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1421. China’s Economy: More Debt than Meets the Eye

Author:
Antonio Graceffo
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Since the beginning of this year, investment banks and international financial organizations, including the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, have steadily downgraded their forecasts for the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) GDP growth in 2022 to around 3.2 percent (Nikkei Asia, October 7). Most analysts agree that Beijing is in a difficult economic position, but the situation has the potential to become far worse due to off-balance sheet liabilities. Such debt risks defaulting, or may otherwise need to be covered by the central government. Another drag on the country’s balance sheet that has yet to fully hit home is the impact of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) financing. Due to economic problems and debt crises in BRI partner countries, a large percentage of the initiative’s loans may have to be forgive or at least restructured. Before looking at its financing and hidden liabilities, it is necessary to establish an overall picture of the current PRC economy across a broad spectrum of indicators.
Topic:
Debt, Economy, Economic Growth, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Investment
Political Geography:
China and Asia

1422. China Increases Support for Pakistan’s Naval Modernization with an Eye on the Indian Ocean

Author:
Syed Fazl-e-Haider
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In mid-July, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and the Pakistan Navy (PN) held the “Sea Guardians-2” exercise in the waters off Shanghai (China Brief, October 4; Pakistan Television, July 12). The joint naval drills focused on neutralizing maritime security threats, particularly those that might jeopardize strategic sea lanes. The bilateral exercise also included joint target practice, anti-submarine, anti-aircraft and anti-missile drills (China Military Online [CMO], July 10). The drills built on the first iteration of the exercise, Sea Guardians-1, which was held in January 2020 in the North Arabian Sea off Karachi, Pakistan. The participation in these exercises of the guided missile frigate Taimur, which is the most advanced warship built by China for the PN, demonstrates the increasing level of Chinese support for the training and modernization of Pakistan’s naval forces (Global Times, July 10). Bilateral military ties, which are a mainstay of the China-Pakistan all-weather friendship and strategic partnership, have strengthened in recent years. China is the main supplier of military equipment to Pakistan, which from 2017-2021 absorbed nearly 47 percent of all Chinese arms exports (China Brief, March 25). In a move to further deepen defense ties, China provided Pakistan with J-10C multi-role fighters in late 2021 (South Asian Voices , April 12). In June, a high-powered Pakistani delegation comprising top brass from the army, navy and air force paid a visit to China at a time when tensions between China and the West were on the rise (CMO, June 12). The visit was part of the Pakistan-China Joint Military Cooperation Committee (PCJMCC), which is the highest body involved in facilitating bilateral defense cooperation. Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff General Qamar Javed Bajwa also attended the top-level committee’s meeting, along with senior-most counterparts in the PLA. Both countries vowed to further deepen their strategic partnership in challenging times and enhance their joint military cooperation in training, technology and counterterrorism (Express Tribune , June 12).
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Navy, Modernization, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, Asia, and Indian Ocean

1423. The Russia-Ukraine War: Has Beijing Abandoned Pragmatic Diplomacy?

Author:
Justyna Szczudlik
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Chinese diplomats contend that Beijing’s position on the “Russia-Ukraine conflict” (俄乌冲突 E wu chongtu) or the “Ukraine issue” (乌克兰问题, Wukelan wenti ) is “consistent and clear” (一贯的、明确的, yiguan de, mingque de) (People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs [FMPRC], May 5). However, China’s paradoxical stance on the Russia-Ukraine War underscores the difficulties that Beijing faces in carrying out sophisticated diplomacy. This has already had repercussions for China’s national interests and ability to achieve its foreign policy objectives. Therefore, any change of course by Beijing coming out of the recently concluded 20th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress, appears unlikely. Throughout the Russia-Ukraine War, China has neither condemned Russia, nor endorsed Ukraine for its resistance and self-defense. However, official discourse indicates the PRC’s supportive posture towards Russia. For example, Beijing consistently accuses the West, primarily the U.S., of provoking Moscow through “constant eastward expansion by NATO” (北约不断东扩, beiyue buduan dong kuo). During his recent visit to Russia, National People’s Congress Standing Committee Chairman Li Zhanshu (栗战书) stated that China “understands and supports Russia” and echoed the Kremlin’s narrative that “the United States and NATO are expanding directly on Russia’s doorstep, threatening its national security and the lives of its citizens” (Twitter, September 13). Furthermore, in the first phone call between Chinese FM, Wang Yi (王毅) and his Russian counterpart Sergiei Lavrov following the 20th Party Congress, Wang said that China “firmly supports the Russian side, under the leadership of President Putin, to unite and lead the Russian people to overcome difficulties, eliminate disturbances, realize the strategic development goals and further establish Russia’s status as a major power on the international stage” (FMPRC, October 27). He also expressed China’s desire to deepen exchanges with Russia at all levels in order to promote international stability in a turbulent world.
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, Pragmatism, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Ukraine

1424. Can Beijing be Flexible on U.S. Policy?

Author:
John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
General Secretary Xi Jinping did not mention “America” in his opening report to the 20th Party Congress (Xinhua, October 16). Nevertheless, Xi made clear that China faces a difficult international environment, precipitated in large part by the U.S. challenge, which threatens the realization of national rejuvenation. For Xi, the threat appears particularly acute in two areas: technology and Taiwan. He called for winning the “battle of key core technologies” by building on breakthroughs in areas such as supercomputing and quantum computing, space exploration, nuclear energy, satellite navigation and biomedicine (Xinhuanet, October 16). On Taiwan, Xi issued a thinly veiled ultimatum to Washington, stating that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will strive for “peaceful reunification” to incorporate Taiwan into the Motherland, which he called “an inevitable requirement for realizing the great rejuvenation.” Should this approach fail, Beijing reserves the right to employ military force to counter “interference by external forces” and “Taiwan independence” separatists (Central Committee Taiwan Work Office, October 16).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

1425. The Ukraine Crisis and China-India Relations

Author:
Amrita Jash
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On March 25, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi made a surprise visit to India after stopovers in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China [FMPRC], March 25). The visit was the first by a high-level Chinese official to India since December 2019 and the ongoing border standoff that broke out in May 2020 along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh. The sudden stopover, which was not announced in advance, generated speculation over Beijing’s intentions, particularly as it occurred in the immediate aftermath of Russia initiating its “special military operation” against Ukraine on February 24. This resulted in international condemnation and boycotts, and the imposition of economic sanctions by the U.S., the European Union, Japan and others on Russia. However, countries such as China and India, made an exception by choosing neutrality in condemning Russia. But did this shared position make any difference in improving China-India ties? Hitherto, relations have not substantively improved, notwithstanding the modest progress in the recent border talks. Following the 16th round of Corps Commander level talks on July 17, China and India stressed the “four-point consensus” they had reached on the resolution of the border issues (Xinhuanet, July 29). This “consensus” was further cited as the reason for the disengagement of troops from Patrolling Point-15 in Gogra-Hot Springs (Global Times, September 9). Notably, the disengagement followed a year-long impasse in the talks process and coincided with both countries’ participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Political stability, Crisis Management, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Ukraine, India, and Eastern Europe

1426. Exploring the Domestic Foundations of Chinese Economic Sanctions: The Case of Australia

Author:
Scott Waldron, Darren J. Lim, and Victor Ferguson
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
More than two years have passed since the People’s Republic of China (PRC) began imposing a broad range of restrictions on Australian trade in what is widely regarded to be a campaign of economic coercion. Despite the apparent sanctions affecting numerous Australian export industries with high exposure to the mainland market, there is now a broad consensus that Beijing’s efforts have been unsuccessful. [1] The measures had a negligible impact on the Australian macroeconomy and did not drive Canberra to make any policy concessions to address Beijing’s long list of ostensible grievances (Australian Department of Treasury, September 6, 2021). It is well established that economic sanctions often fail to change state behavior, typically because the political demands of the sanctioning state are too high. But most sanctions still impose significant economic costs on their targets. Curiously—despite a widely held view that Australia was highly vulnerable to Chinese economic pressure (Global Times, June 10, 2020)—Beijing’s campaign fell short and appeared poorly targeted. The overwhelming majority of affected Australian industries were able to redirect their exports to other markets without significant friction.[2] The economic costs of some barriers, such as those on barley, were significantly higher for China than Australia (Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences, June 2020). Some of Australia’s industries that are most reliant on the Chinese market were left untouched altogether. [3] If—as is widely assumed—China’s objective was to coerce, why did its apparent sanctions not hit the mark and asymmetrically impose politically significant costs on the Australian economy? Exploring this question can yield new insight into the dynamics shaping Chinese economic sanctions—an instrument of statecraft Beijing continues to employ regularly, including recently against Lithuania in 2021 and Taiwan in early August (PRC Charge d’affaires Lithuania, May 3; United Daily News, August 5).
Topic:
Sanctions, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Australia

1427. China’s Interests in Afghanistan One Year After the U.S. Withdrawal

Author:
Zafar Iqbal Yousafzai
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In late June, a severe earthquake struck southeastern Afghanistan. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) announced it would provide 50 million RMB ($7.2 million) in emergency aid, including tents, blankets, cots and other sorely needed supplies to the impacted areas (People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs (FMPRC), June 25). Beijing invests in Afghanistan to further its long-term economic, strategic and political interests. Since the U.S. withdrawal last year, China has had an opportunity to advance its interests and deepen its clout in Afghanistan. When Kabul fell, China did not condemn the move and announced that it respected the choice of the Afghan people—a sign of goodwill from Beijing to the Taliban that it subscribes to the narrative that the new government has the full support of the population (Xinhua, August 16, 2021). China has never been militarily involved in Afghanistan. Uyghur militants have found safe-haven in the country for decades, but the level of threat they pose to the PRC is debated even among Chinese analysts (China Brief, February 11). Despite such long-running concerns, Beijing was unperturbed by the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan last year. The PRC kept its embassy open through the fall of Kabul, and Beijing has sustained extensive diplomatic contact with the Taliban leadership to safeguard its security, economic and strategic interests in Afghanistan (Global Times, August 17, 2021). In fact, the PRC is seeking to carry out a complex balancing act in Afghanistan. Concerns about Afghanistan becoming a safe haven for extremist groups that could target neighboring states persist, but Beijing also perceives huge opportunities in Afghanistan’s natural resources, markets and potential to serve as a key node linking western China with South and Central Asia. In order to achieve a stable and secure Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which will advance China’s interests throughout Central Asia, Beijing needs a stable Afghanistan.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Taliban, Political stability, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, China, Asia, and United States of America

1428. The Economic Outlook for Xi’s Third Term: Mounting Challenges, Dwindling Fiscal and Monetary Options

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
China’s decade-long economic slowdown is accelerating. The pace has picked up since former U.S. President Donald Trump launched his trade war against China in early 2018, and even more so since the COVID-19 pandemic started in early 2020. This year has been particularly difficult as stubborn zero-COVID policies have ground the economy to a halt, further pushed by the bursting of the real estate bubble that had been China’s most important engine of growth for decades. Many ask themselves how much of China’s deceleration is cyclical and how much is structural, but also how much can be reverted. On the first issue, the cyclical element of the ongoing deceleration of the Chinese economy is clearly important and adds additional downward pressure to the well-known structural factors, such as aging and decreasing labor productivity.
Topic:
Monetary Policy, Economy, Xi Jinping, and Zero-COVID
Political Geography:
China and Asia

1429. All the President’s Men – Corruption in the Xi Jinping Era

Author:
Martin Purbrick
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Since the opening up of the Chinese economy by Deng Xiaoping in 1979, China has grown wealthy, but corruption has also become pervasive at all levels of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Corruption has been a part of Chinese business and governance for millennia, but despite the grand pronouncements of the CCP about eradicating corruption, it has not only endured under the current system but grown to extraordinary heights. Due to deeply entrenched corruption across the government, as well as the variable spread of economic benefits, this issue will remain a severe challenge for the CCP as the Xi Jinping era enters its second decade. The necessity for the state security agencies to support political control by Xi will also ensure that anti-corruption purges continue to impact the police and security agencies.
Topic:
Security, Corruption, Economy, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:
China and Asia

1430. Will the Xi Jinping Leadership Take Up Reformist Policies After the 20th Party Congress?

Author:
Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
That President Xi Jinping and his faction will dominate the 20th Party Congress is apparent from the Politburo announcement that the week-long, five-yearly conclave will take place on October 16. The Politburo meeting, which was held on August 30, said that the guiding principle of the party and country would remain “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era” (Gov.cn, October 16). The Politburo reasserted that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would follow principles laid down by Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and above all, Xi Jinping. However, the dictums on reform and the open door – as well as the “lie low” foreign policy – promulgated by “Chief Architect of Reform” Deng in the 1980s and 1990s were conspicuously absent from the Party Congress announcement. Instead, the communique emphasized the so-called “three continuances” (三个继续, san ge jixu). This is a reference to Xi’s efforts to uphold Mao Zedong-style “common prosperity” (共同富裕, gongtongfuyu); to sustain “party construction” (党的建设 (dang de jianshe) in order to ensure the loyalty of cadres; and to work toward the formation of a “community with a shared future for mankind” (人类命运共同体,renlei mingyun gongtongti) (Xinhua, August 30; Ming Pao, August 30).
Topic:
Politics, Reform, Leadership, Domestic Politics, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:
China and Asia

1431. The Russia-India-China Trilateral After Ukraine: Will Beijing Take the Lead?

Author:
Jagannath P. Panda and Wooyeal Paik
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) foreign ministers’ meeting in late July, which included China, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, People’s Republic of China (PRC) State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi exhorted member states to uphold the “Shanghai Spirit” (上海精神, Shanghai Jingshen) of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, mutual consultations, diverse civilizations, and the pursuit of common development (Gov.cn, July 29). He then presented a “five-point proposal” for building an SCO community “with a shared future” (CGTN, July 30). In doing so, Wang echoed President Xi Jinping’s call in his four-point proposal at the BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa) summit in June —albeit via a rather elemental poetic allegory of fire, wind, and water –to embark on a “righteous course” toward a shared global future premised on inclusive, comprehensive and close win-win cooperation (Qiushi, June 24). BRICS already has a “Plus” mechanism and is mulling an expansion to include “like-minded” partners.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, India, and Asia

1432. Beijing Makes a Big Long-term Bet on Nuclear Power

Author:
John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Last fall, China suffered extensive power outages due to a combination of surging electricity demand and tight supply. A confluence of factors contributed to the energy supply shortage, but nearly all traced back to China’s struggle to manage its overdependence on coal for power generation: rising global coal prices; shuttering of old power plants as part of a push to enhance energy efficiency; emission-reduction efforts; an “unofficial” embargo on Australian coal imports due to geopolitical strife between Beijing and Canberra; and disparities in government price controls (power plants must purchase coal at market rates, but consumer prices are set in a narrow band) that incentivized plants to cease or slow operations rather than produce electricity at a financial loss (Caixin, October 12, 2021; Zaobao, July 14). In 2022, China has avoided a replay of last year’s energy crunch despite the supply shocks in the energy markets induced by the Ukraine conflict by increasing domestic coal production, exploiting the opportunity to import Russian oil and coal at discounted rates and continuing to steadily increase its renewable energy capacity. Boosting domestic coal production has been particularly essential to meet demand. This month, the National Energy Administration (NEA) reported that during the second quarter, China’s raw coal output rose 10 percent year-on-year, which the NEA highlighted as particularly noteworthy given it came on the basis of 16 percent growth in coal output in the same quarter last year (NEA, August 2). Another mitigating factor for China on the energy front has been heavy spring rainfall in many areas of the country that has increased hydropower output over 20 percent in the first half of this year—a substantial boost as hydroelectricity already accounts for about 15 percent of China’s overall energy mix (NEA, August 2; Global Times, May 5).
Topic:
Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, Nuclear Power, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

1433. With an Eye on Tibet, China Reacts Warily to Warming U.S.-Nepal Ties

Author:
Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
U.S. Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Uzra Zeya’s three-day visit to Nepal in May evoked a strong reaction from China. During the visit, Zeya, who is also President Joseph Biden’s Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, met with an array of high-level Nepali officials, including Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba as well as Nepali human rights activists. She also visited two Tibetan refugee settlements in Nepal where she interacted with refugees and enquired about their problems (Kathmandu Post, May 22). Zeya had arrived in Kathmandu after meeting the Dalai Lama, senior officials of the Tibetan exile government as well as officials and representatives of the Tibetan refugee community in India (The Hindu, May 18). The Chinese response was swift. The U.S. “should stop meddling in China’s internal affairs under the pretext of Tibet-related issues, and offer no support to the anti-China separatist activities of the Dalai clique,” People’s Republic of China (PRC) Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian said in a press conference (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 19). At the 14th meeting of the Nepal-China Bilateral Consultative Mechanism, which was held a few days after Zeya’s visit, Chinese officials reportedly expressed their misgivings over her engagements to their Nepali counterparts (Kathmandu Post, August 4). Then in July, Liu Jianchao, the head of the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) visited Kathmandu, where at meetings with leaders of Nepal’s major political parties, he asked them to reaffirm their commitment to the ‘One-China’ policy (Nepal Foreign Affairs, July 14).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Nepal, and Tibet

1434. Security Dialogues with Chinese Characteristics

Author:
John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
This summer, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) organized two multilateral security dialogues with African nations, which highlight Beijing’s efforts to promote an alternative model of international security. In June, representatives of the PRC and six East African states convened in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia for the first China-Horn of Africa Peace, Governance and Development Conference, which is an initiative that was originally proposed by Foreign Minister Wang Yi during his January visit to Kenya (Guangming Daily, June 27; PRC Foreign Ministry, January 7). At the meeting, PRC Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa Xue Bing said that Beijing sought a greater role in the region, “not only in trade and investments but also in the area of peace and development” (South China Morning Post, June 23). The conference resulted in a joint statement committing to utilize confidence building, dispute resolution, dialogue and negotiation to achieve a “lasting peace” in the region (China News Service, June 23). In doing so, the parties pledged to uphold the “common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security concept,” which was first laid out by President Xi Jinping in 2014 as a core element of his vision for a new international security architecture (Xinhua, May 24). Xi cited the need to remain committed to this concept as motivation for the PRC’s new Global Security Initiative, which he introduced in April (China Brief, May 13). Earlier this week, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) hosted the second “China-Africa Peace and Security Forum,” which was virtually attended by senior defense leaders from nearly fifty African countries (Gov.cn, July 26). In his keynote remarks, State Councilor and Defense Minister Wei Fenghe read a congratulatory letter from Xi, which hailed the resilience of Sino-African friendship in a challenging international landscape and called for the implementation of the Global Security Initiative (People’s Daily, July 26). Although somewhat short on specifics, Beijing has promoted the Global Security Initiative as a positive-sum, “common security” model in contrast to the militaristic, zero-sum approach it ascribes to the United States (China Brief, July 15).
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:
China and Asia

1435. The Real U.S.-China 5G Contest is Just Getting Started

Author:
Philip Hsu
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On June 6, China declared the three-year anniversary of its business deployment of 5G, with the country having invested nearly 185 billion yuan in related infrastructure in 2021 alone (Xinhua Baoye, June 5). However, China’s 5G ambitions, which continue to form a substantial component of its national and international development policies, began years ago with Huawei. After Apple revolutionized the smartphone, demand for sophisticated computer “chips” and other components skyrocketed. Companies like Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) and Foxconn capitalized on this shift to become the main pillars of Taiwan’s economy. In addition to supplying Samsung, Apple and HTC, a lesser-known, nominally private Chinese company, Huawei was also starting to make smartphones around this time using Taiwanese hardware (Nikkei Asia, 2016). Although in recent years up to 60 percent of 5G-capable Huawei phone components have been manufactured in China, which is due in large part to U.S. sanctions against it and other Chinese technology companies, a new technological Cold War is unlikely to materialize over 5G. The economic stakes over advanced computing and a new generation of telecommunications infrastructure are too high for the international community to afford any one nation or corporation primacy across the deep and diverse set of software, hardware and human capital requirements this technology will demand.
Topic:
Development, Science and Technology, Infrastructure, Strategic Competition, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

1436. China’s Shifting Approach to Alliance Politics

Author:
John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
For decades, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has abstained from seeking formal alliances. Chinese leaders often invoke the principle of advancing state-to-state relations through “dialogue rather than confrontation [and] partnerships rather than alliances” (对话不对抗、结伴不结盟, duihua bu duikang, jieban bu jiemeng) (Xinhuanet, June 23; Gov.cn, November 22, 2021). The PRC highlights its multitude of strategic partnerships and lack of official alliances as emblematic of its self-proclaimed anti-hegemonic approach to international relations, which is predicated on inclusivity, mutual respect and “win-win cooperation.” Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propaganda regularly juxtaposes this purportedly positive-sum approach to world politics with its stock depiction of the United States as a decaying but violent empire, which practices a ruthless brand of power politics based on zero-sum thinking. For the CCP, America’s “cold war mentality” manifests in its global military presence and formal security alliances in Europe and Asia, which Beijing characterizes as “closed and exclusive cliques” (PRC Foreign Ministry [FMPRC], April 12; China Brief, October 22, 2021).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Security, and Alliance
Political Geography:
China and Asia

1437. Will the China-Pakistan Corridor Get a Boost with a New Government in Islamabad?

Author:
Syed Fazl-e Haider
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On June 10, the Foreign Office in Islamabad received a diplomatic communication from the Pakistani ambassador in Beijing (The News, June 13). China assured Prime Minister (PM) Shehbaz Sharif, who replaced former PM Imran Khan in April, that it is eager to work with the present government (PRC Foreign Ministry [FMPRC], June 17). China also confirmed the rollover of a $2.3 billion loan to Pakistan at a reduced rate, which is a great help to the cash-strapped nation (The Express Tribune, June 22). Furthermore, China agreed to extend additional financial assistance between $2.5 to $2.8 billion, and pledged to support Pakistan’s fragile economy through the multi-billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) (Business Standard, June 29). Chinese leadership also urged the present government to reinvigorate CPEC projects, which were neglected under Imran Khan’s government (The News, June 13; Business Recorder, June 15). However, PM Sharif’s government has inherited a plethora of problems and issues plaguing progress and causing delays in the execution of projects that fall under the umbrella of CPEC.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Economy
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

1438. No Choice but to Lie Flat: Youth Unemployment Surges in China

Author:
John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Pity the class of 2022. The job market in China has long been a gauntlet for college graduates as the country’s largely industrial economy does not generate sufficient opportunities in the knowledge industries to satisfy the career aspirations of its growing number of college graduates. However, prospects for the current crop of jobseekers are particularly grim with a record 10.76 million college students graduating this year (Wuhan Evening News, May 24). Recent graduates must navigate an intensely competitive labor market where demand for jobs greatly outstrips supply due to the negative ramifications of the dynamic clearance zero-COVID policy, which has led to mass hiring freezes and layoffs. Regulatory crackdowns on private businesses, which reached a crescendo last year, have fostered uncertainty in the technology and private education industries, sectors where many graduates had previously found work (South China Morning Post, March 20). According to the annual “College Student Employability Survey Report” released by the recruitment firm Zhaopin (招聘), only 46.7 percent of graduating college students had received job offers as of mid-April, which is down from 62.8 percent last year (Hangzhou Daily, April 28). Not only have fewer graduates found work, but those that have, are earning less this year with an expected monthly salary of 6,295 yuan ($939), a six percent decrease from 2021.
Topic:
Economy, Youth, and Unemployment
Political Geography:
China and Asia

1439. 16 + 1: China’s Push Into Central and Eastern Europe Loses Momentum

Author:
Filip Jirouš
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Since its inception in 2012, the Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries (China-CEEC; 中国—中东欧国家合作, Zhongguo—Zhong Dong Ou Guojia Hezuo), better known as the 16+1 or 17+1 initiative, has often been described as a security risk with the potential to divide European structures and make them serve the interests of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC). The 16+1 is a Sinocentric economic cooperation initiative comprising China and 16 Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, which share only a mutual Communist past as a common denominator (in 2019, Greece, which is heavily indebted to China, joined, and the platform was briefly renamed to 17+1). Apart from several different formats such as inter-party dialogues and think tank conferences, the 16+1 holds annual summits attended by state heads, with Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝) and then Li Keqiang (李克强) the official highest-ranking PRC representatives in attendance. In comparison, two other, similar, Sinocentric regional platforms — China-CELAC Forum (中国-拉共体论坛, Zhongguo- Lagongti Luntan); and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC: 中非合作论坛, Zhongfei Hezuo Luntan) — are regularly attended by President and General Secretary Xi Jinping (习近平) (China-CELAC Forum, March 1, 2018). Thus far, FOCAC has generated the greatest level of interest from participating regional countries (China Brief, December 3, 2021). By contrast, several CEE countries have distanced themselves from the 16+1 platform: in 2021, Lithuania quit the group and this May, a Czech parliamentary committee urged the government to consider making the same move.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Eastern Europe, and Asia

1440. Unemployment Monitoring and Early Warning: New Trends in Xinjiang’s Coercive Labor Placement Systems

Author:
Adrian Zenz
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In mid-2019, the first efforts to systematically research and conceptualize state-sponsored forced labor systems in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) took place (Journal of Political Risk, December 2019). First, this research examined the placement of detainees in Vocational Skills Education and Training Centers (VSETCs, 职业技能教育培训中心, zhiye jineng jiaoyu peixun zhongxin), which function as re-education camps; and second, the findings detailed the transfer of rural surplus laborers (农村劳动者转移就业, nongcun laodongzhe zhuanyi jiuye) into secondary or tertiary sector work – referred to as Poverty Alleviation through Labor Transfer (脱贫转移就业, tuopin zhuanyi jiuye). In addition to general evidence for coercive labor placements into labor-intensive manufacturing, scholars uncovered evidence of coercive labor transfers for specific economic sectors such as cotton and tomato picking, as well as the production of polysilicon for solar panels (Newlines Institute, December 2020; CBC News, October 29, 2021; Bloomberg, April 2021).[1] Much of the evidence implicating these industries came from publicly available government data, media or company reports, typically dating from between 2017 and 2020. Unfortunately, since then, such evidence has become much sparser. This examination argues that this falloff in information is not just due to government censorship. Rather, it also reflects systemic and concerning changes to the ways that coercive labor placements in Xinjiang are being consolidated.
Topic:
Labor Issues, Unemployment, Domestic Policy, and Forced Labor
Political Geography:
China and Asia