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1961. Public and Private Hate Speech in Poland

Author:
Magda Stroinska and Grażyna Drazazga
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
“W ords can be like tiny doses of arsenic: they are swallowed unnoticed, appear to have no effect, and then after a little time the toxic reaction sets in after all,” wrote Vic- tor Klemperer in his study of the language of the Third Reich (Klemperer 1946/2000: 15- 16). The importance of language for effective persuasion has been acknowledged by the teachers of rhetoric and orators since the age of antiquity. In modern times, there were both politicians who practiced deception through language for political or other gains, and also those who studied the effects of language-based manipulation. Among the most profound research on the mechanisms and effects of propaganda, one could name the writings of George Orwell, Friedrich Hayek, or Michał Głowiński. In this paper, we focus on one particularly disturbing aspect of propaganda: the use of hate speech. The reason for this choice of topic is the unprecedented explosion of populism all over the world, and the spread of perhaps its strongest weapon – hate through political and social fearmongering and use of what Klemperer referred to as ‘poisonous language’. Both political discourse in general and political propaganda in particular, tend to use a number of linguistic mechanisms in order to maximize the way they affect their target audiences and stir up hostility towards certain minorities. The most effective techniques, proven throughout history, include stereotyping for the purpose of singling out individu- als or groups as the proverbial “other” and, making that “other” out to be the scapegoat (cf. Stroińska 1998), as well as ad hominem attacks and redefining the meaning of certain keywords.
Topic:
Minorities, Discrimination, Language, Hate Speech, and Speech
Political Geography:
Europe and Poland

1962. Shaking the Foundation: the Trump Administration and NATO’s East

Author:
Metthew Bryza
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
Ultimately though, my very last remarks are ultimately optimistic, because President Trump lacks geopolitical vision, lacks historical insight or, really even, frankly – I don’t mean to be disrespectful, but – curiosity about history. Everything is about the deal. One and one, the individuals, the people – that’s why he had nobody in a room which is what Putin wanted, besides Rex Tillerson and the interpreter when they met. And so, what’s inevitably going to happen is he will start up with a grand bargain, where something hap- pens in Ukraine mostly cut over the heads of the Ukrainians. But thank goodness with Am- bassador Volker there, I know he’s no fool and will fight against that, but probably though there will be an agreement which I know that the Trump administration, from my own contacts within, has been cooking up, hoping for, for a longtime, whereby President Putin gets what he needs. He gets an excuse to exit Donbass, because that’s a failed operation, the uprising that he expected never happened, Russian troops are dying, it’s an economic albatross around the neck of Russia. But he can’t just leave, he can’t just pull out Russian troops, because that would really hurt him domestically, politically. So, okay, he says: “We’ve reentered the geopolitical stage, we’re at the center of it with President Trump”. Putin will say “We’ll pull out of Donbass, we’re never leaving Crimea”, That will be the deal I think. Donbass – if the Ukrainian government offers autonomy – will have a sort of a frozen political conflict, troops gone, heavy weapons pulled back on the Russian side, Crimea still what it is – anschlussed by Russia. And then the other area where there will be coopera- tion is in Syria. And we’ve already seen in Southeastern Syria there is a modest cease-fire that seems to be holding – that’s great, may it work, however it also provides U.S. bless- ing for Russian troops to base deeper in the Middle East, and that has never happened before. But leave that aside, maybe it will bring peace. Eventually that cooperation in Syria will collapse. Russia has no history of successfully establishing peace and rebuilding economies and complex cultures. It used brutality in the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, to build the Soviet Union, but it doesn’t have the finesse to rebuild something on the scale of Syria. And so, Trump is going to be disappointed with President Putin. President Putin will inevitably overplay Russia’s hand, and finally at that point my last remark – if the EU and NATO have maintained their cohesion, remain strong, maintain the geopolitical vision of President Duda and Secretary of State Szczerski, then we have a chance to take these positive developments and push away the lack of clarity, the dalliance with Putin and the security services on the part of team Trump, and finally wake up – just as Obama woke up, just as President Bush woke up and realized he that he hadn’t see Putin’s soul, and then maybe we can rebuild. So, the key to all this is that you all are doing exactly what you’ve said, Mr. Secretary of State – taking the strategic reins in your own hands, pursuing initia- tives like the Three Seas, changing the geopolitical facts on the ground so that when the U.S. does finally wake up – we know which way to move. Thank you very much!
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

1963. Remarks on Regional Security

Author:
Graeme P. Herd
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
I am delighted to be in Warsaw on this panel. In 1994 when I graduated with a PhD, and held my first academic post, the first international conference I went to was in Wrocław, and obviously I had to travel through Warsaw. So, it’s really nice to be back in Poland and have the opportunity to present in the capital when older and wiser. Today, I am going to try and look at how we understand the rationality, the logic of Russia’s foreign policy, particularly the destabilization efforts against neighbours and come to a conclusion has to how sustainable and long-term this approach will be. Will it gradually diminish or is it set to stay as it is or even increase? To try and understand Russia’s foreign policy, we need to look into the domestic eco- nomic, political, and social system created by a system-forming figure that is President Vladimir Putin. The two key data points here really are two strategic vulnerabilities that Russia has to deal with. The first is the hydrocarbon dependence, 50% of GDP and 70% of exports, and 98% of corporate tax. The vulnerability is that Russia is dependent on hy- drocarbon revenues but cannot affect the price of oil globally (which sets the price of gas). Oil can be priced at $110pb or at $25pb and the shift can take place over a matter of months. The second vulnerability is the popularity of the president. When Putin has de-modernized Russia, de-institutionalized and de-globalized Russia it means that if his popularity decreases then you have an existential crisis within the federation. The destabi- lizing question is: “If not Putin, then whom?” There are no contingency plans, no succession mechanism to replace the leader. So, essentially we are looking at Russia’s foreign policy operating in a context where the economy is in the toilet as reflected in a 0.2% average GDP growth since 2009; 2012 – 0% growth and since 2012 when Kudrin resigned from the government. Normally, the popularity of a president – as was the case in the first 8 years of Putin’s presidency from 2000 to 2008 – tracks the economy, or maybe lags a little bit behind. As economic performance increases and revenues distributed to the population, so the popularity of the president. So, this is very abnormal politics.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

1964. Kremlin Propaganda and Disinformation in Georgia: tools, channels, narratives

Author:
Małgorzata Zawadzka
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
Georgia is an object of special interest for the Russian Federation for several reasons, mainly due to its strategic location. First of all, Georgia connects oil-rich Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea with Turkey and the Black Sea. The route through Georgia is also the shortest way from Russia to Armenia, which would shorten and ease the transport of military equip- ment to the Middle East. Further, the trade route through Georgia is one of the few routes connecting China with European markets simultaneously omitting Russia. Finally, Georgia is situated in the area called Russia’s “soft underbelly”, territory considered by Moscow as its natural sphere of influence, hence NATO’s or the European Union’s presence there is unwelcome. Yet Georgia is important to Russia for one more reason. Although the Au- gust war in 2008 was in general won by the Russian Federation, to Moscow’s surprise international public opinion did not follow the Kremlin narration of the events’ course. Rus- sia lost the war on information and is unable to dispose of the occupant-aggressor image.
Topic:
Hegemony, Propaganda, Disinformation, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Georgia

1965. Turkey and East Central Europe: idealism, pragmatism, misperception or clash of interests?

Author:
Konrad Zasztowt
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
Turkey is Russia-centric in its East European policies. This approach is a legacy of the Cold War, when the Communist bloc countries were regarded not as sovereign states, but merely the Soviet Union’s “satellites”. Even when they regained full independence after 1989, from Turkey’s point of view, they constituted rather a kind of Russia’s backyard and were generally little known to the Turkish public. Obviously the newly independent states established after the collapse of the Soviet Union were to an even greater extent than the post-communist states perceived in Turkey in the sphere of influence and special interests of Russia. These clichés were shared by Turks and with many in Western societies, as Tur- key remained on the other side of the Iron Curtain.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Hegemony, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe and Turkey

1966. From a Common to a National State(s) and the Lithuanian-Polish Dispute

Author:
Alfonsas Eidntas
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
On the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the restoration of the independent states of Poland and Lithuania, we will return to a fundamental question, namely, whether the relationship between our contemporary states, which had already become hostile during the restoration process, is a time of missed opportunities? Or maybe the interests of both sides were simply so different that it was impossible for them to agree on a matter of major importance – state territory (partly also on the issue of national minorities) – and to balance their interests, thus avoiding conflict and a particularly hostile bilateral relationship which lasted until the tragic developments for both Poland and Lithuania in 1939-1940, when our countries fell victim to two tyrants. It is necessary to adopt new approaches to history. As time passes, new generations lose the memory of how events developed. Moreover, old beliefs, suspicions, and phobias are even revived. I would like to tell you a personal story in order to illustrate this point. At the end of December 1993, an annual convention of Lithuanian ambassadors was held in Vilnius. I had just flown in from Washington, D.C., and so I was reflecting on the attitude of the U.S. Administration and the conclusions that were arrived at after some friendly dis- cussions with the staff of the Polish Embassy in Washington D.C., and I shared my thoughts.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe, Poland, and Lithuania

1967. The Structure of Government Elites within the Regime of Alaksandar Lukashenka

Author:
Francisak Viacorka
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
Belarus under the authoritarian rule of President Alaksandar Lukashenka claims the status as the last free country in Europe1. In contrast to neighboring Ukraine, Russia, and the Baltic States, no structural reforms have been implemented in Belarus: the system of power remains strictly centralized; the government replicates the Soviet vertical system with its multiple bureaucratized ministries and departments; the economy is mainly state- owned, and the opposition is excluded from all state institutions and the government. The personalistic dictatorship of Lukashenka who has uncompetitively remained in power since 1994, lets neither politicians nor officials accumulate sufficient economic or political power. The bureaucracy in Belarus is formed primarily of people who demonstrate full loyalty to the regime. This makes the cabinet of ministers a purely technical, not political body. However, could not this be the evidence of its unprofessionalism? The research statement of the current paper is that Belarus government appointees and bureaucrats take their offices according to their experience and competence, not only because of their personal or political ties. In particular, I assume that for an absolute ma- jority of ministry staffers their way to power was paved with specialized education and professional careers in their area, and later they were appointed to leading positions in the Government or state-building institutions without building political careers.
Topic:
Governance, Authoritarianism, Reform, Leadership, and Elites
Political Geography:
Europe and Belarus

1968. The Balkan Front in the New Cold War

Author:
Gordon S. Bardos
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
As relations between Russia and the U.S.1continue their downward spiral, the Balkans have become another front in what scholars such as Stephen F. Cohen and Robert Leg- vold have dubbed “the New Cold War.”2 Yet the return to cold war, as Legvold notes, in- volves numerous opportunity costs for both countries—and considerable collateral dam- age as well. One of the areas in which the collateral damage will be most severe is the Balkans. Indeed, the costs of the new confrontation between Washington and Moscow are already evident in the democratic backsliding that has occurred throughout the region over the past decade. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 2016, shows that of the nine countries in southeastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croa- tia, Greece, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia), only one (Bulgaria) showed any improvement, one (Albania) showed no improvement, and the remaining sev- en all regressed in terms of their democratic development.3 Freedom House’s Nations in Transit and the Bertelsmann Transformation Index have similarly shown significant demo- cratic backsliding in the Balkans since 2008.4
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Cold War, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe and Balkans

1969. Nord Stream 2 Current State of the Project and its implications for European Energy Security

Author:
Nicola Mellere
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
Nord Stream 2 is a planned pipeline through the Baltic Sea within the project Nord Stream. The pipeline Nord Stream 2 would flank the already existing Nord Stream 1 in transporting natural gas over 1,220 km from the large reserves in North-Western Russia to the German Baltic coast. In particular, Nord Stream 2 is expected to link Ust Luga in Russia with Greifswald in Germany. The project is planned to double the existing Nord Stream 1 pipeline, with the total volume of both ventures being a maximum of 110 bcm per year. In- deed, Nord Stream 2 is expected to transport annually 55 billion cubic metres (bcm), which is the same amount of Nord Stream 1. The history of Nord Stream project began in 1997, when the Finnish-Russian consor- tium “North Transgas Oy” was established to explore the possibilities of transporting gas from Russia to Europe. In 1999 the consortium concluded the exploration stating that an offshore route through the Baltic Sea is the best option from economic, technical and en- vironmental points of view. Then, in 2000 the EU recognized the need for a new pipeline. In 2005, the North Stream consortium was formed with the participation of Gazprom, the German companies Wintershall and E.ON Ruhrgas. Later two other companies joined the consortium: the Dutch company Gasunie and the French GDF SUEZ SA. The construction of the lines of Nord Stream 1 lasted from April 2010 until October 2012, when Line 2 of Nord Stream 1 officially became operational.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, Natural Resources, Gas, and Nord Stream 2
Political Geography:
Europe

1970. Fighting Imagined Invasions with Administrative Violence. Racism, Xenophobia and Nativism as a Cause of Statelessness in Myanmar, the Dominican Republic and Assam (India)

Author:
Jose-Maria Arraiza, Phyu Zin Aye, and Marina Arraiza Shakirova
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Statelessness & Citizenship Review
Institution:
Peter McMullin Centre on Statelessness, Melbourne Law School
Abstract:
Discriminatory policies have the capacity to create statelessness on a massive scale and the majority of stateless persons around the world belong to impoverished minority communities. The intentionality of such discrimination is guided by xenophobia, racism and particularly nativism: the belief that an internal minority with foreign connections is a threat to the nation. Hence, target communities are re-imagined as an enemy invader. This article analyses and compares how such ideologies have resulted in statelessness in the cases of Myanmar, the Dominican Republic and the State of Assam in India. These three scenarios have internal minorities (Rohingya in Myanmar, ethnic Haitians in Dominican Republic and Bengalis in India) that have been represented, based on kinship lines with neighbouring states, as enemy intruders by public officials and institutions. The authors compare how in the three scenarios nativist policies, the erosion of jus soli in citizenship laws and administrative violence have been used to ‘fight’ these imagined invasions and identify common trends.
Topic:
Poverty, Citizenship, Discrimination, and Stateless Population
Political Geography:
India, Asia, Burma, Caribbean, Dominican Republic, North America, and Myanmar