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1901. An Even Larger Role in Everything

Author:
Akhil Ramesh and Michael Rubin
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
On May 24, 2022, President Joe Biden met Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the Quad summit in Tokyo. According to the White House readout of the meeting, “The leaders reviewed the progress made in the US-India Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership. They committed to deepen the Major Defense Partnership, encourage economic engagement that benefits both countries, and expand partnership on global health, pandemic preparedness, and critical and emerging technologies.” While such statements are often aspirational and lag in implementation, the first four months of 2023 show the renaissance in US-India ties to be real.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, Elections, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, North America, and United States of America

1902. US-Korea Relations: Nuclear New Year

Author:
Mason Richey
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
South Korean president Yoon Suk-yeol has tried to make a priority of transforming the traditional US-South Korea military alliance into a “global, comprehensive strategic alliance” with increasing ambitions beyond hard security issues on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia in general. Yoon and his foreign policy team get an “A” for vision and effort—joining the NATO Asia-Pacific Four (AP4) and releasing an Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2022 are evidence. But, like Michael Corleone trying to go legit in The Godfather III, every time they make progress getting out, they get pulled back into the Peninsula. To wit, during the first trimester of 2023 Korean Peninsula security issues again commanded disproportionate attention from Seoul and Washington. The proximate cause for this dynamic is North Korea’s mafioso-in-chief, Kim Jong Un, who started 2023 with a January 1 missile launch and kept at it throughout the winter. This, of course, followed record-breaking 2022 North Korean missile tests and demonstrations, which totaled approximately 70 launches of around 100 projectiles. Given the near-zero prospects for North Korean denuclearization and the growing arsenal at Pyongyang’s disposal, it is understandable that any South Korean president would be distracted from interests further afield. The audacious nature of Yoon’s re-focusing on South Korean security was surprising and controversial, however. On January 11, apparently fed up with perceived South Korean vulnerability to its nuclear-armed consanguine, and perhaps irritated with the Biden administration’s slow realization of this South Korean sentiment, he made a pronouncement that no democratic leader in Seoul has ever made publicly before: he stated that South Korea—which benefits from US extended nuclear deterrence—could still consider acquiring its own nuclear weapons, if “North Korean provocations continued intensifying.” This set off a diplomatic kerfuffle that resonated—on both sides of the 38th parallel, as well as in Washington and Beijing—for much of the rest of the January-April reporting period. Given the provocative nature of Yoon’s statement, the South Korean presidential office later backtracked, “clarifying” that Yoon was simply expressing his “firm commitment to defending the nation” against North Korea’s nuclear threats, and while the “worst case scenario must be taken into consideration,” “the principle of abiding by the [Nuclear] Nonproliferation Treaty holds.” In any event, Washington took notice of its anxious ally, responding with demonstrations of commitment to extended deterrence for South Korea—including a visit by Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and strategic asset deployments to South Korea. All this was in addition to regular combined military exercises and naval exercises featuring US aircraft carrier strike groups. Washington also consented to more bilateral consultation with Seoul regarding the US nuclear umbrella. The saga has concluded—at least for now—with the Washington Declaration promulgated at the Biden-Yoon summit in late April. The Washington Declaration promises tightened US-South Korea extended deterrence coordination and consultation, while the leaders’ summit—in the context of Yoon’s state visit to celebrate 70 years of US-South Korea alliance relations—functioned as a renewal of Washington-Seoul ties. These ties are now perhaps as strong as they have ever been. If Pyongyang has reckoned that increased belligerence would decouple the US-South Korea alliance, it has seemingly miscalculated.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

1903. US-China Effort to Set “Guardrails” Fizzles with Balloon Incident

Author:
Sourabh Gupta
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The proposed “guardrail” that Joe Biden and Xi Jinping sought to erect last fall in Bali failed to emerge in the bitter aftermath of a wayward Chinese surveillance balloon that overflew the United States and violated its sovereignty. Though Antony Blinken and Wang Yi met on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference afterward, aspersions cast by each side against the other, including a series of disparaging Chinese government reports, fed the chill in ties. Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s meeting with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy during the return leg of her US transit added to bilateral and cross-strait tensions and were met with Chinese sanctions. Issues pertaining to Taiwan, be it arms sales or a speculated Chinese invasion date of the island, remained contentious. The administration’s attempt to restart constructive economic reengagement with China, including via an important speech by US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, appears to have fallen on deaf ears in Beijing. Following the Biden-Xi meeting on Nov. 14 on the sidelines of the G20 Leaders Summit in Bali, Indonesia, US-People’s Republic of China relations were transitioning to an improving track—or so it seemed. US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin met with his Chinese counterpart, Defense Minister Wei Fenghe, on the sidelines of the ASEAN Defense Ministers” Meeting-Plus meeting in Cambodia on Nov. 22. On Dec. 11-12, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink held “candid, in-depth and constructive” talks in Beijing. On Jan. 18, Secretary Yellen had a “candid, substantive, and constructive conversation” with departing Vice-Premier Liu He in Zurich ahead of the World Economic Forum in Davos. Hours before Secretary Blinken was due to board a flight to Beijing on Feb. 3, which would have been the highest-ranking contact between the two sides since the Bali meeting, the budding rapprochement came to a screeching halt.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

1904. The US and Japan Build Multilateral Momentum

Author:
Sheila A. Smith and Charles McClean
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
2023 brings a renewed focus on the US-Japan partnership as a fulcrum of global and regional diplomacy. With an eye to the G7 Summit in Hiroshima in mid-May, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio began the year with visits to G7 counterparts in Europe and North America. Later in the spring, he toured Africa in an effort to gain understanding from countries of the Global South. The Joe Biden administration looks ahead to a lively economic agenda, as it hosts the APEC Summit in November on the heels of the G20 Summit in New Delhi in September. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan laid out in detail the economic ambitions of the Biden national strategy on April 27, giving further clarity to how the administration’s foreign policy will meet the needs of the American middle class. Regional collaboration continues to expand. Both leaders will gather in Australia on May 24 as Prime Minister Anthony Albanese hosts the third in-person meeting of the leaders of the Quad. Also noteworthy in this first quarter of 2023 is the progress in ties between Japan and South Korea. Trilateral consultations began early in the Biden administration, and after the election of President Yoon Suk Yeol last spring, the groundwork for resolving the many difficulties in the bilateral relationship began. This spring, President Yoon and Prime Minister Kishida revealed their progress in a set of visits to each other’s capitals. A trilateral summit is planned for the G7 Summit, which Yoon will attend as an observer. Overshadowing this active multilateral calendar is the continuing war in Ukraine. Both Kishida and Biden have visited President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in his capitol. The United States and Japan remain stalwart supporters of the Ukrainian defense effort as Ukrainians prepare for the spring counteroffensive against Russian forces. Yet questions have arisen within the US Congress over the scale and duration of military aide provided to Zelenskyy. Interestingly, there remains little doubt about the Kishida Cabinet’s support of Ukraine. While Japan does not provide lethal aid, it has joined in solidarity with European nations to contribute to the complex humanitarian relief needed by the Ukrainian people. Political choices will also shape the remainder of the year. President Biden on April 25 announced his run for a second term in the 2024 election. The Republican field of candidates begins to emerge with former UN Ambassador Nikki Haley officially declaring her candidacy on Feb. 14, and Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, while not yet official, has been the center of media attention. Former President Donald Trump has already begun his rallies, having announced his candidacy on Nov. 15. In Tokyo, talk of a national snap election continues, with the latest rumors suggesting that Kishida, coming off his party’s good showing in local elections in April, might opt for a ballot after the G7 Summit in Hiroshima.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Multilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

1905. India’s Ongoing “Strategic Correction to the East” during 2022

Author:
Satu Limaye
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
India’s East Asia relations in 2022 followed the arc articulated by External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s address at Chulalongkorn University in Thailand in August. He recalled three decades ago India made a “strategic correction to the East…[o]riginally…contemplated as an economic measure, with trade and investment at its core” and mostly focused on ASEAN. He said the geography, concepts, and assessments of India’s Indo-Pacific vision have expanded “to cover Japan, Korea and China, and in due course, Australia as also other areas of Pacific Islands…[and] facets of cooperation also increased…now cover[ing] connectivity in various forms, people-to-people ties and more recently, defense and security.” And while dutifully referencing India’s Indo-Pacific policies including Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) and the Indo-Pacific Oceans’ Initiative (IPOI), he gave the most attention to the revitalized Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”). The highlights of India in East Asia in 2022 were numerous Quad meetings, the inaugural India-ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting, the second India-Japan 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue, the Australian deputy prime minister and minister for defense’s visit to India, and India’s defense minister visits to Vietnam and Mongolia. Defense and security engagement included numerous exercises, defense dialogues, military-to-military exchanges, and navy ship visits.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Strategic Interests, and Quad Alliance
Political Geography:
India, East Asia, and Asia

1906. China-Russia Relations: Ending the War? Or the World?

Author:
Yu Bin
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
As the Ukraine conflict was poised to expand, the “extremely complicated” situation at the frontline (in Vladimir Putin’s words on Dec. 20) gave rise to intensified high-level exchanges between Moscow and Beijing as they searched for both an alternative to the conflict, and stable and growing bilateral ties. As the Ukraine war dragged on and mustered a nuclear shadow, it remained to be seen how the world would avoid what Henry Kissinger defined as a “1916 moment,” or a missed peace with dire consequences for not only the warring parties but all of civilization.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

1907. Japan and South Korea as Like-Minded Partners in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Ji-Young Lee and Andy Lim
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The last four months of 2022 saw a flurry of bilateral diplomatic activities between Japan and South Korea in both nations’ capitals and around the world. They focused on 1) North Korea, 2) the issue of wartime forced labor, and 3) the future of Seoul-Tokyo cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. Despite mutual mistrust and the low approval ratings of Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and President Yoon Suk Yeol, both leaders had the political will to see a breakthrough in bilateral relations. Another signal came in the form of new strategy documents in which Seoul and Tokyo explained their foreign and security policy directions and goals. On Dec. 16, the Kishida government published three national security-related documents—the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the Defense Buildup program. On Dec. 28, the Yoon government unveiled South Korea’s Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region, its first-ever Indo-Pacific strategy. Although each document serves a somewhat different purpose, it is now possible to gauge how similarly or differently Japan and South Korea assess challenges in the international security environment, and how they plan to respond to them. Importantly, they signal the other, the United States, and the world that they acknowledge the strategic and economic importance of their partner in their vision of the future. When one considers the future of Japan-South Korea relations, what are some of the most important takeaways?
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, and Indo-Pacific

1908. Japan-China Relations: A Period of Cold Peace?

Author:
June Teufel Dreyer
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
In the sole high-level meeting in the reporting period, on the sidelines of the APEC meeting in Bangkok in November, General Secretary/President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio essentially talked past each other. At an earlier ASEAN+3 meeting in Phnom Penh, Premier Li Keqiang and Kishida not only talked past each other but pointedly walked past each other. There was no resolution of major issues: the Chinese position is and remains that Taiwan is a core interest of the PRC in which Japan must not interfere. Japan counters that a Chinese invasion would be an emergency for Japan. On the islands known to the Chinese as the Diaoyu and to the Japanese as the Senkaku, Tokyo considers them an integral part of Japan on the basis of history and international law while China says the islands are part of China. On jurisdiction in the East China Sea, Japan says that demarcation should be based on the median line and that China’s efforts at unilateral development of oil and gas resources on its side of the median are illegal. Beijing does not recognize the validity of the median line. Economically, a number of Japanese industries have been decoupling from China out of concern for the integrity of their supply chains and for security reasons while others are planning to expand operations there. Both sides continued their respective defense buildups while accusing the other of military expansionism.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Politics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Japan, China, and Asia

1909. China-Korea Relations: Kim Jong Un Tests Xi-Yoon Diplomacy

Author:
Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Regional and global summits presented high-level platforms for China-South Korea engagement in November. The summitry showed that the relationship had returned with solidity with the resumption of international meetings and in-person exchanges. Although the Xi Jinping and Yoon Suk Yeol leaderships advanced diplomatic exchange, concerns emerged over enduring political and security constraints and growing linkages with the economic relationship. Kim Jong Un’s escalation of military threats, through an unprecedented number of missile tests this year, challenged Xi-Yoon bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. China-North Korea bilateral interactions, while brisk, primarily relied on Xi and Kim’s exchange of congratulatory letters around significant founding anniversaries, China’s 20th Party Congress, and expressions of condolences after the death of former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin. The UN Security Council’s failure to take unified action on DPRK threats prompted South Korea to voice frustration with China and expand cooperation with US and Japanese partners. Such responses only reinforced concerns raised in recent leadership exchanges, and Korean domestic division over Yoon’s diplomatic strategies.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

1910. Tensions Intensify as Taiwan-US IT Cooperation Blossoms

Author:
David J. Keegan and Kyle Churchman
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
In the wake of then US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August, China’s extensive military exercises continued to impose a more threatening “new normal” in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan continued to be the focus of heated public exchanges between the US and China. US President Biden said, for a fourth time, that the US would defend Taiwan and added an inflammatory codicil that independence was for Taiwan to decide. At the 20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, General Secretary Xi Jinping promised China would strive for peaceful reunification with Taiwan but would not renounce use of force. On Dec. 23, Biden signed the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act and a State Department appropriation providing $2 billion in loans for Taiwan to purchase US equipment. Two days later, China sent 71 military aircraft and seven ships to intimidate Taiwan, its largest-ever one-day exercise near the island. Two days later, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen announced that Taiwan would extend its military conscription to 12 months. TSMC formally broke ground for the first of two factories in the US, a $40 billion investment. The new year will see Taiwan’s DPP and KMT parties launch their presidential election campaigns, debating visions for cross-Strait defense, dignity, and dialogue as the Chinese military appears determined to intensify its intimidation.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Information Technology, and Military
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

1911. Xi Moderates to US and Others Amid Continued Competition

Author:
Robert G. Sutter and Chin-Hao Huang
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Southeast Asia was the center of international attention in November as regional and global leaders gathered at the G20 conference in Indonesia, which took place between the annual ASEAN-hosted summit meetings in Cambodia and the yearly APEC leaders meeting in Thailand. Acute China-US rivalry loomed large in media and other forecasts, warning of a clash of US-Chinese leaders with negative implications feared in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. The positive outcome of the Biden-Xi summit at the G20 conference and related actions eased tensions, which was welcomed, particularly in Southeast Asia, but the implications for the US and allies’ competition with China remain to be seen. Tensions over disputes in the South China Sea continued unabated. President Xi Jinping made his first trip to a major international gathering at the G20 conference followed by the APEC meeting after more than two years of self-imposed isolation in line with his government’s strict COVID-19 restrictions. His visit occurred against the background of China’s unprecedented military show of force in response to US advances in relations with Taiwan, strident criticism of US efforts to increase influence in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, and remarkable warnings about China’s determination to resist adverse international threats in his landmark report to the 20thCommunist Party Congress in October validating his third term as party leader. Representing the United States at the ASEAN and G20 summits, President Joseph Biden gave no ground on Taiwan or other sensitive issues, increased US support for the island government, signed two massive bills calling for over half a trillion dollars of spending to compete with China on high technology and climate change, and imposed strict export controls on advanced computer chip technology to undermine China’s high technology ambitions. Because of protocol and scheduling, Xi and Biden overlapped only at the G20 meeting, making the Xi-Biden summit meeting on the sidelines of that conference a focus of attention. As discussed in the US-China chapter of this edition of Comparative Connections, Xi adopted a more moderate approach in dealing with the United States. He notably ended China’s past insistence that the United States change its policies toward China before China would agree to the Biden government’s longstanding request to work with China to set guardrails to manage US-China rivalry in ways that would avoid military conflict. The Chinese leader’s new approach was accompanied by public diplomacy efforts that were remarkable because they were starkly contrary to Chinese diplomacy throughout 2022. Chinese representatives and commentary endeavored to persuade audiences in Southeast Asia and elsewhere that Xi’s report and recent strident Chinese commentary and provocative actions did not represent China’s intentions. They corrected such “misperceptions” and advised that Chinese intentions were moderate, accommodating, and positive, focused on constructive outreach for cooperation in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. In addition to the United States, targets for this call to improve ties included US allies and partners heretofore strongly criticized by China for their policies in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, notably Japan and Australia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Leadership, Strategic Competition, Rivalry, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

1912. US-Southeast Asia Relations: External Order, Inner Turmoil

Author:
Catharin Dalpino
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
In November three ASEAN states—Cambodia, Indonesia, and Thailand—drew favorable marks for their chairmanship of high-profile regional and global meetings: the East Asia Summit and ASEAN Leaders Meeting; the G20 Summit; and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting, respectively. Helming these meetings was particularly challenging for Southeast Asian leaders—who are naturally inclined to avoid strong alignments with external powers—in the current global environment of heightened tensions between the United States and China in the Taiwan Strait and the war in Ukraine. However, the year was a difficult period for ASEAN internally, with uneven economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic and the intractable conflict in Myanmar. The last quarter of 2022 saw two political shifts in the region: in general elections in Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim achieved a longstanding ambition to become prime minister but will have to manage a difficult coalition to retain power. At the year’s end, Laos changed prime ministers, but it is not clear if the transition will solve the country’s debt problems, which were revealed to be more dire than estimated.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Diplomacy, Alliance, ASEAN, and Decarbonization
Political Geography:
Southeast Asia and United States of America

1913. US-India Relations: Friends with Benefits

Author:
Akhil Ramesh
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
2022 was a challenging year, not just for US-India relations, but for every India analyst trying to explain the Indian government’s position on the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Explaining to a non-IR audience India’s history of nonalignment during the Cold-War era and its current policy of multi-alignment was not a gratifying endeavor. While the last four months of 2022 did not have the friction and stress-tests as the first four of 2022 or the slow and steady expansion of relations that followed between May and September, they certainly had multiple surprising events that could make them the halcyon months of 2022. In mid-November, the US and Indian armies engaged in a military exercise at Auli, not far from the Line of Actual Control (LAC) separating Indian-held and Chinese-held territory. While the US and Indian armies have engaged in exercises prior to 2022, this proximity to the Indo-China border is a first. A month later, in another first, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen traveled to India to meet Indian Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman to expand the US-India “Indo-Pacific partnership.” Yellen characterized India as a “friendly shore” for supply chain diversification and as the indispensable partner for the US. A country that earned notoriety for its bureaucracy and trade protectionism over the years was suddenly characterized as “friendly”; one that was highly skeptical of foreign militaries on its shores was actively engaging the US military at one of its most sensitive and tempestuous borders. The primary catalyst for this sea change has been shared concerns over a rising, authoritarian, and hegemonic China. The events of the last four months, while making India’s multi-alignment labored, also made it abundantly clear that the US-India relations will continue to expand to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, North America, and United States of America

1914. US-Korea Relations: Everything Everywhere All At Once, Extremely Close and Incredibly Loud

Author:
Mason Richey and Rob York
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Continuing a trend from the May-August reporting period, the final reporting period of 2022 in US-Korea relations was marked by an accelerated ratcheting up of tension. In short, numerous problems reared up on the Korean Peninsula from September-December, and good solutions have been few. And not only does this describe relations between the US and North Korea, but in their own, friendly way also the situation between Washington and Seoul, whose frequent invocations of rock-solid alliance cooperation belie unease about crucial areas of partnership. Two critical issues have been increasingly affecting the US-South Korea alliance in 2022, with the September-December period no exception. First, South Korea desires ever more alliance-partner defense and security reassurance from the US in the face of a growing North Korean nuclear threat and Chinese revisionism. Yet the US has downward-trending limits on credible reassurance as North Korea masters nuclear weapons technology that threatens US extended nuclear deterrence for South Korea. The US also faces less geopolitical pressure to effusively reassure its Indo-Pacific allies—including South Korea—as China grows to menace the regional order and the US consequently faces lower risk of ally hedging or realignment.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Military
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

1915. US-Japan Relations: Ramping Up Diplomacy and Defense Cooperation

Author:
Sheila A. Smith and Charles McClean
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
In the wake of the death of former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, the fall brought unexpectedly turbulent politics for Prime Minister Kishida Fumio. In the United States, however, President Joe Biden welcomed the relatively positive outcome of the midterm elections, with Democrats retaining control over the Senate and losing less than the expected number of seats in the House. Diplomacy continued to be centered on various impacts of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but both Biden and Kishida focused their attention on a series of Asian diplomatic gatherings to improve ties. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s attendance at the G20 Meeting in Bali and APEC gathering in Bangkok proffered the opportunity finally for in-person bilateral meetings for both leaders. Finally, Japan’s long awaited strategic documents were unveiled in December. A new National Security Strategy (NSS) took a far more sober look at China’s growing influence and included ongoing concerns over North Korea as well as a growing awareness of Japan’s increasingly difficult relationship with Russia. Accompanying the NSS is a 10-year defense plan, with a five-year build-up commitment, that gave evidence that Kishida and his ruling coalition were serious about their aim to spend 2% of Japan’s GDP on its security. The desire for greater lethality was also there, with the inclusion of conventional strike investment.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

1916. Regional Overview: Indo-Pacific as the 'Epicenter',

Author:
Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The Biden administration released its long-awaited National Security Strategy (NSS) this reporting period, along with unclassified versions of its National Defense Strategy and Missile Defense and Nuclear Posture Reviews. There were no big surprises. The NSS identified the Indo-Pacific as “the epicenter of 21st century geopolitics” and reaffirmed China as the “pacing challenge,” even while branding Russia as “an immediate threat to the free and open international system” as a result of its invasion of Ukraine. Underscoring the priority attached to the region, President Biden attended the East Asia Summit in Phnom Penh and the G20 Summit in Bali, with Vice President Kamala Harris representing the United States at the annual Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Meeting in Bangkok. Kim Jong Un was not invited to any of the Asia summits but found other ways to attract attention, including some 70 ballistic missile launches for the year while announcing plans to rapidly produce and potentially use tactical nuclear weapons. Chinese President Xi Jinping, when not busy defending Pyongyang’s bad behavior, was busy orchestrating the 20th National People’s Congress, where he was elected “president for life.” Meanwhile, the tech war between Washington and Beijing continued to heat up, much to the dismay of many US allies and partners. More broadly speaking, the economic outlook for the region appeared discouraging even as the administration failed to put much additional meat on the bones of its own Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). Other regional trade agreements continued apace, sans Washington, which struggled to get its own House (pun intended) in order as we continue to ponder the significance of the US mid-term elections.
Topic:
International Relations, National Security, Deterrence, ASEAN, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Asia and Indo-Pacific

1917. Mastering the Digital Age: Understanding Artificial Intelligence and Regulation

Author:
Olivia J. Erdelyi
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:
In recent years, news about a mysterious new technology referred to as artificial intelligence (AI) has been everywhere. Even for the most tech-averse individuals, it is virtually impossible to remain oblivious to AI’s existence. While there is positive news establishing a craving for it, blunders and scandals are not far behind, invoking the wrath of the public and calls for reigning in the ac- tors, mostly perceived to be tech companies, that endanger democratic rights. 1 Leveraging the benefits provided by modern information and communication technologies, people rush to take part in the public discourse of the hour, forming strong opinions before understanding the topic. While eye-catching headlines and impassioned debates continue to spread online, few understand the concept of AI. This scenario presents a problem, as mastering the digital age requires some AI literacy.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Regulation, Artificial Intelligence, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

1918. It’s All About the Benjamins: Why Banknotes Look As They Do, and Why You Should Care

Author:
Jacques E.C. Hymans
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:
In his classic treatise The Philosophy of Money, sociologist Georg Simmel asserts that money is “colorless” and “abstract,” a “system of numbers” that relentlessly promotes the rationalization and depersonalization of modern life.1 Simmel might be right about money, but banknotes are a different story. The banknotes of the world contain many colorful images of human beings, animals, landscapes, and other eye-catching features. What are the purposes of banknote iconography? What kinds of images best achieve those purposes? Does the art of the banknote still matter in the digital age? The answers to these questions also speak to broader issues, including the bases of social trust, the content of collective identities, and the power of visual politics. Some people think of physical cash as a relic of the old days of brick-and- mortar retail. It is true that credit and debit cards and digital means of payment are on the rise. Even the Monopoly board game no longer comes with its famous colorful paper money; instead, a voice-activated electronic “banker” processes players’ transactions and keeps track of their balances.2 Yet reports of the death of the banknote are highly exaggerated. Between 1990 and 2020 the value of cash in circulation soared worldwide from about $1 trillion to $7 trillion, and the annual rate of increase has been accelerating over time.3 The coronavirus pandemic that erupted in early 2020 caused a further spike in cash demand all over the world.4 A comprehensive study of 140 currencies found that the value of cash in circulation in 137 of those currencies rose in 2020 over the previous year while it declined in only three.5 The value of U.S. currency in circulation shot up by 16 percent during 2020, double the average increase of the previous 10 years.6 As of the end of June 2023, it stood at $2.3 trillion, or to be more precise, $2,342,265,000,000—almost 10 percent of U.S. GDP.7 In short, banknotes remain greatly in demand almost everywhere; and wherever there are banknotes, there is banknote iconography.
Topic:
Economy, Currency, and Iconography
Political Geography:
Global Focus

1919. How Poster Art of the “Long 1960s” Fueled International Solidarity

Author:
Lincoln Cushing
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:
With internet and cell phone connectivity enabling instant worldwide dissemination of information, many individuals presume that communication between international social justice activists during the twentieth century was tedious, insular, and ineffective. Yet analysis of the vast output of published graphics from that period reveals a different story, one of dynamic interchange and cross-national support.
Topic:
Cold War, History, Arts, Culture, Solidarity, and Internationalism
Political Geography:
Global Focus

1920. Stablecoins, United States Competitiveness, and the Cloud

Author:
Michael B Greenwald
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:
Recent geopolitical events and the overleveraging of U.S. sanctions has strained the relationship between the U.S. dollar and other world financial powers, bringing the current system—fundamentally grounded in the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement—to a critical inflection point. Although the past 80 years has seen a global financial system that hinged on the chosen policy of the United States, adversaries and allies alike are actively searching for ways to diversify from a dollar-centric system. Simultaneously, the innovation of financial technology has led to the creation of blockchain based, non-state currencies and demand for more efficient settlement of transactions. These trends have given rise to a crucial moment for infrastructure that underpins these innovations: the cloud and U.S. financial policy. In developing a long-term strategy that supports a robust global financial system, policymakers should heed the revolutionary potential of innovation and the cloud, specifically related to stablecoins and Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs).
Topic:
Infrastructure, Digital Currency, Competition, and Stablecoins
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1921. The Future of the Digital Asset Space

Author:
Christian Catalini and Nicholas Sanzi
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:
Christian Catalini is founder of the MIT Cryptoeconomics Lab, and Research Scientist at MIT. He is also the Co-Founder and Chief Strategy Officer of Lightspark. Previously, he was a co-creator of Diem (formerly Libra), Chief Economist of the Diem Association, and Head Economist of Meta FinTech. While a Professor at MIT, Christian designed the MIT Digital Currency Research Study. In 2018, Christian was appointed as a Faculty Research Fellow in the Productivity, Innovation and Entrepreneurship Program at the National Bureau of Economic Research. He holds a PhD from the University of Toronto (Rotman School of Management), and MSc (summa cum laude) in Economics and Management of New Technologies from Bocconi University, Milan.
Topic:
Economics, Cryptocurrencies, Interview, Digital Currency, and Stablecoins
Political Geography:
Global Focus

1922. A Wall of Separation Between Money and State: Policy and Philosophy for the Era of Cryptocurrency

Author:
Max Raskin and Richard A. Epstein
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:
Throughout history, there have been two fundamental and interrelated debates over the creation and use of money.1 The first debate is whether money should be created by the market or the state.2 When money is created by private markets, individual currencies oper- ate in competition with each other, such that the value of any given currency is measured by its relative strength against the others. In contrast, under a system where the government has a monopoly over the supply of money, the sound- ness of the currency is ensured, if at all, by a set of institutional constraints to prevent its debasement. A second debate arises between those who believe that money should be a tool used by policymakers to achieve certain political, economic, and social ends and those who believe that money should be a neutral unit of measurement, like inches or kilograms.3 Today, central banks are tasked with mandates to achieve full employment, plug budget deficits, and spur real economic growth. The institutional challenge for governments is to decide how to balance these goals with the need for price stability. Discretion by central bankers with respect to these tradeoffs is intended to allow public officials to operate the system for the public benefit. By the same token, government discretion in the management of money creates the possibility of major failures—such as runaway inflation—if that discretion is misused.
Topic:
Finance, Economy, Central Bank, Currency, Cryptocurrencies, and Bitcoin
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

1923. Hybrid Maritime Security Governance and Limited Statehood in the Gulf of Guinea: A Nigerian Case Study

Author:
Okechukwu Iheduru
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
This article attempts to expand the scope of inquiry into “the market for force” as an important area of study in international relations by focusing on the privatization of aspects of maritime security governance in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) in West Africa and sets out to fill a persistent gap in the study of the privatization of maritime security as part of the normative shift in the global political economy that permits non-state actors to play prominent roles in security provision, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) in West Africa. Extant studies erroneously attribute the persistence and escalation of piracy incidents in the subregion to corruption, weak law enforcement, and grievances over high levels of poverty and unsustainable livelihoods that push coastal community members towards maritime criminality. While providing invaluable insights into contemporary piracy and the justification for a hybrid maritime security governance strategy and the transformations in international maritime law, these studies merely analyze the symptoms, rather than a theorization of the paradox that piracy and other maritime crime incidents have escalated at the same time that many GoG states have substantially modernized and, in principle, improved the anti-piracy capacity of national navies.
Topic:
Security, Governance, Piracy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Africa, Nigeria, and Gulf of Guinea

1924. “Too late and inadequate:” The Southern African Development Community’s Response to the Conflict in Cabo Delgado Province, Mozambique

Author:
Enock Ndawana
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
This article discusses the challenges and prospects facing SAMIM. It augments extant studies on the conflict in northern Mozambique, which had hitherto mainly focused on its causes, dynamics, the challenges and prospects facing the government in fighting against the Ansar al-Sunna terrorist group and the regional implications. The main argument is that though SADC delayed intervening in the conflict in Cabo Delgado, its intervention brought some improvements to the situation, which are yet to be consolidated for sustainable peace to be realized. The analysis in this article is the outcome of data gathered mainly from a review of accessible documentary sources. These include but are not limited to media articles, reports by non-governmental organizations including SADC, journal articles and books on the violent conflict in Mozambique and related developments. The article discusses the causes and drivers of the insurgency in Cabo Delgado province and focuses on the challenges and prospects of SADC’s response and the way forward.
Topic:
Development, Conflict, and Sustainable Development
Political Geography:
Africa and Mozambique

1925. A Force for the Right Purpose? Rethinking Western COIN Interventions in Africa’s Sahel

Author:
Gershon Adela
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
France, the EU, UN, US and its Western allies have implemented several COIN interventions in the Sahel. While these interventions have accomplished some immediate outcomes, their long-term success remains daunting. This article examines six bad practices responsible for the failure of COIN operations. Comparing these practices to Western COIN interventions in the Sahel, the evidence provided here demonstrates that these Sahelian COIN missions are doomed to fail. In addition to being foreign occupiers in the Sahel, the activities of Western forces and their local allies are considered worse than insurgent groups due to their contribution to the creation of new grievances in the region. Furthermore, the alliance between foreign forces and local militia groups has led to an increase in inter-ethnic and inter-community violence mainly due to differences in their agenda and strategy for combating the insurgency. Finally, some Western actors operating in the Sahel, especially the French, remain unprepared to adapt their strategy for combatting the insurgency.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Counterinsurgency, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:
Africa and Sahel

1926. CTC Sentinel: December 2023 Issue

Author:
Michael Knights, Hamdi Malik, Crispin Smith, Phillip Smyth, Austin C. Doctor, and Sam Hunter
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In the December feature article, Michael Knights, Hamdi Malik, and Crispin Smith outline how over the past two years Tehran-backed terrorist organizations and militias captured the Iraqi state, a development that could have dramatic implications for the regional terrorist threat, regional stability, U.S. interests, and great power competition in the wake of Iran enabling the second deadliest terrorist attack in history on October 7. They write that “Iran-backed terrorists and militias lost the 2021 elections in Iraq yet ended up picking the prime minister anyway and taking charge of the world’s fifth-largest oil producer. This remarkable reversal of fortunes in 2022 was not delivered via the barrel of a gun but rather a series of cool-headed and coordinated moves by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, by Iranian-groomed and militia-controlled judges, and by militia politicians. The country’s oil economy, its freedoms, and its intelligence services are being gutted by militias to ensure their rule is permanent. Yet unprecedented control has not moderated these militias: The Gaza war has shown that these armed factions are also still addicted to militant ‘resistance’ to the United States. The result is the emergence of a terrorist-run state with greater resources than any of Iran’s other proxy networks, hiding behind the façade of a sovereign country.” The attack on Israel on October 7 and its aftermath have underlined the regional threat posed by the broader Iran threat network. Besides Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a multitude of other Tehran-backed Palestinian armed groups participated in the attack, including Fatah splinters and leftist groups. Phillip Smyth examines how Iran built up and managed a constellation of Palestinian ‘Axis of Resistance’ groups from across the ideological spectrum and empowered them to launch an attack that killed 1,200 Israelis. He writes: “Iranian assistance allowed its Palestinian proxies to amass the firepower, messaging know-how, and much of the hi-tech equipment necessary to carry out and propagandize the attack.” Austin Doctor and Sam Hunter examine the evolving threat of improvised explosives devices in the United States. They write: “Violent extremists continue to innovate, drawing on emerging technologies and creative problem solving. The onus of initiative requires that the counterterrorism mission community looks over the horizon to identify emerging threats.
Topic:
Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Hamas, IED, October 7, and Regional Stability
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and Palestine

1927. Impact of Climate Change on Communities in Phobji and Gangtey valley in Bhutan

Author:
Tshering Yangden
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Bhutan Studies
Institution:
Centre for Bhutan & GNH Studies (CBS)
Abstract:
While Bhutan is a carbon-negative country, it still is under constant threats of climate change as it compasses global warming. The most significant impact is the melting of glaciers which has led to the loss of livelihoods including human lives. As Bhutan is a country with dramatic variations of elevation with hot and humid weather in the south to cooler regions in the north, different regions are subjected to different impacts of climate change. Using a qualitative method of research, this study examines the impact of climate change in Phobji and Gangtey Valley under Wangdue Phodrang district in Bhutan, a popular tourist and conservation spot. Previous studies in the same place have concentrated on the impact of climate change on conservation efforts and no studies have been found on the impact of climate change on other forms. This study found that climate change impacted crop cultivation, livestock, gender, and food security. Besides the negative impacts, positive impacts such as the introduction of a new variety of vegetables in greenhouses due to the rise in temperature that leads to improvement of food security have been observed.
Topic:
Climate Change, Food Security, Livelihoods, and Gender
Political Geography:
South Asia and Bhutan

1928. Yak Herding as the Main Source of Livelihood: Examining Challenges and Opportunities of Highlanders in Bhutan

Author:
Sonam Wangdi, Kelly Tobden Dorji Tamang, Pelden Wangchuk, and Sherub
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Bhutan Studies
Institution:
Centre for Bhutan & GNH Studies (CBS)
Abstract:
Yak farming is the mainstays of nomadic herders’ economy in Bhutan. However, it has declined over the years despite diverse government interventions. Rapid socio-economic development and access to economic opportunities further hindered yak farming culture rather than helping to maintain highlanders’ livelihood. The study was carried out in four gewogs, Chhoekhor, Sephu, Merak and Sakteng, that depends on yaks for their living. Questionnaire based semi-structured interview was conducted to identify the main challenges and opportunities of yak herding within the different regions and examined the cost-benefit of herding yaks within the premises of nomadic herder’s livelihood sustenance. The study revealed that yak farming generates sufficient income to support the herders’ livelihood even though the profit margin was minimal. Around 90% of herders earned cash income from yaks. Dry cheese was the main revenue generator of Chhoekhor and Sephu, while fermented cheese earnt the highest income in Merak and Sephu. Yaks not only serve as the primary source of livelihood but also acts as a catalyst to generate additional income by gaining access to natural resources such as Cordyceps and herbal medicines. However, increased wildlife depredation on yaks and inadequate pastureland coupled with poor modern amenities threatened yak farming. The findings showed a declining trend in total yak population and number of yak-owning households particularly in Chhoekhor and Sephu compared to Merak and Sakteng. The future of yak farming in Bhutan is uncertain, but there is potential to address the challenges and ensure its continued importance to Bhutanese highlanders.
Topic:
Socioeconomics, Livelihoods, Income, Animal Husbandry, and Yak Farming
Political Geography:
South Asia and Bhutan

1929. Understanding the Experiences of Dropouts During COVID-19 Pandemic School Closure: A Qualitative Study

Author:
Sonam Wangmo, Dorji S., and Cheku
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Bhutan Studies
Institution:
Centre for Bhutan & GNH Studies (CBS)
Abstract:
This study explores the teaching learning experiences of school dropouts during pandemic school closure as well as the factors that influenced them to leave the school. The factors affecting dropouts during pandemic school closure were rarely studied in Bhutan. This study employed phenomenology as its method. A total participants of 12 dropouts of the year 2020, four parents, four teachers and four school principals were selected through purposive and snowball sampling. The data was collected with semi-structured interviews consisting of four research questions. The collected interview data was transcribed and analyzed by following Braun and Clarke’s (2006) six-step framework. The findings demonstrate that abrupt school closures necessitated the use of online learning as a means of ensuring that education continued. However, there were concerns about student participation in online learning using digital platforms due to students’ socioeconomic and technological challenges. These challenges were found to have been the cause of their dropping out of the schools. Students’ socioeconomic background of their parents compelled them to provide support to their parents in the socioeconomic activities, thus, impacting their participation in the regular academic activities. According to the interview, variables that contributed to dropouts included socioeconomic issues, unfinished assignments, difficulties understanding lessons, lack of enthusiasm, a lack of smartphones and poor internet connectivity, pregnancy, and relationships. The study also identified online teaching pedagogy employed by the teachers as a significant contributor to student attrition. Though the study is limited to a district, the findings recommend the need to improve technological access, provide digital equipment and reasonably priced internet to underprivileged students and provide professional development programs for teachers on technical skills to improve their competency in using online apps for effective online teaching.
Topic:
Education, Science and Technology, Internet, COVID-19, and Dropout Prevention
Political Geography:
South Asia and Bhutan

1930. Dumping the Jewel in the River: Renewing and Perpetuating the Memory of Bhutanese Statehood in Punakha Domchoe

Author:
Sonam Kinga
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Bhutan Studies
Institution:
Centre for Bhutan & GNH Studies (CBS)
Abstract:
Theatrical re-enactments of historical battles characterize some local festivals in western Bhutan in contrast to the largely Buddhist mask dances that are performed during such festivals elsewhere in the country. They serve as medium of recording, renewing and transmitting the memory of historic moments in the life of spiritual and political leaders. For example, the festival of Nangkar Dog (snang-dkar bzlog) in Chang village, Paro is dedicated to commemorate the victory of Phajo Drugom Zhigpo over his spiritual adversary called Lama Lhapa (Zangpo, 2003). Lo-ju (blo-‘gyur) is another festival celebrated every three years in villages of Wangdue Phodrang. It is ‘an articulate narrative of the events leading up to the formation of the Drukpa state by conquering hostile forces…’ (Chophel, 2003, p.85). Punakha Drubchen (spungs-thang sgrub-chen) popularly known as Punakha Domchoe (hereafter domchoe) theatrically re-enacts a historic battle that the Bhutanese fought against Tibetan forces in 1649. Dochula Tshechu is a very recent innovation that recounts Bhutan’s military operation in 2003 against Indian militants (David & Samuel, 2016). The domchoe is one of the most important festivals celebrated in the first month of the lunar calendar. It begins with fifteen days of sacred prayers and mask dances inside the congregation hall or dukhang (‘du-khang) of the magnificent Punakha Dzong, which was built by Zhabdrung Ngawang Namgyal (hereafter Zhabdrung Rinpoche) between 1639-40. Known as Goenwang Drubchen (mgon-dbang sgrub-chen), it is followed by three days of martial performances by people dressed as traditional militia called pazangpas (dpa’-mdzangspa - hereafter pazaps) to commemorate and re-enact the military victory in 1649. Both folk and mask dances are performed during the domchoe alongside the pazaps’ performances. The most significant episode of the domchoe with which it concludes involves immersion of multi-coloured sacred substances used as base of the mandala made for Goenwang Drubchen. This moment of dumping of jewel in the Mochu (mo-chu) river and three days of pazaps’ performances record and renew the memory as well as transmit the narrative of that historic victory to both the performers and the audience. The focus may be that particular battle but the overall narrative of the domchoe recounted through songs and dances also record, perpetuate and transmit the memory of the founding of Bhutanese state by Zhabdrung Rinpoche. In this article, I examine how this narrative is constructed and re-told in Punakha Domchoe. I argue that this local festival has transformed into a state-sponsored national ritual that serves important political objective of keeping alive, perpetuating and transmitting the memory of the founding of Bhutanese State.
Topic:
History, Culture, Theater, and Festivals
Political Geography:
South Asia and Bhutan

1931. Characteristics and Determinants of International Migration: The Recent Phenomenon of Migration of Bhutanese to International Destinations

Author:
Tobden Tobden, Lhawang Ugyel, and Tashi Dorjee
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Bhutan Studies
Institution:
Centre for Bhutan & GNH Studies (CBS)
Abstract:
The trend in international migration has always been increasing. However, in Bhutan, the rising number of international migrants, which has surged in recent years, is a new phenomenon. This paper explores the recent development of international migration of Bhutanese to countries, such as India, Australia, USA and countries in Middle-East Asia. It examines the characteristics of Bhutanese international migrants. The study also analyses the underlying reasons that drives international migration in Bhutan. As such, this study is one of the first comprehensive investigations on international migration of Bhutanese that leverages data from the two major Population and Housing Censuses conducted in the country thus far. In doing so, this paper seeks to provide an insight into the impact of international migration on the demographic structure and the policies that influence such migration.
Topic:
Development, Migration, Urbanization, Rural, Push Factor, and Pull Factor
Political Geography:
South Asia and Bhutan

1932. Bibliometric Analysis of Publication Related to Bhutan, 1894-2022

Author:
Sonam Wangdi
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Bhutan Studies
Institution:
Centre for Bhutan & GNH Studies (CBS)
Abstract:
This study provides an overall growth of Bhutan-related literature to understand scientific productivity of the nation. This paper aims to assess scientific productivity of Bhutan in terms of the country’s literature growth in the international arena and to establish baseline information on research trends and hotspots, benefiting both scholars and policymakers.The bibliometric technique was employed to analyze the evolutionary trend, identify key institutions, prolific authors, leading countries, and prominent themes, while also highlighting emerging areas of research in Bhutan. A total of 4145 Bhutan-related publications were identified and retrieved from the Scopus database (1894-2022). The result showed that the growth of Bhutan-related literature increased significantly over the last decade with a maximum publication in 2021 (n=461). Of the total, about 72% consists of articles, whereas conference reviews and data papers were minimum. Journal of Threatened Taxa published the highest number of literature. Among the Bhutanese institutions, the Jigme Dorji Wangchuck National Referral Hospital (JDWNRH) published the highest (n= 398) total number of publications, while the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests (MoAF) received the highest network of publication connections. Keyword analysis revealed that the field of taxonomy, new species and climate change were dominant in Bhutan’s research landscape and are expected to remain prominent in the future. The findings revealed that Bhutan published the highest number of literature among the top ten countries, and ranked the highest number of corresponding authors from multiple countries (n=159). However, the international collaboration rate in literature publication was low compared to Australia, Thailand and Nepal.
Topic:
Research, Literature, Academia, Bibliometric Analysis, and Publication
Political Geography:
South Asia and Bhutan

1933. Studying the Post-COVID-19 Landscape of Higher Education in Bhutan: A Systematic Literature Review

Author:
Kinley Rinchen, Vicki Banham, and Sonam Pelden
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Bhutan Studies
Institution:
Centre for Bhutan & GNH Studies (CBS)
Abstract:
The higher education sector is highly disrupted by the onslaught of the COVID-19 pandemic. The enforcement of social restriction protocols led to the closure of higher education institutions and the shifting of teaching-learning to online classes. Various studies show that the disruption has offered lessons that could improve practices in the postpandemic period. This systematic literature review (SLR) aims to assess the impact of COVID-19 on higher education in Bhutan and identify possible areas of improvement in the postpandemic period. It follows PRISMA guidelines to identify and screen studies, followed by a thematic analysis to classify and categorise challenges and opportunities created by the pandemic. A significant finding for Bhutan is that the adoption of digital pedagogy has paved the way for implementing a blended learning system, offering ample opportunities for educational advancement. This system will promote inclusivity as it supports diverse learning groups, helps promote personalised and self-directed learning systems to improve the quality of teaching-learning, and contributes to the development of a culture of lifelong learning. Another notable finding also shows an unprecedented level of priority accorded to the well-being of students and teachers, which is recommended to be sustained. The SLR may contribute to the discussions on education reform that is currently underway in Bhutan.
Topic:
Education, Science and Technology, Higher Education, COVID-19, and Remote Learning
Political Geography:
South Asia and Bhutan

1934. Warnings and Welcomes: China’s Reopening and the Politics of International Travel

Author:
John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Over the past two months, as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has rapidly rolled back its strict zero-COVID epidemic prevention policy, COVID-19 has spread rapidly throughout the country. The combination of the PRC reopening its borders to outbound travel on January 8 and the ongoing pandemic has put countries that are major travel destinations for Chinese nationals in a bind. Governments have responded differently to the situation, with some imposing testing and quarantine requirements and others declining to do so. In China, official and social media have generally lauded countries that have desisted from testing requirements and opened their doors to Chinese tourists. Thailand, in particular, has been widely celebrated. Not only did Thailand decline to impose testing requirements on inbound travelers from the PRC, but several senior Thai government ministers went to the airport to welcome the first planeload of Chinese tourists following the lifting of travel restrictions on January 8 (Guangming Daily, January 17). Scenes of smiling Thai officials and airport workers greeting the first group of arriving tourists circulated widely in Chinese media.
Topic:
Politics, COVID-19, Health Crisis, and Travel
Political Geography:
China and Asia

1935. At a Dead End? China’s Drive to Reform Defense Science and Technology Institutes Stalls

Author:
Arthur S. Ding and K. Tristan Tang
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Since becoming China’s top leader ten years ago, General Secretary Xi Jinping has sought to sustain a three-decade effort to reform the defense industry in order to advance the development of defense technology and improve the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) capabilities. Recent reforms have focused on transforming defense science and technology (S&T) institutes into enterprise-like entities, but due to political and economic impediments, progress has been slow. This article examines the rationale for defense industry reform, assesses progress in implementation and explains difficulties encountered in the reform process.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Reform, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
China and Asia

1936. The Clash at Tawang: Tensions Rise on the China-India Border

Author:
Amrita Jash
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On December 9, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Indian army clashed at Yangtse along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Tawang Sector in Arunachal Pradesh resulting in injuries on both sides. Following the incident, the local Indian commander held a flag meeting with his Chinese counterpart on December 11 in order to restore peace. The clash at Tawang marked the first major skirmish between the two armies in the eastern sector since the Galwan Valley clash in the western sector in Eastern Ladakh on June 15, 2020 (China Brief, July 15, 2020).
Topic:
Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia

1937. Fentanyl Precursors from China and the American Opioid Epidemic

Author:
Martin Purbrick
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The fentanyl epidemic was born in America, rose from the supply of precursor chemicals made in China and is now even more destructive as Mexican drug cartels profit from huge demand. The involvement of suppliers of fentanyl precursors from China is a controversial issue that negatively impacts U.S.-China relations. The U.S. government has claimed that not enough is being done to curtail the production and trafficking of fentanyl precursors from China. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) government has claimed that it has taken strong action while also emphasizing China’s antipathy to illegal drugs by falling back on the historical legacy of the harm wrought by Western merchants’ trading of opium with China in the 19th century.
Topic:
Narcotics Trafficking, Organized Crime, Cartels, Opioid Crisis, and Fentanyl
Political Geography:
China, Mexico, and United States of America

1938. After the Kabul Hotel Attack: The Taliban and China Confront Security Challenges in Afghanistan

Author:
Zafar Iqbal Yousafzai
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On December 12, members of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) attacked a local hotel in Kabul, where several Chinese nationals were staying. The attack injured five Chinese nationals along with 18 other victims, while the three attackers were killed by security forces (China Daily, December 14, 2022). It was reported that Chinese businesspeople run the hotel, which is frequently visited by Chinese diplomats and business people (Global Times, December 13, 2022). In response, People’s Republic of China (PRC) Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin stated: “China is deeply shocked at the attack, which is highly egregious, and firmly opposes terrorism in any form” (China Daily, December 14, 2022). The ISKP strike in Kabul will further reinforce Beijing’s commitment to giving special attention to the security and stability of Afghanistan. An unstable and volatile Afghanistan threatens Chinese interests and could be a hurdle to the success of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Moreover, Chinese sources have expressed concern that uncertainty and unrest could lead to Afghanistan becoming a hotbed for terrorists “targeting China’s Xinjiang and its interests overseas, such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects, where enhanced communication and coordination between China and Pakistan is required to tackle potential threats” (Global Times, August 19, 2021). In response to these challenges, China has sought to provide the Taliban with enough support to combat all forms of terrorism and extremism in Afghanistan.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Taliban, and Islamic State
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, China, and Kabul

1939. Ten Years of Democratizing Data: Privileging Facts, Refuting Misconceptions and Examining Missed Opportunities

Author:
Donald Kerwin and Robert Warren
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:
Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:
The Center for Migration Studies of New York (CMS) initiated its “Democratizing Data” project in 2013 to make detailed demographic information widely available on the US undocumented, eligible to naturalize, and other non-citizen populations. The paper begins by outlining top-line findings and themes from the more than 30 CMS studies under this project. It then examines and refutes four persistent misconceptions that have inhibited public understanding and needed policy change: (1) migrants never leave the United States; (2) most undocumented migrants arrive by illegally crossing the US-Mexico border; (3) each Border Patrol apprehension translates into a new undocumented resident; and (4) immigrants are less skilled than US-born workers. The paper then offers new analyses in support of select policy recommendations drawn from a decade of democratizing data. It concludes with a short reflection and a case study on the failure of data, evidence-based policy ideas, and national ideals to translate into necessary reform.
Topic:
Border Control, Democracy, Data, and Migrants
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1940. The Polarized American Electorate: The Rise of Partisan-Ideological Consistency and Its Consequences

Author:
Alan I. Abramowitz
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Political Science Quarterly
Institution:
Academy of Political Science
Abstract:
Alan I. Abramowitz presents evidence from American National Election Studies surveys showing that party identification, ideological identification and issue positions have become much more closely connected over the past half century. He argues that as a result, the ideological divide between Democratic and Republican identifiers has widened considerably. The rise of partisan-ideological consistency has contributed to growing affective polarization as well as increasing party loyalty and straight ticket voting.
Topic:
Elections, Ideology, Political Science, Survey, Polarization, Republican Party, and Democratic Party
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1941. The Trajectory of International Relations Dissertations in Turkish Academia Between 2000 and 2020

Author:
Özge Özkoç and Çağlayan. Pınar
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
Dissertations are among the most important elements of academic production, along with scientific research articles and books. They not only reveal an academic’s field of research, but also provide clues as to what research methods and tools scholars will employ in postdoctoral studies. Moreover, and crucial to this paper, they are important indicators of the trajectory of research fields, as well as their general roles in the academic world. This study aims to reveal general trends/indicators in Turkish International Relations (hereafter IR) dissertations through an analysis of IR dissertations written in various Turkish universities between 2000 and 2020. There is a rather widespread claim among IR academics in Turkey that this particular community largely contributes to the Western-oriented discipline of IR as local or regional experts, dealing mainly with Turkish foreign policy and regional problems rather than with theoretical concerns in IR. A further aim of this study is to test whether this claim remains valid with the analysis of recent IR dissertations produced in Turkish universities.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, International Law, Academia, and Dissertations
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

1942. Turkish IR Journals through a Bibliometric Lens

Author:
Hakan Mehmetcik and Hasan Hakses
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
This article aims at evaluating three International Relations (IR) journals in Turkey, namely, All Azimuth, Insight Turkey, and Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi. The scholarly contributions of these three journals to Turkish IR is worthy of exploration since together they constitute ‘the mainstream’ of Turkish IR journals. To this end, this article applies a bibliometric analysis in surveying all three journals' publication records in order to provide a general picture of the field in the last decade. When we consider an evaluation of the Turkish IR community, these three journals are also important and represent different sub-groups and interests among Turkish IR scholars. The field orientations and organization of the IR discipline in a given country may be understood by studying the leading journals of the field in that country. With this assumption in mind, this paper attempts to distinguish certain characteristic differences and similarities among these three journals by surveying their materials and authorships using comparative bibliometric analysis. While there are several articles in the literature that discuss the contents of these publications, no comparative bibliometric analysis has ever been conducted on them.
Topic:
International Relations, Academia, and Meta-analysis
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

1943. Non-Western Theories in International Relations Education and Research: The Case of Turkey/Turkish Academia FacebookLinkedInTwitterMendeleyEmail

Author:
Mehmet Akif Okur and Cavit Emre Aytekin
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
This study examines the usage of non-Western theories in research and education by International Relations (IR) scholars in Turkey. Our primary purpose is to understand the level of engagement with the non-Western IR debate, with its prospects and variations, in Turkish academia, and to evaluate the familiarity of Turkish IR scholars from different schools with non-Western IR theories. Relevant data were obtained from a questionnaire with 47 items designed to let participants, consisting of 116 academicians at IR departments from 57 Turkish Universities, provide their teaching experiences, views, and perceptions concerning non-Western IR Theory. While our findings based on this data confirm the literature on the scarcity of non-Western theories in Turkish IR scholarship, we have also furthered it with many details. Firstly, according to the findings, respondents who study and teach IR Theory at Turkish universities think that the IR theories of Western origin dominating the literature are not universal or objective in terms of their function as interpreters of IR issues. But interestingly, those considerations direct scholars to Western critical IR Theory schools rather than non-Western theories. The other key conclusion of this study confirms our expectations. The thoughts, concepts and theories emanating from the Turkish-Islamic world have much more recognition than other non-Western IR theories among Turkish IR scholars.
Topic:
International Relations, Research, International Relations Theory, Academia, and Survey
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

1944. A Genealogy of the Concept of Civilization (Medeniyet) in Ottoman Political Thought: A Homegrown Perception?

Author:
Mustafa Serdar Palabıyık
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
Since the first translation of the concept of civilization into Turkish as “medeniyet” in 1837 by Sadık Rıfat Pasha, the then Ottoman Ambassador to Vienna, this coinage has turned out to be an essential component of Turkish modernization. This paper aims to establish a genealogy of the concept of “medeniyet” to demonstrate the divergences of Ottoman perceptions in different periods throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It argues that civilization was first perceived by a group of Ottoman intellectuals as a tool to reach an ideal state of being (c. 1840-1860). The next generation of Ottoman intellectuals (c. 1860-1890) defined civilization as “the” ideal state of being, yet they had different views on the concept, particularly concerning the distinction between material and moral elements of civilization. Finally, the third generation of Ottoman intellectuals (c. 1890-1920), whose thoughts were more or less crystallized under three broad political currents labeled as Westernism, Islamism, and Turkism, had different and sometimes contradicting perceptions of civilization based on their political outlooks. By referring to the writings of these intellectuals, the paper will discuss central debates on civilization in the late Ottoman Empire, such as the singularity/plurality of civilization(s), the existence of Islamic civilization as an alternative to European civilization, the degree of importing from European civilization, and the distinction between culture and civilization. Moreover, it argues that the Turkish perception of “medeniyet” is different from the European perception of “civilization”; in other words, while the Ottoman perception of the concept of civilization is not homeborn, it is homegrown. Accordingly, Ottoman intellectuals not only divided the material and moral elements of civilization and opted for importing the former, but they also questioned the singularity and supremacy of European civilization by referring to “Islamic civilization” either as an extinct yet once-present form of civilization or as a potential rival to European civilization.
Topic:
Politics, History, Modernization, Civilization, and Ottoman Empire
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

1945. Sea Blindness in Turkish International Relations Literature

Author:
Levent Kırval and Arda Özkan
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
The oceans and seas cover 72% of the Earth’s surface, and 85% of global trade is done by maritime transportation. Moreover, 40% of the world’s population lives on or near coastlines. Also, the oceans play a crucial role in Earth’s biosphere. Recently, by desalination techniques, the seas have become a potable water resource. Therefore, one can say that the oceans and seas are indispensable for mankind. However, international disputes and collaboration efforts between states regarding the seas are not widely studied by scholars of international relations (IR). This can be referred to as sea blindness, and it may be defined as an inability to appreciate the importance of seas and naval power, particularly with regards to strategic security and economic prosperity. A country with sea blindness is not aware of maritime supremacy as an important foreign policy tool. Similarly, IR scholars mostly focus on land conflicts and not on sea issues when they study international politics. This is particularly true in Turkish IR literature as issues on land are again the focus areas for Turkish scholars. In this context, this article makes an analysis of the articles in peer-reviewed journals and books published by well-known publishers in Turkey, providing statistics about the issues covered. Also, for comparison, major political science and IR journals published abroad are analysed with regards to publications related to the seas. This statistical analysis elucidates whether there is sea blindness in Turkish IR literature. The number of articles and books that cover the seas as crucial study areas of IR in Turkey, as well as their broad focus areas and perspectives, are revealed by this study.
Topic:
International Relations, Maritime, Oceans and Seas, and Disputes
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

1946. Lessons Learned from the Development of Turkish IR: A View from Greece

Author:
Kyriakos Mikelis
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
The essay addresses an outsider's perception of the characteristics and dynamics of the IR field/discipline in Turkey. How may this country serve as a role model or, at the very least, as a source of inspiration, reflection, or evaluation of the field's development in other local/national settings? In this respect, Greece is chosen as a case study. Βy addressing and assessing Turkish self-reflection and the search for disciplinary identity within Turkish IR scholarship, what can be learned, on behalf of Greek IR scholarship, regarding both Greece's and Turkey's social scientific development regarding foreign affairs/policy? A major theme discovered is the acknowledgement of the limitations of the dependency/vulnerability-centered explanations for the development of IR.
Topic:
International Relations, Development, Academia, and Social Science
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Greece

1947. International Relations in Search of an Antidote

Author:
Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
This essay is based on the author’s long-time observation of the International Relations discipline and the repeated crises it has experienced. The piece identifies ‘event-drivenness’ as the structural reason behind these crises, in other words, the course of the discipline naturally follows global IR events and, depending on how transformative these events are, when responding to them, is more likely to fall into an existential crisis—with the most recent one being potentially fatal. By discussing in detail the a) science-statecraft relationship; b) scholar-practitioner disconnect; c) distortion of theories by scholars and practitioners; d) paradoxical relationship between rationality and irrationality; and e) theory-practice disconnect, the essay seeks to operationalize these crisisgenerated processes when responding to major events. In order to show these crisis generation processes in detail, it uses the theories of political realism and, to a lesser degree, classical liberalism, as case reflections. As a possible solution to the reciprocal condescension between scholarship (theory-making) and statecraft (practice), the essay proposes a “Clausewitzian” modus vivendi that aims at creating a culture of synthesis between the presumed producers and consumers of IR knowledge.
Topic:
International Relations, Academia, and Knowledge Production
Political Geography:
Global Focus

1948. The Monroe Doctrine as the Will and Idea of the United States of America

Author:
Boris Martynov
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
On February 24, 2022, international relations entered a whole new stage of development affecting, albeit to varying degrees, practically all states, with no end in sight. On September 7, 2022, speaking at the Eastern Economic Forum, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that the world was experiencing “fundamental transformations.” Such transformations generally require several years to be completed. By the middle of the third decade of the 21st century, two highly important signs of a new situation have become absolutely clear: a crisis of the old institutions of global governance and the new rising and developing centers of power. At the same time, the opinion that the new is just the “well-forgotten old” is confirmed. This is especially true of the US and its policies.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, History, Governance, Law, Psychology, Identity, and Monroe Doctrine
Political Geography:
Russia, Global Focus, and United States of America

1949. Reasons for the West’s Hatred of Russia

Author:
Yury Sayamov
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
Russia as a state and civilization and Russian statehood as an institution have acted for centuries as system-forming factors of the world order. They have, at various times, exerted influence of varying intensity and significance on the shape, character, and content of international relations, while also being influenced by them. The West’s hostility toward Russia arose, took shape, and began to actively manifest itself as one of the constants of this influence, occasionally reaching the level of outright hatred and spiraling into attacks against Russian statehood, which invariably mobilized the country’s peoples to rebuff the aggressors.
Topic:
History, Statehood, Information Warfare, Crusades, and Russophobia
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

1950. Poland's Threat Assessment: Deepened, Not Changed

Author:
Mariusz Antoni Kamiński and Zdzisław Śliwa
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Polish-Russian relations are traditionally difficult, shaped by geostrategic locations in Europe and shared history. Russians have stereotypes about Poland that color their perception of Polish issues. This, combined with ongoing political and economic disputes, creates a situation where hopes for improvement are slim. Poland and Russia’s common history includes a number of painful historical memories that make it challenging to build mutual trust and reconciliation, which outside observers must understand. Although the two nations have been neighbors for more than a thousand years, the critical historical events came between the 16th and 17th centuries, when both countries competed for primacy in Eastern Europe. Poland lost this rivalry, resulting in Austria, Prussia, and Russia partitioning Poland three times between 1772 and 1795, when Russia made Poland a principality within the Russian empire until Poland’s independence in 1918. The result was the compulsory Russification of Polish lands, widespread attempts to convert Catholic Poles to Orthodox Christianity, and the brutal suppression of national uprisings. Together, these meet the modern criteria for ethnic cleansing and form the basis of Poles’ historical consciousness. When Soviet forces sought to invade Europe in the name of communism at the end of the Russian Civil War, they were decisively defeated at the Battle of Warsaw in 1920, which stopped the Soviet advance and frustrated their desire to ignite a global revolution. Stalin, then an officer in the Red Army, was one of the contributors to this disaster and took his revenge in 1940, ordering the execution of some 22,000 Polish officers and intelligentsia at Katyń, after partitioning Poland again with Germany. The Soviets occupied Poland at the end of World War II and imposed a communist regime until 1989, depriving Poland of full political and economic sovereignty, creating elite dependence on the Soviet Union, and enabling Soviet interference in Poland’s internal affairs. Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ascent of the Law and Justice Party in Poland in 2015 led to a more decisive and negative policy toward Russia. According to Witold Waszczykowski, a former member of Poland’s Parliament and a current member of the European Parliament, NATO’s Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, enacted at a time when “Yeltsin’s Russia was relatively weak and cooperative with the West,” was repudiated in acknowledgment that “Today’s Russia is aggressive and imperialistic, [and so] there’s no reason we should respect that agreement.”
Topic:
Threat Assessment, Bilateral Relations, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Poland and Russia

1951. Denmark's Security Starts in the Baltic States

Author:
Amelie Theussen
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Danish security and defense policy strongly builds on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as its cornerstone. Since the 1990s, Denmark has pursued an active military role in international missions. In line with its military activism and Atlanticist orientation, the United States, United Kingdom, and France are Denmark’s closest strategic partners. Yet several developments in recent years have forced the country to question its partnerships and re-evaluate its military priorities: the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, the election of Donald Trump as U.S. President in 2016, Brexit, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. These stand out as major external influences on Danish policies. Additionally, a changing threat environment with an aggressive posturing by Russia (and non-military threats in the cyber realm and of hybrid nature) means that Denmark has made moves to strengthen its military capacities, contributing to NATO’s overall deterrence posture as well as its total defense capacities to deter and defend against unconventional threats. While Denmark does not consider Russia a direct military threat against its own territory, it does regard Russia as directly threatening its neighbors and European security, and the rules-based international order through actions which analysts refer to as “political warfare.”1 Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Denmark has joined with the vast majority of European Union (EU) and NATO members in supporting Ukraine and condemning Russia for raging violations of international law.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Security, NATO, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Denmark and Baltic States

1952. Societal Security and Total Defense: The Swedish Way

Author:
Bengt Sundelius and Jan Eldeblad
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Sweden has recovered from several severe security challenges over the past two decades. In 2004 more than 500 Swedish citizens died in the Boxing Day tsunami in Southeast Asia. During the suddenly escalating Lebanon conflict of 2006, more than 8,000 citizens were hastily, but successfully, evacuated out of harm’s way. Days before Christmas 2010, the first suicide bomber in the Nordic region, luckily prematurely, exploded his bomb near a crowded shopping street in the city center of Stockholm. Sweden’s neighbor Norway experienced a terrible mass murder in July 2011 undertaken by a solo terrorist. In April 2017, terror struck with deadly force in the shopping area of the city center of Stockholm. Dramatic forest fires rampaged in the summers of 2014 and 2018. In the fall of 2015, a massive flow of migrants poured into the country, with major immediate effects and long-term consequences for Swedish society. Most recently, the deadly COVID-19 pandemic, which began in March 2020, became a stress test of endurance and societal resilience for the Swedish population. Compared with the other Nordic states Sweden has suffered much higher rates of infections, and it has seen more than 14,000 deaths, putting into question the Swedish strategy for managing this public health disaster. The close neighborhood of the Baltic Sea region has experienced fundamental security changes since 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and intruded into eastern Ukraine. Like those of the other nations in the region, Swedish political leaders have responded to this development by placing greater emphasis on defense and security issues, taking measures including significant additions to the defense budget. Total defense planning was reintroduced in 2015, and the conscript system, now for both men and women, was reactivated in 2017. In addition to continuing concerns about new terror attacks, political debate has focused on Russian behavior and on the potential damage of so-called hybrid attacks on Swedish society, including cyber activities and social media campaigns. Further heavy investments in national defense have been made in light of the Russian attack on Ukraine in February 2022. The rearmament of the total defense forces has also been accelerated, to reach higher levels more quickly than previously planned. The Swedish security context appears to be entering a troubling period, with the Baltic Sea region living without peace, but not in full-scale war, either, despite the close-by war in Ukraine. The gray zone between peace and war could be characterized as a state of adversarial interdependencies across the boundaries of Europe. Novel tools must be developed to safeguard the nation against acts of ill will and to promote, both at home and abroad, those values and interests that are dear to the people of Sweden. Joining the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) is one such tool. This significant step deviates from a 200-year tradition of staying outside of military alliances. A wide consensus across party lines now exists on the necessity of joining this Western defense alliance. Considering the recent experiences of other democracies, special care was taken to safeguard the election process of September 9, 2018. Public awareness campaigns and various training programs were launched for local election officials and for party staffs. No visible manipulations of this election process were found, but the national result was ambiguous. It took four months of party negotiations before a new government was formed in January 2019. This political stalemate, which is unusual for Swedish consensus-style politics, has generated public dismay and considerable uncertainty about the future direction of Sweden’s parliamentary democracy. Then, in the spring of 2020, the pandemic struck and placed the nation in a seemingly endless state of emergency alert, while partisan politics was placed on hold for a period. Also, 2021 became a year of political turbulence, with changes of government and a new Social Democrat prime minister elected in November. After the national election in September 2022, that government resigned, and a non-socialist coalition government was elected, with the prime minister from the conservative Moderate Party. The new government pledged to continue strengthening the revived total defense system and to conclude the country’s application for membership in NATO. One fundamental element of good governance is the ability to manage everyday accidents and emergencies while building the capacity to prevent, manage, and recover from complex disasters including attacks by a foreign state or individuals. The Swedish risk and threat panorama has widened considerably over the past decade, making this leadership task even more difficult. The multipartisan Defense Commission filed its report, Resilience,1 in December 2017 and presented several recommendations to strengthen the national defense and security capacities in response to the wider threat assessment and less hospitable regional setting. These recommendations informed the direction for the reform program for total defense now under way. Parliament passed a major total defense funding bill in December 2020.2 This funding decision covers the period 2021 through 2025 and almost doubles the budget for national defense by the end of this period. The increased Swedish funding will reach the NATO goal of 2 percent of gross domestic product in 2026.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Security, Governance, Resilience, and Society
Political Geography:
Sweden and Europe

1953. Norway Between the "High North" and the Baltic Sea

Author:
Håkon Lunde Saxi
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
This article will discuss contemporary Norwegian security and defense policy within a regional and contemporary historical perspective, with particular emphasis on the relative importance assigned to the North Atlantic and Arctic “High North”2 versus the Baltic Sea area. The main argument is that Norwegian security and defense policy is focused on deterrence and defense in the country’s immediate vicinity. The Russian Federation is identified as the main source of regional insecurity. Furthermore, the Nordic-Baltic region is increasingly perceived as one interconnected strategic space, with the geopolitical fault-line between NATO and Russia running straight through the region. While not divisible, the region arguably has two sub-theaters: the North Atlantic and Arctic “High North” and the Baltic Sea area. Norwegian decisionmakers view the Baltic States as being more at risk from Russian revisionism than Norway itself. This effort is less likely to take the form of overt conventional military aggression than of ambiguous and nebulous “political” and “hybrid” warfare. Therefore, in Norwegian security policy, the Baltic Sea area is today allotted far more attention and resources than before 2014. After years of neglect, Norway realized during the Ukrainian crisis that it had vital security interests in the Baltic Sea region. Nevertheless, the main security priority for Norway remains its maritime High North and Arctic region. The Baltic Sea area, while important, remains a secondary theatre in Norwegian strategy. This article also discusses which allies and partners are considered vital for Norwegian security. Among its security and defense relationships, Norway has long favored building close ties with the larger “maritime powers” to the west over the “continental powers” to the south or the smaller Nordic-Baltic neighbors to the east. To its east, Norway has been linked by shared bonds of common values, histories, and identities to the other Nordic countries and to a lesser extent to the Baltic ones. However, hardnosed calculations of Norwegian interests have continued to favor focusing on developing good and close relations with the maritime Anglo-Saxon powers to the west. As has been the case since Norwegian independence in 1905 and since Norway joined NATO in 1949, the western powers remain the ultimate guarantors of Norwegian security.3 At the same time, Norway has continued to place some limitations on its “integration” into the Euro-Atlantic security structures. These included restrictions on placing nuclear weapons or permanent allied bases in Norway, as well as some limitations on allied activities and exercises in the High North. The main purpose of this “screening” has been to alleviate Russian security concerns.4 This so-called policy of “reassurance” toward Russia aims to maintain the High North as an area of (relative) low tension.5 As one Norwegian Minister of Defense wrote a few years before 2022, the purpose is to combine “deterrence and reassurance” vis-à-vis Russia, in order to achieve “dialogue and cooperation . . . transparency, predictability and good neighborly relations in the High North.”6 The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has reduced dialogue and cooperation with Moscow to a bare minimum, but has so far not led to the fundamental abandonment of Norway’s “reassurance” policy toward Russia.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Norway, and Baltic Sea

1954. Germany and the Baltic Sea Region

Author:
Marcel Hadeed and Monika Sus
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
The security of the Baltic Sea region (BSR) has gained importance for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Germany in the past decade, even prior to the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Since 2014, the Russian Federation has waged continuous political warfare against its neighbors. Actions include the annexation of Crimea and the war in the Donbass region, as well as ongoing disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, and violations of air and maritime spaces. The BSR is a preferred target of these attacks and provocations, and as attacks on the cyber infrastructure of the German Bundestag in 20151 and the infamous “Lisa” disinformation campaign in 20162 have shown, neither Germany’s size nor its comparatively good relations with Russia guarantees Berlin’s security from Russian political warfare.
Topic:
Regional Security, NATO, Russia-Ukraine War, and European Union
Political Geography:
Germany, Baltic States, Baltic Sea, and Europe

1955. Organized Crime as Irregular Warfare: Strategic Lessons for Assessment and Response

Author:
David H. Ucko and Thomas A. Marks
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Organized crime both preys upon and caters to human need. It is corrosive and exploitative, but also empowering, and therefore pervasive. Indeed, though often out of sight, organized crime is everywhere: wherever governments draw the line, criminal actors find profitable ways of crossing it; wherever governments fail to deliver on human need, criminal actors capitalize on unmet desire or despair. For those excluded from the political economy, from patronage systems or elite bargains, organized crime can offer opportunity, possibly also protection. On aggregate, it amounts to an illicit form of governance, furnishing alternative services to a wide range of clients—be it the vulnerable and weak or a covetous elite. Reflecting the strength and resilience of this illicit order, those who stand in its way—individuals, institutions, even states—find themselves corrupted, co-opted, or violently eliminated. The breadth of organized crime, its clandestine nature, and its blending of creative and destructive effects present acute analytical and policy-related challenges. Much like the response to the threat of terrorism post-9/11, our efforts to counter organized crime are stymied by 1) conceptual uncertainty of the problem at hand; 2) an urge to address the scourge head-on without acknowledging its socioeconomic-political context; and, therefore, 3) unquestioned pursuit of strategies that miss the point, whose progress is difficult to measure, and which may even be counterproductive. Thus, despite occasional operational success, the global illicit economy continues to grow so that, by 2021, 80 percent of the world’s population lived in countries with high levels of crime and low levels of resilience to its effects.1 In the case of counterterrorism, irregular warfare (IW) emerged as a corrective lens, in that it framed terroristic violence within its essential political context and as a component of a broader struggle of legitimacy. This approach has encouraged a more politically informed understanding of terrorism, insurgency, and other irregular challenges. Might a similar lens also improve our understanding and approach to organized crime? The convergence between the two phenomena suggests a way forward. First, much like terrorism and insurgency, organized crime is a scourge that survives due to the functions and benefits it provides to desperate populations with few other options. Second, both are intensely political—if not in motivation, then certainly in origins, activities, and effects. Third, much like irregular threats, organized crime is oppositional to the rule of law and feeds on the state’s vulnerabilities. Fourth, both problems expose deep cracks in an international system supposedly governed by capable states exercising sovereignty over their peoples and lands. Fifth, both phenomena have a clandestine facet but are enmeshed with the licit world in often unpredictable ways. Thus, much like counterinsurgency, efforts to counter organized crime must operate both underground and above-ground, both counter a threat and address its drivers, and proceed with far greater awareness of what constitutes success—and for whom. Based on these commonalities, this article applies the insight of IW to the study of and response to organized crime. The argument is divided into three parts. First, the paper makes the case that, despite key differences, organized crime shares fundamental features with other irregular challenges—principally insurgency. Second, the paper lays out six major lessons of irregular warfare, informed by the bruising campaigns associated with the “War on Terror.” Third, the paper applies these lessons to various state efforts to counter organized crime. The analysis challenges how organized crime is typically understood—its character, expression, and purpose—and encourages a more politically informed way of assessing and responding to this threat.
Topic:
Security, Organized Crime, and Irregular Warfare
Political Geography:
Global Focus

1956. Russia, Ukraine, and the Future Use of Strategic Intelligence

Author:
Joshua C. Huminski
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Before Russia’s unprovoked February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the United States and the United Kingdom undertook an aggressive public and private information campaign to attempt to achieve two concurrent objectives. The primary goal was to convince their allies of the threat of Russia’s pending offensive (and to smooth the mobilization of support to Ukraine after the fact) and to a lesser degree a secondary goal was to attempt to deter Moscow from acting. Central to this campaign was the very visible and highly publicized use of intelligence. Indeed, as Dan Drezner wrote in the Washington Post, “The U.S. intelligence community sure has been chatty as of late about what it thinks Russia is doing.”1 The use of intelligence to support policy or diplomatic efforts and to achieve a strategic effect is, in and of itself, not novel. Intelligence is meant to inform policymakers and their decisions. What was novel was the speed, frequency, and extent to which intelligence was disclosed to the broader public—intelligence which demonstrated significant human or digital penetrations into Russia’s political and military hierarchies, and which was designed to achieve a specific effect. These disclosures also benefited from an unplanned development: the existence of an external third-party validator in the open-source intelligence community. This nascent and maturing field offered a means by which some information, though not all, could be validated in near real-time. Tactical-level activity verified by these communities helped to reinforce Washington’s broader message that policymakers were advancing using sensitive intelligence capabilities. This use of intelligence, the perceived success of the effort, and the utility of that information will likely lead to an increase in demands both by politicians and the public writ large. This raises new issues and reaffirms preexisting challenges that affect and influence the use of intelligence. In that sense, the Ukraine campaign reflects lessons from past successes while, more importantly, also reflecting the lessons from past failures and offering warnings of risks for the future. Many of these lessons are not new. The need to protect sources and methods; the risk that politicians will selectively use intelligence for political aims; the importance of tailoring messaging to competing and differing audiences; all of these are familiar themes encountered throughout the history of intelligence. What is perhaps most novel about the use of intelligence in Ukraine, and likely going forward, is that this represents an effort by the United States to recapture the initiative in the information war, which it largely ceded to Russia by omission and commission. This effort brings with it additional policy challenges and new considerations.
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, Intelligence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

1957. NATO’s New Center of Gravity

Author:
Michael Miklaucic
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
“Russia considers the Baltic states to be the most vulnerable part of NATO….” This is the conclusion of a recent report by Estonia’s Foreign Intelligence Service.1 The three small Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, have a 1,360-kilometer border with Russia and its client state Belarus. With a joint population of just over 6 million and 47,000 active-duty armed forces the Baltic states are on the frontline of any confrontation with Russia. Their vulnerability is keenly felt having all been under brutally oppressive Soviet occupation until quite recently; many still living recall that oppression that lasted until the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. Russia’s unprovoked February 2022 invasion of Ukraine has reminded Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians of the horrors of occupation, and rekindled fears of what until recently was considered unimaginable—a land war of territorial aggression in Europe—a contingency for which the Baltic states are urgently preparing. Each of the Baltic states has adopted a national security posture based on the principle of total or comprehensive defense; a whole-of-nation approach to defending their respective homelands with all elements of society mobilized to protect their national sovereignty. In the words of Estonian Minister of Defense Hanno Pevkur, “Every bush shoots!”2 The Baltic three are among the handful of NATO members that have exceeded NATO’s 2 percent target of gross domestic product on defense spending with significant investments in new capabilities and dramatic increases in armed personnel. All three are acutely aware of Russian efforts to subvert social stability using its hybrid warfare toolbox, including influence campaigns, mis- and disinformation, cyberattacks, the weaponization of migration, and economic or energy dependencies. Through total or comprehensive defense Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have been building up social resilience and preparing their respective populations to actively resist occupation.3
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Baltic States

1958. Neutrality After the Russian Invasion of Ukraine: The Example of Switzerland and Some Lessons for Ukraine

Author:
Thomas Greminger and Jean-Marc Rickli
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
In 1956, former American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated that “neutrality has increasingly become an obsolete conception.”1 Dulles’s statement seemed to be vindicated after the end of the Cold War as only a handful of countries in Europe identified themselves as neutral. Whereas in the past Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden adopted neutrality, only two countries in Europe—Austria and Switzerland—are considered permanent neutral states under international law after the Cold War. Together with Sweden and Finland, Austria although maintaining a constitutional basis for its neutrality, became a non-allied state when it joined the European Union (EU) on January 1, 1995. With Finland having just joined NATO and Sweden about to do so, these two countries are definitely leaving the camp of the neutral and non-allied European states. Thus, Switzerland remains the only permanent neutral state in Europe with no commitment towards the EU and its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as the core substance of Austria’s “Neutrality Act equals the status of a non-allied country”2 since Vienna joined the EU. Considering the renewal of the discussion on the relevance of neutrality in European security following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, this article sheds light on the contemporary relevance of the concept. It will do so by first looking at the conceptual and strategic meaning of neutrality, then reviewing the evolution of Switzerland’s understanding and practice of neutrality, and finally recasting the relevance of neutrality, especially regarding Ukraine, in today’s geopolitical and geostrategic environment.
Topic:
NATO, European Union, Neutrality, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Switzerland

1959. Interview with the Honorable Arvydas Anušauskas: Minister of National Defence of Lithuania

Author:
Arvydas Anušauskas and Michael Miklaucic
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
PRISM: Sweden is reviving its Total Defense concept and Finland has Comprehensive Defense. What are the fundamental elements of Lithuania’s national strategy? Anušauskas: Lithuania’s defense policy is based on three pillars. These are the strengthening of the armed forces, a resilient society, and reliance on collective defense. In order to achieve these three, we are increasing our spending on defense. During the last nine years we have increased our spending on defense six times, which now amounts to 2.5 percent of Lithuania’s GDP. Much of that funding goes to modernizing our armed forces; for this purpose, we now allocate 30 percent of our total spending. The second pillar of our national security is societal resilience. For this purpose, we have adopted a civil resilience strategy. To put it briefly the purpose of the strategy is to ensure that citizens are able to operate in times of crisis. When it comes to collective defense, our key interest is enhanced forward defenses and combat credible deterrence. We are really interested in having sufficient NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and also U.S. forces deployed in the region as well as pre-positioning of equipment and air and missile defense. And the regional plans that connect all these in-place forces, reinforcements, command and control elements, capabilities, and enablers across the regions.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and Lithuania

1960. Interview with the Honorable Hanno Pevkur: Minister of Defense of Estonia

Author:
Hanno Pevkur and Michael Miklaucic
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
PRISM: Sweden has Total Defense and Finland has Comprehensive Defense. What are the fundamental principles of Estonia’s strategic paradigm? Pevkur: We are quite like Finland in the sense that we have a clear understanding that everyone must be involved in protecting the country. We have a conscript service for the reserve army. This is mandatory for all men and voluntary for women. What we have changed since the full-scale war in Ukraine is that we have increased the number of wartime structures. We had 31,000 fighters before, but now we have almost 44,000. Most of those come from the Volunteer Defense League. The Estonian army is based on the regular army, the reserve army, and the Volunteer Defense League which at the moment has 30,000 people of which 10,000 are combatants. This will be increased this year to 20,000, which brings us to 44,000 combatants in our wartime structure.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Interview, Regional Security, Russia-Ukraine War, and NATO
Political Geography:
Estonia, Baltic States, and Europe

1961. The Baltic Sea Region at an Inflection Point

Author:
Alexander Crowther
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
The unprovoked Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, catapulted conventional military operations to the forefront of Western security thinking, re-kindled serious contemplation of major war in Europe, and galvanized dramatic re-thinking among Western countries about how to secure and protect democratic governance which has become the norm in the transatlantic region. Alarm and fear are perhaps most acutely felt in the Baltic Sea and adjoining regions which share extended borders with Russia and have suffered Russian and Soviet domination for centuries. Russian President Vladimir Putin, seeking to reverse the tide of NATO expansion and to dominate a sphere of influence resembling that of the defunct Soviet Union, has inadvertently catalyzed what German Chancellor Olaf Scholz called “Zeitenwende”—a major inflexion point in global geopolitics resulting in fundamental political re-alignments. The Putin regime uses all the elements of Russian national power to gain its political and strategic objectives. However, the most immediate threat to peace, stability, and security in the Baltic Sea region is Russian political warfare. This warfare is waged in the so-called gray zone, where actions though aggressive do not cross the threshold of armed attack or a use of force as defined and proscribed in the Charter of the United Nations and international law. Russia and its accomplices including China, Iran, and North Korea utilize a variety of deniable and difficult-to-attribute means including information operations, cyber operations, and criminal operations to achieve strategic advantage. The complexity of this challenge can only be fully appreciated by examining the many elements of national power including diplomatic, information, military, economic, finance, intelligence, law enforcement, political, social, and infrastructure. Western analysts commonly refer to this model by the acronym DIMEFILPSI. Putin clearly seeks to destabilize states in the transatlantic alliance and to fracture the two organizations that provide the greatest challenge to Russian influence: the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). While the Baltic states themselves are the most directly threatened by Russia, the Baltic Sea “north shore”—comprised of Sweden, Finland, and Norway—is also challenged: Sweden and Finland are members of the EU but not NATO while Norway is a member of NATO but not a member of the EU. Sweden and Finland have historically cooperated closely with NATO and are currently in the queue to join the alliance while Norway is closely integrated into the EU common market via the European Economic Area (EEA). There remain substantial differences of perspective—though in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine these may be converging. A leitmotif within Russian strategic thinking is that war is the natural state of relations between states and that the West has been at war with Russia—historically and especially since the 1990s—and deploys information operations to achieve regime change in states aligned with Russia and in Russia itself. This perception of a constant state of war justifies doing whatever is necessary to achieve Russian political goals: “the ends justify the means.” This belief obviates any need for separate strategies for different means; there is one comprehensive strategy using techniques ranging from non-violent competition to kinetic operations. Examples include cyber-attacks against Estonia in 2007, conventional warfare against Georgia in 2008, a combination of information and deniable military operations against Ukraine in 2014, and ongoing conflicts in Syria and Libya as proxy attacks on Western interests. Such operations have been described over the years as “active measures,” “reflexive control,” “hybrid warfare,” the “Gerasimov Doctrine,” and “gray-zone operations.” Each term has its advocates and critics. The Russian label for these operations is “New Generation Warfare.” As these operations do not exceed the threshold of armed combat—typically resulting in damage or destruction of property and infrastructure as well as human casualties—international law does not sanction military retaliation. As states committed to the rule of law EU and NATO countries are bound by these constraints of international law. Conversely, authoritarian states such as Russia use law as a tool of oppression—they are sometimes referred to as “rule-by-law” as opposed to rule of law states—and are not so constrained. Prior to Russia’s February invasion of Ukraine, not everyone agreed that the Russian Federation was a strategic threat. Even today, states have diverse perceptions of the Russia threat, and attitudes towards engaging Russia range from “NATO should intervene in Ukraine” to “we should not humiliate Russia.” The three Baltic states, Poland, and Finland feel Russia’s recent bellicosity vindicates their past insistence on focusing on Russia as the main strategic threat. Finland, unlike so many others, never disarmed or dismantled its defense architecture at the end of the Cold War. As might be expected, Russians have a different perspective on the region and its history. The regime sees itself as the victim and the guardian of Christianity, conservative values, and Orthodox civilization. They also believe that the current global system was designed by the West and operates to marginalize them. Putin’s response is to seek to destabilize that system using political warfare.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Baltic Sea, and Baltic States

1962. Estonia: Size Matters

Author:
Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Estonia is a very small state, with limited resources to counter hostile Russian activities. Like any small country, it must concentrate on some instruments of national power more than others and use them as intelligently as possible. Estonia has thus followed two complementary approaches to applying elements of national power since regaining independence in 1991: participating in international frameworks and using elements of national power to insulate itself from hostile Russian actions. Within international frameworks, Estonia uses diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, legal/law enforcement, political, social, and infrastructure (DIMEFILPSI) instruments to counter Russia in two ways. The first is to directly target Russia in coordination with others to create an impact that would be unachievable should Estonia act alone. The second is to enhance Estonia’s profile by influencing allies within the international framework, increasing the chances that these allies will support Estonia’s agenda and interests regarding Russia. Such indirect use of the instruments of national power is frequently seen in small states’ efforts to “punch above their weight” by developing and marketing particular skill sets that may be attractive or useful to others. Estonia’s second, more inward-facing approach to applying elements of national power is to use them to insulate itself from hostile Russian actions.1 This approach might be labeled resilience-building; examples include programs to erase uneven development across Estonia’s regions, as well as strategic communications policies to engage and inform the population about national-security-related activities. The importance of resilience in modern security thinking is evident in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s recognition that it is “an essential basis for credible deterrence and defence and effective fulfillment of the Alliance’s core tasks.”2 This second approach is more important for Estonia’s security on a day-to-day basis. Resilience-building measures can increase societies’ abilities to deal with a range of risks, making them able to counter Russian political warfare. Russia has a clear, long-term objective to achieve a more prominent place in the European and global security systems, so it acts to weaken the current Western-dominated architecture. It finds and exploits opportunities that challenge Western security structures and Western cohesion, such as its ongoing aggression against Ukraine, 2008 attack on Georgia, military intervention in the Syrian civil war, and probable orchestration of the 2007 cyber attacks against Estonia. Although such major challenges are rare, Russia also pursues its long-term objective by subjecting Western states to a steady stream of low-key antagonistic actions to create uncertainty and confusion, undermining the targeted states’ confidence. Russia’s day-to-day hostile actions against Estonia include regular incursions into its national airspace, cyber intrusions, allegations of discrimination against the 23.7 percent of the Estonian population that is ethnic Russian, and hostile information policies such as alleging that Estonia’s Russophobic attitudes caused the failure to ratify the Estonia-Russia border treaty.3 These actions are well thought out and often well timed. For example, Russian operatives kidnapped an Estonian agent from the Estonian side of the Estonia-Russia border during NATO’s 2014 Wales Summit and just two days after U.S. President Barack Obama’s reassurance-building visit to Tallinn.4 Russia may thus be considered to be waging political warfare—“a form of strategy that leverages all of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic capabilities at a nation’s disposal to achieve its strategic objectives”5—on the West. This malign statecraft has the potential to create unease and undermine security in the target states, requiring vigilance and an appropriate response from state authorities.6 DIMEFILPSI instruments provide a range of possible resources.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Resilience, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Estonia

1963. Finnish Defense "Left of Bang"

Author:
Jyri Raitasalo
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Finland has a long tradition of combining military and non-military aspects of defense. During the Cold War this crystallized within the concept of “total defense,” the mobilization of the entire society for the potential purpose of war. Throughout the Cold War, the all-penetrating threat from the Soviet Union was felt constantly within Finnish society. This threat was not only military in nature but also contained political, economic, energy-related, and even cultural aspects. In today’s parlance, the Soviet Union prosecuted an aggressive campaign of information warfare, hybrid war, and political warfare against Finland. With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Finland decided to move from a policy of neutrality toward closer cooperation with the Western security community. The concept of total defense with its military-centric focus began to lose significance and meaning. This did not occur overnight. Rather, it was a process of slow decay. A broader conception of security seemed warranted as the all-pervasive and all-penetrating politico-military threat from the East rapidly waned. This was not only the case in Finland but also throughout the Western world. Western states—Finland among them—have gradually stretched the contours of the concept of security during the last 30 years. Today, the Western—and Finnish—notions of international security are extremely broad—both concerning the different sectors of security (military, economic, environmental, societal, etc.) and different referent objects of security (the state, the nation, individual security, the stability of the international system).1 During the post–Cold War era, the Finnish system of total defense was gradually redefined into a comprehensive security model. This model was first formalized in 2003—more than a decade before the West became obsessed with Russia’s Gerasimov doctrine,2 hybrid warfare,3 the gray zone,4 the weaponization of information,5 and weaponized narratives.6 This model has been developed and practiced ever since, with the Government of Finland issuing official strategy updates in 2006, 2010, and 2017. The model has been based on the increasing cooperation among different authorities, the business community, and the third-sector actors in tackling an ever-widening spectrum of security threats. These threats include information threats, threats to data networks, the threat of large-scale immigration, terrorism, military pressure against Finland, and dozens of other threat scenarios.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Cold War, Regional Cooperation, and Post-Cold War
Political Geography:
Europe and Finland

1964. Lithuania’s Total Defense Review

Author:
Dalia Bankauskaitė and Deividas Šlekys
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Russian aggression against Ukraine since 2014, and especially after February 2022, was a gamechanger that radically transformed the geopolitical and security environment in the Baltic Sea Region. Russia’s aggressive and unpredictable behavior pushed Western capitals out of their comfort zone, while the Baltic states understood the new reality and reacted swiftly. Lithuania performed the most drastic overhaul of its security and defense policy since independence in 1990. Some say that the real formation and development of the modern Lithuanian Armed Forces (LAF) started then. For several years following independence many did not focus on national defense issues. After joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004 Lithuanians relaxed, as did the many other NATO allies. At that time the thinking was that liberal democracy would prevail in the region. Also, NATO would help in times of crisis, therefore there was no need for increased spending on defense or LAF development.1 This article describes the development of Lithuania’s total defense policy, which focuses on a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach.2 It discusses the major changes in the Lithuanian security and defense policy during the last 8 years, concentrating on political-military and strategic issues. The article is organized in three parts. The first discusses major conceptual debates concerning the best options for the state defense. These discussions mainly circled around the ideas of hybrid warfare, total defense, and the Suwalki Corridor dilemma. The second part focuses on institutional and political changes in Lithuania’s defense sector with an emphasis on such issues as Lithuania’s international cooperation and conscription. The third part deals with the dilemma of society’s engagement in defense issues and the challenges that presents.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Lithuania, and Baltic States