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Begin New Search Topic Markets Content Type Working Paper Author David Wheeler

1. From REDD to Green: A Global Incentive System to Stop Tropical Forest Clearing

Author:
David Wheeler, Robin Kraft, and Dan Hammer
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
In this paper, we develop and illustrate a prototype incentive system for promoting rapid reduction of forest clearing in tropical countries. Our proposed Tropical Forest Protection Fund (TFPF) is a cash-on-delivery system that rewards independently monitored performance without formal contracts. The system responds to forest tenure problems in many countries by dividing incentive payments between national governments, which command the greatest number of instruments that affect forest clearing, and indigenous communities, which often have tenure rights in forested lands. The TFPF incorporates both monetary and reputational incentives, which are calculated quarterly. The monetary incentives are unconditional cash transfers based on measured performance, while the reputational incentives are publicly disclosed, color-coded performance ratings for each country. The incentives include rewards for: (1) exceeding long-run expectations, given a country's forest clearing history and development status; (2) meeting or exceeding global REDD+ goals; and (3) achieving an immediate reduction in forest clearing. Drawing on monthly forest clearing indicators from the new FORMA (Forest Monitoring for Action) database, we illustrate a prototype TFPF for eight East Asian countries: Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam. A system with identical design principles could be implemented by single or multiple donors for individual or multiple forest proprietors within one or more countries, as well as national or local governments in individual countries, tropical regions, or the global pan-tropics. Our results demonstrate the importance of financial flexibility in the design of the proposed TFPF. Its incentives are calculated to induce a massive, rapid reduction of tropical forest clearing. If that occurs, a TFPF for East Asia will need standby authority for disbursements that may total $10–14 billion annually for the next two decades. This financial burden will not persist, however, because the TFPF is designed to self-liquidate once all recipient countries have achieved clearly specified benchmarks. We estimate that the TFPF can be closed by 2070, with its major financial responsibility discharged by 2040.
Topic:
Agriculture, Economics, Globalization, and Markets
Political Geography:
China, Indonesia, Malaysia, East Asia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Southeast Asia, and Myanmar

2. Economic Dynamics and Forest Clearing: A Spatial Econometric Analysis for Indonesia

Author:
David Wheeler, Robin Kraft, Susmita Dasgupta, Dan Hammer, and Brian Blankespoor
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
This paper uses a large panel database to investigate the determinants of forest clearing in Indonesian kabupatens since 2005. Our study incorporates short-run changes in prices and demand for palm oil and wood products, as well as the exchange rate, the real interest rate, land-use zoning, forest protection, the estimated opportunity cost of forested land, the quality of local governance, the poverty rate, population density, the availability of communications infrastructure, transport cost, and local rainfall and terrain slope. Our econometric results highlight the role of dynamic economic factors in forest clearing. We find significant roles for lagged changes in all the short-run economic variables—product prices, demands, the exchange rate and the real interest rate—as well as communications infrastructure, some types of commercial zoning, rainfall, and terrain slope. We find no significance for the other variables, and the absence of impact for protected-area status is particularly notable. Our results strongly support the model of forest clearing as an investment that is highly sensitive to expectations about future forest product prices and demands, as well as changes in the cost of capital (indexed by the real interest rate), the relative cost of local inputs (indexed by the exchange rate), and the cost of land clearing (indexed by local precipitation). By implication, the opportunity cost of forested land fluctuates widely with changes in international markets and decisions by Indonesia's financial authorities about the exchange and interest rates. Our results suggest that forest conservation programs are unlikely to succeed if they ignore such powerful forces.
Topic:
Agriculture, Economics, Globalization, Markets, and Natural Resources
Political Geography:
Indonesia

3. Why Warner-Lieberman Failed and How to Get America's Working Families behind the Next Cap-and-Trade Bill

Author:
David Wheeler
Publication Date:
07-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
Among partisans of greenhouse gas emissions regulation, the Senate's failure to pass the Warner-Lieberman cap-and-trade bill is often attributed to rampant denial, fueled by diehard political conservatism, energy-company propaganda, and government suppression of evidence on global warming. If so, the solution to the problem is electoral change, exposure of the propaganda, and public education. However, public concern is already so widespread that even leaders of the Southern Baptist Convention have acknowledged the need for action. In this paper, I consider two additional forces that have stymied carbon emissions regulation in developing countries. The first is the perception that costly carbon regulation promoted by the rich will inflict an unjust burden on the poor. The second is hostility to taxation of critical fossil-fuel resources that were developed long before climate risk was identified. My econometric analysis suggests that these same forces have significantly affected senators' votes on Warner-Lieberman. By implication, Congress is not likely to approve cap-and-trade legislation unless Americans with below-median incomes are compensated for expected losses. My analysis supports recent proposals for direct distribution of emissions permit auction revenues to American families on an equal per-capita basis.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, Government, Markets, and Politics
Political Geography:
America

4. Crossroads at Mmamabula: Will the World Bank Choose the Clean Energy Path?

Author:
David Wheeler
Publication Date:
02-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
At the recent UN climate change conference in Bali, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon called for a revolutionary change in the world's energy mix to minimize the risk of catastrophic global heating. This paper explores the implications for the World Bank and other donor institutions, employing proposed Bank financing of the Mmamabula coal-fired power project in Botswana as an illustrative case. Using the latest estimates of generating costs for coal-fired and low-carbon power options, I compute the CO2 accounting charges that would promote switching to the low-carbon options. In all cases, I find that that the switching charges are at the low end of the range that is compatible with safe atmospheric limits on carbon loading. Among the low-carbon options that I have considered for Botswana, solar thermal power seems to dominate carbon capture and storage.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Environment, Markets, and United Nations
Political Geography:
Africa

5. Moving Toward A Consensus on Climate Policy: The Essential Role of Global Public Disclosure

Author:
David Wheeler
Publication Date:
11-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
Among climate scientists, there is no longer any serious debate about whether greenhouse gas emissions from human activity are altering the earth' s climate. There is also a broad consensus on two issues related to reducing emissions. First, developing countries must be full participants in global emissions control, because they will be most heavily impacted by global warming, and because they are rapidly approaching parity with developed countries in the scale of their emissions. Second, efficient emissions control will require carbon pricing via market-based instruments (charges or cap-and-trade). These points of consensus are sufficient to establish a clear way forward, despite continued disagreements over the choice of specific instrument and the appropriate carbon charge level. Since all market-based systems that regulate emissions sources require the same emissions information, the international community should immediately establish an institution mandated to collect, verify and publicly disclose information about emissions from all significant global carbon sources. Its mandate should extend to best-practice estimation and disclosure of emissions sources in countries that initially refuse to participate. This institution will serve four purposes. First, it will lay the necessary foundation for implementing any market-based system of emissions source regulation. Second, it will provide an excellent credibility test, since a country's acceptance of full disclosure will signal its true willingness to participate in globally-efficient emissions reduction. Third, global public disclosure will itself reduce carbon emissions, by focusing stakeholder pressure on major emitters and providing reputational reward s for clean producers. Fourth, disclosure will make it very hard to cheat once market-based instruments are implemented. This will be essential for preserving the credibility of an international agreement to reduce emissions.
Topic:
Environment, Industrial Policy, International Cooperation, and Markets
Political Geography:
Europe