The United Nations in its Second Half-Century

The Independent Working Group on
the Future of the United Nations
July 1995

International Security Studies at Yale University

Table of Contents

The Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations
Preface
1.		The Challenges to Humanity at Century’s End
2.		The Future United Nations System
3.		Strengthening the United Nations for its Second Half-Century Providing Security from the Scourge of Violence Improving Global Economic Conditions Protecting the Social Fabric Leadership, Organization and Resources
4.		Reaching the Common Goal
5.		Summary of Principal Recommendations Providing Security from the Scourge of Violence Promoting Economic Betterment Protecting the Social Fabric Leadership, Organization and Resources

The Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations

Moeen Qureshi, Co-Chair

Former Prime Minister, Pakistan

Richard von Weizsäcker, Co-Chair

Former President, Federal Republic of Germany

Alicia Bárcena Ibarra

Executive Director of the Earth Council, Costa Rica

Muchkund Dubey

Former Foreign Secretary, India

Stéphane Hessel

Ambassador, France

Koji Kakizawa

Former Prime Minister, Japan

Wangari Maathai

Green Belt Movement, Kenya

Xue Mouhong

Scholar and former Ambassador, China

Anthony Parsons

Former Permanent Representative to the United Nations,

United Kingdom

Felix Rohatyn

Investment Banker, United States

Road Sagdeev

Physicist, Russia

Hanna Suchocka

Former Prime Minister, Poland

Yale University Secretariat

Paul M. Kennedy, Director

International Security Studies

Bruce Russett, Director

United Nations Studies

A project supported by the Ford Foundation.

Additional copies of this Report may be obtained from:

Office of Communications
Ford Foundation
320 East 43rd Street
New York, New York 10017

 

 

Preface

The Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations was convened by the Ford Foundation at the request of Secretary–General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in late 1993. The Working Group held four meetings at the Pocantico Conference Center in Pocantico Hills, New York. In our initial meeting, we set out the guidelines for the Report. The Secretariat, located at Yale University’s United Nations Studies program, held intensive and wide-ranging consultations with experts on many aspects of the United Nations’ activities, commissioned special reports on particular problems, held informal conferences to discuss specific reform proposals, and produced draft versions of the document. After considerable deliberations, the Working Group gave its overall approval to the Report at its final May 1995 meeting.

The Independent Working Group sought to make as clear a statement as possible to the governments and peoples of the world about the need to enhance and realign the United Nations so that it might better meet the challenges of the decades ahead. Throughout this Report, we have repeatedly stressed the need for the Member States to provide the leadership, common will and purpose which we believe are necessary to create a more effective United Nations.

Each member joined our Working Group in the deep conviction that the ultimate objective of the United Nations system is, in Dag Hammarskjöld’s words, a “world community living in peace, under the laws of justice.” The Report which follows reflects that common belief. Each would have composed a different text if writing alone.

Not every proposal was embraced in every detail by every Member, but all were in basic agreement on the principal recommendations, as well as the need to call upon the governments and the people of the world to take seriously the need to strengthen the United Nations as it enters its next fifty years.

We want to express our gratitude to the Ford Foundation and its president, Franklin A. Thomas, for their support of the work of the Independent Working Group; to Shepard Forman, Director of the International Affairs Program; and to Sir Brian Urquhart, its Scholar in Residence. We also owe a debt of gratitude to the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and its president, Colin Campbell, for making available to us the conference facilities at Pocantico. The Conference Center staff, under the direction of Charles Granquist, was unfailingly efficient and helpful. The Secretariat carried out the research and drafting of the Report under the direction of Professors Paul Kennedy and Bruce Russett. Mr. James Sutterlin acted as special consultant. The Secretariat, co-ordinated by Isabelle Grunberg and later by William Hitchcock, included Ann Carter-Drier, Robert Chase, John Mack Gill, Emily Hill and Karen Yoder. Rafael Bonoan of the Ford Foundation acted as rapporteur of the sessions at Pocantico. We also acknowledge the support of the President of Yale University, Richard Levin, and the officers and staff there who assisted us in this endeavor.

Above all, we must express our profound thanks and sincere appreciation for the efforts of our colleagues in the Working Group. We carried out this task because we share a fundamental belief in the value and the promise of the United Nations. Although we represent different countries and cultures, our work together on this Report is one example of the enduring ability of people to communicate, cooperate and join in common undertakings on behalf of the world we share.

Moeen Qureshi Co-Chair

Richard von Weizsäcker Co-Chair

 

 

1. The Challenges to Humanity at Century’s End

As humanity approaches the twenty-first century, the prospects ahead are at the same time forbidding and promising. If promise is to triumph, the nations of the world need an organization that will enable them to pursue, in common purpose, a world of equity and justice, a world of shared economic progress, a world in which future generations can live secure and well, at peace with themselves and with the environment on which their very survival will depend.

Fifty years ago such an organization, the United Nations, was created, brought into being by the vision, the hope and the determination of men and women who had seen at first hand the dangers of rampant nationalism, of economic depression, of freedom lost, and war unbridled. We are today the fortunate inheritors of that Organization. For a vastly altered world, the United Nations offers broader promise than even its founders could have imagined. But it has not come through these fifty years unscathed. Like any good vessel, it needs refitting, weak timbers replaced, compasses reset. This is the objective that underlies the present report. The recommendations that are put forward can, we believe, make the United Nations a sounder Organization, adjusted to what we foresee as the central needs of the next half-century. They will be of little avail, however, unless governments grant to the United Nations a degree of commitment and support commensurate with the promise it offers and with the tasks it will need to fulfill.

We start from a positive assumption. We see that human creativity and invention have made the conditions of life across a good portion of this planet far better than they were fifty years ago. A majority of people today enjoy a standard of living considerably superior, in material terms at any rate, to that of their grandparents. The regions of the world and their peoples, still widely separated only yesterday, face the future as a community drawn ever closer by shared ideas, by communication, by economic exchanges and, we believe, by a common yearning for freedom and peace.

These transformations are related to the unprecedented revolution in communications and to an emerging global economy that, despite its regional, cyclical and structural anomalies, is far more open than it was when the UN Charter first called for international cooperation to resolve economic problems. World output over the past half-century has grown faster than in any comparable period in history.

Our political world, too, has undergone dramatic transformations, some to extraordinarily positive effect. The threat of global nuclear destruction, posed by the Cold War, has receded. We have witnessed how the community of nations can benefit when the interests of major powers converge on the goal of peace.

More than one hundred states have come into being since 1945, some gaining recognition for the first time and others regaining an earlier independence. Democratization has made important strides. Many states have embarked upon a course of greater openness and opportunity for their peoples.

Yet a daunting array of problems, deriving in part from these very transformations, stands ahead. While the growth in world product has brought a widespread increase in standards of living, it has also brought into sharper and more telling focus the disparities in wealth between countries and between social groups within them. Huge capital flows, moving daily between the financial centers of advanced and advancing countries, bypass peoples caught in abject poverty.

The economic and social problems that confront us are by no means limited to the most disadvantaged countries. Varied societies are challenged by debilitating debt, by the volatility of the international financial system, by unemployment and persistent poverty, and by increasingly destructive crime and corruption. A profligate consumption of resources in developed countries, and a similar trend in developing countries, is undermining the health of large ecosystems. The current environmental trends — from growing urban population to depletion of natural resources — threaten human welfare and development prospects across the entire globe. More than one billion people now lack clean water and 1.7 billion do not have access to adequate sanitation — compelling evidence of the socio-economic dimension of environmental degradation. Environmental problems require concerted action from governments, in both industrial and developing countries. Inaction on this front will prove devastating.

Demographic changes over the past fifty years are linked to these environmental problems. In 1945 the Earth’s total population stood at some 2.5 billion. It is now 5.7 billion and increasing by an additional 95 million human beings each year. Projections for total global population by 2025 or 2050 vary widely, but on this there is consensus: in half a century the world will be host to billions more people than now. By far the greatest share of the increase will occur in poorer countries, already struggling with demographic and environmental pressures and suffering from inadequate access to capital and resources. Mass migration resulting from economic deprivation, social conflict or environmental stress rises year by year to levels increasingly difficult to accommodate. The prospect of hundreds of millions born into circumstances of instability and want is among the gravest challenges facing humankind and one, like so many others, that can only be successfully handled within a multilateral framework.

The end of the Cold War, its manifest benefits notwithstanding, has also had contradictory results for which neither the world community nor the United Nations was prepared. The breakdown of bipolar control has lifted restrictions on long-simmering civic, ethnic, and territorial disputes. Of the nearly 100 armed conflicts in the world since 1989, all but five were, or are, internal. Violence has brought the very existence of some states into question and, with it, gross violations of human rights including instances of genocide exceeded only by those of the Second World War.

The institution most affected by these forces is the sovereign state. In the worst cases we confront today, disintegrative pressures are tearing the state apart from below. Relatively prosperous and well-administered countries are experiencing record levels of public discontent, mistrust of authority and internal conflicts and class antagonisms. Even the most powerful countries have found they have limited capacities to resolve on a national basis problems that are global in origin and demand global solutions.

These are the disparate circumstances in which the United Nations must pursue the goal of international security in the coming years. In this pursuit, security must be seen as encompassing the political, the economic and the social conditions within which people and nations exist. No state is now an island unto itself, able to provide, in isolation, this broad security for its people. Even the wealthiest and most powerful need to share the burden of common security and the responsibilities of bequeathing a better — or even a tolerable — future to the next generations.

This need to share responsibilities is both the basic rationale of the United Nations system and a compelling reason to make it more effective. The invigoration and expansion of the international system with the United Nations at its center is vital to the future well-being both of individual states and of the human race collectively. In the context of the global forces unleashed in the past 50 years, only a collective effort can give states the framework and the strength to shape their own destiny in the promising but turbulent times that lie ahead. Our Report derives from this conviction.

We recognize that sovereign nations will continue to carry the chief responsibility of protecting their peoples from threat and improving their well-being. No level of global governance will compensate for the absence in a country of good domestic governance, a healthy social fabric and decent living standards. But if nation-states are to handle the global challenges listed above, they need mechanisms for working together. This was the very purpose of the United Nations, which was designed as an international organization with a global mandate to further peaceful and cooperative relations among states.

Since then, the world body has developed the capacity to deal with a wide range of complex international issues. The Secretary–General developed a role as intermediary and manager of peace operations, and brought new techniques to peacekeeping. The United Nations defined human rights for the global community. It played a vital role in decolonization, affording international recognition to the new countries and helping them improve their economic and social conditions.

The world organization also provided the basis for an intensive development of international law. Through a series of global conferences, it moved toward an international consensus on global problems like the environment, population, the status of women, human rights, development, and many other basic issues. Its specialized agencies pioneered important normative and regulatory arrangements in their different spheres of activity, and provided humanitarian and other assistance in distressed parts of the world. In recent years, despite drastic limitations on personnel and resources, the UN has managed to respond to the dramatic rise in demand for peacekeeping and other emergency operations throughout the world.

Despite this creditable record, it is often the shortcomings of the UN that receive greatest attention. Its members have frequently expressed their disappointment at the Organization’s performance, usually with little regard for the fact that it can only be as effective as governments allow it to be. The Organization has deficiencies, but it has too often been a useful scapegoat for the mistakes or failings of Member States, or a fig leaf for their unfulfilled promises or intentions.

Ensuring international security in the broad sense of human security requires new approaches both by governments and the UN system. The use of military force for purposes of peace requires clarification and rethinking in the context of increasing the UN’s capacity to handle emergencies. The UN’s response to global problems such as population growth, resource depletion, environmental protection and migration has yet to be fully articulated and activated. Vital social concerns — the status of women, youth unemployment, education, cultural diversity, the impact of technology — are only now being met with action. The UN has not as yet been able to deal effectively with such global economic issues as currency instability, indebtedness, protectionism, and inequitable commercial relations.

If the Organization is to realize its potential in the world of the twenty-first century, its members must recognize and resolve a paradox caused by the altered condition of the world. The association of sovereign states set up a half-century ago to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” is now expected to function as the public service sector of a world community that does not exist as a political entity. In virtually all of its activities, from peacekeeping to development, from human rights to environmental accords, the United Nations is being asked to play a larger role and to assume fresh responsibilities at a time when governments are increasingly anxious to reduce their financial contributions, and increasingly reluctant to provide the necessary political, military and material support.

Governments will only give the needed support if they see the United Nations as essential for advancing their interests in an effective and appropriate manner. Grappling with their current concerns, governments cannot be expected to invest in totally new formulas of international organization or world government. For now, the key to progress is to understand the paradox which confronts the UN, and to work more effectively through existing mechanisms or, where further change is necessary, to improve those mechanisms. The UN’s galaxy of organizations must be made to operate as an integrated system within the framework of agreed policies. Its activities, including peacekeeping, development and social programs, must complement each other. Its work has to gain a greater understanding among the private and nongovernmental sectors, the public and the media.

These goals are reachable. Indeed, they must be reached soon, if the United Nations is to fulfill the hopes and aspirations of the peoples of the world whom it was set up to serve.

 

 

2. The Future United Nations System

Change will not come easily. A great gulf often exists between what is ideal and what is politically possible. We are convinced, however, that the United Nations must adapt itself to swiftly-changing international conditions and take the lead in the development of policies and the coordination of action to meet the challenges of the future. We shall suggest reforms designed to attain this goal in the pages following. But before considering specific proposals, let us envision the outlines of an international system working to benefit all humanity. What might a successful UN system look like some decades hence, when our children and grandchildren confront these global challenges?

Such a vision need not imply a total transformation of today’s world. We imagine that the UN of the next century would still remain an organization of nation-states responding to its members’ concerns and needs. By the mid-twenty-first century, however, it is likely that the nature of statehood and assumptions about national sovereignty will have evolved in response to global needs and to an enlarged sense of world community. The communications revolution will have created a greater awareness of the interconnectedness of all human society. Disparate peoples and cultures will have become more familiar with one another. A growing awareness that the gravest challenges are global ones will have generated an acceptance of the critical need for collective action.

To provide states and people with security from violence and disorder, the present improvised approaches will be made much more systematic. The separate functions of an enhanced UN system — peacekeeping and conflict-resolution, human rights, social and economic development, peace-building — will be better integrated to achieve “human security” for all peoples. The Security Council will have been enhanced by a more representative structure and by the willingness of governments to contribute regularly to the effectiveness of UN security operations. The veto power will have been modified, at least to the extent of the Permanent Members agreeing to limitations on its application.

By next century we foresee that the Security Council will have developed better methods of dealing with civil and ethnic conflicts within states’ borders, benefiting from early warning and analysis that will permit the more effective exercise of preventive diplomacy. Where inter-state conflicts and the collapse of civil authority threaten to cause a human disaster, the United Nations will by then have a capacity for rapid deployment immediately upon the decision of the Security Council. Regional organizations will also play a more effective role, in partnership with the UN. The need to assist faltering states and bring them back into the international community will have been broadly recognized by UN members, and the necessary legal, nation-building and other guidelines agreed upon.

In the international security field, we would see greater clarity and effectiveness. Should there be UN action against an aggressor state (as defined in Chapter VII of the Charter), present procedures would still apply. For other instances, the Security Council will have clarified the procedures and conditions governing the use of military force. Inappropriate mixtures of peacekeeping and enforcement techniques will by this stage be avoided. New methods of response combining military, police, and civilian elements will have been devised. In other words, the United Nations security system of the future will have learned the lessons offered by the successes and failures of peacekeeping missions of the early 1990s. The provision of the requisite forces and adequate financing will have been put on a systematic basis.

Human rights, too, would have become a more significant feature of UN action. The range of bodies presently dealing with this critical issue will have been streamlined and the monitoring capacity of the UN greatly improved. The fear that a sweeping human rights agenda would intrude upon national sovereignty will have given way to the recognition that societies are better protected, and their prospects for sustained human development improved, by systems of representative government whereby the rights of individuals and groups are assured. Cultural diversity, and the reasonable claims of ethnic minorities, will be respected within a common acknowledgment of each group’s rights and responsibilities. International law will be accorded the importance it justly deserves as the basis of the future international community.

In an improved international system, Member States will have fully recognized the need to link their actions more effectively in the economic and social spheres. In grappling with the need to improve the material conditions of humanity, especially of its poorest members, in striving to create more equitable economic circumstances worldwide, and in devising common strategies to improve the social fabric of states, the United Nations and its many agencies will have learned to work together in a much more effective fashion than at present. The need to give greater authority to the organs that supervise the economic and social activities of the UN system will have been recognized, thus fulfilling the hopes of the founders as expressed in the “purposes” stated in the first article of the United Nations Charter.

In the more strictly economic sphere, the global economy will have become so interdependent that it would be clear folly for any nation, however large, to pursue unilateralist and isolationist policies. The enhanced UN system will have begun to harmonize trade practices, technological cooperation, and the monetary policies of Member States and international institutions. This activity will have the support of national economic and financial agencies as well as of the private sector, all of which will increasingly recognize it as contributing to their long-term advantage.

The social agenda of the UN would also be tackled through a much improved coordination of agencies, as well as through active cooperation with the nongovernmental and private sector. The necessity of achieving sustainable development for all will be recognized as involving not just increases in material standards of living but also advances on other, related fronts, including respect for the natural environment and improvement in the status of women worldwide.

The hopeful picture we have sketched out in the preceding paragraphs will require an international civil service of the highest integrity, competence and commitment. This means that Member States will need to respect the relevant Charter provisions and act in support of them. It will require improvements in personnel policy for recruitment, training and promotion, as well as in gender equity. It may also require rationalizing or abolishing certain organizational units to achieve greater efficiency and coherence for the UN system as a whole. The quality of leadership will be decisive. Governments must exercise leadership that reflects their commitment to reform.

This vision cannot be realized unless Member States also agree to provide the future UN system with adequate, reliable and predictable resources. Eliminating waste and inefficiency, and better management and accountability, essential though they are, will not alter the need to ensure adequate and regular funding. As compared with national budgets, especially those parts devoted to defense or social security, the sums required to support even a greatly enhanced United Nations a few decades hence will still be relatively small. They will be increasingly recognized as an essential investment in the future, a modest and prudent insurance premium when measured against the far greater costs of inaction in the face of negative global developments. Whether the requisite flow of financial resources comes, as now, solely from governmental contributions (thereby reaffirming the world organization as the creation of its members), or whether it is supplemented by some system of international taxation, the United Nations system will have the resources to carry out its essential tasks.

The United Nations is an association of sovereign states and must respond to the governments of the world. But the profound transformations and growth of civil society in our time — the rapidly-growing importance and power of non-state actors such as the media, religious groups, business communities, and people everywhere — mandate a new dimension of international cooperation. Any plans for improving international machinery must take account of the growing activism of civil society. Finding the best means for nongovernmental groups to participate in the evolving United Nations system will, however, require much imaginative work if the world organization is to evolve with the times. But this is the direction to go, reflecting thereby the proud opening words of the UN Charter: We the Peoples of the United Nations...Resolved to Combine our Efforts to Accomplish these Aims.... If the world organization is to gain the respect of peoples everywhere, it will have to develop effective partnerships across the whole human spectrum. Only thus will the United Nations be recognized by all as the best hope of humankind in confronting the dangers and opportunities of the years ahead.

 

 

3. Strengthening the United Nations for its Second Half-Century

We are at present far from this ideal of a functioning, properly endowed United Nations system. Yet, seen against the daunting problems of the future, it is both realistic and essential to move towards that vision. We have come a long way from the dark valley of the Second World War. Governments and peoples have advanced toward the goal of creating common policies and shared structures that would help Member States achieve together what they could not secure in isolation. Objectives that seemed impossible yesterday are accepted facts today. But the world organization has arrived at a plateau. Its members should aspire to new heights by establishing a United Nations significantly more effective than today’s body.

Along which paths and by which means can we begin to move the world organization towards those heights? What practical measures are needed to bring the international community nearer to that distant yet reachable goal? In this fiftieth anniversary year, many commissions, investigations and hearings, both within and outside the United Nations, are focusing upon ways to improve the international system. Some of the changes proposed are incremental, others radical. Different solutions are recommended for universally recognized problems.

In the following pages we put forward our own proposals in the hope that they will be of help to governments as they consider the future of the United Nations. We recommend that these ideas as well as others be laid before the General Assembly for early deliberation.

For purposes of clarity, we have divided this chapter into four sections, dealing with security affairs, economic policies, social concerns, and organizational and resource matters, each containing a number of specific proposals for improving parts of the United Nations. They are designed to complement each other, and all are needed. Improved peacekeeping responses will not be enough in a world of gross economic disparities and social distress. Better economic cooperation will be of little avail if we fail to keep and enforce the peace. Strengthening a state’s social fabric is a prerequisite for stability and growth. And unless both structures and resources are enhanced, piecemeal improvements in the UN system will achieve little.

Our Report should thus be seen as an integrated whole, designed to provide the United Nations with the means to harmonize policies over a spectrum of human needs. Although many recommendations are made in the following pages, the core lies in the proposal of three related Councils, each a principal UN organ: a new Economic Council, a new Social Council, and the existing but enhanced Security Council, all three serviced by a common Secretariat and working together on behalf of human security and sustainable development. Because of the intimately connected nature of the UN’s economic and social agendas, the Economic Council and the Social Council would develop a special relationship, enabling them to form a Global Alliance for Sustainable Development.

 

3a. Providing Security from the Scourge of Violence

Historically, the United Nations was intended to deal with conflict between states through a system of collective security, preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and, if necessary, enforcement. Disarmament and armscontrol were also essential parts of the original vision. These functions remain vital to the world organization, but in recent years, such traditional security issues have been widened to include the non-military dimensions of human security and sustainable development. Graphic images of starvation, violence and terrorism, transmitted into living rooms around the world, have stimulated ordinary citizens and their governments to support a new generation of UN actions in many parts of the globe. The result has been a tenfold increase in UN peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in recent years.

This swift expansion, as well as the change in the nature of UN operations, has given rise to serious problems. A large number of simultaneous operations strains the system and absorbs unprecedented amounts of money and personnel. Even more important, the mandates and guidelines for some operations have been inconsistent, and have combined peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, humanitarian action and post-conflict peace-building in ways that have sometimes proved unworkable. Despite the public demand for such operations, the speedy provision of military forces by Member States for UN operations is often unpredictable, making it difficult for the Secretary–General to implement Security Council resolutions. These weaknesses must be remedied if the public is to have confidence in the UN and its capacity to provide for human security.

Because of these new pressures upon states, security in 1995 and the years beyond has assumed dimensions not foreseen in 1945. While the threat of violence by one country against another has not disappeared, the sources and the manifestations of conflict are changing. Struggles within states involving civil wars, local insurrections or ethnic violence far outnumber those stemming from external aggression or conflict between states. New means are also needed to counter the practice of terrorism. Thus most of the interventions the world organization has recently been asked to undertake have been motivated less by a direct threat to international peace and security than by images of violence so fierce and costly in human terms.

Intra-state conflict forms the primary focus of the “security” section of our Report. It would be unrealistic, however, to assume that international war is a thing of the past, or that the defense departments of UN Member States are persuaded that the only dangers they face in the future arise from new sources of insecurity like social or environmental collapse. We ought to recognize that, should a crisis cause relations between some states to deteriorate, the “human security” provisions recommended here would not be enough. The more traditional security alliances and arrangements will exist alongside international agreements on new means to improve the United Nations’ security mechanisms for all types of conflicts.

The new generation of multi-faceted conflicts (with religious, economic, ethnic and territorial disputes interwoven) presents great problems for a United Nations that was created to meet a very different type of security threat. There is considerable political dissension about how the world organization should deal with intra-state conflicts. At the very least, in order to handle these new crises, the UN’s intergovernmental organs have to be made more democratic and more representative of the world community than they are today; the mandates of its field operations have to be clarified; and the world organization has to be given the capacity to react quickly and to establish a presence in areas of conflict before the situation gets completely out of control. A number of institutional changes are thus required to help the UN identify the problem, define a solution, and put that solution into effect.

The Security Council: Sustaining Authority and Effectiveness

Since the end of the Cold War, the Security Council has become a much more active decision-making body, with its members showing increased awareness of their responsibility to maintain peace and of their ability to do so. Nevertheless, its present membership and composition do not reflect the reality of economic and political changes over the past 50 years, still less the fact that the relative position of nations is likely to be even more transformed during the next half-century. The Security Council must become more representative of diverse perspectives if its actions are to command full respect in all parts of the world.

A Security Council of larger membership and different composition should not be hindered in its ability to take action. If more countries possess veto privileges in the Security Council, the UN faces the increased possibility of paralysis should one Permanent Member oppose the great majority of states. This risk would be particularly acute if, as during the Cold War, the veto were to be invoked over a broad range of issues and not just on enforcement measures. We therefore suggest both the expansion of the Permanent Membership and a restriction of the existing veto privilege.

Members of the General Assembly have given extensive consideration to changes in the size of the Security Council without yet reaching consensus, but we recommend the following compromise: the Security Council would be expanded from its present membership of 15 to a total of approximately 23 Members, of whom not more than five would be new Permanent Members. All new Members should be selected with attention to the accepted principles of participation and equity in a universal organization. The new Permanent Members would be chosen also for their ability and will to contribute, according to their capabilities, to peacekeeping and enforcement operations.

At the same time, the veto would be applicable only to peacekeeping and enforcement measures. This would return the UN to the original spirit of the Charter, where the veto was intended mainly to prevent the Security Council from authorizing military action against a Permanent Member or requiring use of its forces against its will. In fact the veto has been invoked over a much wider variety of decisions and resolutions. A change in the use of the veto could be arranged by agreement among the Permanent Members and without Charter amendment, and would be in order even if no alteration is made in the Council s membership. However, if there is an increase in the number of Members accorded veto rights — necessarily by Charter revision — as a complementary measure, an amendment restricting the scope of the veto for all Permanent Members would be desirable.

The advantages of these twin changes are clear: the Security Council, when it does decide to intervene, will be speaking for a truly global constituency. The distinction between the Permanent and Non-Permanent Members will not be as large as before. And the veto will no longer be used to delay progress on the wide array of other issues with which the Security Council is concerned.

Early Warning and Threat Assessment

An essential first step toward preparing the United Nations to deal with contemporary challenges would be to establish in the Secretary–General’s office an early-warning and threat-assessment section, to provide the Secretary–General and the UN’s intergovernmental bodies with better information of impending crises. While the Secretariat has considerably developed its capacity to collect and process data from public sources, it needs access to first-hand reports of internal conflicts and economic, social, and humanitarian crises from governments, field representatives of UN agencies, specialized agencies and non-state actors. Such information should be assembled and assessed by a central office. An effective early-warning system would augment the ability of the Secretary–General and his special representatives for preventive diplomacy, one of the key functions of the Secretary–General’s office. It would also provide a reliable basis for alerting the Security Council to possible trouble.

Since many of today’s conflicts stem from social or economic causes, the assessment office must develop knowledge of internal economic and social developments as well as of the state of political or international relations. In the context of global development, early warning of growing tensions among ethnic groups will be as pertinent as first-hand information of a likely border dispute. The assessment staff should draw heavily on data and expertise in the various departments of the Secretariat and in the specialized agencies, as well as on analyses of the UN’s experience in field operations. It should be in contact with regional organizations, sharing information and advice with them when preventive diplomacy or peacekeeping actions are contemplated. In this way it would work as a global conflict prevention center.

An interdisciplinary analysis and planning staff would serve, and be of value to, the Secretary–General, the Security Council, and the other principal organs of the United Nations. It should provide for better coordination among the many parts of the United Nations system by bringing together the security, economic and social elements of human security problems. It should also produce well-thought-out plans for dealing with societies that are collapsing.

We therefore recommend that a Security Assessment Staff, drawn from existing departments and through secondment from functional organizations, be established as part of the Office of the Secretary–General.

Capacity for Action

Better information alone, however, cannot prevent violence. As the recent experience of the UN suggests, the world organization must have better means to meet emergency challenges. The Security Council, aided by the Secretary–General and his staff, must bring greater clarity, coherence, flexibility, and effectiveness to the many actions which it presently oversees and which it is likely to authorize in the future.

The range of actions the Security Council may call for is extensive, running from diplomacy and peacekeeping, through economic sanctions, to full-scale enforcement and collective military operations against a named aggressor. There are some types of conflict which the United Nations is ill-equipped or not designed to handle, apart from offering its impartial good offices. A major war between great powers, or a large-scale civil war, will be beyond the scope of the UN’s peacekeeping or enforcement capacity. The focus must be upon those cases where the Security Council has agreed there is a situation calling for a military or non-military response by the United Nations. There must also be a demonstrated willingness to act by Member States, especially those that provide contingents and the bulk of the financial and logistical support for UN operations. The instruments and actions which we suggest below are predicated on the assumption both that a UN response is deemed necessary and that Members have the will and determination to carry through the plans they have agreed upon. Failing such will, proposals for improving the UN’s security apparatus have little value.

Clarifying the Concepts of UN Military Action

A conceptual re-evaluation of the current confused distinctions between the peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, and peace-building functions of the United Nations system is badly needed. This re-evaluation has commenced with the Secretary–General’s Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, issued in January 1995, and needs to be developed further.

We envisage the UN’s peace-building task as belonging primarily in the civilian sphere and taking place after the conflict is concluded; it is therefore discussed later, in the “Social Fabric” section of the Report. It is the distinction between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement that concerns us here. United Nations’ peacekeeping operations have traditionally involved lightly-armed forces, interposed impartially by agreement between conflicting parties to maintain stability while negotiations to resolve the conflict get under way. In some cases, as in Macedonia, these forces are intended to serve preventively as a symbol of UN concern and a link to a possible UN response to an outbreak of violence. Authorized by the Security Council, the day-to-day management of peacekeeping operations is the responsibility of the Secretary–General. It is hard to foresee a time when the world organization will not be engaged in this field.

However, traditional peacekeeping methods are not appropriate for those occasions where armed conflict occurs within a state, civil authority is challenged or collapses entirely, and factional struggles for dominance are under way. Given the United Nations’ responsibility for maintaining peace, the world organization cannot ignore crises which place in jeopardy entire populations and threaten human security in the broadest sense. It needs consistent and principled guidelines to deal with this recurrent problem.

A first step in this direction was provided by Secretary–General Boutros Boutros–Ghali’s document, An Agenda for Peace, which articulated the idea of special “peace-enforcement” contingents, equipped with appropriate armaments and authorized to use them to accomplish their mission. This deployment would be a provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter, and thus “without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned.” In practice, however, the realization of this concept has been seriously affected by three critical difficulties. The first is that, as events in Somalia and Bosnia have shown, it is a mistake to transform a peacekeeping operation into provisional peace-enforcement without the necessary mandate or resources for the task.

The second difficulty is that as soon as peace-enforcement is carried out (even to secure humanitarian aid), one of the parties to the conflict is likely to assert that UN impartiality has been forfeited, and to take action against UN personnel. The role of the Secretary–General as an impartial diplomatic mediator — a precious resource — is particularly endangered when provisional peace-enforcement turns into a major operation directed against an enemy.

The third difficulty, the reluctance of Member States to accept the task of enforcing peace, flows from the second. Because an aggrieved party might threaten retaliation against peace-enforcement actions, casualties are more likely and the number of troops and cost of the operation will be much higher than in peacekeeping. Even relatively small, unexpected losses can cause a dramatic public reaction, damaging (albeit unfairly) the UN’s image. We cannot stress too strongly that any commitment to peace-enforcement should mean that the Security Council has also resolved to supply the necessary forces — substantial, adequately armed units — and the finances to get the job done. Anything less is likely to lead to failure and a loss of confidence in the Organization.

This problem can be resolved only at the political level. When conditions change in a country after an initial UN force deployment, and proposals are made to augment the action originally mandated by the Security Council, Member States and their publics have a right to know what new operations they are being asked to support and what additional risks are entailed. Keeping the mandates distinct is also essential to protect UN personnel and the integrity of their mission. We therefore recommend that, when the Security Council adopts a resolution authorizing the use of military force of any kind, the resolution should clearly state whether that force will be used for peacekeeping, peace-enforcement under Article 40 of the Charter, or collective security action under Article 42. It should be clearly provided that forces acting on behalf of the Council will not exceed the Council’s mandate. In addition, any change in the original mandate must be approved by the Security Council and explained to the participating Member States. In particular, the implications of moving from a peacekeeping mission to peace-enforcement should be made crystal clear to all parties involved.

Actions against Aggression

A United Nations response to an act of major aggression (under Chapter VII) would involve a much larger military undertaking than peacekeeping or peace-enforcement. Faced with such a serious challenge to international order, the Security Council will authorize a Member State, or perhaps a regional organization (under Chapter VIII), to implement its decision. While the Council must establish clear guidelines and limits for this sort of mandate, the operation would not be directly under UN command but under a field commander designated by the country or organization charged with carrying out the Council resolution. If, however, sufficient troops were to be made available by Member States themselves to deploy an adequate force for Article 42 enforcement under UN command, the Security Council should establish an ad hoc military authority for each operation, comprising representatives of the parties involved in the operation. The authority would be responsible for strategy and liaison with the UN field commander, and might be mandated to name the field commander, who would have operational control of the forces. The Security Council itself would retain ultimate authority in defining the mission objectives and the terms of peace. It should keep the situation under continuing review so as to insure that the conduct of the operation is in conformity with the objectives and terms laid down by the Council.

Rapid Response Capability

The United Nations needs the capability to respond quickly in situations of conflict, including those where civil authority collapses and violence breaks out threatening a massive loss of life and an interruption of humanitarian assistance. Slowness to act may lead to enormous cost and casualties, as was the case in Rwanda. The United Nations needs to have a reliable and immediately available, well trained and adequately equipped rapid response force to deploy quickly in such circumstances. We accordingly recommend that a UN Rapid Reaction Force be established for urgent deployment on the decision of the Security Council.

The initial target figure for such a force might be 10,000. The mixture of military, police and civilian elements will need careful study in the context of the duties to be performed, as will its mode of operation. It should consist of well-trained and highly competent personnel drawn from different regions of the world. The force would be mandated to perform such functions as the following: establish a UN presence; provide security for UN personnel; hold an airport for use in bringing in supplies and additional UN personnel or for evacuations; establish one or more safe areas for the civilian population; limit escalation and assist in ending the violence; provide limited humanitarian assistance in emergency circumstances; assess and report on the situation to the Secretary–General and the Security Council.

A Rapid Reaction Force would operate in conformity with the provisions of Article 40 of the UN Charter, that is, without prejudice to the rights or position of any of the parties. It would be replaced as soon as feasible by regular peacekeeping or peace-enforcement troops provided by Member States, for which it would in no way be a substitute. The Force would have a permanent command and control staff, operating during deployment under the day-to-day direction of the Secretary–General.

To meet the requirements of quick availability, common training and compatible equipment, the Force could best consist of volunteers, recruited by the UN and stationed and trained in UN camps or centers. Deployment would be subject only to the decision of the Security Council.

This is an ambitious innovation, and we realize that there is likely to be opposition to it for a variety of reasons: political, financial, and military. On the other hand, there is at present a damaging gap in the UN’s performance both in time (between a Security Council decision and the practical measures to implement it) and in function (in the capacity of the UN to put an effective presence on the ground before the situation gets totally out of hand). Ideally, the Rapid Reaction Force suggested could fill this gap, and it should be the ultimate objective.

Pending the realization of a standing UN force, a less ambitious effort could employ earmarked national contingents as the basis for quick deployment. Under such a system, however, much needs to be done to redefine their composition, purposes, training and doctrine. The roster of stand-by units ready and fully trained for UN operations needs to be expanded and systematized. This approach may be seen as a useful first step, provided there is swift execution by Member States. The disadvantage is that, given the time required for government decisions, delays would occur that might permit a disaster to unfold. Uncertainty as to which troop contingents were available would also complicate advance planning. Hence we prefer a standing UN force that could more fully meet the Organization’s need for a rapid deployment capability.

Sanctions

The imposition of economic sanctions offers the principal non-military means of responding to breaches of the peace. While sanctions will not halt aggression quickly, they can sometimes mobilize international solidarity in limiting arms and the level of violence, and function as a bargaining chip in mediating an end to the conflict. But their use must also be weighed against the possible suffering of innocent people, economic losses by participating countries, and strains suffered by third-party states affected by sanctions.

The purpose of sanctions is to change behavior, not simply to punish. They should be targeted at the particular vulnerability of the “guilty party,” with the least possible side effects on others. Careful monitoring of both the impact of sanctions and the degree of compliance is an integral part of this strategy. A system of field monitoring should be developed by the Secretary–General with the cooperation of relevant UN functional agencies. This would be an important task for the Security Assessment Staff, which should provide the Secretary–General and the Security Council with the information they require for imposing, measuring and adjusting sanctions.

Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction

While the Security Council’s authority must remain unimpaired, there is one further proposal which, we believe, could bring a wider sense of participation in security-related issues. For too long, a sense of division has existed between the Permanent Members of the Security Council and the collectivity of Member States in the General Assembly, many of whom have felt excluded from the Council’s work. In addition, despite the end of the Cold War, scarce national resources continue to be squandered on armaments, and the danger from biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons remains. These problems ought now to be addressed by the General Assembly and the Security Council, working together. The Assembly has approved many resolutions on arms control and disarmament, but lacks the authority to require compliance by Member States. The Council has brought some limitation of arms in conflict areas when it imposes sanctions, but it has done little else despite its responsibility under Article 26 to formulate plans for the regulation of armaments.

The Security Council should discharge this mandate, through a joint General Assembly–Security Council Working Group, which would keep under review the progress in disarmament negotiations, transmit proposals and guidelines to the Conference on Disarmament for negotiation, and mobilize the political will of governments in an attempt to provide impetus to the negotiations. It would also promote ideas for global disarmament regimes beginning at the regional level and aiming, ultimately, at the elimination of all nuclear weapons. In coordination with the proposed Economic Council, the joint Working Group should further enhance and complement existing measures to limit arms transfers and sales, taking full account of the security and economic implications. With this process in place, it should be possible to eliminate the Commission on Disarmament. No effort to meet the threat of violence worldwide will be effective unless Member States make concerted efforts in the years ahead to reduce arms spending and, in place of those weapons, to create better forms of human security.

The measures suggested above are intended to produce a more popularly supported, more flexible, more credible, and thus more effective United Nations security system capable of meeting the challenges of the future. Here, as elsewhere, the critical element is national commitment.

 

3b. Improving Global Economic Conditions

The United Nations system could, with the necessary authority and resources, develop into an effective global security system. Its mechanisms would be largely reactive, its success judged upon how well it kept the peace. Yet a reactive institution, even a very efficient one, is incapable of dealing with the sources of violence, which are frequently rooted in the injustices, poverty and socioeconomic ills that wrack our planet. To ensure a more durable basis for “human security,” the world organization also needs to help Member States in their struggle for prosperity and social peace.

This fundamental truth was recognized and stressed by the founders of the United Nations. The governments attending the 1945 San Francisco conference, and all later members of the world body, pledged “to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples”; and the UN itself is charged to promote “higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development.” In addition to urging the solution of “international economic, social, health, and related problems,” and promoting international cultural and educational cooperation, the Charter calls for universal observance of “human rights and fundamental freedoms.” It vested responsibility for discharging these many functions in the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), acting under the authority of the General Assembly, and authorized ECOSOC to “coordinate the activities of the specialized agencies” in the economic and social arena and to obtain regular reports of their activities.

Over time, the membership of ECOSOC has become too large to be effective. It has never been able to perform its coordinating role among the organizations of the UN system, including the Bretton Woods institutions. Moreover, the Council has too many items on its agenda to be able to do justice to them, especially since it now meets for only one session each year.

Thus there still remains a need for an effective international forum in which countries at all stages of economic and social development can meet on a regular basis, harmonize economic policies as foreseen in the UN Charter, and give guidance to the multiple activities of the UN system in these fields. Intergovernmental bodies do play an important though partial role in economic and social policy, such as the OECD, the G–7 and G–77, the Bretton Woods institutions, and regional commissions and development banks. However, significant international action on economic and social issues requires not only a regional but also a global approach, and not just membership by rich countries or developing countries but full participation by states representing both.

This deficiency is widely recognized. There has been no lack of proposed remedies, but none has improved matters. In theory one could envisage a revived ECOSOC, empowered by Member States to coordinate the UN’s economic and social policies across a broad front, with a smaller membership and regular operating procedures working throughout the year to supervise the progress made toward sustainable development. In practice, however, we think such a renewal is unlikely to occur.

The Global Alliance for Sustainable Development

Economic and social activities must go hand in hand. In particular, the role of the United Nations in the development field has so many dimensions — social, economic and others — that an integrated, comprehensive approach is needed. While preserving that overall coherence and purpose, however, the United Nations needs to find structures that would permit effective and focused deliberation on and supervision of its various economic and social programs. To achieve this aim, we recommend that the functions of ECOSOC be taken over by two UN bodies that will fulfill the Charter’s original purposes, but with a very different structure, authority, mandate and membership. These bodies will be a new Economic Council and a new Social Council. Like the Security Council, they will be available throughout the year and each would have a specific portfolio of responsibilities detailed below.

In order to ensure the necessary integration of the UN s economic and social policies, the Economic Council and the Social Council would meet once a year at the highest level of government. They would then constitute the Global Alliance for Sustainable Development. The Global Alliance would provide an authoritative forum to promote consensus on global issues and develop parameters for common action on issues of great economic and social concern. After the Global Alliance has determined appropriate objectives, the full machinery of the United Nations system would be enlisted to implement them.

In following up the broad objectives established by the annual meeting of the Global Alliance, the Economic Council would focus on coordinating monetary, financial and trade policies at the global level, as well as addressing the economic aspects of sustainable development including job creation, poverty alleviation and protection of the environment, responsibility for which it would share with the Social Council. The Social Council would be responsible for supervision and integration of all UN agencies, and international institutions, programs and offices involved with all social issues, including social development, humanitarian questions, human rights and restoration of states under stress. Given the inter-related nature of their work, the Economic Council and Social Council would work closely together, and also with the Security Council when the occasion required it. Their day-to-day cooperation would lend a degree of coherence to the economic and social policies of the United Nations system. In addition, many UN agencies, such as UNDP, UNICEF, and UNFPA, would report to and be represented before these new Councils, as would other international bodies and groups.

The Global Alliance and its two Councils should reflect the profound transformations that have occurred in world society since the UN’s founding: the new relationships arising between peoples and governments, the revived emphasis on democratic institutions, and the desire for participation and not mere representation in the political process. The Councils could benefit from this development by encouraging non-state organizations to act as advisors and implementers of UN programs. A task force should be established early on, by the Councils, to develop more effective partnerships between the UN, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other elements of civil society.

This interaction between UN bodies and non-state groups has been an important element in the array of conferences held recently to address broad social and economic issues: the UNCTAD VIII conference at Cartagena, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro, the World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna, the International Conference on Population and Development held in Cairo, and the World Summit on Social Development held in Copenhagen. These conferences represented an important step in the evolution of the UN system, since they entailed considerable political negotiation and produced plans of action complete with follow-up and monitoring arrangements. Non-state actors and public-interest groups played a significant role parallel to the formal proceedings, working with the official delegations to move the United Nations and its Member States toward common policies, and giving a new resonance to the debate and the plans of action.

The Global Alliance for Sustainable Development would further these promising trends. Its role should be to coordinate strategies to implement the recommendations of the UN conferences and to ensure that the work of each conference reinforced the others. The Alliance could request either the Economic Council or the Social Council (or very often both) to monitor the follow-up to the various conferences and report to the General Assembly on the progress made, or lack thereof. The two Councils would be expected to be in contact with non-state agencies and interest groups during that follow-up period to elicit their maximum collaboration.

The Economic Council

We recommend the establishment of an Economic Council as a principal organ of the United Nations. The Council should, in consultation with the Social Council, the Security Council and the General Assembly, be empowered to formulate guidelines to integrate the work of all UN agencies and international institutions, programs and offices engaged in economic issues. Accordingly, the Council would receive periodic reports from UN-affiliated bodies, have the authority to request special reports, and be able to invite representatives of those economic bodies to meet with it. In addition, the Council would advise and give direction to the various agencies within the UN system, particularly as regards an effective division of labor and mutual support in their work.

The Economic Council would provide a global forum to review and build a consensus on global economic issues and policies that affect all members, large and small. Thus, for example, the functioning of the global economy would be greatly improved by greater harmonization of fiscal, monetary and trade policies pursued by major governments. The Council would provide a venue for discussing these and other issues — such as transfers both of resources and technology for development, external indebtedness and the functioning of commodity markets, and creation of competitive market conditions — that are politically sensitive but have a global impact. The Economic Council would pay particular attention to coordinating the UN’s efforts on environment and development, building on the experiences of the Commission on Sustainable Development established at the Rio Summit.

The prospects of Member States would also be greatly improved by the existence of stable international financial markets. Recent years have seen a phenomenal growth in the volume of international private capital flows, creating new opportunities for countries capable of attracting foreign investment, by-passing others and increasing the exposure of all to the volatility of the global economy. So far these issues have been discussed, if at all, within the restricted forums of the G–7 or the Bank for International Settlements. Since these issues affect the welfare of all countries, we believe that meetings of finance or economic ministers under the auspices of the Economic Council would provide an alternative forum that could enhance international collaboration in economic and financial matters.

We believe that it is now opportune to review the structure and functions of the Bretton Woods institutions and their relationship with the United Nations. Since World War II, they have contributed to the development of the international monetary system and to economic and social progress in the developing world. However, a new range of issues has arisen, such as the transformation of command economies into market-oriented economies; the emergence of massive, and largely unregulated, international-capital and foreign-exchange markets; and, in many countries, increasing cooperation between the government and the private sector. At the same time, old problems such as endemic poverty and the inadequacy of capital transfers to those who are in greatest need persist.

Last year, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of these institutions, a number of symposia and conferences were held — some under the aegis of the Bretton Woods institutions — and reports prepared calling for a review of the structure and functions of these institutions. We believe that such a review is timely. The Fund should be a more effective forum for overall surveillance of the international monetary system, including international-capital markets; a source of providing international liquidity when there is need; and a source of advice and financial support for economies experiencing problems of economic transition and adjustment. The World Bank should focus on its primary task of stimulating and supporting sustainable development with particular emphasis on lower-income countries. To that end, it should give increasing attention to developing its catalytic role both in terms of helping its member governments access new sources of capital and working in cooperation with the private sector and nongovernmental organizations in furthering development.

The Economic Council would need to be imaginative, flexible and practical, welcoming submissions from the private sector and consulting with the worldwide business community as to the best ways of using public funds to leverage the vastly larger amounts of private capital to assist human development. It should summon the leading world’s economists and engage them in the process of re-evaluating global economic policies. It should consult with representatives of UN field offices, farmers’ organizations, women’s associations, environmental groups, and others about the local impacts of broader economic and technological trends. And it should hold regular discussions with the Social Council on the social implications of proposed economic strategies.

The above proposals would not alter the fact that many countries are unable to marshal the domestic or foreign capital required to support sustained economic growth, and thus reduce the massive wealth disparities within and between nations. Therefore, our proposed reforms must be accompanied by additional measures to support peoples, countries and regions that fall behind. The challenges facing today’s poorest countries deserve special attention from the international community.

Such nations exist in every developing continent, and deserve equal treatment. But they are most heavily concentrated in Africa, whose political, economic and social conditions test every part of the UN system. In virtually every measurement of human well-being, from GDP per capita to educational access, and from capital stocks to health care, the continent is in distress. Corruption and political repression often add to impoverishment. Civil wars and internal conflicts displace millions within state boundaries and drive other millions into neighboring countries. The phenomenon of the seriously weakened state is more prevalent in Africa than elsewhere. Africa s population and environmental pressures are intensifying and still have not reached their peak. In many areas social distress, disease, infant and adult mortality are growing worse.

To meet the special challenge of these poorest countries and of justice in the world economy, many UN bodies and other international organizations are currently engaged in efforts to promote sustainable development. The Economic Council should draw up coherent guidelines about how the UN system can best meet the development needs of its membership, fulfilling a role that is urgently required but simply does not exist at present. One of its functions would be to suggest ways in which the Member States might harmonize their (very disparate) bilateral aid policies, as well as their policies in different multilateral development agencies.

Since no panacea will transform widespread poverty into decent living conditions for all, the Economic Council will need to foster a broad range of development policies that involve governmental, intergovernmental, and non-state actors. Institutions such as the World Bank are important for the resources they can mobilize. Smaller organizations, including NGOs, have pioneered novel development strategies that have since gained wide acceptance. Previous UN conferences have played a useful role in this regard, drawing attention to new ideas and moving them up the development agenda. For example, the conferences at Rio and Cairo made clear that enhancing the condition of women across the globe, especially their access to education, is not simply a good social policy but an investment in the future of humankind and should be viewed in the same light as more traditional investments in (say) agriculture and infrastructure. The Economic Council can afford an opportunity for all development actors to learn from each other’s successes and failures, and to appreciate the comparative advantages of their different approaches.

Given the larger purposes of the Global Alliance, the Economic Council should seek to support development policies that are holistic and sustainable. Its charge would be to coordinate strategies that will benefit not only today’s generation, but also future generations. Raising living standards is central to the success of the United Nations in its second half-century, but this must be done with due respect to the dignity of individuals, the needs of local inhabitants, and the preservation of cultural and ecological diversity. The Council should aim to ensure that the use of the world’s material resources does not impose an intolerable burden on fragile environments. It should encourage Member States, non-state agencies, the private sector, and scientists and professionals everywhere to foster solutions to complex problems of sustainable development, in line with the work of the global conferences.

Like the Social Council, the Economic Council would be a much smaller body than ECOSOC to allow for effective dialogue and debate. Its size would be decided by the Member States through Charter amendment, but we suggest that it be restricted to approximately 23 voting members. While the criteria of membership would have to be negotiated within the General Assembly, due consideration should be given to geographic representation, population, and a balance between national economies of different size. We propose that membership be for four-year renewable terms, with half of the members rotating in each biennium.

The Economic Council, consisting of senior representatives from the Permanent Missions of those states currently elected to the Council, would be located in New York. Meeting regularly for ordinary business, it would also be on call to answer the request of any Member State or the Secretary–General to consider an urgent item. It should also meet on special occasions at the level of ministers (such as trade ministers or finance ministers) to take an authoritative look at specific aspects of the global economy. A two-thirds majority would be necessary to resolve substantive questions and a simple majority required for procedural questions, although it should proceed as much as possible by consensus. The agenda for the meetings would be prepared by the coordinating Secretariat, in consultation with the economic agencies and the Member States themselves.

While the Economic Council would only have governments as members, individual UN agencies, including the Bretton Woods institutions, would report to the Council and discuss relevant issues with it. The Council can be expected to seek the advice of agency heads on matters within their competence.

We further recommend that the Economic Council have a standing Advisory Committee, composed of distinguished and talented individuals drawn from various disciplines and professional fields. It is particularly important to involve the private sector much more than previously in addressing global issues. The benefits would be mutual. While companies engaged on the international scene realize that they require effective worldwide rules and structures to support stability and prosperity, the United Nations itself needs to work with the private sector if it is to play a significant role in improving the common good. The potential shared interests between the private and public international sectors, and the relation of both to the needs of Member States, could be significantly developed by an Economic Council that reaches out to wider, non-governmental constituencies.

 

3c. Protecting the Social Fabric

The material benefits of sustained economic progress can be fully enjoyed only in the context of a healthy social fabric. The process of building social cohesion starts with the establishment of shared norms within a nation’s boundaries. In such a society, the rights of every individual are guaranteed by the rule of law, people can participate in their own governance, and disagreements over policy issues are settled peaceably. Creating a pluralistic society, characterized by basic consensus among citizens and tolerance for others, is key to achieving human security for all.

The founders of the United Nations realized that respect for fundamental human rights was a central element in forging a strong social fabric. Member governments therefore elaborated a wide range of human rights, later set forth in The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in subsequent conventions, protocols, and other agreements. In many countries, great progress has been made in this field over the past half-century, and both decolonization and the demise of many autocratic regimes in recent years mean that more people than ever enjoy democratic freedoms. However, violations of human rights continue to be widespread, as both a cause and effect of violent civil conflict. Ethnic cleansing, amounting at times to genocide, often is no mere byproduct of war, but its primary purpose. These violations represent a direct challenge to the principles of the United Nations system which all Member States are pledged to support.

Flawed political institutions only exacerbate the problems faced by societies. Despite democratic advances, many states still lack good governance, the rule of law is absent, regular elections are denied to the people, power is in the hands of a select group, and political opposition is suppressed. Instead of embracing cultural diversity and respecting “human rights and religion” as the Charter specifies, governments pursue unjust policies against part, or perhaps all, of their populations. Minority groups, particularly those with different ethnic backgrounds, are discriminated against. The failure of government to build public consensus, address social issues effectively and respect human rights results in the widespread suffering recently seen in Haiti, Bosnia, Tajikistan and many other places.

Moreover, in today’s world, states confront a variety of social ills, many of which are common to both developed and developing countries. They include drug abuse and narcotics trafficking, corruption, a rising tide of violence, an increasing incidence of crime, the spreading AIDS epidemic, persistent gender inequality, failing educational institutions, rapid population growth and mass internal and international migrations. Because most of these problems are transnational in nature, cooperation is essential if states are to address them adequately.

The Social Council

The United Nations needs a high-level forum where members can debate these issues and develop approaches to alleviate social problems, fulfill its commitment to human rights under the Charter, and provide assistance to societies in distress. These purposes can best be secured by the creation of an intergovernmental body to bring coherence to the social functions of the UN system. To this end, we recommend the establishment of a Social Council as a principal organ of the United Nations.

The Social Council should be empowered to supervise and integrate the work of all UN activities relating to issues of social development, including environmental protection, education and health care, housing, human rights and humanitarian affairs, the special needs of women and children, population and migration concerns, measures to protect cultural diversity, and efforts to assist societies in distress.

The Council should receive periodic reports from UN-affiliated bodies, and have the authority to request special reports as needed as well as to invite representatives of those bodies to participate in its deliberations. It should monitor the social policies pursued by the UN system and give advice and direction to agencies and programs whenever appropriate. Working with the Economic Council and the Security Council, and in consultation with the General Assembly, it would develop policy guidelines to enable the UN system as a whole to advance toward sustainable development.

In order to ensure productive debate and effective decision-making on social issues, the Social Council would have a structure similar to that of the Economic Council, its partner in the Global Alliance for Sustainable Development. The Social Council should consist of representatives of no more than 23 states elected by the General Assembly with due regard for geographic representation and a balance between countries with larger and smaller populations. It would have the same voting procedures as the Economic Council, be located in New York, receive staff support from the coordinating Secretariat, and have high-level representation from the Permanent Missions of the countries currently elected to the Council. It would meet on a regular basis with the possibility of special thematic meetings at the ministerial level. The Social Council would also be available to meet on call to consider urgent items. It would maintain full liaison with the other two Councils, the office of the Secretary–General and the General Assembly itself.

The Social Council would also look to non-state representatives to assist in every stage of its work, from early consultations to implementation. It is essential that the Council have always available the advice of regional organizations and that for their part, regional organizations have a sense of participation in the Council’s work. Like the Economic Council, the Social Council should also have a standing Advisory Board composed of distinguished individuals drawn from various disciplines, professional fields, and other groups involved in social and human rights policies.

We will not attempt here to delineate how every UN agency and office might relate to the Social Council. This will emerge from the deliberations and policies of the Council itself, its work with UN bodies, the private sector and many other non-state actors, and above all, from consultations with the Member States. The Social Council will play its role in three particular areas: promotion and coordination of social development policies and programs as already described; enhancing the effectiveness of the UN’s human rights apparatus; and alleviating the political and social disintegration of states in distress.

Promoting Respect for Human Rights

At present, the human rights apparatus of the United Nations is badly overburdened and unable to respond adequately to the flow of appeals on human rights abuses. The Social Council should consider ways to strengthen and rationalize the Centre for Human Rights. The Centre needs an enhanced capacity to assess alleged violations of economic, social, environmental, and political rights in an independent and timely manner. The High Commissioner should submit monthly reports to the Social Council on urgent situations. The Centre and the High Commissioner should forge closer ties with regional organizations, development and human rights agencies, the media and non-state groups, to facilitate the assembly of information and ensure more effective monitoring of compliance with human rights instruments. We urge Member States to adhere to the Optional Protocol of the Convention on Civil and Political Rights which allows for a right of petition. The objectives would be greater transparency on human rights issues and improved coordination of responses from governments and from within the UN system.

It is also important for the Social Council to work closely with, and seek to strengthen, the Commission on Human Rights. The Commission, as an intergovernmental deliberative body, has played a key role in the protection of human rights. Its Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities has been especially valuable. The Commission should report to the Social Council and continue to undertake human rights investigations. It should develop links with, and consult, regional organizations concerning fact-finding and adjudication.

We recognize that there are disagreements on the best ways to fulfill basic human rights. Nevertheless, an impressive consensus has been established on the definition and importance of universal rights as evidenced at the UN conferences on environment and development, population, and human rights. If the United Nations is to meet the intent of this consensus, greater resources must be allocated to the operational responsibilities of the human rights offices to promote compliance with the human rights code articulated in the Charter, the Universal Declaration, and the instruments known collectively as the International Bill of Human Rights.

Assisting States in Distress

Assisting states undergoing crises in governance, or in the process of recovery from such crises, was not originally a concern of the UN s founders. The Charter does not provide guidance on these issues. Nevertheless, recent examples of Member States coming under acute social and political stress point to the need for the global community to offer assistance during critical times and to provide for rebuilding economic viability and social harmony. Emergency humanitarian relief is already a major and ongoing function of the UNHCR, UNICEF and other agencies as well as of many NGOs. The role of the Social Council in backstopping these efforts, as proposed below, will be a delicate one which needs to be developed gradually and with tact. It should be emphasized that any such assistance should be afforded with the consent of the local government if it retains authority, and carried out through temporary and agreed-upon guardianship mechanisms. It would have as its purpose the restoration of the state s social and political integrity, and of its capacity to exercise, in full, its sovereign rights.

We would expect the Social Council, in cooperation with the Economic Council and the Security Council, to mobilize the resources of the UN system to aid a state encountering severe problems in order to prevent total disintegration of the social fabric. In the broadest sense, the rationale for all UN programs, from development to education to increased trade, is to prevent such collapse by encouraging peace and social and economic progress within and among Member States. More specifically, the United Nations can, and often does, help states in crisis by providing good-office diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, and services such as electoral monitoring. The Social Council, in cooperation with the Economic Council and the Bretton Woods institutions, should work to build into any recovery package, social, political and environmental dimensions, in order to insure that financial distress does not force a country to adopt austerity measures which might undermine social cohesion.

Were a society to collapse into civil war, or its governing institutions fail for any other reason, the challenge becomes much greater. The United Nations must develop agreed-on policies to deal with these crises in the future. While the Security Council can authorize peacekeeping and even peace-enforcement actions to bring conflict to an end, we recommend that the Social Council coordinate efforts to rebuild the weakened society. In these circumstances, it would call on the Secretary–General to organize restorative action, in accordance with policy guidelines defined by the Council, just as the Security Council directs the Secretary–General to organize peacekeeping operations. Close cooperation with the Economic Council would also be needed to help rebuild the distressed society’s economy.

In An Agenda for Peace, Secretary–General Boutros Boutros–Ghali described this process as “post-conflict peace-building,” and suggested that it may require restoring order, humanitarian relief, demobilizing former combatants, and reintegrating them into society, repatriating refugees, providing advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to promote human rights, reforming or strengthening government institutions, and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation and economic restoration. Such custodianship is an ambitious responsibility, and the United Nations should not embark upon such tasks unless requested to do so by the Security Council and by political groups within a distressed state. It is also essential that Member States be prepared to commit the necessary human and financial resources for such action.

Assistance efforts along the above lines have been carried out, with some success, in parts of the world from El Salvador to Namibia to Cambodia. Our concern is that these recovery mechanisms be properly directed, supported and coordinated in the future by an authoritative UN organ. We believe that the Social Council should play this role. Peace-building, in contrast to peacekeeping action, is likely to be a lengthy and costly process. It should therefore be supervised by a body focused upon social concerns and using predominantly civilian tools and personnel, although the Council would call upon other parts of the UN apparatus should that be necessary. The Social Council is also the most suitable organ to investigate and promote promising ideas such as establishing a civilian recruitment system, so that well-trained cadres of civilian personnel are available to be seconded from the Member States to participate in, as well as provide advice on, the peace-building process. The Council’s central place in a restructured UN system would affirm, both in a real and symbolic sense, that advancing human security is a primary purpose of the United Nations.

The Social Council could, we believe, make a major contribution to the establishment or restoration of open, fair and participatory governance, enabling distressed states to regain full sovereignty and to rejoin the community of Member States in moving toward the common goals of peace, economic betterment, and social progress.

 

3d. Leadership, Organization and Resources

We have recommended, as the main structural change proposed in this Report, three Councils acting as the functional core of the UN’s operations. Each of these three would be responsible for a separate though related field. The Economic Council and the Social Council would come together annually as a Global Alliance to formulate their overall policies, with a common Secretariat to service all these activities. However, these changes will not in themselves guarantee an improved world organization. Success also requires other elements: political and intellectual leadership to inspire and sustain the United Nations; an efficient organization; and adequate resources.

Leadership

To exercise the leadership needed, the UN must have above all else the commitment of the heads of government and senior ministers of Member States to support the Organization, and to ensure that their electorates understand why the world body is vital. If improvements in the system are to occur, political leaders need to match the vision, integrity, and wisdom of those who established the United Nations fifty years ago. What the founders did at that time, in contracting to work together, was to vest in the Charter of the United Nations a moral authority that bound every Member State to cooperate in achieving great common objectives. The influence the United Nations can exercise on behalf of peace and justice depends upon this moral authority.

The Charter represents a universal code of conduct for nations and peoples. Wherever it is observed, the international system can exist in harmony; where it is violated, and the international community does not contest that transgression, the system is in peril. In this respect, the responsibility of those nations that command great military and economic resources, in particular the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, is critical. If they fail to support the United Nations, the Organization is unlikely to flourish or develop. When they cooperate with other states in support of the Charter, the UN’s prospects brighten. In the future, the willingness of Permanent Members to join with other Member States in making the Security Council more representative would greatly enhance the standing and authority of the UN. In much the same way, the commitment of those states elected as members of an authoritative Economic Council or Social Council could significantly advance the capacity of the United Nations to lead in efforts to improve the world’s social, economic and environmental condition.

Since the three Councils will necessarily have limited memberships, the General Assembly will remain the only principal organ under the Charter that consists of all UN members voting on an equal basis. While not a parliament of the world, it is the sole deliberative body in which each country is guaranteed a hearing and at which — during the annual General Debates — each nation’s leaders can bring their views to international attention. It also has sole budgetary authority as well as purview over all of the fields (economic, social, human rights, cultural) listed in Article 13 of the Charter, and as the importance of social and economic factors in international affairs increases, so also should the role of the General Assembly. Given the Assembly s responsibility for all budgetary matters, it ought to be kept informed, via its own Peacekeeping Committee, of all contemplated peacekeeping and peace-enforcement actions, so as to avoid delays in deployment when emergencies occur. And it remains the forum for the concerned nations of the world to push for improvements in the entire UN system, including consideration of the proposals made in this Report. The General Assembly also has a notable potential for leadership in its ability to convene international conferences to address major social, economic, and environmental issues requiring global attention.

To enhance the Assembly s reputation as the locus of global opinion, Member States could augment its leadership claims in various ways: further streamlining and rationalizing of its own procedures, especially by concentrating on a smaller agenda; and working to implement agreed-on agendas in the economic and social spheres with the new Economic Council and the Social Council, which will be handling such issues on a continuing basis but still need a close working relationship with the Assembly. Above all, Member States must recognize their responsibility to support the General Assembly’s vital place at the center of the world organization.

Leadership requires a strong voice. The Secretary–General, in his unique position, must provide the moral authority, intellectual stimulus, and the organizational skill to sustain the credibility and effectiveness of the world organization. There should be no question among the various UN agencies that the Secretary–General is the chief coordinator of the UN system and must be recognized and supported as such. In this connection it is worth recalling the words of the UN’s Preparatory Commission, fifty years ago: “The Secretary–General, more than anyone else, will stand for the United Nations as a whole. In the eyes of the world, he must embody the principles and ideals of the UN Charter to which the Organization seeks to give effect.” Member governments should bear these words in mind both when they go about the process of appointing the Secretary–General, and when the Secretary–General asks them for their support in critical times.

Organization

The efficiency and reputation of the United Nations also depend upon the quality of its staff, especially those appointed to senior positions within the Secretariat and to be heads of agencies. Many dedicated and committed individuals have worked hard to carry out the tasks required of them by the General Assembly, the Security Council and other principal organs. Nonetheless, ritual denunciations of an oversized bureaucracy and sinecure positions will not go away until there is a radical overhaul of the Secretariat’s organization, as well as of its recruitment, promotion and transfer procedures. Reforming the UN personnel system can be done only through the will of Member States themselves. Their reaffirmation of the Charter principle that recruitment and promotion be based upon “securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity” would be a starting point for the renewal process. Gender equity must be a central part of this process. The fiftieth anniversary would be a good occasion to reaffirm the absolute necessity of an international civil service of the highest standards.

Restructuring the UN central core to create three inter-related Councils should also give the Secretary–General an opportunity to reform the Secretariat in order to achieve the greatest possible efficiency and coordination. The aim should be to establish the lean and effective working framework of a United Nations committed to enhancing peace and sustainable development in the decades to come. We recommend that a committee of permanent representatives and senior staff appointed by the Secretary–General be convened to consider how these and other reforms recently proposed by various external bodies and individuals can be undertaken.

Our proposals imply the elimination of UN bodies such as ECOSOC and the Trusteeship Council, whose tasks would be done elsewhere or are completed. There are certain other bodies which may now be redundant, or which for various reasons are unable to fulfill their intended purpose. To the degree that duplication exists elsewhere, the General Assembly might also consider the elimination of such units. The basic restructuring necessitated by the three-Council arrangement should provide the opportunity for this kind of reassessment and streamlining of the Organization as a whole.

Financing

Institutions need resources. The Security Council will be limited in its capacity to maintain peace unless it can be confident of the availability of adequately trained forces that can be sent quickly to the site of need. Guidelines for global growth prepared by the Economic Council will have little effect unless governments respond with the requisite resources. The proposed Social Council cannot restore the basis for democratic governance in shattered lands without far more funds than are presently available for this purpose.

Although governments are perennially concerned about the costs of the UN and their own assessments, the UN’s budget, considered in relation to the size and diversity of the Organization’s tasks, is relatively small. The UN budgeted expenditures for 1994, excluding the specialized agencies, totaled $8.3 billion. Of this, the regular budget amounted to $1.3 billion, peacekeeping was $3.3 billion, and the remainder covered operational activities and programs supported by voluntary contributions. The total amounts to less than $2 for every person on the globe, as compared, for example, to $150 spent on armaments. It is probably unrealistic to expect large savings through internal cuts — especially when Member States keep requiring the UN to assume ever more responsibilities. Governments must therefore take other approaches to end the UN’s financial problems and to give it adequate, reliable and predictable resources to meet the demands that will almost certainly be placed upon it in the coming years.

There are two main reasons for the UN’s financial debility: the failure of many Member States, large and small, to fulfill their legal obligations to pay assessed contributions fully and on time; and the manifold tasks now being thrust upon the Organization, or likely to be thrust on it in the future. The budget for regular UN activities, funded by assessed contributions, has (adjusted for inflation) been steady for 15 years. If all Member States paid on time, that budget would suffice. In fact, arrears typically total annually between $500 million and $1 billion, which is about half the regular budget — a circumstance no government or private company could be expected to tolerate. We concur here with the Report of the Independent Advisory Group on UN Finances (Ogata/Volcker report) that while the assessment formulas need to be updated, each member must pay its dues, in full and on time.

The peacekeeping budget, which has grown by more than tenfold in less than a decade, is financed by a special assessment scale that also reflects the larger responsibility of the Permanent Members of the Security Council. Here the UN faces a double dilemma. Many of these assessments are also unpaid (to the amount of more than $1.5 billion out of the $3.3 billion peacekeeping total in 1994). By their very nature the costs of peacekeeping are unpredictable and their recent sharp increase has made the principal contributors resistant to further growth. Unless this tendency is reversed, future proposals for UN peacekeeping and peace-enforcement actions may well be denied primarily on grounds of expense, although they may be as morally and politically justifiable as those recently undertaken. The same reason will also inhibit the establishment of a UN Rapid Reaction Force — a 10,000-strong body is estimated to cost approximately $500 million annually, with one-time startup costs of $500 million — even if all agree that its existence would in the end reduce the cost of future peacekeeping efforts through timely and effective intervention.

The issue of financial resources is fundamental. Little that is recommended in this Report can be accomplished without them. If Member States wish to have an effective world organization to meet global challenges, they must pay their assessments (regular budget, and peacekeeping) as they are legally committed to do. However, the current assessment formulas no longer fully reflect global economic and political realities. The assessment structure needs urgent revision, especially for peacekeeping.

In order to meet the current financial crisis, the Secretary General has asked for some contingency funds, especially to defray costs of peacekeeping. Governments and other bodies should give serious attention to this request.

Most important of all, the time has come to recognize that the UN will need additional sources of funding that are not dependent on the political and budgetary constraints under which most governments operate. If bold changes in the United Nations system are to be implemented and the world body is to grow in effectiveness, it needs an additional and reliable source of income. Since the United Nations has responsibility for the maintenance of human security in the broadest sense, it is reasonable that it should enjoy income from some sort of levy on the utilization of the global commons. A number of suggestions have been made for some form of impost which governments can collect on behalf of the UN. The General Assembly, in conjunction with the new Economic Council, should agree on an appropriate approach. We are not in a position to make specific recommendations, because these proposals require detailed technical, legal and financial analyses. One possibility would be for governments to consider using a part of the UN system — the IMF — to create Special Drawing Rights for the purpose of supporting the United Nations. The creation of SDRs in this manner would be similar in effect to a levy on the commons. An expert group should review and examine the administrative, legal and economic feasibility of the options.

 

 

4. Reaching the Common Goal

The founders of the United Nations, like ourselves, recognized that they could not envision exactly how the world would look 50 years hence. Instead they identified basic principles and purposes and placed them in a Charter of sufficient flexibility to allow the Organization to serve the ends of peace and to evolve in response to new challenges. The Charter has endured, and its principles and purposes need no revision for the next half-century. But the vastly changed circumstances in which the UN will be operating require modifications in the Organization’s structure and in its operational practices.

This is the main intention of the recommendations we have put forward. We have tried to address global problems that, in the coming years, will define the future of the world. The United Nations needs to be equipped to deal with these problems in order to achieve the abiding objectives of peace, freedom, and well-being for succeeding generations.

We have not speculated on how human society might look in 2045, or whether it might be ready by then for some more definitive form of global governance. The United Nations is an intergovernmental organization which is only beginning to appreciate the necessity of broader participation in its work by the private and nongovernmental sectors. In addition, the question of popular representation must be taken much more seriously in the UN of the future.

Our focus is not on the distant future, but on how the UN can assist the world to get through the intermediate period without serious breakdown or failure. This is not a time to relapse into despair over the problems of the world and its principal international organization. It is a time, rather, to learn from experience and to reshape and revitalize the Organization and the ways in which it is used and supported. There can be no doubt that disastrous consequences will flow from a failure to deal effectively over the next years with poverty, social decay, environmental degradation, ethnic conflict, abuse of human rights and many other problems that affect the very nature of our civilization.

We have also suggested a happier vision in which nations will live in peace, diverse cultures flourish in harmony, and all people enjoy both freedom and material well-being. It is no idle dream to imagine a world in which peoples live freely under governments that serve to promote the welfare and social cohesion of their citizens. Nor is it foolish to imagine a world in which states and peoples exist in productive harmony with each other and with their environment, joined by a recognized sharing of interests and of destinies. This would not be a homogenized global society, but rather one in which cultural and linguistic identities are mutually respected. Variations in standards of living would persist, but efforts to reduce the disparities will continue and no society would lack the basic needs of human dignity and human potential.

In such a world the United Nations’ responsibility for international peace and security would be enhanced by a standing force for rapid deployment, and by making use of forces and equipment held ready by governments. A revitalized UN system would be capable of helping seriously weakened societies to recover their full capacity. The Organization would function as a coordinated, open system through which leadership can set policy goals for social and economic advancement, and practical measures can be taken to assure that those goals are reached. A global society in which development, freedom, and peace reinforce each other would promote the well-being of humanity and the environment on which it depends.

This is the vision towards which the world’s collective compass should be set. The United Nations, properly strengthened, will be critically important in centering the world’s attention on what needs to be done, and identifying solutions to the problems that block the way. Yet the Organization’s effectiveness will continue to depend on the policies and the will of national governments, and on the support it receives from them and their citizens. States and other groups must avail themselves of peaceful means of settling disputes, rather than relying on military instruments of vast destructive power. Citizens accustomed to peaceful and participatory means of decision-making within their countries must expect their governments to use similar means in international affairs.

States and persons normally make commitments to the degree that they see it in their interest to do so. The global condition of interdependence demands a rethinking of what constitutes the national interest. Decisions must not depend merely on the immediate balance of costs and benefits. An enlightened interest takes the long view. The consequences of violent conflict, economic deprivation, and abuse of human rights can travel to the farthest reaches of the globe.

These are the enemies that countries rich and poor can equally identify. Conquering them is in the national and collective interest of all states. This is the necessary price for the maintenance of human security. Without the strong support of their citizens, governments will be reluctant to pay the price. The United Nations is the only available instrument for the necessary worldwide effort. Only if there is general willingness to provide the UN with adequate resources and political support can the world organization lead the way to our common goal — making a success of the future.

 

 

5. Summary of Principal Recommendations

For the United Nations to confront successfully the challenges and opportunities of the next half-century, new institutional mechanisms are needed to prevent or resolve intrastate as well as interstate conflicts, and to promote sustainable economic and social progress. To achieve these objectives, Member States must reaffirm their commitment to the institution. The central recommendation of this Report calls for three related Councils: a new Economic Council, a new Social Council, and the existing but enhanced Security Council, all three serviced by a common Secretariat and working together on behalf of human security and sustainable development.

Because of the intimately connected nature of the UN’s economic and social agendas, the Economic Council and the Social Council would coordinate policy and programs through a Global Alliance for Sustainable Development, comprised of state representatives of the highest level.

 

5a. Providing Security From the Scourge of Violence

• Expand the membership of the Security Council to a total of not more than 23 Members, taking into consideration the principles of participation and equity in a universal organization. Not more than five new Members would be Permanent Members.

• Limit the use of the veto to issues related to Chapter VII or to other decisions entailing the use of military personnel.

• Articulate a clear mandate for all peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, collective security and custodianship operations.

• Establish an ad hoc military authority for each Article 42 enforcement operation which is directly under UN command.

• Establish a UN Rapid Reaction Force capable of immediate deployment upon the decision of the Security Council.

• Establish a joint General Assembly-Security Council Working Group to promote progress toward global disarmament starting at the regional level, and to limit arms transfers.

• Establish a Security Assessment Staff, drawn from existing departments and agencies, to support the efforts of the Secretary–General and the three Councils to protect and promote human security.

 

5b. Promoting Economic Betterment

• Establish an Economic Council as a principal organ of the United Nations system. The Economic Council would seek to integrate the work of all UN agencies and international institutions, programs and offices engaged in economic issues. It would also promote the harmonization of the fiscal, monetary and trade policies of Member States and encourage international cooperation on issues such as transfers of technology and resources, indebtedness, and the functioning of commodity markets.

• Its Members, approximately 23 in number, should be chosen on a rotating basis by the General Assembly, taking into consideration geographic representation, population, and a balance between national economies of different size.

• The Economic Council should have a standing Advisory Committee, composed of distinguished and talented individuals drawn from various disciplines and professional fields, and from the private sector.

• Representatives of UN specialized agencies, financial institutions and non-state actors would provide input to the Economic Council’s deliberations.

 

5c. Protecting the Social Fabric

• Establish a Social Council as a principal organ of the UN system. The Social Council should integrate UN activities relating to issues of social development, such as the protection of the environment, education, health care, population and migration; the promotion of human rights and freedom of cultural expression; and the coordination of efforts to rebuild weakened societies under stress.

• Its Members, not more than 23 in number, should be chosen on a rotating basis by the General Assembly with due regard for geographic representation and a balance between countries with larger and smaller populations.

• The Social Council should also have a standing Advisory Board composed of distinguished individuals drawn from various disciplines, professional fields, and other groups involved in social and human rights policies.

• Representatives of UN specialized agencies, regional organizations and non-state actors would provide input to the Social Council’s deliberations and implementation of policy.

• The Social Council should strengthen and rationalize the Centre for Human Rights.

 

5d. Leadership, Organization and Resources

• The Organization needs to eliminate redundancy by transforming, rationalizing or abolishing certain units. The three-Council arrangement recommended here would provide such an opportunity. The Secretary–General should convene a committee of permanent representatives and senior staff to consider reforms.

• The financial crisis of the Organization needs to be addressed by securing the committment of Member States to pay their assessments; re-evaluating the assessment formulae; and making more efficient use of existing resources. For the future, new and predictably recurring sources of finance will be needed. An expert group should examine the options for other public sources of revenue, such as designated levies on global commons.