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1731. Sea Blindness in Turkish International Relations Literature

Author:
Levent Kırval and Arda Özkan
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
The oceans and seas cover 72% of the Earth’s surface, and 85% of global trade is done by maritime transportation. Moreover, 40% of the world’s population lives on or near coastlines. Also, the oceans play a crucial role in Earth’s biosphere. Recently, by desalination techniques, the seas have become a potable water resource. Therefore, one can say that the oceans and seas are indispensable for mankind. However, international disputes and collaboration efforts between states regarding the seas are not widely studied by scholars of international relations (IR). This can be referred to as sea blindness, and it may be defined as an inability to appreciate the importance of seas and naval power, particularly with regards to strategic security and economic prosperity. A country with sea blindness is not aware of maritime supremacy as an important foreign policy tool. Similarly, IR scholars mostly focus on land conflicts and not on sea issues when they study international politics. This is particularly true in Turkish IR literature as issues on land are again the focus areas for Turkish scholars. In this context, this article makes an analysis of the articles in peer-reviewed journals and books published by well-known publishers in Turkey, providing statistics about the issues covered. Also, for comparison, major political science and IR journals published abroad are analysed with regards to publications related to the seas. This statistical analysis elucidates whether there is sea blindness in Turkish IR literature. The number of articles and books that cover the seas as crucial study areas of IR in Turkey, as well as their broad focus areas and perspectives, are revealed by this study.
Topic:
International Relations, Maritime, Oceans and Seas, and Disputes
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

1732. Lessons Learned from the Development of Turkish IR: A View from Greece

Author:
Kyriakos Mikelis
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
The essay addresses an outsider's perception of the characteristics and dynamics of the IR field/discipline in Turkey. How may this country serve as a role model or, at the very least, as a source of inspiration, reflection, or evaluation of the field's development in other local/national settings? In this respect, Greece is chosen as a case study. Βy addressing and assessing Turkish self-reflection and the search for disciplinary identity within Turkish IR scholarship, what can be learned, on behalf of Greek IR scholarship, regarding both Greece's and Turkey's social scientific development regarding foreign affairs/policy? A major theme discovered is the acknowledgement of the limitations of the dependency/vulnerability-centered explanations for the development of IR.
Topic:
International Relations, Development, Academia, and Social Science
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Greece

1733. International Relations in Search of an Antidote

Author:
Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
This essay is based on the author’s long-time observation of the International Relations discipline and the repeated crises it has experienced. The piece identifies ‘event-drivenness’ as the structural reason behind these crises, in other words, the course of the discipline naturally follows global IR events and, depending on how transformative these events are, when responding to them, is more likely to fall into an existential crisis—with the most recent one being potentially fatal. By discussing in detail the a) science-statecraft relationship; b) scholar-practitioner disconnect; c) distortion of theories by scholars and practitioners; d) paradoxical relationship between rationality and irrationality; and e) theory-practice disconnect, the essay seeks to operationalize these crisisgenerated processes when responding to major events. In order to show these crisis generation processes in detail, it uses the theories of political realism and, to a lesser degree, classical liberalism, as case reflections. As a possible solution to the reciprocal condescension between scholarship (theory-making) and statecraft (practice), the essay proposes a “Clausewitzian” modus vivendi that aims at creating a culture of synthesis between the presumed producers and consumers of IR knowledge.
Topic:
International Relations, Academia, and Knowledge Production
Political Geography:
Global Focus

1734. The Monroe Doctrine as the Will and Idea of the United States of America

Author:
Boris Martynov
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
On February 24, 2022, international relations entered a whole new stage of development affecting, albeit to varying degrees, practically all states, with no end in sight. On September 7, 2022, speaking at the Eastern Economic Forum, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that the world was experiencing “fundamental transformations.” Such transformations generally require several years to be completed. By the middle of the third decade of the 21st century, two highly important signs of a new situation have become absolutely clear: a crisis of the old institutions of global governance and the new rising and developing centers of power. At the same time, the opinion that the new is just the “well-forgotten old” is confirmed. This is especially true of the US and its policies.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, History, Governance, Law, Psychology, Identity, and Monroe Doctrine
Political Geography:
Russia, Global Focus, and United States of America

1735. Reasons for the West’s Hatred of Russia

Author:
Yury Sayamov
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
Russia as a state and civilization and Russian statehood as an institution have acted for centuries as system-forming factors of the world order. They have, at various times, exerted influence of varying intensity and significance on the shape, character, and content of international relations, while also being influenced by them. The West’s hostility toward Russia arose, took shape, and began to actively manifest itself as one of the constants of this influence, occasionally reaching the level of outright hatred and spiraling into attacks against Russian statehood, which invariably mobilized the country’s peoples to rebuff the aggressors.
Topic:
History, Statehood, Information Warfare, Crusades, and Russophobia
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

1736. Poland's Threat Assessment: Deepened, Not Changed

Author:
Mariusz Antoni Kamiński and Zdzisław Śliwa
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Polish-Russian relations are traditionally difficult, shaped by geostrategic locations in Europe and shared history. Russians have stereotypes about Poland that color their perception of Polish issues. This, combined with ongoing political and economic disputes, creates a situation where hopes for improvement are slim. Poland and Russia’s common history includes a number of painful historical memories that make it challenging to build mutual trust and reconciliation, which outside observers must understand. Although the two nations have been neighbors for more than a thousand years, the critical historical events came between the 16th and 17th centuries, when both countries competed for primacy in Eastern Europe. Poland lost this rivalry, resulting in Austria, Prussia, and Russia partitioning Poland three times between 1772 and 1795, when Russia made Poland a principality within the Russian empire until Poland’s independence in 1918. The result was the compulsory Russification of Polish lands, widespread attempts to convert Catholic Poles to Orthodox Christianity, and the brutal suppression of national uprisings. Together, these meet the modern criteria for ethnic cleansing and form the basis of Poles’ historical consciousness. When Soviet forces sought to invade Europe in the name of communism at the end of the Russian Civil War, they were decisively defeated at the Battle of Warsaw in 1920, which stopped the Soviet advance and frustrated their desire to ignite a global revolution. Stalin, then an officer in the Red Army, was one of the contributors to this disaster and took his revenge in 1940, ordering the execution of some 22,000 Polish officers and intelligentsia at Katyń, after partitioning Poland again with Germany. The Soviets occupied Poland at the end of World War II and imposed a communist regime until 1989, depriving Poland of full political and economic sovereignty, creating elite dependence on the Soviet Union, and enabling Soviet interference in Poland’s internal affairs. Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ascent of the Law and Justice Party in Poland in 2015 led to a more decisive and negative policy toward Russia. According to Witold Waszczykowski, a former member of Poland’s Parliament and a current member of the European Parliament, NATO’s Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, enacted at a time when “Yeltsin’s Russia was relatively weak and cooperative with the West,” was repudiated in acknowledgment that “Today’s Russia is aggressive and imperialistic, [and so] there’s no reason we should respect that agreement.”
Topic:
Threat Assessment, Bilateral Relations, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Poland and Russia

1737. Denmark's Security Starts in the Baltic States

Author:
Amelie Theussen
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Danish security and defense policy strongly builds on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as its cornerstone. Since the 1990s, Denmark has pursued an active military role in international missions. In line with its military activism and Atlanticist orientation, the United States, United Kingdom, and France are Denmark’s closest strategic partners. Yet several developments in recent years have forced the country to question its partnerships and re-evaluate its military priorities: the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, the election of Donald Trump as U.S. President in 2016, Brexit, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. These stand out as major external influences on Danish policies. Additionally, a changing threat environment with an aggressive posturing by Russia (and non-military threats in the cyber realm and of hybrid nature) means that Denmark has made moves to strengthen its military capacities, contributing to NATO’s overall deterrence posture as well as its total defense capacities to deter and defend against unconventional threats. While Denmark does not consider Russia a direct military threat against its own territory, it does regard Russia as directly threatening its neighbors and European security, and the rules-based international order through actions which analysts refer to as “political warfare.”1 Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Denmark has joined with the vast majority of European Union (EU) and NATO members in supporting Ukraine and condemning Russia for raging violations of international law.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Security, NATO, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Denmark and Baltic States

1738. Societal Security and Total Defense: The Swedish Way

Author:
Bengt Sundelius and Jan Eldeblad
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Sweden has recovered from several severe security challenges over the past two decades. In 2004 more than 500 Swedish citizens died in the Boxing Day tsunami in Southeast Asia. During the suddenly escalating Lebanon conflict of 2006, more than 8,000 citizens were hastily, but successfully, evacuated out of harm’s way. Days before Christmas 2010, the first suicide bomber in the Nordic region, luckily prematurely, exploded his bomb near a crowded shopping street in the city center of Stockholm. Sweden’s neighbor Norway experienced a terrible mass murder in July 2011 undertaken by a solo terrorist. In April 2017, terror struck with deadly force in the shopping area of the city center of Stockholm. Dramatic forest fires rampaged in the summers of 2014 and 2018. In the fall of 2015, a massive flow of migrants poured into the country, with major immediate effects and long-term consequences for Swedish society. Most recently, the deadly COVID-19 pandemic, which began in March 2020, became a stress test of endurance and societal resilience for the Swedish population. Compared with the other Nordic states Sweden has suffered much higher rates of infections, and it has seen more than 14,000 deaths, putting into question the Swedish strategy for managing this public health disaster. The close neighborhood of the Baltic Sea region has experienced fundamental security changes since 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and intruded into eastern Ukraine. Like those of the other nations in the region, Swedish political leaders have responded to this development by placing greater emphasis on defense and security issues, taking measures including significant additions to the defense budget. Total defense planning was reintroduced in 2015, and the conscript system, now for both men and women, was reactivated in 2017. In addition to continuing concerns about new terror attacks, political debate has focused on Russian behavior and on the potential damage of so-called hybrid attacks on Swedish society, including cyber activities and social media campaigns. Further heavy investments in national defense have been made in light of the Russian attack on Ukraine in February 2022. The rearmament of the total defense forces has also been accelerated, to reach higher levels more quickly than previously planned. The Swedish security context appears to be entering a troubling period, with the Baltic Sea region living without peace, but not in full-scale war, either, despite the close-by war in Ukraine. The gray zone between peace and war could be characterized as a state of adversarial interdependencies across the boundaries of Europe. Novel tools must be developed to safeguard the nation against acts of ill will and to promote, both at home and abroad, those values and interests that are dear to the people of Sweden. Joining the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) is one such tool. This significant step deviates from a 200-year tradition of staying outside of military alliances. A wide consensus across party lines now exists on the necessity of joining this Western defense alliance. Considering the recent experiences of other democracies, special care was taken to safeguard the election process of September 9, 2018. Public awareness campaigns and various training programs were launched for local election officials and for party staffs. No visible manipulations of this election process were found, but the national result was ambiguous. It took four months of party negotiations before a new government was formed in January 2019. This political stalemate, which is unusual for Swedish consensus-style politics, has generated public dismay and considerable uncertainty about the future direction of Sweden’s parliamentary democracy. Then, in the spring of 2020, the pandemic struck and placed the nation in a seemingly endless state of emergency alert, while partisan politics was placed on hold for a period. Also, 2021 became a year of political turbulence, with changes of government and a new Social Democrat prime minister elected in November. After the national election in September 2022, that government resigned, and a non-socialist coalition government was elected, with the prime minister from the conservative Moderate Party. The new government pledged to continue strengthening the revived total defense system and to conclude the country’s application for membership in NATO. One fundamental element of good governance is the ability to manage everyday accidents and emergencies while building the capacity to prevent, manage, and recover from complex disasters including attacks by a foreign state or individuals. The Swedish risk and threat panorama has widened considerably over the past decade, making this leadership task even more difficult. The multipartisan Defense Commission filed its report, Resilience,1 in December 2017 and presented several recommendations to strengthen the national defense and security capacities in response to the wider threat assessment and less hospitable regional setting. These recommendations informed the direction for the reform program for total defense now under way. Parliament passed a major total defense funding bill in December 2020.2 This funding decision covers the period 2021 through 2025 and almost doubles the budget for national defense by the end of this period. The increased Swedish funding will reach the NATO goal of 2 percent of gross domestic product in 2026.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Security, Governance, Resilience, and Society
Political Geography:
Sweden and Europe

1739. Norway Between the "High North" and the Baltic Sea

Author:
Håkon Lunde Saxi
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
This article will discuss contemporary Norwegian security and defense policy within a regional and contemporary historical perspective, with particular emphasis on the relative importance assigned to the North Atlantic and Arctic “High North”2 versus the Baltic Sea area. The main argument is that Norwegian security and defense policy is focused on deterrence and defense in the country’s immediate vicinity. The Russian Federation is identified as the main source of regional insecurity. Furthermore, the Nordic-Baltic region is increasingly perceived as one interconnected strategic space, with the geopolitical fault-line between NATO and Russia running straight through the region. While not divisible, the region arguably has two sub-theaters: the North Atlantic and Arctic “High North” and the Baltic Sea area. Norwegian decisionmakers view the Baltic States as being more at risk from Russian revisionism than Norway itself. This effort is less likely to take the form of overt conventional military aggression than of ambiguous and nebulous “political” and “hybrid” warfare. Therefore, in Norwegian security policy, the Baltic Sea area is today allotted far more attention and resources than before 2014. After years of neglect, Norway realized during the Ukrainian crisis that it had vital security interests in the Baltic Sea region. Nevertheless, the main security priority for Norway remains its maritime High North and Arctic region. The Baltic Sea area, while important, remains a secondary theatre in Norwegian strategy. This article also discusses which allies and partners are considered vital for Norwegian security. Among its security and defense relationships, Norway has long favored building close ties with the larger “maritime powers” to the west over the “continental powers” to the south or the smaller Nordic-Baltic neighbors to the east. To its east, Norway has been linked by shared bonds of common values, histories, and identities to the other Nordic countries and to a lesser extent to the Baltic ones. However, hardnosed calculations of Norwegian interests have continued to favor focusing on developing good and close relations with the maritime Anglo-Saxon powers to the west. As has been the case since Norwegian independence in 1905 and since Norway joined NATO in 1949, the western powers remain the ultimate guarantors of Norwegian security.3 At the same time, Norway has continued to place some limitations on its “integration” into the Euro-Atlantic security structures. These included restrictions on placing nuclear weapons or permanent allied bases in Norway, as well as some limitations on allied activities and exercises in the High North. The main purpose of this “screening” has been to alleviate Russian security concerns.4 This so-called policy of “reassurance” toward Russia aims to maintain the High North as an area of (relative) low tension.5 As one Norwegian Minister of Defense wrote a few years before 2022, the purpose is to combine “deterrence and reassurance” vis-à-vis Russia, in order to achieve “dialogue and cooperation . . . transparency, predictability and good neighborly relations in the High North.”6 The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has reduced dialogue and cooperation with Moscow to a bare minimum, but has so far not led to the fundamental abandonment of Norway’s “reassurance” policy toward Russia.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Norway, and Baltic Sea

1740. Germany and the Baltic Sea Region

Author:
Marcel Hadeed and Monika Sus
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
The security of the Baltic Sea region (BSR) has gained importance for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Germany in the past decade, even prior to the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Since 2014, the Russian Federation has waged continuous political warfare against its neighbors. Actions include the annexation of Crimea and the war in the Donbass region, as well as ongoing disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, and violations of air and maritime spaces. The BSR is a preferred target of these attacks and provocations, and as attacks on the cyber infrastructure of the German Bundestag in 20151 and the infamous “Lisa” disinformation campaign in 20162 have shown, neither Germany’s size nor its comparatively good relations with Russia guarantees Berlin’s security from Russian political warfare.
Topic:
Regional Security, NATO, Russia-Ukraine War, and European Union
Political Geography:
Germany, Baltic States, Baltic Sea, and Europe