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101. US-China Roundtable on Carbon Capture, Utilization and Storage

Author:
David B. Sandalow, Sally Qiu, and Zhiyuan Fan
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
On November 17, 2021, New York time/November 18, 2021, Beijing time, the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University and Energy Foundation-China convened an online roundtable on carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS) in the United States and China. Scholars, industry officials and policy makers exchanged information and ideas concerning CCUS development in each country. Participants discussed the role of CCUS in achieving net zero emissions, focusing on three topics in particular: CCUS costs, strategies for utilization of carbon dioxide (CO2) and CCUS policies. This report summarizes key points made by participants at the roundtable, which was held under the Chatham House Rule.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Energy Policy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

102. Sanctions, SWIFT, and China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payments System

Author:
Barry Eichengreen
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
In response to Russia’s attack on Ukraine, the United States and a coalition of cooperating countries imposed harsh financial sanctions on the Russian government, corporations, and individuals.1 These sanctions bar Russian banks from using SWIFT (the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications) to facilitate cross-border payments, prohibit banks from doing most forms of business with Russian entities, and freeze assets held abroad by the Central Bank of Russia in the form of treasury securities and bank deposits. These developments have led Russia, as well as other countries contemplating whether they might find themselves in the same position, to explore alternatives. Such options could include building a substitute for SWIFT to send instructions regarding cross-border interbank transactions; identifying financial counterparties other than Western banks with which to do international business and platforms other than Western clearinghouses through which to make payment; and finding a vehicle other than the dollar for denominating and executing transactions. Specifically, countries are looking to China, which has large internationally active banks, has created its own clearinghouse for cross-border transactions and is embarked on a campaign to encourage broader international use of its currency, the renminbi.2 This note investigates how far China has gone in creating alternatives to SWIFT, Western banks, and the dollar. It explores whether Russia and other countries might be drawn toward this parallel international financial universe and what economic and political implications this has—for the United States, for its geopolitical rivals, and for global economics and politics. China is making strides in fostering cross-border use of the renminbi and building a renminbi-based interbank payments system that can serve as an alternative to SWIFT and Western clearinghouses. However, these remain somewhat limited alternatives—for the moment. The situation could change faster if lent additional impetus by Western sanctions. Thus, countries such as the United States that employ financial sanctions should prepare for the development of alternative financial arrangements in China and possibly elsewhere. This may mean relying more heavily on nonfinancial measures insofar as financial sanctions eventually become less effective.
Topic:
Economics, Sanctions, Finance, Borders, and Banks
Political Geography:
China and Asia

103. How China’s Human Capital Impacts Its National Competitiveness

Author:
Briana Boland, Kevin Dong, Jude Blanchette, and Ryan Haas
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
How will the strengths and weaknesses of China’s human capital impact national competitiveness? China’s efforts to maintain economic growth, strengthen supply chains, develop strategic science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) sectors, and secure a modern military edge hinges on the ability to cultivate and utilize human capital. As the United States and other countries increasingly engage in multidomain competition with China, it is critical to start from a clear-eyed understanding of China’s human capital and Beijing’s strategy for nurturing national talent. Investments in higher education, strategic STEM sectors, and military talent demonstrate key areas in which Beijing is focusing on cultivating human capital. However, China must overcome significant obstacles to innovate as it faces substantial demographic pressures, socio-economic inequalities, and challenges to attracting and retaining top talent both domestically and internationally.
Topic:
Economics, Labor Issues, Human Capital, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China and Asia

104. Bridging U.S.-Led Alliances in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific: An Inter-theater Perspective

Author:
Luis Simon
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Although U.S. strategic competition with China and Russia is often presented as a challenge with two separate fronts, this brief argues that the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theaters are increasingly linked. Insofar as preserving a favorable balance of power in these two regions hinges largely on U.S. power, and as long as they both continue to exercise a significant pressure on U.S. defense resources, their alliance and deterrence architectures should be looked at from an inter-theater perspective. Thus, optimally managing atwo-front challenge would require a serious effort to bridge U.S.-led alliances in both regions.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Hegemony, Alliance, Strategic Competition, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

105. Who Leads China's 5G Technology Ecosystem? A Network Analysis of China's Cooperation on Association Standards

Author:
Won Seok Choi
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
This study suggests who is leading the ecosystem of China's 5G industry through analysis of the association standard network. Our study finds that the Chinese government think tank is in the most important position in the related network. Our study also suggests that it is important to monitor association standards in China and strengthen the standard cooperation of companies, scholars, and institutes in the Korean ICT industry.
Topic:
Government, Science and Technology, Think Tanks, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Korea

106. Analysis of Chinese Response Patterns to Diplomatic Friction and Its Influencing Factors

Author:
Jai Chul Heo
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
As China grows into a global power, it is forming a closer relationship with the international community. In the process, the nation is experiencing increasing levels of diplomatic friction, such as confrontation and conflict with other countries, as well as cooperation. Accordingly, this study analyzes China's response to various forms of diplomatic friction, as Korea seeks an effective response to possible friction with China in the future. More specifically, China's response to diplomatic friction was examined through various cases, with the aim of categorizing China’s response measures based on these examples. In addition, this study aims to prepare for possible friction with China in the future by identifying factors that differ in China's response to diplomatic friction.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Sovereignty, Territorial Disputes, and Economy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Korea

107. China's New Trade Strategy amid US-China Confrontation and Implications

Author:
Sang Baek Hyun, Wonho Yeon, Suyeob Na, Young Sun Kim, and Yunmi Oh
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
In 2021, China has reached the point of entering a new stage of socialist development by declaring the achievement of the goal of building ‘a comprehensive well-off society’. Since the reform and opening up of China, the paradigm of economic and social development is facing the greatest turning point from ‘getting rich first’ to ‘common prosperity’. As the US checks on China intensify during this period of economic transition in China, China is pursuing a new trade strategy to respond to it. In order to understand the changes in the global trade environment in the era of the US-China conflict, it is necessary to understand both the US checks with China and China's trade strategy to respond to them. Most of the recent US-China conflicts are analyzed from the perspective of the US checking in with China, but it is necessary to take a balanced look at what kind of countermeasures China is seeking in order to correctly forecast and prepare for changes in the global trade environment in the future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Global Markets, Trade, and Economic Development
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

108. The Effects of Increased Trade with China and Vietnam on Workers’ Earnings and Job Security in Korea

Author:
Kyong Hyun Koo
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
This study empirically demonstrates that changes in trade structure caused by the rise of China and Vietnam over the last 20 years have had a significant impact on the widening of the income and employment stability gap for Korean workers. An important policy goal for Korea, which is heavily reliant on trade, is to ensure that the benefits of trade and openness are distributed evenly to all classes of society while minimizing the harm. In order to achieve the policy goal, the analysis results of this paper show that it is necessary to institutionalize a systematic process for monitoring changes in Korea's trade structure and preparing response policies from a mid- to long-term as well as a short-term perspective. Furthermore, the results indicate that policy efforts are required to identify blind spots where existing trade adjustment assistance policies, employment insurance systems, and vocational training policies do not adequately protect or support workers, and supplement and improve them. More follow-up research is needed to gain a better understanding of the mechanism by which external trade shocks are transmitted to the domestic labor market in order to develop more effective domestic supplementary measures for trade shocks.
Topic:
Labor Issues, Employment, Inequality, Economy, Trade, and Wage Income
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, Vietnam, and Southeast Asia

109. CHIPS Act will spur US production but not foreclose China

Author:
Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Megan Hogan
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
The CHIPS and Science Act, export controls, and agreements with allied countries will accomplish many of their multiple objectives. More US semiconductor fabrication plants will be built, US R&D will be accelerated, and advanced chips and chip-making machines will be denied to China, Russia, and other adversaries. However, the Act will not make a material difference to US chip supplies in the next two or three years. Slower economic growth has already tipped the chips market in favor of ample supplies. While collective measures have inflicted considerable short-term pain on China, causing a sharp drop in the fortunes of its high-tech firms, China will respond by redoubling its self-sufficiency programs. The United States, however, should not mimic China in pursuing self-sufficiency, as US self-sufficiency is an illusion. The United States currently exports high-value chips and imports low-value chips, so increasing self-sufficiency would require the United States to prioritize basic chip production at the same time it is supposed to be competing with China in advanced chip production. Continuing to prioritize advanced chip production—where the United States has a clear advantage—is the most efficient course of action.
Topic:
Economics, Legislation, Exports, Production, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

110. South Korea should prepare for its exposure to US-China technology tensions

Author:
Mary Lovely and Abigail Dahlman
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
The stated goal of the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) is to create standards that enhance and elevate regional trade and investment flows, but it is clearly aimed at reducing the role of China in global supply chains. As China is Korea’s largest trading partner, US policy discouraging Chinese participation in supply chains has immediate detrimental implications for Korean manufacturers. The United States is the second-most important destination for Korean exports. Given the values of these triangular trade flows, Lovely and Dahlman assess South Korea’s exposure to US demands to remove or reduce Chinese participation in the manufacture of exports destined for the US market. The reliance of the proposed framework on certain standards will likely reduce Chinese participation in IPEF trade networks. Korea may benefit from this trend, but IPEF could also increase production costs for Korean companies, especially in the electronics sector, a problem that would worsen if China retaliates against these companies. To reduce these risks, Korea might find it prudent to reduce its reliance on intermediate goods from China for products it produces for export to the United States. The Korean government should also seek to better understand its exposure to US–China trade tensions and diversify its trade relations. Korean firms should start preparing for supply chain disruptions, perhaps by making investments at home. Korea could also help other IPEF members reduce supply chain disruptions while addressing security concerns over China.
Topic:
Economics, Science and Technology, Supply Chains, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

111. China's CPTPP bid spurs South Korea to act on Asia-Pacific trade pacts

Author:
Jeffrey J. Schott
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
China’s sudden application to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) in September 2021 has broad implications for South Korea’s economic relations with China, Japan, and the United States. In the past, Korea frequently debated but invariably postponed deciding whether to participate in negotiations on the CPTPP, despite the substantial benefits to be gained from doing so. However, China’s application has prompted Korean officials to get off the fence and apply as well. As China moves to deepen its ties to regional partners, Korea needs to follow suit, complementing the ongoing implementation of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) with expedited negotiations to join the CPTPP and participation in the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). Korean participation in the RCEP, CPTPP, and IPEF is desirable and mutually reinforcing and should allow Korea to sustain its strong commercial interests in both the US and Chinese markets.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, Treaties and Agreements, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, South Korea, and Asia-Pacific

112. The Scowcroft Center’s project on twenty-first-century diplomacy

Author:
Jeffrey Cimmino and Amanda J. Rothschild
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
How should US diplomacy adapt for the twenty-first century? The practice of diplomacy has changed drastically over the past several decades, with the return of great power rivalry, the emergence of the new technologies of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR), and the rise of other important developments. Yet, while scholars and strategists have devoted enormous attention to how these new developments affect other domains, such as the future of warfare, they have devoted scant attention to the changing nature of diplomacy. If we believe, however, that diplomacy is a—if not the—most important tool of American statecraft, then twenty-first-century diplomacy deserves the same level of sustained attention. This paper will seek to characterize the changing nature of diplomacy with the objective of helping US and allied diplomats more effectively practice strategy and statecraft. This issue brief considers two key questions. How is the context of twenty-first-century diplomacy different from that of the past? How can US diplomacy begin to adapt for the twenty-first century? In answering the first question, this issue brief will focus on the most salient change in the international balance of power—the rise of China—in addition to the current technological revolution. After outlining how these changes have affected the context in which the United States conducts diplomacy, this issue brief will suggest several proposals to adapt US diplomacy to the twenty-first century. These suggestions will address both how changes in the global context—especially technology—have affected the conduct of US diplomacy and how US diplomacy can best respond to China’s rise and the 4IR.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Organization, Politics, Science and Technology, and Innovation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

113. China’s surveillance ecosystem and the global spread of its tools

Author:
Bulelani Jili
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
This paper seeks to offer insights into how China’s domestic surveillance market and cyber capability ecosystem operate, especially given the limited number of systematic studies that have analyzed its industry objectives. For the Chinese government, investment in surveillance technologies advances both its ambitions of becoming a global technology leader as well as its means of domestic social control. These developments also foster further collaboration between state security actors and private tech firms. Accordingly, the tech firms that support state cyber capabilities range from small cyber research start-ups to leading global tech enterprises. The state promotes surveillance technology and practices abroad through diplomatic exchanges, law enforcement cooperation, and training programs. These efforts encourage the dissemination of surveillance devices, but also support the government’s goals concerning international norm-making in multilateral and regional institutions. The proliferation of Chinese surveillance technology and cyber tools and the associated linkages between both state and private Chinese entities with those in other states, especially in the Global South, is a valuable component of Chinese state efforts to expand and strengthen their political and economic influence worldwide. Although individual governments purchasing Chinese digital tools have their local ambitions in mind, Beijing’s export and promotion of domestic surveillance technologies shape the adoption of these tools in the Global South. As such, investigating how Chinese actors leverage demand factors for their own aims, does not undercut the ability of other countries to detect and determine outcomes. Rather it demonstrates an interplay between Chinese state strategy and local political environments. This paper specifically focuses on key features in China’s surveillance ecosystem, while the companion to this report will focus on the key ‘pull factors’ from African countries and their significance for US interests.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Surveillance, and Public-Private Partnership
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Global Focus

114. How the Chinese government is financing its way to becoming a techno-superpower

Author:
Ngor Luong
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
On October 7, the Biden administration announced a new rule to control exports of advanced-computing semiconductor chips to China. As the United States works to cut off technology and capital flows to China, Beijing’s desire to achieve technological self-sufficiency is greater than ever. In fact, during the 20th Party Congress in the following week, Xi Jinping further pledged self-reliance in technology to gain a competitive edge in the tech competition with the United States. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China has sought technology-focused securitization to build an innovation system that supports its broader economic, societal, and geostrategic goals. In response to the economic impact ranging from the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic to the US-China trade and technology war, the Chinese Politburo unveiled the new “dual circulation” strategy at a Central Financial and Economic Commission meeting in 2020. At its core, dual circulation aims to reduce China’s vulnerability to external shocks, and to increase the country’s self-reliance to better guard against global volatility. The Chinese government works to improve China’s innovation-building capacity by attracting foreign capital and technology know-how in order to maximize their benefits while retaining overall control of the system. Beijing is committed to becoming a state-led and self-sufficient techno-superpower. In doing so, the Chinese government is consolidating its influence in both the domestic market and overseas markets where Chinese firms are active, while simultaneously mobilizing public, private, and public-private investment vehicles to support these tech ambitions. A number of its financial mechanisms have already spanned decades, but others have emerged recently. The decade-long mechanisms have yielded mixed results, while the successes of the new ones remain to be seen. It can thus be expected that the Chinese government will continue to further assert itself in all aspects of the innovation system by providing financial support and political guidance for critical and strategic industries. Within this context, this paper examines the various forms of financing vehicles that involve a range of diverse actors to support China’s whole-of-nation approach in an effort to achieve self-reliance in technology. To conclude, this paper assesses the mechanisms’ successes and shortcomings as well as areas to monitor going forward.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Economy, Business, and Innovation
Political Geography:
China and Asia

115. How China Came to Dominate the Global EV Lithium-ion Battery Value Chain: Lessons and Opportunities for Africa

Author:
Xieshu Wang
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for Business and Development Studies (CBDS), Copenhagen Business School
Abstract:
The electrification of vehicles is accelerating and the global automotive industry is under full transformation. China has become an indispensable partner for EV makers as the only country that has succeeded in building a complete and competitive industry value chain of EV lithium-ion batteries. Top-down government-led policymaking has been an important driver; bottom-up firm-level vertical integration strategy and investments have effectively created a closedloop supply chain. Africa is still at an early stage in this mobility transition. But with its rich deposits of minerals and potential markets, it can become a key player in the global EV value chain, if a favourable ecosystem for the fast uptake of EV and related green businesses could be developed in time.
Topic:
Industry, Global Value Chains, Lithium, Automotive Industry, Batteries, and Electric Vehicles
Political Geography:
Africa and China

116. How Does China’s Industrial Policy Support Specific Sectors?

Author:
Barry Naughton and Tai Ming Cheung
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
The brief summarizes discussions and findings from the workshop on China’s Industrial Policy: Sectors and Resources, which was hosted by the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) with support from the UC San Diego 21st Century China Center, on September 30–October 2, 2022. Held in La Jolla, California on the UC San Diego campus, the workshop examined Chinese industrial policies in the sectors in which China hopes to make the biggest technological leaps, including high-performance computing, artificial intelligence, electric vehicles, solar, robots, aerospace, and biotech. Participants from leading universities, think tanks, and industry, along with U.S. government representatives, shared their research and observations along China’s industrial policy life cycle, from formulation to implementation.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, Science and Technology, and Innovation
Political Geography:
China and Indo-Pacific

117. China and the U.S. Compete for Global Techno-Security Dominance

Author:
Tai Ming Cheung
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
In the struggle for global geostrategic and geoeconomic supremacy between the United States and China, the technosecurity sphere where economics, technological innovation, and national security meet has become a principal battleground. Two contrasting models are pitted against each other: China’s state-led top-down approach and the United States’ market-driven bottom-up system. Which of them will ultimately prevail will depend on how capable, robust, and adept they are in meeting the challenge of rapid and disruptive change? This brief examines the underpinnings of U.S.-China great power technosecurity competition and assesses what the countries’ different approaches imply for future techno-security rivalry.
Topic:
Security, Industrial Policy, Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

118. Lessons for Europe from China’s quest for semiconductor self-reliance

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Pauline Weil
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Semiconductors are a critical input to production of information and communication technology and many other goods. The major economies want to be able to produce chips at home to avoid excessive dependence on supply chains in an increasingly unpredictable world, where trade is being compromised because of national security concerns. China was first in terms of timing and scale of funding to support its its semiconductor industry. Since 2015, China has spent $150 billion upgrading its semiconductor industry. Success, however, has been limited. China’s massive industrial policy effort has been most successful in increasing capacity for assembly of chips, though that is also the least value-added part of the semiconductor supply chain. Progress on chip design and fabrication in China remain underwhelming. The United States has also started implementing its $50 billion package to support the production of chips. The European Union, meanwhile, has not yet fully finalised its main semiconductor initiative, the European Chips Act. China’s experience offers a number of lessons. First, chip fabrication requires massive fixed asset investment and, therefore, large subsidies, but with no guarantee of success. Second, one reason for the underwhelming results of China’s semiconductor policy is US containment, through export controls and other measures. In this respect, the EU should find it easier than China to upgrade its chips industry but, given the costs, focusing on the highest-end part of the supply chain would be the best approach. Assembly and production of lower-end semiconductors already face overcapacity, given the financial resources already invested by China.
Topic:
International Relations, European Union, Economy, Trade Policy, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China and Europe

119. Chinese companies in Arctic mining are gaming the master plan

Author:
Patrik Andersson, Per Kalvig, and Urik Pram Gad
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Looking for Chinese state ownership in Arctic extractive projects misses the point, and politically framed rhetoric from Chinese companies may be misleading. Some Western companies downplay their Chinese relations, but Western companies are often reliant on Chinese partners. In Western media, Chinese companies are sometimes discussed as being parts of a well-oiled state machine. They are not, but neither are they left to fight on their own without any support or guidance. Rather, they follow their own business priorities while eagerly seizing opportunities provided through supportive state policy. Interaction and integration with the state varies between different types of companies. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a complex set of levers which make it possible to secure specific strategic investments. The likelihood of state intervention varies depending on the commodity involved as well as geopolitical factors. However, the preferred mode of governance is to issue general policies that encourage companies to contribute to state objectives.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Business, Global Political Economy, and Mining
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Arctic

120. Myanmar - China´s west coast dream

Author:
John Nielsen
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Myanmar is blessed as well as cursed by its geography. Sandwiched between Asia’s heavyweights, China and India, it is potentially in a favorable position for trade and economic relations with both countries. However, trade and economic relations are secondary to China’s geopolitical and security interests in Myanmar. China´s main objective in Myanmar is to gain access to the Indian Ocean through Myanmar and gain control over a dual-use deep-sea port in Kyauk Phyu on Myanmar´s west coast. Another priority for China involves managing the stability of the two countries´ 2,000 km shared border. The porous border region has for decades played host to armed conflicts and is also the center of a billion- dollar drugs production and trafficking network. China regards Myanmar as forming part of its neighborhood, an extension of its national interests, and is extremely sensitive to any western engagement along its borders.
Topic:
Sovereignty, Geopolitics, Coup, Strategic Interests, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Southeast Asia, Myanmar, and Indian Ocean

121. The impacts of the pandemic on investment flows in BRICS countries: a preliminary analysis based on UNCTAD global investment reports

Author:
Ana Garcia, Rafaela Mello, Victor Fernandes, Maria Eduarda Lopes, João Carmino, and Felipe Queiroz
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
BRICS Policy Center
Abstract:
In 2020, with the advent of the pandemic, the lockdown and social isolation actions implemented by governments in order to contain the contagion of the virus had an impact on the economies, reducing the speed of execution of existing investment projects and hindering the prospect of new ones. In this sense, the flow of direct investments around the world fell by 35% in 2020, reaching US$ 1 trillion, compared to US$ 1.5 trillion in the previous year, according to UNCTAD. Based on this observation, the present research aims to understand the main trends around the investment flow related to the BRICS countries, in order to assess how the Covid-19 pandemic impacted the dynamics of investments in the world, and especially, in emerging economies. To this end, the reports produced by UNCTAD from 2019 to 2022 regarding global investment flows were analyzed, in order to understand how the scenario was before the pandemic and what dynamics were underway before the health crisis, but it also allowed to understand what transformations occurred with the course of the pandemic, in addition to signaling paths and trends for the future.
Topic:
Economy, Investment, COVID-19, BRICS, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:
Russia, China, India, South Africa, and Brazil

122. The Taiwan Factor: Why Is China seeking a larger military might?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Chinese President Xi Jinping, who is also the head of Central Military Commission, told the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held from October 16 to October 22, to speed up efforts to modernize the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to transform it into a world-class military. He also underscored the need for winning regional wars.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Conflict, Borders, Strategic Interests, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

123. The Third Term: Messages from China’s CCP’s national congress to the US

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held from October 16 to October 22, is the most significant event in China. The event only happens twice every decade, but this particular Congress is extraordinarily important. President Xi Jinping secured an unprecedented third five-year term in power, breaking with the party’s rule of not allowing a sitting leader for more than two successive five-year terms in office. The rule was established by former president Deng Xiaoping and was enshrined in the country’s constitution which was later amended by president Xi in 2017.
Topic:
Economy, Domestic Politics, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

124. Geoeconomics of Polarisation: Can BRICS eclipse western global economic power?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The 14th BRICS summit concluded on June 24 amid Western sanctions on Russia and rising tension between China and the US over Taiwan. The two-day event took place via video and was hosted by Beijing.
Topic:
Economy, BRICS, Polarization, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, India, Taiwan, South Africa, Brazil, and United States of America

125. Managing Risks in the EU-China Economic Relationship

Author:
Claudia Schmucker and Guntram Wolff
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
As the German Chancellor heads to Beijing – the first visit by a G7 leader since the pandemic began, Germany and the EU must reevaluate their approach to China, especially after the recent Communist Party Congress further cemented a system of uncontested authoritarian power. European unity is critical in dealing with China. Russia’s war in Ukraine has exposed Germany’s energy dependency and many Western companies have had to leave Russia. To be prepared for a possible escalation of geopolitical tensions with China, Germany needs to draw lessons and review critical dependencies and corporate risks. Better corporate risk management, a diversified trade policy, and a targeted industrial policy are necessary to manage economic risks.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, European Union, Trade, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

126. Don’t Get Caught in the Middle: A Geo-Economic Strategy for Germany to Survive US-Chinese Rivalry

Author:
Markus Jaeger
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The economic fallout from the war in Ukraine has been very significant. The consequences of a war in East Asia involving the United States and China would be much worse. And even if a Sino-US military confrontation can be avoided, geo-economic conflict between the two powers is going to intensify. Washington will put increasing pressure on Germany and Europe to align their policies with Washington’s geo-economic strategy.
Topic:
Economics, Strategic Competition, Rivalry, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, Germany, North America, and United States of America

127. Ending the Destructive Sino-U.S. Interaction Over Taiwan: A Call for Mutual Reassurance

Author:
Michael D. Swaine
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Recent years have witnessed steadily rising hostility and suspicion between the United States and China over each other’s approach vis-à-vis Taiwan. The unprecedentedly aggressive Chinese military exercises in response to U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taipei this year indicated that the continued downward spiral in Sino-American relations over Taiwan would increasingly expose Washington and Beijing to risks of repeated crises with a potential of a dangerous armed conflict. This brief lays out the policy steps necessary to reverse this spiral of escalation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Crisis Management, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

128. The Worsening Taiwan Imbroglio: An Urgent Need for Effective Crisis Management

Author:
Michael D. Swaine
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
A severe diplomatic or military crisis over Taiwan is the issue that poses the greatest risk of war between the United States and China. Worryingly, the risk has increased in recent years with the deepening Sino-American rivalry amid intensifying conflicts of interest vis–à–vis Taiwan. Washington and Beijing must recognize the cycle of confrontational deterrence that drives it and take urgent measures to stop it. If the United States and China fail to take measures of mutual reassurance, the two countries will continue on the path to confrontation over Taiwan. This is particularly likely if their overall bilateral relationship continues to deteriorate. While acknowledging the likelihood of such a dangerous scenario, this brief affirms the need to improve crisis management on the Taiwan issue, outlines the major problems and limits of existing crisis management efforts, and offers concrete recommendations for improving the ability of both Washington and Beijing to more effectively manage future crises over Taiwan, as well as Sino-American crises in general.1
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

129. A Restraint Recipe for America’s Asian Alliances and Security Partnerships

Author:
Michael D. Swaine and Sarang Shidore
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
As Sino–American relations deteriorate, risks of conflict between Washington and Beijing are growing. A major war would be terrible for both the United States and the region while setting back critical goals, like the fight to stop climate change. Avoiding a war while safeguarding vital U.S. interests ought to be a priority. But while many in the United States want to strengthen alliance structures as a means of deterring China and to make Taiwan a de facto security ally, those who espouse a strategy of Restraint believe this approach endangers Americans and undermines their prosperity. A policy of Restraint is predicated on the view that alliances are not ends in themselves, but a means of bolstering U.S. security. This brief analyzes the utility of America’s Asian alliances and security partnerships from a Restraint perspective under two scenarios. The first and preferred scenario is that of the United States and China walking back from their current march toward confrontation to achieve a stable, if still significantly competitive, relationship. The second and more likely scenario is a much sharper and sustained rivalry with China becoming a regionally strong, possibly in many ways dominant, power.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Partnerships, and Alliance
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, East Asia, Asia, and United States of America

130. How to Engage and Prevail in Political Warfare against China

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In his report to the Twentieth National Congress of the Communist Party in October, Xi Jinping praised the progress made over the past decade under his leadership to advance the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation domestically and internationally. According to Xi, this is taking place in an era of “momentous changes of a like not seen in a century [and which] are accelerating across the world.”1 For Xi, these “great changes” comprise “a significant shift [that] is taking place in the international balance of power, presenting China with new strategic opportunities in pursuing development.”2 A pillar of Xi’s plan to realize the rejuvenation of China and to emerge as the preeminent nation in the region and beyond is to shrink the strategic, military, economic, political, and normative ground in the region on which the United States can sustain, build, and demonstrate its power and influence. This is because China knows there is no material or nonmaterial counterbalance without the US. Additionally, the more China can weaken the resolve of US allies and other countries to support American-led initiatives to counter China and the credibility of the US-led alliance system, the smaller and weaker the ground for Washington to maintain its footholds in distant lands becomes, and the closer China draws to its goal of preeminence. The Chinese plan relies on building unmatched “comprehensive national power,” or CNP, which China can use to seduce, compel, or coerce other nations.3 CNP has material and nonmaterial elements. Regarding the latter, Beijing places enormous emphasis on political warfare in the form of information and influence operations. The first three memos in this series on Chinese political warfare argue that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) makes no distinction between wartime and peacetime and believes it is engaged in a perpetual “struggle” against the West.4 Regarding political warfare, the previous memos noted that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) plays a central and often dominant role in leading doctrine and operations when it comes to informational and influence warfare.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

131. Mapping China’s Participation in Multilateral Development Institutions and Funds

Author:
Scott Morris, Rowan Rockafellow, and Sarah Rose
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
China has emerged as a leading participant in multilateral development organizations. In many ways, this is a welcome development. Today’s global challenges, including COVID-19 and climate change, require an international response and have prompted renewed calls for increased multilateral engagement by the major economy countries. This, combined with the recognition of multilateral institutions’ high standards for transparency and environmental safeguards, have led the United States at times to encourage China to step up its multilateral contributions. At the same time, countervailing voices focused on strategic competition increasingly view China’s multilateral participation with skepticism. When the People’s Republic of China joined the World Bank in 1980, it was allocated 12,000 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) shares, becoming the Bank’s sixth largest shareholder with 3.47 percent of the of the voting power. By 2013, decades of rapid economic growth had propelled China to its current position as the IBRD’s third largest shareholder, eclipsing France, Germany, and the United Kingdom with 5.03 percent of IBRD voting power. In many ways, China’s rise in stature at the IBRD mirrors its growth in influence across the multilateral development system. This is certainly true of China’s increasing voting share in the World Bank, IMF, and UN system, all of which tie financial contributions to economic size (see Figure 1). But China’s growing importance in the multilateral system is also the product of distinct policy choices made by the Chinese government. These policy choices go beyond the wealth-based financial contributions that dictate IBRD shareholding to include voluntary financing, borrowing, and commercial contracting. In concert, they make China a unique player in the multilateral system by virtue of to its simultaneous roles as a multilateral organization donor, shareholder, aid recipient, and commercial partner.
Topic:
Development, International Cooperation, Multilateralism, and Participation
Political Geography:
China and Asia

132. Collateral benefits? South Korean exports to the United States and the US-China trade war

Author:
Mary Lovely, David Xu, and Yinhan Zhang
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
This Policy Brief assesses the extent to which the United States increased its imports from South Korea after the US imposition of tariffs on Chinese exports. Korea benefited from this shift in US imports, although the increase was relatively small in most sectors. The authors use highly disaggregated US import and tariff data to examine adjustments in US purchases of manufactured goods from its trade partners. Their analysis indicates that Korea made a small gain in the US market following the levying of US tariffs on Chinese exports, with Korea’s share of overall US manufacturing imports rising 0.9 percent and its share of US manufacturing imports subject to trade war tariffs rising 1.0 percent. Gains were spread across a variety of manufacturing sectors—such as wood products, textiles and apparel, and machinery—reflecting both the choices made by US officials regarding which Chinese exports to tax and the nature of preexisting trade relationships between South Korea and the United States.
Topic:
Markets, Economy, Trade Wars, and Exports
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

133. How the rest of the world responds to the US-China split

Author:
Hung Tran
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The election of Joe Biden as the forty-sixth US president is not expected to change the list of substantive issues dividing the United States and China, such as trade, investment, technology, geopolitical competition, national security, and human rights—except that the priority among them may change, with human rights concerns moving more to the forefront. However, the tone and modality of the unfolding of the US-China competition will change from Donald Trump’s unilateralism to Biden’s efforts to build alliances with “likeminded” countries in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere to deal with the challenges China has posed. In a way, Biden’s alliance-building approach may intensify pressure on the rest of the world to take sides. How countries respond to this challenge, unwelcome by most, depends on whether they see themselves as competitors to China, or as “price takers” in the international economic system.
Topic:
Global Markets, Regulation, Finance, Economy, Trade, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

134. A strategic framework for countering China’s human-rights violations in Xinjiang

Author:
Jeffrey Cimmino
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
China is engaged in a systematic campaign of repression against predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in northwest China. Through a combination of detention camps, mass surveillance, birth suppression, and other means, China is responsible for gross human-rights violations. In recent years, the international community has devoted an increasing amount of attention to China’s actions in Xinjiang. Earlier this year, the United States declared that Beijing’s behavior constituted genocide. More recently, the United States and several key partners announced multilateral sanctions on Chinese officials facilitating repression in the region. To build on these developments, the United States and its allies and partners should adopt a more strategic approach to addressing China’s human-rights abuses. This Issue Brief proposes a framework for such a strategy, articulating a multilateral approach for dealing with China’s repressive actions in Xinjiang. This Issue Brief argues that addressing China’s abuses in Xinjiang is of strategic importance. Ultimately, the goal of this strategy is to achieve an end state in which China has ceased its repressive activities; however, even if achieving this objective proves elusive, imposing costs on Beijing’s actions in Xinjiang can still serve broader strategic ends vis-a-vis China. China has chosen an assertive path to attaining global power and influence, and decades of economic growth and incorporation in the global economic system have not been enough to transform Beijing into a responsible stakeholder in a rules-based international system. The United States and its allies and partners will need to impose costs on Chinese behavior that violates international norms. Imposing costs on China’s human-rights violations in Xinjiang is a critical element of a broader strategy to dissuade Chinese Communist Party (CCP) behavior that undermines international norms and to push Beijing toward becoming a cooperative member of a rules-based international system.
Topic:
Human Rights, International Organization, Politics, Sanctions, Economy, and Uyghurs
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Xinjiang

135. Trusted connectivity: A framework for a free, open, and connected world

Author:
Kaush Arha
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Global affairs are increasingly shaped by three important and overlapping trends: 1) the unprecedented and growing demand for trillions of dollars’ worth of global digital and physical infrastructure; 2) the ideological battle between democracy and autocracy for the best path forward to achieve peace and prosperity; and 3) the world’s response to changing climate. As democracies address the global demand for a free, open, and connected world while ensuring that local and global emissions targets are met, they need an organizing framework: the concept of “trusted connectivity.” Democratic governments and institutions function with intricate checks and balances to ensure public trust. Unchallenged aggregation of power is antithetical to democracies and instinctively distrusted by their citizens. While holding unimaginable promise, today’s advancements in digital and physical infrastructure also embody new opportunities for malign actors in general, and authoritarian governments in particular, to accumulate and wield this power. Malign influence or control over data, communications, trade routes, energy, and transportation, all of which becomes possible when countries accept infrastructure investments from authoritarian states, could open potential vectors for coercion, disruption, or attack in times of crisis or conflict. In order to deny malign actors this influence over other countries’ infrastructure, democracies need to work together to ensure that the benefits and terms for the host country in building a bridge, port, rail, road, or telecommunications network are equitable and transparent, thereby leading to greater trust and security in addition to economic prosperity. US President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., rallied the world’s leading democracies behind this cause at the Group of Seven (G7) summit in June 2021 in Cornwall, England. The G7 nations, comprising the world’s leading free economies and free societies, proclaimed that, as they aim to meet global infrastructure demand, among other goals, their efforts will be guided by shared democratic values. For China, the standard-bearer of an alternate, illiberal model, infrastructure investment serves a different purpose: to increase China’s global economic leverage for its political gain. To prevail in this competition, advance their values, and develop much-needed digital and physical infrastructure, the world’s leading democracies should adopt the principle of trusted connectivity.
Topic:
National Security, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, and Connectivity
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

136. The Special Role of US Nuclear Weapons

Author:
Matthew Kroenig
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
This issue brief is based on Dr. Matthew Kroenig’s written testimony at a hearing on “Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Strategy” before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee of the United States Senate, conducted on June 16, 2021. US nuclear weapons play a special role in underpinning international peace, global security, and the US-led, rules-based international system. The nuclear threat to the United States and its democratic allies is growing: nuclear-armed, revisionist, autocratic powers (Russia, China, and North Korea) are relying more on nuclear weapons in their strategies, and they are modernizing and expanding their arsenals. In this new issue brief, the Scowcroft Center’s Matthew Kroenig explains why the United States needs to retain a robust, flexible, and modernized nuclear force to meet its national security objectives.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Missile Defense, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

137. Nuclear priorities for the Biden administration

Author:
John Harvey and Robert Soofer
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
How can the administration of President Joseph R. Biden both address the deteriorating international security environment and follow through on campaign promises to reduce the role of nuclear weapons? Former nuclear deterrence policymakers John R. Harvey and Robert Soofer, from Democratic and Republican administrations, respectively, contend in this issue brief that the Biden administration can address the increasing nuclear threat to the United States, meet its commitment to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, and maintain bipartisan support for US nuclear policy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Nonproliferation, Missile Defense, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

138. Subsidising Balkanisation: What China’s 3G Subsidies Teach us about 5G Open RAN

Author:
Hosuk Lee-Makiyama
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Open RAN is increasingly becoming the answer to how to diversify 5G networks and beyond, especially in the light of a potential exclusion of China’s participation in western networks. In recent times, the US and Japan have jointly pledged $4.5 billion to support its development. Much – or perhaps entirety – of this support is predesignated for the O-RAN Alliance, a closed-door and private industry consortium. State interventionism is back – in a sector hereto characterised by open western markets and free competition. The public support currently pledged to the O-RAN consortium bear many resemblances to the Chinese government’s attempt to support TD-SCDMA, a unique standard for the Chinese market that was designed to support local vendors. Its use was a pre-condition for public subsidies for R&D or public procurement. As recent as 2020, the US Trade Representative reported on China’s standard-setting practices and subsidies as one of the world’s worst trade barriers. Those who advocate similar support in the West are either indifferent or nescient about how EU and US trade negotiators worked to address subsidies and opaque standard-setting. It is an open question whether the US and Japan will offer a level-playing field to European vendors – or non-O-RAN members who may develop their own Open RAN variants. Nowadays, Chinese scholars and senior officials openly talk of “TD-style innovation” as a disaster for the nation that delayed China’s rollout of 4G and plunged the economy into a performance and innovation lag. A key lesson for policymakers today is how vendors that cannot survive without subsidies will not optimise the organisation for innovation but public grant-seeking. This is an eerie warning for the 5G debate in some western capitals.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Digital Economy, 5G, and Subsidies
Political Geography:
China and Asia

139. China’s Public Procurement Protectionism and Europe’s Response: The Case of Medical Technology

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Anna Guildea, Oscar Guinea, and Philipp Lamprecht
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
This paper concerns China’s market for medical technologies and how the Chinese state is assisting its own companies to gain greater sales at the expense of producers from Europe and other advanced manufacturing economies. The medical technology sector captures a variety of products, services and solutions which are essential to the provision of healthcare to citizens. Examples range from fairly simple technologies such as sticking platers, to complex ones, such as coronary stents, orthopaedics and pacemakers. In the last decades, Europe’s exports of medical devices to China have grown robustly. On the back of vibrant innovation, firms from Europe and elsewhere have not just followed the growth of Chinese demand for medical devices – they have also increased their share of Chinese imports. Now, however, this market is at risk of being gradually closed off for European firms as China doubles down on various policies that advantage local firms, while ultimately harming innovation and Chinese patients. China has recently introduced a new element in its industrial policy for its medical technology sector – a policy that builds on its long-term ‘made-in-China’ ambition to have local firms taking up the lion’s share of the market for medical devices by 2030. Beijing and provincial governments are using many different policies to provide support to the domestic industry and are in effect pursuing a policy for import substitution. Accessing the Chinese market for medical devices has never been easy but it has become increasingly challenging in recent years. Direct financial support, tax benefits, R&D support, local content requirements, opaque approval systems and other forms of advantages to domestic MedTech producers are now becoming major sources for the behaviour and development of the Chinese medical device market. China’s Fourteenth Five-Year Plan and the country’s new economic model of ‘dual circulation’ reinforces this trend. The Chinese market is becoming less open. Added to that is centralised state procurement – a new public procurement policy in China that was launched in 2019 for medical devices which has led to a grossly distorted procurement market. While this policy has reduced the price of medical devices in a drastic way, it has also paved the way for Chinese firms to take up a larger market share. This procurement policy is gradually squeezing European firms out of the Chinese market. Competition in China is becoming less fair. These policies follow a pattern. In several sectors, Chinese firms have grown their domestic market share through industrial subsidies and policies that restrict market access for foreign firms – or make it more difficult for foreign firms to compete in China. From their domestic market, these firms have then expanded abroad and taken a more prominent role outside of China. Backed by the Chinese state, these firms can squeeze market opportunities even more for otherwise-competitive European producers. Now this development is happening in the MedTech sector. It is urgent for Europe to respond to China’s procurement protectionism. MedTech manufacturers in Europe are often small and medium-sized enterprises, and they already struggle with getting into the Chinese market. China’s new procurement policy has also had a significant impact on Chinese imports of medical devices: a 1.3 billion euro trade deficit for China in medical technology products in 2019 turned into a 5.2 billion euro surplus in 2020. In Africa, Asia and Latin America, competitive European manufacturers are now confronted with competition from Chinese MedTech companies that have the backing of the Chinese state. The competitive distortions in the Chinese market now spill over to the global market – making European MedTech manufacturers even more disadvantaged. Europe should consider a case at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) against China’s policies which reduce European market presence for medical devices. Once agreed, a new International Procurement Initiative might be a useful instrument to wield pressure against the Chinese government to agree to free and fair competition. Europe can also negotiate with China – for instance in the framework of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) or through the new initiative on trade and health that Europe proposed to the Ottawa Group in 2020. These responses should focus both on remedying China’s current policy for growing its domestic medical technology industry by distorting its market and setting out the core policies and rules that should guide the future market for medical technologies. Fredrik Erixon and Anna Guildea are Director and Research Associate, respectively, at ECIPE. Oscar Guinea and Philipp Lamprecht are Senior Economists at ECIPE. The authors are grateful to a number of experts in the private sector and from the European Commission, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy in Germany, China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology that have taken their time to share their knowledge with us.
Topic:
Health, Science and Technology, European Union, and Public Procurement
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

140. U.S. Security Ties With Korea and Japan: Getting Beyond Deterrence

Author:
Stephen Haggard
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
Japan and Korea—the United States’ two key allies in Northeast Asia—are both advanced industrial democracies facing similar constraints from a rising China and a nuclear North Korea. One would think that trilateral cooperation would be a cinch. Yet Japan and Korea have been at each other’s throats over simmering historical issues and differing approaches to China. Forging a trilateral alliance is highly unlikely. But strengthening cooperation is possible by focusing less on the military components of the alliance—i.e., providing extended deterrence—and more on new issues such as 5G, artificial intelligence (AI), and infrastructure, which can strengthen collective capabilities and make cooperation more appealing.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Security, Nuclear Power, Innovation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Japan, China, North Korea, and Indo-Pacific

141. Why the U.S. Should Prioritize Security in Its 5G Roll Out

Author:
James Lee
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
5G technology promises to transform practically every sphere of life, from smartphones and self-driving cars, to remote surgery and virtual reality. Policies related to the rollout of 5G in the United States have tended to focus on mitigating security risks, but does protecting security come at the cost of expanding U.S. global influence—or does it simply cost too much? This policy brief by IGCC postdoctoral research associate James Lee analyzes the three main criteria for deciding what a “good” 5G policy should look like—security, global influence, and efficiency— and recommends that the United States’ 5G strategy prioritize security first, influence second, and efficiency third.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, International Security, Innovation, Strategic Competition, 5G, and Power
Political Geography:
China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

142. A Crucial Link: Using Intellectual Property to Inform Global Supply Chain Policy

Author:
Philip C. Rogers
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic, coupled with trade tensions and technological competition between the United States and China, have severely disrupted global supply chains. As businesses and policymakers grapple with “building back better” in a tense trade environment, they face the dilemma of balancing the traditional benefits of global production with the security demands of new geopolitical realities. This policy brief, part of a series on great power competition, highlights the productive role that intellectual property (IP) can play in navigating supply chain disruptions resulting from great power competition in a post-pandemic world. Rather than reinforcing the vicious cycle of techno-nationalist confrontation, it is possible for businesses and policymakers to promote virtuous cycles of competition with a more robust focus on intellectual property. Specifically, businesses and policymakers can look to IP licensing and allocation of rights to play a key role in tariff mitigation strategies and supply chain restructuring. At the same time, competitive pressures can lead to enhanced IP regimes in China and other economies, which argues for a more nuanced discussion of supply chains beyond physical relocation and economic decoupling.
Topic:
National Security, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Innovation, Strategic Competition, COVID-19, Supply Chains, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
China, Global Focus, and United States of America

143. The One-China Policy: Adapting to Tensions in the Taiwan Strait

Author:
James Lee
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
Tensions are growing in the Taiwan Strait. Chinese warplanes have violated Taiwan’s air defense identification zone in record numbers, prompting fears of an invasion.1 2021 was the first year in which a potential crisis over Taiwan rose to the level of a “Tier 1 risk” in the Council on Foreign Relations’ Preventive Priorities Survey, which is an annual survey of American foreign policy experts.2 The United States faces a decision about what it can do to help prevent crossstrait tensions from escalating into war. A vital question is whether, and how much, the United States should change its “One-China policy.” Beginning with the Trump administration and continuing with the Biden administration, the United States has bolstered its support for Taiwan and become more assertive in resisting Beijing’s claims of sovereignty over the self-governing democracy.3 Although U.S. officials stress that the United States continues to adhere to the One-China policy, there is growing concern, as expressed by Daniel Russel of the Asia Society Policy Institute, that the United States is “edging closer and closer to the line that separates unofficial relations with official relations, which, in effect, could hollow out America’s One-China policy.”4 How much flexibility is built into the One-China policy, and what limits does the policy impose on what the United States can do to support Taiwan? To answer those questions, this policy brief explains what the One-China policy is and how it can exhibit both continuity and change. Analysis of the One-China policy often focuses on the Three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six Assurances, which can create the impression that the One-China policy has not changed since those texts were formulated in the 1970s and 1980s.5 In fact, the One-China policy has been revised, such as in the Taiwan Policy Review during the Clinton administration.6 The One-China policy is neither set in stone nor completely fluid, and this policy brief identifies which elements are fixed and which elements are variable. It explains the OneChina policy at three levels: the fundamental position, the doctrinal statements, and the practices and conventions. These levels of policy range from the most abstract to the most concrete, but each is logically consistent with the others.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Security, Strategic Competition, and One-China Policy
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

144. A new direction for the European Union’s half-hearted semiconductor strategy

Author:
Niclas Poitiers and Pauline Weil
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
A basic component in electronic devices, semiconductors are essential to the production of many products, from smartphones to cars. Securing reliable supplies of semiconductors to safeguard the production lines of a range of industries has thus become an important policy goal, especially in the context of an increasingly confrontational international environment in which high-technology leadership is also associated with military power and geopolitical reach. The semiconductor sector is highly concentrated, capital- and R&D-intensive, and particularly exposed to bottlenecks and political risks. High-end chip fabrication is centred in Asia, dominated by the duopoly of Taiwan’s TSMC and South Korea’s Samsung. In other parts of the supply chain, companies in the United States and Europe hold relative monopolies that have been leveraged for trade sanctions. The United States has taken steps to block the supply of chips and components to emerging tech giants in China, and to contain China’s ambitions of building its own cutting-edge chip production capacities. Heavy United states and Chinese investment poses a challenge to the European Union, which in response has set the goal of increasing European production beyond domestic demand. To increase its presence in this strategic and thriving sector, the EU needs a more targeted strategy that builds on its existing strengths while accommodating its relatively low domestic needs. Instead of investing public funds in a subsidy war over fabrication capacity, the EU should focus on inputs and chip design. However, no economy can hope to fully achieve independence in the sector and ensuring sustainable supply through diplomatic means should therefore also be a priority. Lastly, Europe’s small role in global semiconductor production is symptomatic of shortcomings in the European environment for high-tech innovation. These shortcomings should be addressed.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Economy, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

145. Xi Jinping’s Evergrande Dilemma

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Evergrande is one of the top-two real estate developers in a still highly fragmented Chinese sector. Its main strategy is to achieve ever-increasing scale (rather than profitability) in order to move ahead of and crowd out commercial competitors. It has also amassed the largest land reserves of all Chinese developers, which were financed through massive borrowings. By 2018, Evergrande held 822 pieces of undeveloped land in 228 cities, with a planned gross floor area of 3.28 billion square feet of new homes—the equivalent of 10 percent of Germany’s entire housing stock. It paid $75 billion just for this undeveloped land. Although Evergrande’s market share is only around 4 percent, its borrowings stand out. Its current balance sheet liabilities amount to an estimated 2 percent of China’s gross domestic product (GDP), while its off-balance-sheet liabilities could be another 1 percent of China’s GDP. This makes Evergrande the most indebted property developer in the world. Burdened by this debt, struggling to meet its debt interest and repayment obligations, and viable only if property asset values and sales continue to increase, Evergrande faces possible financial collapse—an event bound to have flow-on effects for the Chinese economy. However, the unusually high global interest in Evergrande has arisen because its woes are increasingly seen as symptomatic of those faced by the broader Chinese economy, which is struggling with enormous levels of indebtedness and overreliance on the real estate sector. Debt held by nonfinancial institutions in China increased from about 115 percent of GDP in 2010 to around 160 percent of GDP currently. This is the most rapid and largest increase in a 10-year period for any major economy and makes the level of debt held by Chinese nonfinancial institutions one of the highest in the world. The real estate sector accounts for around 15 percent of GDP, while property services account for another 14 percent—the highest in any developing economy. The share of the real estate sector as a proportion of GDP was only about 4 percent in 1997 and 9 percent in 2008. Since 2008, up to a third of all domestic fixed investment has gone into real estate, and up to half of total national debt is linked to the real estate sector.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Debt, Economics, Markets, and Business
Political Geography:
China and Asia

146. Genocide in Xinjiang: Centering Uyghur Human Rights in US Policies Toward China

Author:
Nury Turkel
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Acts of genocide are currently underway against the Uyghur people in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of northwestern China, also known as East Turkistan. As part of a campaign of persecution and cultural eradication, Chinese authorities have, according to former detainees and prisoners, subjected millions of Uyghurs and other minorities to rape, torture, forced labor, arbitrary detention, involuntary abortion and sterilization in state-run facilities, and the separation of around half a million Uyghur children from their families. Although both Republicans and Democrats in the United States have acknowledged these horrifying acts as genocide, the rest of the world has been slow to follow, whether because they find the evidence to be inconclusive or because they are reluctant to antagonize China. Regardless, now that the Biden administration is on record declaring the actions of the Chinese government to be genocide, the United States has a legal and moral obligation to do what it can to end the mass atrocities that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is committing against the Uyghur people. While both the Trump and Biden administrations and Congress have already taken steps to address this human rights disaster, more can and should be done to defend the Uyghur people, address their humanitarian needs, promote accountability, and ensure that individuals and entities within the United States—including private businesses—are not complicit in the abuses underway. A strong response to the ongoing genocidal campaign would send a powerful message to Beijing that America will not tolerate efforts to destroy ethno-religious groups, either as a whole or in part. Conversely, failure to act would render the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (which the United States ratified in 1988) and its implementing legislation null and void. Through the three Cs—competition, confrontation, and cooperation—the Biden administration can act in coordination with US friends and allies abroad to end these atrocities. The Biden administration is now on record as recognizing this repressive campaign as genocide, a move that must trigger a response toward Beijing that departs from business as usual. Although China’s significant global influence supports the assumption that effective levers to influence its behavior with respect to human rights issues are lacking, international attention and pressure have already caused Beijing to backpedal to a certain degree. This attention and pressure resulted from US-led efforts to rally international support coupled with US legislative and executive responses, including sanctions, visa restrictions, and trade restrictions. This policy memo outlines the nine areas of action that, performed in coordination with complementary actions of partners and allies, could alleviate the Uyghur human rights crisis, pressure China to reverse course, and ensure that the West and corporate America are not complicit in genocide.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Genocide, Human Rights, and Religion
Political Geography:
China, Asia, United States of America, and Xinjiang

147. Winning the Geo-Tech Battle and Building the Quad Alliance in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Eric B. Brown, John Lee, and Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Under Xi Jinping, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has established as its paramount geopolitical objective the replacement of the free and open, rules-based order in Asia with an alternative world order, one that is to be dominated by the interests and values of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This decision presents a danger to the entire world, not just to any one state or group of states. For, as US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said at the March 2021 US-PRC meeting in Alaska, the alternative to a rules-based order “is a world in which might makes right and winners take all, and that would be a far more violent and unstable world for all of us.” In furtherance of its objectives, the PRC is in the midst of a large military build-up, but there is much more. For today’s CCP, political power grows not only from the “barrel of the gun,” as Mao Zedong once put it, but also from cutting-edge technologies. Thus, while Beijing pours billions into artificial intelligence and surveillance tech to impose its new “digital totalitarianism” inside the PRC, from Hong Kong to Xinjiang, it is also using its growing technological prowess to press its larger geopolitical agenda in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. It is weaponizing technology and connectivity, along with trade, finance, and other policy instruments to try to rule the key technologies and industries of the future, as well as to improve its strategic positioning and acquire political power over other countries—for instance, through its bid to dominate other nations’ most sensitive data networks, or via the export of its suite of “social stability” technologies, i.e., the “techno-tyrant’s toolkit.” In all this, the CCP’s intent is to entrench its power and Leninist norms and practices to the extent it can do so beyond the PRC’s borders, and to make other nations, or at the least their ruling elites, beholden to it. So in addition to the PRC’s militarily destabilizing activities in the West Pacific and incursions into India’s Himalayas, there is also a “geo-technological front.” If Xi’s CCP succeeds at enmeshing other countries in its expanding “PRC sphere of technological influence,” it could unlock and be able to exploit decisive military, economic, diplomatic, and ideological advantages.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Economics, and Alliance
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, East Asia, and Asia-Pacific

148. The Chinese Communist Party’s Economic Challenge to the Free World

Author:
Miles M. Yu
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The Chinese economy and the philosophical roots of China’s system have greater implications for the United States economy than many assume. The one critical fact to understand about the People’s Republic of China is that it is a communist dictatorship ruled by a Marxist-Leninist party. The Party is dedicated to maintaining and strengthening its monopoly on all powers in the world’s most populous country and to mounting the most serious challenge to the free world since the Cold War. This policy memo will examine the Chinese economy’s distinct traits, how it operates, and why it thrives under a monopolistic government that exploits and challenges the global free market system, along with possible policy recommendations for the United States and its allies. Unlike most other communist countries, China has been afforded the benefits of a global free-market system and enjoys largely open access to international trade, capital markets, and advanced technologies. The paradox of a communist nation fully participating in a largely capitalist system has enriched and strengthened the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), to the point where Beijing poses a mortal threat to the United States and to the international free market economic system that has enabled the rise of the communist state. The West played a role in creating the current state of play. But too many conversations in the United States focus only on our own strategic thinking. In his historic speech at the Richard Nixon Library in July 2020, former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo aptly described the situation and how we got here: “Our policies—and those of other free nations—resurrected China’s failing economy, only to see Beijing bite the international hands that were feeding it.” As President Richard Nixon admitted in his later years, his initiative to open up China in 1972 might have created a Frankenstein.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Communism, Economics, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

149. The Atrocities Against Uyghurs and Other Minorities in Xinjiang

Author:
Nury Turkel
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
This memo is adapted from Nury Turkel’s testimony before the US House of Representative’s Committee on Foreign Affairs’ hearing on May 6, 2021, “The Atrocities Against Uyghurs and Other Minorities in Xinjiang.” He testified on behalf of the Uyghur Human Rights Project.
Topic:
Human Rights, Politics, Religion, Repression, Uyghurs, and Freedom
Political Geography:
China and Asia

150. A Just Response to Beijing’s COVID-19 Abuses

Author:
David Asher, Miles M. Yu, David Feith, Matthew Zweig, and Thomas DiNanno
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Nearly 18 months after word of a deadly new virus began leaking out of Wuhan, China, the Chinese government’s response remains fundamentally hostile to international cooperation and transparency. Despite hundreds of offers of assistance, polite diplomatic entreaties, and demands for access to data by governments and health authorities across the globe, the world still knows far too little about COVID-19’s origin. As in a Dali painting, the clocks have melted but time has not stood still. China’s initial silencing and censoring of its doctors and scientists, followed by misinformation about COVID-19’s dangers—especially denials concerning the virus’s ability to be spread human-to-human, invisibly and asymptomatically—helped cost the world trillions of dollars and millions of lives. Whether one believes COVID-19 originated in a zoonotic host, a bat cave, a frozen food shipment, or a Wuhan lab’s dangerous “dual-use” research supporting undeclared bioweapons programs, the world needs answers from the Chinese Communist Party. These are answers Beijing won’t provide unless it faces a high price for refusing. For the good of public health and international security, the Biden administration and the Congress can unite in a coordinated, long-term response.
Topic:
Security, Health, Research, Transparency, Public Health, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia

151. Recommendations to Congress Concerning the Investigation into SARS-CoV-2's Origin

Author:
Thomas DiNanno
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
On May 26, 2021, President Biden announced that he had tasked the US Intelligence Community (IC) with providing a definitive review of SARS-CoV-2’s origins within 90 days, and that deadline is fast approaching. On the same day, CNN reported that the Biden administration had shut down another investigation into possible Chinese government dual-use biological programs being conducted at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) and its associated facilities. This investigation, which was being conducted by the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC), had been initiated by Secretary Pompeo’s State Department in 2019, and its purpose was to answer the following questions: What role, if any, did the Chinese government’s virus research program play in its biological weapons program? Under the Biological Weapons Convention, any use and development of capabilities with potential dual uses (civilian and military) must be for peaceful purposes. Did this virus research program and the spread of SARS-CoV-2 represent a further Chinese violation of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)? Following the completion of the 90-day review, Congress should, over the short term, request that the AVC Bureau continue the investigation into SARS-CoV-2’s origin that President Biden interrupted and re-assigned to the Intelligence Community. In contrast to the US IC, the Bureau’s sole function is to assess other nations’ compliance with their international arms control obligations and, moreover, has the legal mandate to do so. Additionally, this memo contains recommendations concerning the US government’s compliance-and-verification function over the long term that would support policymakers and allow it to effectively fulfill its Congressional mandate.
Topic:
Health Care Policy, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Global Health
Political Geography:
China and Asia

152. Europe's China Chimera

Author:
Peter Rough
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
When Xi Jinping, the chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), dreams of global domination, he worries about one thing above all else: a hostile United States backed by its allies—and on the Eurasian landmass, the US has no more important ally than Europe. As a result, Xi has worked to weaken the transatlantic alliance through a two-pronged economic stratagem. First, under the guise of globalization, China has insinuated itself into the European economy, creating dependencies. Second, Beijing is manipulating those dependencies to hollow out and supplant Europe’s advanced economies. To give this deception cover, China has built a vast political network across Europe, from basic sympathizers to outright spies. Until recently, barely anyone took notice, but the financial crisis and forever wars of the past two decades, culminating in the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States, lured the self-confident Xi out into the open. During the coronavirus pandemic, China revealed an aggressive attitude toward Great Britain’s former colonies that shocked the United Kingdom. In the span of mere months, London shifted from cooperation to confrontation. In July, it became the first country in Europe to block the Chinese telecommunications giant, Huawei, from its next-generation networks. Germany, the continent’s most important country, still sees China as key to post-pandemic recovery and economic growth, however. Xi has exploited this attitude to strike an investment agreement with the European Union (EU), the chief purpose of which is to forestall a transatlantic approach under the new US president, Joe Biden. Together, the United States and Europe have unparalleled advantages against any competitor. Now is the time for cooperation, before Xi’s dreams become our collective nightmare.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

153. A US-India Trade Agenda for the Biden Administration

Author:
Aparna Pande and Husain Haqqani
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The US ought to counteract the influence of Chinese authoritarianism early and often. One relatively low-cost way is to encourage India to engage more deeply as a competitor with China in the global economy. A democracy since its independence in 1947, with a population about the same as that of China, India is that country’s natural rival in Asia. Beginning with India’s decision in 1990-91 to liberalize its economy, the nation has gradually opened its vast market to global trade. Fueled by fresh access to foreign capital and technology, India’s economy grew over six percent during the first decade of the 21st century. In May 2014, this progress was further advanced by the election of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. For the first time in India’s history, a conservative administration had a clear parliamentary majority, making it possible to legislate foundational, market-positive reform. India has adopted a new insolvency and bankruptcy code and replaced multiple taxation regimes across its states with a federal goods and services tax, which is welcome. But India has done little to end its excessive protectionism. Its distrust of foreign corporations, a legacy of colonial rule, endures. Indian policy makers may believe that the US is so eager for Indian competition with China that Washington will grant them a pass on restrictive trade and investment policies. But there is a better choice. India is nowhere near its full economic potential, and the fix isn’t complicated. The Biden agenda for India should encourage India to lower tariffs, to remove barriers to foreign retail, to roll back unnecessarily restrictive data privacy rules, and to provide economic incentives for foreign investment.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, and United States of America

154. US Support for Australia and the Region Against PRC Coercion: A Six Point Agenda

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Since around 2016, Australia has been transitioning away from a “small target” hedging mindset toward a more proactive countering and balancing approach vis-à-vis the People’s Republic of China. This is largely a response to the increasingly assertive and coercive activities of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which is the predominant cause of instability, uncertainty, and anxiety in Canberra and throughout the Indo-Pacific region. The CCP has implemented a sustained and cascading array of economic and diplomatic punishments against Australia in an attempt to intimidate Australia and force changes in Australian policy. Beijing is explicit that this is the purpose of the ongoing series of punishments against Canberra. In November 2020, its embassy in Canberra went to the extraordinary lengths of releasing the infamous “14 grievances” against the Australian government[i] to justify the ongoing punitive measures. These included mainly domestic Australian policies such as restrictions on Chinese investment, the funding of Australian think tanks critical of the PRC, the passing of foreign interference legislation to root out Chinese interference in Australian institutions, and the banning of Chinese firms from the Australian 5G telecommunications roll-out. Australia is widely seen as the proverbial canary in the mine and needs American support. If Australia can hold its ground and continue to find the courage and creativity to pursue its national interest, then the PRC will suffer an enormous blow. On the other hand, if Australia is eventually cowed by the PRC and relents on key policy settings, then other sovereign nations might well lose the courage to stand firmer against the PRC’s coercion and intimidation. Strengthening the fortitude of Australian leaders is the assurance that the United States is behind its ally. That assurance was previously given to Canberra by the Donald Trump administration and has been continued by the Joe Biden administration. Indeed, the Biden administration has declared it will go further and do better than the previous administration in reinvigorating and deepening its alliances and friendships with Indo-Pacific nations to better manage the PRC challenge and threat. This brief has been prepared to assist the Biden team in doing just that. It gives some context to Australia’s evolving Indo-Pacific strategy: how a nation that is not a superpower is thinking about the PRC’s policies and activities in the region, why Canberra is taking proactive and forward leaning actions to counter and balance the PRC, and what Canberra is hoping will be some priority areas for the Biden administration with respect to the Indo-Pacific approach and strategy by the US.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Joe Biden, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
China, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

155. China’s grand industrial strategy and what it means for Europe

Author:
Frederico Mollet
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
In its 14th Five-Year Plan, China has mapped out a grand economic and industrial strategy that upends many of the assumptions that underpin the EU's approach - how can the Union respond? With this new plan, the EU can expect tougher competition and greater protectionism in its economic relations with China. A further blurring of the public-private sector distinction in the country's economic model will make it harder to combat unfair Chinese competition. And while China is actively courting foreign investment, it is also signalling greater protectionism to products not made in China, which will lead to European investors' and exporters' interests diverging. To balance the scales, the EU should adapt its own strategy by: continuing to develop trade instruments to combat unfair competition at home and abroad; ensuring that these instruments and institutions can respond to unfair competition from private companies benefiting from state capital investment; ensuring that the extensive and often opaque government holdings in private firms are reflected in foreign direct investment and export controls; incorporating China's attempts to reconfigure supply chains into its own assessment of strategic dependencies, identifying areas that could become vulnerable; prioritising the improvement of access to the Chinese market for goods and services produced in Europe; developing alternative sources of growth, and boost demand and reduce barriers within the Single Market to offset greater Chinese protectionism; and ensuring that its industrial policy efforts will enable European industry to match China's developments. The present moment may mark a turning point in EU–China relations: in a little over three months, an agreement on an investment treaty was followed by sanctions and countersanctions. Geopolitical conflict ratchets up between China and the US. Beijing's new economic course will reshape its global relationships. China's protectionist turn and growing one-sided dependencies will threaten Europe's long-term strategic autonomy and undercut any attempts to construct a balanced approach to EU–China relations. If the EU's multi-track strategy is to work, a concerted effort is required to preserve economic parity and balance between the two powers.
Topic:
International Relations, Political Economy, European Union, Grand Strategy, Industry, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

156. China's Ties with Southeast Asia : From Green Shoots to Sustained Recovery

Author:
Kensuke Tanaka
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
China's rebound happened relatively quickly owing to a large extent to timely macroeconomic policy responses to the crisis. Lagging somewhat behind China, most Southeast Asian countries have now entered the transition from recession to recovery. Some export-dependent Southeast Asian countries shifted their export destination to China to benefit from its early recovery. This switch of export destination to China illustrates China's important role in leading the recovery of the region. Enhancing regional macroeconomic co-operation would help reduce vulnerability of the region and ensure a sustained recovery. Regional macroeconomic co-operation remains at an early stage in Southeast Asia, but possibilities for further co-operation should be explored.
Topic:
Development, Economics, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Economic Recovery
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Southeast Asia

157. Chinese Intentions in the South China Sea

Author:
Oriana Skylar Mastro
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:
What are China's intentions in the South China Sea? In The 2020-21 Wilson China Fellowship: Essays on the Rise of China and Its Implications, Oriana Skylar Mastro uses a two-part analytical framework to outline why she believes China is trying to establish de facto control over the South China Sea. This means sovereignty over the disputed islands and the ability to dictate the rules of behavior in the surrounding waters. These intentions are detrimental to U.S. and allied interests. Mastro goes on to provide a list of recommended measures the United States can take to prevent Beijing from incrementally advancing its control over the South China Sea
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Strategic Interests, and Territory
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South China Sea

158. Mitigating the Risk of a China–India Conflict

Author:
Arzan Tarapore
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:
The Ladakh crisis between China and India seems to have settled into a stalemate, marked by somewhat reduced tactical tensions and continuing fruitless talks on disengagement—but its trajectory could again turn suddenly, even flaring into a limited conventional war. Despite a limited disengagement, both sides continue to make military preparations near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to increase their readiness for potential conflict. While China proved its revisionist intent with its 2020 incursions, its specific goals and plans remain opaque. The broader political context is marked by distrust and hostility, and bilateral relations are at their lowest ebb in decades. War remains unlikely—both sides can ill-afford the distraction from higher national priorities and have demonstrated a recent keenness to step back from the brink. But, with growing capabilities and unclear intent, and with military operations no longer impaired by winter, the Ladakh crisis may still escalate to conflict. The crisis has been full of surprises. Despite observing major military maneuvers in China, India didn’t anticipate the multiple incursions across the LAC in May 2020. For weeks thereafter, the Indian Army leadership insisted the incursions were nothing out of the ordinary. After both sides agreed to an early disengagement plan, the crisis took a shocking turn with a deadly skirmish in June — the first loss of life on the LAC in 45 years. India also mustered its own surprises, deploying troops to occupy tactically valuable heights in late August, to gain some bargaining leverage. And the crisis also abated with a surprise, with the sudden announcement of disengagement from heavily militarised stand-off sites around Pangong Tso Lake in February 2021. Future surprises may yet occur. This paper argues that the risk of China–India conflict is significant because, even if its likelihood is low, its consequences may be considerable. A limited conventional war would be likely to impose significant costs on India, but, depending on the reactions of its partners, it may also reinforce latent Indian suspicions over the utility and reliability of its strategic partnerships. In that way, even a localized limited war on the LAC may have far-reaching implications, if it incidentally drives a wedge between India and its partners in the Quad. Mitigating that risk will require sound policy settings and astute diplomatic and public messaging from Canberra, Washington, Tokyo, and other like-minded capitals. The remainder of this paper is in three parts: first, why a border war is plausible; second, what costs it would impose on India and how it might stir distrust of India’s Quad partners; and, finally, a framework to mitigate those risks.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, Risk, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia

159. Military Competition With China: Harder Than the Cold War?

Author:
Oriana Skylar Mastro
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:
Dr. Oriana Skylar Mastro begins her paper by emphasizing that U.S. national defense strategy has characterized the US-China relationship as one of great power competition (GPC). Both the US and China have existing relationships in the Indo-Pacific region and are undergoing efforts to foster new relationships there as well. China’s efforts, however, conflict with US military efforts to promote peace, strategy, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific, making them much harder to achieve. Mastro argues that it will be difficult to deter China’s efforts — perhaps even more difficult than it was to deter the Soviet Union’s efforts during the Cold War. She cites the geography of the Asia-Pacific (compared to that of Central Europe), the US’s ongoing struggle to establish a credible deterrent, China’s range of options for nonlethal but effective uses of force, and the lack of US willingness to grant China a parallel sphere of influence to that in which the Soviet Union was allowed to control as evidence to support her claim. Thus, Mastro recommends that the US must avoid relying on the same Cold War tools and competition strategies in its competition with China, despite their success in the past. Instead, the US needs to combat the threat posed by China through 1) convincing China that the costs of using force outweigh the benefits and 2) forging a counterbalancing coalition of allies and partners that are confident that the US will not only protect them from a military attack but other costly behaviors (e.g., economic coercion, diplomatic isolation) that China may leverage against them as well.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

160. Defending 2020: What Worked, What Didn’t, and What’s Next

Author:
Jessica Brandt and Bradley Hanlon
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The 2016 presidential election served as a wakeup call to the threat of authoritarian interference, and in the years since, many segments of American society—from the federal government to private companies and civil society groups—have taken valuable steps to prepare for and counter it. Congress and the Executive Branch stood up a new government agency and multiple coordinating bodies to protect election infrastructure, while social media platforms have instituted policies to restrict the manipulation of advertisements, label misleading and false content, and slow the spread of disinformation. Working together, civil society instituted new cross-sector coordination mechanisms for election security. Yet longstanding vulnerabilities—including crippling political polarization and underfunded election jurisdictions—persist. A series of high-profile failures to prosecute the solicitation of foreign interference in U.S. elections further threaten to solidify a dangerous new norm. Meanwhile, the threat landscape is growing more dynamic. New actors, including China and Iran, have taken an interest in adopting elements of Russia’s information manipulation playbook. And that playbook is itself evolving. In 2020, Russia and Iran took active steps to influence U.S. voters, engaging in information operations—at times augmented by cyberattacks—to denigrate candidates, sow chaos and division, and reduce trust in democratic institutions.1 New players, including Cuba, Venezuela, and other, non-state actors also took steps to influence voters and attack election infrastructure.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Authoritarianism, Elections, Disinformation, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, and United States of America

161. Decoupling Europe

Author:
Gabriel Felbermayr, Steffen Gans, Hendrik Mahlkow, and Alexander Sandkamp
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic revealed the vulnerability of international value chains in the face of global shocks. This has triggered a political discussion regarding a possible reshoring of vulnerable supply chains back home. The aim is to reduce dependencies on foreign suppliers and thus improve crisis resilience of the domestic economy. The debate is also rooted in the growing dependence on Asian suppliers and the colliding political and ideological systems between China and the West. Unilateral decoupling of the EU from China (a doubling of trade costs) would reduce real income in the EU on average by 0.8 percent. In terms of GDP in 2019, this equals a permanent loss in real income of 131.4 bn EUR. Should China retaliate, real income would fall by 1.0 percent (170.3 bn EUR). With its extremely interconnected economy, real income in Germany would even decline by 1.4 percent (48.4 bn EUR). China would also lose from such a trade war, with real income declining by 1.3 percent. Should the EU increase its trade barriers against all its non-European trading partners, real income in the Union would fall by 3.5 percent or 584.3 bn EUR in case of a unilateral increase and by 5.3 percent or 873.1 bn EUR in case the rest of the world responds by also raising trade barriers.
Topic:
Economics, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Economic Cooperation, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Europe

162. China's Blockchain and Cryptocurrency Ambitions: The First-mover Advantage

Author:
Alice Ekman
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
China was initially cautious in the development and application of blockchain technology. Among the technology’s best-known attributes are the relative anonymity and immutability of the information, as every blockchain transaction has a digital record and signature that can be identified, validated, stored and shared. This technology could therefore become a double-edged sword for the Communist Party of China (CPC), as it goes against the government’s efforts to censor content it considers sensitive and, in more general terms, efforts to assert its cyber-sovereignty. However, after at first observing the emergence of blockchain technology with concern, China’s central government has increasingly seen it as an opportunity, as has been the case with most emerging technologies. Since the launch of the 13th five-year plan in 2016 and the release of the first White Paper on Blockchain Technology and Application Development by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology the same year, the CPC has increasingly considered that blockchain could become an economic, political and geopolitical asset for the country, if ‘guided’ well. China has continued to shape its positioning on and conceptualisation of blockchain technology on a regular basis over the last 5 years: the China Blockchain Industry White Paper (1) was published in 2018, another White Paper entitled Blockchain Technology Application in Judicial Evidence Storage was published in 2019 (2) and the 14th five-year plan (2021–2025), released in March 2021, also refers to blockchain and cryptocurrency (see timeline diagram on page 7) (3). China’s unique approach to blockchain is conditioned precisely by this paradox, stemming from the decentralised nature of the technology and the highly centralised nature of the Chinese political system. While blockchain technology is essentially decentralised, regulations in China have aimed to guarantee state control over its development and application. As part of this dual policy, which is analysed in the first part of the Brief, the Chinese government has launched its own digital currency – the digital yuan. At the same time, it dislikes bitcoin, which relies on a truly decentralised type of blockchain. Although blockchain is best known for being the technology behind cryptocurrency, the Chinese government’s approach towards blockchain is very comprehensive, going far beyond cryptocurrencies. It promotes application of the technology in a variety of fields, ranging from energy conservation to urban management and law enforcement, and has strong ambitions to become the world leader in the field. In October 2019, China’s President Xi Jinping, speaking at a study session for members of the Politburo, declared that he wanted the country to be a ‘rule-maker’ on blockchain, suggesting that this technology will increasingly become a key arena in the country’s race against the United States for technological supremacy (4). Blockchain has become a fast-growing sector in China over the last two years. But is China likely to succeed in the global promotion of an alternative form of blockchain? This Brief answers this question by analysing the development of different applications at national level, before and during the Covid-19 pandemic, but also the emergence of international cooperation on blockchain and cryptocurrency.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cryptocurrencies, and Blockchain
Political Geography:
China and Asia

163. China's Data Strategy: Creating a state-led market

Author:
Camille Boullenois
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
In 2019 and 2020, the European Union, the United Kingdom and the United States issued strategy papers on data governance acknowledging the importance of data to their economic development and national security. With different emphases, four competing objectives dominate these data strategies: innovation (using data to create new business models and boost economic growth); security (ensuring that sensitive data is not used by a hostile foreign power); privacy (protecting citizens from abusive use of personal data); and surveillance (using data to monitor and control citizens’ and companies’ behaviour). In the past two years, China has been defining its own data strategy and governance regime and, while juggling the same four competing objectives as its Western counterparts, is taking an innovative approach. While the specific data governance framework is still being debated among scholars, policymakers, industrial lobbyists and state institutions, local pilot regulations on data and stakeholders’ public positions have already hinted at its future characteristics. This Brief aims to shed light on these debates over China’s emerging data governance framework. It starts by describing the objectives of the framework, then summarises the debates around the new data rights that Chinese policymakers are establishing and analyses China’s first local pilot regulations defining those rights. The Brief then focuses specifically on health data to illustrate how China'sdata governance regime is designed to work. Finally, the Brief gives an overview of the challenges that China’s data governance framework presents for EU governments and companies. Ultimately, China’s data governance regime will have important implications for the protection of EU citizens’ data and creates a risk of data protectionism. It is therefore crucial that the EU understands early enough the direction that China is taking, so that it can respond appropriately.
Topic:
Governance, European Union, Transnational Actors, and Data
Political Geography:
China and Asia

164. Strategic Foresight in Chin: The other missing dimension

Author:
Paul Charon
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Over the last few decades, analysis of international relations and strategic issues has developed rapidly in China, both within the Chinese Communist Party– state apparatus and in think tanks and universities. However, the richness of this field of study is in stark contrast to the absence of any real open reflection on the question of foresight. If, like other nations, China is committed to understanding the world in which it is evolving and to identifying possible changes, the function of foresight has not been conceptualised or institutionalised to the same degree as in the West. Foresight analysis in China is marked by several salient features: firstly, it remains almost non-existent in Chinese institutional frameworks dedicated to the analysis of international relations; secondly, the concepts of the ‘black swan’ and the ‘grey rhino’ have made a significant breakthrough, particularly in economics, before being cannibalised and politicised by the Party; and thirdly, the reading of the horizon remains essentially informed by the Party’s vision, fears and obsessions.
Topic:
International Relations, Political Parties, Domestic Policy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China and Asia

165. Russia's Redefined View on Strategic Stability: A Security Dilemma in Northern Europe?

Author:
Jyri Lavikainen
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Te concept of strategic stability has traditionally been associated with a stable nuclear relationship between leading nuclear powers, the US and USSR/Russia. Teir last commonly agreed defnition of the concept in 1990 formed the basis of the START negotiations, defning strategic stability as a nuclear relationship, where neither side has an incentive to attempt a disarming strike. In 2016, Russia and China suggested replacing the concept of strategic stability with ‘global strategic stability’ by arguing that the conventional defnition of strategic stability as a military category concerning only nuclear weapons was outdated.1 Instead, they seek to redefne strategic stability as a concept con- cerning the state of great-power relations, with both political and military categories, the military category being the focus of analysis in this paper.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Conflict, Strategic Stability, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

166. China’s Foreign Policy at the Centennial of the Communist Party: Prestige Above All

Author:
Jyrki Kallio
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Chinese external and internal politics have manifested increased ideologization in recent years, presumably laying the groundwork for the Communist Party’s 100th anniversary this year. The trend is likely to continue at least until the completion of the 20th Party Congress in 2022. In China’s foreign policy, this ideologization has taken the form of increased emphasis on the realization of China’s “Grand Rejuvenation” and heightened sensitivity to anything that might stand in its way. This is in line with the Party’s historical narrative emphasizing the “century of humiliation” and the ensuing efforts to curb China’s rise. The resulting prestige-driven foreign policy has proved harmful to China’s external image. An easing of Chinese politics may thus be conceivable once the Party has left the current sensitive times behind to its satisfaction. Countries with vital economic ties to China, and which depend at the same time on continued US support in security policies, have little choice but to continue tightroping for a few more years at least.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Hegemony, Conflict, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
China and Asia

167. Fish and ships: Chinese fishing and Europe’s Indo-Pacific strategy

Author:
Frédéric Grare
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
The fisheries sector has become a central geopolitical issue in the Indo-Pacific. China is a major cause of the problems in the industry, thanks to the size of its fleet and the tonnage of its captures. China also contributes to the erosion of ocean governance through its participation in illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. Beijing instrumentalises its fishing fleet for geopolitical gain, as evidenced by its policy on the South China Sea. These predatory fishing activities threaten Europe’s geopolitical and geo-economic interests, as well as its attempts to protect marine biodiversity. Europe cannot be a bystander on the issue; it should develop a more proactive policy on fisheries.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Fishing, Strategic Interests, and Biodiversity
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

168. What Europeans think about the US-China Cold War

Author:
Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
A majority of European citizens believe a new cold war with both China and Russia is under way – but they mostly do not think that their own country is involved. Most believe the US is already taking part in these confrontations, and they consider EU institutions as more likely than their own governments to be in a cold war with China and Russia. An optimistic interpretation sees the outsourcing of such great-power competition to Brussels as the arrival of a true EU foreign policy – but a more pessimistic analysis sees a gap emerging between Brussels on the one hand and member state capitals and EU citizens on the other. This difference in views between whether one’s own country is taking part in the brewing conflict, as opposed to whether America and the EU are, suggests there is no European public consensus that the world of tomorrow will be one of growing competition between democracy and authoritarianism. Given this risk, policymakers should find a different, less ideological, framing to generate public support for a strong transatlantic alliance.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cold War, Authoritarianism, European Union, Democracy, Alliance, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

169. Geo-tech politics: Why technology shapes European power

Author:
Ulrike Franke and José I. Torreblanca
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
New technologies are a major redistributor of power among states and a significant force shaping international relations. The European Union has for too long seen technology primarily through an economic lens, disregarding its implications for its partnerships and for its own geopolitical influence. If the EU wants to be more than a mediator between the two real technological powers, the United States and China, it will need to change its mindset. For the EU and its partners, the vulnerabilities created by battles over technology divide into two types: new dependencies and openness to foreign interference. The EU and its member states need deeper engagement with the geopolitical implications and geopolitical power elements of technology. This engagement has an external element of reaching out to partners and an internal element of ensuring close cooperation between the EU and its member states.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

170. Built to order: How Europe can rebuild multilateralism after covid-19

Author:
Anthony Dworkin
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
The pandemic has brought forward a new agenda for multilateralism, focused on areas including global health, economic recovery, climate, technology, and trade. In trying to promote global cooperation, the EU must take account of competition with China and other illiberal powers across these areas. The EU should pursue a twin-track strategy, seeking to revitalise institutions that include rival powers while promoting deeper cooperation with like-minded countries. Europe should launch an initiative to build up global vaccine manufacturing and encourage the free movement of medical goods, and set up a ‘preparedness club’ of countries committed to transparency in their health systems. The EU should look for ways to coordinate with China on climate and global debt, while focusing on work with its liberal partners on technology and human rights.
Topic:
European Union, Multilateralism, Trade, Vaccine, COVID-19, and Global Health
Political Geography:
China and Europe

171. Home advantage: How China’s protected market threatens Europe’s economic power

Author:
Agatha Kratz and Janka Oertel
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
China’s vast yet protected home market has allowed some of its firms to acquire a scale that provides them with significant advantages when they compete in other markets. These firms are able to undercut European companies both in the EU and around the world, including in sectors key to Europe’s future economy and security, from energy to telecommunications. The EU urgently needs to incorporate the concept and reality of this ‘protected home market advantage’ into its thinking on China. Europe can defend its own industries by adopting an integrated policy approach, working with like-minded partners around the world, and even prising open closed parts of China’s domestic market. The EU should also look to enhance its single market – both as a defensive measure and a way to improve its strategic sovereignty.
Topic:
Markets, European Union, Economy, Business, and Industry
Political Geography:
China and Europe

172. Network effects: Europe’s digital sovereignty in the Mediterranean

Author:
Matteo Colombo, Federico Solfrini, and Arturo Varvelli
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Undersea internet cables are critical infrastructure as important as gas and oil pipelines, and are becoming a focus of growing geopolitical competition. Throughout the EU’s wider neighbourhood, geopolitics influences states’ decisions about who is allowed to build internet infrastructure and where they can do so. China and the US differ in their approaches, but both are racing ahead of the EU in their influence over internet infrastructure and the states that depend on it. The EU has the ambition and potential to become a sovereign digital power, but it lacks an all-encompassing strategy for the sector, in which individual governments are still the key players. The EU should set industry standards, help European telecommunications companies win business abroad, and protect internet infrastructure against hostile powers.
Topic:
Infrastructure, European Union, Geopolitics, Internet, and Digital Sovereignty
Political Geography:
China, Europe, United States of America, and Mediterranean

173. The crisis of American power: How Europeans see Biden’s America

Author:
Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Most Europeans rejoiced at Joe Biden’s victory in the November US presidential election, but they do not think he can help America make a comeback as the pre-eminent global leader. Europeans’ attitudes towards the United States have undergone a massive change. Majorities in key member states now think the US political system is broken, and that Europe cannot just rely on the US to defend it. They evaluate the EU and/or their own countries’ systems much more positively than that of the US – and look to Berlin rather than Washington as the most important partner. There are geopolitical consequences to American weakness. A majority believe that China will be more powerful than the US within a decade and would want their country to stay neutral in a conflict between the two superpowers. Two-thirds of respondents thought the EU should develop its defence capacities. There is a great chance for a revival of Atlanticism, but Washington cannot take European alignment against China for granted. Public opinion will have a bigger effect on the relationship than it once did, and needs to be taken into account.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Public Opinion, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

174. Artificial divide: How Europe and America could clash over AI

Author:
Ulrike Franke
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Artificial intelligence is a rapidly advancing field that policymakers everywhere are struggling to keep up with. Calls for international, and particularly transatlantic, cooperation are growing. In Europe, interest in strengthening “ethical” AI policy is particularly strong – including as a way of making Europe more attractive than other jurisdictions around the world. Close cooperation between Europe and the US is not a given: Europe sees the US as its main competitor in AI; the US wants to join forces against China on AI, but European interest in such a front is weak. The non-combat military realm may be a good area for transatlantic AI cooperation.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Artificial Intelligence, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

175. Decade of patience: How China became a power in the Western Balkans

Author:
Vladimir Shopov
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
China has become the most prominent third actor in the Western Balkans. The country’s activities are spread unevenly across the region, but they follow a common approach. This approach is marked by China’s wide-ranging efforts to establish itself in key economic areas and to gradually position itself as an indispensable actor. China is slowly transforming its interactions with Western Balkans countries in sectors such as culture, media, and politics into long-term and institutionalised relationships. As European and US ambivalence towards the Western Balkans persists, the region will be in increasing danger of falling into an endless spiral of competition between various foreign actors. Western policymakers should address the widening developmental gap between the region and the EU through initiatives such as targeted investment plans in energy and infrastructure, sectoral integration frameworks, and the frontloading of EU law in the accession process.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Infrastructure, European Union, and Investment
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Eastern Europe, Balkans, and United States of America

176. The evolution of US strategic priorities

Author:
Carl Bildt
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
The Biden administration’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance reflects an evolution in US strategic thinking and policy priorities. The document shows how the administration intends to shift away from America Alone and towards America and its Allies. But the optimism and confidence the US expressed in 2015 has been replaced by deep concern over a range of strategic trends. The US will now prioritise strategic competition with China, a new approach to trade, the rise of technology, the defence of democracy, the urgent climate and health crises, and efforts to avoid ‘forever wars’ in the Middle East.
Topic:
Climate Change, Health, Science and Technology, Democracy, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

177. China vs. US: The Green Energy Race

Author:
Katharine Klačanský
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
In her policy paper, Katharine Klačanský, Research Fellow at EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, discusses the role of climate in geopolitics and provides an overview of the Chinese and American green investment plan and its implications for the future of fossil fuels.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Geopolitics, Green Technology, and Fossil Fuels
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

178. The EU and China: Sanctions, Signals, and Interests

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Sanctions are much easier to use against your allies than against your enemies. A friend will want to stay in your good books, and is much more likely to modify his behaviour than an adversary, who will probably just harden his resolve to outdo you. The Trump administration liberally used sanctions against allies in Europe and Asia, who did not exactly cave in but did not want things to escalate either.1 The US trade war with China, on the other hand, cost both sides dearly, without resolving anything. In a coordinated move with the US, the UK, and Canada, the EU has adopted sanctions against four Chinese officials and one entity for violating the human rights of the Uighur people in Xinjiang province.2 That is fully legitimate: as a union of democracies, the EU has a moral duty to speak up for human rights everywhere. But are sanctions the most effective way of doing so?
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Sanctions, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

179. How 2400 Pages of Tech Industrial Policy will change Transatlantic Relations

Author:
Tobias Gehrke
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The currently 2400-page long ‘US Innovation and Competition Act’ making its way through Congress is about one thing only: China. But it also signals a much broader shift in American geoeconomic strategy towards tech industrial policy which matters just as much for Europe. To avoid major rifts, tech industrial diplomacy will need to become a staple of transatlantic affairs.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, Science and Technology, Transatlantic Relations, Industry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

180. How to Think About the China-Russia Partnership

Author:
James Sherr and Frank Jüris
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Since the conclusion of the Treaty on Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation in 2001, the balance of power between China and Russia has appreciably shifted in favour of the former, but their common definition of the enemy and the complementarity of their core interests remains as strong as it ever was. If the China-Russia relationship is not an alliance, then what is it, and what are its limits? In the Xi-Putin era, apprehension and ambition have transformed the ‘axis of convenience’ into an axis of necessity. But will ‘strategic partnership’ prove important or irrelevant to potential conflicts in Taiwan, Belarus or Ukraine? How much should be made of divergences of approach in Central Asia and the Arctic, where China’s rise leaves no stone unturned? To what extent will Russia continue to welcome the growth of China’s power — to the point of nuclear parity with the United States and, by extension with Russia itself?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Geopolitics, Alliance, and Emerging Powers
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Taiwan, Asia, Arctic, and United States of America

181. A New World Order, According to Beijing

Author:
Nadège Rolland
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
After seven decades of liberal order and three decades of American unipolarity, it may be difficult to imagine that the current rules-based international system, supported by liberal norms and values and organised around a set of multilateral institutions, could eventually give way to something radically different. But in Beijing, political and intellectual elites have engaged in intense discussions about building a new world order. This latest brief of China Awareness Series casts light on this discussion and outlines the emerging contours of vision and strategy pursued by China in building a new world order.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, International Affairs, Unipolarity, Emerging Powers, and International System
Political Geography:
China and Asia

182. #NATO2030: Towards a NATO China Strategy

Author:
Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO’s search for a common, cohesive strategy towards China is among the challenges most likely to reveal deep fractures between the positions of the Allies. In the second of our series of policy briefs intended to shed light on some of the issues related to the Alliance’s further adaptation, Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova of the Latvian Institute of International Affairs examines the Allies’ public statements on China to find the common ground that might form the backbone of a NATO Strategy for China, and the differences between them that still need to be addressed.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, and Alliance
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

183. China’s Technological Rise: Implications for Global Security and the Case of Nuctech

Author:
Didi Kirsten Tatlow
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
China under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is poised to become the world’s first technology enabled totalitarian superpower. No country will be untouched by this development, including Estonia, where a Chinese state-owned technology company Nuctech specialising in “security solutions” monitors cargo crossing the NATO border with Russia using a radiation-based technology originally copied from Europe. A clear understanding of the Chinese political system shows why there is fundamental cause for concern in all this, and why Chinese technology should not be viewed as politically neutral.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:
China and Estonia

184. Enhancing South Asian Nuclear Dialogues: The Implications of Covid-19

Author:
Petr Topychkanov
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
Before the global spread of Covid-19, nuclear-armed China, India and Pakistan lacked official diplomatic exchanges to address nuclear weapon-related issues. The pandemic then halted even unofficial dialogues between these countries, which had existed in various bilateral and multilateral formats. As a result, China, India and Pakistan are faced with the challenge of keeping a desirable level of predictability concerning each other’s nuclear postures and capabilities. This SIPRI Policy Brief explores ways of dealing with this challenge and enhancing nuclear dialogues in South Asia. It considers both longer-term developments in the region and the recent implications of Covid-19. The paper finds that bilateral dialogue remains more feasible than trilateral dialogue between China, India and Pakistan. Nevertheless, it argues that these countries may need to address specific issues in broader formats. Emphasized by the Covid-19 crisis, such issues notably include emerging technologies and autonomy. On the one hand, these technologies support diplomacy digitalization, allowing nuclear-armed states to use online and mixed formats to develop nuclear dialogues between them. On the other hand, if applied in the military area, these technologies may affect nuclear postures and capabilities, and contribute to military escalation.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Power, Disarmament, Nonproliferation, COVID-19, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, South Asia, and India

185. Trojan Dragons? Normalizing China’s Presence in the Arctic

Author:
Bryan J. R. Millard and P. Whitney Lackenbauer
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Many Arctic narratives cast suspicion on China, based on concern that the Asian power will seek to undermine the sovereignty of Arctic states and co-opt regional governance mechanisms to facilitate access to resources and new sea routes to fuel and connect its growing global empire. This paper focuses on China’s Arctic maritime capabilities to analyze and infer possible Arctic interests of this self-declared “near-Arctic” state. Do Chinese state officials mean what they say about the Arctic, or are they using the cover of polar scientific research and thinly veiled language in an attempt to normalize their presence and advantageously position themselves? Assuming that acceptance of China’s presence – or at least apathy to it – serves as a necessary precondition to access and exploit Arctic resources, the authors deduce how Chinese scientific research reflects and fits with the country’s regional interests and its global commercial, resource extraction, and power projection goals. After producing a timeline of key inflection points in Chinese academic and official discourse, the authors analyze the activities of Chinese icebreaker Xue Long and the 11 Chinese national Arctic research expeditions (CHINARE). They conclude that China has successfully used its scientific community as an instrument to normalize its presence in the region for skittish Arctic nations. This is consistent with China’s “near-Arctic state” narrative, thus laying the foundation for the broader strategic goal of accessing the region and exploiting its resources.
Topic:
Natural Resources, Maritime, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Arctic

186. Lithuania, China and EU lawfare to counter economic coercion

Author:
Steven Blockmans
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
Without any formal notification, China recently declined customs clearances for shipments from Lithuanian firms in the pharmaceutical, electronics, and food sectors, and warned multinationals of secondary sanctions if they did not sever their ties with Lithuania. These covert actions were taken in response to Lithuania’s invitation to Taiwan, which the People’s Republic of China (PRC) claims as its own territory, to open a ‘representative office’ in Vilnius. No other country has ever found itself at the receiving end of such intense and politically motivated Chinese economic pressure. These actions on the part of the PRC are politically explosive because it raises serious questions about the international conduct of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). If it can simply wipe a country off its trade book, a state belonging to the EU’s customs territory no less, then what does it mean to be a member of the WTO, or a signatory to any other number of international agreements? And, given the lamentable state the WTO is in: could the European Commission’s newly proposed anti-coercion instrument bring any solace to Lithuania and the EU?
Topic:
Law, European Union, Economy, Trade, and Coercion
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Lithuania

187. Industrial Policy Implementation: Empirical Evidence from China’s Shipbuilding Industry

Author:
Panle Barwick, Myrto Kalouptsidi, and Nahim Bin Zahur
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Industrial policy has been widely used in developed and developing countries. Examples include the United States and Europe after World War II; Japan in the 1950s and 1960s; South Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s and 1970s; and Brazil, China, India, and other developing countries more recently. Industrial policies are now back in the spotlight in developed countries, such as Europe and the United States. Designing and implementing industrial policies is a complicated task. Governments seeking to promote the growth of selected sectors have a wide range of policy tools at their disposal, including subsidies on output, provisioning loans at below‐​market interest rates, preferential tax policies, tariff and nontariff barriers, and so on. They must also choose the timing of policy interventions and whether to target selected firms within an industry.
Topic:
Government, Industrial Policy, Economic Policy, and Shipbuilding
Political Geography:
China and Asia

188. The Smoot‐​Hawley Trade War

Author:
Kris James Mitchener, Kirsten Wandschneider, and Kevin H. O'Rourke
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
In the words of Robert J. Samuelson, “The ghost of Smoot‐​Hawley seems to haunt President Trump.” As fears of a trade war between the United States and China grew after the U.S. presidential election of 2016, many commentators drew this link between the signing of the Smoot‐​Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 and recent trade disputes. And the consensus was that the trade wars of the 1930s were an ominous portent of what might await the world if Donald Trump’s protectionist impulses were not checked.
Topic:
Tariffs, Trade Wars, Economic Policy, and Imports
Political Geography:
China and United States of America

189. The architecture of repression: Unpacking Xinjiang’s governance

Author:
Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, James Leibold, and Daria Impiombato
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Since the mass internment of Uyghurs and other indigenous groups in China was first reported in 2017, there is now a rich body of literature documenting recent human rights abuses in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. However, there is little knowledge of the actual perpetrators inside China’s vast and opaque party-state system, and responsibility is often broadly attributed to the Chinese Communist Party, Xinjiang Party Secretary Chen Quanguo, or President Xi Jinping himself. For accountability, it is necessary to investigate how China’s campaign against the Uyghurs has been implemented and which offices and individuals have played a leading part. The current knowledge gap has exposed international companies and organisations to inadvertent engagement with Chinese officials who have facilitated the atrocities in Xinjiang. It has also prevented foreign governments from making targeted policy responses. Finally, it is essential to carry out such an investigation now. Amid debate internationally about whether the recent events in Xinjiang constitute genocide, Chinese officials are actively scrubbing relevant evidence and seeking to silence those who speak out.
Topic:
Human Rights, Governance, Repression, and Uyghurs
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Xinjiang

190. China’s cyber vision: How the Cyberspace Administration of China is building a new consensus on global internet governance

Author:
Nathan Attrill and Audrey Fritz
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This report provides a primer on the roots of the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) within China’s policy system, and sheds light on the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) intentions to use cyberspace as a tool for shaping discourse domestically and internationally. The report details the position of the Cyberspace Administration of China in China’s propaganda system. Considering its origins in the former Party Office of External Propaganda, the authors argue that ‘countries that lack comprehensive cyber regulations should err on the side of caution when engaging with the CCP on ideas for establishing an international cyber co-governance strategy.’ By assessing the CCP’s strategy of becoming a ‘cyber superpower’, its principle of ‘internet sovereignty’, and its concept of ‘community of common destiny for cyberspace’, this report seeks to address how the CCP is working to build a consensus on the future of who will set the rules, norms and values of the internet. The report also examines the World Internet Conference - a ‘platform through which the CCP promotes its ideas on internet sovereignty and global governance’ – and its links to the CAC.
Topic:
Governance, Cybersecurity, Internet, and Surveillance
Political Geography:
China and Asia

191. Benchmarking critical technologies: Building an evidence base for an informed critical technologies strategy

Author:
Kitsch Liao, Samantha Hoffman, Karly Winkler, Baani Grewal, and Cheryl Yu
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Technology policy formulation has recently gained a renewed importance for governments in the era of strategic competition, but contextual understanding and expertise in deciding where to focus efforts are lacking. As a result, decision-makers might not understand their own national strengths and weaknesses. It’s difficult to judge whether a country’s R&D outputs, no matter how advanced, and its development of production capacity, no matter how significant, align with the country’s intended strategic objectives or can be used effectively to achieve them. The ability to measure the relative strengths and weaknesses of a country by weighing specific strategic objectives against technical achievements is of paramount importance for countries. This is especially true as nations seek to resolve supply-chain resilience problems underscored by the Covid-19 pandemic. China’s rejection of the Quad’s vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific, willingness to use economic coercion and the resulting strategic competition, call further attention to multiple technology sectors’ heavy reliance on a single source. A solution must be found that can exploit synergy across multiple technology sectors among collaborating countries while ensuring supply-chain resilience.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, COVID-19, Supply Chains, and Research and Development
Political Geography:
China and Indo-Pacific

192. #StopXinjiang Rumors: The CCP’s decentralised disinformation campaign

Author:
Fergus Ryan, Ariel Bogle, Albert Zhang, and Jacob Wallis
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This report analyses two Chinese state-linked networks seeking to influence discourse about Xinjiang across platforms including Twitter and YouTube. This activity targeted the Chinese-speaking diaspora as well as international audiences, sharing content in a variety of languages. Both networks attempted to shape international perceptions about Xinjiang, among other themes. Despite evidence to the contrary, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) denies committing human rights abuses in the region and has mounted multifaceted and multiplatform information campaigns to deny accusations of forced labour, mass detention, surveillance, sterilisation, cultural erasure and alleged genocide in the region. Those efforts have included using Western social media platforms to both push back against and undermine media reports, research and Uyghurs’ testimony about Xinjiang, as well as to promote alternative narratives. In the datasets we examined, inauthentic and potentially automated accounts using a variety of image and video content shared content aimed at rebutting the evidence of human rights violations against the Uyghur population. Likewise, content was shared using fake Uyghur accounts and other shell accounts promoting video ‘testimonials’ from Uyghurs talking about their happy lives in China. Our analysis includes two datasets removed by Twitter: Dataset 1: ‘Xinjiang Online’ (CNHU) consisted of 2,046 accounts and 31,269 tweets. Dataset 2: ‘Changyu Culture’ (CNCC) consisted of 112 accounts and 35,924 tweets. The networks showed indications of being linked by theme and tactics; however, neither achieved significant organic engagement on Twitter overall—although there was notable interaction with the accounts of CCP diplomats. There were signs of old accounts being repurposed, whether purchased or stolen, and little attempt to craft authentic personas. Twitter has attributed both datasets to the Chinese government, the latter dataset is specifically linked to a company called Changyu Culture, which is connected to the Xinjiang provincial government. This attribution was uncovered by ASPI ICPC in the report Strange bedfellows on Xinjiang: the CCP, fringe media and US social media platforms.
Topic:
Human Rights, Diaspora, Social Media, Disinformation, Misinformation, and Twitter
Political Geography:
China, United States of America, and Xinjiang

193. Borrowing mouths to speak on Xinjiang

Author:
Fergus Ryan, Ariel Bogle, Nathan Ruser, Albert Zhang, and Daria Impiombato
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This report explores how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) uses foreign social media influencers to shape and push messages domestically and internationally about Xinjiang that are aligned with its own preferred narratives. Our research has found key instances in which Chinese state entities have supported influencers in the creation of social media content in Xinjiang, as well as amplified influencer content that supports pro-CCP narratives. That content broadly seeks to debunk Western media reporting and academic research, refute statements by foreign governments and counter allegations of widespread human rights abuses in Xinjiang. Often, such content is then promoted by party-state media and diplomatic accounts across major international social media networks and in Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) briefings. This trend is particularly notable given the difficulty faced by journalists reporting in Xinjiang. Our research also examines how the CCP’s use of foreign influencers presents a growing challenge to global social media platforms, and in particular their efforts to identify and label state-affiliated accounts. This report focuses on the promotion of foreign influencers who disseminate content about Xinjiang on US-based social media and content networks, including YouTube, Twitter, Facebook and Instagram, as well as on Chinese platforms such as Bilibili. The report analyses this unique online influencer ecosystem and examines three in-depth case studies with a focus on Xinjiang-focused foreign influencer content and the amplification of that content by Chinese state entities. The Chinese party-state continues to deny allegations of human rights abuses in Xinjiang, including forced labour, mass detention and cultural erasure. Previous work by ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre (ICPC) has found Chinese party-state entities using US social media networks in an effort to create greater ambiguity about the situation in Xinjiang, push a counter-narrative and amplify disinformation. It has also found that the CCP uses tactics, including leveraging US social media platforms, to criticise and smear Uyghur victims, journalists and researchers who work on this topic, as well as their organisations. Other tactics have included temporal and narrative alignment between pro-CCP social media influencers and state entities (for example, targeting the BBC over its reporting on allegations of systematic rape in Xinjiang’s internment camps, among other stories) as well as the amplification of content that depicts Uyghurs as broadly supportive of the Chinese Government’s policies in Xinjiang.
Topic:
Social Media, Propaganda, Disinformation, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Influencers
Political Geography:
China and Xinjiang

194. China’s Nuclear Arms Race: How Beijing Is Challenging US Dominance in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Elisabeth Suh and Leonie Reicheneder
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
China is building up its military capabilities. Not only is the country investing heavily in conventional arms, but it is also modernizing its nuclear weapons. To secure its nuclear deterrent, China is diversifying its delivery systems. The United States sees this as a challenge to its military superiority in the Indo-Pacific region. Washington and Beijing are both fueling a qualitative arms race by investing in new capabilities. This spiral poses risks to stability that affect Germany and Europe as well.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, and Military
Political Geography:
China, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

195. Promoting Peace and Stability in the Maritime Order Amid China’s Rise

Author:
Rachel Esplin Odell
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
A shift in the balance of maritime power in the Indo–Pacific region is contributing to rising tensions. This shift is accompanied by a mismatch in perceptions between the United States and China, which is in turn driving a dangerous great-power rivalry at sea. China’s growing presence, assertive behavior, and expansive claims in the maritime domain are also provoking a backlash among China’s neighbors and even some countries far from its shores. While these tensions have thus far remained under control, they could erupt into conflict if not carefully managed. To promote peace and stability in the South China Sea and beyond, the United States should pursue a bilateral détente with China in the maritime domain while also promoting the development of a more inclusive regional and global maritime order. The specific steps the United States should implement include: • Incentivize reduced militarization of the disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea, and support compromise between China and other claimants to maritime jurisdiction and rights; • Significantly reduce the frequency of freedom of navigation operations, and instead promote bilateral and regional agreements on military activities at sea; and • Build more robust maritime crisis-management mechanisms with China.
Topic:
Maritime, Crisis Management, Peace, Strategic Stability, and Militarization
Political Geography:
China, United States of America, Indo-Pacific, and South China Sea

196. China and the Persian Gulf in the Aftermath of a U.S. Withdrawal

Author:
Steven Simon
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
• Given longstanding U.S. economic ties to the Arab Gulf states, the withdrawal of the U.S. military would not mean the United States is departing from the region. Even if it did signify that, however, China would be unlikely to fill the vacuum. A U.S. decision to maintain a military presence in the region should therefore not be based on fear of a strategic vacuum that China will fill to America’s disadvantage. • The United States should leverage China’s interest in stable cross–Gulf relations by working in tandem with Beijing to encourage dialogue and confidence-building measures. • The United States should monitor Chinese military deployments to the Indian Ocean and work with Gulf partners to set limits on China’s military use of air and naval bases. This would serve as a confidence-building measure and ensure that the Gulf does not become an arena for competition amid heightened Sino–American tensions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Trade and Finance, Military Affairs, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Persian Gulf, and United States of America

197. It’s complicated: Russia’s tricky relationship with China

Author:
Kadri Liik
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Western policymakers are now asking whether Russia and China will join forces in an alliance of autocracies, and whether they have a chance to manage this challenge by drawing Moscow away from Beijing. Neither of these outcomes is likely in the short term: Russia has many reasons to maintain a cordial relationship with China, while policymakers in Moscow view rapprochement with the West as impossible or too politically costly. The Kremlin’s thinking on China is an amalgam of quickly developing trends that will determine Russia’s position in a world shaped by the US-China rivalry. While the West does not have an opportunity to prompt a policy U-turn in Moscow that divides Russia and China, it could give Russia space to hedge against China in key areas such as advanced technology.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Alliance, Ideology, Pragmatism, and Autocracy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

198. Xi Jinping Boosts the Party’s Control and His Own Authority

Author:
Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Under Xi Jinping, the leadership of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has initiated multi-pronged measures to ensure the success of celebrations marking the centenary of the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in July this year and planning for the 20th CCP Congress, scheduled for the second half of 2022. The accent is on preserving political stability and further consolidating the apparently unassailable authority of President Xi, who is also CCP General Secretary and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC).
Topic:
Media, Political Parties, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

199. Winter Coal Shortages Reveal Chinese Energy Vulnerabilities

Author:
Elizabeth Chen
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Amid the coldest winter recorded since 1966, provinces across the People’s Republic of China (PRC) struggled with the worst electrical blackouts seen in nearly a decade (OilPrice, January 8). More than a dozen cities across Zhejiang, Hunan, Jiangxi, Shaanxi, Inner Mongolia, and Guangdong provinces imposed limits on off-peak electricity usage in early December, affecting city infrastructure and factory production. Analysts expect power shortages to persist through at least mid-February (SCMP, December 23, 2020). Officials have repeatedly assured the public that residential heating would not be affected and that China’s electrical supply remained “stable” and “sufficient,” even as energy spot prices continued to rise into the new year.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Services, Electricity, and Coal
Political Geography:
China and Asia

200. Early Warning Brief: Introducing the “New, New” China Coast Guard

Author:
Ryan D. Martinson
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In the past decade, the China Coast Guard (CCG, 中国海警, zhongguo haijing) has experienced two major reforms. The first, which began in 2013, uprooted the service from the Ministry of Public Security—where it was organized as an element of the People’s Armed Police (PAP)—and placed it under the control of the State Oceanic Administration (SOA), a civilian agency. In the process, the CCG was combined with three other maritime law enforcement forces: China Marine Surveillance (CMS), China Fisheries Law Enforcement (CFLE), and the maritime anti-smuggling units of the General Administration of Customs. The resulting conglomerate was colloquially called the “new” CCG, differentiating it from the “old” CCG of the Ministry of Public Security years. The second reform began in 2018, when the “new” CCG, now swollen with the ranks of four different forces, was stripped from the SOA and transferred to the PAP, which itself had just been reorganized and placed under the Central Military Commission (CMC) (China Brief, April 24, 2018). While much research has been done on the first reform, little is known about the second, at least in the English-speaking world. This article seeks to answer basic questions about the “new, new” CCG. What are its roles/missions, organization, and force structure? How does it differ from the CCG of the SOA years? How is it similar? What progress has been made two years after the second reform began?
Topic:
Law Enforcement, Armed Forces, Reform, and Borders
Political Geography:
China and Asia