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Begin New Search Topic Foreign Policy Content Type Journal Article Publication Year within 3 Years

41. Sanctions Run Amok – The Undermining of U.S. Power

Author:
Keith A. Preble
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Well into its second year, the Biden administration has continued to grapple with persistent foreign policy challenges while new ones have emerged: North Korea has not curtailed its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs; negotiations with Iran on resuscitating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) remain stalled; and a Russian troop buildup near Ukraine may signal a potential invasion and full-scale conflict. In confronting these and other challenges, the United States continues to use economic sanctions as a mean of punishing, signaling, and coercing rivals into changing their foreign policy behaviors. As a tool of American economic power, policymakers often see sanctions as “Goldilocks” instruments that are “just right,” albeit ones that require time and patience to facilitate policy change.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, and Economy
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

42. Turkey's Growing Role as a Security Actor in Somalia: Dynamics and Motivations

Author:
Abdurrahim Siradag
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Academic Inquiries
Institution:
Sakarya University (SAU)
Abstract:
Somalia has a special place in the foreign policy of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party), which has been in power since November 2002. Turkey's relations with Somalia started to develop after the official visit of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Somalia on 19 August 2011, who was the prime minister at that time, to support Somalis affected by severe drought and civil war. After 2011, Turkey launched one of the largest humanitarian aid campaigns to Somalia. Turkey has not only developed a soft power policy in Somalia but also started to implement a hard power policy. In this respect, Turkey has been training hundreds of Somali soldiers and police in both Ankara and Mogadishu since 2012. At the same time, Turkey opened its largest military base abroad in Somalia in 2017. This research explores the reasons and dynamics behind Turkey's deepening of its security policy in Somalia and sheds light on what Turkey's security policy means for Somalia. The research argues that there is a combination of factors driving Turkey's security policy towards Somalia, including socio-cultural, economic, and geopolitical. This study examines Turkey's security policy with a holistic approach, using conceptual and theoretical perspectives.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Soft Power, and AKP
Political Geography:
Africa, Turkey, Middle East, and Somalia

43. China Makes a Move in the Middle East: How Far Will Sino-Arab Strategic Rapprochement Go?

Author:
Sine Ozkarasahin
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
With a well-planned strategy and a careful exploitation of the gaps opened by U.S. foreign policy shifts, China has successfully increased its role as a strategic actor in the Middle East, including by gaining a foothold in the regional arms market. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s early December visit to Saudi Arabia, upon King Salman’s invitation, exemplifies the recent improvement in Sino-Arab ties (Xinhua, December 8). While in Saudi Arabia, Xi initiated two new multilateral forums intended to strengthen engagement between China and the Arab world: the China-Arab States Summit and the China-Gulf Cooperation Council summit (Xinhua, December 11). In addition to deepening political rapprochement between Beijing and several regional countries, China is simultaneously establishing crucial military-strategic ties with key Middle Eastern states. Chinese-made drones are already present in the arsenals of multiple Arab countries and technological cooperation between Beijing and its regional counterparts is rapidly increasing. The most striking example in this regard was the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) revocation of the F-35 deal that constrained its cooperation with the Chinese tech and telecommunications giant Huawei over 5G technology (Al Arabiya News, December 14, 2021). As many Arab countries’ doubts about Washington’s commitment to regional security grow, more and more countries are increasingly open to entreaties from China.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Rapprochement
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Asia, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

44. Finland and the Demise of China’s Polar Silk Road

Author:
Matti Puranen and Sanna Kopra
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Only a short time ago, considerable enthusiasm existed in Finland regarding Beijing’s efforts to forge an “Arctic corridor” of railroads and undersea tunnels, satellite ground stations, an airport for scientific expeditions, and massive biorefineries. In this, Finland was not alone but represented only a small branch of China’s comprehensive thrust to permanently establish a presence above the Arctic Circle. Yet, with the recently emerging geopolitical turbulence, China’s Arctic expansion is facing a standstill, even in Finland, which long seemed like its most viable partner in the region. By applying for NATO membership along with Sweden, Finland is turning westward, practically closing the gates on China’s Arctic expansion beyond Russia. Its story serves as an interesting microcosm on the rise and demise of China’s Arctic policy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Finland, and Arctic

45. Meloni at the Helm: What Does Italy’s New Government Mean for Sino-Italian Relations?

Author:
Andrew R. Novo
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Questions about the unity of Italy’s new government on several key foreign policy issues persist, ranging from the extent of its support for Ukraine to its commitment to various European Union institutions. However, on the issue of China, the new government of Prime Minister (PM) Giorgia Meloni appears united. This bodes well for transatlantic cooperation and could spell trouble for Beijing, which not too long ago entertained ideas of using Italy as a friendly counterweight in Europe. Under Meloni, Italian foreign policy, particularly toward China, is unlikely to chart a dramatically new course. This is largely because the current government has prioritized its commitment to NATO and needs to focus on domestic issues rather than risk upsetting the international arena. While openings remain for Sino-Italian cooperation in economic terms, such cooperation will be geared toward supporting Italy’s domestic challenges and is unlikely to provide Beijing with the significant foothold that it has long hoped to gain in Europe.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Government, Bilateral Relations, and Giorgia Meloni
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Italy

46. Can Beijing be Flexible on U.S. Policy?

Author:
John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
General Secretary Xi Jinping did not mention “America” in his opening report to the 20th Party Congress (Xinhua, October 16). Nevertheless, Xi made clear that China faces a difficult international environment, precipitated in large part by the U.S. challenge, which threatens the realization of national rejuvenation. For Xi, the threat appears particularly acute in two areas: technology and Taiwan. He called for winning the “battle of key core technologies” by building on breakthroughs in areas such as supercomputing and quantum computing, space exploration, nuclear energy, satellite navigation and biomedicine (Xinhuanet, October 16). On Taiwan, Xi issued a thinly veiled ultimatum to Washington, stating that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will strive for “peaceful reunification” to incorporate Taiwan into the Motherland, which he called “an inevitable requirement for realizing the great rejuvenation.” Should this approach fail, Beijing reserves the right to employ military force to counter “interference by external forces” and “Taiwan independence” separatists (Central Committee Taiwan Work Office, October 16).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

47. China’s Interests in Afghanistan One Year After the U.S. Withdrawal

Author:
Zafar Iqbal Yousafzai
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In late June, a severe earthquake struck southeastern Afghanistan. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) announced it would provide 50 million RMB ($7.2 million) in emergency aid, including tents, blankets, cots and other sorely needed supplies to the impacted areas (People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs (FMPRC), June 25). Beijing invests in Afghanistan to further its long-term economic, strategic and political interests. Since the U.S. withdrawal last year, China has had an opportunity to advance its interests and deepen its clout in Afghanistan. When Kabul fell, China did not condemn the move and announced that it respected the choice of the Afghan people—a sign of goodwill from Beijing to the Taliban that it subscribes to the narrative that the new government has the full support of the population (Xinhua, August 16, 2021). China has never been militarily involved in Afghanistan. Uyghur militants have found safe-haven in the country for decades, but the level of threat they pose to the PRC is debated even among Chinese analysts (China Brief, February 11). Despite such long-running concerns, Beijing was unperturbed by the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan last year. The PRC kept its embassy open through the fall of Kabul, and Beijing has sustained extensive diplomatic contact with the Taliban leadership to safeguard its security, economic and strategic interests in Afghanistan (Global Times, August 17, 2021). In fact, the PRC is seeking to carry out a complex balancing act in Afghanistan. Concerns about Afghanistan becoming a safe haven for extremist groups that could target neighboring states persist, but Beijing also perceives huge opportunities in Afghanistan’s natural resources, markets and potential to serve as a key node linking western China with South and Central Asia. In order to achieve a stable and secure Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which will advance China’s interests throughout Central Asia, Beijing needs a stable Afghanistan.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Taliban, Political stability, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, China, Asia, and United States of America

48. The Russia-India-China Trilateral After Ukraine: Will Beijing Take the Lead?

Author:
Jagannath P. Panda and Wooyeal Paik
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) foreign ministers’ meeting in late July, which included China, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, People’s Republic of China (PRC) State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi exhorted member states to uphold the “Shanghai Spirit” (上海精神, Shanghai Jingshen) of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, mutual consultations, diverse civilizations, and the pursuit of common development (Gov.cn, July 29). He then presented a “five-point proposal” for building an SCO community “with a shared future” (CGTN, July 30). In doing so, Wang echoed President Xi Jinping’s call in his four-point proposal at the BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa) summit in June —albeit via a rather elemental poetic allegory of fire, wind, and water –to embark on a “righteous course” toward a shared global future premised on inclusive, comprehensive and close win-win cooperation (Qiushi, June 24). BRICS already has a “Plus” mechanism and is mulling an expansion to include “like-minded” partners.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, India, and Asia

49. With an Eye on Tibet, China Reacts Warily to Warming U.S.-Nepal Ties

Author:
Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
U.S. Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Uzra Zeya’s three-day visit to Nepal in May evoked a strong reaction from China. During the visit, Zeya, who is also President Joseph Biden’s Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, met with an array of high-level Nepali officials, including Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba as well as Nepali human rights activists. She also visited two Tibetan refugee settlements in Nepal where she interacted with refugees and enquired about their problems (Kathmandu Post, May 22). Zeya had arrived in Kathmandu after meeting the Dalai Lama, senior officials of the Tibetan exile government as well as officials and representatives of the Tibetan refugee community in India (The Hindu, May 18). The Chinese response was swift. The U.S. “should stop meddling in China’s internal affairs under the pretext of Tibet-related issues, and offer no support to the anti-China separatist activities of the Dalai clique,” People’s Republic of China (PRC) Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian said in a press conference (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 19). At the 14th meeting of the Nepal-China Bilateral Consultative Mechanism, which was held a few days after Zeya’s visit, Chinese officials reportedly expressed their misgivings over her engagements to their Nepali counterparts (Kathmandu Post, August 4). Then in July, Liu Jianchao, the head of the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) visited Kathmandu, where at meetings with leaders of Nepal’s major political parties, he asked them to reaffirm their commitment to the ‘One-China’ policy (Nepal Foreign Affairs, July 14).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Nepal, and Tibet

50. Security Dialogues with Chinese Characteristics

Author:
John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
This summer, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) organized two multilateral security dialogues with African nations, which highlight Beijing’s efforts to promote an alternative model of international security. In June, representatives of the PRC and six East African states convened in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia for the first China-Horn of Africa Peace, Governance and Development Conference, which is an initiative that was originally proposed by Foreign Minister Wang Yi during his January visit to Kenya (Guangming Daily, June 27; PRC Foreign Ministry, January 7). At the meeting, PRC Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa Xue Bing said that Beijing sought a greater role in the region, “not only in trade and investments but also in the area of peace and development” (South China Morning Post, June 23). The conference resulted in a joint statement committing to utilize confidence building, dispute resolution, dialogue and negotiation to achieve a “lasting peace” in the region (China News Service, June 23). In doing so, the parties pledged to uphold the “common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security concept,” which was first laid out by President Xi Jinping in 2014 as a core element of his vision for a new international security architecture (Xinhua, May 24). Xi cited the need to remain committed to this concept as motivation for the PRC’s new Global Security Initiative, which he introduced in April (China Brief, May 13). Earlier this week, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) hosted the second “China-Africa Peace and Security Forum,” which was virtually attended by senior defense leaders from nearly fifty African countries (Gov.cn, July 26). In his keynote remarks, State Councilor and Defense Minister Wei Fenghe read a congratulatory letter from Xi, which hailed the resilience of Sino-African friendship in a challenging international landscape and called for the implementation of the Global Security Initiative (People’s Daily, July 26). Although somewhat short on specifics, Beijing has promoted the Global Security Initiative as a positive-sum, “common security” model in contrast to the militaristic, zero-sum approach it ascribes to the United States (China Brief, July 15).
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:
China and Asia