China’s diplomacy toward Africa: drivers and constraints\(^1\)

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**Abstract**

The increasingly multi-faceted engagement of China in Africa is part of China’s growing global reach. Chinese diplomats strive to promote an image of a peacefully rising power, whereas Chinese businessmen seek natural resources and export markets. As a result, those responsible for Chinese foreign policy strategic thinking struggle to accommodate the needs of this diverse group of actors in Africa, well aware that as a major power, Beijing is expected to address international crisis. In Washington and Brussels, China is criticized for its support of despotic African regimes and its aid programs ‘with no strings attached’. In Sudan, in particular, China’s credibility as a responsible nation is questioned. This article provides a concise overview of China’s evolving diplomacy toward Africa, highlighting the Sino-Sudan relationship, with the aim of shedding light on the drivers and constraints on Beijing’s motives and actions on the African continent. The article

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assesses some of the implications of Beijing’s policy choices in Africa for its international relations.

1 Introduction

China’s presence in Africa has expanded dramatically in the last decade. Between 1997 and 2006, the value of China–African trade rose 10-fold from US$5.7 billion in 1997 to US$56 billion in 2006 (Burke et al., 2007, p. 3); in 2008 the figure exceeded US$100 billion. China’s investments in Africa have increased almost six-fold from US$56 million in 1996 to US$370 million in 2006 (Huang and Li, 2007, p. 51). China’s political and military engagement on the continent has also deepened considerably in recent years. President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao made altogether five high profile visits to Africa 2003–07, and in November 2006 Beijing hosted 41 African heads of state at the third Forum on China–Africa Cooperation. As of January 2009, of the 11 People’s Republic of China (PRC) peacekeeping operations worldwide, six were in Africa (Gill and Huang, 2009, p. 1).

China’s engagement in Africa has not only caught the attention of other governments; it is also the focus of international organizations ranging from aid agencies and advocacy groups to development and financial institutions. In 2007, the World Bank’s lengthy report on China’s and India’s economic activities in Africa began by stating that ‘China and India’s interest in trade and investment with Africa – home to 300 million of the globe’s poorest people and the world’s most formidable development challenge – presents a significant opportunity for growth and integration of the Sub-Saharan continent into the global economy’ (Broadman, 2007, p. 1).

China’s diplomatic engagement in Africa is driven by the country’s growing need for resources to ensure economic growth. Oil is the leading commodity that China imports from Africa, but China’s Africa policies encompass strategic goals other than merely securing oil, other natural resources, and new export markets. China’s heightened level of activity in Africa is part of China’s overall strategy to promote an image of a

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peacefully rising, constructive, and responsible major power. When describing Sino-African relations, China’s political leaders refer to 50 years of friendly ties between China and African countries. Official statements stress mutual benefit and mutual respect for state sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of states as guiding principles of the international system. In articles by Chinese academics and observers about China’s relationship with Africa, a predominant theme is the common heritage of struggling to eradicate poverty and colonialism which China and African nations share (Zhang, 2006, p. 55; Liu, 2007, p. 25).

In sum, from Beijing’s point of view, Africa is a continent that is vital for China’s continued economic growth as well as an important component in shaping China’s influence and prestige as a major power.

From Africa’s point of view, the relationship with China is multifaceted. African governments welcome Chinese engagement because increased trade, investment, aid, and debt-relief have resulted in economic opportunities and benefits – at least for the African elites. China has put Africa in the global spotlight which in turn is considered good for African development. Moreover, Chinese aid is an alternative to the aid from Western countries and international organizations which Africans look upon as representing Western interests (Marks, 2006). However, the degree to which local African businesses have been marginalized by the arrival of Chinese competitors is difficult to quantify. The tendency of Chinese companies to employ labor from the PRC to work on infrastructure projects in Africa is also a contentious issue. On the basis of the literature available in English by African authors, the picture that emerges is complex (Manji and Marks, 2007, p. 7). China poses both ‘a tantalizing opportunity and a terrifying threat’ (Mbeki, 2005). While China’s aid projects have resulted in the training of Africans in areas ranging from irrigation and malaria treatment to the building of nuclear power plants and telecommunication networks, Chinese aid has also been channeled to constructing large prestige projects ‘linked to the institutional interests with the state’, for example, foreign ministry buildings and stadiums (Alden, 2005, pp. 150–152).

Though at the official level China and African leaders proclaim that their countries are all equal partners in the developing world, the partnership is viewed by some outside observers as a ‘deeply unequal relationship’ (Clapham, 2006, p. 3). Excluding South Africa, there is no
African economy that can even begin to engage with China in the way that China is engaging with Africa; and the size of South Africa’s economy – by far the most developed in Africa – is tiny compared with that of China’s (Clapham, 2006, p. 3). China is presently Africa’s third largest trading partner after the United States and France. For China, trade with Africa constituted less than 4% of China’s overall trade in 2007. As Ian Taylor notes, China–Africa ties have historically been based on China’s needs rather than any coherent African China policy (Taylor, 2006, p. 2). African nations have no real plan as to how to maximize the relationship with China for Africa’s long-term development (Taylor, 2006, p. 2).

From the point of view of Western and other Asian countries, China’s growing engagement in Africa constitutes competition – competition for resources, competition for markets, and competition for political and military influence on the continent. In addition, international aid organizations are wary of the promise by Chinese leaders to provide development aid ‘with no strings attached’ because of the fear that this undermines efforts by international organizations to promote accountability, sustainable development, and environmentally sensible projects in Africa. Furthermore, Western governments have expressed concern that by providing economic, political, and military support, Beijing is propping up regimes known for their abysmal human rights records. China–Sudan ties are a case in point.

This article’s aim is to shed light on the motives and goals of China’s diplomatic efforts in Africa to further our understanding of China’s broader foreign policy objectives as well as the complex dynamics unfolding on the African continent. The immense diversity of African nations has to be recognized as an underlying complicating factor in any assessment of China–Africa relations. Sub-Saharan Africa is not a country. It is a highly heterogeneous continent comprised of 47 nations. Chinese actors do not have similar patterns of behavior in all African nations. In the same vein, China poses different kinds of challenges to different kinds of states. In weak or dysfunctional states (e.g. Zambia, Angola),

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elite views and the views of ordinary citizens are likely to be vastly different, whereas in functioning states such as South Africa the relationship with China is more balanced. In African countries that belong to neither category the picture is mixed; though the African counterpart should have leverage vis-à-vis China because of abundant resources, this advantage is not necessarily utilized – again, for various reasons (Sidiropoulis, 2006, p. 8).

2 Overview of China–Africa relations

During the Mao Zedong era, relations between the PRC and Africa were marked by rhetoric reflecting Cold War politics as well as the solidarity of developing nations and their common cause of combating colonialism and imperialism. A leader of the Non-Alignment Movement, China provided African countries in the 1960s and 1970s with political support in several liberation and independence struggles and gave them development assistance, in spite of its own poverty and political isolation. China undertook large-scale infrastructure projects in Africa such as the Tanzam railway between Tanzania and Zambia in addition to sending technical experts and doctors to Africa and granting Africans with scholarships to study in China. African countries supported Beijing’s pursuit of retaking its seat in the United Nations. When reviewing the history of China–African relations, Chinese observers often mention the fact that of the 76 votes in favor of recognizing the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China in the decisive UN vote in October 1971, more than a third (26) of the votes were from African countries (Zhang, 2007b, p. 68).

After Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms took off in the late 1970s and pragmatism gradually replaced ideology as the driving force behind Beijing’s foreign policy, the nature of China’s relations with Africa changed. When discussing China–African relations in the 1980s, Chinese writers usually focus on then Premier Zhao Ziyang’s 1982 visit to Africa and his declaration of the four-point principle intended to guide China’s engagement with Africa (equality and mutual benefit, efficiency, diversity and mutual development) (He, 2007a, p. 28; Li, 2007, p. 72; Luo and Liu, 2007, p. 26). However, outsiders have pointed out that China neglected Africa during the 1980s due to Beijing’s preoccupation of forging closer ties with the West and attracting Western
technology and direct investment (Taylor, 2006, p. 2). A turning point was June 4, 1989. The West’s condemnation of the Chinese government’s violent crackdown of the Tiananmen demonstrations and consequently China’s international isolation spurred a renewed interest in Beijing toward governments of Third World countries. African governments were for the most part either supportive of the Chinese government’s actions or refrained from making comments. During the three years following the June 1989 events, the then Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen toured 14 African countries and numerous African leaders visited Beijing with much fanfare.

Since 1989 China’s emphasis on Africa has continued uninterrupted. China’s leaders have invested a substantial amount of time and resources in the African continent. When China for the first time participated in an UN peacekeeping operation, it was in Africa (Namibia 1989) and as of January 2009 nearly three-quarters of Chinese UN peacekeeping operations were concentrated on the African continent (Gill and Huang, 2009, p. 1). China and Africa have also continuously supported each other in the United Nations.

In commemoration of 50 years of the first diplomatic ties between China and Africa, Beijing proclaimed 2006 ‘China’s Year of Africa’. President Hu and Premier Wen both toured the continent that year. China also published its first Africa Policy Paper. At the Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Beijing, the leaders of 48 African countries were promised a long list of cooperation initiatives with financial initiatives in addition to substantial debt cancellation pledges by China (Hu, 2006). Hu Jintao’s eight-point proposal at the Summit included:

1. China’s pledge to double its assistance to Africa by 2009 (though because no official figure exists for aid up until 2006 the value of the pledged aid is unknown).
2. China’s promise of US$3 billion of preferential loans and US$2 billion of preferential buyer’s credits to Africa in the next three years.

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4 Taylor points out that Beijing denies neglecting Africa. For example Luo and Liu write that from the 1980s – though the international environment changed dramatically – China’s policy toward Africa did not change (Luo and Liu, 2007, p. 26)

5 Hu’s promise of debt cancellation only applies to the heavily indebted and least developed countries of Africa which have diplomatic relations with China.
3. China’s promise to set up a China–Africa development fund which will reach US$5 billion to encourage Chinese companies to invest in Africa.

4. China’s commitment to build a conference center for the African Union.

5. China’s pledge to cancel debt in the form of all interest-free government loans that matured at the end of 2005 owed by the heavily indebted and least developed African countries that have diplomatic ties with China (not for countries who recognize Taiwan).

6. China’s pledge to further open up its market to Africa by increasing from 191 to over 440 the number of export items to China receiving zero-tariff treatment from the least developed of African countries that have diplomatic ties with China.

7. China’s promise to establish three to five trade and economic development zones in Africa in the next three years.

8. China’s promise within the next three years to train 15,000 African professionals; send 100 senior agricultural engineers to Africa; set up 10 agricultural technology demonstration centers and build 30 hospitals in Africa; provide 30 million RMB of grant for building 30 malaria prevention and treatment centers in Africa; send 300 youth volunteers to Africa; build 100 rural schools in Africa; and double the number of scholarships to African students from the current 2,000 per year to 4,000 by 2009.

Generally, in the Twenty-first century, China has given little direct aid to African and other developing countries; rather China’s assistance consists to a great extent on concessional loans (with low interest e.g. 1–2%) granted by China Export-Import Bank and China Development Bank (CDB) to Chinese companies for infrastructure projects, including roads, ports, dams, and railways, as well as power plants, oil facilities, mines, and medical centers. This Chinese focus on ‘hardware’ differs from the ‘software’ approach preferred by Western countries that concentrates on

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6 The OECD defines Official Development Assistance as follows: Flows of official financing administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective, and which are concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25%. Lending by export credit agencies – with the pure purpose of export promotion – is excluded (OECD, http://www.oecd.org/glossary/0,3414,en_2649_33721_1965693_1_1_1_1,00.html1965586).
capacity building in the recipient country (Brandtzaeg et al., 2008, p. 10). Chinese observers state that the Chinese approach leads to tangible results that benefit the African populace. According to W enping He of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Chinese leaders and diplomats stress the importance of equality in its relationship with African nations by dogmatically avoiding the words ‘donor’ and ‘assistance’ when referring to the development aid; rather Chinese leaders use the term ‘economic cooperation’.  

3 Drivers and constraints of China’s Africa policies

China wants to cultivate strong relations with Africa for multiple reasons, as discussed in Section 1.

In the economic sphere, the African continent is of interest to China primarily because of its oil resources, its other natural resources, its role as an export market for manufactured goods and labor, and Africa’s role in enhancing China’s food security. Besides Sub-Saharan Africa having the world’s second largest oil reserves (after the Middle East), Africa is looked upon by Chinese companies as an expanding market for their products. As competition in the Chinese market has become fiercer and profit margins have shrunk, The Chinese government in turn views African energy and other major infrastructure projects as a vehicle to create jobs for China’s growing labor pool. In recent years, Chinese enterprises have also been encouraged by both national and provincial government officials to invest in the agriculture sector in Africa.

Especially, since the early 2000s, China’s trade with African countries has grown rapidly, as has the amount of Chinese investments in Africa. China’s largest trading partners in 2007 were Angola, South Africa, Sudan, Egypt, and Nigeria, accounting for 58% of all African trade with China in 2007 (Fundira, 2008a). China’s imports from Africa consist overwhelmingly of mineral products (80%), which is mainly crude oil (71.1%), while African imports from China include textiles and clothing.

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7 Author’s research interview with W enping He, Director of the African Studies Section at the Institute of West Asian and African Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences on 26 February 2008 in Beijing.

machinery, transport equipment, base metals and footwear (Fundira, 2008b).

Increased trade with China coupled with Chinese investments have spurred economic growth in African countries, which (excluding Zimbabwe) has been on average around 5% per year since 2000 (Li, 2008, p. 3). Oil is the critical factor. Four of five African countries China imports the most from (Angola, Sudan, Congo, and Equatorial Guinea) sell nearly exclusively oil to China; these are also the African nations which have shown the most robust economic growth over the past decade (Sandrey, 2006, p. 8).9 The three top countries (Sudan, Algeria, Nigeria) that China invested in 2004–06 were all oil producers (Ministry of Commerce, 2007).

In absolute terms, the value of China–African trade for 2007 – US$74 billion – was very modest when compared with the volume of China’s trade in 2007 with the United States (US$302 billion), Japan (US$236 billion), the European Union (US$230 billion) or even South Korea (US$160 billion) (US–China Business Council, 2008). In terms of global capital flows, China’s interests on the continent are marginal, though growing. Chinese investments in Africa are far smaller than those of developed nations, especially the United States and former European colonial powers. Even India and Malaysia invest more in Africa (Donavan and McGovern, 2007).

In the realm of education, considered an important tool of China’s soft power projection, Africa also figures moderately in the larger China picture, but that too is set to change. Over the past five decades, 29,000 African students in total have pursued studies in China. In 2007 alone, more than 190,000 foreign students studied in China; of the 10,151 foreigners, who received a Chinese government scholarship, about one-fifth were Africans (Wang and Zhang, 2007; Xinhua, 2008a). In the view of these statistics, Beijing’s pledge in 2006 to double scholarships for African students from 2,000 students per year to 4,000 students per year by 2009 is remarkable.

Politically, Africa has for decades been important to China because of the support by the majority of African nations for the ‘one China’ principle and deterrence of Taiwanese independence. As of January 2009, only four African countries maintained ties with Taipei and not

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9 South Africa is the nation among the top five that is not a major oil exporter.
Besides relying on the African voting bloc on all issues related to Taiwan or China’s human rights record at the United Nations and its sub-organizations, Beijing relies on the African nations’ support in a number of international multilateral settings.

More broadly, China’s increasingly close relationship with African countries reflects China’s evolving foreign policy and hence public diplomacy as it strives to establish itself as a world power. Beijing’s leaders do indeed want China to be regarded as a responsible stakeholder (though this term, coined by then US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick in 2005, has not wholesale been adopted by China’s top foreign policy officials). They recognize that a world power is expected to address the challenges and crises that afflict the international order. But at the same time the leadership is finding it increasingly difficult to juggle the demands of diverse national interests. In Africa, multiple contradictions coexist because the continent encompasses some of the world’s most resource-rich countries, most fragile states, poorest nations, most severe humanitarian crisis, and most harsh regimes. While China benefits from its relationship with Africa because of the economic opportunities and diplomatic support that Africa offers, China is simultaneously running the risk of losing political capital in the international arena because of its close ties with dictators and its disregard for transparency or accountability when providing aid. Television footage of China’s leaders warmly welcoming Zimbabwe’s Richard Mugabe and continuous public statements by Chinese officials that low interest loans and development aid to Africa are granted by China with ‘no strings attached’ reinforce the image of the Beijing government having little regard for human rights among parliamentary democracies around the world as well as segments of the African population. Outsiders’ views of China do not stand to benefit by accounts of loans being granted by China Export-Import Bank or CDB to Chinese companies on the basis of recommendations by provincial government officials who have been bribed by the companies for projects in Africa which in turn provide benefits for the relatives of African government officials.

On 27 December 2007, Malawi established diplomatic ties with the PRC reducing to four the number of African countries to maintain formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan: Burkina Faso, Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, and Swaziland. In addition, the Taiwan government operates four quasi-official liaison missions in Africa: one in Nigeria (in Abuja) and three in South Africa (in Pretoria, Cape Town, and Johannesburg).
officials.\textsuperscript{11} The European Commission (2006) targeted the need for transparency in China’s aid policies in Africa in the Commission’s ‘Communication’ on China in late 2006.

\textbf{3.1 A diverse group of Chinese actors}

Those responsible for Chinese foreign policy are scrambling to come to terms with the increasingly dynamic roles of a diverse group of Chinese actors in the international arena. In a mere two decades, the face of the PRC abroad has changed. Ensuring that China’s diplomacy supports China’s national interests is a daunting challenge.

In the Chinese bureaucracy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is merely one actor in the realm of diplomacy; in addition, representatives of the National Development and Reform Commission, People’s Bank of China, CDB, China Export-Import Bank, State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Commerce, several other ministries, and provincial and municipal governments are all involved in activities abroad in the name of the PRC, and are directly or indirectly part of decision-making processes pertaining to China’s diplomatic efforts. Most of these government entities lack the personnel with sufficient expertise on Africa. Moreover, rivalry between different bureaucracies hampers coordination.

The CDB is one of the major Chinese state actors in Africa. It was founded in 1994 by the PRC State Council to provide long-term financing for policy-oriented projects in line with the Chinese government’s development strategy. The focus of CDB’s international activities is in the area of infrastructure construction and energy exploration. In 2007, the bank initiated the China–Africa Development Fund with a preliminary injection of USD 1 billion, intended to be increased to US$5 billion. It also signed a partnership with United Bank of Africa, a leading financier in Nigeria, to mark what was described by an African business newspaper as the ‘start of a transformation in Africa’s banking industry, opening fresh channels for finance in a region hitherto dependent on western companies and donors’ (Were, 2007). Furthermore, China’s biggest bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC)

\textsuperscript{11} Corruption was brought up continuously by interviewees when they spoke about decisions regarding Chinese low interest loans for projects in Africa. Author’s interviews in Beijing and Shanghai 2007.
acquired 20% of Africa’s largest bank, Standard Bank and the two have ambitious joint plans in Africa (Burgis, 2008).

Turning to the commercial front in Africa, there are a host of state enterprises who conduct business on the African continent, including defense-related companies supervised by the former Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense. In addition, there are private enterprises and individual entrepreneurs who all have their own interest and agenda when doing business overseas. The activities of Chinese businessmen abroad have exploded in the past two decades. In 1985, the number of Chinese enterprises investing abroad was 143 and they were worth US$170 million; by the end of 2006, more than 5,000 domestic Chinese investment entities had established nearly 10,000 overseas direct invested enterprises in 172 countries or regions with accumulated outward foreign direct investment stock valued at US$90 billion (Ministry of Commerce, 2006, p. 51). Cautious estimates on the number of companies doing business in Africa and the number of Chinese in Africa vary from 674 (Kone, 2006, p. 46) to more than 800 companies (Huang and Li, 2007, p. 51), and 100,000 to 300,000 people (Sautman, 2006, p. 31), respectively.

Chinese actors in Africa can be roughly divided into five categories. The first group of actors is comprised of government officials, including diplomats but also officials representing the afore-mentioned numerous government entities. Province-level state-owned enterprises make up over four-fifths of all Chinese firms investing abroad, making provincial governments key players in Africa.

Second, there are representatives of major state-run and large private enterprises that benefit from the Chinese government’s ‘Go Out’ strategy that encourages companies to invest abroad by providing preferential tax treatment, low-interest bank loans and foreign exchange access (Corkin, 2006). This second group usually operates with the explicit approval and

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12 When a government restructuring plan was announced on 17 March 2008 COSTIND was disbanded and its supervisory activities dispersed among various entities, principally the new Ministry of Industry and Informatization, NDRC and the General Armaments Department of the People’s Liberation Army.

13 The author is grateful to Professor Daojiong Zha of Beijing University for initially (October 2007) drawing attention to a rough breakdown of Chinese actors in Africa into four groups. The elaboration that follows, expanding the breakdown into five categories, is based on research interviews conducted with officials and researchers working on China–Africa issues in Beijing in 2007.
support of the Ministry of Commerce and provincial or city governments.

The third group comprises of medium-size to small businesses, some of which are officially categorized as rural enterprises but in fact are simply rural entrepreneurs who have ventured to Africa in search of business opportunities.

Fourth, there are a diverse set of middle-men operating in Africa who represent mainland Chinese or Overseas Chinese companies. These middle-men, some of who are PRC passport holders and some of who are PRC-born businessmen who carry a green card or passport of another country, are often mentioned as go-betweens in Chinese arms deals to African countries.

And finally, there are hundreds if not thousands of Chinese laborers in Africa. They work on oil rigs and construction sites; in other words they implement the huge infrastructure contracts secured by Chinese companies, to a large extent with the backing of preferential loans from Chinese banks.

It is evident that the Chinese authorities are not able to oversee or control all the activities of these diverse actors though they have in recent years become aware that these actors can disrupt China’s broad diplomatic efforts and taint China’s image abroad. China’s national oil companies (NOCs), other large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and banks such as ICBC increasingly operate as market-driven business enterprises striving toward efficiency and seeking profits – in fact this is precisely what the Beijing government wants them to do. These large Chinese SOEs scouling the globe for natural resources have a symbiotic yet ambiguous relationship with the government. There is conflicting evidence with regard to which party is in the driver’s seat (Jakobson, 2008). On the one hand, the executives of an NOC, for example, are appointed by the Chinese Communist Party Organizational Department. On the other hand, the NOCs are important sources of tax revenue for the central government and they also employ hundreds of thousands of people. From recent research it is evident that the central government does not simply dictate policies of the NOCs (Downs, 2006; Lieberthal and Herberg, 2006; Jakobson, 2008).

14 Author’s research interviews with officials working on African issues in Beijing during 2007.
This lack of authority on the part of the central government is even more acute when examining the operations of medium-sized and small enterprises in Africa. Since the mid-2000s, the government has hurriedly put into place a host of regulations in an attempt to regulate the activities of Chinese businessmen in Africa, but enforcement of these regulations is highly problematic. When one considers the immense difficulties that the central government encounters in its attempts to oversee the enforcement of many laws in China due to the opposition of enterprise managers as well as the close relationship they cultivate with local officials, one can surmise the weak position of a diplomat sitting in the Chinese Embassy in Khartoum or any other African capital when he tries to make Chinese businessmen heed Ministry of Commerce regulations in Africa. Businessmen seek profits while the goal of any diplomat is to enhance the nation’s national interests.

3.2 Diverse range of national interests

China’s foremost national interests include ensuring continued economic growth, ensuring international support for the ‘One China Policy’ in relation to Taiwan, and deterring the United States from constraining China’s rise, whereas at the same time avoiding conflict with Washington (or any major power) to enable China to remain stable and concentrate on its modernization drive. Economic growth and stability constitute the foundation upon which the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party is based. Furthermore, as the economic, political and military power of China grows, an increasingly significant fourth national interest is to ensure that China’s rise to international pre-eminence evokes respect rather than creating enemies. This goal is reflected in Hu Jintao’s call in 2005 for a ‘harmonious world’ and his assurances that China will continue its path of ‘peaceful development’ by upholding ‘multilateralism, mutually beneficial cooperation and the spirit of inclusiveness’ (Hu, 2005).

Taiwan’s unresolved political status is still of overriding importance in the formulation of Chinese foreign policy. As touched upon earlier in the paper, African nations are a crucial component in pursuing this national interest. Another paramount national objective of the Beijing leadership is managing its complex relationship with Washington. China wants to avoid confrontation with the United States but simultaneously wants to
deter Washington from containing China or impeding its modernization efforts. In general, the converging commercial interests of Americans and Chinese in Africa make them competitors (both seek oil and other natural resources from Africa). However, the USA and China share a range of common interests in Africa, starting from combating infectious diseases (HIV/AIDS, malaria), countering terrorism and preventing instability and humanitarian crisis, both would stand to benefit from cooperation on the African continent (Gill et al., 2007, pp. 14–16).

Further compounding the oil factor in Sino-US relations with regard to Africa is the Chinese leaders’ tendency to view dependency on the global oil market as undesirable because of their perception that the United States in particular can manipulate markets (Jiang, 2006). Rhetoric about the need to contain China and the ‘China threat’ in statements by the United States. Congressmen and other Western officials has been a recurring theme in Chinese discussions about energy security (Zha, 2006, p. 47; Zhang, 2007a, p. 36; b, p. 28). In part because of this skepticism that a level playing field exists in the global oil business, the Beijing government has not changed its approving stance toward Chinese NOCs acquiring stakes in overseas oil fields (commonly referred to as ‘buying oil at the well’), even though in reality oil pumped from Chinese overseas sites does not necessarily end up in China but is sold on the global oil market (Downs, 2006, p. 35; Houser, 2008, p. 162). The Chinese acquisition of oil fields in Sudan is the most publicized manifestation of this stance and the one that continues to evoke harsh international criticism.

3.3 China’s controversial relationship with Sudan

Chinese-Sudanese ties are a nexus of the conflicting interests of Chinese commercial enterprises, the People’s Liberation Army and Chinese diplomats.

Commercially, ties between Sudan and China are strong; China is northern Sudan’s most important trading partner (World Bank, 2007). China is also Sudan’s largest foreign investor. The oil sector is the main focus of Chinese investments; but in addition, Chinese companies are involved in building roads, railways, dams, bridges and housing construction.
About a third of all of the foreign equity oil pumped by China’s NOCs is from Sudanese sites (Houser, 2008). Of the dozens of Chinese oil investments overseas, the Sudan operation of the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) represents the single greatest commercial success (Jakobson and Zha, 2006, pp. 65–68; Jakobson, 2007, pp. 15–16). The Chinese company is simply not going to abandon this very lucrative operation. Or it won’t as long as the Chinese government does not have the political will to force it to do so.

Ironically, CNPC’s oil operations in Sudan have hardly enhanced China’s energy security which the Beijing government so ardently pursues. The low sulfur oil pumped from Chinese oil sites in Sudan is poorly suited for existing refineries in the PRC. Data from 2001 to 2006 indicates that the oil that CNPC has pumped in Sudan has, to a large extent, been sold elsewhere. So while the CNPC has since the early 2000s earned handsome profits from the oil it has pumped in Sudan and sold on the world market, the Beijing government has been the target of international criticism. Japan imported more oil from Sudan than China did in 2006. But this trend could be changing, as data for 2007 indicates, as a result of the completion in 2006 of the expansion of the Khartoum refinery, owned 50–50 by CNPC and the Sudanese Ministry of Energy, which is capable of processing low sulfur Sudanese oil. In 2007, Chinese oil imports from Sudan increased dramatically by over 110% (Xinhua, 2008b). China’s capability to process Sudanese crude oil (as well as similar low sulfur oil from other countries) will expand further when a new refinery, specifically built to handle this so-called dirty oil, is completed in Guangxi, China in 2010.

Also on the military and defense industry front, Sudan is a valued customer of China. According to May 2007 Amnesty International report, in 2005 China sold Sudan arms and ammunition worth US$24 million as well as nearly US$57 million worth of parts and aircraft equipment (Amnesty International, 2007). Though this sum constitutes only a fraction of the revenue Chinese companies earn from arms sales worldwide, for an individual enterprise or company the revenue can be lucrative in terms of its overall sales when one takes into account the Chinese

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government’s demands for profitability from defense-related enterprises. China’s arms sales to Sudan rose 20-fold between 2002 and 2005. From 2004 to 2006, Chinese companies supplied the Khartoum government with on average 90% of its small arms purchases (Save Darfur Coalition, 2007; Human Rights First, 2008). Moreover, in 2007, China publicly promised to strengthen exchanges and cooperation between the two armed forces (People’s Daily Online, 2007).

Diplomatically, China has lost considerable credibility because of its commercial and military dealings with Sudan. Beijing makes no secret of its close relationship with the Sudanese government and rejects being blamed for not doing enough to stop the genocide in Darfur. Beijing has repeatedly hidden behind its policy of non-interference to justify its opposition to UN Security Council sanctions against Sudan. It is as if Beijing does not acknowledge that its oil investments in Sudan and arms sales to the Al-Bahir government inevitably impact the internal affairs of Sudan. First, the Al-Bahir government is strengthened by the oil revenue it accumulates from Chinese oil companies and second, China’s arms sales permit the Al-Bahir government to more effectively carry out or support others’ genocide policies. Furthermore, China first endorsed a UN Security Council arms embargo on the Darfur region in 2005, but according to the 2007 Amnesty report, China has since (together with Russia) violated the resolution by selling weapons to the Al-Bahir government for use in Darfur, in clear contravention of its earlier commitments (Amnesty International, 2007).

Chinese academics and diplomats observe that Sudan is a member of the United Nations and has the same right as other sovereign states to purchase weapons. Upon returning from a visit to Sudan in March 2008, China’s special envoy to Darfur said that it is ‘neither fair nor objective to criticize China on this issue (of arms sales) because Beijing is not Sudan’s major weapons supplier. China is only one of seven countries selling weapons to the Khartoum government, but not the biggest’ (Zhang, 2008). (This statement is contradictory to information provided by the Save Darfur Coalition that states that China has

16 According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s Arms Transfer Database, China arms sales to Sudan constitute a small percentage of China’s arms sales worldwide.

17 Author’s interviews in research institutions and the Foreign Ministry in Beijing during 2007.
overtaken Iran as Sudan’s largest supplier of arms.) When Wenping He of CASS was asked about information in the Amnesty report regarding China’s violations of the arms embargo on the Darfur region, she noted that it is possible that the arms ended up in Darfur via a third country or middleman-merchant and that arms made in several countries have been found in the Darfur region.\(^\text{18}\)

As Sudan’s largest investor China is the one country that could possibly have some clout vis-à-vis the Sudanese government. On the other hand, it is unclear how much sway China actually has. Because the Sudanese oil sites have been proven to have oil, the Khartoum government would probably find other willing overseas investors to take the place of the Chinese NOCs if these were to withdraw. Daojiong Zha of Beijing University puts forth that China cannot put a lot of pressure on the Khartoum government for fear of being told to leave; the fear of retaliation makes it highly unlikely that the Chinese top leaders will order arms sales to Sudan to stop.\(^\text{19}\)

To China’s credit, Chinese diplomats became more active with regard to Darfur during the course of 2007, presumably as a result of international outrage over the genocide coupled with more attention being paid to China’s passivity (Farrow and Roman, 2007; Farrow, 2007).\(^\text{20}\) During 2007, several senior Western officials praised Chinese diplomats for their behind-the-scenes efforts on behalf of the Darfur crisis. However, in conversations in the autumn of 2007, several Chinese foreign ministry officials acknowledged that the attempts by Chinese diplomats to redeem China’s reputation are impossible so long as Sino-Sudan military cooperation and arms sales continue.\(^\text{21}\)

4 Implications for China’s foreign policy

Chinese foreign policy leaders are aware of the enormous challenge that balancing the conflicting interests of the numerous Chinese actors in

\(^\text{18}\) Author’s interview with Professor Wenping He of CASS in Beijing, 26 February 2008.

\(^\text{19}\) Author’s discussion with Professor Daojiong Zha of Beijing University on 13 March 2008.

\(^\text{20}\) Wenping He of CASS said in a research interview that international pressure was one reason but not the main reason why China had diplomatically engaged more actively in efforts to persuade the Khartoum government to cooperate with international efforts to stop the violence in Darfur (author’s interview 26 February 2008).

\(^\text{21}\) Author’s discussions in Beijing in September and October 2007.
Africa constitutes. This is discussed in the presence of foreigners in research interviews and research institute seminars in the PRC. Foreigners are often reminded that the Chinese government is experiencing a steep learning curve in Africa because activities on the ground have progressed with such speed that the government is straining to keep up with developments. This applies to many phenomenons in China during the past 20 years; the speed with which change takes place surpasses the ability and capacity of the bureaucracy to adapt, acquire expertise, and put in place a regulatory framework.

Among mid-level ministry officials in Beijing there is a growing realization that the acquisition of equity stakes in overseas oil fields by Chinese NOCs will not substantially enhance China’s energy security. The original notion of the importance – from a national security point of view – of overseas oil equity is being proven overoptimistic. As Trevor Houser notes, Chinese NOCs would much rather sell their equity oil on the world market for a higher price than they would get from Chinese consumers (the Chinese government has only taken the first steps to implement price reforms to force Chinese consumers to pay world market prices for energy) (Houser, 2008, p. 162). Chinese NOCs’ overseas equity production totalled roughly 681,000 barrels per day in 2006. If all of this oil had been returned to China, only 19% of China’s total imports would have been satisfied. Yet, most of this oil was not brought back to China but instead was sold on the open market to the highest bidder (Houser, 2008, p. 162). These mid-level officials acknowledge that China’s energy security would be better served by China becoming more active in strengthening coordinated international efforts to keep the world oil market stable as well as China’s own measures to drastically increase energy efficiency and the use of alternative energy. Saving energy and relying on non-fossil fuels would also address China’s severe pollution problems. But as long as the powerful oil company executives have the ear of the top leaders, i.e. as long as this powerful lobbying group of oil industrialists is perceived by the top leadership as instrumental as tax revenue providers and employers, Chinese NOCs will continue to expand their overseas oil

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22 Author’s discussions with officials working for the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and National Development and Reform Commission, Beijing and Shanghai, November 2007–February 2008.
Simultaneously, China will continue to diversify the sources of its oil supplies, build pipelines, pursue a higher degree of energy efficiency and reliance on alternative fuels as well as participate in international efforts to keep the world oil market stable (Cheng et al., 2007, p. 150; Zhang et al., 2007, p. 42).

To protect the overseas investments of its NOCs and many other large state-owned companies, the Chinese government will find it increasingly difficult to adhere to its long-standing principle of non-interference in another country’s domestic affairs. It is this pillar of Chinese foreign policy which Chinese diplomats at every level refer to when fending off criticism of China’s actions in Africa. It is as if Beijing does not acknowledge that an economy of its size inevitably interferes in the affairs of another country merely on the basis of its economic engagement. Furthermore, China does not demand that labor standards or anti-corruption practices be enforced to even a minimum standard when it provides aid and China does not approve of using sanctions as a means, for example, of pressuring the Sudanese government to do more to stop the atrocities in Darfur – all in the name of the principle of non-interference.

But this stance is bound to change as China’s fast-growing economy – and the consequent need for energy, resources, and markets – forces Beijing to engage more deeply with supplier and customer countries. The slaying and kidnapping of Chinese oil workers in Ethiopia and Nigeria in 2007 and in Sudan in 2008 were reminders that China will have to deal with a growing number of non-traditional threats in countries in which it has commercial interests.

In private, Chinese foreign policy specialists acknowledge that non-interference is no longer practical, tenable, or in line with Chinese national interests (Jakobson, 2007). Besides the need to protect Chinese companies’ interests, Chinese Foreign Ministry officials are aware that to be credible as a rising power – especially one that advocates achieving a ‘harmonious world’ (Hu, 2005) as its foreign policy objective – China cannot be viewed as turning a blind eye to international crises such as genocide.

Deciding how to free China of its ‘non-interference trap’ and formulate a more activist – yet not overly aggressive – core principle is a major challenge for Chinese foreign policy makers today (Jakobson, 2007). Ever since 2006, there have been an increasing number of careful formulations in academic journals by Chinese researchers laying the groundwork for the acceptance of a flexible approach to the non-interference principle (Wang, 2004, p. 18; 2007b; Wang and Zhang, 2007; Zeng, 2008, p. 61). Jisi Wang of Beijing University writes:

From the diplomatic point of view, non-interference of domestic affairs will still be an important principle. We should, however, see that the stability of other countries has become more and more related to our rights and interests in those countries, including the security of our overseas organizations and civilians. Therefore, China will contribute to the construction of harmonious society of other countries through diversified means of cooperation, consultation, aid, communication and so on (Wang, 2007a, p. 1).

There are numerous examples from this decade of China accepting a role that entails interfering in the affairs of other countries, from China’s active participation in recent years in UN peacekeeping operations to Beijing’s hosting the six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear program. When President Hu Jintao met Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir in February 2007, he made it clear that China wants to stabilize Sudan by announcing China’s support for a UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur (Chen and Liu, 2007). Ahlbrandt and Small, writing in a 2008 Foreign Affairs article about China’s changing policies toward dictatorships, conclude that Beijing experiences in dealing with North Korea in 2006 left the leadership convinced that ‘fence-sitting can be more damaging than decisiveness’ (Ahlbrandt and Small, 2008, p. 46). Commenting on the principle of non-interference at the 2007 China EU Roundtable in Beijing, a Chinese participant observed that ‘in Chinese foreign policy practice, when there is a conflict between national interest and principle, national interest will prevail’. A senior foreign policy specialist who consults the country’s leading policymakers went a step further in January 2008 by stating that China is moving toward a policy.

Comment by Chinese researcher at the China–EU Roundtable held at the China Institute of Strategic Studies in Beijing, 28 June 2007.
of ‘constructive interference’. Analysis by a growing number of non-Chinese researchers supports this line of thinking (Gill et al., 2007; Jiang, 2007; Ahlbrandt and Small, 2008). As mentioned earlier, Chinese diplomats have since early 2007 taken a more active role in trying to persuade the Khartoum government to cooperate with international efforts to stop the violence in Darfur.

Since early 2007 China’s credibility has been a recurring theme in internal discussions involving officials, foreign policy advisors, and scholars. There have been Chinese scholars who have written about China’s image problem in Chinese journals, calling on China to ‘improve its credibility in the international community through enhancing the transparency of its governmental and commercial activities’ (Zha, 2005, p. 10). In discussions, Chinese diplomats admit that especially Chinese oil companies’ operations in Sudan but also nonchalant attitudes by some Chinese companies toward working conditions and workers’ safety have damaged China’s international standing. Chinese academics have spoken and written about this problem openly: Zhiguo Ge of Hebei Normal University writes about the ‘poor behaviour’ of Chinese companies in Africa and ‘their lack of social responsibility’ which have not only caused obstacles to the ‘Go out’ strategy of the enterprises, but ‘have also hindered the great efforts made by Chinese government to maintain China-Africa relations’ (Ge, 2007, pp. 33–35). Feng Zhu of Beijing University is quoted by the Financial Times as saying that Chinese state-owned companies are ‘hijacking China’s diplomacy’ (McGregor, 2008).

However, most Chinese officials and researchers take to task the criticism China encounters in the international arena regarding its role in Africa. They dismiss outsiders’ descriptions of China as an exploiter or worse yet a modern day colonizer of Africa, pointing out that Chinese, regardless whether they are government officials or businessmen, are in Africa with the consent of the Africans themselves (Luo and Liu, 2007, p. 29). The President of China Export-Import Bank rebuked critics in 2007 by saying that China is spreading prosperity and delivering concrete

25 Author’s meeting in Shanghai 17 January 2008.
26 Author’s conversations with officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC and Chinese researchers at universities and research institutes in Beijing in October and November 2007.
benefits in Africa and that roads and radios are more urgent needs for Africans than human rights and freedom (Reuters, 2007). Chinese researchers and officials also point out that Africa remains poor and undeveloped despite decades of Western aid, indicating the failure of Western policies to genuinely benefit Africans. Chinese policies are injecting hope for new industrialization and trade patterns to emerge in African countries (Fu and Yu, 2007, p. 51; Yao, 2008, p. 24). There are Western observers who agree (Bräutigam, 2007a, b). Criticism of China’s nonchalant attitude toward human rights in Africa has also been questioned by non-Chinese academics who note that the more important China has become as an economic power the more the issue of human rights abuses in China has taken a backseat in relations between Western countries and China (Breslin and Taylor, 2008).

Moreblessings Chidaushe of the African Forum and Network of Debt and Development remarks that only time will tell whether China is indeed a better partner than the West and whether Western concerns are justified (Manji and Marks, 2007, p. 107). She points out that China’s Africa policy of 2006 projects a ‘gentle, friendly, caring attitude which appears to many Africans as a welcome contrast with the exploitation and heavy-handed top-down relationship which has typified the West’s approach’ (Manji and Marks, 2007, p. 109).

In future years China will undoubtedly continue to stress this gentle approach, emphasizing sincerity and mutually beneficial cooperation in its relations with African countries. Furthermore, though Beijing states that it is not trying to promote its development model and defends the right of each nation to choose its own development path, Beijing can be expected to subtly use any possible progress made by African countries to defend its own pursuit of economic development without meaningful political reform. Were African nations to follow a similar development path as China and succeed in raising significant portions of the populace out of poverty, it would place China in an advantageous position in the international governance debate of authoritarianism versus democracy.

5 Conclusion

China’s foreign policy is in a state of flux. Chinese diplomats are continuously having to adjust their behavior to adapt to changing international conditions and also to the country’s developing needs. This is a natural
consequence of China’s growing economic, political and military weight on a global scale. The dramatic increase in activity by Chinese diplomats, officials from a host of government agencies and businessmen in Africa needs to be viewed as just one dimension of China’s new global activism (Saunders, 2006, pp. 6–9; Gill et al., 2007, pp. 16–18). As in other spheres, China’s officials are scrambling to keep abreast with the new realities created by Chinese companies doing business and investing abroad.

Africa is strategically important to China for several reasons. Africa’s abundant oil, other natural resources, and its emergence as a lucrative export market support China’s national interest of ensuring continued economic growth. Diplomatically, African nations give China valuable support in multilateral organizations, in particular to counter Taiwan’s pursuit of more international space. Moreover, the embrace by African leaders of China’s Africa policy enhances both Beijing’s global standing and Beijing’s wish to portray China’s rise as peaceful and constructive to the world order.

Pursuing a set of foreign policy objectives that takes into account all of China’s national interests in Africa is simply not possible. The ‘Go out’ policy of the Chinese government, initially intended to encourage Chinese companies to expand overseas and become globally competitive, has resulted in hundreds of Chinese business operations on the African continent. The interests of Chinese businessmen and the Chinese government are not always in unison, creating complex challenges for the government who, on the one hand, wishes to foster a favorable environment for Chinese business but, on the other hand, want to protect the diplomatic interests of China. In the case of large state-owned enterprises the Chinese government is not necessarily in a position in which it can dictate the policies of the SOEs; in the case of smaller enterprises, the Chinese government finds it difficult (if not impossible) to ensure that rules and regulations, when they have been put in place, are abided by in far-off countries. These contradictions and the damage inflicted by Chinese businesses on China’s international image are bound to increase as Chinese enterprises expand their scope of activities in Africa.

Overall, China is still a marginal force in Africa if one compares trade and investment volumes of the China–Africa relationship with those of Western countries and Africa. However, the very rapid pace with which China has increased its activities in all spheres in Africa has given rise to
anxiety in especially Europe and the United States regarding China’s intentions in Africa and the possibility that China’s interests will undermine the interests of Europe and the United States. The world’s two largest energy consumers, the United States and China, appear to be heading toward a fierce competition for oil on the African continent. Moreover, Westerners suspect or blame China’s ‘no strings attached’ aid policies for undermining their attempts to link aid to good governance and to support sustainable development in Africa. China, in turn, dismisses this criticism by pointing out that Africa has not benefited from several decades of Western aid policies. There are both African and Western observers who agree with this stance and advocate a wait-and-see attitude with regard to the concrete benefits for Africans that China’s approach to development assistance will bring about. The Chinese leadership’s emphasis on equality and mutual respect in China’s relations with Africa resonates well among Africans, even among those who are skeptical about the motives behind China’s policies.

In Africa in particular China’s adherence to its long-standing non-interference principle will become more and more difficult to reconcile with China’s other objective of being regarded as a responsible international stakeholder. As the commercial interests of Chinese companies in Africa increase the Beijing government will find it necessary to protect these interests and the security of its citizens by trying to influence policies in these countries, especially in fragile states. Judging by the growing number of articles published in China by Chinese researchers advocating a modified stance to the non-intervention principle – usually a prelude to policy change in the PRC – one can surmise that the top leadership is mulling over ways to free itself of the ‘non-interference trap’. A constructive interference policy is what is most likely to emerge in reality during the next few years though it will probably take longer for this to be formulated in official dogma.

While China will continue to embrace global and regional security policies that improve its international image and are consistent with international norms, it is unclear how often in future years there will be instances – like in the case of Sudan – that Beijing will not give up pursuing self-interested national objectives. As its economic, political and military clout grows, it is possible that Beijing’s inclination to be selfish could strengthen.
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