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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244.

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FOREWORD

Lieutenant Colonel Clarence Bouchat conceived this paper while teaching theater strategy on the Distance Education faculty at the U.S. Army War College. As an adjunct member of the resident course teaching team, he also observed resident students wrestle with the subject. While the Strategic Studies Institute does not normally publish curricular materials, this is the second time a subject has been deemed of sufficient importance and utility that it is now offered to our wider audience.

Theater strategy and theater security cooperation (TSC) are two of the most important tools available in attaining national security. They offer an effective means for geographic Combatant Commanders to engage other countries, deter aggression, or resolve crises. Despite their importance, however, little current, concise, and comprehensive guidance is available on how they are planned and implemented. This Letort Paper offers a framework to explain what theater strategy is, its basis, how it is formulated, and how it is executed with emphasis on theater security cooperation. With this background, a reader interested in or involved with the development, execution, or support of theater strategy will better understand its role in defense and national affairs through examples from a case study of the formulation of theater strategy and security cooperation in U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) leading up to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in Afghanistan.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this Letort Paper as a contribution to a more complete
understanding of theater strategy and theater security cooperation.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

CLARENCE J. BOUCHAT is a U.S. Air Force lieutenant colonel on loan to the U.S. Army War College. He was a Security Assistance Officer in Kuala Lumpur, and teaches theater strategy and theater security cooperation at the U.S. Army War College. In addition to teaching, Colonel Bouchat flew fighter aircraft, was involved in command and control of airpower before and after Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and has been stationed overseas six times in Europe and Asia. He is a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy and University of Southern California.
SUMMARY

This overview of theater strategy and theater security cooperation is a primer on one of the most important tools the U.S. military uses to engage other countries, deter unwanted actions, and defend U.S. and friendly nation interests. To be effective, theater strategy and theater security cooperation must be derived from and consistently linked to national and multinational strategic guidance and policy, and formulated to meet the requirements found in each region. To attain the combatant commander’s strategic security goals, proper support for joint operation plans through organizational structure, force projection, sustainment, readiness training, and force development input is essential. Theater security cooperation directly supports national goals at the regional level, and enhances military operations by obviating the need for military action, or by preparing the environment better for U.S. military intervention, should it be necessary. Theater strategy is an important part of realizing national strategy around the world, and theater security cooperation is not only one of the most powerful tools in attaining the goals of theater strategy, but, through its ability to obviate the need for combat, a cost effective tool as well.
AN INTRODUCTION TO THEATER STRATEGY
AND REGIONAL SECURITY

CENTCOM found itself in a bubbling pot of crises from one end to the other. We had to develop a CENTCOM [theater] strategy to handle them . . . without necessarily using military force—or else only as a last resort. We needed to help build stability in this troubled region, in my view, or we would pay the price in the long run.

General Anthony Zinni
Central Command Commander, 1997-2000
from Battle Ready, written with Tom Clancy, p. 319

THEATER STRATEGY

Since the demise of the Soviet Union and its allies as an overarching worldwide opponent, regional security issues have risen as the greatest challenge for U.S. national security. Even the Global War on Terrorism is a chain of regional problems linked by an amorphous network based on an extremist philosophy and anti-Western sentiment. Since regional problems now dominate security issues, the primary contribution towards attaining U.S. national, defense, and military strategy by the Department of Defense (DoD) is at the theater level through the combatant commander’s theater strategy. Theater strategy coordinates both the use of force and the many other military activities supporting national strategy that do not involve force, since not all security problems can or should be resolved with kinetic solutions. Despite its importance to military and national strategy, however, there is little definitive or comprehensive information available on theater strategy. For that reason, this paper acts as a framework to integrate the concept,
processes, products, and activities associated with theater strategy. It introduces the implementation of national strategy at the theater and operational levels by explaining what theater strategy is, its basis, how it is formulated, and how it is executed with emphasis on theater security cooperation. With this background, a reader involved with the development, execution, or support of theater strategy will better understand its role in defense and national affairs through examples from a case study of the formulation of theater strategy and security cooperation in U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) leading up to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in Afghanistan.

**Theater Strategy Overview.**

Joint Publications 3-0, *Joint Operations*, and 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, use this new, broader definition of theater strategy:

> Concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and multinational policies and strategies through the synchronized and integrated employment of military forces and other instruments of national power.¹

Theater strategy directs military activities ranging from peacetime cooperation with other countries, to meeting potential threats through contingency planning (previously known as deliberate planning) and crisis action planning. Theater strategy organizes a theater’s forces and operational areas, and arranges the relationship among them to ensure unified action. Theater strategy also ensures adequate logistics and other support for theater activities, and synchronizes joint, multinational, and interagency operations
and training. All of this maintains military unified action within a geographic region to achieve strategic goals. Such unified action in theater strategy must be maintained even while some regions of the theater are in conflict, and others remain at peace. Thus theater strategy must be broad enough to encompass a wide variety of political-military activities at the same time. Campaigns, military operations, security cooperation, and use of the operational art—each is a part of theater strategy throughout the continuum of military activities.

Theater strategy is an extension of national military strategy tailored to a geographic combatant commander’s area of responsibility (AOR). It is both similar and in complementary support to national strategy (see Figure 1). A combatant commander’s theater strategy consists of the three elements found in any strategy: theater objectives and strategic end states

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Figure 1. National Strategic Direction (Joint Pub 3-0, Fig I-1).
(ends), which are achieved through the synchronization of integrated strategic concepts (ways), by using theater organization, activities, and plans employing joint, interagency, and multinational resources (means), and thereby accomplishes national and multinational objectives.  

The geographic combatant commander is the focus for developing and executing theater strategy. Theater strategy should be coordinated with other regional elements of power, as is done with national strategy in the interagency process. The Department of State’s (DoS) Assistant Secretaries of State direct Regional Bureaus, but they have less authority and resources than a geographic combatant commander has, and the regional areas used by DoS and DoD do not coincide (see Figure 2). Diplomatically, national strategy is mainly applied at the country level through the U.S. ambassador and the country team. At the country team level, DoD representatives such as the defense and military service attaches, and the combatant commander’s security assistance officers, work together with the representatives from the other federal government agencies in the embassy to attain national strategic goals as interpreted by the President’s personal representative, the ambassador. The country team military representatives must balance the ambassador’s guidance with that of their DoD commanders. At the country level, this system works when both sides reference and use the common national strategic direction—the National Security Strategy from which is derived the DoS and U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Strategic Plan, and DoD’s National Defense Strategy. On a regional level, however, there is no equivalent of the National Security Council or a regional security strategy to coordinate efforts among the various U.S. federal
Figure 2. DoD Combatant Commanders AORs and DoS Regional Bureau Areas.
agencies, much less internationally with like-minded states. This sometimes gives the geographic combatant commander a stronger comparative influence in the region when he directs a comprehensive theater strategy.

To compound the imbalance between DoS and DoD further, the DoS simply lacks the depth of personnel and resources given to DoD. The DoS, for instance, has fewer than a brigade’s worth of Foreign Service Officers (4,000-5,000 people) in the field. Their resources for tangible engagement activities also do not match the opportunities that DoD’s schools, visits, exercises, equipment, and other cooperation activities offer. Thus an imbalance has occurred where DoS has the authority for international engagement, but DoD has most of the resources to do so.

There also are no economic and information regions, equivalent to the DoD AORs and DoS Regional Bureaus, in which the other elements of national power are planned or coordinated, further weakening national strategic direction at the regional level. All of these challenges to the development and implementation of theater strategy emphasize the need to keep theater security in very close support of national strategy, and for government officers to work towards common goals.

Sources of Theater Strategy.

The national strategic direction that a theater commander receives should initiate and guide the development of theater strategy. National strategic direction is the common thread that integrates and synchronizes the activities of the U.S. military with other government agencies, and is derived from national values, interests, and policy. The President
and Secretary of Defense translate policy into strategic and defense end states and objectives, which are reflected in the *National Security Strategy* (NSS), *National Defense Strategy* (NDS), the *Unified Command Plan* (UCP), *Contingency Planning Guidance* (CPG), *Strategic Planning Guidance* (SPG) and *Joint Programming Guidance* (JPG), *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR), the “Forces For Unified Commands” memorandum, and national policy and multinational policy statements and goals when the United States is operating as part of an alliance or coalition.9 The interplay between these guiding documents is shown in Figure 3.

To digest the direction given, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) uses the resources of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), the consultation means by which the CJCS develops strategy, plans, budgets, and assessments.10 Thus the JSPS provides some of the strategic guidance and direction to U.S. armed forces for theater security cooperation planning.

*Strategy: Foundation for all Major Processes*

![Diagram](image-url)

**Figure 3. Strategic Planning and Programming System (Joint Chiefs of Staff).**
Figure 4. Joint Strategic Planning
(Joint Pub 5-0, Figure I-1).

joint operation planning, and force planning (see Figure 4). The CJCS refines this direction further for the combatant commanders in the form of the National Military Strategy (NMS), the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Global Force Management, and other forms of guidance.

The process and documents, cited above, work well for contingency planning. However, in the unanticipated circumstances and short time period that usually follow a crisis, less formal forms of national direction are given. When existing plans and guidance are applicable, they should be used although they are normally supplemented by additional direction as the circumstance’s intelligence and situation become better known. Memos and verbal guidance from the President, Secretary of Defense, or CJCS may initiate or change a plan or theater strategy, to be followed by more formal planning directives such as a Warning Order, Planning Order, or Alert Order. Other forms of timely and flexible direction during a crisis are the national policy statements, speeches, and other forms
of strategic communication that inform the U.S. and international public. Strategic communications from the President and cabinet secretaries establish unity of themes and messages, and as such can be a major source of national security direction in a crisis situation when little documented guidance may be available.14

Joint strategic planning from the theater strategy level, be it contingency or crisis planning, should contribute to the President and Secretary of Defense’s formulation of political-military assessments, define political and military objectives, develop strategic concepts and options, allocate resources, and formulate policy.15 Ultimately, national strategic direction guides theater strategy, but together the geographic combatant commands’ theater strategies also influence strategic direction. The Secretary of Defense melds these theater strategies to ensure that the relative importance of the combatant commands’ competing interests are prioritized and integrated, and that they adequately support strategic goals in a limited resource environment. This resulting global strategy is the bridge coordinating national and theater strategies.16


In his book, Bob Woodward chronicles the formation of strategic direction for the response that led to OEF. These passages show how national direction for theater strategy is formed in a crisis. This reading opens with the attack on the Pentagon. The author notes the lack of a contingency plan against Afghanistan, so the Secretary of Defense starts forming the first draft of strategic direction, by defining the problem. Three weeks later, in the second reading, the Secretary issues very clear strategic guidance to DoD to use for crisis action planning.
Theater Strategy Formulation.

From the interlocking sources that form strategic direction, the combatant commander provides comprehensive guidance and direction to his subordinates and staff to formulate theater strategy. To craft theater strategy effectively, however, the commander and staff must understand in depth the context of the theater and its mission, which is typically achieved through developing a strategic (or theater) estimate.17 Once the theater’s environment and mission are analyzed and understood, the commander’s vision for theater security is formed. From the resulting theater objectives the theater concept is derived and codified into theater strategy and its implementing actions and plans.

A strategic estimate starts with a review of the complex and interconnected theater environment (see Figure 5). This contextual review sets the parameters within which to frame the combatant commander’s theater actions and plans. This review must take into account the geographic, economic, and cultural

<table>
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<td>• Translation of national objectives to objectives applicable to the combatant commander or theater.</td>
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<td>• Visualization of the strategic environment and how it relates to the accomplishment of assigned objectives.</td>
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<td>• Assessment of the threats to accomplishment of assigned objectives.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Assessment of strategic alternatives available, with accompanying analysis, risks, and the requirements for plans.</td>
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Figure 5. Strategic Estimate Overview (Joint Pub 5-0, Figure I-3).
characteristics of the region; the geo-political context of regional influences, causes, and interests; and an understanding of the capabilities and vulnerabilities of each friendly, neutral, and adversarial state or relevant organization in the region. This review must also account for the U.S. situation, including limitations in the form of constraints, restraints, and restrictions; planning assumptions (which should be periodically reviewed for validity); and deduce relative power and capabilities. A theater’s environment is best analyzed through a systems approach. This is an integrated, holistic perspective that improves understanding, and generates more options than just military actions through force. “With a systems perspective, [commanders] gain the situational awareness to determine what effects (behaviors) need to be attained within the Operational Area to achieve their objectives . . . [and] to mitigate risk and act with greater precision.” One system’s approach to analyzing a theater’s environment is through a regional strategic appraisal which is “an assessment of a specific region in which U.S. regional interests are determined, policies to support these interests are identified, and strategies to support the policies are developed.” The net assessment of a country is more focused and detailed,

a systems understanding of the operational environment in the form of a common, shared, relevant database and a network of people . . . used to understand key relationships, dependencies and vulnerabilities within and across political, military, economic, social, information, and economic systems . . . [to ascertain] leverage points such as key links and nodes . . . to influence adversary capabilities, perceptions and decision making.

These system analyses do not replace but complement products such as the Joint Intelligence Preparation of
the Operational Environment. Sun Tzu’s dictum to “know the enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles with no danger of defeat,” is reflected in a systemic theater environment analysis.

Along with the analysis of the review of the theater’s environment, a thorough mission analysis of given national and multinational strategic direction is needed. This analysis derives objectives, desired effects, and key assumptions. The emerging effects-based approach in joint operations is useful in deriving theater strategic objectives, effects, and assumptions because its systemic analysis examines all aspects of an opponent or friendly system, and coordinates the application of all instruments of national power. This process “enhanc[es] the probability that objectives can be translated more accurately into actionable direction . . . [giving] a shared common understanding of the effects . . . before tasks are prescribed and assigned . . .” With an improved understanding of the assigned mission through the effects-based approach, the combatant commander identifies and prioritizes specified, implied, and essential tasks, which tailor and orient a higher command’s purpose to regional conditions. Determining the appropriate scope and content of the mission, and proposing changes to it through restating it back to higher headquarters is an important aspect of this mission analysis. Once the theater’s situation and mission are thoroughly analyzed, the theater commander articulates his intent through strategic vision, which then guides theater objectives, theater strategic end states, and mission statements.

Based upon the strategic estimate, the combatant commander develops strategic alternatives (broad statements of what is to be accomplished). The combatant commander then selects implementing
actions that will support national or multinational policies and address the requirements identified in the theater. The selected implementing actions become the basis for the theater strategic concept, which sets the stage for planning and actions in broad flexible terms. Such plans and concepts include those for theater security cooperation, combat operations, and support throughout the range of military operations.26

From the analyzed mission and regional environment, the combatant commander determines the possible means his command will employ to attain national goals. There may be diverse sets of options to address the tasks and problems faced by the combatant commander. These courses of action must be evaluated, compared to actions that other players in the region may take, and then the most appropriate one(s) selected to complete the strategic estimate.27 Using a systemic approach, any military actions must be integrally coordinated with a larger interagency effort of diplomatic, information and economic efforts.28 The combatant commander also organizes command relationships, and requests resources required to fulfill any requirements derived from this theater strategy development process. Theater strategy is the basis for initiating and coordinating international programs and activities, requesting support for the theater, and synergizing actions and activities with the other combatant commands. The resulting estimate is continuously updated based on a constantly changing environment in the theater, and to maintain consistency with national objectives and end states.29

Thus, theater strategy is derived from U.S. national strategy, and theater strategy determines operations and activities. No two combatant commands follow the same process, format, or procedures for developing theater strategy. Each combatant command has
adapted its method to the peculiarities of its region and the personalities of its commanders. The process described here is generic, but it is the basis for many of the processes found among the geographic combatant commands. The Secretary of Defense reviews each combatant commander’s theater strategy.


These are General Zinni’s reflections on the state of USCENTCOM as he takes command in 1997. What he describes here is the formal and deliberate method of developing theater strategy, in contrast to the crisis method described in Vignette 1. He discusses the sources of national strategy which he must consider to determine his theater’s mission, summarizes the theater’s situation, states the strategic alternatives, and proposes ways of implementing his strategy, including operational and theater engagement plans. Note that General Zinni identifies a new charge to “shape” the region. Shaping is a significant addition to theater strategy and will be presented later in this paper in the Theater Security Cooperation section.

**Theater Strategy Implementation — Joint Operation Planning.**

Theater strategy implements many activities of a combatant command through its guidance, which ensures those activities are in direct support of the theater strategic objectives which in turn support national objectives and strategy. One of the most important missions for a geographic combatant commander is to deter hostile actions against U.S. and friendly-nation interests, and, if necessary, to counter
such hostile actions through contingency operations. To be prepared for such contingencies, combatant commanders conduct joint operation planning, which translates national and theater strategy into operational concepts. Joint operation planning encompasses both contingency planning and crisis action planning (CAP), as coordinated at the operational level through campaign planning. The process for both contingency and crisis action planning is similar, although their timelines and the validity of assumptions used are significantly different. DoD is developing a modified method of campaign planning known as adaptive planning, which is meant to incorporate both contingency and crisis action planning into one. The elements introduced here, however, are still valid and will be incorporated into adaptive planning. The current joint operation planning method remains instructive for the basic process until adaptive planning is validated and approved.

**Figure 6. Joint Operation Planning Activities, Functions, and Products (JP 5-0, Aug 2006, Figure I-3).**
Contingency planning is the means during peacetime by which contingencies are anticipated and deliberate plans developed. These plans are based upon the Secretary of Defense’s CPG and CJCS’s JSCP. To ensure close adherence to national strategic goals and guidance, contingency plans undergo an in-progress review (IPR) by the Secretary of Defense at critical points in the development process (see Figure 6). The process also involves the entire Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC, see Figure 7), an informal group consisting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their staff, the military services and their major commands, the combatant commands and their subordinate commands, and the combat support agencies. Contingency plans are fully coordinated by the JPEC, and often have forces and resources allocated to them before execution. Because of its thorough coordination, contingency planning normally takes

Figure 7. Joint Planning and Execution Community (JP 5-0, August 2006, Figure I-2).
longer to complete than crisis action planning. The assumptions upon which contingency plans are based are important to the process, but may not always be valid when faced with the actual crisis envisioned. For that reason, nearly all contingency plans are modified through crisis action planning before execution. To keep them as relevant as possible, contingency plans are updated regularly.³³

Crisis action planning occurs as the contingency it addresses unfolds. CAP is more immediate than contingency planning, and the contingency plan assumptions are either verified as fact or disproved, leading to the plan’s modification.³⁴ CAP often builds upon previously conducted contingency planning, but a crisis could occur for which no previous planning has taken place,³⁵ as happened with OEF. In such situations, operations orders are developed from scratch rather than modified from operations plans.

Theater strategy, as translated into theater plans through the joint operation planning process, is one major example of how to execute theater strategy.


These are Gen Zinni’s memoirs covering his time as the USCENTCOM combatant commander from 1997 to 2000. Operation DESERT VVIPER, recounted here, was one of the periodic “smack downs” of Iraq after Operation DESERT STORM in response to hindering the work of United Nations (UN) weapons inspectors. This reading highlights the process of getting an operational plan approved by the President in a crisis, and the balance of authority between the Service chiefs and combatant commanders.
Theater Strategy Implementation—
Products and Activities.

To implement a theater’s strategy, and thereby national security strategy, a variety of activities and products are involved. Through the contingency planning process just described, combatant commanders’ staffs produce the estimates, base plans, concept plans and operational plans (also called level 1, 2, 3, and 4 plans), and crisis action planning that collaboratively coordinate efforts, and identify forces, functional support, and resources to deter and defend against aggression, or participate in assistance to civil authorities. Another major means of implementing theater strategy is through theater security cooperation. The theater security cooperation strategies and plans that result from this process are part of the joint operation plans family, and will be covered in more detail in a following section. Theater organization and theater logistics cover other crucial aspects of implementing theater strategy, by arranging how to attain unity of effort among the U.S. services, government agencies, and other countries’ forces. This is accomplished through organizing the commands in a theater, and sustaining theater strategy and its activities and plans through logistics and movement.

Although the above activities are the major products and efforts needed to support theater strategy and national objectives, there are other activities that also are elements of implementing a theater strategy. Since the combatant commander is responsible for developing joint operation plans for his theater, he also is responsible for ensuring that the force capabilities needed to execute those plans are available to him through apportionment in Global Force Manage-
ment or the “Forces For Memorandum.” At the theater strategic level, force planning encompasses all of those activities performed by the supported combatant commander and the subordinate component commands to select forces and capabilities to accomplish an assigned mission, or request capability found wanting. However, having forces assigned, attached, or apportioned for an operation plan (OPLAN) is of little use if those forces are not ready for their mission. For that reason, another means by which the combatant commander helps to implement theater strategy is through the training of joint forces and realistically exercising them. These force readiness activities are important parts of security assistance which is explained in a later section.

Another means of implementing theater strategy is through a Combatant Commander’s Initiative Fund (previously known as the CINC’s Initiative Fund). The expenses for running the various geographic combatant command headquarters are paid through the military service budgets and leave little flexibility on how the money is spent. Some combatant commanders have chaffed at this funding arrangement, believing that service chiefs had little interest in or understanding of the engagement programs. The Combatant Commander’s Initiative Fund, although relatively small, is spent at the discretion of the combatant commander in order to further the needs of his command, and often supports theater strategy. This can be used as seed money to start programs to be funded formally later, or to directly support unanticipated situations through theater security cooperation. Such funds may provide significant regional leverage to a theater strategy if judiciously applied.

As an end product of theater strategy, combatant commanders feed back to national authorities their
inputs to better develop and refine national strategy and priorities. The Integrated Priority Lists (IPL) (see Figure 3), for instance, are high priority requirements that fill capability shortfalls that a combatant commander’s component forces face when trying to accomplish their assigned missions. This feedback gives combatant commanders a formal voice in force planning, national level apportionment of resources, and development of strategic concepts in the Programming, Planning, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES, see Figure 3).40 Another feedback mechanism is the Joint Quarterly Readiness Review (JQRR, formerly the Joint Military Readiness Review [JMRR]) in which the services and combatant commanders respond to a stated future crisis scenario with limiting factors (LIMFACS) and deficiencies that may reduce mission accomplishment in their command. JQRR feedback covers many aspects of theater strategy—mobility and sustainment; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; joint headquarters command and control; and joint personnel and training—that may be beyond the control of the combatant commanders. Such feedback influences national political-military assessments, and the formulation of strategic policy and planning guidance.41 The end result should focus the senior national leadership on pressing readiness issues in order to determine where to place additional emphasis and resources, and thereby better support the theater strategy through improved funding, assigned forces, and combat systems.


These are General Zinni’s memoirs from the time he was Commander of USCENTCOM, implementing his
theater strategy and the challenge of gaining support for his strategy from national authorities. General Zinni raises a point about the control of funding for the combatant commanders, and the built-in tension between the Services and combatant commands.

THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION

Theater Security Cooperation Overview.

Theater security cooperation (TSC, formerly known as theater engagement) is part of the combatant commander’s theater strategy of linking military activities involving other countries to U.S. national strategic objectives. The characteristics of TSC are inherently joint, interagency, and multinational. Whereas much of the rest of theater strategy is primarily military in nature, theater security cooperation is a DoD effort that includes more of a diplomatic, information, and economic flavor.\(^42\) As part of a greater interagency effort in national security, TSC is a complementary activity with other agencies such as the DoS with its oversight of security assistance programs, or the Department of Justice which has the lead in fighting drug and human trafficking.

TSC seeks to shape and maintain the international environment within which the U.S. military must act during both peacetime and contingencies. TSC consists of both the overall theater environment in which it is executed, and the programs that execute it. The purpose of TSC is to support the Secretary of Defense’s security cooperation effort and to reinforce each geographic combatant commander’s mission to deter aggression by strengthening ties and interoperability with friendly military forces, supporting regional stability and U.S. values, and showing U.S. resolve in supporting
allies. Each command’s TSC is customized to the specific geographic, economic, political, demographic, and military situations found in a region. By design, TSC stresses activities that directly support theater operational plans and objectives, which is unlike the previous philosophy of theater engagement which relied upon varied military activities to only generate bilateral good will. TSC is a continuous process that is pertinent through all phases of joint operation planning. Its multiplying effect is most felt during Phase 0, Shape, and Phase 1, Deter, operations because each can successfully isolate adversaries and buttress allies on its own—reducing the need to resort to combat operations.

Each region’s theater security cooperation direction is derived from specific national strategic direction known as security cooperation. Security cooperation consists of a focused program of bilateral and multilateral defense activities conducted with other countries to serve U.S. security interests, and, as a result, build the right defense partnerships for the future. Although foreign policy is the purview of DoS, DoD also is actively engaged in foreign policy through security cooperation. At the strategic level, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, states:

Security cooperation consists of a focused program of bilateral and multilateral defense activities conducted with foreign countries to serve U.S. mutual security interests and build defense partnerships. Security cooperation efforts should also be aligned to support strategic communication themes, messages, and actions. The [Secretary of Defense] identifies security cooperation goals, assesses the effectiveness of security cooperation activities and revises goals when required to ensure continued support for U.S. interests abroad. Although they can shift over time, examples of typical security cooperation goals include: creating favorable
military geographical balances of power, advancing mutual defense or security arrangements; building allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and preventing conflict and crisis.\textsuperscript{46}

A geographic combatant commander focuses security cooperation at the theater level by deriving his theater security cooperation guidance from sources such as the President’s UCP and the CJCS’s JSCP.\textsuperscript{47} However, the Secretary of Defense’s CPG Annex A, and Security Cooperation Guidance (SCG) articulate more specific direction for the combatant commanders, Joint Staff, each of the services, and the defense agencies.\textsuperscript{48} The SCG “sets security cooperation priorities by tasking subordinates to prepare security cooperation strategies and implementation plans.”\textsuperscript{49} The overall combatant commander’s theater security cooperation program is the interpretation of this national security direction, and is built from the foundation of a regional strategic appraisal. Theater security cooperation is executed through the theater security cooperation plan (TSCP), which proposes and prioritizes military activities with other countries.\textsuperscript{50} The TSCP activities must demonstrably support the theater’s strategy and defense relationships to promote specified U.S. security interests identified in Joint Publication 5-0, \textit{Joint Operation Planning}, as:

1) Military contacts, including senior official visits, port visits, counterpart visits, conferences, staff talks, and personnel and unit exchange programs.

2) National assistance, including foreign internal defense, security assistance programs, and planned humanitarian and civic assistance activities.
3) Multinational training.

4) Multinational exercises, including those in support of the Partnership for Peace Program.

5) Multinational education for U.S. personnel and personnel from other nations, both overseas and in the United States.

6) Arms control and treaty monitoring activities.51

The subordinate service components of each combatant command (for instance, Pacific Air Forces in Pacific Command) play an important role in TSC, especially when directly dealing with the counterpart service components of target nations.


These are General Zinni’s musings over the importance of engagement (the term then used for what we now call theater security cooperation) to warfighting. He is outspoken for engaging in “not strictly military activities” that still impacted the theater, such as environmental security. He again illuminates the importance of interagency operations, especially in supporting “not strictly military” concerns.

Theater Security Cooperation Planning.

A TSCP is a deliberately developed plan covering non-combat military activities with other nations within a region. A TSCP implements the combatant commander’s theater security cooperation strategy and thus is a way to shape the security environment to protect and promote U.S. interests and regional objectives.52 A TSCP is a joint strategic plan, part of the
The TSCP planning process begins with a theater situation overview, which is derived from an area's regional strategic appraisal and analyzes the environment in which the TSCP will be implemented. This section sets the stage for the combatant commander's mission, which outlines the theater's prioritized regional objectives as derived from national strategic direction. The combatant commander provides guidance on the threats to security and stability in the theater, opportunities, assumptions, and a planning schedule to develop a TSCP.

The Execution section of the plan consists of the commander's Vision, Objectives, Prioritized Effects (all three defining a theater strategic end state), and Concept sections. The centerpiece is the combatant commander's Concept which outlines security cooperation activities, resources, and interagency coordination needed to realize the stated vision and objectives. If the combatant
commander’s theater objectives are the ends of security cooperation, then security cooperation activities comprise the typical ways through which theater security cooperation is executed, while the Resources and Interagency Coordination sections represent the means. Assessment of past theater security cooperation is needed to improve the current plan, and those lessons should be applied through the TSCP’s Implementation Guidance. The Annexes provide detailed information on the theater security activities and interagency coordination required by the plan.\textsuperscript{56}

The crucial part of a TSCP is the Concept section’s security cooperation activities to engage other countries and directly support the combatant commander’s strategy and the complementary annexes. In the past, there were eight separate categories for consideration when developing security cooperation activities.\textsuperscript{57} The underpinning of each of these activity categories remains solid, but since much has changed in the perspective of joint doctrine, a modified listing of seven theater security cooperation activity categories based upon new Joint Publication 5-0, \textit{Joint Operation Planning}, guidance would be best represented as: 1) Multinational Exercises, 2) Multinational Training, 3) Multinational Education, 4) Security Assistance, 5) Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, 6) Military-to-Military Contacts, and 7) Other Engagement Activities.

These activities should support specific theater objectives, so not every category will be given equal importance or weight depending upon what needs to be accomplished. The SCG enumerates “other engagement activities” to include bilateral information operations, intelligence sharing, arms control and monitoring, and defense experimentation and industrial cooperation, among others. Once developed, each TSCP is reviewed
by the theater’s service components to develop their own supporting plans. Upon completion, the SCG directs that each TSCP be forwarded to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for an annual review and inclusion into a coordinated family of security cooperation plans. This review should ensure the TSCP attains national objectives, and that together each of the regional TSCPs is sustainable at a global level. These theater plans also are coordinated with similar plans that each of the services produce, and are supported by defense agencies such as the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA); the military services; and unified commands such as U.S. Transportation Command or U.S. Special Operations Command. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) is particularly important to security assistance since it manages many of the DoD-authorized international programs, and its mission is to directly support the combatant commanders, their theater strategy and security cooperation plans through interaction, advocating policy, planning, and execution on their behalf.

The interagency process should require a national level review of the military’s theater security cooperation programs to ensure unified action of the various federal departments, but there is no process to prioritize efforts within the federal government. This situation has led one U.S. Army War College scholar to observe, “because there is no national level prioritization, each particular component is left to determine which requirement to support.” Direction from the Secretary of Defense in his SCG attempts to remedy this situation, as part of his transformation efforts in security cooperation. Since the inauguration of the SCG in 2003, theater security cooperation strategy and its implementation plans must be written in a prescribed format, and annual assessments provided to
This should standardize the products of what has been an ad hoc system. However, since no two combatant commands follow the same process, the procedures for developing theater strategy remain different.


This reading from General Zinni’s memoirs as the USCENTCOM commander is an example of engaging Yemen to keep it from becoming a failed state. He offers several ways through security assistance and intelligence sharing to make a difference. Notice how theater security cooperation works to benefit both parties, and how he leverages several types of activities to achieve his purpose.

**Theater Security Cooperation Execution.**

As JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, notes, “security cooperation is a key element of global and theater shaping operations . . .,” and more of a combatant command staff’s time is spent on these security cooperation activities than any other aspect of theater strategy. In a resource constrained environment, as all government operations are, the trick to executing TSC is matching the TSC requirements, which the combatant commander determines are needed to succeed in his mission, with finite resources allocated to each commander in competition with other priorities. Prioritization of goals and resources is a necessity in TSC. For each of the theater security cooperation activities (see Figure 8), the combatant commander must plan for the forces and command organization
needed to control these endeavors, and the movement and sustainment aspects that support them. All of these various actions to implement theater security cooperation activities are ultimately meant to prepare the command to meet its assigned missions, to balance the risk, and manage the consequences inherent in trying to attain the objectives of its strategy in a fiscal and resource-constrained environment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typical TSC Activities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multinational Exercises</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Field Training Exercises</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Command Post Simulations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multinational Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Joint Combined Exchange Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multinational Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Regional Center for Security Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Senior Service Colleges</td>
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<tr>
<td>Security Assistance</td>
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<td>- Foreign Military Sales</td>
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<tr>
<td>- International Military Education and Training</td>
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Figure 8. Samples of Theater Security Cooperation Activities.

Although the commanders and staffs of the combatant commands, military services, and defense support agencies each play an important role in planning and executing theater security cooperation,
the Security Assistance Offices (SAOs), which are part of the country team of most American embassies, are the “point men.” The SAOs are military members, DoD civilians, and host nation employees who work closely with the host government to ensure that their security requirements and the combatant commander’s security cooperation plan for that country mesh. The SAO members also ensure that their efforts in supporting the military elements of power with the host nation are synchronized with the broader diplomatic, economic, and information activities established by the American Ambassador referencing the National Security Strategy and DoS’ Strategic Plan. The SAO usually administers International Military Education and Training (IMET) and other training and education programs by matching host country needs to available U.S. positions, and coordinating the U.S. funding allotted to some countries. SAOs arrange for sales or transfers of military goods, services, support, and training to the host country through grants and Foreign Military Sales, which are made directly through the U.S. Government. SAOs also may be involved in the transfer of munitions and other defense articles through the direct commercial sales process, in which countries purchase directly from U.S. vendors, after licensing by DoS. SAOs, in coordination with the Defense Attaché’s Office, which is also part of the country team, also may be responsible for coordinating bilateral exercises, determining U.S. participation in trade and air shows, overseeing exchange programs and military-to-military exchanges, or being responsible for a host of many other security cooperation activities. The overlap of duties between these two military agencies requires close cooperation between the two. SAOs are the combatant commander’s direct representatives to their
host country, and are responsible for the success of the command’s theater strategy and theater security cooperation in their affected area.

The planning and execution of these security cooperation activities by the SAO and other involved DoD organizations directly support the combatant commanders when preparing for future military operations, especially when engaging with friendly and neutral countries, and when deterring hostilities with potential opponents: the first two critical phases of Operations Planning (see Figure 9). The U.S. military employs a full spectrum of actions to protect national interests ranging from mutual peace-time cooperation to full combat against aggressors. Shaping may be the most important of these OPLAN phases because, if successfully conducted, shaping activities can, by themselves, reduce the frequency of crises, and thereby avert the need to resort to combat operations. Shaping actions also promote U.S. and coalition partners’ mutual interests, increase understanding of the region, and strengthen future multinational military bonds and operations. This shaping is accomplished through security activities that organize and train forces, maintain operational area access, rehearse operational plans through exercises, employ space assets, and anticipate stability operations that may occur in later phases.66 Shaping activities are the foundation upon which the other phases of military operations are developed.

Deter phase operations are closely linked to the shaping activities, although in the former the role of theater security cooperation diminishes. Deter operations are overt conventional deterrence or increased readiness to avert the need for the violent use of military force. The Deter phase prepares the U.S.
Figure 9. Generic Operations Planning by Level of Military Effort (Joint Staff J7) (Vego, 5).

military to conduct potential high-tempo operations intending to preempt further adverse actions by an opponent. With the contingency better defined in this phase, deterrence operations facilitate joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment and understanding of the operational area's physical environment; prepare the operational area through use of special operations, stability operations, civil affairs activities, and logistics sustainment; continue the employment of space capabilities; enable force protection; and use flexible deterrent options in order to isolate an opponent and stymie hostile intentions before resorting to combat. While shaping activities and deterrence operations directly benefit the most from theater security cooperation, theater security cooperation spans all six phases of military operations and is a valuable augmentation to each. Theater security
cooperation is a continuing activity for each combatant command, military service, and defense agency during all levels of peace, contingencies, and war.


These are General Zinni's memoirs covering his time as the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) deputy J-3 from 1990 to 1992. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, but before the end of the Soviet Union, the USEUCOM commander, General Galvin, sent a contingent of officers to Moscow as part of his command’s engagement activities. Then Brigadier General Zinni discusses the importance and intent of military-to-military contacts for a combatant commander.

**Summary.**

This overview of theater strategy and theater security cooperation is a primer on one of the most important tools the U.S. military uses to engage other countries, deter unwanted actions, and defend U.S. and friendly nation interests. To be effective, theater strategy and theater security cooperation must be derived from and consistently linked to national and multinational strategic guidance and policy, and formulated to meet the requirements found in each of the world’s regions. To attain the security goals of a combatant commander’s strategy, the proper support for joint operation plans through organizational structure, force projection, sustainment, readiness training, and force development input is essential. A crucial means to attain a combatant commander’s objectives is through the proper derivation and
development of theater security cooperation. Theater security cooperation directly supports national goals at the regional level, and enhances military operations by obviating the need for military action, or by preparing the environment better for U.S. military intervention should it be necessary. Theater strategy is an important part of realizing national strategy around the world, and theater security cooperation is not only one of the most powerful tools in attaining the goals of theater strategy but, through its ability to obviate the need for violent military action, a cost effective tool as well. The OEF case study shows how each part of theater strategy and theater security cooperation is manifest in an unexpected military operation and the actions that led up to it in the years before.

THEATER STRATEGY: OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM CASE STUDY

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Overview.

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in Afghanistan was not the campaign for which the U.S. military had prepared in the years following Operation DESERT STORM. For a variety of reasons, OEF was a combination of high technology weapons and sophisticated command and control with tactics and equipment that U.S. forces had not seriously employed in nearly a century. By necessity, its operations and support were both joint and combined in ways the armed forces had not considered before. Yet, by relying on international connections established in the years leading to this unexpected operation, modifying established processes, and the creativity and ingenuity of professional and well-led forces, U.S. forces were
able to complete their assigned combat missions. Doing so was difficult, however, and presented many challenges.

OEF was a short-notice, “come as you are” operation. It was fought in a region in which the U.S. military had completed little contingency planning, conducted with minimal crisis action preparation, and the active combat part was of relatively short duration and used limited U.S. forces. It was an operational success, replacing the pariah government of the Taliban with one more representative of the people of Afghanistan and willing to adhere to the conventions of civilized nations. Terrorist organizations, most notably al-Qai’da, lost an important sanctuary for their activities, and were weakened. However, this operation also became the basis for significant changes to military and interagency processes and operations that were to follow, due to the problems encountered during its execution. Some of these problems, especially the interdependence of operations and strategy and security cooperation at the national and theater levels, are the focus of this case study.

This case study covers the theater security cooperation endeavors in USCENTCOM from 1996 to 2001, and the national and theater strategy that developed to combat terrorism during the first campaign waged. It reviews and applies the theater strategy concepts described in this paper, and contrasts the doctrinal process of developing theater strategy with the reactive crisis action methods that were adapted from the established processes for OEF. The next section focuses on the national direction given to the combatant commander waging OEF and the operations that resulted. With this better understanding of operations and direction given during the operation, the final
part of this case study presents the theater security cooperation that preceded the operation, and how it affected combat operations. The first reading, below, is an early analysis of OEF to familiarize the reader with that operation.


This study is an early analysis of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM highlighting the difficulty of executing national and theater level strategy in an unexpected situation, and using joint forces to combat terrorism. Read this to ascertain national strategic directions and missions given to the combatant commander, and then for an understanding of how operations evolved. As an early review of an operation, this study is subject to further revision.

**Theater Strategy and Crisis Planning in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.**

This section presents the development of combat operations in ENDURING FREEDOM, which did not follow the contingency planning process as presented in this paper. The attacks on the U.S. homeland surprised many by the quarter from which they came. As a result, there was little direct guidance or preparation for military operations against Afghanistan before September 11, 2001 (9/11), although diplomatic, information, and economic elements of power already were engaged in isolating the Taliban regime and pressuring al-Qai’d. Plans existed in USCENTCOM
for strikes against Afghani targets, as had been done by the previous administration, but there were no plans for ground operations or regime change, hence this was a crisis action planning process. Nonetheless, national and theater guidance were quickly developed into strategies that guided operations. This part of the case study contrasts the contingency planning process of developing national and theater strategies with the ad hoc process that followed the 9/11 attacks, to show that the deliberate process can be adapted when needed, and that it is often a messier process than military manuals show. Indeed, to make matters worse, as national strategic direction developed and evolved during OEF, the operation’s goals and objectives rapidly changed to keep pace.

Below, read the presidential administration's national security policy directive that was too late in influencing policy with regard to the Taliban, and the examples of national security direction that were given on the fly. The evolving national security direction and demand for immediate action made developing a coherent theater strategy to counter terrorism, particularly al-Qai’da and the governments that harbored the group, difficult to develop.


The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) is a watchdog group that acts as a convenient clearinghouse for government documents. From open source reporting, FAS has assembled the content of the otherwise classified NSPD 9, which was the first policy directive of the new Bush administration to
address terrorism and al-Qa‘ida. Ironically it was set to be signed on September 10, 2001. This was one of the few national security direction documents issued during OEF, and it was released 18 days after combat operations started.


In this passage, Bob Woodward chronicles the formation of national strategic direction for the crisis action response that led to OEF. The President's speech on the evening of 9/11 establishes the “Bush Doctrine,” declaring that America would pursue those who planned and executed terrorist acts, and those who harbored them. Security policy and national strategic direction are sometimes promulgated in this way through dramatic public speeches, especially in a crisis. In the end, national strategy is always the President’s to make; in this case, the President did not consult with the Vice President, Secretary of State, or Secretary of Defense.


On September 17, 2001, Bob Woodward recounts a National Security Council (NSC) meeting in which the President gives clear direction based on discussions held earlier on September 16 (pp. 78-81). He chooses the level of the military response against Afghanistan, how wide to make the war on terrorism, and issues diplomatic initiatives, as part of national security direction. In the second reading, memos are signed which formally issue strategic direction for nearly all aspects of diplomatic, information, military, and economic responses.

This snapshot by Bob Woodward chronicles the continuing formation of national strategic direction for OEF. Objectives for the campaign are examined in detail by the cabinet principals. Note the issues that arise with relying on indigenous opposition forces, the discussion on interagency cooperation, support from other countries, and prioritization. The principal cabinet members involved may be trying to direct events outside of the control of the United States, and are doing so on October 11, 2001, 5 days after the start of hostilities. “Jawbreaker” is the code name of the first CIA team operating inside Afghanistan.


In his autobiography, the commander of USCENTCOM recounts how his command built the guidance and plan that directed OEF. He had to design the military response with minimal guidance from command authorities because they were developing national direction during this time too, as the readings above indicated. The USCENTCOM staff used their best judgment of what their bosses would want, and started to build a theater strategy to meet the new situation. This passage outlines the three options that eventually evolved into OEF.

**Theater Security Cooperation and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.**

As a short notice crisis, OEF was essentially fought with the environment, forces, and processes that were
in place on September 10, 2001. The national and theater security cooperation pursued with countries of the USCENTCOM region prior to hostilities set the stage for what was possible, or not possible, during the operation. Although additional diplomatic, information, military, and economic actions were accomplished in the harried, confused days that followed the 9/11 attacks, operations were conducted based on the international political environment that USCENTCOM and the State Department carefully constructed in the years prior. Since few people seriously planned for a regime change in Afghanistan before September 2001, these security cooperation efforts were focused on achieving outcomes for different purposes and in different places. The personal contacts, established trust and procedures among governments, familiarity with bases and forces, and exercised interoperability, however, gave USCENTCOM operational flexibility to pursue OEF. In particular, USCENTCOM benefited from international assistance which provided over-flight permission, basing, intelligence, forces, or many other forms of support and aid from Kuwait to Kyrgyzstan and beyond.

The readings below offer examples of theater security cooperation efforts that preceded September 2001, and set the stage for OEF. These are the shaping activities that theater security cooperation supports, so you will read examples of security cooperation continuing around the region, as another means of influencing the outcome of the conflict. These documents show what was done to engage the political and military interests in this region, and how such relations were used to support OEF. Note also the weaknesses of the security cooperation efforts that left operational gaps to fill, and threatened the success of OEF. The readings below are
presented in the approximate chronologic sequence under three successive USCENTCOM commanders, General Peay, General Zinni, and General Franks.


This is an overview of theater strategy and engagement used by the Commander, USCENTCOM from 1996 to 1997. Since theater strategy and theater security cooperation are long-range activities, the actions taken or not taken during this time would have reached fruition during OEF. Read this document to see how USCENTCOM approached engagement with key supporters of the future OEF effort, to include Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain. Although in its AOR, crucial governments affected by OEF, Iran and Afghanistan, did not have diplomatic ties with the United States and therefore were not directly influenced by theater strategy; however, that strategy may have been formed with those countries in mind. Other key players such as Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan were not assigned by the Unified Command Plan to USCENTCOM’s AOR until 1999. Although marked For Official Use Only, this document’s proponent has determined that the protective marking no longer applies.


In this set of readings from General Zinni’s memoirs, he is commander of USCENTCOM. He writes about a time where the relationships he gained through the military-to-military relationships of theater security
cooperation opened doors during a crisis in May 1998, which were otherwise unavailable. His insight on Pakistan’s views toward cooperating with the United States before the tragedies on 9/11 is important, and sheds some understanding on Pakistan’s involvement in OEF.


In this reading from General Zinni’s memoirs, he discusses his first visit to Central Asia as the commander of USCENTCOM in September 1998. He analyzes the state of affairs between these countries and the United States before 9/11, and the problems they faced. He accesses the effectiveness of his theater security cooperation plan, and the growing threat of al-Qai’da in the region.


The commander, U.S. Central Command gave this summary of the state of his command and region 6 months before the commencement of OEF. He starts by citing activities that are part of his theater engagement plan (now known as theater security cooperation plan). General Franks presents threats in the region, which are many, but only specifically mentions Afghanistan or Central Asia twice, once obliquely through terrorism and once with smuggling. If central Asia was not a
concern to Congress or USCENTCOM, it then follows that the theater strategy would not address this region sufficiently either.


At the September 29, 2001 NSC meeting, Bob Woodward’s account stresses national security cooperation efforts. Multinational support is beginning, but Uzbekistan remains an unknown. A key question from this meeting is “We need to identify what the Pentagon wants from countries . . .?” By October 4, in the second reading, Uzbekistan was supporting U.S. military requirements. Security cooperation seems to have achieved its desired effect.


This article gives a brief overview of the types of security cooperation that the United States conducted in Central Asia by country between 1996 and 2001 and the operational impact they had for OEF. The article advocates for increased use of security cooperation because it is a cost effective military operations enabler.

**Case Study Points to Consider.**

1. In order to examine the effectiveness of theater security cooperation in supporting combat operations
During OEF, we must first note the theater strategy, missions, and objectives that guided its efforts. Identify the national strategic guidance given to the USCENTCOM commander in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, and the formal national strategic direction given in documents that preceded the attack but might still be applicable to the situation. Comment on how effective the guidance was towards reaching its goals.

2. After identifying the national strategic guidance given, identify the mission and goals that General Franks issued to his command to guide the OEF effort, and show the links between national and theater guidance, if any.

3. Since there was little time to reflect on the situation and action was demanded quickly, was the right national strategic and theater guidance given, did it sufficiently cover what was needed, and did it outline what was required to implement it? As an operational commander, was there something else you would have wished was given? Was the guidance given sufficient to reach the goals that were set?

4. Many restraints and constraints were placed on military operations, because of the environment in which OEF was fought. That environment was shaped in large part by the theater security cooperation policies and activities that USCENTCOM engaged in before and during OEF. Identify the theater security activities that occurred or were proposed between 1996 and 2001, and critique their influence on successes and problems in OEF. Were these TSCP activities able to support combat operations in a way and place not considered when they were proposed? Discuss this in terms of the theater security cooperation categories (Multinational Exercises, Multinational Training, Multinational Education, Security Assistance, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, Military-to-Military Contacts, or
Other Engagement Activities) as conducted with countries in the region and surrounding regions.

5. TSCPs are meant to shape the AOR for potential future operations, and the OEF case study scenario here is different only in that the OEF events already have occurred, so we know the “future” with certainty. Knowing now what problems will need to be resolved for the “future,” but remaining based on the general situation and guidance in 1996, what theater security cooperation activities should be developed to better prepare for anticipated combat operations in Central Asia?

6. As with any government endeavor, a TSCP is restrained by limited funds, resources, and time. Therefore, the activities of a good TSCP are written with an eye to salesmanship, meaning selling the Secretary of Defense, the President, and the Congress on how well the activities support national goals and objectives to attain funding. The prioritization, integration, and synergy among the activities of a TSCP, and with the activities of the TSCPs of other combatant commands, are selling points. Clear succinct descriptions of the TSCP activities are also important if we are to influence busy decisionmakers. For all of these reasons, integrate the pieces of the TSCP that were developed earlier, looking for prioritization and synergy among the plan’s activities; clear adherence to national guidance through ends and ways links; firm grounding in the scenario and addressing a problem of concern; and activities that clearly describe themselves in terms of who, what, where, when, why, and how.
ENDNOTES

1. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, Signature Draft, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 24, 2006, p. GL-26. Joint doctrine is evolving rapidly during the turmoil that has followed the end of the Cold War. As the foundation for military planning and operations, a definitive overview of theater strategy and security cooperation must reference joint doctrine, but may fall behind in its latest pronouncements. The notes referencing JFSC Publication 1 and CJCSM 3413.01A already account for this phenomenon. Using a signature draft version of Joint Publication 5-0 also falls into this category, although the parts referenced in this paper seem to have stabilized in the past several drafts of this document. See also JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 17, 2006, p. GL-32.

2. Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) Publication 1, *The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide*, Washington, DC: Joint Forces Staff College, National Defense University, 2000, p. 3-24. This document has not been updated since 2000, although it has not been rescinded as of the date of this publication. The theater strategy experts at JFSC “generally consider the information cited to be correct,” therefore it has been cited judiciously, as confirmed by practices generally found in the field.


4. JFSC-1, p. 3-25.


6. Ibid.


8. JP 5-0, p. II-1.


10. Ibid., p. GL-20.


15. Ibid., p. II-1.
17. JFSC Pub 1, p. 3-26.
18. Ibid., pp. 3-26 to 3-27.
22. JP 5-0, p. III-17.
25. JFSC Pub 1, p. 3-26.
27. JFSC Pub 1, p. 3-28.
29. JFSC Pub 1, p. 3-29.
30. Ibid., p. 4-10.
32. Ibid., p. x.
33. Ibid., pp. I-16 to I-17.
34. Ibid., p. III-22.
36. Ibid., pp. I-17 to I-18.
38. Clancy, p. 323.


42. JP 3-0, p. xxvi.


45. JP 5-0, p. I-3.


49. Preface, Department of State/USAID Publication 11084.


52. JP 3-0, p. I-6.


54. *Theater Engagement Planning*, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3113.01A, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Staff, May 31, 2000, pp. C1 to C-8. This manual was rescinded on February 17, 2006. Much of the guidance, however, was common sense, and its impact on theater security cooperation will remain through inertia until further guidance is given. For that reason, CJCSM 3113.01A was judiciously referenced in this paper with the caveat that its replacement may update the process. Such is the nature of theater security cooperation.


58. Preface, Department of State/USAID Publication 11084.


63. JP 5-0, p. I-3.


65. DISAM, p. I-1.


67. JP 3-0, Sep 2006, V-4 to V-8.
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Note 1: CJCSM 3113.01A, *Theater Engagement Planning*, was rescinded on February 17, 2006. Much of the guidance in that manual, however, was common sense and its impact on theater security cooperation will remain through inertia until further guidance is given. For that reason, CJCSM 3113.01A was judiciously referenced in this paper with the caveat that its replacement may update the process. Such is the nature of theater security cooperation.

Note 2: Joint Forces Staff College Publication 1, *Joint Staff Officer’s Guide*, has not been updated since 2000, although it has not been rescinded as of the date of this publication. The theater strategy experts at JFSC “generally consider the information cited to be correct.” Therefore Publication 1 has been cited judiciously, as confirmed by practices generally found in the field.


Note 3: The definitive history of OEF has yet to be written, and likely will not be for some time. Although controversial, Bob Woodward’s *Bush At War* is used here as a source that had wide access to the events reported, and whose account has not been seriously questioned by the principals about whom it reports. For these reasons it is a reasonable source from which to derive early lessons on theater strategy and security cooperation during OEF.

Note 4: Joint doctrine is rapidly evolving during the turmoil that has followed the end of the Cold War. As the foundation for military planning and operations, a definitive overview of theater strategy and security cooperation must reference joint doctrine, but may fall behind in its latest pronouncements by so doing. The notes above referencing JFSC Publication 1 and CJCSM 3413.01A already account for this phenomenon. Using a signature draft version of Joint Publication 5-0 also falls into this category, although the parts referenced in this paper seem to have stabilized in the past several drafts of this document.


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