CIAO DATE: 8/99

Trends in Sino-Japanese Relations and the Challenges Ahead for Asia

Wang Yi

May 1998

Institute for the Study of Diplomacy
Georgetown University

 

The views expressed in this paper are purely personal and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Government of the People’s Republic of China or the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy staff, associates, or board of directors.

 

Part One: Trends in Sino-Japanese Relations

In terms of geopolitics, economic interests, and national security, China and Japan place priority on their relationship. Historically, Japan is one of China’s neighbors nationalities that derived most of its cultural dynamism from China. Ancient Japanese statecraft replicated China’s institutions and statutes.

Before and during World War II, Japan inflicted severe destruction on China, killing thirty-five million Chinese. Today, in contrast, Japan has extensive, frequent, and profound contacts with China, in all areas of society. It goes without saying that Japan is the country, among the world’s major powers, that knows China best. However, Japan’s feelings toward China are extremely complex. By the same token, China’s understanding of Japan is much deeper and more varied than that of any other country.

The year 1997 marked the 25th anniversary of the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. While the bilateral relationship has registered unprecedented progress, despite the historical friction of interests, various problems and contradictions persist. Can China and Japan truly establish a long-term, stable relationship as good-neighbors and friends? Can the two countries define a 21st-century orientation for their relations in the wake of the major geopolitical and economic changes that have marked the end of the 20th century?

Both China and Japan are important countries in Asia. China is the largest developing country in terms of population and geographic size. Japan is a highly developed economic powerhouse, preponderant in the region. The rise of Japan and China after World War II has helped propel the tide of Asian history. Paralleling the course of China and Japan, one can undoubtedly feel that Asia is emerging on the international scene. But Asia also faces serious challenges. What will its status be in the coming millennium? What contributions can Asia make for the world and mankind?

Positive Elements of Sino-Japanese Relations

Due to the concerted efforts by China and Japan since the normalization of relations in 1972, a fairly firm foundation has been established for their bilateral relationship.

The political and legal basis guiding Sino-Japanese relations. The Sino-Japanese Joint Statement issued in 1972, when normalization was realized, and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, signed by China and Japan in 1978, constitute the political and legal basis governing their bilateral relations. The critical components of these documents are the following:

• Japanese rapprochement with China basedf on remorse for its history of aggression against China.

• Japanese commitment to comply with Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation, recognition of the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, adherence to a one-China policy, and refusal to develop relations of any official nature with Taiwan.

• The establishment of durable relations of peace and friendship between the two countries based on the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.

• A pledge that neither Japan nor China should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and that each country is opposed to efforts by any other country to establish such hegemony.

A tradition of extensive and permeating people-to-people friendship. Both the Chinese and Japanese people have enjoyed a long-standing history of friendship, which was the most significant driving force for normalizing relations. There have been increasingly closer people-to-people exchanges over the past twenty-five years. Take “twin cities” partnerships as an example. There are now 183 pairs of twin cities between China and Japan, accounting for 24.7 percent of such arrangements between China and other countries. Japan began its gradual Westernization after the Meiji Reforms and went all out to absorb aspects of American and European civilization after World War II. Nevertheless, the fundamental impact of Chinese civilization on Japanese culture still imperceptibly influences Japan’s views and sentiments toward China. Since the end of the Cold War, changes of attitude toward China have occurred in Japanese politics, media, and academia. But these changes did not produce an anti-China force capable of dominating Japanese policy toward the People’s Republic of China. Thus, the tradition of people-to-people friendship is still playing a positive role.

Mutually beneficial economic cooperation and trade transactions. With a bilateral trade volume exceeding $60 billion in 1996, Japan easily holds first place among China’s trading partners. Japan has also taken the lead in investing in and technology transfer to China. The two countries are also complementary in terms of economic development, science and technology, and resources, which portends great potential for and prospects of economic cooperation. The ever deepening economic cooperation and trade ties are playing an increasingly important role in consolidating bilateral relations.

A friendly foreign-policy orientation. The Chinese government has always pursued a policy of friendship toward Japan and is determined to develop a durable, good-neighbor relationship with Japan on the basis of the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between China and Japan. This policy is an important component of China’s foreign policy of good-neighborliness, and it conforms to China’s overall objective of maintaining a peaceful peripheral and global environment. Therefore, this policy is lasting and stable. The Japanese government’s policy toward China, despite some adjustments in recent years, remains friendly on the whole. After the political turmoil in Beijing during the spring and summer of 1989, Japan distanced itself from the United States and Europe by taking the lead in resuming contacts with and lifting sanctions on China. This reflects the Japanese government’s realization that maintaining a stable relationship with China serves both Japan’s strategic needs and pragmatic interests. The above-mentioned policy orientations of both countries is an essential condition for continued development of bilateral relations in the years to come.

An increasingly stable periphery. The end of the Cold War altered the map of hegemonic power rivalry. As a result, the danger of large-scale wars between major powers has diminished greatly. Economic reinvigoration of the developing countries has both narrowed the gap of economic growth and the difference of overall national strength among Asian countries, thus accelerating a regional evolution toward positive and balanced advancement. The deepening economic interactions have consolidated regional stability, awakening the historic consciousness of an Asian identity. All of these developments constitute external elements that are positive and favorable to the development of Sino-Japanese relations.

Negative Elements of Sino-Japanese Relations

Questions left unanswered by history. Modern Chinese history has witnessed numerous Japanese aggressions that humiliated China. These aggressions were the long, devastating, and extensive. While the Chinese people will never forget this chapter of their history, China has formulated a set of basic ideas and policies for addressing historical issues between China and Japan as early as the 1950s.

• China will not bog down in old feuds, but it will adopt a forward-looking attitude, provided that Japan acknowledges the historical truth of its aggression against China and draws appropriate lessons from it.

• The Japanese people are not to blame for the aggression. They, including the ordinary soldiers, were themselves victims of the war. The handful of militarists who waged and commanded the war should be held responsible for it.

China has renounced its demand for war indemnities from Japan in the interest of friendship between the two peoples. However, the Japanese government must adopt a serious approach to some questions that are not directly related to war losses, but remain important issues and still inflict material and physical harm on the Chinese people, such as deserted chemical weapons.

These policies and positions not only demonstrate the magnanimity of the Chinese people, but also provide a way for Japan to step out of the historical shadows. Unfortunately, historical questions have time and again interrupted the healthy development of Sino-Japanese relations since the resumption of diplomatic relations, particularly since the 1980s. Different as some specific circumstances may be, these interruptions have one trait in common. Each and every one was stirred up by Japanese rightists who distort history by publicly denying Japan’s aggression, thus forcing China to make an imperative response to defend the historical truth. It is also worth noting that the Japanese government has made some efforts to address historical issues. On the 50th anniversary of World War II’s end in 1995, then-Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, made a public statement on the Japanese government’s latest position on historical issues by officially using the word “aggression” for the first time. He said Japan would express deep remorse for the great damage caused to the Asian people by its colonial rule and aggression. This marked a significant step forward for Japan by taking a correct attitude toward history some fifty years after the end of World War II. China expressed a very positive appraisal of this statement. Nevertheless, one cannot fail to point out that the word “aggression” is a variant of the expression “aggressive actions” previously used by the Japanese government, and that its substance is still limited to the admission of “certain aggressive actions” during the war. Thus, the Japanese government’s definition of the nature of the war remains ambiguous.

One cannot help but ask why there remains a certain force in Japanese society, which includes some important politicians, that continues to shy away from squarely facing up to the historical truth? The answer is twofold: First, the post-World War II settlement for Japan, totally different from Germany’s,was not thorough. The United States, for the sake of its own Cold-War strategy, shifted its occupation policy from weakening Japan to actively propping it up. Some old institutions and mindsets survived as a result. Second, that Japan only admits its “aggressive actions” during the war and is reluctant to define the nature of the whole war as aggression is, in part, due to scruples about the institution of Emperor, which still enjoys a certain inviolable authority.

The collective tradition of the Japanese nation tends to make Japanese society neglect the dominant role sometimes played by individuals. Because of the subconsciousness of collective responsibility, many Japanese people are hesitant to blame the small number of militarists for taking responsibility for waging aggression. The interplay of the above elements has always affected the political culture and social customs as well as the code of behavior in Japan, resulting in a quite abnormal phenomenon that those who openly challenge history and reverse the verdict of aggression are not cast aside, while those who demand an unequivocal admission of the history of aggression are likely to be attacked.

The Taiwan question. Japan owes the Chinese nation deference over the Taiwan question, because Japan annexed, colonized, and occupied Taiwan by force for half a century since 1895. Although Japan’s public actions on the Taiwan question since 1972 have been relatively prudent in general, the Taiwan question remains one of the important dimensions of Sino-Japanese relations for two reasons.

• Japan has been, up to now, unwilling to officially state that Taiwan is part of Chinese territory. According to Article 3 of the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement, the Japanese government has recommitted itself to adhere to Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation, which demands that the terms of the Cairo Declaration must be met. The Cairo Declaration stipulates that all territories stolen from the Chinese by Japan, such as Taiwan, must be restored to China. This is a de facto recognition of Taiwan as part of China. However, Japan only stresses the first half of Article 3 of the Joint Statement: “the Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of China” that “Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China.” In fact, Japan has made no clear commitment on the ownership of Taiwan.

• The Taiwan Straits are near Japan’s maritime lines of transportation. Economic, trade, and people-to-people exchanges between Taiwan and Japan are very close. Japan believes that its practical interests in Taiwan are larger than those of other countries, even surmounting those of the United States. There are now certain forces in Japan that are, more often than not, nostalgic about and subconsciously attached to the past colonial rule, and exhibit political and security partiality for Taiwan. Even some of the Taiwan authorities harbor unrealistic illusions about Japan.

Duality of Japan’s perspective on China. After the Meiji Reforms, Japan faced a weak China. During the 20th century, it has commanded relatively greater strength over other Asian countries. In recent years, Japan has been affected by the fast and dynamic emergence of China. There has existed, for a long time, a duality in Japan’s approach to China, its gigantic neighbor. On the one hand, Japan has great esteem for Chinese culture, but on the other, it sneers at China’s backwardness. Japan wishes to see a stable China that provides a market for Japanese goods, but at the same time, it refuses to recognize a fast-growing China. Historically speaking, Japan has been more accustomed to “befriending distant states while attacking those nearby” than dealing face to face with powerful neighbors. It is justifiable to say that Japan has so far fallen short of a comprehensive and positive policy formula toward an emerging China. To the contrary, the theory of a “China threat” is quite prevalent in Japan, and the idea of geopolitics characterized by a contest of strength is still widespread in the Japanese approach toward China.

The uncertainty of Japan’s future development. In the late 1980s, Japan basically accomplished its goal of catching up with the West economically and technologically, entering a period of historic transformation. The end of the Cold War and dramatic changes in the international situation have prompted Japan to further expedite this transformation and to formulate an outline, or blueprint, for a new strategic orientation. “Whither Japan?” is an issue of concern to the world, especially to the people of Asia. Monoethnicity and an isolated geographical setting have prompted the Japanese nation to maintain a high degree of cohesion and obedience, generating a collectively convergent power and potential energy that exceed the country’s capacity to handle it constructively. 

History has proven that if this power and energy are correctly distributed, they can effectuate human miracles, such as Japan’s economic growth after World War II. If they are led astray, they can cause enormous damage to Japan’s neighbors and backfire, as was the case of Japan’s foreign aggression and expansion after the Meiji Reforms. The uncertainty of Japan’s future development is also reflected politically in the attempts by some domestic political forces to break the postwar taboo by amending the Peaceful Constitution, engaging in rearmament, and projecting military influence beyond Japanese territory. Diplomatically, Japan has been vacillating between Asia and the West, unable to define a foundation upon which its national interests rest. All of these could well develop into negative elements in Sino-Japanese relations.

The Course of China-Japan Relations

China and Japan are neighbors. History has shown that amity is in the interest of both, while confrontation is mutually detrimental. Indeed, the positive elements in Sino-Japanese relations outweigh the negative. Interdependence between China and Japan has deepened. It follows that the two countries must establish a durable, cross-century relationship as good-neighbors and friends, which not only coincides with the long-term interests of China and Japan, but also is conducive to the overall interests of Asia, as well as to peace and development of the region and the world as a whole. To achieve this, it is imperative for both countries to continue to pursue good-neighborly and friendly policies and to maintain the cooperative strand in them. Meanwhile, the two countries should also make continuous efforts to expand the positive elements while reducing the negative. Accrodingly, the following issues must be contemplated in earnest and treated properly.

To adopt a correct approach to and perspective on each other. China is a force for peace and development, posing no threat to other countries, including Japan. Historically, China’s experience can be summed up as “do not do unto others what you would not have them do unto you.” Diplomatically, China’s basic foreign policy is one of peace. In reality, China is a developing country with a long way to go in its modernization drive. Japan should correctly understand these realities and adhere to its basic policy of friendship toward China. Japan aspires to a more prominent regional and international role, to which China takes an understanding and supportive approach. China hopes that Japan will fully use its economic and technological advantage and does not wish to obstruct Japan from playing a greater political role. Nonetheless, China does not want to see the Japanese military reach abroad. The role of the Japanese military is first and foremost a domestic concern for Japan because it involves such complicated components as Japan’s constitutional principles and defense policy. For historical reasons, Japan’s Asian neighbors are also concerned about this issue. It is in Japan’s own interest to exercise prudence continuously.

Both China and Japan are rising powers. The rise of both, from the global point of view, represents a rejuvenation of Asia. However, in a regional context, the rise of China differs sharply from that of Japan in both time and pace, resulting in latent contradictions and friction between them. It therefore requires the two countries to explore and expand their common objectives and shared interests. Because the emergence of China has come later than Japan’s, yet faster in pace, it is all the more necessary that Japan hasten to adapt to, and take a correct approach toward, China’s emergence.

To adopt a correct attitude and approach toward history. Historical issues, though not core issues that directly affect bilateral ties, deserve to be handled seriously because they encompass broad aspects and bear great sensitivity. History may be fading, but it will not be forgotten. Past misdeeds may be forgiven, but they cannot be undone. On historical issues, China will maintain its constructive, forward-looking attitude. In the meantime, Japan needs to acknowledge that its war against China--waged by militarists--was aggressive in nature, and that the war and its purpose were wrong. There should be no beating around the bush by clinging to the phrase “aggressive actions.” This is not meant to make Japan defame itself. In the long span of history, all nations, including the Chinese nation, are capable of making mistakes. Only those nations that face up to and acknowledge their mistakes can win respect and trust from others.

Japan should also try to reach a domestic consensus among people of all circles to curb and weaken the forces that deny the fact of past aggression and distort historical truth. China does not mean to urge the Japanese people to renounce their freedom of speech. It is China’s hope that in the future there will be more Japanese people and louder voices denouncing the small number of people who challenge history. The countercurrent of distorting history should be smothered by the Japanese people through the weight of their public opinion, rather than through foreign protests. The above-mentioned efforts conform, first of all, to Japan’s long-term interests and also benefit Japan’s relations with China and other neighboring countries.

To acknowledge and properly handle the Taiwan question. Taiwan is part of China. This is not only a historical fact, but also a common understanding of the international community. The Sino-Japanese Joint Statement stipulates that Japan cannot have official contacts of any form with Taiwan, although China holds no objections to trade, economic, and cultural exchanges between Japan and Taiwan. China will maintain this principled, yet flexible, policy, while Japan is obliged to observe its commitment. It should be made clear that Japan does not have any political responsibility, nor does it bear any legal obligation for Taiwan, and thus it should refrain from intervention in Taiwan. China’s main concern over the revised Japan-U.S. Guidelines for Defense Cooperation is that they could make it possible for Japan to become engaged militarily in Taiwan’s affairs. This tendency, with its great potential for danger, is by no means in Japan’s interest. Therefore, Japan should move cautiously.

To correctly approach and handle existing problems between China and Japan. In recent years, there has been friction between the two countries over preexisting, or pending, issues. Such issues as the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu Islands should be dealt with in a sober-minded manner in accordance with the understanding reached by the leaders of the two countries. As for the new issues, such as maritime delineation, the two sides should take a farsighted view and resolve them through consultations in keeping with the principle of fairness and other principles of international law. In addition, sensitive issues, such as China’s nuclear tests and the reaffirmation of the Japan-U.S. alliance, call for timely contacts and a deep exchange of views.

 

Part Two: The Challenges Ahead for Asia

The differences between China and Japan, and the complexity of their relations, reflect a basic characteristic of Asia, diversity. Unlike other regions, Asia is greatly diversified in terms of country size, type of political system, level of economic development, and cultural tradition. Even on security, Asian countries differ in their security environment and objectives. However, these commonalities among Asian countries should not escape notice.

• The majority of countries in Asia are developing ones.

• Most of these concentrate on economic development and growth of national strength, with domestic and foreign policies serving both purposes.

• Most attach great importance to domestic stability and consider it an essential precondition for national prosperity.

• All Asian countries share the same oriental roots, which transcend the different cultures of each country, respect the collective interests of society, and emphasize harmony and coordination.

These commonalities do not contradict the diversity that is Asia. Indeed, they are derived from Asia’s diversity and even accommodate it. Together, they respect and live with diversity in an accumulative manner and are creating an awareness of “an Asian identity,” which goes side by side with the rise of Asia and advances its development. It is justifiable to say that the road of development is a bumpy one and Asia faces severe challenges ahead.

Political Challenges

The political systems of Asian countries vary. For historical reasons, the political systems of many Asian countries are quite young and thus are relatively unstable. In recent years, Asian countries have worked for political restructuring. Although the different restructurings display different priorities, all of them are intended to complete three major transitions: a transition of leadership, a transition from “rule by men” to “rule by law,” and a reformation and establishment of a political structure suited to their specific conditions. The political challenge facing Asian countries is how to accomplish this complicated process while maintaining political and social stability.

Japan for example, has not yet finished its leadership transition. Its attempt to imitate the American bipartisan system has suffered setbacks. In Southeast Asia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia are also faced with leadership transitions. In South Asia, India’s case gives added testimony that it is impossible to maintain political and social stability if there is discontinuity between the political system and economic development, which could also hinder national development. It is gratifying to note that some Asian countries, fully aware of the challenges ahead and the importance of stability for reforms, have carried out their reforms in a careful yet positive way. Many countries have made significant progress while some have basically fulfilled their fixed goals. China has realized a smooth transition of leadership and has found a way of building socialism with Chinese characteristics. China will further its efforts to advance its political reforms and to strengthen democracy and the legal system.

Economic Challenges

Asian countries, particularly East Asian countries, have enjoyed rapid economic growth in recent years; Asia has become nothing less than the new locus of growth in the world economy. Asia’s economic development has its own unique feature, which has been praised as the “East Asian Model.” However, in 1997, the momentum of the East Asian economy has undergone a sharp slowdown due to the widespread financial crisis. South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia are the most seriously hit, reduced to surrendering their economic sovereignty to accept an overhaul by the IMF. Since the difficulties caused by the financial crisis persist, the international community is reevaluating East Asia’s economic prospects: Has the fast-growing period for the East Asian economy come to an end? Is the “East Asian model” finished? What are the prospects for the East Asian, as well as the Asian, economy?

Undoubtedly, some problems were accumulated during the course of rapid growth, such as an irrational economic structure, an imperfect financial system, and a backward infrastructure. These are common problems that developing countries will encounter as they enter a fast-growing period of industrialization. These problems should be solved gradually by the process of sustainable economic development. Unfortunately, due to mistakes in economic policies of some countries, coupled with massive attacks by international “hot” money, these problems suddenly became acute and quickly erupted into a series of national economic crises. This crisis is contingent on the one hand and inevitable on the other. However, it does not imply that Asian economic dynamism is exhausted or that the East Asian growth model has come to an end. The basic conditions and positive elements that have boosted the Asian economy still exist.

• The East Asian model is characterized by a high level of education, a high savings rate, high capital accumulation, and it emphasizes resource allocation as well as the oriental traditions of diligence and frugality. As is borne out by history, these are indispensable factors enabling developing countries, against the background of the current international economic order, to revitalize their own economies and to catch up with developed nations.

• According to the theory of the economic development cycle, an economy cannot always maintain a high growth rate, and at a certain stage of development, readjustment is necessary. The current economic difficulty facing East Asia is, in essence, a kind of natural phase of the development cycle.

• Market demand is the main driving force for economic growth. The market potential of East Asia has yet to be tapped. This is the greatest advantage for continued growth of the Asian economy.

To sum up, the East Asian economy will experience a period of difficulty. Its growth model will have to undergo necessary adjustments in keeping with the expanding economic capacity and increasing level of development. As long as Asian countries remain confident and hold to the various methods that have already been proven effective in deepening their economic restructuring, and as long as they do not relinquish their own characteristics and efforts while receiving foreign assistance, an Asian economic renaissance will not be far away.

Security Challenges

Asia has formed neither a perception of nor a mechanism for regional security. During the Cold War, security in Asia, to a large extent, was confined to the global pattern of U.S.-Soviet rivalry for hegemony and to the interactions of the triangular relationship among China, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War made more salient the diversified character of Asia that gives rise to divergent security interests and objectives of each country. The existing disputes over territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, together with the unbalanced national economic development, makes it more difficult for Asian states to build confidence and trust. It merits mentioning that the ASEAN-initiated forum on regional security issues, namely, the ASEAN Regional Forum engages all major regional powers. During the past four years, ARF has gradually had, with respect for sovereignty, a series of useful experiences, such as reaching a consensus through consultations, starting cooperation, and proceeding in an incremental manner, while maintaining its focus on confidence-building.

However, bilateral alliances have also been strengthened in this region, most notably among them is the reaffirmed Japan-U.S. military alliance. Some hot spots such as the Korean Peninsula and Afghanistan still lurk in the region. It should be pointed out that the rationale of a bilateral military alliance is the Cold War mentality that encourages security through military build-up and military deterrence. This by no means helps maintain lasting peace nor does it coincide with the theme of peace and development in today’s world.

An ancient continent that has weathered hardships and tribulations, Asia has won political and economic independence, but in a security dimension, Asia is still immature. Challenges ahead include nurturing new security approaches and constructing a regional security mechanism suited to Asia’s characteristics.

As a large country, China is fully aware of its responsibilities for safeguarding regional security. While adhering to its independent foreign policy of peace, China has already put forward its three basic objectives on regional security:

• China’s own stability and prosperity.
• A long-term and peaceful regional environment.
• Dialogues and cooperation with all countries on the basis of mutual respect and equality.

China has also been active in exploring new security approaches and has initiated such important ideas as enhancing confidence through dialogues, achieving security through cooperation, respecting sovereignty, and settling disputes by peaceful means. This manifests China’s sincerity in and active approach toward regional security.

In Asia, the major problem of security is a lack of mutual confidence among countries in the region. The theoretical foundation of new security approaches does not lie in the traditional notion of balance of power, but rather, in the ultimate building of mutual confidence. The ARF’s mission is to enhance mutual confidence among its participants to improve the overall security environment of the region and to create a sound and relaxed atmosphere for peaceful settlement of disputes between countries. In the foreseeable future, the bilateral military arrangements and multilateral security processes will proceed side-by-side. However, with suspicions between Asian countries gradually reduced and mutual confidence further enhanced, a regional security framework will eventually take shape. This framework should be based on mutual respect for sovereignty and equal consultation. It should be open and flexible, and not ostracize the extra-regional powers’ constructive role in maintaining security in Asia as equal participants. Although it will take time for this prospect to materialize, once it is fulfilled, Asia will enter into a fruitful maturity on security, which will further strengthen its comprehensive capacity and enable it to make greater contributions to the cause of peace and development of mankind.