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Begin New Search Topic Markets Content Type Working Paper Author Dean Karlan Publication Year within 25 Years

1. Savings by and for the Poor: A Research Review and Agenda

Author:
Dean Karlan, Jonathan Zinman, and Aishwarya Lakshmi Ratan
Publication Date:
11-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
The poor can and do save, but often use formal or informal instruments that have high risk, high cost, and limited functionality. This could lead to undersaving compared to a world without market or behavioral frictions. Undersaving can have important welfare consequences: variable consumption, low resilience to shocks, and foregone profitable investments.
Topic:
Development, Economics, Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Markets, Poverty, and Financial Crisis

2. Hoping to Win, Expected to Lose: Theory and Lessons on Microenterprise Development

Author:
Dean Karlan, Ryan Knight, and Christopher Udry
Publication Date:
11-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
We show how financial and managerial constraints impede experimentation and thus limit learning about the profitability of investments. Imperfect information about one's own type, but willingness to experiment to learn one's type, leads to short-run negative expected returns to investments, with some outliers succeeding. We find in an experiment that entrepreneurs invest randomized grants of cash and adopt advice from randomized grants of consulting services, but both lead to lower profits on average. In the long run, they revert back to their prior scale of operations. In a meta-analysis, results from 19 other experiments find mixed support for this theory.
Topic:
Development, Economics, Markets, Foreign Aid, and Foreign Direct Investment
Political Geography:
Africa

3. Agricultural Decisions after Relaxing Credit and Risk Constraints

Author:
Dean Karlan, Robert Osei, Christopher Udry, and Isaac Osei-Akoto
Publication Date:
11-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
The investment decisions of small-scale farmers in developing countries are conditioned by the farmers' financial environment. Binding credit-market constraints and incomplete insurance can reduce investment in activities with high expected profits. We conducted several experiments in northern Ghana in which farmers were randomly assigned to receive cash grants, grants of or opportunities to purchase rainfall-index insurance, or a combination of the two. Demand for index insurance is strong, and insurance leads to significantly larger agricultural investment and riskier production choices in agriculture. The salient constraint to farmer investment is uninsured risk: when provided with insurance against the primary catastrophic risk they face, farmers are able to find resources to increase expenditure on their farms. Demand for insurance in subsequent years is strongly increasing in a farmer's own receipt of insurance payouts, and with the receipt of payouts by others in the farmer's social network. Both investment patterns and the demand for index insurance are consistent with the presence of important basis risk associated with the index insurance, and with imperfect trust that promised payouts will be delivered.
Topic:
Agriculture, Economics, Markets, Food, and Foreign Direct Investment

4. How Can Bill and Melinda Gates Increase Other People\'s Donations to Fund Public Goods?

Author:
Dean Karlan and John A. List
Publication Date:
04-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
We develop a simple theory which formally describes how charities can resolve the information asymmetry problems faced by small donors by working with large donors to generate quality signals. To test the model, we conducted two large-scale natural field experiments. In the first experiment, a charity focusing on poverty reduction solicited donations from prior donors and either announced a matching grant from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, or made no mention of a match. In the second field experiment, the same charity sent direct mail solicitations to individuals who had not previously donated to the charity, and tested whether naming the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation as the matching donor was more effective than not identifying the name of the matching donor. The first experiment demonstrates that the matching grant condition generates more and larger donations relative to no match. The second experiment shows that providing a credible quality signal by identifying the matching donor generates even more and larger donations than not naming the matching donor. Importantly, the treatment effects persist long after the matching period, and the quality signal is quite heterogeneous—the Gates\' effect is much larger for prospective donors who had a record of giving to "poverty-oriented" charities. These two pieces of evidence support our model of quality signals as a key mechanism through which matching gifts inspire donors to give.
Topic:
Development, Government, Humanitarian Aid, Markets, and Foreign Aid
Political Geography:
United States

5. Group Versus Individual Liability: A Field Experiment in the Philippines

Author:
Xavier Giné and Dean Karlan
Publication Date:
01-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
Group liability is often portrayed as the key innovation that led to the explosion of the microcredit movement, which started with the Grameen Bank in the 1970s and continues on today with hundreds of institutions around the world. Group liability claims to improve repayment rates and lower transaction costs when lending to the poor by providing incentives for peers to screen, monitor and enforce each other's loans. However, some argue that group liability creates excessive pressure and discourages good clients from borrowing, jeopardizing both growth and sustainability. Therefore, it remains unclear whether group liability improves the lender's overall profitability and the poor's access to financial markets. We worked with a bank in the Philippines to conduct a field experiment to examine these issues. We randomly assigned half of the 169 pre-existing group liability “centers” of approximately twenty women to individual-liability centers (treatment) and kept the other half as-is with group liability (control). We find that converting to individual liability from group liability but keeping other aspects of group lending such as weekly repayment meeting does not affect the repayment rate, but leads to higher outreach by attracting new clients.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, and Poverty
Political Geography:
Philippines and Southeast Asia

6. Credit Elasticities in Less-Developed Economies: Implications for Microcredit

Author:
Dean Karlan and Jonathan Zinman
Publication Date:
01-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
Policymakers often prescribe that microfinance institutions increase interest rates to eliminate reliance on subsidies. This strategy makes sense if the poor are rate insensitive: then microlenders increase profitability (or achieve sustainability) without reducing the poor's access to credit. We test the assumption of price inelastic demand using randomized trials conducted by a consumer lender in South Africa. The demand curves are downward-sloping, and steep for price increases relative to the lender's standard rates. We also find that loan size is far more responsive to changes in loan maturity than to changes in interest rates, which is consistent with binding liquidity constraints.
Topic:
Development, Economics, and Markets
Political Geography:
Africa and South Africa

7. Observing Unobservables: Identifying Information Asymmetries with a Consumer Credit Field Experiment

Author:
Dean Karlan and Jonathan Zinman
Publication Date:
01-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
Information asymmetries are important in theory but difficult to identify in practice. We estimate the presence and importance of adverse selection and moral hazard in a consumer credit market using a new field experiment methodology. We randomized 58,000 direct mail offers issued by a major South African lender along three dimensions: 1) an initial "offer interest rate" featured on a direct mail solicitation; 2) a "contract interest rate" that was revealed only after a borrower agreed to the initial offer rate; and 3) a dynamic repayment incentive that extended preferential pricing on future loans to borrowers who remained in good standing. These three randomizations, combined with complete knowledge of the Lender's information set, permit identification of specific types of private information problems. Our setup distinguishes adverse selection from moral hazard effects on repayment, and thereby generates unique evidence on the existence and magnitudes of specific credit market frictions. We find evidence of moral hazard and weaker evidence for adverse selection. A rough calibration suggests that perhaps 7% to 16% of default is due to asymmetric information problems. Asymmetric information may help explain the prevalence of credit constraints even in a market that specializes in financing high-risk borrowers at very high rates.
Topic:
Civil Society, Development, Markets, and Poverty
Political Geography:
South Africa

8. Expanding Credit Access: Using Randomized Supply Decisions to Estimate the Impacts

Author:
Dean Karlan and Jonathan Zinman
Publication Date:
01-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
Expanding credit access is a key ingredient of development strategies worldwide. Microfinance practitioners, policymakers, and donors have ambitious goals for expanding access, and seek efficient methods for implementing and evaluating expansion. There is less consensus on the role of consumer credit in expansion initiatives. Some microfinance institutions are moving beyond entrepreneurial credit and offering consumer loans. But many practitioners and policymakers are skeptical about “unproductive” lending. These concerns are fueled by academic work highlighting behavioral biases that may induce consumers to overborrow. We estimate the impacts of a consumer credit supply expansion using a field experiment and follow-up data collection. A South African lender relaxed its risk assessment criteria by encouraging its loan officers to approve randomly selected marginal rejected applications. We estimate the resulting impacts using new survey data on borrower behavior and well-being, and administrative data on loan repayment. We find that the marginal loans increased credit access and produced measurable benefits in the form of increased employment, reduced hunger, and reduced poverty. The marginal loans also appear to have been profitable for the lender. The results must be interpreted with caution but suggest that consumer credit expansions can be welfare-improving.
Topic:
Development, Markets, and Poverty
Political Geography:
Africa and South Africa