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1. Trade Wars and Currency Wars – Lessons from History

Author:
Kris James Mitchener and Kirsten Wandschneider
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
Explaining President Trump’s “Liberation-day” tariffs on April 2nd, 2025, Stephen Miran, President Trump’s chairman of the council of economic advisors suggested that countries accept the U.S. tariffs without retaliation to come to a fair “burden sharing”(Miran: 2025). History shows that this assumption is wrong: using a detailed data set of bilateral trade flows constructed for the interwar period, this column shows that in fact the US faced substantial and widespread retaliation from trade partners in response to the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930 (i.e., the Smoot-Hawley Tariff). U.S. exports to retaliating countries fell by as much as 33%, with U.S. trade partners specifically targeting high-end, branded consumer products, such as U.S. autos. The drop in trade contributed to the Great Depression, which in turn triggered a large currency war: between 1929 and 1936, 70 countries devalued their currencies relative to gold. We show that trade was further reduced by more than 21% following devaluation. The currency war destroyed the trade-enhancing benefits of the global monetary standard, ending regime coordination and increasing trade costs. The 1930s are a potent reminder of what can happen when international policy coordination breaks down and countries go it alone when negotiating trade and exchange-rate policies.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, International Trade and Finance, Financial Crisis, Tariffs, Trade Wars, Trade Policy, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

2. Three risks that must be addressed for new European Union fiscal rules to succeed

Author:
Lucio Pench
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The debate on the reform of the European Union’s fiscal rules, the Stability and Growth Pact, has largely focused on their design. This nearly exclusive focus has distracted attention from the equally, if not more, important aspects of implementation. The reform, completed in April 2024, left implementation unaddressed, or at least open to very different potential outcomes. In particular, the reform failed to clarify the interplay between EU countries’ medium-term fiscal structural plans (MTFSPs), which embody the new focus on debt sustainability, and the excessive deficit procedure (EDP), which remains the main enforcement tool under the rules. The need for clarification is urgent as several countries are set to enter EDPs for breaching the SGP’s 3 percent of GDP deficit threshold at the same time as their first MTFSPs are endorsed in autumn 2024. There is a risk that the adjustment paths prescribed by EDPs may be at least temporarily less demanding than the debt-sustainability requirements of the MTFSPs would normally imply. Even if consistency between EDPs and MTFSPs is ensured from the start, inconsistencies may arise over time and be resolved in a way that further postpones the necessary adjustment. The main risk is that the 3 percent of GDP deficit might be perceived as the only target that matters for countries that enter EDPs in 2024, as repeated revisions of the MTFSPs undermine the cogency of the debt sustainability requirements. This scenario is likely to materialise if the countries are allowed to exit their EDPs upon bringing their deficits to or below 3 percent of GDP, while being still far from the necessary correction of the debt trajectory. It is important to shape countries’ expectations on the implementation of the upcoming EDPs in a way that is conducive to the immediate internalisation of the debt sustainability constraint implied by the new rules, rather than allowing it to be viewed as a distant objective. This change in expectations could be achieved by clarifying that, even if a country has been placed in an EDP only for breach of the deficit criterion, it should also satisfy the debt criterion for the procedure to be abrogated.
Topic:
Debt, Reform, European Union, Fiscal Policy, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
Europe

3. Financing European air defence through European Union debt

Author:
Armin Steinbach and Guntram B. Wolff
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Europe is vulnerable to air attacks by both state and non-state actors. Russia has substantially increased its production of hypersonic missiles, missiles and drones, while European air defence capacities remain patchy with little improvement in coverage in recent years. Air defence is a classic European public good. No individual nation alone can provide it comprehensively, while air defence provided individual European Union countries can offer significant benefits to Europe as a whole. Joint EU funding for the build-up of greater air defence capabilities would be thus justified and help ensure rapid and sufficient provisioning. Debt funding would be economically justified as air defence systems, such as Patriot and IRIS-T, involve large upfront costs – debt would allow the cost of the investment to be smoothed over longer periods. Issuing EU debt, similarly to what was done with the NextGenerationEU post-pandemic recovery instrument, would be justified given the level of the air-attack threat. EU debt funding of air defence system is legally possible. Debt funding for air defence would respect the EU’s limited competence in defence and such a scheme would maintain the exceptional character of debt funding, with EU countries responding to a security threat in an act of solidarity. Joint debt issuance would not imply changing the command structure of air defence as foreseen under NATO and the European Sky Shield Initiative, but it would impact procurement processes. Procurement could be organised in the framework of the EU’s existing Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) system. Additional EU debt would benefit the development of European industrial capacities in air defence, even if in the short term some funds were used to buy systems from the United States. Significant funds for research and the development of the domestic industrial base should be part of the initiative.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Debt, European Union, Finance, Macroeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

4. How demographic change will hit debt sustainability in European Union countries

Author:
Zsolt Darvas, Lennard Welslau, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Population ageing is putting pressure on the public debt-to-GDP ratios of European Union countries, both by raising net public expenditures and by lowering potential growth. To keep debt ratios under control and to comply with EU fiscal rules, EU countries will need to run sufficiently high structural primary balances – the difference between non-cyclical revenue and non-interest spending. Because the EU’s fiscal rules require countries to anticipate and offset the fiscal costs of ageing during the adjustment period and in the 10 years beyond, the impact of ageing on overall fiscal indicators, such as the structural primary balance, will be felt mostly during the initial four-to-seven-year adjustment period that begins in 2025. Thereafter, structural primary balances will not need to rise further in most countries. However, in countries in which fiscal ageing costs are rising – all EU countries except Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, France, Italy, Latvia and Sweden – fiscal adjustment in the non-ageing portion of the budget needs to continue, even if the structural primary balance does not need to increase. Unless ageing cost can be brought under control, this would require the re-allocation of expenditure from non-ageing to ageing-related items, or further increases in taxation. This creates difficult adjustment choices for many EU countries. Demographic risk factors could add one percentage point of GDP or more to required primary balances, while policies that alleviate demographic pressures – increasing immigration, raising fertility levels and labour force participation, boosting productivity and reducing the cost of long-term care for the elderly – could reduce fiscal pressures by around half a point. The annual country-specific recommendations (CSRs) issued as part of the European Semester include many good ideas to raise labour force participation, reform pension and healthcare systems and raise productivity, but implementation of these recommendations by EU countries has been limited. Furthermore, CSRs contain almost no advice on immigration policy or fertility-enhancing policies, despite a rich academic literature on both. EU countries need to act on existing CSRs to alleviate demographic pressures, while the Commission and the Council should go further in their advice on tackling demographic challenges.
Topic:
Debt, Demographics, European Union, Regulation, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
Europe

5. Korea has increased its lending to emerging-market and developing economies but faces risks if their debt problems grow

Author:
Julieta Contreras and Adnan Mazarei
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
Over the last few decades, South Korea has transitioned from an aid beneficiary to a provider of financial aid to emerging-market and developing economies (EMDEs). This Policy Brief examines Korea’s role as a creditor to EMDEs and how EMDE debt problems affect it as a creditor. For now, Korea’s direct exposure to EMDEs is not large. In 2021, the latest year with comprehensive data, the stock of Korea’s claims on EMDEs amounted to almost $11 billion, about 0.6 percent of its GDP. Although this share is larger than those of some countries with similar GDP per capita, such as Italy and Spain, it is well below the shares of others, such as China and Japan. The immediate risks from Korea’s lending are limited, but it is vulnerable to risks from a systemic EMDE debt crisis in other ways, particularly through trade. It is therefore in Korea’s interest to continue to play a constructive role in ongoing international efforts, especially through the G20, to establish more effective debt restructuring frameworks.
Topic:
Debt, Development, Emerging Markets, Markets, and Economies
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

6. Strategies to future-proof Zambia: Debt relief and beyond

Author:
Vincent Obisie-Orlu
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Good Governance Africa (GGA)
Abstract:
Debt relief negotiations are currently taking place, with Zambia expected to be the first country to receive debt relief under the newly created G20 Common Framework. However, the process faces challenges, with China and the United States trading accusations of impeding the process. Some of Zambia's creditors have also been unwilling to agree to write off some of the country's debt. Positively, innovative approaches to debt relief have been proposed that would support Zambia's net-zero ambitions and promote sustainable development, such as debt for nature swaps. The integration of Zambia into the European Union's Critical Minerals framework could further support and assist Zambia in attaining a deal. Without a deal, Zambia risks being plunged into further macroeconomic uncertainty at a time when the country needs investment to capitalise on opportunities presented by political stability and structurally higher prices for copper and other critical minerals with which Zambi a is endowed.
Topic:
Debt, Development, Natural Resources, Political stability, Mining, and Macroeconomics
Political Geography:
Africa and Zambia

7. Don’t look only to Brussels to increase the supply of safe assets in the European Union

Author:
Francesco Papadia and Heliodoro Temprano Arroyo
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
A sufficient supply of safe assets denominated in euros is critical if the European Union is to achieve full banking and capital markets union while fostering the euro’s international role. The European debate on developing the supply of safe assets has so far focused on the possible creation of a common safe asset. This has tended to underplay the potential contribution of sovereign assets. Expanding the supply of national safe assets, notably through the gradual implementation of fiscal and growth-oriented structural policies in euro-area countries, leading to upgrading of their sovereign ratings, provides a promising, and perhaps more feasible, option. An upgrade to triple A of those euro-area countries that are currently rated double A could produce substantially more safe assets than most common safe asset proposals, including those based on the development of ‘synthetic’ safe assets. There has been a remarkable increase in the share of supranational assets in the stock of euro-based safe assets since 2008, reflecting downgrades in sovereign ratings and the EU’s financial responses to the euro-area crisis and the pandemic. However, safe assets in euro remain dominated by those issued by euro-area governments. Although common safe assets have certain advantages over national safe assets, reflecting their built-in risk diversification properties, there is currently not much political appetite for such proposals. Meanwhile, sovereign safe assets already offer many of the advantages of common safe assets. Sound fiscal policies and growth-stimulating reforms, which are in any case desirable, should be implemented to improve the credit ratings of euro-area sovereigns. This might not be politically feasible in the short-term, given the difficult economic environment currently faced by the EU, but it should be a key component of the EU’s medium-term safe asset strategy. Should the political consensus be found to create a common safe asset, such an asset could be incorporated into the euro area’s existing safe asset system, reinforcing its positive effects.
Topic:
Debt, Markets, Monetary Policy, European Union, Regional Integration, European Monetary Union, and Banking
Political Geography:
Europe

8. The ABCs of Sovereign Debt Relief

Author:
Rakan Aboneaaj, Jocilyn Estes, and Clemence Landers
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Global Development (CGD)
Abstract:
We are living in a time when many countries face heightened debt vulnerabilities. Already high before the pandemic, debt levels reached a 50-year peak following the growth in government spending to combat COVID-19. Debt is not inherently bad; borrowing can allow countries to finance vital government investment. But unsustainable levels of debt can have devastating consequences for a country’s population, crowding out government spending on even basic necessities including food, medicine, and fuel imports. In Sri Lanka, for example, 71 percent of government revenue was spent on debt service before the country defaulted. Even where the tradeoff is not so dire, unsustainable debt service can limit productive investments in infrastructure, education, healthcare, and other sectors, hampering the economic growth necessary to reduce a country’s debt burden. After a decade-long period of low borrowing costs, a confluence of rising interest rates, inflation, and commodity shocks have raised the likelihood of overlapping debt crises in developing countries. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) now estimates that 30 percent of emerging market countries and 60 percent of low-income countries could face trouble paying down their debts or will soon. There is no international bankruptcy mechanism for countries that default on their external obligations. Instead, countries have historically depended on a patchwork of precedents, contracts, and conventions to bring creditors to the table for debt relief negotiations. The United States has a legacy as the lead architect of large global debt relief initiatives, from the Brady Bond plan for Latin America to the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative that kickstarted debt relief for poor countries in the 1990s. However, the global creditor landscape has changed significantly over the past decade. Low-income sovereigns’ largest creditors today—China and private bondholders—operate under much different principles than the leading bilateral creditors of the past, making the traditional norms and structures less effective for present debt challenges. The objective of the international financial architecture—historically overseen by the IMF and its shareholders— will be to corral these new creditors into a cooperative arrangement to deliver on debt relief.
Topic:
Debt, Development, Governance, Credit, and Sovereign Debt
Political Geography:
Global Focus

9. Improving China's participation in resolving developing-country debt problems

Author:
Martin Chorzempa and Adnan Mazarei
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
The COVID-19 shock has exacerbated the struggles of many emerging-market and developing economies (EMDEs) to repay their external debt. One of the most urgent challenges relates to debt owed to China, whose lending spree under its Belt and Road Initiative and other programs has played an outsized role in what amounts to a crisis for many countries. The scope of the problem is striking. China is owed more than $100 billion, or 57 percent of all debt owed to official creditors by the countries that need help the most. China is not a member of the Paris Club of official creditors, which coordinates, within a multilateral framework, the resolution of general sovereign illiquidity or unsustainable external debt of EMDEs. There is an urgent need to put in place more effective, long-term solutions to help durably lower the risks of prolonged debt difficulties in EMDEs. These problems could be partly addressed by creating creditor committees to coordinate debt relief with China. The Group of Twenty (G20) has taken some steps to include creditor committees in the context of the Common Framework for Debt Treatments beyond the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI), but only for low-income countries that qualify for the DSSI and only for official creditors. To better address debt distress, it needs to extend the approach, especially to middle-income debtor countries.
Topic:
Debt, Development, Emerging Markets, and G20
Political Geography:
China and Asia

10. Xi Jinping’s Evergrande Dilemma

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Evergrande is one of the top-two real estate developers in a still highly fragmented Chinese sector. Its main strategy is to achieve ever-increasing scale (rather than profitability) in order to move ahead of and crowd out commercial competitors. It has also amassed the largest land reserves of all Chinese developers, which were financed through massive borrowings. By 2018, Evergrande held 822 pieces of undeveloped land in 228 cities, with a planned gross floor area of 3.28 billion square feet of new homes—the equivalent of 10 percent of Germany’s entire housing stock. It paid $75 billion just for this undeveloped land. Although Evergrande’s market share is only around 4 percent, its borrowings stand out. Its current balance sheet liabilities amount to an estimated 2 percent of China’s gross domestic product (GDP), while its off-balance-sheet liabilities could be another 1 percent of China’s GDP. This makes Evergrande the most indebted property developer in the world. Burdened by this debt, struggling to meet its debt interest and repayment obligations, and viable only if property asset values and sales continue to increase, Evergrande faces possible financial collapse—an event bound to have flow-on effects for the Chinese economy. However, the unusually high global interest in Evergrande has arisen because its woes are increasingly seen as symptomatic of those faced by the broader Chinese economy, which is struggling with enormous levels of indebtedness and overreliance on the real estate sector. Debt held by nonfinancial institutions in China increased from about 115 percent of GDP in 2010 to around 160 percent of GDP currently. This is the most rapid and largest increase in a 10-year period for any major economy and makes the level of debt held by Chinese nonfinancial institutions one of the highest in the world. The real estate sector accounts for around 15 percent of GDP, while property services account for another 14 percent—the highest in any developing economy. The share of the real estate sector as a proportion of GDP was only about 4 percent in 1997 and 9 percent in 2008. Since 2008, up to a third of all domestic fixed investment has gone into real estate, and up to half of total national debt is linked to the real estate sector.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Debt, Economics, Markets, and Business
Political Geography:
China and Asia