Political Geography: Europe / Content Type: Policy Brief

501. Protecting the EU’s Submarine Cable Infrastructure: Germany’s Opportunity to Transform Vulnerability into Mutual Resilience

Author:: Jannik Hartmann
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Submarine cables handle over 95 percent of the world’s internet traffic, making them essential for everything from finance to foreign affairs. The September 2022 attack on the Nord Stream pipelines and increased Russian naval activity brought greater awareness of how European – and German – interconnectedness also brings vulnerability. The urgency of tackling this threat offers Germany an opportunity to take a structural and joined-up approach that shows it can act as a “team power.”
Topic:: Security, Infrastructure, European Union, and Resilience
Political Geography:: Europe and Germany

502. Evaluating Public Support for Chinese Vendors in Europe’s 5G Infrastructure

Author:: Tim Rühlig and Richard Q. Turcsányi
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Germany is considering banning equipment made by Chinese companies like tech giant Huawei – in its 5G mobile infrastructure. A revised 2021 IT Security Act failed to reduce China’s 59 percent market share. A representative opinion poll, shows only 30.8 percent of Germans want 5G cooperation with China. Across 11 European countries, skepticism is equal, with only 31.8 percent approval – though this varies greatly from country to country.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Infrastructure, European Union, and 5G
Political Geography:: Europe and Asia

503. A More Strategic Approach to Foreign Direct Investment Policy

Author:: Markus Jaeger
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Cross-border investment and trade give rise to both economic gains and economic vulnerabilities. As geopolitical competition is intensifying, governments increasingly resort to restricting cross-border investment and trade. Policies are informed by a desire to limit security risks and secure technological advantages rather than pursue efficiency gains.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Foreign Direct Investment, Strategic Competition, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, and Americas

504. The Ukraine War & European Security: How Durable Is America’s Strategy?

Author:: Zachary Paikin
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: More than a year after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the morale of the United States and its Western allies appears high.1 Spurred into action by Moscow’s act of aggression, NATO appears more united, the EU has seemingly become more of a geopolitical actor, and Ukraine has resisted and repulsed the Russian onslaught to a degree that few initially thought possible. The Biden administration has thus far laudably managed to ramp up assistance to Kyiv without directly confronting Moscow. However, while the current U.S. policy toward Russia and Ukraine may be sustainable for some time, that does not mean it will never run out of road. Sanctions against Russia — a major global economy — have been ramped up to a level previously unseen, but they have not been effective in compelling Moscow to change course. The United States and its allies have yet to agree on what they deem to be an acceptable endgame to the war. Great power or not, Russia will remain a populous, powerful and potentially disruptive actor in Europe. Without clearly and credibly proposing policies that can lower the temperature, and without beginning to envisage what a future European security order might look like, the United States risks prolonging the conflict — with potentially unforeseeable consequences if popular war–weariness continues to grow.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Sanctions, European Union, Strategy, Military Aid, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

505. Paths to a Ceasefire in Ukraine: America Must Take the Lead

Author:: Anatol Lieven
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: Barring an improbable complete victory for Ukraine or Russia, the conflict in Ukraine will end, or more likely be suspended, in the form of a compromise. The fighting is therefore now essentially about the geographical and political lines along which this compromise will be drawn. These will become much clearer once the results of the forthcoming Ukrainian counter–offensive are known, and the aftermath of the offensive will be the time for an intensive diplomatic effort to bring about a ceasefire. Ideally, this compromise should take the form of a peace settlement like Northern Ireland’s in 1999, that would end the war and allow the creation of a stable, consensual and peaceful security order in Europe. More likely, however, is a ceasefire that (as in the cases of Kashmir, Korea, and Cyprus) will freeze the existing battle–line, wherever that runs. Such a ceasefire will in any case be necessary if talks aimed at a formal peace settlement are to take place; and even if such a treaty cannot be reached, such a ceasefire, if far from ideal, might still prove reasonably stable and permanent. Both the U.S. and Ukrainian administrations stated after it began that the war would inevitably end in a negotiated peace. In the first month of the war President Volodymyr Zelensky put forward peace proposals that included suspending the issues of Crimea and the eastern Donbas for future negotiation. Since then, however, both Ukraine and Russia have adopted positions that make any agreement between them exceptionally difficult. Given these circumstances, the United States must play the greatest role in achieving a ceasefire.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Strategic Engagement, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

506. The Future of European Security

Author:: Anatol Lieven
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: In three online sessions in May, the Quincy Institute convened a working group of leading experts on European foreign and security policies to discuss the stance of European countries concerning the war in Ukraine, “de-risking” the relationship with China, and the chances of an autonomous European approach to these issues. The group also discussed the much longer-term possibility of a new security architecture in Eurasia including Russia and China. The meetings of the working group took place under Chatham House rules, whereby participants are not individually cited. The following report therefore reflects a consensus of the group, but not necessarily the views of each individual member. Members of the working group were generally in agreement that as long as present circumstances continue, European countries are expected to take little independent action in the security domain, either individually or collectively. Genuine moves towards military self–sufficiency remain inhibited by resistance to pooling resources, and the fact that it is much cheaper simply to rely on the United States for defense. In addition, Washington has never brought really heavy pressure on the Europeans to provide for their own security, because the U.S. establishment and military–industrial complex see great advantages in keeping them in a position of dependence, even if this is extremely costly for U.S. taxpayers.1 Consequently, the European countries (which in this case really means France and Germany) are highly unlikely to adopt a determined autonomous initiative for a ceasefire in Ukraine. On the other hand, opinion was divided on how far European countries will be willing to follow the United States towards the economic and military containment of China, at least if this seems to involve them in serious losses and dangers. It was also pointed out that present circumstances will not last forever, and may not even last for very long. Several possible occurrences could change European attitudes. These include developments on the battlefield in Ukraine; a shift in Sino-U.S. relations towards actual conflict; a new global economic crisis; or a drastic acceleration of the effects of climate change. Given these potential developments, the group concluded that the United States should refrain from putting excessive pressure on Europe in areas where this could cause both severe economic damage and a backlash in European public opinion. This means, in the first instance, putting pressure on Germany to break off important economic links to China. In future, however, it could also mean U.S. refusal to support a ceasefire in Ukraine even if a majority of European states and populations desired one. U.S. policymakers should remember that the war in Ukraine is taking place in Europe, not North America and that the United States has a vital interest in maintaining Europe’s prosperity and democracy. The United States must not endanger them in the pursuit of its own narrow and short–term geopolitical goals. Finally, the group agreed that international affairs experts must not allow themselves to become trapped by contemporary issues and assumptions, because they might prove (as has often been the case) to be relatively temporary and contingent. Precisely because the situation today is so dire, it is important both to examine the past to see how we got to where we are, and to think imaginatively and independently about ideas for a better international system for our descendants.
Topic:: European Union, Military Spending, Strategic Autonomy, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

507. The Green Transformation of Europe: challenges, opportunities, and the way forward

Author:: Phoebe Koundouri, Konstantinos Dellis, and Angelos Plataniotis
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: This paper delves into the multifaceted impacts of climate change on Europe. It examines the immediate risks, including infrastructure damage and health crises, and explores the broader socio-economic consequences. The paper highlights Europe’s strategic responses, such as the European Green Deal, and its efforts at pioneering innovative, sustainable solutions. Key initiatives like the Net-Zero Cities program and the role of Public-Private Partnerships are discussed, and the need for holistic, cross-sector collaboration emphasized. The paper also addresses the financial mechanisms and regulatory frameworks crucial for supporting the green transition. Ultimately, the paper underscores the EU’s commitment to a sustainable, resilient future, balancing economic growth with environmental stewardship. The summer of 2023 marked record-high temperatures, illustrating the urgent challenge posed by climate change. Climate change poses immediate risks including infrastructure damage and health crises, but also presents opportunities for green technology and sustainable economic growth. The European Green Deal sets ambitious emissions reduction targets, employing strategies like REPOWER-EU to enhance energy security and reduce dependency on fossil fuels. Greece is making strides in renewable energy and climate laws, but challenges remain, particularly in phasing out lignite and fossil fuel reliance. Massive investment increases are needed to meet climate commitments, with the EU deploying financial instruments like the European Green Deal Investment Plan and Horizon Europe. The EU has adopted a holistic approach with initiatives like European Missions and Net-Zero Cities focusing on collaborative, cross-sector efforts to achieve sustainable development. The UN SDSN Global Climate Hub offers scientific, human-centric solutions for a climate-neutral future, emphasizing collaboration and sustainable pathways. The EU demonstrates a strong commitment to a holistic, sustainable future, balancing economic growth with environmental responsibility.
Topic:: Climate Change, Infrastructure, Public-Private Partnership, Green Transition, and Net Zero
Political Geography:: Europe

508. Beyond the deregulation dilemma: the European ‘regulatory state’ at crossroads

Author:: George Kalpadakis
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: A persistent deregulation dilemma is often implied in public discourse that is framed as a trade-off between economic competitiveness and regulatory safeguards, with calls for reducing bureaucracy to spur growth on one side and concerns over maintaining essential protections on the other. However, this tension is not absolute as evidence suggests that well-calibrated regulation can enhance competitiveness when designed strategically. The European regulatory state, shaped by subsidiarity and market-driven governance since the 1990s, now faces growing pressure, accelerated by the aggressive deregulation drive of the new US administration, to simplify rules and reduce compliance burdens. However, over-deregulation could also weaken legal predictability, investor confidence, and key policy goals such as climate resilience and industrial strategy. The EU can embrace targeted regulatory refinement by emphasizing sector-specific flexibility, enforcement proportionality, and regulatory coherence as adaptive regulatory models – particularly in technology, energy, and finance – can support both governance efficiency and long-term economic resilience. The emergence of a ‘European regulatory state’ has been a defining feature of EU governance since the late 1990s, shaped by two fundamental shifts. First, the EU’s growing reliance on subsidiarity – the principle that decision-making should be devolved to the lowest effective level –has stemmed from structural constraints on centralizing political authority. Second, the retreat of Keynesianism, which once legitimized large-scale state intervention, has given way to market-driven economic governance, diminishing the direct role of the state (Majone, 1999). In response, Brussels has compensated for its limited fiscal capacity by governing through regulation, establishing supranational rules implemented at national and sectoral levels while integrating business and stakeholder consultation into policymaking (Yeung et al., 2010; Weimer, 2025). In recent years, however, deregulation has once more gained momentum as a broader global trend, with advanced economies under mounting pressure to streamline governance structures, reduce regulatory complexity, and enhance corporate flexibility. While often framed as a response to economic stagnation and intensifying global competition, this shift raises critical concerns about its consequences for legal predictability, public accountability, and long-term sustainability. The eurozone crisis further complicated this trajectory, expanding the EU’s role beyond market regulation into fiscal oversight and economic stabilization—not through traditional Keynesian intervention, but via financial governance and coordination mechanisms—thus challenging its status as a mere ‘regulatory state.’ Simultaneously, concerns over excessive EU overreach have fueled long-standing calls for regulatory loosening (Caporaso et al., 2014). Rather than dismantling its regulatory capacity outright, the EU has faced intensifying pressure to recalibrate its framework, a debate now amplified by the aggressive deregulatory shift of the new U.S. administration, which has sharpened transatlantic tensions between competitiveness-driven deregulation and the preservation of legal, social, and environmental safeguards. Yet, while the U.S. is leading this push, similar forces are at play in Europe, where business leaders advocate regulatory rollbacks to bolster global competitiveness. As the EU navigates these pressures, its core challenge lies in balancing economic efficiency with the regulatory safeguards necessary to sustain long-term resilience and stability.
Topic:: Political Economy, Regulation, Transatlantic Relations, Strategic Autonomy, and Deregulation
Political Geography:: Europe

509. How Sweden Can Use its EU Presidency to Build the Civilian Security Dimension of the Eastern Partnership

Author:: Michal Baranowski, Mikołaj Bronert, Maximilian Kaminski, and Elene Kintsurashvili
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: The EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) lacks a security dimension and this is an urgent reform need. In particular, the EU should become the leading provider of civilian security support in the EaP countries, particularly Ukraine. But significant weaknesses in this policy field inhibit its capability to do so. Sweden’s long-term focus on the EaP, its experience in augmenting domestic cyber and hybrid resilience as well as in placing the civilian aspect at the heart of its national security, and it its leading contribution to the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) missions put it in a unique position to be a champion of the security dimension of the EaP during its presidency of the Council of the EU. Sweden can do so by pushing for: a EU-NATO memorandum of understanding on the EaP; the provision of a rapid financing mechanism to assist EaP countries in nonmilitary defense; a more coordinated training, planning, and implementing process for CSDP missions between EU actors and the EaP countries; a more targeted approach towards EaP countries; and prioritization of deepening of cooperation with EaP countries in the domain of hybrid threats.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, and Partnerships
Political Geography:: Europe, Eastern Europe, Sweden, and Central Europe

510. Children of War: The Ukrainian Case

Author:: Isabella Martin
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The war in Ukraine has imposed considerable physical, mental, and emotional damage on children. It is critical to provide mental health and psychosocial support (MPHSS), as well as to reinforce psychological and social infrastructure—in Ukraine and countries hosting refugees—to help them cope with the immediate trauma of war and promote resilience for future reconstruction efforts. Severe damage to civilian infrastructure has left many children without access to schools, healthcare resources, and support networks within care facilities, while those who have fled Ukraine risk falling victim to human trafficking and exploitation. Moreover, children are targets of the Kremlin’s efforts to erase the Ukrainian identity, brutally executed through oppressive policies such as forced school curriculum in the occupied territories and atrocious practice of ’filtration’, with children separated, abducted, and then put up for adoption in Russia. Inside and outside of the country, Ukraine’s youth are left extremely vulnerable to abuse, with the consequences to their mental health to last for generations—and to affect the nation’s post-war recovery—if not taken care of already today. Without developing proper coping mechanisms in children and adolescents now, the trauma imposed on the young generation will hinder rebuilding efforts and undermine societal institutions. It is thus imperative to support MHPSS initiatives and contribute to a resilient society in post-war Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, Civil Society, Education, Health, War, Children, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

511. Preparing for the Final Collapse of the Soviet Union and the Dissolution of the Russian Federation

Author:: Luke Coffey
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev as president of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the start of the USSR’s collapse—but not the collapse itself. While the USSR ceased to exist as a legal entity after 1991, the collapse of the USSR is still happening today. The two Chechen Wars, Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, the on-and-off border skirmishes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and the 2020 Second Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan are just a few examples showing that the Soviet Union is still collapsing today. However, future historians will likely describe Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine as the most consequential moment, if not the final moment, of the Soviet Union’s collapse. When the war in Ukraine will end is unknown, but it will likely mark the dissolution of the Russian Federation (the legal successor of the Soviet Union) as it is known today. Russia has undeniably suffered a major blow to its economy, devastation to its military capability, and degradation of its influence in regions where it once had clout. The borders of the Russian Federation will likely not look the same on a map in 10 or 20 years as they do now. As the final collapse of the Soviet Union plays out and as the Russian Federation faces the possibility of dissolving, policymakers need to start planning for the new geopolitical reality on the Eurasian landmass. The goal of this policy memo is not to advocate for regime change in Russia—this will be a matter for the Russian people. Nor does this paper predict exactly how Russia and the broader Eurasian region will emerge after the final collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Russian Federation. Instead, it establishes realistic goals for Western policymakers, outlines assumptions on which these goals are based, and highlights the questions that decision-makers should ask now to better prepare for the future.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and History
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

512. Broken Dream: The oligarch, Russia, and Georgia’s drift from Europe

Author:: Régis Genté
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Georgia’s relationship with the West has deteriorated over the last year and a half. The Georgian government’s actions have prevented the country from becoming a candidate for EU membership. Three-quarters of Georgians see themselves as pro-Western; only a tiny proportion of the population is pro-Russian. Oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili appears to be largely responsible for this dissonance between Georgian foreign policy and public opinion. Through his control of the Georgian Dream party and the government, Ivanishvili may be attempting to manoeuvre Georgia into Russia’s sphere of influence. It is still possible for the EU to work with Georgia. But the bloc should condition the financial and political support it provides – starting with the 12 points that Brussels designated in June 2022.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, European Union, and Oligarchy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Caucasus, and Georgia

513. The old is dying and the new cannot be born: A power audit of EU-Russia relations

Author:: Kadri Liik
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Policymakers across the EU agree Russia poses a multifaceted threat to their security. Europeans have responded quickly to the challenges posed by the war in Ukraine, but they lack a ‘theory of victory’. They have no shared view about how the conflict is likely to end. No single EU member state is guiding Russia policy; a ‘leaderless unity’ has emerged. This could provide the bloc with a form of dispersed strength – but a change in US leadership could expose the weakness of this situation. EU policymakers do not believe that Europeans have the means to bring about regime change in Russia; at the same time, they are unable to foresee a stable future relationship with a Putin-led Russia. Policymakers are uncertain how Russia’s war on Ukraine will affect their interaction with other parts of the world, including China and the global south. This could prevent Europeans from mounting a more effective global response. Europeans should re-examine the support they give to Russians fleeing the regime – emigrés represent an important connection to Russian society, which will be valuable whoever occupies the Kremlin.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

514. Fragmentation nation: How Europeans can help end the conflict in Yemen

Author:: Helen Lackner
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: For eight years, Yemen has suffered a civil war, whose conduct has been exacerbated by outside powers, principally Saudi Arabia and the UAE on one side, while Iran has supported the other. Yemen is a politically, socially, geographically, and religiously fragmented country, including within the two broad areas controlled by the internationally recognised government and the Houthis respectively. Saudi Arabia and the UAE may soon decrease their military interference in Yemen – but their exit could expose divisions in both government and Houthi areas. Yemen was poor before the conflict, but a corrupt war economy has now taken hold, strengthening an array of local power holders, while the Yemeni people slip into ever-deeper destitution. Short-term measures introduced with the support of the international community have failed to stabilise the situation. Europeans should take a longer-term approach to Yemen. They should promote the country’s cause in their diplomacy with Gulf Arab states and make a commitment to economic support, a values-based approach, and an emphasis on human rights in Yemen.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Civil War, Diplomacy, Human Rights, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:: Europe, Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, North Africa, and United Arab Emirates

515. Cold winter: How the EU can help Moldova survive Russian pressure and protect its democracy

Author:: Andrew Wilson
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Russia has long used gas prices and supply to put pressure on Moldova. It did so again when the country elected pro-European president Maia Sandu in 2020 and her parliamentary majority in 2021. Moldova occupies a significant geostrategic position with regard to the war in Ukraine, as a key ally and neighbour to that country’s immediate west. The Moldovan government has made some progress on its reform agenda, all while dealing with the impacts of the war, including looking after refugees and handling increased transit of goods across its territory. If the government can get through this winter, in 2023 it should be able to further diversify its energy options and make stronger progress on reform of the judiciary, defence, and security. The EU should support the Moldovan government in its endeavours. The country remains highly vulnerable to Russian pressure but financial assistance in the short term and support for reform in the long term will help it make progress, including towards eventual EU membership.
Topic:: Reform, European Union, Democracy, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Moldova

516. The US economic presence in Greece – George Tzogopoulos

Author:: George Tzogopoulos
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: The excellent status of Greek-American relations is reflected in the economic sphere. The stock of American Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Greece has increased in the recent years. The technology sector has captured the attention of American digital giants, which have displayed a tendency to choose to build some of their innovation hubs in Greece. Although this is not a new phenomenon, the last few years have seen several new investments, as well as an increasing number of tech-labs in which Greece’s digital ecosystem flourishes. Over and beyond Greece’s digital transformation, the country’s shift toward green energy has sparked the interest of American companies, keen to explore opportunities. In tandem, the US is a critical supplier of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Greece, which is, in addition, slowly acquiring the infrastructure capacity to function as an artery through which American LNG can be transported to other markets in the Balkans. Greek ship-owners are playing a significant role in the new energy market. The investment of ONEX in Syros is crucial for Greek-American co-operation in the maritime sector and could possibly be replicated in the Elefsis shipyards. The real estate sector appears attractive for American companies. Focused principally on the acquisition and/or renovation of hotels, this is expected to boost the tendency of American tourists to return to Greece after the two-years hiatus imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic. The positive momentum could also encourage more American students to study in Greece. The volume of Greek-American trade has steadily increased since 2016, with Greece maintaining a diminishing surplus.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, Economy, Trade, Real Estate, and Digital Transition
Political Geography:: Europe, Greece, North America, and United States of America

517. Population Displacements in the Ukraine War: The challenge of first humanitarian assistance – Antoine Laurent

Author:: Antoine Laurent
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: Since February 2022, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has triggered the largest war-related displacement of population in Europe since the aftermath of World War Two. Setting up an effective humanitarian response to support internally displaced persons in Ukraine is a task of major political importance. Since the beginning of the war, local volunteers have played a key role in providing assistance to internally displaced persons in Ukraine. They are often unable to comply with the standards set by international humanitarian institutions, which refuse to fund them, despite their being in urgent need of support. There would seem to be a need to relax the common standards that apply to humanitarian assistance in order to allow local actors, including volunteers, to collaborate with international humanitarian organisations. Helping informal groups of volunteers to organise themselves into non-profit organisations or NGOs could encourage international humanitarian organisations to support them.
Topic:: Humanitarian Aid, Migration, Displacement, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

518. NATO Allies’ geopolitical diversity and the cohesion of the Alliance

Author:: Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: The Russia-Ukraine war has revealed a high degree of cohesion among NATO Allies, who largely converge on what the Alliance is about and how it should respond to the Russian threat. In the longer- term, though, NATO’s cohesion will be dependent on Allies’ success in knitting together a common vision from their varying strategic cultures and threat assessments. And indeed, from the United States’ global reach and first-class military to France’s strategic autonomy imperative and the UK’s renewed ambition for ‘Global Britain’; from the Baltic states’ and Poland’s geographical proximity to Russia, to Italy’s and Spain’s regional southern focus; and from Türkiye’s special defence and foreign policy posture to Germany’s Zeitenwende, the Atlantic Alliance brings together a wide range of geopolitical diversity. This Policy Brief draws on a study conducted by the author1 to build a typology of NATO Allies based on three sets of variables: the nature of the relationship between any given Ally and the United States; the Ally’s perception of the Russian threat; and the extent to which NATO is given exclusivity in the Ally’s defence policy. Against this backdrop, Allies can be classified into three groupings that reveal persistent fault lines running through the Alliance, making cohesion a permanent challenge.
Topic:: NATO, Geopolitics, Alliance, Diversity, Russia-Ukraine War, and Cohesion
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

519. Finland and Sweden in NATO: the potential of new security providers

Author:: Hanna Ojanen
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO is occurring at an accelerated pace. In January 2022, neither government was considering NATO membership; in May 2022, they moved decisively into the application process. In response, NATO member states have rush processed their membership, with most NATO countries ratifying Accession Protocols. In November 2022, they are a mere two ratifications short of membership. Both Finland and Sweden are sending a strong message to Allies and Russia by joining NATO without preconditions as already active contributors and security providers within the Alliance. For its part, NATO would not only gain two new member states but also a new regional subgroup of Nordic countries that have their own perspectives and strategic cultures. Moreover, Finland and Sweden will bring a model for bilateral defence cooperation.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:: Europe, Finland, and Sweden

520. Russia’s military after Ukraine: down but not out

Author:: Łukasz Kulesa(ed.)
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: The June 2022 Madrid Summit decided on the next steps in enhancing the Alliance’s deterrence posture, describing Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area”.1 The poor performance of the Russian forces in the first months of their war against Ukraine and the scale of casualties and material losses they suffered should however prompt further reflection about Russia’s ability to recover and challenge NATO militarily. If the Russian military seems unable to prevail over Ukrainian forces (supported by a number of NATO countries), it may reasonably be asked whether unrolling “the biggest overhaul of our collective defence and deterrence since the end of the Cold War”2 is justified. This Policy Brief argues that NATO’s goals to shore up the Eastern flank are indeed warranted for three reasons – Russia’s political will to claim a victory, evidence of learning from past mistakes, and the existing Russian industrial capacity. In fact, the Russian military will probably experience a relatively speedy recovery. With the caveat that much is contingent on day-to-day developments and the ultimate outcome of the war, it is also plausible that Russia will “build back better” rather than simply rebuild a military which has proven to be ill-prepared for the operation against Ukraine.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, Russia-Ukraine War, and Madrid Summit
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

521. New Standard Indicators for German Development Cooperation: How Useful are “Numbers at the Touch of a Button”?

Author:: Heiner Janus and Daniel Esser
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: For years, German development cooperation (GDC) has been striving to become more results-oriented. In 2022, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) took an important step in this direction by introducing 43 standard indicators. The aim was to aggregate development results across themes and countries in order to present them to the public. The BMZ hopes for more effective communication with Parliament (Bundestag) and the general public, as well as more coherent reporting by Germany’s two main implementing organisations, the GIZ (Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit – the German agency for international cooperation) and the development bank of the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW). From an international vantage point, Germany needs to catch up in respect to results orientation. Other major actors, especially the United Kingdom, the United States and multilateral development banks, introduced compre-hensive reporting systems back in the 2010s. These organisations report on 20 to 50 standard indicators to demonstrate how their activities contribute to measurable results. On this basis, they communicate more coherently with the public. BMZ aims to create a similar basis for improved communication. In a participatory process – and jointly with the GIZ and the KfW development bank – the BMZ has formulated indicators that are equally suited to implementing organisations’ political priorities and their needs. The administrative burden of collecting the standard indicators is limited by leveraging existing data. In addition, the BMZ has set methodological standards whose obligatory use is intended to increase the quality of the data collected. However, the introduction of standard indicators also entails risks: They can set perverse incentives that encourage reporting on short-term results. Such reporting can lead to a neglect of long-term effects, which are more difficult to measure. Research also shows that indicators no longer fulfil their original purpose of providing neutral representations of change if they are used to exert political control. In addition, there are methodological challenges, such as double counting across different benchmarks, as well as concerns about unrealisable expectations. Overall, we assess the development and introduction of standard indicators in GDC positively. Yet, some important decisions are still pending. The level of detail at which the data will be shared among stakeholders and the public has yet to be determined. The quality of the data collected and the transparency of reporting will in turn determine what larger effects towards an improved results orientation of GDC can be achieved. In view of the decentralised and fragmented structure of GDC, especially regarding monitoring and evaluation systems, we hope that the new indicators can foster the harmonising of the reporting systems of the GIZ and the KfW development bank. The standard indicators can also help make GDC more transparent. We therefore recommend that all data collected be made publicly available. Finally, the integrative potential of standard indicators should be harnessed to improve the division of labour between the ministry and the two main implementing organisations towards becoming learning-oriented – both in the data collection process and during evaluation.
Topic:: Development, Government, Development Aid, Cooperation, and Impact Evaluation
Political Geography:: Europe and Germany

522. The EU-CEAP Impacts on Developing Countries – Recommendations for Development Policy

Author:: Jenny To
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: The European Union Circular Economy Action Plan (EU-CEAP) is key to transitioning to a circular economy and climate neutrality under the EU Green Deal, with developing and emerging countries (DECs) playing an important role. First, DECs are essential for the primary material chains, for example, supplying material for electric vehicle (EV) batteries to the European Union (EU). Second, DECs are involved in secondary material chains: To recycle its plastic packaging, Europe relies on DECs. But despite the essential role DECs play in Europe’s transition to a circular economy, the EU-CEAP’s impact on DECs has largely gone unexamined in literature and policy discourses – a shortcoming that could reinforce Eurocentrism and jeopardise the much-needed willingness to cooperate on multilateral solutions to global challenges (Messner, 2022). This policy brief and associated discussion paper (To, 2022) outline challenges and opportunities for DECs that are related to the EU-CEAP and present recommendations for German development cooperation. In the plastic packaging sector, DECs will likely be impacted by stricter waste shipment regulation (WSR), along with higher EU recycling targets, mandatory recycled content for plastics, and bans on certain single-use plastic items. Hence, the following recommended policy actions: • To lower the risks of illegal plastic waste trade and disposal, DECs must be helped to enforce the WSR and meet tightened import regulations. • The impact of plastic waste imports on DEC domestic markets in light of changing WSR must be monitored; discussion about stricter EU waste export regulations should be initiated accordingly. • In response to plastic waste imports, plastic recycling in DECs must be improved by raising standards and investments in advanced machinery as well as working conditions for informal labourers. • Changing EU plastic ban regulations must be monitored to anticipate increased demand for plastic alternatives. For EVs and batteries, EU-CEAP regulations that could impact DECs include stricter due diligence requirements for raw materials, higher targets for retrieving secondary battery materials, as well as reusing, repurposing and recycling EVs and their batteries. In response, the following policy actions are recommended: • Help DEC suppliers meet tighter supply-chain require-ments in light of the expected steady increase in demand for virgin raw materials from DECs. • Help expand road infrastructure to make it possible to reuse EVs, ensure EV batteries for repurposing, and provide recycling machinery and know-how.
Topic:: Climate Change, Development, European Union, Multilateralism, Supply Chains, Green Deal, and Circular Economy
Political Geography:: Europe

523. Learning from Each Other: The Multifaceted Potential for Partnership between the Republic of Korea and Germany

Author:: Niels Keijzer, Stephan Klingebiel, and Min Jee Oh
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: Although geographically distant, there is considerable convergence in the development policy priorities of Germany and the Republic of Korea (hereafter: Korea) – and indeed scope for cooperation between them. Whereas Germany was a founding member of the international development cooperation system as we know it today, Korea is a recent member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and its Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and both an important former recipient as well as a current provider of development cooperation. The development policies and operations of Germany and Korea are confronted by a challenging global geopolitical and economic setting, as well as a worrying decline in human development globally. Both countries are being challenged to respond to this changing setting and to communicate such changes effectively in their contributions towards advancing sustainable development at home and through international cooperation. Both countries have seen considerable increases in their official development assistance (ODA) budgets during the past decade, with Korea expected to continue its gradual growth path, whereas Germany may face challenges to consolidate its ODA budget – notwithstanding its important position as the only G7 member that has reached the target of providing 0.7 per cent of its gross national income (GNI) as ODA. This policy brief describes and discusses the German and Korean systems for setting development policy.
Topic:: Partnerships, Economy, Foreign Assistance, and Development Policy
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, South Korea, and Germany

524. Germany and the UK: Perspectives for Deepening the Bilateral Dialogue on Development Policy

Author:: Niels Keijzer and Ina Friesen
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) are the second- and fourth-largest providers of official development assistance (ODA) worldwide and are key actors in driving international policy discussions on global development in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the G7, the G20 and other key groupings and platforms. The development policies of both countries witnessed important convergence and detailed cooperation during the first decade of this millennium – a period when Western countries understood development cooperation as a source of considerable soft power, which was demonstrated in rising budgets and like-minded policy directions. The austerity policies that followed the global economic and financial crisis, and the UK’s decision to leave the European Union (EU) in 2016, have challenged the bilateral relationship in the development policy area between Germany and the UK. The UK’s departure from the EU has reduced the number of joint interactions and corresponding opportunities for identifying cooperation initiatives. Halfway through the period envisaged for the completion of the 2030 Agenda, both countries are adjusting their development policies, seeking to determine their future European roles and global development ambitions, but they remain key partners in global development. Both the UK and Germany have recently revised or are in the process of preparing development policy strategies as part of their integrated foreign policies – a reflection process which in recent months has been challenged to adjust to the implications of the war in Ukraine. The case remains strong for regular exchanges and cooperation on development policy between both countries, including by intensifying dialogues and resuming formal secondments between the FCDO and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). Two areas in particular offer good prospects. First of all, the UK and Germany should closely work together to deliver on the current G7 Presidency agenda – including the key focus on infrastructure investment, as initiated during last year’s UK Presidency. Other key opportunities for cooperation include gender and climate action, as well as the provision of global public goods. Secondly, Germany and the UK should seek to engage in and harness the role of the OECD as a provider of key standards for international development policy and as an important forum for peer learning. As key providers of global development finance, the legitimacy of its reporting system is essential to both countries’ influence and contribution to global development.
Topic:: Development, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Development Assistance, and Dialogue
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Europe, and Germany

525. Europe’s Global Gateway: A New Geostrategic Framework for Development Policy?

Author:: Mark Furness and Niels Keijzer
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: The proposal by the European Union (EU) to build a “Global Gateway” to the world is potentially an important juncture in EU foreign relations. Since its official launch in December 2021, most attention has been put on the initiative’s geostrategic implications and whether the EU can compete with China. Less attention has been paid to the Global Gateway’s implications for EU development policy in terms of strategic objectives, decision-making, thematic focus and financing. Two aspects are important in this regard. The first is whether the Global Gateway is a serious proposal that can deliver on its headline promises to massively increase European infrastructure financing in developing countries, provide partners with an alternative economic and political model to that being offered by China, and make a meaningful contribution to their efforts to realise the 2030 Agenda. The EU’s announcement that the Global Gateway will generate up to EUR 300 billion in investment by 2027 grabbed headlines, many of them sceptical. There is, however, no reason to doubt that the initiative will be adequately financed. Although the planning for the EU’s international aid budget for 2021-2027 has mostly been completed, a significant proportion remains flexible and could be spent on Global Gateway projects. As for the EU’s implementing capacity, the Gateway’s financial toolbox draws on the EU’s recent experiences with the Juncker Investment Plan and the External Investment Plan, which have both been utilised by development banks and private investors. The second aspect is whether the Global Gateway heralds a change in the EU’s motivations, objectives and modalities for cooperation with developing countries and regions. On the surface, the Global Gateway does not seem to change much. There are many thematic overlaps with existing strategic frameworks for engaging with Africa and the EU’s Neighbourhood. There is even a sense that the Global Gateway turns back the clock to the days when the EU focussed aid spending on infrastructure and emphasised its “political neutrality”. The geopolitical context in which the EU finds itself is, however, being transformed by pandemic, wars and multipolarity. The impacts of epochal events such as the Covid-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are still playing out. The Global Gateway signals a major adjustment in the EU’s response to these transformations, particularly regarding its engagement with the “Global South”. This will create a new paradigm for EU development policy, defined by strategic interests. It is likely that the new geostrategic framework will weaken the EU’s commitment to, and observance of, core development policy principles, especially the focus on poverty, partner country ownership, open governance and the “do no harm” principle. The Global Gateway’s use of aid to catalyse commercial investment risks further instrumentalising EU development policy. Specific measures are therefore needed to safeguard and promote the principles that the EU and its member states have committed themselves to.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, European Union, Development Aid, and Competition
Political Geography:: Europe

526. France at the head of the Council: positive results despite the war

Author:: Eric Maurice, Justine Ducretet-Pajot, and Monica Amaouche Recchia
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: The French Presidency of the Council of the European Union began on 1 January in a context of postCovid-19 recovery and the development of the dual climate and digital transition, and ends on 30 June in an environment shaken by the war in Ukraine. In the space of a few weeks, the EU-27 have imposed unprecedented sanctions on Russia, broken the taboo regarding financing the war, they decided to change their energy supplies and opened the door to further enlargement. They also are having to accommodate several million people fleeing war, deal with the highest inflation in decades and anticipate a global food crisis. Under the motto "recovery, power, belonging", the French presidency of the Council, commonly referred to as the FPEU[1], has had to take the new situation in its diplomatic, political and economic dimensions into consideration. Whilst, according to the institutional scheme of things, the main orientations of the European Union's response have been decided by the European Council, and the measures taken have been prepared by the Commission, the role of the FPEU has been to coordinate the adoption and implementation of these measures, and to maintain the unity of the Member States. This diplomatic and technical undertaking is what typifies a rotating Council Presidency. In the longterm work of European institutions, it organises the work of the Member States and the legislative process with the Parliament. Prepared in advance, it represents continuity in the projects that will be taken up by the next presidency, by following a programme prepared in coordination with its partners. In times of crisis such as those that Europe is currently experiencing, presiding over the Council means striking a balance between priorities defined in advance and the urgencies of the moment. An assessment of the FPEU must therefore be drawn on both levels, that of the processes and that of the events. The FPEU in its strict institutional sense, i.e. the temporary chairing of meetings of ministers and their preparatory bodies, establishes goals in terms of legislative texts to be concluded or taken forward. As part of the broader ambition of building a sovereign Europe that defends its model of society, these objectives have largely been achieved.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Sanctions, European Union, Leadership, Russia-Ukraine War, and European Council
Political Geography:: Europe and France

527. Conference on the Future of Europe: the complex implementation of high ambitions

Author:: Eric Maurice
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: On 9 May after a year's work the Conference on the future of Europe delivered its conclusions to chart the way for a "new, effective and more democratic Europe (...) sovereign and capable of acting", to quote one of its co-chairs, Guy Verhofstadt (BE, Renew). The Conference, which was an unprecedented exercise in participatory democracy at EU level, involving citizens, experts, representatives of the institutions and politicians, will only have achieved its objective if Europe, and in particular its Member States, follow and appropriate at least part of its recommendations. A first discussion is taking place at the European Council on 23 and 24 June, whilst the Parliament has already expressed its position and expectations. While a debate on the timeliness of revising the treaties was quickly launched around a few strong measures such as the abolition of unanimity when taking certain decisions, the questions raised by the Conference mainly concern the content and purpose of European policies and the participation of citizens in the definition and development of these policies. Initiated before the Covid-19 pandemic, launched and conducted between different phases of health restrictions, and concluded in the midst of the war in Ukraine, the Conference is both a review of the European project at a time of profound change as well as a call for its renewal. It is therefore fitting to examine its proposals and the possibilities of their implementation. The Conference on the Future of Europe was suggested in March 2019 by French President Emmanuel Macron in his letter to Europeans, to "to propose all the changes our political project needs, with an open mind, even to amending the treaties". The idea was taken up by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, with the support of the Parliament. Delayed by lengthy discussions between institutions on its functioning, and then by the pandemic, the Conference opened on 9 May 2021 under the joint presidency of the Parliament, the Commission and the Council. In a joint declaration, the presidents of the three institutions stressed that this was a "citizens-focused, bottom-up exercise" exercise and pledged to "listen to Europeans and follow up the recommendations made during the Conference". By including citizens in a broad institutional debate, the European Union has aimed to strengthen its democratic legitimacy and reinforce the link between the institutions and citizens. The Conference was based on the principles of inclusion, openness and transparency, and on the respect for European values. This complex mechanism was designed to cross perspectives by multiplying scales and actors. A total of 6,465 events were organised in the 27 Member States, with 652,532 participants. An online platform in all official languages registered five million visitors, with 52 346 active participants sharing 17,671 ideas and leaving 21,877 comments. National citizens' panels were held in six countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania and the Netherlands. Four thematic panels, comprising 200 randomly selected Europeans, were organised and produced 178 recommendations. These were assessed and synthesised by the Conference plenary assembly, which was made up equally of representatives of the three institutions and representatives of national parliaments, as well as citizens and representatives of the social partners and civil society. This final report was drafted by an Executive Board of nine representatives from the Parliament, the Commission and the Council, in collaboration with the Conference plenary. In total, the Conference conclusions contain more than 320 measures divided into 49 proposals on nine main topics.
Topic:: Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Democracy, Institutions, and Conference
Political Geography:: Europe

528. Prospects for agriculture in the new European context: the French example

Author:: Bernard Bourget
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: The health crisis and the subsequent invasion of Ukraine by the Russian army has revealed the EU's dependence on agriculture and food, as well as in other strategic sectors such as energy[1]. Can French agriculture seize the opportunities offered by the new situation resulting from these major events to give it new life? As the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union enters its final month, this is an opportunity to take stock of the situation and prospects for French agriculture before the implementation of the new Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 2023 and the objectives of the European Commission's Green Deal.
Topic:: Agriculture, European Union, Health Crisis, Green Deal, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and France

529. Europe in a perfect storm

Author:: Jean-Dominique Giuliani and Pascale Joannin
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: The European Union continues to encounter greater and more violent [1] crises as well as strategic surprises. The Russian war in Ukraine is the latest one in a series. However, it would seem that there are no more crises, only the acceleration of unforeseen events and profound changes. After the subprime crisis, Greek finances, Syrian refugees, the Covid pandemic, the spectre of war is back on the continent. All of these challenges are putting a strain on most EU policies and yet they confirm the relevance of the European project. In the face of these events, the European Union has made more progress in a few months than in thirty years. But it is paying for its delays and hesitations. It must revise many of its policies and resolutely project itself into a new and more brutal global world.
Topic:: European Union, Crisis Management, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe

530. “An open conflict between the West and Russia is not an option”

Author:: Dita Charanzova
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: You sit in the European Parliament in the Renew group. In what way is the re-election of Emmanuel Macron good news for the European Union? The re-election of French President Emmanuel Macron is obviously good news not only for France but also for Europe. Emmanuel Macron is one of the few leaders with a vision for Europe. His policy takes into account the realities at national level, but also the major challenges that the European Union will have to face in the coming years. In these troubled times, with a war in Ukraine, we need strong European leaders like him, and I am delighted to see that the French have put their trust in him for the next five years.
Topic:: Refugees, Conflict, European Parliament, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and France

531. The challenges of protecting Europe’s maritime areas of common interest, from the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Hervé Hamelin
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: The geostrategic environment is currently replete with confrontations and "fait accompli" policies, set against a backdrop of national power reassertion and conflicting competitive interest[1]. Maritime spaces are also increasingly embroiled in this tension as economic, commercial and even strategic issues remain inextricably linked to the maintenance of good order at sea. Consequently the world faces two strategic paradoxes. The first of these is the tension between national and global interests. The interdependence of world economies and the pressing issue of climate change require a global approach to problem resolution. Indeed it is from this imperative that the notion of common spaces was born, initially in the maritime domain before being extended to the air, space and cyber domains. Freedom of navigation enabling the ability to trade in the maritime environment is therefore a fundamental element of collective wealth. The second paradox is the contradictory pressure between the maintenance of the international framework and the law of the strongest. Some States increasingly uses intimidation and coercion as the transactional mode of choice. This challenge to the role of the international community is contributing markedly to increased instability and regional tensions. Certain stakeholders are attempting to appropriate maritime areas over which they claim sovereignty. The European Union (EU) must take account of this evolving ominous change to the stability of geostrategic environment. While the extent of the EU maritime domain is synonymous with major opportunities, it also brings with it a corresponding level of challenges to be met, first and foremost that of the security of these maritime areas of common interest. Accordingly, to ensure continuity of the work undertaken within the framework of the Strategic Compass, the theme of "maritime issues" must be taken into account in the Member States' discussions. The French Presidency of the Council, which lasts until 30 June 2022, should also provide an opportunity to capitalise on the relative consensus of the collective opinion concerning the importance of the "maritime factor". This would allow us to further promote the EU to assume a broader remit, both as a security provider with a global vocation and as an actor that invests and innovates in this crucial strategic area.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Maritime, Strategic Stability, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Europe, Atlantic Ocean, and Indo-Pacific

532. Strategic dependencies, a question of sovereignty

Author:: Eric Maurice
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: The Russian aggression against Ukraine triggered a massive response from Europeans and their Western allies. Instead of direct military intervention, which would have carried the risk of an armed or even nuclear escalation with Russia, the EU's response has taken the shape of sanctions against the Russian regime in many sectors of the country's economy, with the stated aim of weakening the government's ability to finance the war. The five packages of European sanctions adopted since the end of February in coordination with the sanctions of the G7 countries, have "devastated the Russian economy", deems Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. The sanctions, in particular the exclusion of most Russian banks from the Swift financial messaging system, the ban on market transactions with the Russian Central Bank and the embargo on the sale of certain equipment, are having an impact because they rely on the economic and financial strength of the West and, conversely, on Russia's dependence on Western financial markets and foreign technology. Yet, after two months of war, the Russian regime continues its offensive despite numerous casualties, several tactical defeats and the impact of sanctions. Sanctions have so far failed to stop the fighting, or even to change the behaviour of the Russian President. And for the Europeans there is the question of the final stage of possible sanctions, an embargo on Russian oil and gas, which would deprive the regime of about €100 billion a year (€99 billion in 2021). In early April, EU High Representative Josep Borrell lamented that Europeans had bought €35 billion worth of gas from Russia since the war began. The reluctance of some member states, most notably Germany, to take the decisive step of an embargo highlights the fact that the other side of the EU's economic strength is its dependence on Russian hydrocarbons, which is hampering its decision-making capacity and leaves it at the mercy of supplies being cut off in retaliation for sanctions. While the Commission claims to be geopolitical and the President of the Council considers the European Union's strategic autonomy to be "the aim of our generation", recent events have raised the question of its capacity to act through economic power and sanctions and its dependence on the outside world. They are forcing Europeans to rethink their relationship with the economy and trade.
Topic:: Sovereignty, Sanctions, Gas, Military Intervention, Russia-Ukraine War, and Dependency
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

533. Reception of Ukrainian refugees. Between emergency responses and long-term solutions

Author:: Ramona Bloj and Stefanie Buzmaniuk
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: By mid-April 2022, more than 7.1 million Ukrainians had been forced to move within their country. More than 4.6 million people have had to flee Ukraine since 24 February when the Russian invasion began (Figure 1). In total, more than a quarter of the population has been forced to leave their homes as a result of Russia's aggression. For Europe, this is the largest movement of a population since the Second World War, and the challenges for neighbouring countries - Moldova[1], Romania, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia - hosting the largest numbers of refugees are significant, from securing temporary accommodation and immediate access to health care, to ensuring children's education and access to labour markets.
Topic:: Humanitarian Aid, Refugees, Borders, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

534. From the Russian Pact to the Green Deal?

Author:: Gilles Lepesant
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Russia's invasion of Ukraine has, among other things, caused an energy crisis comparable to the oil crisis of the 1970s, one that goes beyond oil however since Russia is also a major supplier of gas and coal. By 2021, it was the EU's largest supplier of all three fossil fuels. The military hostilities started in a context dominated by price pressures induced by global economic recovery and by an abnormally low level of storage sites in Europe. In this context a policy of diversification as part of RepowerEU was launched in view - as put forward by the European Commission - to do away with the supply of fossil fuels from Russia by 2030. Beyond the quest for new short-term suppliers, the question of a radical acceleration of the energy transition in Europe in favour of low-carbon energy sources and sobriety is now being asked. This paper highlights the opportunity for Europeans to break not only with their dependence on Russia but also, and above all, with fossil fuels. It outlines the challenges to be met by underlining the extent to which the current stage of energy decoupling from Russia marks a turning point and closes several decades of close interdependence between Russian deposits and the European economies.
Topic:: European Union, Fossil Fuels, Green Deal, Energy Crisis, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

535. “The energy crisis shows the importance of European solidarity in the face of asymmetric shocks”

Author:: Nicolas Berghmans
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: How has the current energy crisis arisen? To understand current developments, we need to go back a little: first of all, the global economic context with a fairly strong post-Covid recovery has contributed to the increase in prices of raw materials and energy. And then there has been the crisis with Russia. Even prior to the start of the invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, Moscow had begun to reduce the gas storage levels held by Russian operators in EU Member States, including Gazprom, which controls significant capacity, particularly in Germany. The war in Ukraine has only made the situation worse. The availability of natural gas in Europe has fallen and the price on the markets has risen to an unprecedented level, sometimes reaching a price five times higher than previously. It should also be noted that Europe is emerging from a period of more than ten years in which the price of gas and, more generally, of energy has been relatively low, which makes the shock all the greater, and this upward trend is spreading beyond the gas to the electricity market; at certain times, the price has increased fourfold, or even fivefold, compared with the usual rate.
Topic:: Gas, Solidarity, European Commission, Energy Crisis, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe

536. “It is high time to light up Europe’s stars again”

Author:: Paolo Levi
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: You grew up in Rome and have lived in Paris for several years, you are Italian and resolutely proEuropean. How do you reconcile these different identities? My three identities, Roman because in my country you are first and foremost linked to your city, but also Italian and European, are completely complementary. They are the same roots, the same culture that I find everywhere. In Paris everything speaks to me of Rome and in Rome everything speaks to me of Athens; when I see the Madeleine church I think of the Parthenon and the temples that were later built in Italy. There are, of course, differences between us, but these differences are our wealth because they are based on a foundation of common values. It is the same civilisational movement that began with Plato and has been passed down to us; you cannot sing the praises of Rabelais without knowing Dante, you cannot sing the praises of Kant without knowing Plato. I have been fortunate enough to travel a lot in Europe and I have seen that what unites us is much more important than what divides us. It is up to us to carry the message of Simone Veil who, after having lived through the horror of the camps, made the choice of Franco-German reconciliation and of European hope. With Putin’s war, the ideal of the European Union - «never again war» - is in now jeopardy. We cannot remain indifferent: it is up to each of us to defend the values that that are ours. The twelve stars of the European Union must show us the way.
Topic:: NATO, European Union, Crisis Management, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Italy

537. The end of European dependence on Russian fossil fuels

Author:: Ramona Bloj
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: The Russian war in Ukraine is entering its eighth month. As winter approaches, the question of energy and Europe's dependence on Russian hydrocarbons, which has dominated European debate since the invasion began on 24 February, is turning into a major challenge for the 27 Member States. The latter must strike a delicate balance between reducing consumption, relieving pressure on consumers and making a genuine transition to deal with climate change
Topic:: Climate Change, European Union, Fossil Fuels, Energy Crisis, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

538. Nationalism, Sovereignism, Virilism: the sources of Russia's war against Ukraine

Author:: François Hublet
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Because war is the ultimate negation of all autonomy, all freedom and, a fortiori, all democracy, maintaining peace is the first of political necessities. Post-war Europe[1] knew this only too well. In the industrial age, education for peace and tolerance has become the condition for the survival of humanity: according to Adorna, "all political education must have at its centre the demand that Auschwitz cannot be repeated[2]”, not only because horror is imprescriptible, but because, in the absence of consistent education, it is destined to reproduce itself and sweep away the entire civilisation in which it is rooted. With the return of war in Europe, the question of collective education cannot be eluded. The mental patterns that led - directly or indirectly - to the massacres in Ukraine will have to be questioned in depth, lest any future peace be obliterated in advance, since "no peace treaty can be considered as such, if it secretly reserves for itself some subject for starting war again[3]”
Topic:: Nationalism, Sovereignty, History, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

539. The change of era (Zeitenwende) in Germany and its implications for European integration

Author:: Alexine Corblin
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: The Russian aggression in Ukraine, on-going since 24 February 2022, has shattered the European collective security system that was patiently built up in the 1970s and which has been consolidated since the end of the Cold War. For Germany, the return of war to European soil, a few hundred kilometres from its territory, is a stinging rejection of the policy of normalisation and openness towards the East (Ostpolitik) supported by Chancellor Willy Brandt (1969-1974) and to which the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the left-wing party (die Linke) had until then been very attached. The pacifism that permeates German society and the resulting restraint in foreign policy, a sign of German contrition for the horrors of the Second World War, are also being questioned: they could potentially lead to a 'soft' response to the aggression against Ukraine, which might then encourage further Russian attacks on Western European security. This aggression also challenges the concept of the "Exportnation" – the exporting nation - dear to the Christian Democrats (CDU), who gambled that trade and the interdependencies it entails would guarantee peace with Russia. Instrumentalised as a weapon of war, Germany's cheap energy supplies from its Russian neighbour, which had never been at issue - even in the worst hours of the Cold War - have become a major source of vulnerability for German economic growth. While it was already experiencing tensions before the Russian aggression, the German foreign policy model has now entered into a period of accelerated change and new directions are taking shape, in the course of the speeches made by its Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD) and Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence, Annalena Baerbock and Christine Lambrecht. They confirm or deny the trajectory defined in the 'Ampel' coalition contract between the SPD, the Greens and the Liberals (FDP). The answer is threefold: at national level, certain decisions taken in response to the Russian invasion could change Germany's international and European positioning; initially, the war in Ukraine created a GermanAmerican "transatlantic moment", but it also has opened up strong prospects for a revival of European integration, in which Germany intends to play a leading role; for a long time an economic giant but a political dwarf, Germany seems to be abandoning the posture of restraint that characterised its foreign policy, deciding to fully deploy all the facets of its power on the European and international stage. This is both a challenge and an opportunity for the Franco-German couple in the construction of Europe.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Conflict, Integration, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Germany

540. The declining influence of the European Union in its Southern Neighbourhood

Author:: Pierre Mirel
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Civil wars in Syria and Libya, endless conflicts in Palestine and Western Sahara, failed states such as Lebanon, authoritarian regimes in Egypt and Algeria, and recurrent migratory crises are all upheavals that have created a periphery of chaos in the European Union's southern neighbourhood. It is struggling to respond to it, from " Arab Springs " to authoritarian autumns, in the face of the geopolitics of Moscow, Ankara and Teheran, which are fuelling conflict. And all of this whilst dealing with ambiguous partners between Russia and the West. Regional integration initiatives have been forgotten, while Algiers and Rabat are engaged in an arms race. The spectacular, sudden emergence of China has marked the past decade and illegal immigration remains a contentious issue. The New Agenda for the Mediterranean, welcomed by the Council on 19 April 2021, proposes excellent cooperation measures. But it does not have the means to achieve its ambitions. And it fails to address the most vexing issues[1].
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Authoritarianism, European Union, Arab Spring, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:: Europe

541. 70 years on, it's time to reinvent the ECSC

Author:: Thierry Lepercq
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Upset between Berlin, Brussels and La Coruña On 16 May 2022, in the Radialsystem conference centre in Berlin, a chair remained forlornly empty. The German Minister for Education and Research, Bettina Stark-Watzinger, inaugurated the conference "Green Hydrogen for a Sustainable European Future" promoted by the German government, before handing over to her Italian counterpart, Cristina Messa, and then to European Commissioner Mariya Gabriel. The empty chair was that of the French Presidency of the European Union which, despite strenuous effort on the part of the German government, did not wish to delegate a representative. In the Chancellery, the mood was one of great tension. Nearly 100 executives representing 31 gas transmission and storage operators (TSOs) from 28 European countries met with the European Commission on 7 June 2022 in Brussels. It was time to present the latest version of the European Hydrogen Backbone (EHB), an initiative launched two years ago by the German company OGE. On the agenda was the unveiling of an ambitious plan to build 28,000 km of hydrogen pipelines across the continent by 2030. One point of interest was a dotted line linking Barcelona to Livorno - to connect the Iberian Peninsula to the rest of Europe, bypassing France, whose opposition to cross-border green hydrogen infrastructure is no longer a mystery. A few months later, on 5 October 2022 in La Coruña, Pedro Sanchez, president of the Spanish government, hosted German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, together with some fifteen ministers. On the agenda of this summit: the European energy crisis and the measures that must be taken to strengthen the continent's supply security and European solidarity. One proposal stood out: to strengthen gas interconnections to allow liquefied natural gas (LNG) arriving in Spanish ports to relieve a German industry that is on the verge of suffocating - and to pave the way for the implementation of green hydrogen transport infrastructures (EHB).
Topic:: Energy Policy, Gas, Investment, Economic Crisis, European Commission, and Energy Crisis
Political Geography:: Europe, Germany, and Spain

542. Greco-Turkish relations at their lowest ebb

Author:: Alexia Kefalas
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: What really happened on 6th October in Prague? This question has been on the minds of European analysts since the dinner held in the Czech capital on the side-lines of the first summit meeting of the European Political Community. Versions vary between the international press and the 44 heads of state and government.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Greece

543. What is President Putin so afraid of?

Author:: Francisco Juan Gomez Martos
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Faced with the brutal and unjustified military aggression of Putin's Russia against Ukraine, the vast majority of European citizens have realised what seemed unlikely until now: the possibility of a war in Europe[1]. A cruel and devastating war, both materially and morally, a war of occupation of a sovereign country and a free people. Undoubtedly the aggressor will be held accountable for his crimes before the international community and nothing will be forgotten. The EU is watching, perplexed but united and in solidarity with the heroic struggle of the Ukrainian people who are valiantly defending their independence and their freedom, which is also ours. The borderline between Western civilisation based on values and respect for human rights and authoritarian regimes that trample on the dignity of their citizens has been crossed in the blood of the victims, many of whom are civilians. The European Union, as a global actor, is facing its limits as it tries to curb the hideous logic of war against which it was built 72 years ago.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Democracy, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

544. Energy: great hope for the 21st century

Author:: Jean-Luc Alexandre
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: The dawn of a new energy era is breaking over the world. In a few years’ time, everything will be different. Not only will we be able to overcome the scarcity, but also the planet will be undergoing depollution, and at the same time, the energy sovereignty of France and Europe will become a reality. Contrary to the hasty conclusions of some, or to the Malthusian mindset of others, the innovative capacity of the human spirit is boundless: a new generation of energies, notably nuclear, means that the future can be considered without falling into naive optimism however. An economic and societal revolution is now within reach. Historically, there are few fields that have generated a very large number of economic sectors around them. Among the most significant for over two centuries, three stand out: the automobile and aviation industries, as well as digital technology. Although the French were at the origin of each of these, the supply shocks that they have triggered all originated in the United States[1]. Today Europe may in turn trigger a similar kind of shock. In the same way that laptops have revolutionised work by simultaneously helping individuals become more autonomous and better connected to the world around them, the decentralised provision of a secure, cheap, safe, abundant and environmentally responsible energy service will be Europe's fundamental contribution to serene prosperity. This is provided that Europe mobilises for what is now much more than energy: its freedom. It could thus combine an overall vision for its territory and support the many local communities that make up its community fabric. To evaluate these assertions, which may seem to find inspiration in an unforgivable blindness, the difficulties of the current situation must also be considered, together with an explanation of the technological reasons why this can be overcome, and finally the path to achieve this has to be explored.
Topic:: Climate Change, Science and Technology, Sovereignty, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe

545. Will the new generations of Europeans be up to the task of succession?

Author:: Isabelle Marchais
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: The European project has been imagined and shaped by several generations. That of the founding fathers who, around Schuman, Monnet, Adenauer and De Gasperi, decided in the aftermath of a murderous conflict to build a new project for peace and reconciliation. That of Mitterrand and Kohl, whose joined hands at Verdun forever symbolise Franco-German reconciliation. The generation currently in office, born after the Second World War, embodies a need for renewal but is still marked by this memory. The new generation, born after the fall of the Berlin Wall, is quite different: for them, peace was a matter of course, until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine brutally marked the return of war to the continent[1].
Topic:: European Union, Youth, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Europe

546. How Can We Achieve Europe’s Ambitions in terms of Research?

Author:: Maria Leptin
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: A year ago on 26 November 2021, the Competitiveness Council adopted Conclusions on the governance of the European Research Area (ERA) and a Recommendation for a Pact for Research and Innovation in Europe. The European Research Council (ERC) welcomed this positive step forward[1] . However, the Conclusions and the Recommendation are the latest in a long series of efforts to complete the ERA, an objective first declared in 2000 with subsequent relaunches in 2007, 2012 and a new roadmap agreed in 2015. What lessons can we learn from past attempts to achieve the ERA to ensure better results?
Topic:: Science and Technology, European Union, Research, and Innovation
Political Geography:: Europe

547. The defeat of Russia in Ukraine will herald the defeat of the Lukashenko regime.

Author:: Svetlana Tikhanovskaia
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: What is the domestic political situation in Belarus? Has the government been weakened by its brutal and incessant repression? How is the population responding? The government has been weakened by the protest movement of the Belarusian population. It has chosen the path of repression instead of meeting the demands of the people and holding fair elections. It has been weakened. The government now has a very small toolbox. Only repression remains. Any easing in its stance will be a signal for people to launch further protests, even bigger than before. Because life has not improved. When you are at war with your own people all the time, your position is a weak one. And the gains here for the so-called government are not visible.
Topic:: Democratization, Authoritarianism, European Union, Domestic Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Belarus

548. To Regulate, or Not to Regulate? Subsidies for Foreign Enterprises, Climate Change, and Currency Undervaluation

Author:: Cheon-Kee Lee, Min Ji Kang, and Minjoo Kim
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: In response to today’s rapidly changing global trade environment, countries have continued to make changes to their policy objectives and instruments to address new and emerging issues such as supply chain restructuring and reshoring, climate change, and currency undervaluation. To this end subsidies have been playing a particularly important role, and are expected to be used more broadly across different sectors in the coming years. While controversies over government subsidization are likely to continue at the international level, the United States and the European Union have proposed at the domestic level to expand the scope of subsidy regulation and to tighten regulation on newly emerging subsidy types beyond the traditional boundaries set by international trade rules. Among a number of the latest developments on subsidy regulation, this Brief intends to primarily focus on (i) transnational subsidies granted by a government to enterprises active in other foreign countries (“foreign subsidies”); (ii) green subsidies for climate change mitigation; and (iii) subsidies related to currency undervaluation.
Topic:: Climate Change, Business, Currency, Trade, and Subsidies
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, United States of America, and European Union

549. A Review of the First Decade of the Korea-EU FTA

Author:: Dong-Hee Joe
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: Last year marked the tenth anniversary of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the European Union (EU) and Korea, which entered into force in 2011. The EU is the world's largest economy and Korea's third largest trade partner, only after China and the United States. Back when the FTA nego-tiations began in 2007, the EU was Korea's second largest export destination, from which Korea enjoyed the largest surplus. Al-so, more than 35 per cent of Korea's foreign direct investment came from the member states of the EU. Korea is also a major econ-omy and a major trade partner of the EU, especially in Asia. The FTA with Korea was the first case of the EU's “next generation” FTAs, and is considered to have served as a benchmark for the EU's bilateral trade agreements thereafter (Kang 2016). As for Korea, it was the first FTA with a major economy, even before the US, its traditional ally, and China, its closest neighbor. Because of its importance, the Korea-EU FTA has received attention from economics and trade policy. KIEP also took a look at the first decade of its implementation last year (Joe et al. 2021). This Brief introduces some of the findings in Joe et al. (2021), fo-cusing on the impact of the FTA on the bi-lateral economic relationship between the two sides.
Topic:: European Union, Economy, Free Trade, and Trade
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, and South Korea

550. Leveraging Predeparture Counseling to Support Returning Migrants’ Sustainable Reintegration

Author:: Lucía Salgado
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Migration Policy Institute (MPI)
Abstract:: Across the European Union, assisted voluntary return and reintegration (AVRR) programs have proliferated over the past several decades, amid mounting pressure on policymakers to increase the return rate of migrants without a right to stay in Europe. These programs are considered more cost-effective, humane, and pragmatic from a diplomatic perspective, and ultimately aim to help migrants reintegrate successfully into their communities of origin. Much of the reintegration assistance AVRR programs offer occurs after migrants arrive in their origin countries, but there is growing awareness that kickstarting this support before the return journey can play a decisive role in reintegration outcomes. It can have the dual benefits of helping migrants develop a clearer picture of life after return, and of collecting information that origin-country service providers can use to support them effectively after they arrive. Yet, the potential of predeparture counselling may remain untapped if information gaps between actors in origin and destination countries are not addressed. This policy brief provides an overview of predeparture counseling and information-sharing challenges in European AVRR programs. It then explores strategies for improving the exchange of information and, thus, better leveraging predeparture counseling to support returnees’ sustainable reintegration.
Topic:: International Cooperation, International Organization, Governance, European Union, Borders, Integration, Deportation, and Illegal Immigration
Political Geography:: Europe

551. Embedding Reintegration Assistance for Returning Migrants in the Local Context: The Role of Referrals

Author:: Ravenna Sohst and Camille Le Coz
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Migration Policy Institute (MPI)
Abstract:: The objectives of European reintegration programs for migrants returning to their countries of origin have expanded in recent years. Reintegration assistance, instead of being delivered as standardized support packages, is increasingly being designed to take into account the multiple dimensions of returnees’ reintegration—economic, social, and psychosocial—and the context of the communities in which they settle. As these programs become more complex, it has also become clear that no one service provider can offer all of the various services necessary to meet returnees’ diverse needs and profiles. One way to broaden the range of supports available to returning migrants and embed reintegration assistance into the local context is to refer returnees to local actors, including government agencies and civil-society organizations. Such referrals, particularly when combined with capacity-building assistance for local partners, can help connect returnees with tailored, long-term support. Yet, there is no consensus across reintegration programs as to how referral mechanisms should be organized, what types of services referral partners should deliver, the level of budget support different actors need, and how their work should be monitored. This policy brief explores the role of referrals in reintegration programming, offering a typology of approaches taken across programs to date. It also discusses common challenges, emerging good practices, and promising next steps to improve the local embeddedness of reintegration assistance.
Topic:: International Cooperation, International Organization, Migration, Governance, Integration, Deportation, Reintegration, Immigration Policy, and Illegal Immigration
Political Geography:: Europe and Global Focus

552. Promoting Evidence-Informed Immigrant Integration Policymaking

Author:: Jasmijn Slootjes
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Migration Policy Institute (MPI)
Abstract:: Across Europe, immigrant integration policy has often been forged in the heat of crisis and driven by political priorities. This can be seen in the response to millions of people fleeing war in Ukraine and to the 2015–16 migration and refugee crisis. Resources and attention are much less frequently devoted to gleaning lessons from integration initiatives and using them to improve policymaking going forward. Yet, pressing labor shortages, strained government budgets, and social cohesion challenges all point to the importance of implementing integration policies that efficiently use limited resources—and that work. This policy brief explores why immigrant integration has fallen behind other policy areas in embracing an evidence culture and suggests ways to remedy this lag. It first examines recent progress and key gaps in this area, and then maps the obstacles that continue to hinder an evidence revolution in integration policy. The brief concludes with recommendations for creating an environment in which evidence-informed integration policymaking can thrive, including through the effective use of pilot projects, targeted funding, stakeholder engagement, and capacity-building initiatives.
Topic:: Migration, Law, European Union, Immigrants, Integration, and Immigration Policy
Political Geography:: Europe

553. Russia’s Ill-Fated Invasion of Ukraine: Lessons in Modern Warfare

Author:: Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: Russia has failed to achieve most of its objectives in Ukraine because of poor military planning, significant logistical problems, low combat readiness, and other deficiencies, which undermined Russian military effectiveness. These and other challenges—including Ukrainian military efforts and Western aid—severely impacted Russian air, ground, cyber, and maritime operations. Russia’s failures will force the Russian military to fundamentally rethink its training practices, organizational structure, culture, logistics, recruitment and retention policies, and planning efforts. Nevertheless, Russia is still attempting a de facto annexation of parts of eastern and southern Ukraine that it controls.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

554. Best and Bosom Friends: Why China-Russia Ties Will Deepen after Russia’s War on Ukraine

Author:: Andrea Kendall-Taylor and David Shullman
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: The partnership between China and Russia has become one of the most critical features of the contemporary strategic relationship. Russia’s war in Ukraine has created economic and diplomatic dilemmas for China, but it hasn’t altered the fundamental alignment of interests and autocratic values that drives that relationship. In this Marshall Paper, David Shullman and Andrea Kendall-Taylor explain why the Sino-Russian relationship will only get deeper as a result of the war—even as it reveals strains and divisions that the United States and its allies may, eventually, be able to exploit.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

555. Resetting NATO’s Defense and Deterrence: The Sword and the Shield Redux

Author:: Sean Monaghan
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: There is a saying: “If you want a new idea, read an old book.” For the authors of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) new strategic concept looking for a new approach to its core task of defense and deterrence, the best “old books” to consult might be the seven strategic concepts NATO has published since 1949. The first four of these were classified and made public in 1997.1 Since 1991, three concepts have been published openly, the latest in 2010. This paper examines NATO’s first seven strategic concepts to chart the progress of the alliance’s approach to defense and deterrence. The main purpose of doing so is to give today’s leaders and planners a better understanding of their forebearers’ efforts, to learn their lessons, and avoid their mistakes. The analysis also reveals three broad insights that can be applied today: plan against Russia’s maximum intentions; revitalize the sword and the shield; and modernize the sword and the shield.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

556. Transforming European Defense

Author:: Max Bergmann, Colin Wall, and Sean Monaghan
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has been a wake-up call for Europe, which has taken decisive steps to assist Ukraine and shore up European security and defense. Yet this moment could be short-lived if not followed by a sustained, collective effort to transform and rationalize European defense. Without this, additional European defense spending may be wasted and the continent will continue to rely on the United States for its defense. European nations should fully leverage the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and other multilateral formats to overcome fragmentation and avoid a piecemeal approach to defense. By doing so, they can invest together in modern capabilities, build a strong, resilient, and open industrial base, and think creatively to pool and share forces. Importantly, the United States has a crucial role in providing both practical and political support to achieve this shared goal of a stronger and more capable European defense.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, and Regionalism
Political Geography:: Europe

557. Corruption and Private Sector Investment in Ukraine’s Reconstruction

Author:: Nick Fenton and Andrew Lohsen
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: The aim of the bipartisan and international CSIS Ukraine Economic Reconstruction Commission is to produce a policy framework that will help attract private sector investments to support Ukraine’s future economic reconstruction. To support the commission, CSIS will convene a series of working groups to examine a range of issue-specific areas that are critical for reconstruction and modernization of the Ukrainian economy, including in agriculture, energy, and transportation and logistics, as well as addressing the impact of corruption on private sector investment. Ukraine experienced significant human and economic losses in the first six months of Russia’s unprovoked invasion. In July 2022, the Ukrainian government estimated the cost of recovery at $750 billion. That figure continues to grow due to ongoing missile strikes and artillery shelling, population displacement, and disruptions of exports. Given the scale of Ukraine’s losses, private sector investment will be critical to the country’s recovery and transformation. But concerns about corruption threaten the flow of much-needed funds. Ukraine has undertaken significant anti-corruption reforms in recent years, but it will need to show additional progress to maximize the potential for foreign investment.
Topic:: Corruption, Infrastructure, Investment, and Private Sector
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

558. Fishing for Chips: Assessing the EU Chips Act

Author:: Niclas Poitiers and Pauline Weil
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: China, the United States, and the European Union (EU) are currently developing strategies for semiconductors aimed at financing R&D and the installation of new factories on their territories, in particular through subsidies. The EU Chips Act, announced in February 2022, represents a real break in Europe's industrial policy. Key Takeaways: Drawing lessons from the ongoing shortages in chip supply, the United States, China, and the European Union are adopting industrial policies in the semiconductor sector in search for supply chain security and economic and technological competitiveness. The EU Chips Act in particular represents a notable shift from a long-held opposition to industrial subsidies seen as detrimental to international competition. The proposal will support R&D in Europe, provide a legal basis for EU member states to use subsidize domestic semiconductor manufacturing, and facilitate trade measures to intervene in the supply chain in times of crisis. This new global subsidy race to build foundries carries the risks of channeling billions in public funds into unprofitable investments, due to the complexity of semiconductor production and risks of overcapacity in certain segments. To avoid that, cooperation with like-minded partners of the EU, especially the US, appears necessary but still needs to be worked out.
Topic:: Industrial Policy, Digital Policy, Value Chains, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and United States of America

559. “Don’t Bank on the Bombs” New European Standards Affecting the Defense Industry

Author:: Amélie Ferey and Laure de Roucy-Rochegonde
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, has underlined the need to upgrade the European armed forces, the urgency of the fight against climate change—as illustrated by reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)—requires the political mobilization of the European Union (EU) to carry out the transition to climate neutrality. The EU has therefore established guidelines for ambitious action in these two areas. Via its Strategic Compass, adopted in March 2022, it intends to contribute to world stability with the support of a permanent and viable defense tool. Via its 2018 green finance plan, the European Commission aims to redirect financial flows toward sustainable activities and thus facilitate the 480 billion euros (€) of additional annual investments which will be necessary if it is to achieve its environmental objectives by 2030. The tension between these two objectives— strengthening European defense on the one hand and promoting sustainable finance on the other—was made manifest in lively discussions regarding the integration of the defense sector into European taxonomy projects and the expansion of the Ecolabel. These proposals led to concerns among companies of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), wary of the perceived threat to their funding.
Topic:: Defense Policy, European Union, Industry, Defense Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe

560. A Green-Blue Alliance in Motion: Pacific Island Countries and Europe Fighting Climate Change

Author:: Celine Pajon
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: The Pacific Islands Countries (PICs) were the first to ratify the Paris climate agreement in 2015. Indeed, for them, climate change has had very concrete implications for years. Islanders have seen the sea level rising, endangering the very existence of atolls. They have also experienced increasingly violent cyclones and other natural disasters, and must deal with multiple impacts of a changing climate on their everyday lives More than bearing the brunt of such impacts, and they have been calling for the rest of the world to awaken to this existential threat. At the recent UN General Assembly, the government of Vanuatu, supported by other states, led an initiative to ask for the opinion of the International Court of Justice on climate change. The European Union (EU) has been a proactive leader in international negotiations on climate change; it strives to lead by example and do its share to mitigate climate impacts and support adaptation efforts. But it was perhaps on only this past summer that climate change began to feel very real for European public opinion, as the continent was ravaged by a series of heatwaves, major wildfires and droughts that had serious impacts on biodiversity, agriculture, but also human health. Some have said this is the “end of innocence” for the Europeans on climate change. This episode might help bridge the gap and make Europeans better understand what the populations of the Pacific Islands have been enduring, keeping in mind that PICs are more exposed and have fewer financial resources to implement solutions. It might also raise greater interest about the way Oceanians could adapt and provide innovative solutions. This Briefing argues that climate change challenges require an innovative, transformative approach to deliver results on mitigation, adaptation, and compensation for loss and damage. Europe and Oceania are two leading actors that already have a fruitful record of cooperation, and are willing to step up their cooperation to lead this transition to a new model. This paper is based on discussions that took place during the webinar “Climate Change: The Pacific Island Countries, seven years after the Paris Agreement” organized by Ifri’s Pacific Islands Program, in partnership with the Pacific Community, on September 20, 2022.4 Contributions from panelists will therefore be highlighted.
Topic:: Climate Change, European Union, Regional Integration, and Biodiversity
Political Geography:: Europe, Indo-Pacific, and Pacific Islands

561. Open Innovation in Defense. Passing Fad or New Philosophy?

Author:: Raphaël Briant
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: The use of civilian technologies on the battlefield—one of the lessons that can be drawn from recent conflicts—is attracting growing interest from the armed forces of France and other nations. The growing number of examples of effective integration of civilian technologies into the armed forces, including during conflict, shows the importance of open innovation and the acceleration of the international race toward innovation in the defense industry. The war in Ukraine offers several practical examples of the operational added value that open innovation can offer. A case in point is the GIS Art for Artillery smartphone app, the deployment of which was speeded up after Ukraine was invaded by Russian forces, and which enables Ukrainian soldiers to order an artillery strike by entering the GPS coordinates from their phones. Under certain conditions, open innovation in defense can therefore reset or even reverse the balance of power. Its goal is to detect, stimulate, and capture civil society innovations and, via short cycles, integrate them into force structures so as to seize opportunities or respond to challenges on the ground. For states, this mode of innovation now seems to be the norm, without raising questions about the way armament operations are conducted. More than just a passing fad resulting from the development of “agile methods” imported from the civilian world, open innovation in defense has become vital to ensuring operational superiority. It strengthens arguments in favor of a “new philosophy” for France’s Defense Technological and Industrial Base (DTIB).
Topic:: Science and Technology, Innovation, Defense Industry, and Military
Political Geography:: Europe and France

562. The European Green Deal, Three Years On: Acceleration, Erosion or Fragmentation?

Author:: Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega and Diana-Paula Gherasim
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: The European Green Deal (EGD) is the single most defining policy initiative of the von der Leyen Commission. Since its publication in December 2019, it has become the European Union’s (EU) new raison d’être: protecting the planet and Europeans from environmental degradation, through a holistic approach to the energy transition, while promoting sustainable growth and a just transition with no social group or territory left behind. The credibility of the EGD was secured by the European Climate Law, which makes the objectives of climate-neutrality by 2050 and a reduction of at least 55% in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2030 legally binding at the EU level. This has given a strong mandate to the European Commission (EC) to propose an overhaul of European energy and climate policies. The EC has lived up to the task remarkably, resolutely sticking to an accelerated policy and legislative timeline, featuring around 30 strategies and action plans, in addition to emblematic, coherent legislative packages like Fit for 55. The European Parliament has also positioned itself as a key stakeholder, finding consensus on overall targets and objectives. While all Member States (MSs) finally subscribed to the EGD ambition and agenda, they remain torn between a discourse that is largely supportive of the energy transition, but which in reality suffers from insufficient implementation efforts and mounting difficulties. Three years since the EGD set the direction of travel for the EU for the next 30 years, the EU finds itself in the midst of a storm not seen since World War II, coming just after it successfully weathered the Covid-19 pandemic. The war in Ukraine is a tectonic game changer with profound implications that are yet to be fully grasped. For energy and climate policies, these new realities require reviewing many assumptions about the energy transition, energy security, social acceptance, economic competitiveness, and hence, decarbonization strategies and policies going forward.
Topic:: Climate Change, European Union, Gas, Fossil Fuels, Nuclear Energy, Green Deal, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe

563. EU carbon border adjustment mechanism faces many challenges

Author:: Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Megan Hogan, and Jisun Kim
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: This Policy Brief assesses the evolving EU Emissions Trading System and EU carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) and explains objections within Europe and from major trading countries likely to be affected by the proposed CBAM import levies. While EU officials have sought to ensure that the CBAM is consistent with obligations under the World Trade Organization (WTO), key aspects of the CBAM could violate WTO rules and are likely to be contested, taking years to play out. Meanwhile, several other countries will adopt new carbon-inspired border restrictions, adding to global trade frictions. Major carbon-emitting countries, therefore, need to act cooperatively instead of unilaterally to both advance the fight against climate change and update the rules-based global trading system. Two-thirds of greenhouse gas emissions result from nontraded activities, such as road transport, electricity generation, and home and office heating. Countries can curb emissions in these activities, while developing guidelines for carbon abatement in traded sectors.
Topic:: Climate Change, Economics, International Trade and Finance, World Trade Organization, European Union, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:: Europe

564. Is South Korea vulnerable to EU and US carbon border restrictions?

Author:: Jeffrey J. Schott and Megan Hogan
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: South Korean exports, especially carbon-intensive products like steel, are increasingly vulnerable to both the European Union’s proposed carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM)—set to begin on January 1, 2023—and the proposed Clean Competition Act (CCA) before the US Congress. Schott and Hogan caution that Korean exporters should not count on Korea’s decade-old EU and US free trade agreements (FTAs), nor on the multilateral trading rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO), to protect them from new carbon-based import barriers in key foreign markets. The WTO and the FTAs have broad and loosely defined exemptions for environmental protection. Nor is Korea likely to be shielded by its own cap-and-trade emissions trading system (the K-ETS), because of extensive use of free allowances and large differences between EU and Korean carbon prices. While the threat the EU CBAM poses to Korean exports is imminent, passage of the CCA faces major legislative obstacles. But US imports of Korean steel and other carbon-intensive goods are still subject to climate-related duties at the US border under US unfair trade statutes. The US Department of Commerce has ruled that free allowances issued under the K-ETS (and EU ETS) are implicit subsidies that can be offset by countervailing duties. These charges are in addition to the harsh tariff-rate quotas on imported Korean steel applied under the “national security” authority of Section 232 of US trade law, which are more restrictive than measures imposed against European and other steel exporters. The authors suggest relaxing these US barriers, as they have been for shipments from Europe, in return for Korean participation in the nascent US-EU talks to establish a “Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum.”
Topic:: Economics, International Trade and Finance, European Union, Exports, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

565. Hackers, Hoodies, and Helmets: Technology and the changing face of Russian private military contractors

Author:: Emma Schroeder, Gavin Wilde, Justin Sherman, and Trey Herr
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The first time Russia invaded Ukraine in the twenty-first century, the Wagner Group was born. The now widely profiled private military company (PMC) played an important role in exercising Russian national power over the Crimea and portions of the Donbas—while giving Moscow a semblance of plausible deniability. In the near decade since, the Russian PMC sector has grown considerably, and is active in more than a dozen countries around the world. PMCs are paramilitary organizations established and run as private companies—though they often operate in contract with one or more states. They are profit-motivated, expeditionary groups that make a business of the conduct of war.1 PMCs are in no way a uniquely Russian phenomenon, yet the expanding footprint of Russian PMCs and their links to state interests call for a particularly Russian-focused analysis of the industry. The growth of these firms and their direct links to the Kremlin’s oligarch network as well as Moscow’s foreign media, industrial, and cyber activities present a challenge to the United States and its allies as they seek to counter Russian malicious activities abroad. As signals intelligence and offensive cyber capabilities, drones and counter-drone systems, and encrypted communications become more accessible, these technologies will prove ever more decisive to both battlefield outcomes and statecraft. More exhaustive research on these issues is necessary. The ongoing conflict resulting from Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in this young century seems likely to shape the conduct of Russian foreign policy and security behavior for years to come—and these firms will play a part. The activities of these PMCs include high-intensity combat operations, as evidenced in Syria in 2018 and Ukraine in 2022, and a mix of population control, escort and close protection, and local direct-action activities, as seen in Libya, Mali, and elsewhere.2 Given the sourcing and dependence of Russian PMCs on Russian military service personnel and no small influence of Russian doctrine, the questions to reasonably ask include: How do changes in the Russian conduct of war and adoption of new technologies influence these PMCs? Moreover, how might these technological changes influence the role these PMCs play in Russian strategic goals and activity abroad?
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Innovation, Wagner Group, Russia-Ukraine War, and Private Military Companies (PMCs)
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, Middle East, and Africa

566. Beyond munitions: A gender analysis for Ukrainian security assistance

Author:: Cori Fleser
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: From the hospitals of Mariupol to the streets of Bucha, the Russian war in Ukraine has extracted an unacceptably high cost, while banding NATO allies and partners together in an unprecedented tide of support. In bilateral and multilateral security assistance packages, the transatlantic community has sent Ukraine javelins, High-Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARs), and all manner of weapons to defend against the Russian invasion. Still, Russia’s war continues against the nation of Ukraine and its people. So how should future military assistance account for the different impacts of the war on Ukrainian civilians? What strategies remain for NATO allies and partners to enhance their support beyond weapons and materiel? The answers lie in using gender analyses to zero in on the unique human security challenges facing Ukraine. When we overlook the role of gender in conflict, we miss the opportunity to both lead with our values and make our military support more effective. Applying a gender analysis to our security assistance is a solution that allies and partners have already agreed to implement in forums from the United Nations to NATO. In fact, it’s a tool that many allies have already developed within their own militaries. Now is the time to employ it in support of Ukraine. This starts with acknowledging the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda. The WPS Agenda, passed under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000, recognizes the disproportionate impact of conflict on women and girls, and their critical role in reconstructing societies. Militaries can apply gender analyses to better understand and tailor assistance to the unique security environments in which they operate. To help policymakers think through how a gender analysis can shape what security assistance should look like—and, in many cases, how allied militaries can implement solutions at scale, and consistent with political decisions that have already been made—we are proud to offer this issue brief. Our intention is to demonstrate to global decision makers that incorporating gender can and should be integrated in real-time conflicts to achieve real results. Our support to Ukraine must not waver, but more can be done to mitigate the severe impact of Russia’s war on the Ukrainian people. Allies and partners already have the political mandate to integrate the WPS Agenda into their operations. They already have the tools, training, and technical expertise to implement it in the field. The next step is making this common practice. This issue brief spells out ten steps for how to do so in Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Women, Partnerships, Resilience, Society, Gender, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

567. Sweden and Finland are on their way to NATO membership. Here’s what needs to happen next.

Author:: John R. Deni
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Sweden and Finland have just cleared a big hurdle on their path to NATO membership with the US Senate’s overwhelming vote to welcome them into the Alliance. While several other allies still need to ratify the expansion, Finnish and Swedish membership in NATO is now not a question of whether but when. Even though some analysts have posited that these two countries—especially Finland, which has an 830-mile border with Russia—bring disqualifying liabilities, most Alliance leaders, NATO-watchers, and European security experts argue these newest aspirants will strengthen the Alliance. This is especially so in terms of military capabilities and capacity, but also in terms of strategic culture and geostrategic outlook. Nonetheless, in the days, weeks, and months after Finland and Sweden officially become members, there is an array of subsequent questions that these two aspirants, other allies, and NATO as an organization will need to consider—and ultimately answer. After examining the key strengths that Finland and Sweden are likely to bring into NATO, this issue brief will consider several of these critical topics. These include defense planning, operational planning, and readiness concerns.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, National Security, Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, Finland, and Sweden

568. The international role of the euro and the dollar: Forever in the lead?

Author:: Martin Mühleisen
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The international monetary system has been surprisingly resilient over the past two years, considering the size of pandemic and geopolitical shocks that hit markets during this period. Liquidity injections by the major central banks helped stabilize economic activity and avoid disruptions to capital flows or foreign exchange markets. Major exchange rates remained range-bound throughout most of the crisis, even if the dollar has appreciated sharply in recent months. Volatility is likely to pick up as monetary policy responds to high inflation, but there should be no doubt that the dollar-based monetary order has withstood a major test during the past two years. This feat has been even more remarkable as the global security landscape has deteriorated in dramatic fashion, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has brought international tensions to a level not seen since the 1961 Cuban missile crisis. Moreover, while the dollar’s safe haven status remains firmly established, the center of global economic activity has been shifting east. Asia has become an economic powerhouse, and China is on course to become the world’s largest economy over the next few years. It is a natural question whether China will challenge the United States and Europe for global economic leadership, and whether the renminbi will appear as a leading, if not dominant, currency. This paper argues that this is unlikely for the foreseeable future, in part because a larger global role for the renminbi would be inconsistent with the Chinese leadership’s current policy priorities. However, there is no room for complacency. With the post-World War II international order in gradual decline, the world could again reach a moment where unforeseen geopolitical events might lead to changes in long-held political and economic paradigms. The United States and Europe can reduce this risk by making their growth models more robust and sustainable. Moreover, keeping their global alliances intact could prevent a loss of influence that has heralded changes in the international monetary system in the past.
Topic:: Economic Growth, Currency, Financial Institutions, Digital Policy, Digital Currency, Dollar, and Euro
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

569. Engaging the Pacific Islands is no longer about the why, but about the how

Author:: Marie Jourdain and Charles Lichfield
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Over the past year, US and European engagement in the South Pacific has noticeably accelerated. Wooing these islands away from Chinese influence is clearly a priority but there are many dimensions to this. The “Blue Pacific” is more than a consortium of scattered islands. They see themselves as large ocean states, which collectively make up the second-largest Exclusive Economic Zone in the world. While they are important as we game out Taiwan scenarios, the peoples of the South Pacific want their region to remain immune from “great-power games.” This calls for a subtle Transatlantic strategy emphasizing partnership. This report acknowledges the mistakes of past engagement strategies, which didn’t approach the region as a coherent whole, lacked sustained and continuous effort, and always came second to other priorities in the Indo-Pacific region.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, European Union, and Engagement
Political Geography:: Europe, United States of America, Indo-Pacific, and Pacific Islands

570. Securing alternative gas supplies and addressing critical infrastructure gaps in Europe

Author:: Richard L. Morningstar, András Simonyi, Olga Khakova, and Paddy Ryan
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The Kremlin’s weaponization of natural gas exports to Europe as winter approaches has shattered any illusions that Russia could be a reliable supplier. Europe urgently needs to import gas from other suppliers to heat its homes and power its industry. In doing so, Europe can build a more secure and sustainable energy system while cutting off funds for Moscow’s war machine. Painfully high energy prices are already having a serious impact on quality of life and economic development in Europe. New natural gas supplies and expanded interconnections to bring them to market will drive down the costs of energy and reduce the likelihood of social unrest over energy poverty. The surest means to end Russia’s energy leverage over Europe include accelerating the green transformation, curtailing gas demand, and boosting energy efficiency. However, the continent cannot implement these changes overnight. Gas remains instrumental in Europe’s transition from dirtier fossil fuels, electrification of power-hungry sectors, and integration of large-scale intermittent renewables. Natural gas will likely remain a critical part of Europe’s power baseload for at least the medium term. Procuring an adequate supply of gas in the short to midterm is not at odds with the energy transition. Europe must cultivate alternative suppliers, build non-Russian-oriented import infrastructure, and accelerate decarbonization in tandem to boost energy security and affordability. Sourcing gas from non-Russian suppliers will sustain longer-term decarbonization efforts and prevent regression back to dirtier fuels amid the energy crunch. To diversify their energy systems, European states must determine how much Russian gas can be replaced and from where, as well as what new infrastructure will be necessary to enable new imports. The European Union (EU) needs to clearly articulate the anticipated natural gas supply gap to identify investment opportunities for the relevant market players. This issue brief examines potential sources of alternative gas supplies, the infrastructure required to bring new supplies to European consumers, and the financial and regulatory mechanisms needed to support diversification efforts. It offers recommendations for measures that European countries decoupling their energy supplies from Russia should take to give themselves the best chances of succeeding.
Topic:: Environment, Markets, Oil, Gas, Energy, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:: Europe

571. The Significance of Convening the European Union – Israel Association Council

Author:: Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:: On July 18, 2022, the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union (EU) decided to move ahead with convening the EU-Israel Association Council (AC) after a decade-long hiatus. What does this mean? What opportunities does it offer, and what were the costs of not convening it so far? This paper explains what the AC is, the reasons for its suspension and for the decision to re-convene it. Assuming it will re-convene, the paper recommends future measures between Israel and the EU.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

572. Processing Trade and Global Supply Chains: Towards a Resilient “GVC 2.0” Approach

Author:: Lucian Cernat
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: In the current global context marked by economic fragility, growing uncertainty and geopolitical conflicts, ensuring the smooth functioning of global supply chains becomes more important than ever. Supply shortages, higher freight costs, higher commodity prices and strong demand increase will trigger inflationary pressures for all economic sectors dependent on global value chains (GVCs). As part of global efforts to enhance the resilience of GVCs, this paper makes the case for a broader discussion about the untapped potential of processing trade, a relatively unknown trade facilitation option available in many countries around the world. Processing trade has been credited with stimulating China’s participation in GVCs, in combination with foreign direct investment (FDI) attraction and industrial upgrading. However, processing trade is not just a Chinese phenomenon. In the EU, significant trade flows (over 200 billion euros in 2021 alone) benefitted from a double-digit trade cost reduction, thanks to the EU processing trade provisions. Different types of processing trade arrangements exist in over 70 countries worldwide (including in the EU), as a way to facilitate the integration of developing countries in global production chains. However, these unilateral schemes have different requirements and co-exist without any attempt to facilitate their inter-operability along complex global supply chains. This paper argues that there is a pressing need for a global reflection on how best to promote a better integration between these national processing trade schemes. One option is to promote a “GVC 2.0” approach that offers key recommendations and best practices for processing trade along GVCs. Such a coordinated “GVC 2.0” trade facilitation initiative would not only make GVCs more resilient for countries that depend on global sourcing for their critical economic activities, but it will also reduce the inflationary effect generated by the unnecessary trade costs associated with GVC activities.
Topic:: European Union, Economy, Trade, Resilience, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: Europe

573. Has Globalisation Really Peaked for Europe?

Author:: Lucian Cernat
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: This paper builds on the recent arguments put forward by Richard Baldwin and others debunking the myth that we enter a period of de-globalisation. The paper argues that globalisation is a complex phenomenon that requires detailed, firm-level indicators going beyond simple aggregate metrics. When using such indicators, the picture is much more nuanced and, in the case of Europe, the role of global trade is as important as ever for hundreds of thousands of companies and millions of jobs supported by global trade flows. A strong participation in the “new globalisation” is also key for the future EU competitiveness in technology-driven sectors.
Topic:: Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Science and Technology, European Union, and Trade
Political Geography:: Europe

574. The Impacts of EU Strategy Autonomy Policies – A Primer for Member States

Author:: Matthias Bauer
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: EU governments should be much more sceptical and critical of the EU’s strategic autonomy agenda and the new polices intended to achieve the EU’s “long-term” industrial and technological ambitions. The long-term costs for Member States’ economies and the process of economic convergence are largely ignored by the agenda. Negative impacts of strategic autonomy on trade openness and the international rules-based trading system are also greatly understated. Many EU strategic autonomy ambitions are inherently guided by a “European Union First” impulse. Policymakers follow the assumption that EU values are superior to those in other parts of the world and EU regulation should be different from third countries. Major strategic autonomy aspirations represent a relapse of the EU to the old policy of EU member states designing and enforcing their own laws without considering the economic and political costs of regulatory fragmentation and economic disintegration from others. Recent strategic autonomy policies are estimated to create income losses in the EU of between 0.08% and 0.15% of EU27 GDP. These losses correspond to short-term economic harm resulting from changes in the use of productive resources in the EU. Long-run impacts, which reflect losses to productivity and innovation, could be up to 3 to 5 times higher with national income per capita falling by up to 0.5% to 0.75%. The costs are not evenly distributed across the EU27. Larger countries like France and Germany are less impacted than smaller ones, notably Ireland and the Baltic states. The impacts on Ireland, for example, are close to 4 times bigger than they are for France, the impacts on Estonia close to twice those on Germany. Strategic autonomy ambitions have failed to account for negative impacts on developing countries. To the extent that the EU’s policy stance further fragilizes rules-based multilateralism, there are longer-term impacts stemming from a less certain legal environment and higher barriers for cross-border trade and investment. EU strategic autonomy policies have the effect of empowering vested interests in developing countries to engage in lobbying for their own protectionist policies. Accordingly, EU strategic autonomy policies risk encouraging the diffusion of protectionist policies globally, particularly in countries with weak institutional capacity. EU Member States should examine their options and ask themselves whether there are better long-term strategies to pursue than those currently proposed at the EU level, strategies guided by the spirit of an open society – a society embracing the principles of free trade, non-discrimination, and economic freedom. Europe’s policymakers should aim for closer market integration and regulatory cooperation with trustworthy international partners such as the G7 and the larger group of the OECD countries. It is in the EU’s self-interest to advocate for a rules-based international order with open markets. It is neither in the EU’s economic nor its political interest to disintegrate from partner countries.
Topic:: Markets, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Trade, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:: Europe

575. How Important are Mutual Recognition Agreements for Trade Facilitation?

Author:: Lucian Cernat
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: Trade in the 21st century may face lower tariffs, but regulations that affect international trade in goods and services have proliferated. While regulations are important for many public policy objectives, different and complex non-tariff measures can become unnecessarily costly trade barriers for the millions of companies engaged in international trade. Trade policy can play a crucial role in reducing these unnecessary costs, without impairing the ability of regulatory authorities to carry out their public policy responsibilities. Mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) are a concrete trade policy instrument, specifically designed to achieve this dual objective. This paper revisits the arguments in favour of upgrading the existing EU MRAs to cover 21st century regulatory aspects impacting trade flows, offering empirical evidence on the positive difference MRAs have both on the value of exports and on increasing the number of exporting firms and their product portfolio towards new export destinations. The paper also summarises the results of a recent EU firm-level survey on the importance of MRAs for export performance. The results of the EU business surveys confirm the need for a renewed attention to MRAs, in particular with regard to emerging regulatory issues.
Topic:: Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Regulation, and Trade
Political Geography:: Europe

576. Don’t look only to Brussels to increase the supply of safe assets in the European Union

Author:: Francesco Papadia and Heliodoro Temprano Arroyo
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: A sufficient supply of safe assets denominated in euros is critical if the European Union is to achieve full banking and capital markets union while fostering the euro’s international role. The European debate on developing the supply of safe assets has so far focused on the possible creation of a common safe asset. This has tended to underplay the potential contribution of sovereign assets. Expanding the supply of national safe assets, notably through the gradual implementation of fiscal and growth-oriented structural policies in euro-area countries, leading to upgrading of their sovereign ratings, provides a promising, and perhaps more feasible, option. An upgrade to triple A of those euro-area countries that are currently rated double A could produce substantially more safe assets than most common safe asset proposals, including those based on the development of ‘synthetic’ safe assets. There has been a remarkable increase in the share of supranational assets in the stock of euro-based safe assets since 2008, reflecting downgrades in sovereign ratings and the EU’s financial responses to the euro-area crisis and the pandemic. However, safe assets in euro remain dominated by those issued by euro-area governments. Although common safe assets have certain advantages over national safe assets, reflecting their built-in risk diversification properties, there is currently not much political appetite for such proposals. Meanwhile, sovereign safe assets already offer many of the advantages of common safe assets. Sound fiscal policies and growth-stimulating reforms, which are in any case desirable, should be implemented to improve the credit ratings of euro-area sovereigns. This might not be politically feasible in the short-term, given the difficult economic environment currently faced by the EU, but it should be a key component of the EU’s medium-term safe asset strategy. Should the political consensus be found to create a common safe asset, such an asset could be incorporated into the euro area’s existing safe asset system, reinforcing its positive effects.
Topic:: Debt, Markets, Monetary Policy, European Union, Regional Integration, European Monetary Union, and Banking
Political Geography:: Europe

577. Which mergers should the European Commission review under the Digital Markets Act?

Author:: Christophe Carugati
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Large digital platforms acquired 1149 firms in various economic sectors between 1987 and July 2022. The European Commission reviewed only 21 of these mergers as most did not meet the European Union merger control turnover threshold. This suggests under-enforcement, with some problematic mergers escaping merger review and thus posing competition risks. The EU Digital Markets Act, which entered into force in November 2022, imposes obligations on firms that are considered ‘gatekeepers’ in relation to some core platform services, such as online search engines. In particular, these firms must now inform the Commission of all their intended acquisitions. This, in combination with Commission guidance on referrals by EU national competition authorities of mergers for review, should ensure more merger reviews in the digital sector. Current European Commission guidance on referring cases for merger review is flexible but impractical as it relies on theories of harm rather than clear and objective criteria. Without clarification, there could be over-enforcement in which unproblematic mergers are reviewed, human resources are allocated inefficiently and legal uncertainty persists. The Commission should issue new guidance on which digital mergers are likely to be problematic, thus triggering referral for merger review. This is likely to be the case when the target’s user base overlaps with that of the acquirer, when the target is a leader in a future critical market and when the target is active in a core platform service.
Topic:: Economy, Innovation, European Commission, and Digital Markets Act (DMA)
Political Geography:: Europe

578. A European policy mix to address food insecurity linked to Russia’s war

Author:: Georg Zachmann, Pauline Weil, and Stephan von Cramon-Taubadel
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The Russian war against Ukraine has put at risk a significant share of global food exports, and has contributed significantly to strongly rising global food prices. This has made poor, food-import dependent countries more vulnerable, with potentially serious humanitarian consequences. The crisis also has negative security, migration and foreign policy repercussions for the European Union. The EU and its members have a number of policy levers to address the crisis. These include agricultural, trade, environment, aid, energy, fiscal and foreign policy. However, in the complex interplay of local and global, agricultural and non-agricultural markets, apparently simple solutions can have significant unintended consequences and policy trade-offs must be taken into account. While EU agricultural policy can address the crisis directly by adjusting production, energy policies also have an impact on food security through the complex relationship between the food and energy systems. Energy is an input to food production but also, as bioenergy, competes for agricultural commodities. Fiscal policy can discourage inefficient food consumption and food waste, while trade policy and aid can improve the allocation of agricultural production factors (eg fertilisers) and products. Increasing information sharing on food stocks and building trust are prerequisites for trade policy and diplomacy to limit export restrictions, thus alleviating some of the price pressures on international markets. The crisis highlights food-system fragilities when confronted with global conflicts, climate change and economic shocks. Policies should seek to increase shock-resilience, for example by reducing structural rigidities in production, trade and consumption patterns, and by encouraging sustainable production in import-dependent countries. This is especially important considering that most food production is locally consumed. Only 20 percent of the global cereals volume is traded, making the current shock significant in terms of globally traded volumes (Ukraine represents 10 percent of the global grain market), but not relative to overall volume (Ukraine represents 2 percent of global grain production).
Topic:: European Union, Food Security, Exports, Russia-Ukraine War, and Green Economy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

579. How to implement the self-preferencing ban in the European Union’s Digital Markets Act

Author:: Christophe Carugati
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Large online platforms are intermediaries between end-users and business users. They sometimes propose their own products and services alongside those of rivals. This can lead to platforms promoting their offers over those of competitors in so-called self-preferencing. The European Union Digital Markets Act (DMA) bans large online platforms under its scope from treating their own products and services more favourably that those of rivals when ranking, crawling and indexing. Platforms – or gatekeepers in the DMA definition – should apply transparent, fair and non-discriminatory conditions when ranking products and services. However, the identification, detection, compliance with and monitoring of self-preferencing is complex and resource-intensive. It requires a case-by-case approach and access to and analysis of platform data and algorithms. The DMA allows gatekeepers to promote their own products and services if rivals are subject to the same treatment. Nonetheless, the DMA neither defines equal treatment nor the main elements of self-preferencing, thus preventing platforms within the DMA’s scope from correctly applying the prohibition. To ease enforcement, the European Commission should issue guidance on what constitutes self-preferencing under the DMA, outlining two main principles. First, gatekeepers should use objective and unbiased parameters to determine ranking, indexing and crawling. Second, gatekeepers should demonstrate equal treatment. The guidance will make compliance easier. The Commission should then monitor compliance by appointing and ensuring sufficient rotation of external auditors to avoid capture by gatekeepers. The Commission should also work with competent national authorities that develop technological tools. When monitoring flags a risk of non-compliance, the Commission should then further specify the ban on self-preferencing on a case-by-case basis.
Topic:: European Union, Digital Economy, Economy, Innovation, and Digital Markets Act (DMA)
Political Geography:: Europe

580. Promotion of high capacity broadband to rebuild and recover from the pandemic

Author:: J. Scott Marcus, Alicia Garcia-Herrero, and Lionel Guetta-Jeanrenaud
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Promoting high-quality fixed and mobile broadband for all, at an affordable price, is an important enabler of the digital transformation of society and will help close the digital divide. This became clearer than ever during the pandemic, when broadband access was a crucial enabler of remote work, distance learning, telemedicine and e-commerce. It has always been challenging to provide broadband access to all at an affordable price. The pandemic, global geopolitical tension and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have exacerbated supply-chain disruptions in ways that make this even more difficult and potentially expensive. Promotion of broadband deployment, adoption and use are all important for both fixed and mobile broadband; however, different policy levers are needed in each case, on both the supply and demand sides. The market will not always deliver complete solutions. Consequently, there is a role for regulation, targeted industrial policy and public finance. Promotion of competition, combined with prompt and efficient provision of access to resources such as electromagnetic spectrum and access to land and rights of way, can be particularly important. G20 countries and others now seek a future-proof, sustainable and equitable recovery, meaning new sources of public revenues need to be considered. Broadband can be boosted by judicious use of recovery funds and expected new tax revenues arising from global tax reforms agreed within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Topic:: Infrastructure, Digital Economy, Innovation, COVID-19, and Inclusion
Political Geography:: Europe and Global Focus

581. Completing Europe’s banking union: economic requirements and legal conditions

Author:: Thorsten Beck, Jan Pieter Krahnen, Philippe Martin, Franz Mayer, Jean Pisani-Ferry, Tobias Tröger, Beatrice di Mauro, Nicolas Veron, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The European Union’s banking union project started in mid-2012 in response to the euro-area crisis, with the goal of breaking the bank-sovereign vicious circle. The objective was also to restore private liability in banking and to move towards an integrated supranational market for banking services. For all the progress achieved in the past decade, particularly in banking supervision, these aims have not yet been accomplished. This Policy Contribution analyses the deficiencies of the current framework and identifies possible responses, in line with three levels of reform ambition. We label these ‘incremental’ (broadening the scope for private-sector burden-sharing in future cases of bank failures), ‘real’ (effectively breaking the bank-sovereign vicious circle), and ‘cosmic’ (a single, seamlessly integrated banking market). European policymakers should set their sights on the second level, which we view as achievable within the current decade, requiring new EU legislation but no change to the European treaties.
Topic:: Regulation, Economy, Crisis Management, European Central Bank, and Banking
Political Geography:: Europe

582. Lessons for Europe from China’s quest for semiconductor self-reliance

Author:: Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Pauline Weil
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Semiconductors are a critical input to production of information and communication technology and many other goods. The major economies want to be able to produce chips at home to avoid excessive dependence on supply chains in an increasingly unpredictable world, where trade is being compromised because of national security concerns. China was first in terms of timing and scale of funding to support its its semiconductor industry. Since 2015, China has spent $150 billion upgrading its semiconductor industry. Success, however, has been limited. China’s massive industrial policy effort has been most successful in increasing capacity for assembly of chips, though that is also the least value-added part of the semiconductor supply chain. Progress on chip design and fabrication in China remain underwhelming. The United States has also started implementing its $50 billion package to support the production of chips. The European Union, meanwhile, has not yet fully finalised its main semiconductor initiative, the European Chips Act. China’s experience offers a number of lessons. First, chip fabrication requires massive fixed asset investment and, therefore, large subsidies, but with no guarantee of success. Second, one reason for the underwhelming results of China’s semiconductor policy is US containment, through export controls and other measures. In this respect, the EU should find it easier than China to upgrade its chips industry but, given the costs, focusing on the highest-end part of the supply chain would be the best approach. Assembly and production of lower-end semiconductors already face overcapacity, given the financial resources already invested by China.
Topic:: International Relations, European Union, Economy, Trade Policy, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:: China and Europe

583. How have sanctions impacted Russia?

Author:: Maria Demertzis, Benjamin Hilgenstock, Ben McWilliams, Elina Ribakova, and Simone Tagliapietra
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has triggered a series of sanctions imposed by the European Union, the United States and others. Sanctions included restrictions on Russia’s financial industry, its central bank and its coal and oil exporters, in addition to general export controls. Meanwhile, foreign companies have withdrawn voluntarily from the Russian market as a result of a ‘self-sanctioning’ trend. We assess the impact these sanctions have had on Russia’s economy in the immediate aftermath of the invasion and more structurally. Russian fiscal revenues have not suffered from sanctions sufficiently to reduce the length of this war. Effective management by the Bank of Russia has prevented financial instability and has therefore also protected the real economy. However, this picture of economic containment is coming to an end. Russia’s fiscal revenues are now beginning to take a hit; given the breadth of sanctions, the economy will suffer in the medium to long term. The voluntary departure of a large number of western firms, eventual energy decoupling by the EU and Russia’s inability to find equal alternatives will damage the Russian economy severely. As the Russian economy closes in on itself, it will become harder to find reliable data to evaluate the extent of the hit. Still greater sanctions coordination across the globe is needed to isolate the Russian economy, limit the flow of income into Russian coffers and therefore help stop the war.
Topic:: Governance, Sanctions, Economy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

584. An assessment of Europe’s options for addressing the crisis in energy markets

Author:: Conall Heussaff, Simone Tagliapietra, Georg Zachmann, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, wholesale prices for electricity and gas in the European Union have risen five to fifteen-fold, with severe impacts for households and businesses. The crisis is also creating liquidity problems for energy companies, with contagion risks for the financial sector. In response, European governments have taken a range of actions. Some have introduced measures at retail level, while others have introduced windfall-profit taxes on energy companies. Some countries have provided emergency liquidity to energy companies facing soaring collateral costs. Some energy companies have even been nationalised. Emergency-intervention proposals should be evaluated against three principles. First, energy supply must meet demand at prices that do not cause major damage to the European economy. Second, the most vulnerable consumers must be protected. Third, measures should be consistent with the case for investment in a sustainable energy system, in order to safeguard Europe’s ability to decouple structurally from fossil-fuel imports. Gas price caps have been proposed as an emergency measure in different forms: a cap on Russian gas only, a cap on gas used in electricity generation, a cap on all wholesale gas. All entail significant risks. The first might lead to a full stop of Russian gas into the EU. The second might increase gas demand from the electricity sector. The third might raise gas demand and also undermine Europe’s ability to attract much-needed gas supplies. Instead of capping gas prices, the EU should engage collectively with external gas suppliers and negotiate new long-term contracts with provisions to limit price volatility. A September 2022 European Commission proposal involving electricity demand reduction, a revenue cap on inframarginal generation, solidarity payments from fossil-fuel companies and consumer support measures, is broadly positive, notably because it emphasises demand reduction. However, it is not sufficient. A more comprehensive plan needs to ensure that all countries bring forward every available supply-side flexibility, make real efforts to reduce gas and electricity demand, keep their energy markets open and pool demand to get a better deal from external gas suppliers. In the longer term, measures to split the markets for energy generated from renewables and fossil fuels should be examined.
Topic:: Markets, European Union, Energy Sector, and Green Economy
Political Geography:: Europe

585. Will Ukraine’s refugees go home?

Author:: Uri Dadush and Pauline Weil
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: About 15 percent of the population has fled Ukraine since the start of the Russian aggression in February 2022. Nearly 4 million Ukrainians have already registered in European Union countries. Based in part on evidence that few refugees return voluntarily to poor countries once they settle in rich countries, even once security is re-established at home, it can be expected that large numbers of Ukrainian refugees are likely to remain in European host countries, and will likely be joined by others, including many men that remained to fight when the conflict is over. Ukraine already has a long history of emigration. Its shattered economy, the likelihood of a protracted conflict and significant uncertainty with regard to its final status reinforce the argument that most refugees will not return and many more will join them. EU nations must prepare for. There will be large short-term costs and long-term economic gains from Ukrainian immigration in Europe. The best way to help Ukraine, and to moderate the likely outflow of its people, will be to assist in the country’s reconstruction, and not to place artificial impediments to the immigration of individuals who have already suffered greatly.
Topic:: Migration, Governance, Reconstruction, Refugees, Economy, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

586. Enlarging and deepening: giving substance to the European Political Community

Author:: Franz Mayer, Jean Pisani-Ferry, Daniela Schwarzer, and Shahin Vallée
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: France’s President Emmanuel Macron and Germany’s Chancellor Olaf Scholz have stressed the geopolitical emergency of re-designing the European Union’s relationship with its neighbourhood. Both acknowledge that EU enlargement is necessary, but also emphasise that profound EU institutional reform is required beforehand, though deepening and widening the EU are complex processes that veto players could block. The geopolitical challenges mean it is in the critical interest of the EU to bring stability to its neighbourhood by ensuring geopolitical alignment with the EU, limiting the blackmailing power of external, authoritarian states, supporting more resilient democracies and strengthening the rule of law. Meanwhile, the EU’s neighbours are seeking a political space in which challenges to collective security and stability can be addressed and concrete policies decided. Given the urgency, it is not enough to rely on lengthy EU accession processes. A ‘European Political Community’ (EPC), which will have its first summit on 6 October 2022, could act both as a bridge to an eventual larger EU and as a framework for continental-scale partnership. Leaders should use the summit to start the building of a platform that can combine political dialogue with policy delivery in a quick and flexible way, and will thus structure more impactfully the relationship between the EU and its neighbourhood. The EPC could start as a soft law agreement between states and the EU. It would work with existing institutions as far as possible, while aiming at more effective decision-making than currently in the EU. For instance it could function without vetoes and could work in geopolitically relevant areas that are not yet EU competences. An ambitious EPC would provide financial resources for deeper cooperation on energy and climate, security and defence, and economic and social convergence. The EPC would not be, and should not be, regarded as a substitute for EU accession, but should be designed in such a way that it can work as an accelerator. For countries not seeking to join the EU, it would provide an ongoing framework that sustains structured cooperation with the EU.
Topic:: Security, Politics, Governance, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe

587. A grand bargain to steer through the European Union’s energy crisis

Author:: Ben McWilliams, Giovanni Sgaravatti, Simone Tagliapietra, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Europe’s energy system faces unprecedented physical and institutional stress. The policy response so far has been excessively nationally focussed and could undermine the goals of calming energy markets over the next 18 months and achieving ambitious decarbonisation targets. At the basis of the crisis is a post-COVID-19 global energy imbalance. While demand bounced back quickly as economies re-opened, supply did not. A particular challenge is that the reducing supply of fossil fuels in line with climate targets has not been matched by a commensurate reduction of fossil-fuel demand. Russian manipulation of European natural gas markets since summer 2021, exploiting its significant market power, has deepened the crisis. Finally, events including weak French nuclear output and the ongoing drought, which has cut hydropower generation, have further escalated the situation. In response to high and volatile prices and forced demand reduction, European governments have tended to opt for narrow and uncoordinated measures that prioritise national security of supply and affordability over an integrated European approach. Subsidising energy consumption instead of demand reduction has been a common and misguided approach. Governments run the risk that energy consumption subsidies become unsustainable, eroding trust in energy markets, slowing action in sanctioning Russia and increasing the cost of the net-zero transition. An integrated European approach and a coordinated plan is essential to address the crisis. European Union leaders must strike a grand energy bargain based on four broad principles: (i) all countries bringing forward every available supply-side flexibility, (ii) all countries making comprehensive efforts to reduce demand, (iii) a political committing to maintain energy markets and cross-border flows, (iv) compensation for the most vulnerable consumers. This grand bargain can be the first step on a new course towards united energy policy at EU level.
Topic:: Markets, European Union, Crisis Management, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe

588. Welfare Implications of Electric Bike Subsidies: Evidence from Sweden

Author:: Anders Anderson and Harrison Hong
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: Greenhouse gas emissions from U.S. transportation account for about 29 percent of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, making it the largest contributor by sector to global warming in the United States. Within the U.S. transportation sector, cars are responsible for 58 percent of all transportation emissions according to the Environmental Protection Agency. Along with electric cars, electric bikes (also known as pedelecs or e‑bikes) are a potentially important tool to address global warming. With rechargeable batteries, they are capable of long distances and hence can replace car trips for work in dense and growing urban areas around the world.
Topic:: Climate Change, Welfare, Transportation, and Subsidies
Political Geography:: Europe and Sweden

589. Seeking Safety: Roma Refugees in Moldova – Challenges and humanitarian needs

Author:: Charlotte Greener and Emly de Andrade Costa
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:: The war in Ukraine has displaced millions of people to neighbouring countries – but some groups who already face poverty and discrimination in society, including Roma people, are facing particular challenges accessing the safety they need. This paper outlines the results of Oxfam’s rapid assessment of Roma refugees in Moldova in July 2022, highlighting the challenges that Roma refugees face when trying to access assistance, and some key humanitarian needs of these refugees. It aims to help amplify the voice of Roma refugees and to inform a humanitarian response – from the Moldovan government, United Nations (UN) agencies, and non-government organizations (NGOs) – that is more inclusive of Roma refugees, and more responsive to their particular needs.
Topic:: International Cooperation, United Nations, Refugees, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:: Europe and Moldova

590. The Price Cap on Russian Oil Exports, Explained

Author:: Catherine Wolfram, Simon Johnson, and Łukasz Rachel
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: If you’ve taken an introductory economics class, you were probably left with the strong impression that price caps are bad – they distort demand and discourage producers from supplying the market. So, why has Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, the consummate economist, advocated so strongly for a price cap on Russian oil? The answer is that this price cap is different from the standard cap discussed in introductory economics classes. A standard price cap applies to all goods traded in a market. For example, in some countries there are price caps on bread for everyone or diesel for farmers or rent controls on housing. Such caps lead to excess demand for the good and insufficient supply, leading to shortages at the capped price. If prices are constrained, other non-price mechanisms, like first-come-first-served, are required to allocate the good. All too frequently, the result is empty bakery shelves or fuel shortages or difficulties finding housing. To understand why the cap on Russian oil is different, we first need to provide background on Russian oil trade and the proposed price cap.
Topic:: Economics, Markets, Oil, Exports, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

591. The future of nuclear energy in the Baltic Sea Region

Author:: Izabela Surwillo
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: The Russian invasion of Ukraine has put the issue of energy supply at the top of the EU’s security agenda, leading to a drastic policy shift in energy relations with Moscow. Similarly to other European states, countries in the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) are struggling to phase out Russian fossil fuels and accelerate the transition to a low-carbon economy amid skyrocketing energy prices. Although there are no quick fixes, the challenge of the dual energy and climate crisis in a tense geopolitical context has triggered different policy responses across the region, with national policies increasingly pointing to the nuclear energy sector.
Topic:: Climate Change, Energy Policy, European Union, Crisis Management, Nuclear Energy, Russia-Ukraine War, and Net Zero
Political Geography:: Europe and Baltic Sea

592. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: A forum where China works for a multilateral order in Central Asia

Author:: Lars Erslev Andersen
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Since then, the organisation has developed its cooperation and included more member states and observer states, and it now constitutes an important forum in Central Asia where it is indeed relevant for the EU to elaborate its economic ties and collaboration. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has been described in Western media as a defence alliance, à la NATO, facing the West and the USA. However, it is not a defence alliance but rather a forum for cooperation that includes security policy issues.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Organization, and Politics
Political Geography:: Europe and Denmark

593. With energy at play in the Ukraine war, everybody pays

Author:: Izabela Surwillo and Veronika Slakaityte
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Despite sustained efforts to turn towards the West, as a major transit country dependent on cheap gas, Ukraine has been particularly vulnerable to Russian pressure. Now, with the outbreak of war in Ukraine, the EU’s problematic dependence on the Russian petrol state is under stress, as diversification of energy supply from non-Russian sources in the wake of war will incur high economic costs for the EU in the near future. The Russian attack on Ukraine has put the EU’s lenient policy towards Russia into question and has highlighted its problematic overdependence on Russian oil and gas. On the 12th day of the war in Ukraine, with Russia under tough Western sanctions, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak stated: ‘We have every right to take a matching decision and impose an embargo on gas pumping through the Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline.’ The International Energy Agency (IEA) has urged the EU neither to extend nor to sign new contracts with Gazprom. Meanwhile the EU is exploring policy options for diversification of gas supply. Russia currently supplies over 40% of the EU’s gas and nearly a third of its oil, leaving the EU exposed to economic and political pressure. Energy blackmail primarily concerns gas supply, as replacing Russian gas with other sources cannot be executed immediately due to insufficient gas infrastructure and market conditions (i.e. limited availability of liquified gas). While oil can be transported by land and sea, meeting the EU’s energy demand will nevertheless require both diversification of energy supply routes and speeding up of its energy transition. This process will prove challenging and costly. Phasing out the EU–Russia energy cooperation after the Russian invasion of Ukraine also marks a major shift in continental energy politics that affects all the parties. For Russia, the loss of the European market implies a huge loss of revenue and a deepening future dependence on China. Ukraine finds itself once again caught in the middle. For years Ukraine increasingly sought greater energy independence from Russia and deeper integration with the EU energy market. Meanwhile, the construction of pipelines such as Nord Stream 2, circumventing Ukraine as a transit state for Russian gas, made Ukraine even more vulnerable because it sent a clear signal to Moscow that energy trade with Europe would not cease, even following the annexation of some Ukrainian territories by Russia in 2014. During the current war, Moscow is claiming that Russia is doing ‘everything in its power’ to keep the flows through Ukraine to the EU stable. However, the damage being done to Ukrainian energy infrastructure and its economy at large is still hard to estimate.
Topic:: Oil, European Union, Gas, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

594. How to support a rights-based approach to nature-based solutions

Author:: Mikkel Funder and Marie Ladekjær Gravesen
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: While NbS offer many promises, it is critically important to ensure that such approaches safeguard and strengthen the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities in the use and governance of natural resources. The recent adoption of a Global Standard for NbS is an important step forward but the Standard needs support and additional actions if a rights-based approach is to be realized in practice. This policy brief provides recommendations for how Denmark can help ensure this.
Topic:: Climate Change, Development, Environment, Natural Resources, and Cooperation
Political Geography:: Europe and Denmark

595. Berlin’s Hesitation: Implications of German Foreign Minister’s tour to Mali and Niger

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, on April 12 and 13, made an important visit to Mali and Niger that is set to determine the future of Germany’s military presence in Mali. The German government is divided into those who support a continued presence in Mali and those who push for complete withdrawal of the German troops from the African country.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Armed Forces, European Union, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, Germany, Mali, and Niger

596. How to ‘open’ Strategic Autonomy

Author:: Luuk Molthof and Luc Köbben
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: The EU’s open strategic autonomy agenda is quickly gathering pace, especially in the trade and industrial domain. A host of initiatives and autonomous instruments have been introduced to strengthen the EU’s resilience, reduce its strategic dependencies in key sectors, and protect its industries against economic coercion and unfair trade practices. The EU has generally been careful to ensure that its efforts do not undermine the openness of its economy. However, there is an undeniable tension between the ‘open’ and ‘autonomous’ components of the agenda. Guaranteeing compatibility will require a careful balancing act, contingent on a coherent strategy not only for strengthening the EU’s strategic autonomy but also for fostering and preserving its openness. This policy brief offers concrete suggestions for operationalising the ‘open’ component in the EU’s open strategic autonomy agenda.
Topic:: European Union, Economy, Trade, Industry, Resilience, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:: Europe

597. Realising the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity: opportunities and pitfalls

Author:: Dick Zandee and Adaja Stoetman
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: When the European Union’s Strategic Compass had almost been completed in late February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. Consequently, the language on Russia in the Compass text was adapted to a more bellicose content. However, the military level of ambition remained unchanged as it had already been agreed informally by the EU member states. At the end of March, when the Council formally adopted the Compass, the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) became the new focal point for crisis management tasks in the context of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Although the attention of strategists, defence planners and armaments experts has shifted further towards strengthening collective defence as a result of the war in Ukraine and the outcome of the NATO Madrid Summit, instability in the areas to Europe’s south and south-east remains the norm rather than the exception. The EU RDC has to provide the EU with the military capability to be deployed in crisis situations when needed, also taking into account that the United States (US) is less likely to act in Europe’s southern neighbourhood in the future. Ambitious targets have been set with regard to the flexible composition of the RDC and to the timeline of its initial operational status in 2025. This policy brief examines the milestones to be reached towards the year 2025 – in other words ‘what should be done in the near future’. Three aspects are given particular attention: the question of using the existing format of the EU Battlegroups as building blocks for the RDC; the issue of how to speed up decision-making; and the question of capability shortfalls. This is followed by conclusions on the opportunities and pitfalls that the EU and its member states may encounter up until 2025 and beyond.
Topic:: NATO, European Union, Troop Deployment, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

598. Open strategic autonomy in European defence: what countries must do

Author:: Dick Zandee
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: Russia’s war in Ukraine has resulted in wide support for strengthening European defence capabilities. At the same time, the debate on whether to rely on NATO or to seek European strategic autonomy in the area of security and defence has withered away. There is wide recognition in Europe that both the EU and NATO are key actors in response to Russia’s armed aggression and violation of international law, agreements and norms. While the Alliance is strengthening its deterrence and defence posture, the role of the EU in security and defence is growing. Better European capabilities will allow the EU to act on its own when needed – more in particular in areas and countries outside the Union – and simultaneously support NATO to defend its territory. Nevertheless, the question has to be asked how European defence capabilities can best be strengthened. In recent years, the European Commission has taken various initiatives to promote cross-border defence cooperation. These efforts have been further expanded after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The steps taken by Berlaymont are bold and most welcome, but the member states are in the driving seat: they continue to deliver the military forces that are needed to secure Europe’s interests. Defence policy and planning provides the basis for allocating money to investment programmes and the acquisition of military equipment. The procurement of military equipment is still primarily conducted on a national basis instead of collaboratively with European partner countries. This Policy Brief assesses the scope for a closer coordination and synchronisation of the defence policies, planning and investment of the European countries in order to contribute to open strategic autonomy. First, the author provides an overview of the recent EU initiatives and how these relate to the efforts of the member states. Next, the question of what the member states should do to increase cross-border defence cooperation in terms of decision-making, budget cycles and defence planning will be addressed. The subsequent section assesses how the hurdles to moving from national to multinational defence planning and investment can best be overcome. The final section points to the way forward, including suggestions on the specific role that the Netherlands can play in enhancing European collaboration in defence programmes.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe

599. Realising the EU Hybrid Toolbox: opportunities and pitfalls

Author:: Kenneth Lasoen
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: In recent years European and other nations have been increasingly targeted by different manipulation or coercion tactics that remain under the threshold of violence, and are commonly referred to as hybrid threats.For the debate on defining hybrid threats, see Dick Zandee, Sico van der Meer and Adája Stoetman, Countering hybrid threats: steps for improving EU-NATO cooperation, Clingendael Report, October 2021, p. 2-5; Georgios Giannopoulos, Hanna Smith and Marianthi Theocharidou, The landscape of Hybrid Threats: A conceptual model, Publications Office of the European Union, February 2021. For instance, in 2016 the elections in the United States were manipulated by a foreign state actor through targeted propaganda and the leaking of hacked material that compromised one of the presidential candidates. In the same year the British referendum on remaining in the European Union was also targeted by sophisticated propaganda efforts.United States Senate, Putin’s Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security, Committee on Foreign Relations, 115th Congress, 2018, p. 116-118. The need to counter these threats and deal with them comprehensively has therefore been acknowledged in the EU Strategic Compass. It provides for the development of a toolbox to put at the disposal of member states a wide range of measures to respond to hybrid campaigns, should they choose to invoke the assistance of the EU. This EU Hybrid Toolbox (EUHT) intends to gather all civilian and military instruments that can be employed to counter hybrid campaigns. Operationalisation was intended by the end of 2022 but this no longer seems attainable. However, the conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated the importance of having a coordinated reaction capability to counter hybrid campaigns and is likely to provide the momentum to bring the development of the EUHT to fruition. This policy brief examines the most recent progress on operationalising the EUHT. First, the rationale for the EUHT is explained. Next, the state of play in the operationalization process is analysed. The subsequent section focusses on the difficulties stemming from differences of opinion between the member states, followed by an assessment of the issues surrounding decision-making. After suggestions for increasing the effectiveness of the EUHT are given, the policy brief ends with conclusions and a listing of opportunities and pitfalls.The methodology used for this policy brief consists of a combination of literature scanning and a limited number of interviews. The author would like to thank the interviewees for their valuable input that was given under the application of the Chatham House Rule.
Topic:: European Union, Hybrid Threats, Coercion, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe

600. Strict and Uniform: Improving EU Sanctions Enforcement

Author:: Kim B. Olsen and Simon Fasterkjær Kjeldsen
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: For as long as the EU has been using sanctions as a foreign policy instrument, countering violations has been a challenge. With the EU rapidly expanding the breadth and depth of its sanctions, its institutions and member states must find ways to ensure stricter and more uniform enforcement to deter violations, enhance efficiency, and ensure a more level playing field for economic actors. The stakes are high: the success of the EU’s response to Russia’s military aggression hinges largely on effective sanctions, and the long-term legitimacy of the tool itself depends on its enforcement.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Governance, Sanctions, European Union, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Eastern Europe

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS