, but key to the future democratic success of the region, are true platform-based parties. Vacuums of political leadership have developed due to the limited role parties play in shaping governance, representation, and public policy. In a rapidly changing region, the opportunity for effective, issues-based parties has never been more evident. Iran’s proxies in the region have been significantly weakened and the “Axis of Resistance” dismantled, presenting openings for new political leadership to emerge. Political parties are not yet poised to meet the moment. In much of the region, long histories of implicit and explicit bans and one-party dominance have left political parties weak, unpopular, and ineffective. Extended periods of suppression and restriction—such as Jordan’s thirty-year party ban, Iraq’s decades of one-party rule under Saddam Hussein, and Tunisia’s twenty-three years of party bans during the Ben Ali era—have resulted in political parties that lack both organizational capacity and broad public appeal. Rather, they are fragmented, ideologically vague, and centered around individuals rather than coherent platforms. The proliferation of political parties—more than 220 are currently registered in Tunisia, for example—has further undermined any sense of clear policy platforms and the ability to differentiate one party from another. Rather than reforming or uniting under existing frameworks, disillusioned members frequently break away to form new parties, stymieing coalition-building and the development of rooted, comprehensive party ideologies. Disillusionment with traditional parties has led citizens to favor actors perceived as more directly serving their interests, such as Hezbollah—which positions itself as a resistance force against Israel—or Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated parties, which have gained trust through their provision of essential social services in Egypt, Jordan, and elsewhere. In an era defined by youth-led movements, digital activism, and persistent calls for democratization, these parties stand at a crossroads. Whether they act as agents of change or instruments of entrenched power remains a central question, shaping not only the future of governance within individual nations but also the trajectory of regional stability and development.
Topic:: Civil Society, Corruption, Diplomacy, Politics, Elections, and Democratic Transitions
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, North Africa, and Lebanon

52. Trade with Colombia is big business for US exporters—amid growing Chinese influence in Latin America

Author:: Geoff Ramsey and Enrique Millán-Mejía
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Colombia and the United States have achieved a close, mutually beneficial partnership over several decades on migration, security, counternarcotics, and commerce—with the US trade surplus with Colombia totaling $1.3 billion in 2024. The Colombian market is particularly important for US agricultural producers. Thanks to the US-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA), Colombia is the top destination for US agricultural exports in South America and the third main destination in the Western Hemisphere. The United States is still Colombia’s largest trading partner in South America—with $36.7 billion in two-way trade in 2024—but January data showed Chinese products leading over US imports for the month. The TPA promotes both reciprocal trade and US influence; interpretative improvements to previously agreed-upon matters are possible,
Topic:: Economy, Business, Tariffs, Exports, Trade, and International Markets
Political Geography:: China, Colombia, South America, Latin America, and United States of America

53. The Future of European Digital Competitiveness

Author:: Oscar Guinea and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: Former Italian prime minister Mario Draghi’s recent report on Europe’s competitiveness lays bare the negative effects of overregulation in the EU economy and the underperformance of its digital sector. However, Draghi failed to draw connections between these two phenomena. The future of Europe’s competitiveness is inextricably linked to the future of its digital economy. Unfortunately, the economic contribution of Europe’s Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector remains significantly smaller than that of the US ICT sector to the US economy. There are well-known reasons behind this divergence. Chief among them is the lack of sufficient investment in Europe’s intangible and tangible assets. Regulation, particularly those regulations governing the digital economy, has emerged as a key factor that restricts Europe’s usage of digital technologies and hinders subsequent productivity growth. The EU now has nearly 100 tech-focused laws, comprising thousands of pages, provisions, and restrictions. This must change. The EU should develop a joint plan for digitalisation and competitiveness. This plan should build upon Europe’s comparative advantages: openness, strong institutions, the rule of law, robust intellectual property protections, and high levels of human capital. Above all, the EU must recognise that, while protecting consumer rights, EU policies and regulations must also prioritise the competitiveness of Europe’s ICT sector and promote the widespread adoption of digital technologies across the entire EU economy.
Topic:: Markets, European Union, Digital Economy, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:: Europe

54. Quantum Technology: A Policy Primer for EU Policymakers

Author:: Oscar Guinea, Dyuti Pandya, Oscar du Roy, and Andrea Dugo
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: Quantum technology is rapidly emerging as a transformative force with the potential to reshape industries ranging from finance and pharmaceuticals to automotive and aerospace. In 2024 alone, investments in quantum technology reached over USD 56 billion. Its development, however, presents unique geopolitical challenges, stemming from its applications in defence and encryption, as well as its power to unsettle established comparative advantages and market specialisations across countries. Against this backdrop, an open and collaborative approach to quantum innovation is critical for maximising the benefits of this technology. Countries perform more effectively in quantum technology when they support cross-border collaborations and market specialisation. Firms producing quantum hardware or software solutions can sell to a range of industrial users who, in turn, integrate these cutting-edge systems into goods and services. Such synergy reduces the overall risks and costs of R&D, as different partners share both the financial burden and any uncertainties related to the commercial viability of quantum applications. Moreover, collaboration fosters a wider diffusion of quantum technologies. As firms specialising in quantum computing, communication, or sensing deepen their expertise, their insights permeate adjacent sectors through the shared knowledge enabled by joint collaborations. Conversely, restrictive policies that limit interaction between domestic and foreign firms risk stifling innovation. Self-reliance strategies reduce opportunities for knowledge-sharing, limit the pool of potential partners, and ultimately slow the pace of quantum breakthroughs. This operating framework supports the current EU approach to quantum technology, which emphasises openness and encourages a higher number of collaborations between EU and non-EU companies. This approach is grounded in economic realities: the EU ranks second only to the US in terms of the number of companies and collaborations between firms and it thrives on partnering with non-EU countries as the number of collaborations with companies outside the EU far exceeds the number of collaborations within the EU.
Topic:: European Union, Digital Economy, Digital Policy, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:: Europe

55. Cybersecurity at Risk: How the EU’s Digital Markets Act Could Undermine Security across Mobile Operating Systems

Author:: Matthias Bauer and Dyuti Pandya
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: The EU’s fight against cybersecurity threats risks being undermined by the over-enforcement of the Digital Markets Act (DMA). Article 5(4) could force mobile operating system providers to allow unregulated external links, bypassing critical security controls and exposing millions of smartphone users to cyber threats. The DMA focuses on market structure, overlooking how differences in operating system design affect security vulnerabilities. A one-size-fits-all approach ignores platform-specific security needs, leaving European users exposed to cyber threats. This risks undermining the EU’s economic security agenda, including initiatives like the Cybersecurity Strategy, Cyber Resilience Act, and NIS2 Directive, which aim to strengthen digital defences. The unintended consequences of this regulatory approach are already evident in Apple’s recent decisions to withhold certain features – such as advanced AI functionalities and enhanced app security tools – from the EU market due to DMA-related concerns. As a result, EU consumers face reduced access to innovative technologies, diminished user experiences, and weaker security protections compared to users in other regions. Now, Android, a widely used open-source system, may also be compromised by DMA enforcement, potentially limiting its flexibility, security, and the broader ecosystem of app developers and device manufacturers that rely on its open architecture.
Topic:: European Union, Cybersecurity, Digital Economy, and Digital Markets Act (DMA)
Political Geography:: Europe

56. The Participation of Foreign Bidders in EU Public Procurement: Too Much or Too Little?

Author:: Lucian Cernat
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: This policy brief examines EU public procurement data from the Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) to evaluate foreign bidders’ participation and success in winning EU public contracts. Despite data coverage limitations, the available information shows an increase in foreign participation in both full and partial contracts, with most activity concentrated in a few countries. Countries like the United States, Japan, and Canada focus on securing full contracts, while nations such as Norway and Turkey often engage through partial contracts. Notably, since Brexit, UK bidders have faced a significant decline in market share, benefiting other countries. The main conclusion is that foreign participation via cross-border procurement (Mode 1) – the only one available in the TED database – is not very high. Although it increased over time, it remains relatively modest, mainly due to low participation rates, rather than discriminatory practices. Between 2016 and 2019, only about 7 percent of EU procurement authorities received foreign bids. This fact alone largely explains the low level of cross-border procurement taking place via Mode 1: put simply, there is no winning without trying. Another important conclusion is that a comprehensive assessment of the participation of foreign bidders in EU procurement would require two new key metrics in the TED data collection process to capture the more important yet missing modes of international procurement. Having reliable and comprehensive data is not just an academic pursuit but a necessity for shaping effective EU policy in the face of rising global protectionism in public procurement.
Topic:: European Union, Contracts, and Public Procurement
Political Geography:: Europe

57. Benchmarking Quantum Technology Performance: Governments, Industry, Academia and their Role in Shaping our Technological Future

Author:: Fredrik Erixon, Andrea Dugo, Dyuti Pandya, and Oscar du Roy
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: In this study on the transformative potential of quantum technology in reshaping economies, we present results and evidence drawing on a unique and innovative quantum dataset compiled by ECIPE. This data offers new insights into the current state of quantum advancements. This comprehensive database sheds light on the roles of various actors – governments, industry, and academia – showcasing their contributions to the development of quantum technologies. By grounding the analysis in real data, we provide a clearer understanding of the dynamics at play, enabling stakeholders to assess the sustainability of quantum technology progress and foster an ecosystem that supports both public and private sector involvement.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Digital Economy, Private Sector, Industry, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:: Global Focus

58. India and the World Economy: Policy Options at a Time of Geopolitical Drama, Technological Shifts, and Rising Protectionism

Author:: Fredrik Erixon, Dyuti Pandya, and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: What trade policy should India pursue? Geopolitical drama and a faltering multilateral system have made choices of trade policy harder for many countries. Rising protectionism, economic nationalism, and growing scepticism towards globalisation eat into most trade relations. Technology-driven innovation and rapid changes in the composition of trade have added additional layers of complexity, forcing governments to develop new policies for cross-border economic integration. This is the inflection point for India’s trade policy: its traditional approach is increasingly unable to respond to new economic and political realities, and new approaches may be needed to deliver better economic outcomes. Using India’s external trade strategy as a starting point, this policy brief presents three strategic options for India, each reflecting varying degrees of trade openness as a means to drive economic development. Using categories from the world of soft drinks, we call them “Trade Zero”, Diet Trade” and “Trade Regular”. First, the Trade Zero approach allows India to maintain its defensive stance on trade, focusing primarily on the growth of its domestic market and demand. Trade only serves as a means to manage production surpluses. Second, the Diet Trade approach pushes India to softly enhance trade with its already well-established trading partners, ideally by focusing on high-value-added goods and services. The model emphasises deepening diplomatic relations through trade: however, not at the cost of domestic policy priorities. And lastly, the Trade Regular approach encourages the adoption of a more ambitious trade strategy with the aim of establishing India as a central hub connecting major global economic regions. This would happen through upgrading existing trade agreements, signing new multilateral trade agreements, as well as adopting significant domestic reforms for further economic liberalisation. India’s trade performance provides the actual context of the realities of India’s trade policy. There are some notable features in India’s trade performance: its trade sector is small (international trade as a share of the GDP); it has a large services export sector compared to the export of goods; exports of high-value added goods and services has increased substantially; there is a consistently large share of big economies such as the United States and the European Union in India’s exports. All these features point to India’s position in global trade as a relatively high-value added economy. India, therefore, not only has an opportunity to leverage its trade capacity to significantly improve economic growth but can also adapt to newer forms of trade and increasingly engage with the global economy. Moreover, given the shifting global context and the increasing trade reciprocity demands from larger economies, India will also need to strengthen its trade relations with a diverse set of partners. In a way, India’s economy has already made the choice of which model that suits it best. Given the key features of the country’s trade sector, India’s real economy is already moving towards a Trade Regular model. However, there is a gap between the actual performance and policy positions, which remain defensive. Future trade growth, however, will likely depend on India becoming more pro-active in its trade policy and better equipped to negotiate trade agreements that respond the ambitions of its outward-oriented companies.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Geopolitics, and Trade Policy
Political Geography:: South Asia and India

59. EU Export of Regulatory Overreach: The Case of the Digital Markets Act (DMA)

Author:: Matthias Bauer, Dyuti Pandya, and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: The EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) exemplifies the “Brussels Effect,” extending the EU’s regulatory influence beyond its borders and shaping global digital competition policies. While intended to curb the market power of large technology platforms and promote fair competition, its broad, rigid, and pre-emptive approach risks stifling technological development, deterring investment, and creating legal uncertainty, particularly in emerging markets still building digital infrastructure and seeking to attract foreign investment. Large technology firms play a pivotal role in global economic development, driving innovation, infrastructure upgrading, and consumer welfare. However, increasing regulatory scrutiny, particularly under DMA-like frameworks, could inadvertently harm the very markets they help grow by imposing compliance burdens that hinder business expansion and technology diffusion. Countries with weaker institutions and regulatory capacity – such as India, Brazil, South Africa, and other emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) like Indonesia – could face greater risks of regulatory capture, corruption, and enforcement challenges if they replicate the EU’s approach without adapting it to their economic realities (Section 2). A key concern with the DMA is the departure from traditional case-by-case enforcement in competition policy, instead relying on broad, pre-emptive obligations based on ambiguous concepts such as fairness and contestability. This shift reduces legal certainty, increases the risk of inconsistent enforcement, and may inhibit dynamic competition, which is essential for innovation-driven sectors like fintech, e-commerce, ICT, and edtech. By prioritising static over dynamic competition, the DMA could impede technological progress, limiting consumer choice and long-term economic benefits (Section 3). The global adoption of DMA-like regulations risks further regulatory fragmentation and may create unintended consequences, particularly in emerging economies where regulatory frameworks, institutional quality, and market structures differ significantly from the EU. Broad prohibitions on business practices, such as self-preferencing and data-sharing, could limit opportunities for local firms to scale internationally, weaken cybersecurity protections, and reduce incentives for large technology firms to invest in these regions (Section 4). To ensure proportionate and effective competition enforcement, governments outside the EU should prioritise regulatory flexibility and case-by-case assessments over broad, static restrictions. OECD best practices on competition policy emphasise clear objectives, legal certainty, and regulatory proportionality, ensuring that competition enforcement supports, rather than stifles, innovation and investment (Section 5). Moreover, the risks of corruption and regulatory overreach in developing countries make broad ex-ante regulations especially problematic. Excessive discretionary power granted to local authorities could increase the risk of politically motivated enforcement, deter foreign investment, and undermine long-term economic growth. A more effective approach would be to strengthen institutional frameworks, enhance transparency, and adopt supply-side policies that support technology neutrality, free trade, and economic freedom.
Topic:: Science and Technology, European Union, Regulation, Digital Markets Act (DMA), and Economic Competition
Political Geography:: Europe

60. Trade in the Great Sea: The Future of EU-Southern Neighbourhood Trade Relations

Author:: Jan A. Micallef
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: This policy brief looks into the future of EU-Southern Mediterranean trade relations. It evaluates the current trade and contractual instruments governing these relations and asks if they are sufficient or if more is needed to exploit trade opportunities and manage trade challenges in the region. The policy brief shows why and how the current trade instruments are no longer sufficient. There are two main reasons for this: first, they do not really tackle areas such as services, investment and non-tariff measures (NTMs), all of which are important to unlock economic value for both sides in today’s economy; and second, new economic and political developments reinforce the need for better agreements. As trade becomes more political and intertwined with other issues such as energy, critical minerals, the environment and industrial policy, it is necessary to improve the agreements and instruments that govern trade. The policy brief lists some of the upgrades in EU-Southern Mediterranean trade agreements that are necessary. However, it also analyses what challenges there are to pursue these upgrades and what can be done to overcome the problems. The policy brief concludes that working towards these aims will be challenging but not impossible if there is the necessary political will on both sides. Both sides should realise that the price of not doing anything might be higher than the effort that is required to bring their trade instruments up to the standards needed.
Topic:: International Relations, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, and Trade
Political Geography:: Africa and Europe

61. Navigating Geopolitical Realities: The EU’s Strategic Positioning in the South Caucasus and Central Asia

Author:: Tengiz Pkhaladze
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: This policy brief examines the strategic importance of the South Caucasus and its pivotal role in the European Union’s evolving engagement with Central Asia. The regional landscape, however, remains highly volatile. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has had direct and indirect repercussions for the South Caucasus. Against the backdrop of the war, Moscow continues its efforts to maintain the region within its sphere of influence – through military presence, disinformation, economic leverage, and political interference. Twenty percent of Georgia’s territory remains illegally occupied by Russian forces, while the fragile post-conflict environment following the Second Karabakh War continues to shape relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. While missions such as EUMM in Georgia and EUMA in Armenia reflect the EU’s growing political engagement, they remain limited in scope and capacity, constraining the Union’s ability to address the region’s evolving risks. The EU’s partnerships with South Caucasus countries are characterized by both strategic opportunity and persistent friction. Azerbaijan has become an important energy supplier to the EU, particularly via the Southern Gas Corridor, and is also involved in early-stage renewable initiatives such as the Black Sea Submarine Cable Project. However, the relationship remains complicated by enduring concerns related to governance, human rights, and democratic norms. Georgia, despite receiving EU candidate status in 2023, has prompted growing concern among EU institutions and member states over perceived democratic backsliding and increasing political polarization. The country remains a vital transit hub for the Middle Corridor and a central partner in EU connectivity efforts, but its internal developments have raised questions in Brussels about the sustainability of its European path. At the same time, Georgia continues to be a major target of Russia’s hybrid influence operations, which exploit internal divisions and erode trust in Euro-Atlantic institutions. Armenia, disillusioned with Russia’s security guarantees, is cautiously deepening its engagement with the West. However, the extent of this shift remains contingent on developments in Georgia – given Armenia’s geographic dependence – and on the prospects for a durable peace agreement with Azerbaijan. This policy brief assesses how the EU is managing the tensions between its strategic objectives and its normative commitments in a region increasingly shaped by Great Power rivalry. It concludes with policy recommendations aimed at strengthening the EU’s credibility and effectiveness in both the South Caucasus and Central Asia – advocating for a more coherent, proactive, and principled approach that aligns short-term geopolitical interests with long-term goals for regional stability and integration.
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, Strategic Interests, Regional Economy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Central Asia, and South Caucasus

62. Collective Action in the Netherlands: Why It Matters for the Transposition of the Product Liability Directive

Author:: Oscar Guinea, Dyuti Pandya, and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: This policy brief explores the implications of the Netherlands’ transposition of the new EU Product Liability Directive (PLD), focusing on its interaction with the Dutch collective action system. As one of the first EU countries to implement PLD and a key hub for mass litigation, the Netherlands offers a compelling case study. Features such as low claim thresholds, opt-out mechanisms, flexible settlements, limited cost-shifting, and the ease of creating litigation-backed entities make the Netherlands particularly attractive for mass claims, reinforcing its reputation as a “litigation magnet.” The new PLD simplifies liability claims, broadens the definition of “product” to include software, digital files, and related services, lowers evidentiary thresholds, extends liability to third-party actions such as cyberattacks, and includes post-market defects. These provisions, combined with the Netherlands’ collective redress regime, are expected to drive a rise in mass litigation. This rise poses particular economic risks for the Netherlands, one of the EU’s most digitised economies. Ranked sixth in digital adoption by Eurostat’s Digital Intensity Index, Dutch firms – especially in finance, insurance, ICT, and manufacturing – may also face growing exposure to collective actions under the PLD, which extends liability across the entire value chain. These sectors account for 27 percent of the value added in the Dutch market economy and are widely recognised as key drivers of economic growth. Increased legal uncertainty may also reduce the Netherlands’ attractiveness to multinational corporations, threatening levels of foreign direct investment and employment, both essential pillars of the Dutch economy. Growing mass litigation may also hinder innovation by redirecting R&D resources toward legal risk management. This is particularly concerning for the Netherlands, one of the EU’s top R&D investors. Drawing on US evidence, large-scale litigation can significantly erode market capitalisation, and based on our estimates, the cumulative loss in value for 31 Dutch companies featured in the EU R&D Scoreboard could reach €5.5 billion under the high-growth scenario. Such declines could impact household wealth, as Dutch households save approximately 14.6 percent of their gross disposable income, of which 20 percent is invested in equity. Pension funds, which also play a central role in Dutch long-term savings, can also hold significant stakes in publicly traded Dutch companies. As a result, the effects of collective actions on the market value of Dutch companies extend beyond corporate balance sheets, posing potential negative consequences for Dutch savers, as well as current and future pensioners. This report was commissioned by the European Justice Forum, a coalition of businesses, individuals and organisations that are working to build fair, balanced, transparent and efficient civil justice laws and systems for both consumers and businesses in Europe.
Topic:: European Union, Economy, Litigation, and Liability
Political Geography:: Europe and Netherlands

63. Strengthening the Supply-Side Innovation in EU Telecommunications

Author:: Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, and Dyuti Pandya
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: The telecommunications sector is central to the EU’s competitiveness, not only providing the infrastructure that underpins digital connectivity but also serving as a key driver of innovation. Recent EU reports already highlight the persistent structural challenges faced by the EU telecommunication sector: market fragmentation, low investment levels, divergent spectrum policies, and an urgent need to bolster digital sovereignty. However, a critical dimension in this discussion often receives far less attention: the supply of the underlying technologies that power telecommunications infrastructure. In this domain, EU companies remain competitive. In 2023, 27 EU-headquartered firms were among the world’s top 2,000 R&D spenders in telecommunications, accounting for 16 percent of global sectoral investment. These figures underscore that, while Europe may lag in investment and infrastructure, it still holds strategic leadership in telecom innovation and technology development. Central to Europe’s success are standard development organisations (SDOs), technical standards, and Standard Essential Patents (SEPs). SDOs provide collaborative forums where companies jointly develop technical standards that ensure interoperability, reduce fragmentation and foster innovation. Complementing this, SEPs protect the innovations embedded within these standards, granting European companies vital licensing revenues that sustain their research efforts. This system is particularly important for EU firms, which tend to be smaller than their global competitors; it enables them to specialise in cutting-edge technology development and commercialise their innovations globally without needing to dominate manufacturing or end-user markets. As competitiveness in telecommunications increasingly depends on the pace and adoption of innovation, the EU faces both a challenge and an opportunity. European firms have the potential not only to supply critical technologies but to drive breakthroughs in connectivity which are linked to the development of other technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) or quantum technologies. However, to stay competitive, the EU must reinforce its position on the supply side, where its companies still operate at the technological frontier.
Topic:: Economics, European Union, Digital Economy, Innovation, and Supply and Demand
Political Geography:: Europe

64. Palestinian Women: Between War Resilience and Their Role in Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Gaza.

Author:: Mirvat al-Zaqzouq and Diab Zayed
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Pal-Think For Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Women constitute 49% of the total population, according to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) reports, but their contribution to public life remains far below their numbers in society. According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) reports, women in the labor market will account for 19% in 2023. In decision-making centers, women’s participation remains low and one of the lowest rates in the region, despite being one of the most important indicators of gender equality, as data for 2021 showed that the percentage of women members of the Central Council constitutes about 23%, 19% of the members of the National Council, and 12% of the members of the Council of Ministers. There is also one-woman governor out of 15 governors, and 1% of the heads of local authorities in Palestine are women. As for the management of the councils of chambers of commerce, industry and agriculture, only 1% are women, about 19% of judges are women, and 18% of prosecutors are women. These figures reflect a marked exclusion of women from public life, which negatively affects their status, deepens gender inequality gaps, and at the same time prevents society from benefiting from women’s abilities and contribution to public life. This will inevitably affect the development of society and reinforce internal conflicts, especially gender conflicts. The exclusion of women in Palestine is a social tendency to exclude them from important public positions in the economy and politics, preventing them from expressing their opinions and limiting their public visibility. Despite the vital role that women play in crises, such as their steadfastness during the recent war on the Gaza Strip, in which various types of munitions were used including internationally banned ones, and came after years of siege imposed on Palestinian men and women, which deepened their suffering, but the general trend was to exclude women.
Topic:: Reconstruction, Women, Post-Conflict, Palestinians, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Middle East, Palestine, and Gaza

65. A Forward-Looking Vision for Reforming the Palestinian Political System

Author:: Maher Issa and Omar Rahal
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Pal-Think For Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Political reform in Palestine is an urgent necessity to achieve progress and development, ensure political and social stability, and confront the internal and external challenges facing the Palestinian cause. The Palestinian political system, which was established under complex historical circumstances and under Israeli occupation, needs continuous development to be able to respond to the requirements of the Palestinian people and their aspirations for freedom, dignity, and independence. The importance of political reform also comes in the context of enhancing the political legitimacy of the Palestinian system. Over time, the Palestinian citizen’s confidence in political institutions has declined as a result of the accumulation of issues such as the absence of periodic elections, the erosion of legitimacy, weak accountability and transparency, and the spread of favoritism and corruption in some areas. Thus, this reform is the cornerstone for rebuilding trust between the people and their institutions, and ensuring real and inclusive representation of all groups.
Topic:: Politics, Reform, Elections, Legitimacy, and Institutions
Political Geography:: Middle East and Palestine

66. Perceptions on Enhancing Youth Access to Decision-Making Positions in the Palestinian

Author:: Jamal al-Fadi and Raed al-Dab'i
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Pal-Think For Strategic Studies
Abstract:: This policy paper addresses the reality of Palestinian youth participation and access to decision-making centers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, amidst the political, economic, and social challenges faced by Palestinian youth due to Israeli occupation, internal division, and the Gaza blockade. Youth face significant difficulties in gaining opportunities for active participation in decision-making processes. The paper emphasizes the importance of empowering youth to access decision-making centers as a step toward achieving development and stability in Palestinian society. It highlights the need to enhance educational and training opportunities, improve economic conditions, and enable youth to have a real impact on public policies. Additionally, the paper offers alternatives, solutions, and practical recommendations, such as promoting political dialogue between the West Bank and Gaza, providing platforms for political participation, and developing economic and educational opportunities, in order to achieve genuine empowerment for Palestinian youth in various fields.
Topic:: Occupation, Youth, Economic Development, Decision-Making, Political Participation, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Middle East, Palestine, Gaza, and West Bank

67. Takers Not Makers: The unjust poverty and unearned wealth of colonialism

Author:: Anjela Taneja, Anthony Kamande, Chandreyi Gunaray Gomez, Dana Abed, Max Lawson, and Neelanjana Mukhia
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:: Billionaire wealth has risen three times faster in 2024 than in 2023. Five trillionaires are now expected within a decade. Meanwhile, crises of economy, climate and conflict mean the number of people living in poverty has barely changed since 1990. Most billionaire wealth is taken, not earned- 60% comes from either inheritance, cronyism, corruption or monopoly power. Our deeply unequal world has a long history of colonial domination which has largely benefited the richest people. The poorest, racialized people, women and marginalized groups have been and continue to be systematically exploited at huge human costs. Today’s world remains colonial in many ways. This must be reversed. Reparations must be made to those who were brutally enslaved and colonised. Our modern-day colonial economic system must be made radically more equal to end poverty. The cost should be borne by the richest people who benefit the most.
Topic:: Inequality, Colonialism, Cronyism, Monopoly, Justice, Reparations, and Gender
Political Geography:: Global Focus

68. Innovative Pathways: When and how to use alternative approaches to Human Rights Impact Assessments

Author:: Caroline Brodeur and Eline Achterberg
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:: Human rights violations are widespread across global supply chains, with companies increasingly exposed to risks like forced labor and environmental degradation. While audits and certifications have proven insufficient in preventing such abuses, a more robust approach is necessary. A Human Rights Impact Assessment (HRIA) is an essential tool that helps businesses identify and assess human rights risks by engaging directly with affected rightsholders. This process is becoming more critical, especially with new regulations like the EU's Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, which mandates comprehensive human rights and environmental due diligence (HREDD) for large companies starting in 2027. To make the HRIA process more efficient, some companies are exploring alternatives like joint HRIAs, sector-wide impact assessments, and rapid assessments. Joint HRIAs allow companies to share resources and expertise, especially when they source from the same suppliers or regions, while sector-wide assessments provide a broader view of industry-wide impacts. Rapid assessments are a faster alternative, focused on urgent or well-documented issues. Regardless of the approach, companies must adhere to key criteria to ensure effectiveness: selecting appropriate targets, engaging rightsholders meaningfully, addressing root causes, ensuring transparency, and committing to action. These principles ensure that the assessment process is thorough and leads to real, lasting improvements in human rights practices. Cutting corners in the due diligence process is not an option.
Topic:: Human Rights, Business, Impact Evaluation, and Due Diligence
Political Geography:: Global Focus

69. Personal to Powerful: Holding the line for gender justice in the face of growing anti-rights movements

Author:: Lata Narayanaswamy and Amina Hersi
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:: Thirty years on from the commitments enshrined in the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (BPfA) this briefing reveals a picture of broken promises and unfulfilled ambition by States. This failure is not just due to a lack of political will, but also an economic system that is unequal by design. As world leaders prepare to review their commitments to the BPfA, they must reject the mainstreaming of anti-rights actors and their co-optation of human rights language as this risks violating universal human rights and eroding the hard-won gains of feminist and LGBTQIA+ activists and movements, ultimately breaking the social contract between the state and people.
Topic:: Women, Feminism, Decolonization, Care work, Gender Justice, and Bodily Autonomy
Political Geography:: Global Focus

70. Fast, Fair, Funded and Feminist: A pathway to a just and transformative climate transition within and beyond the UK

Author:: Natalie Shortall, Chiara Ligouri, and Ruth Mayne
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:: The world is in the grip of a climate emergency. Urgent and equitable action is essential to prevent yet further escalating climate impacts that are devastating communities worldwide and to safeguard a liveable planet for future generations. For governments everywhere, including the UK Government, this is a defining test of leadership. But it is also a moment of opportunity—an opportunity to build economies and societies that are not only decarbonised and climate resilient, but that actively reduce inequalities, are more inclusive, and prioritise the wellbeing of people and the planet over short-term profit. In this report, we outline key steps the UK Government can take to lead the way toward a just and transformative transition—one that not only stabilises the climate but also delivers fairness and justice for all.
Topic:: Climate Change, Government, Transition, Climate Justice, and Net Zero
Political Geography:: United Kingdom and Europe

71. Beyond the Targets: An ambitious agenda to put aid back on track

Author:: Salvatore Nocerino
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:: Aid can make a huge contribution to significantly reducing inequality. Given the widespread agreement that bringing down inequality is necessary to underpin efforts to end poverty, achieve gender justice and successfully fight climate change, there is an urgent need for donors to make this a priority in their aid policies. For this virtuous cycle to be effective, there is also an imperative to rebalance decision-making on aid, ensuring it is done in an inclusive way that centres Global South governments and civil society. Building on the findings of the 2019 Oxfam report 'Hitting the Target: An agenda for aid in times of extreme inequality', this paper presents a new and updated agenda to put aid back on track given recent changes in the development landscape and the multiple crises facing our world. It makes 10 concrete recommendations on how to ensure development finance effectively contributes to building a more equal and sustainable world.
Topic:: Development, International Cooperation, Poverty, and Inequality
Political Geography:: Global Focus

72. Raising the Bar: Supermarkets must urgently address structural exploitation of cocoa farmers

Author:: Jesse Arnon and Anouk Franck
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:: Most cocoa farmers in main cocoa producing countries Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana are poor, even though they are at the heart of the supply chain for a luxury good: chocolate. For decades they have been receiving low farm gate prices, which don’t allow them to earn a living income for their families. At the same time, companies in the cocoa and chocolate supply chains have been making huge profits. Supermarkets in the Netherlands and Germany have taken first steps by making long-term commitments to ensuring cocoa farmers are paid a living income reference price, but the share of honest chocolate they have on offer only reaches 5%. It’s time that they radically change the way they do business, by committing to long-term fair prices for farmers, sharing the risk with cocoa farmers and being accountable for all the chocolate products they sell. This paper focuses on supermarkets, which are powerful actors in the cocoa and chocolate supply chain. As primary retailers, supermarkets have a direct link with consumers and have power across the supply chain so they can drive real change. Dutch and German supermarkets have made living income commitments, and they have started implementing them.
Topic:: Human Rights, Business, Cocoa, Farming, Living Income, and Supermarkets
Political Geography:: Europe, Germany, Netherlands, and Global Focus

73. Water-Driven Hunger: How the Climate Crisis Fuels Africa’s Food Emergency

Author:: Giuseppe Selvaggi and Elise Nalbandian
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:: This paper calls for an integrated water and food security management in eight Eastern and Southern African countries—Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Somalia, South Sudan, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. These countries, identified as Hunger Hotspots for 2025 and among the 30 most water insecure globally, are also experiencing the severe impacts of climate variability. The paper strongly recommends that multilateral bodies, governments, donors, and the private sector implement sustainable adaptation and mitigation measures—such as strengthening national hydro-meteorological forecasting systems, increasing investment in anticipatory action, ensuring access to climate finance etc. to tackle the root causes of these crises. Furthermore, it also provides insights into effective water management practices that can help national governments and policymakers adopt comprehensive policies, ultimately improving governance to tackle the triple crises of water, food and climate.
Topic:: Climate Change, Water, Hunger, and Water Insecurity
Political Geography:: Africa

74. Land, Peace and Security: Secure access to land as a vital guarantee for the protection of communities in the Sahel

Author:: Mohamadou Fadel Diop
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:: The lack of secure access to land is a major driver of physical and food insecurity, violence, and violations of the fundamental rights of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and their host communities. This briefing paper outlines the causes and consequences of restricted land access and explores its links with protection risks in the context of violent conflict and climate change in the Sahel. It highlights the essential role of secure land access and land rights in economic empowerment and protection policies for IDPs and host communities in the Central Sahel, in line with the “Triple Nexus” approach connecting humanitarian action, development and peace.
Topic:: Humanitarian Aid, Displacement, Land Rights, and Protection
Political Geography:: North Africa and Sahel

75. The Private Sphere Trap: Women and the climate crisis in Iraq

Author:: Laila Barhoum
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:: This Oxfam briefing paper examines the intersection of gender inequality and climate change in Iraq, focusing on the agricultural sector. Women in Iraq face systemic barriers that confine them to the "private sphere," limiting their participation in decision-making processes critical to climate adaptation and mitigation. Through qualitative research, including focus group discussions and key informant interviews, the paper highlights how social norms, economic dependency, and lack of access to resources exacerbate women’s vulnerability to climate impacts. It provides actionable recommendations to foster inclusive climate action, such as raising awareness, leveraging respected female leaders, and improving technical support for farmers. The report underscores the urgent need to dismantle male-dominated structures to build a resilient and equitable future for Iraq.
Topic:: Agriculture, Climate Change, Inequality, Rural, Decision-Making, Adaptation, Livelihoods, Gender, and Social Norms
Political Geography:: Iraq and Middle East

76. From Pledges to Progress: Tracking climate finance flows and accountability in Nigeria and Uganda

Author:: Tallulah Cherry-Virdee
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:: Oxfam’s Climate Finance Shadow reports have shown that high-income countries have failed to deliver on their commitment to mobilize climate finance for low- and middle-income countries. In 2024, two country reports, on Uganda and Nigeria, were published that analyzed how the insufficient international climate finance that is reaching their governments is being spent at national and subnational level. The two reports also lay out ways for how civil society can track these flows, ensure meaningful community participation, and hold their governments accountable. This paper analyses the findings and commonalities from the reports on Uganda and Nigeria, and includes recommendations for climate finance providers, national and subnational governments, and civil society on how climate finance can be spent fair, transparent, accountable and in an inclusive manner.
Topic:: Budget, Climate Finance, Citizenship, Accountability, and Participation
Political Geography:: Uganda, Africa, and Nigeria

77. No Women, No Peace – A Snapshot of Oxfam’s Engagement with the Women, Peace and Security Agenda: Lessons and Opportunities

Author:: Marie Sophie Petersson, Lydia Ayikoru, Souhadou Diasso, Fatma Jaffer, and Moath Jamal
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:: This briefing paper summarizes the important lessons learned since 2018 by Oxfam Denmark and the wider Oxfam confederation while promoting the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda and supporting WPS programming in Burkina Faso, Colombia, Ghana, Kenya, Lebanon, Mali, Niger, the Occupied Palestinian Territory, South Sudan, Syria, Uganda, Ukraine and Yemen, including under the Danish International Development Agency (Danida) strategic partnerships. It contains practical and policy-level recommendations for international actors working on the WPS agenda in various crisis and conflict contexts globally. The briefing paper shows that supporting and amplifying locally led feminist action by diverse women-led, women’s and LGBTQIA+ rights organizations, networks and groups is a central foundation for peace and justice.
Topic:: Leadership, Crisis Management, Gender, Protection, Localization, Women, Peace, and and Security (WPS)
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, Middle East, and Global Focus

78. Back to the Future: The Rise of Militarization in China in the 2020s

Author:: Tai Ming Cheung
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:: In this policy brief, IGCC director Tai Ming Cheung analyzes Chinese militarization efforts as the country seeks tighter integration of the civilian and defense economies and a strong sense of national security, and whether such efforts lead to China being more prone to going to war in the near future.
Topic:: Defense Policy, National Security, Economy, and Militarization
Political Geography:: China and Asia

79. Using data as a production factor: policy ideas for a new EU data strategy

Author:: Bertin Martins
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: A major task for the 2024-2029 European Commission will be to reconcile and simplify the European Union’s range of data-market laws into a more coherent framework. At the heart of the approach should be the non-rival nature of data, meaning it can be used by many parties for many purposes at the same time. That creates the potential for economic efficiency gains from the re-use and aggregation of data. Exclusive private data control rights and high transaction costs may stand in the way of realising these gains. We define economic criteria against which existing data market regulations can be evaluated. These criteria lead to the following recommendations to improve existing EU data regulations: The EU general data protection regulation facilitates re-use of personal data. Machine-readable consent notices and real-time data transfers could reduce high transaction costs that prevent meaningful exercise of informed consent. The European Health Data Space contains an almost-ideal governance regime for health-data re-use and pooling that maximises incentives for data-driven innovation. This regime should be applied to other industrial data-space initiatives. The Data Act facilitates access and re-use of product data but exclusive licensing rights for data holders, monopolistic pricing of third-party data transfers and other anti-competitive measures reduce its impact. Widening its application to services data would make it a truly horizontal data-market regulation. The Digital Markets Act contains several obligations for platforms to grant users access to their own data. Widening access to networked data would facilitate competition between platforms and their users. Mutual instead of unilateral sharing of search-engine data would avoid fragmentation of the search-data pool. The Artificial Intelligence Act imposes unwarranted and costly restrictions on the re-use of copyright-related content data for AI model training data, reducing the innovative impact of AI. The text and data mining exception in the EU Copyright Directive could be broadened to address these new AI technology challenges. EU data market regulations exhibit a tension between exclusive private rights and the realisation of the wider societal value of data. Finding an acceptable balance may involve some redistribution of the efficiency gains between data users and the original data collectors.
Topic:: Markets, European Union, Digital Economy, Microeconomics, Data, and Digital Markets Act (DMA)
Political Geography:: Europe

80. Prepare now: Europe must get ready for the coming long-term care surge

Author:: Svend E. Hougaard Jensen, David Pinkus, and Nina Ruer
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Demographic change and ageing populations in European Union countries will impact many aspects of the economy and have a direct effect on long-term care (LTC) systems. Demand for LTC already exceeds supply in many EU countries, leading to the ‘care gap’. This gap is expected to widen, threatening quality of life for the elderly, exacerbating gender disparities and imposing significant economic costs. The root causes of the gap include demographic shifts, inadequate public investment, workforce shortages and a heavy reliance on informal caregiving. Women stand to lose the most if no steps are taken to prepare LTC systems for the coming surge in demand because care, both formal and informal, is predominantly provided by women. The care gap can be reduced by either increasing the supply of care or by reducing the demand for care. We assess LTC reforms in five EU countries and explain how these can affect the care gap by influencing demand and supply. Governments should: Recognise LTC as a priority. Governments should increase public spending on LTC and make LTC a central policy priority linked to broader goals, including gender equality and economic growth. Expand funding mechanisms. Governments can introduce new means of financing, such as mandatory LTC insurance and pre-funding mechanisms. Most importantly, benefits should target those with the greatest needs, to promote equity and adequacy. Support the workforce more. The LTC sector should be made more attractive by raising wages, improving working conditions and expanding training programmes to attract and retain workers. Develop prevention strategies. EU funds could be directed to research into treatments targeting age-related diseases such as dementia. National governments could invest in public health campaigns and preventive care to reduce future demand. Use the newest technologies. EU countries should invest in robotics and assistive technologies to improve productivity and to reduce physical strain on caregivers.
Topic:: Economics, Health, Governance, European Union, and Macroeconomics
Political Geography:: Europe

81. Not yet Trump-proof: an evaluation of the European Commission’s emerging policy platform

Author:: Heather Grabbe and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The economic strategy being defined by the 2024-2029 European Commission seems to follow the prescriptions on innovation and single market reform, and the expansive approach to industrial policy, set out by Mario Draghi in his September 2024 report on European Union competitiveness, with two important differences. First, the Commission stops short of calling for World Trade Organisation-prohibited subsidies – this is welcome. Second, the Commission proposes a new state aid framework for national industrial policy rather than expansion of EU-level public investment funding. This runs the risk of weakening the single market and harming competition, with the unintended consequence of protecting incumbents and inhibiting structural change. In terms of specific policies, on defence, the Commission is right to face up to the challenge of defining an EU procurement mechanism that offers sufficient speed and cost advantages to justify large-scale funding. On economic security and international partnerships, the Commission is right to take a broader approach than a foreign economic policy focused only on supply chains. What is lacking is a much greater commitment to providing support for climate mitigation in developing countries. The second Trump presidency creates risks for the Commission strategy. President Trump has gone further than expected in threatening territorial expansion and with the speed, aggression and disregard for the rule of law with which he has started to implement his policies. These factors will complicate the EU-United States relationship. The best defence against both Trump and the competitive and security threats posed by China is to accelerate policies that address the EU’s structural weaknesses: raising productivity growth, defence capacity and economic security. Economic security, in turn, requires more resilient trade relationships, less financial dependence on the US and an improved standing with emerging market and developing economies. The EU should also seize the opportunity offered by the shift in US policy from subsidies to deregulation. While the EU should not race Trump to the bottom on environmental or financial deregulation, it should rapidly improve its own regulatory framework while building on its core strengths: human capital and the rule of law. Unlike tariff wars or discriminatory subsidies, a competition to provide a good business environment is not a zero-sum game.
Topic:: Security, Economics, Industrial Policy, Budget, European Union, Digital Economy, Trade Policy, Donald Trump, Sustainability, European Commission, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

82. Upgrading Europe's electricity grid is about more than just money

Author:: Conall Heussaff and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Electricity network investment is essential for the energy transition, with annual investments of tens of billions of euros required across Europe. Network companies are already investing such amounts and delivering efficient grid investments requires more than additional money. Assessing infrastructure needs is the first step in grid investment. At local, national and European Union levels, network development planning is determined by policy choices and can greatly affect the efficiency of investments. Coordinated grid planning is crucial to set the right incentives for the efficient development of the European electricity system. An EU independent system operator could assume responsibility for network planning by providing regular, independent assessment of efficient network investment needs from a holistic European perspective. Although significant capital expenditure is undoubtedly necessary, network regulation should encourage network companies to invest in the most-efficient solutions. Current regulatory approaches may favour traditional capital expenditure, leading to system inefficiencies and higher-than-necessary consumer costs. Cross-border electricity transmission infrastructure is critical to integrate renewables into the electricity system at scale and reduce costs for European consumers. But such projects are often not built or are delayed because those that decide on and pay for the infrastructure are not necessarily those that benefit from it. A European fund could smooth negotiations between parties and accelerate the physical interconnection of the European electricity system. Fairly recovering the costs of grid investments from consumers is vital to maintain public support for the energy transition. National funds could smooth out cost impacts over time, keeping electricity affordable throughout the energy transition.
Topic:: Climate Change, Electricity, Decarbonization, and Energy Security
Political Geography:: Europe

83. How to improve the European Union’s sustainable finance framework

Author:: Silvia Merler
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The European Union has sought to steer corporate behaviour to support its climate goals by adopting a large body of rules on sustainable investment, sustainability disclosures and sustainability labelling of financial products, underpinned by a taxonomy of activities considered sustainable. It is unclear, however, if this effort has had significant results. Examination of financial market data and metrics of investment flows towards green and sustainable investment shows up several weaknesses – both contingent and structural – in the EU sustainable finance framework, which could limit its effectiveness in aligning capital flows with climate objectives. The Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR) is aimed at making the sustainability content of financial products more transparent but rests on a concept of ‘sustainable investment’ that is too broad and loosely defined. Meanwhile, the EU Taxonomy Regulation has not yet become established as the reference framework for corporate bond issuance or sustainable investing. The EU also lacks a coherent framework for transition finance – or investment that is not yet classified as sustainable but that represents progress to greater sustainability – despite this being the market segment to which the largest volumes of investment will need to flow in the short to medium run. Five adjustments would make the EU sustainable finance framework more effective at delivering the desired alignment of incentives. First, the taxonomy framework should be completed and clarified. Second, the SFDR definition of sustainable investment should be toughened. Third, the neutrality of the framework across capital market instruments, in particular debt versus equity, should be ensured. Fourth, a dedicated framework for transition finance should be developed. Finally, formal sustainable and transition labels for financial products should be introduced. This approach would make the sustainable finance framework more easily applicable to all kind of companies and all types of capital market instruments, regardless of whether they limit the use of proceeds, and it would be naturally extendable into a framework for transition finance and into a transparent sustainability labelling regime for financial products.
Topic:: Climate Change, European Union, Regulation, Finance, Macroeconomics, and Sustainability
Political Geography:: Europe

84. The European Union’s new fiscal framework: a good start, but challenges loom

Author:: Nicolas Boivin and Zsolt Darvas
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The European Union’s fiscal framework, updated in April 2024, aims to strengthen fiscal sustainability and foster public investment. It requires countries to maintain or gradually reduce their public debts to no more than 60 percent of GDP, and ensures compliance with a 3 percent of GDP deficit limit and some safeguards. EU countries must submit Medium-Term Fiscal Structural Plans (MTFSPs) showing how they intend to comply. MTFSPs for most EU countries have now been approved by the European Commission, on the basis that the fiscal paths in the plans are credible and increased public investment is foreseen even amid fiscal consolidation. However, macroeconomic assumptions in MTFSPs frequently deviate from the Commission’s guidance, often reflecting optimistic growth projections. Overly optimistic assumptions risk deviations from approved fiscal paths, while disagreements about macro projections, which are central to debt sustainability analysis, could undermine the framework’s credibility and hinder implementation at a later stage. Several MTFSPs assume higher stock-flow adjustments (SFAs) than included in the Commission’s prior guidance, indicating that these countries must implement somewhat larger fiscal adjustments. Historical data shows large positive SFAs for many countries, suggesting that multi-year-ahead SFA projections should be extended to all countries, based on a transparent methodology. The plans indicate that greater planned fiscal adjustments tend to be associated with deeper cuts to public investment. The overall increase in public investment ratios remains below 0.2 percent of GDP according to the plans and Commission and OECD forecasts. While the EU’s major investment gaps should primarily be addressed through private investment, public investment must also play a role. Innovative approaches, such as a new EU fund financed by common borrowing, are essential to boost investment in the EU. The updated fiscal framework’s long-term success depends on achieving consensus on macroeconomic assumptions, including the standardisation of methods to assess the growth impacts of reforms, while refining SFA methodologies and finding new ways to foster investment. Strengthening these elements will make the framework more credible and effective, enabling it to better guide fiscal policy and support sustainable growth.
Topic:: Governance, European Union, Macroeconomics, and Fiscal Policy
Political Geography:: Europe

85. Europe’s energy information problem

Author:: Ben McWilliams, Simone Tagliapietra, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Comprehensive information on energy-related topics, such as take-up of heat pumps, industrial natural gas consumption and prices, and battery connections to the electricity grid, is either not available in Europe in a timely manner, or not available at the level of granularity, reliability and consistency needed for informed decision-making. Certain information is simply not collected, while other information is collected but is not comparable or consistent across Europe, or is hard to access. European policy targets, such as greenhouse-gas emission reduction pathways, are evaluated using models for which input assumptions and parameters are not public knowledge. It should be a European Union priority to improve this situation. Doing so will enable better decision-making by policymakers and companies. This is especially relevant when Europe faces the triple challenge of decarbonisation, ensuring security of energy supply and growing its internationally competitive energy-consuming industries. The EU status quo is that good energy information is provided by a mix of institutions, agencies, national bodies, industrial associations and non-governmental organisations, but with substantial room for improvement. Lessons can be learned from the United States Energy Information Administration and the European Environment Agency, which was established to better coordinate climate data. Improving energy information will involve difficult political decisions. A process should be started to evaluate the options and to measure the continued cost of inaction.
Topic:: Climate Change, European Union, Institutions, Green Deal, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe

86. Europeans still want climate action, but don't trust governments to deliver

Author:: Jan Eichhorn and Heather Grabbe
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The vast majority of Europeans continues to support action to combat climate change, but many are losing faith in governments to deliver a transition that is effective and fair. Based on a large-scale questionnaire answered by nearly 8000 people in five EU countries in 2024, with a comparison to responses from 2020, we find that Europeans continue to worry about climate change and want effective action to combat it, even though the pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine significantly increased their concerns about economic and physical insecurity. Scepticism about the causes of climate change has risen a bit, and concern about adapting to its impact has grown. People across all income groups, particularly in France, Germany, Italy and Sweden, feel negative about the outlook for their economic future and their governments’ ability to improve it. People who feel politically disaffected think that decisionmakers are not taking their views and interests into account when making economic and climate policies. Some people are now shifting their attention away from action against the climate crisis towards adaptation, but this does not mean they are less concerned about climate change. Instead, for some people, it is an expression of their disillusionment with state institutions – and this feeling is present among supporters of parties across the political spectrum. Worry about climate change is equally spread across all socio-economic groups. Closer examination of attitudes in Germany, using evidence from focus groups, which we also discuss in this Policy Brief, reinforces the finding of increasing scepticism about the German government’s ability to manage the climate crisis. If political leaders want the public to continue to support climate policies, they must engage proactively now to avoid even greater loss of confidence in government. If governments go soft on efforts to combat the climate crisis now or delay action, they will not meet voters’ demand for an effective and just transition. Moreover, hesitation and delay would boost populist and far-right actors’ efforts to sow doubt about the causes of climate change and whether policies will be effective.
Topic:: Climate Change, Elections, Populism, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe

87. Will China’s economy follow the same path as Japan’s?

Author:: Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Jianwei Xu
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Since the bursting of China’s real-estate bubble in mid-2021, there has been a growing concern that the Chinese economy could end up like that of Japan in the early 1990s. Some structural patterns are strikingly similar: low private consumption over a long period, especially when compared to the rest of the world, and an excessively high savings ratio, though China’s imbalances now are even larger that Japan’s were then. Initial policy responses to the bursting of their respective bubbles have also been similar. Both China now and Japan then were initially hesitant to ease monetary and fiscal policies, and opted to expand manufacturing, with an eye on external demand, supported by more research and development expenditure. In both cases, the outcomes were stubborn trade surpluses and a mercantilist attitude to their growth problems, leading to the United States taking protectionist measures. China also seems to be following Japan’s offshoring of production to mitigate the impact of protectionism. The main difference, though, is that China now is a poorer country than Japan was then, with still more convergence opportunities ahead. China is also a much bigger military and geopolitical contender than Japan ever was. China’s geopolitical weight is behind the US technological containment of China, but also gives China more room for manoeuvre globally, especially in the Global South. It remains unclear – though globally significant – whether China will be able to deviate from the path followed by Japan in the 1980s and 1990s.
Topic:: Industrial Policy, Geopolitics, Economy, Economic Growth, Innovation, and Real Estate
Political Geography:: Japan, China, and Asia

88. Ukraine: European democracy’s affordable arsenal

Author:: Jacob Funk Kirkegaard
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: European NATO members must raise defence spending by enough to deter through strength an irredentist Russia. This must be done possibly without the United States and when ageing populations demand higher social spending. Raising defence spending to sufficient levels could result in a doubling of current primary deficits to just over 3 percent of GDP on average. This seems likely to be a fiscally unattainable goal for this group of countries. European NATO members, in addition to their quantitative defence spending challenge, face the qualitative challenge of significantly increasing their outlays on new modern military equipment, especially drones, to credibly deter Russia. This will require all European NATO members to significantly increase investments in their domestic and regional military-industrial capacities. While its armed forces are physically defending their country against Russia’s onslaught, Ukraine is transforming gradually into a very large, advanced and cost-competitive military equipment and weapons producer. Through the so-called ‘Danish Model’, individual European Union and NATO members are already actively funding Ukrainian defence production, helping it to help itself against Russia. Much more focus should be put on Ukraine’s ability, if fully integrated with the military-industrial sector in the rest of Europe, to produce much of the modern military equipment wanted by itself and the rest of Europe. This Policy Brief shows how Ukraine already produces drones and modern howitzers, arguably the two most important weapons in defensive warfare today, at prices well below those achieved by other Western military suppliers. The EU, with a fully integrated and funded Ukrainian military-industrial sector, will have the capacity to produce much of the cost-competitive military equipment it will need in future, while continuing to fund its welfare systems. To facilitate this development, the EU must in all defence and military-related matters begin treating Ukraine immediately as a full EU member.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Industrial Policy, Governance, European Union, Geopolitics, Transatlantic Relations, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

89. Reinforcing EU merger control against the risks of acquisitions by big tech

Author:: Mario Mariniello
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Since 2000, online platforms that are now within the scope of the European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA), have bought nearly 700 small, promising companies worldwide. However, only 19 of their attempted acquisitions were notified to the European Commission, the authority exercising merger control over deals with a substantive EU connection. In the other cases, the acquired target’s turnover did not meet the conditions for merger notification. These acquisitions have happened in the context of digital markets becoming increasingly concentrated, leading to speculation that concentration levels might have been lower had some of those acquisitions not taken place. The harm that the concentration of market power in a handful of American digital companies may cause is magnified by the current position of the United States, which aims to shield platforms from regulatory enforcement. Acquisitions of small companies may have pro- or anti-competitive effects. Established market players may buy startups to become more competitive or to supply a higher quality product or service, ultimately benefitting final users. Mergers may also incentivise innovation and attract venture capital. However, incumbents might also acquire small companies with strategic, anti-competitive objectives. They might want to stop challengers to their market power from emerging in the future. Or they might acquire small companies to prevent competitors from relying on the target’s supply to complement their competing products. Moreover, competition authorities struggle to make accurate predictions about the evolution of competitive dynamics in new and complex markets, such as digital markets. Authorities thus may be unable to take the correct decision, even if the merger is notified. Responding to these issues hinges on amending the DMA. The European Commission should be empowered to scrutinise any acquisition performed by the large platforms within the DMA scope (currently, the DMA requires these platforms to inform the Commission of any intended concentration, but envisages no other action). Moreover, the burden of proving that the merger is not harmful should be shifted to the large platforms. This would leverage market players’ knowledge to help increase the accuracy of merger decisions in a highly dynamic and uncertain environment.
Topic:: Science and Technology, European Union, Microeconomics, Big Tech, European Commission, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:: Europe

90. How DeepSeek has changed artificial intelligence and what it means for Europe

Author:: Bertin Martens
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: By mid-2024, artificial intelligence large language models (LLMs) were running into diminishing returns to scale in training data and computational capacity. LLM training began to shift away from costly pre-training to cheaper fine-tuning and allowing LLMs to ‘reason’ for longer before replying to questions. Fine-tuning uses chain-of-thought (CoT) training data that includes questions and the logical steps to reach correct answers. This increases the efficiency of learning for smaller AI models, such as DeepSeek. CoT data can be extracted from large ‘teacher’ LLMs to train small ‘student’ models. These changes shift the cost structure of AI models from high pre-training costs to lower fine-tuning costs for model developers and more inference costs for users. While smaller models are cheaper to use, a positive AI demand effect is likely to exceed the negative price effect. Price competition between models will increase, resulting in tighter margins for AI firms. Specialised models can still fetch premium prices. Cheaper LLMs are an opportunity for European Union companies to catch up in building smaller AI models and applications on top of LLMs. Increased demand for AI services will require more investment in computing infrastructure, including in the EU. Investing in large LLMs and the corresponding hyperscale infrastructure is riskier, especially as price competition between models increases. Knowledge extraction between AI models puts pressure on model developers to protect their investments against free-riding by others. It also creates a dilemma for policymakers: should they favour free-riding to promote competition and innovation, or should they clamp down and reinforce monopoly rents to stimulate investment in AI models? Past policy will not be an appropriate response in a world that offers vastly expanded opportunities for knowledge pooling and innovation at lower cost.
Topic:: Science and Technology, European Union, Economic Policy, Microeconomics, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, Large Language Models (LLMs), and DeepSeek
Political Geography:: Europe

91. The demographic divide: inequalities in ageing across the European Union

Author:: David Pinkus and Nina Ruer
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The European Union is projected to enter a period of population decline after 2026, with implications for economic development and labour markets, though these will vary because of different trends in different EU countries. Between 2023 and 2050, Eastern and Southern EU countries will face the sharpest declines because of both natural population decrease and limited net inward migration. In contrast, Northern and Western countries could see population growth driven by higher migration. By 2050, working-age populations are projected to decline in 22 out of 27 EU countries, while the share of those aged 85+ in the EU as whole will more than double. This shift will strain healthcare, pension and long-term care systems across the continent. Eastern and Southern EU countries will face more severe ageing and workforce shrinkages, undermining their competitiveness and potentially contributing to increasing inequality. Western and Northern countries will also age, but slower natural population decline and larger migration inflows will give them more time to adjust. However, regional disparities within countries will likely widen as migrants concentrate in urban areas, leaving rural regions even more vulnerable to depopulation. Policies must be adapted to these different demographic trends. Eastern EU countries should focus on retaining talent, attracting migrants in sectors with labour shortages and increasing labour-force participation by women and older workers. Southern countries should strengthen family-friendly and youth-employment policies, while improving migrant integration and regional infrastructure. Western and Northern countries must prioritise migrant integration, rural development and gradual labour-market reforms for ageing populations. A coordinated EU plan for these different trends would support EU countries in addressing the challenges they will face. Integration of migrants into labour markets and societies will be especially important, though relying on sustained high migration may not be a viable long-term solution and will not be a substitute for maximising the participation of residents in labour markets.
Topic:: Demographics, European Union, Inequality, and Aging
Political Geography:: Europe

92. Making the best of the new EU Social Climate Fund

Author:: Eva Jüngling, Giovanni Sgaravatti, Simone Tagliapietra, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The slow pace of decarbonisation of buildings and transportation threatens the European Union’s goal of reducing emissions by 55 percent by 2030 and achieving net zero by 2050. To address this, a new emissions trading system, ETS2, is being introduced to put a carbon price on fuels used in buildings and road transport. However, the resulting cost increases risk a disproportionate impact on vulnerable households and small and medium sized enterprises. The European Union has created the Social Climate Fund (SCF) to address these distributional challenges. This instrument redistributes a portion of auction revenues generated by the ETS2 among EU countries, in order to protect the most vulnerable. A much larger share of ETS2 revenues will flow directly to national governments, offering significant opportunities for social measures and investments in the green transition. The use of those revenues will dictate how successful EU countries are in managing the transition and protecting households, particularly in higher-income member states, which will receive relatively smaller shares of SCF funding. ETS2 is an essential part of the EU climate policy toolkit. Governments should employ good practices, as identified by the European Commission, to tackle emissions from buildings and transport and to gradually phase out income support, in line with the achievement of investment targets and milestones. Higher-income EU countries should develop additional targeted financing levers to protect the vulnerable and to introduce extra enablers to encourage private investment. Proper sequencing, outreach and communication will be essential to ensure the uptake of measures and public support for policy instruments. Cross-country learning should be leveraged, including through the creation of a European policy registry that will help countries compare their approaches and potentially amend their SCF spending plans on the basis of learning from policies that been successful elsewhere.
Topic:: Climate Change, European Union, Welfare, Transportation, Carbon Emissions, Decarbonization, and Protection
Political Geography:: Europe

93. The governance and funding of European rearmament

Author:: Guntram B. Wolff, Armin Steinbach, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Europe faces a grave security threat. Gaps in European military equipment are substantial compared to Russia’s military build-up. The European defence market is fragmented and weakened by home bias in procurement, low order numbers and technological gaps. These problems reflect the combination of past reliance on the United States and Europe’s nationally-based defence governance. With the US now retreating from its role of European guardian, greater cooperation is essential to close technological gaps and reduce rearmament costs. Unless procurement is pooled and fragmentation reduced, additional demand for defence goods will mainly drive up prices. Better-integrated defence markets would both increase competition and facilitate entry of new defence technology firms. The combination of integrated markets and scaled-up procurement could lead to a halving of unit costs. European Union measures including the European Defence Fund, the Act in Support of Ammunition Production, the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act and ReArm Europe represent progress towards strengthening the supply of military goods but the incentives offered are too small to address the home bias in procurement or to coordinate the provision of ‘strategic enablers’ such as military satellites. To go further, the EU and its European allies have two options. First, the role of the European Defence Agency could be broadened, possibly in combination with a new lending instrument similar to the EU’s 2020-22 SURE programme. Second, a European Defence Mechanism (EDM) could be created: an institution similar to the European Stability Mechanism, based on an intergovernmental treaty. The EDM would undertake joint procurement and plan for the provision of strategic enablers in specified areas, with a capacity to fund these roles. It could own strategic enablers and charge usage fees to EDM members, reducing the budgetary impact of rearmament. EDM membership would entail prohibition of both state aid and procurement preferences that benefit national defence contractors at the expense of contractors from other EDM members. Of the two options, the second is preferable, as it would (1) create a defence industry single market among EDM members, (2) create a financing vehicle that might make large-scale projects fiscally feasible, and (3) include non-EU democracies such as the United Kingdom on an equal footing, while also giving an opt-out to EU countries that lack the political appetite for more defence integration, or that have national constitutional constraints.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Governance, Geopolitics, Weapons, Macroeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and United States of America

94. Who should be charged? Principles for fair allocation of electricity system costs

Author:: Conall Heussaff, Eva Jüngling, Simone Tagliapietra, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The high costs in the European Union of supplying electricity can only be structurally reduced through decarbonisation and deeper European electricity system integration. In the short-term, policymakers have few choices. They can redistribute system costs by shifting components from one consumer to another. Another immediate distributional option would be to reduce energy taxation, implicitly shifting costs to the taxpayer. Meanwhile, decision-making processes that translates electricity system costs into final consumer prices are fragmented. Rules on the short-term production, transmission and consumption of electricity are determined at EU level. National regulators and governments determine how the fixed costs of the system are recovered from consumers, while national policymakers also set energy taxes. This Policy Brief sets out options for shifting the fixed costs of the electricity system between consumers, for changing energy taxation to reduce prices and for evaluating systemic trade-offs between system cost and other characteristics, such as sustainability and reliability. We also estimate the quantitative effects of shifting costs between consumers and reducing taxes on electricity. We set out four principles for pricing electricity fairly. Policy interventions in the electricity system should not seek to achieve broader economic objectives at the expense of energy-policy goals. Consumer prices should incentivise efficient system operation. Carbon emissions should be priced in. The fixed costs of the electricity system should be primarily recovered from inelastic consumption. European policymakers should develop transparent analytical tools to assess the distributional effects of electricity-policy interventions. Lessons should be learned from the energy crisis, during which EU and national policies attempted to shield consumers from price impacts, and these lessons should form the basis of ongoing efforts to reduce prices. EU guidelines for electricity cost recovery should be established, following fundamental economic principles, and could form a policy toolbox for national governments to reduce energy prices. Finally, the long-term strategic goal of deeper physical and institutional integration of the European electricity should be pursued to structurally reduce electricity prices.
Topic:: Climate Change, European Union, Electricity, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe

95. Building coalitions for climate transition and nature restoration

Author:: Jean Pisani-Ferry, Beatrice di Mauro, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Global climate and biodiversity outcomes will largely be determined in emerging and developing economies (EMDEs). We propose a four-pillar strategy to support climate and nature preservation in line with the economic interests of both developing and advanced countries. This would move beyond voluntary pledges to embed climate and nature objectives into the structures of trade, finance and industrial policy, creating a self-reinforcing system of cooperation and reducing the net costs of the green transition. Under Pillar 1, a coalition of advanced and developing countries would link tiered carbon pricing with a common carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM). Pillar 2 would create a climate-finance coalition to decarbonise the power sectors of developing countries. Pillar 3 would involve partnerships to develop clean energy-intensive industrial production stages in developing economies with rich renewables endowments; these would feed into the supply chains of the European Union and other energy-importing advanced economies. Pillar 4 would redesign markets to create scalable and credible mechanisms to fund carbon removals. Technology-based removals can be incentivised through the introduction of clean-up certificates into the EU emissions trading system, while nature-based removals would require improved market design centred on a new asset class: nature shares. The four pillars reinforce each other. A multi-country CBAM and carbon pricing coalition (Pillar 1) would reduce the cost of financing power sector decarbonisation (Pillar 2). Linking EMDE membership of the CBAM and carbon-pricing coalition to financial support for the decarbonisation of power sectors would also make it more attractive for EMDEs to adopt carbon prices. Decarbonisation of power sectors (Pillar 2) would be a precondition for developing clean, highly energy-intensive industry in renewables-rich EMDEs (Pillar 3). The Pillar 1 coalition should include the EU, China and as many other countries as possible. Advanced countries and China could underpin the Pillar 2 financier coalition. Pillar 3 would involve the EU and potentially other energy-poor advanced countries, along with EMDEs that are richly endowed with renewables. Pillar 4 would include the main custodians of the planet’s natural capital. Enabling these coalitions will require EU leadership.
Topic:: Climate Change, Economics, Industrial Policy, Trade, Sustainability, Decarbonization, and Green Transition
Political Geography:: Europe

96. Reconciling the European Union’s clean industrialisation goals with those of the Global South

Author:: Ben McWilliams, Simone Tagliapietra, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Clean industrialisation is a political and economic priority for the European Union. For it to work, affordable clean energy is needed. However, producing this energy in Europe is constrained by limited renewable energy endowments (sunshine and wind) and land availability, while the transportation costs for imported clean energy (in the form of electricity or hydrogen) are much higher than for fossil fuels. An alternative way to fuel Europe’s clean industrial sector would to import energy-intensive primary tradeable products such as ammonia, methanol and reduced iron. We estimate that more than ten percent of total future EU clean energy demand will be met by such products. Public policy in Europe should aim to facilitate trade in energy-intensive intermediate inputs, which are cheaper to import than energy directly. Imports of these inputs could boost the competitiveness of downstream stages in the energy-intensive value chain (such as steel production). By lowering overall energy demand and thus electricity prices, such imports would also raise EU competitiveness more broadly. In many cases, they would replace imports of less energy-intensive commodities such as iron ore, therefore not adding to Europe’s overall import dependency. The direct economic impact in terms of jobs and value added that would be offshored is not substantial. The international benefit of such a strategy would be that it would embed third countries – especially emerging and developing economies – into clean industrial value chains. Stable European demand can help such countries develop export-driven, clean industrial strategies. Politically, this could be an important incentive that could offset the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism. Governments should therefore not use taxpayer money to fight the relocation of energy-intensive and tradeable primary products, beyond some minimum threshold that is desirable for economic security and innovation reasons. Meanwhile, ongoing negotiations with third countries to establish Clean Trade and Investment Partnerships should put trade in energy-intensive clean products at the core of new international clean supply chains.
Topic:: Industrial Policy, European Union, Global South, Industrialization, Decarbonization, Energy, and Emerging Economies
Political Geography:: Europe

97. The time is right to make a European Union-India trade deal happen

Author:: Ignacio Garcia Bercero and André Sapir
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Nearly 20 years have passed since the EU and India started negotiations on a bilateral trade and investment agreement. After seven years of intense negotiations, the process stalled in 2014, primarily because of the failure of the respective political leaders to make difficult choices. Talks restarted in 2022 and now offer a reasonable chance of delivering a bilateral free-trade agreement “within the course of the year”, as Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen declared in February 2025. The EU and India both rank among the world’s five largest economies in terms of GDP. Yet much separates the two economically. India’s GDP per capita is much lower than the EU’s, and its level of trade and investment protection is much higher than that of the EU or even its middle-income peers. However, India has recently enjoyed faster growth than any other large economy, including China. The EU and India are also being brought closer by the global geopolitical situation and their common pursuit of strategic autonomy and economic security. The two sides should learn the lessons from past failure and reach an ambitious agreement in areas that previously proved difficult, such as goods tariffs and services, and in new areas, such as climate protection, that could again derail the revived negotiation if not managed well. A deal by the end of 2025 will have economic benefits and will also reinforce the broader economic and political links between the EU and India at a time when world affairs are under severe strain. An ambitious agreement could also help reconstruct a rules-based global order for the new multipolar world. This is particularly important for the multilateral trade and climate regimes, where converging EU and Indian positions could have a major influence on the redesign of international institutions and rules.
Topic:: Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, Governance, European Union, and Trade
Political Geography:: Europe, South Asia, and India

98. Terrorism and Immigration: 50 Years of Foreign-Born Terrorism on US Soil, 1975–2024

Author:: Alex Nowrasteh
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: Terrorism is a hazard to human life and material prosperity that should be addressed in a sensible manner whereby the benefits of government actions taken to contain it outweigh the costs. Whether policies are sensible depends on the risks that terrorism poses, the harms that terrorism inflicts, and the costs of anti-terrorism policies. This risk analysis of foreign-born terrorism is a crucial step in evaluating anti-terrorism policies related to immigration.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, and Immigration
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

99. Rethinking Social Security from a Global Perspective: What Congress Can Learn from the Experiences of Canada, Germany, New Zealand, and Sweden

Author:: Romina Boccia and Ivane Nachkebia
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: Social Security is projected to reach technical insolvency by 2033, threatening retirees with automatic 23 percent benefit cuts as the program will be unable to pay full benefits on time. The program’s looming trust-fund insolvency creates a legislative forcing mechanism and thus presents an opportunity to reimagine how Social Security could work. Policymakers should consider fundamentally rethinking the program’s structure and transform it into a system that ensures seniors are protected from poverty when they can no longer work, while also freeing up resources for younger workers to save more on their own. With Social Security running large and rising cash-flow deficits since 2010, and given a political desire to protect most current retirees from being affected by benefit reductions, Congress should act now to stabilize the system—not procrastinate any longer, which only ensures that inevitable changes will be more drastic and economically harmful. The longer Congress waits, the more people will be locked into the current unsustainable system, and the higher the burden will be on younger generations to finance it.
Topic:: Poverty, Reform, Fiscal Policy, Social Security, and Sustainability
Political Geography:: Canada, Germany, Sweden, and New Zealand

100. The Misleading Panic over Misinformation

Author:: David Inserra
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: Misinformation is widely viewed as one of the most serious challenges facing modern societies. Together with the related terms “disinformation” and “malinformation,” nearly every present-day issue involves claims of misinformation. As a result, a host of actors have dedicated significant amounts of resources to the problem of incorrect or misleading information, especially online.
Topic:: Regulation, Freedom of Expression, and Misinformation
Political Geography:: Global Focus

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS