Terrorism is not a synonym for political violence in general. It is a special kind of violence designed to create a climate of fear among a wider target group than the immediate victims, usually for political ends. ₁ There is an impressive weight of historical evidence showing that terrorism alone has rarely sufficed to achieve long-term political goals ₂ . It has proved highly effective as an auxiliary weapon in political conflict in achieving more limited tactical aims, and this helps to explain its continuing popularity as a method of struggle in a host of causes ₃ .

The characteristic objectives of terrorists include: massive and immediate publicity as a result of an outrage or a series of atrocities; to inspire followers and sympathizers to further acts of terrorism or insurrection; to provoke the authorities into a repressive over-reaction which the terrorists can then exploit to their political advantage ₄ ; as a means of extortion to force the authorities into making concessions, such as the release of imprisoned terrorists or the payment of ransoms; to sow inter-communal hatred and conflict; to destroy public confidence in government and security agencies; and to coerce communities and activists into obeying the terrorist leadership. In short, terrorism has proven a low-cost, low-risk, potentially high-yield method of struggle for all kinds of groups and regimes. There is no sign that the ending of the Cold War has eradicated the underlying ethnic, religio-political, ideological and strategic causes of conflict which spawn terrorism ₅ .

On the other hand, twentieth century history also shows `terrorism is a faulty weapon that often misfires ₆ . Wanton murder and destruction may have the effects of uniting and hardening a community against the terrorists, of triggering a violent backlash by rival groups or of stinging the authorities into more effective security measures in the ensuing period of public revulsion. It is also clear that liberal democracies have been extraordinarily resilient in withstanding terrorist attempts to coerce them into major changes of policy or surrender in the face of the terrorists' demands. ₇ In contrast to dictatorships and colonialist regimes, liberal democracies have the key advantage that they enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of the overwhelming majority of the population and can depend on their support against the terrorists ₈ .

The underlying resilience of liberal democracies should not, however, blind us to the fact that it is relatively easy for terrorists to exploit liberal democratic freedoms to organize and implement attacks and more sustained campaigns of violence which may well involve massive bombing attacks deliberately aimed at causing hundreds of deaths and injuries among the civilian population. The terrorist bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie in Scotland in December 1988, killing all 259 passengers and crew and 11 people on the ground, accounted for over 40 per cent of all deaths caused by international terrorism in that single year ₉ . Thirty people were killed and 252 injured in the Hizbullah bomb attack on the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in March 1992. Six Americans were killed and over 1,000 injured in the bombing of the World Trade Centre in February 1993, and 96 were killed and 200 injured in the bombing of the Jewish community's building in Buenos Aires in July 1994. The attacks on the Jewish community in Buenos Aires and London in July 1994 show not only that terrorist crimes endanger life and limb and are often aimed at intimidating particular religious or ethnic minorities; they also graphically demonstrate how terrorist groups and their state sponsors use terrorism as an international weapon, in this case to derail or at least severely disrupt the peace process in the Middle East.

It is clear, then, that the international and national problems of response to terrorists threats are interwoven. To be effective, action against terrorists must be synchronised to both levels. By tolerating the terrorists' capacity to provoke and incite further conflict the international community is playing with fire. And we have seen that terrorists confront liberal democracies internally with a ruthless challenge against the safety of their citizens, the security of the state, and the rule of law. Liberal democratic governments have to decide how to react to terrorist violence, and they have to carry a majority of their citizens with them behind their policies.

Counter-terrorism is not an insignificant or purely marginal responsibility which can safely be left entirely to secret intelligence and police agencies. By its very nature it raises important issues of democratic accountability, legal powers, and civil liberties. Clumsy and heavy-handed responses can endanger human rights and weaken democracy and the rule of law. Weakness and under-reaction can invite worse violence by signalling to terrorists that they can commit their crimes with relative all deaths caused by international terrimpunity and can gravely damage public confidence in the authorities and their ability and will to uphold the law. It would be foolish to pretend that it is easy for liberal democratic states to get this balance right. It is also important to bear in mind that, in the post-Cold War world, the national policies of major democratic states, especially the United States and the key European Union (EU) member states, have the predominant influence on the shaping of the international order. If they get things badly wrong, this has major repercussions on the global strategic environment.

The Current Threat in Britain and Western Europe

The United Kingdom has experienced the most protracted and lethal terrorist campaign in Western Europe: the bombing campaign by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in the twenty-seven years since 1970. This campaign, mainly centred in Northern Ireland but frequently spilling over into attacks on the British mainland, and occasionally against British targets on the continent of Europe, has been more than three times as lethal as the terrorist campaign conducted against Spain by ETA-M-Euskadi ta Askatasuna (military faction), the armed wing of the Basque separatist movement, and has resulted in hundreds of deaths, thousands of injuries and hundreds of millions of pounds of damage to property ₁₀ . It has also provoked a retaliatory terror campaign by Loyalist extremist groups, the UVF and UFF, though these groups declared a cease-fire in October 1994, and although extremely tenuous this has not yet been formally renounced.

The IRA declared a cease-fire in September 1994, but resumed violence in February 1996. It is now clear that the hardline IRA leadership is determined to keep to the bomb and the gun, the mortar and the land mine, their habitual weapons, and that the talk by Sinn Fein, the IRA's political wing, of their 'peace strategy' was intended as a political ploy. It should be clearly understood that even if the IRA did declare a new cease-fire and thus gain Sinn Fein entry to inter-party talks, the gulf between the IRA's demands and the views of the Unionist parties representing the majority of the population in Northern Ireland is vast. Hence it would be premature, indeed reckless, for the British government and the intelligence and police agencies to scale down their counter-terrorism efforts when a lasting peace still appears so elusive. However, so far as civil aviation is concerned, the IRA and ETA have not viewed this as a major target. The IRA did mount a mortar attack on Heathrow Airport in 1994, and ETA bombed a tourist airport in Spain in 1996, but these attacks were a departure from their normal practice.

The other major indigenous terrorist threats in Western Europe are also separatist/ nationalist in political motivation: ETA-M, which is still capable of committing outrages in the Basque region and against Spanish targets in Madrid despite the success of the Spanish security authorities, in close co-operation with the French, in capturing and convicting ETA leaders and cell members; and the FLNC and other Corsican terrorist groups waging a violent campaign against the French authorities. However, although the ETA campaign has occasionally spilled over the border into France, and both the Basque and Corsican terrorists have sometimes used foreign countries for safe havens and arms procurement, their violence has been primarily concentrated in their own regions, and they have not chosen to wage international campaigns.

There has been a sharp decline in the activities of extreme left-wing indigenous terrorist groups since the 1980s ₁₁ . Action Directe (AD) in France and the Fighting Communist Cells (CCC) in Belgium were effectively eradicated by successful police action. The Red Brigades (BR) in Italy were defeated in the early 1980s by a combination of effective police and judicial measures, such as the Pentiti legislation, and their own internal splits and demoralization ₁₂ . The Red Army Faction (RAF) in Germany is a mere shadow of the group that plagued the federal republic in the 1970s. Greece is the only EU country in which left-wing terrorist activity is still a problem for the authorities ₁₃ .

On the other hand, there has been a very worrying escalation of terrorism and political violence by ultra-right groups in Germany and elsewhere. In Europe during the past few years, the problem of the resurgence of extreme-right violence has become a far more serious threat than ideologically motivated violence from the extreme left. For example, in Germany, the widespread disillusion with mainstream political parties, the economic strains of re-unification, high levels of unemployment and the arrival of hundreds of thousands of newcomers has created a climate in which violent right-wing extremism thrives. In 1992, there were over 2,000 attacks by extreme right groups, causing 17 deaths and over 2,000 injuries. The German interior ministry estimates that there are some 75 extreme-right groups active in Germany with 65,000 activists, roughly 10 per cent of whom have a record of violence. Between 1991 and 1993, the extreme-right groups killed thirty people. In September 1993, Chancellor Kohl rather belatedly condemned the rise of these groups and their violent actions, and said they were as much of a threat to democratic society as extreme left-wing terror had been in the 1970s and early 1980s. The neo-Nazi groups easily circumvented the ban on groups which threaten the constitutional order, under Article 9 of the German constitution. However, a number of extreme groups have now been proscribed and the authorities are making greater efforts to prevent them from mounting violent attacks. Nevertheless, more arson attacks causing the deaths of immigrant families cannot be ruled out.

Extreme right-wing violence from skinhead and racist thugs has also been on the increase in other parts of Central, Eastern and Western Europe, from Russia in the East to Britain in the West. In Russia, the extreme-right Liberal Democratic Party of Vladimir Zhirinovsky and similar groupings have the potential to generate violence on the streets. While pin-stripe neo-fascist parties have done surprisingly well in elections in Italy, Austria and several other continental countries, it is not safe to assess the danger from the extreme right purely in electoral terms. In Britain, by contrast, where the electoral performance of the extreme right has been abysmal, the incidence of racist attacks has grown dramatically: racist incidents recorded by the police over the past five years have doubled. Over the next few years, violent attacks motivated by extreme right-wing ideology may well increase in many countries where conditions are conducive. However, extreme right-wing terrorism is likely to remain indigenous, and shows no signs of developing a significant international dimension.

Single-issue group extremists are another growing source of terrorist violence. Recent escalations in attacks against medical staff, clinics and hospitals by anti-abortion campaigners in the US, and against research scientists, laboratories and commercial premises by animal rights campaigners in the UK, are indications of the kinds of motivation involved. Although single-issue group extremists aim to change specific policies or practices rather than the whole socio-political system, their potential for endangering life and social and economic well-being should not be underestimated. For example, they have shown considerable sophistication in tactics, such as the use of product contamination and computer sabotage. Such terrorism shows every sign of increasing in the heavily urbanized pluralist democracies, with their complex and vulnerable systems of communications, transportation and electronic funding transfers.

International terrorism

The area of conflict which has generated the most significant and ruthless spill-over of terrorist violence since 1968 is of course the Middle East. If one defines the Middle East as including Algeria and Turkey, both of which have spawned conflicts involving considerable terrorist violence, including some international spill-over, this region remains the most dangerous source of terrorist challenges to the wider international community, accounting for over 21 per cent of all international terrorist incidents worldwide in 1992 and over 23 per cent in 1993. This may seem surprising in view of the astonishing breakthrough in negotiations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the agreement on the Declaration of Principles in September 1993, the agreement between Israel and Jordan, and the continuing efforts by Israel and Syria, encouraged by the US, to resolve the prolonged dispute over the Golan Heights.

There are four basic motivations for terrorism related to the Middle East which spills over into countries outside the Middle East: First, bitter opposition by rejectionist Palestinian groups to the agreement between PLO Chairman Yassir Arafat and the Israeli government. These groups see Arafat as a traitor who has betrayed the cause of Palestinian self-determination. Moreover, the dominant hardline opposition to Arafat and Israel now comes not from the old secular Marxist revolutionary groups like George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), but from the Islamic fundamentalist movements, Hamas and Islamic, Jihad driven by religious fanaticism, in addition to the virulent opposition to Israel espoused by the secular revolutionary groups. The Palestinian Islamist groups are rapidly winning mass support in the occupied territories at Arafat's expense. All the indications are that they are likely to intensify their use of terrorism against Israeli targets within the territories and within Israel's own borders, as the peace process moves forward, in a desperate effort to derail it. Most of this terrorism is likely to be mounted in Israel and the West Bank.

However, the recent bombing in Buenos Aires against a Jewish community target, involving a massive loss of life, provides tragic evidence that the Islamic fundamentalist rejectionists, their main state sponsor Iran and their militant sympathizers abroad are willing and able to wage international terrorism in an effort to destroy the peace process. This rejectionist international terrorism remains a major threat to Israeli and Jewish targets, especially in Western countries, where there is a profusion of potential targets and where the terrorist groups have set up cells and an infrastructure of support.

Second, in almost every Muslim country, there are groups of extreme Islamic fundamentalists, inspired and actively encouraged by the Islamic revolutionary regime in Iran, ready to wage Jihad (holy war) against pro-Western, Arab regimes with the aim of setting up Islamic republics in their place. As the examples of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria and the Islamic Group in Egypt demonstrate, these groups are not confined to Shia populations. The primary targets of the groups' campaigns are the incumbent regimes and their military, police and government officials, as well as the intellectuals who are identified with the regime. As in the case of ethnic conflicts, terrorism is generally only one weapon in a wider struggle: others include propaganda, fighting elections (where this is permitted by the regime), and the development of a mass base of support by means of establishing a wide range of welfare, educational and cultural agencies under the fundamentalist movements' control. The examples mentioned here are Algeria and Egypt, but it should not be thought that these militant Islamic threats are confined to these areas. They also apply to Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states.

Third, the Islamic fundamentalists' challenge is not solely directed at incumbent regimes in the Muslim world: frequently they widen their range of targets to include Westerners within their country. For example, the GIA has deliberately targeted French citizens in Algeria since September 1993, because they allege that France is providing covert support and assistance to the Algerian military regime and is historically responsible for the situation there. But, as the GIA's hijack of the Air France Airbus A300 on 24 December 1994 demonstrates, the Islamist terror groups are also prepared to take their terrorist war to France itself. There is little doubt that the terrorists fully intended to crash the Airbus over Paris. The highly effective rescue of the hostages by the French authorities at Marseilles therefore not only saved the lives of the passengers and crew, but very probably at least several hundreds more who would have been killed if the terrorists had succeeded in launching their `flying bomb' at Paris.

France is, of course, not the only foreign target of such groups. All these groups are bitterly anti-American and hostile to all Western countries. The Muslim fundamentalists in Algeria have made threats against other Western states. In the wake of the Air France hijacking, they sent a letter to several Western governments, written in German and posted in France, demanding that all contact with Algeria should be broken by and embassies should be closed. They threatened: `We cannot guarantee the lives of foreign nationals after the expiry of this ultimatum. . . After that, all unbelievers, will be killed in cold blood.' In view of the fact that over seventy foreigners have been killed in Algeria since 1993, this threat has to be taken seriously.

There is a further highly dangerous aspect to the threat of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism against Western targets. The findings of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the judiciary in the US indicate that the group responsible for blowing up the World Trade Centre building in New York in February 1993 was operating as a type of independent or freelance group of Islamic fundamentalists, allegedly inspired and encouraged by their spiritual mentor, Sheikh Omar Abdal-Rahman, but not directly controlled by a state sponsor or other known major terrorist player. `Amateur' or `freelance' groups of this type pose a particularly difficult problem for the intelligence and police agencies as they have no known political identity, no identifiable organizational and communications infrastructure and no previous track record. Moreover, as they are able to recruit fanatical members from the expatriate community, including those who have lived and worked in the host country sometime, the possibility exists of many such groups emerging spontaneously in Western countries with substantial Muslim minority populations, such as the US, Canada, France, Britain, Germany and Australia.

Finally, the Middle East is also the major region of state sponsors and supporters of terrorism: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan and Libya. The ending of the Cold War did not bring an end to regimes that sponsor terrorism, but it dramatically reduced the number of states involved. It is also the case that the removal of Soviet superpower support from a number of state sponsors (for example, Syria and Iraq), together with the combined intelligence and security efforts of the US-led coalition against Saddam Hussein in Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm in 1990-91, showed the grave limitations of state-sponsored terrorism as an instrument of policy. Saddam's much vaunted campaign of `holy terror' proved to be a dismal failure.

Moreover, economic sanctions by the US and its allies against sponsor states are considerably more effective when there is no rival superpower bloc to go to for assistance. The position of the US as sole remaining superpower and the desire of President Assad of Syria to improve relations with the US in order to gain better diplomatic leverage in the Middle East peace process have undoubtedly helped to mute Syria's terrorist efforts for the time being. But Damascus has not discarded this weapon: it is still giving safe haven to a variety of groups which it might be useful to unleash at some future time.

Meanwhile Iran remains by far the most important state sponsor. As mentioned above, it is the leading sponsor of Islamist and Palestinian rejectionist groups, and provides them with weapons, funds, training and intelligence. Nor is its sponsorship activity confined to the Middle East and Western Europe. It has been extremely active in Pakistan and Turkey, for example, and has been linked to the car bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires on 17 March 1992. In addition to using terrorism as a weapon to back Islamic fundamentalism and Palestinian rejectionism, Iran has targeted Iranian dissidents abroad over a considerable period. Iranian operations have been linked to the murders of dissidents in France, Germany and Switzerland.

The Iranian regime also continues to uphold the Fatwa , issued by Ayatollah Khomeini in February 1989, which condemns the British writer Salman Rushdie to death for his alleged blasphemy against Islam in his book The Satanic Verses . A government-backed Iranian foundation has offered a reward of $2 million for the killing of Rushdie. Meanwhile attacks on publishers, translators and bookshops involved in disseminating Rushdie's works continue, and it would be foolish to assume that any country is immune from attempts to carry out such threats.

Likely Targets

On the basis of a statistical analysis of trends in targeting by international terrorist groups over recent years, it is not difficult to assess the most likely targets in coming years. Over half the attacks on property or facilities are likely to involve business or industrial premises, roughly 10 per cent are likely to involve diplomatic premises and about half this number will involve other government premises and military facilities. Owing to the fact that some terrorism is primarily directed at buildings rather than personnel and the fact that military, governmental and diplomatic facilities have been 'target hardened', the vulnerability of personnel in each category does not coincide with the vulnerability of facilities. The ,most vulnerable individuals are usually civilian members of the public, such as shoppers or tourists, who do not have the benefit of any security protection whatsoever. Military, governmental and diplomatic personnel are roughly equal in vulnerability to being terrorist targets but, in combination, these only account for a third of total casualties of international terrorism in any one year.

It is important not to rely too heavily on terrorism incident statistics. These do not bring out the qualitative difference in the effect of specific terrorist attacks. For example, in the international terrorism figures for 1993, the single event of the World Trade Centre bombing accorded North America the highest number of victims wounded by international terrorist activity in any region of the world. Yet this does not accurately reflect the characteristic distribution of terrorist vicitimization internationally.

In view of the fact that terrorist groups have shown an increasing tendency to be more lethal over recent years, it is wise to plan for a continuing trend towards massive car and truck bombings in crowded city areas and 'spectacular' terrorist attacks for example, on civil aviation, airport facilities or military or diplomatic facilities designed to capture maximum attention from the mass media and to cause maximum shock and outrage and to effect some demands sought by the terrorists.

Countering International Terrorism: The Democratic Response

In countering international terrorism, the democratic state confronts an inescapable dilemma. It has to deal effectively with the terrorist threat to citizens and to vulnerable potential targets, such as civil aviation, diplomatic and commercial premises, without at the same time destroying basic civil rights, the democratic process and the rule of law. On the one hand, the democratic government and its agencies of law enforcement must avoid the heavy handed over-reaction which many terrorist groups deliberately seek to provoke: such a response would only help to alienate the public from the government and could ultimately destroy democracy more swiftly and completely than any small terrorist group ever could. On the other hand, if government, judiciary and police prove incapable of upholding the law and protecting life and property, their whole credibility and authority will be undermined.

If this balance is to be maintained, the liberal state should seek at all times to combat terrorism using its criminal justice and law-enforcement mechanisms. In his January 1995 State of the Union message, US President Bill Clifton showed that he fully recognised this aspect of international co-operation against terrorism when he announced that he had signed an executive order that will block the assets in the United States of terrorist organisations that threaten to disrupt the Middle East peace process and prohibit financial transactions with these groups. He called upon America's allies and all peace-loving nations to join in the global effort to combat terrorism. However, it is clearly the case that some terrorist groups attain a level of fire-power outstripping the capabilities even of elite squads of armed police. It has been proven time and again that in certain circumstances of high emergency, such as the hijacking to Entebbe in 1976 and the Iranian embassy siege of 1980, it may be essential to deploy a highly-trained military rescue commando force to save hostages. Military, naval or air forces may be invaluable in interdicting a major terrorist assault, as has been seen in the case of Israel's measures against terrorist groups attacking its borders from land and sea. But in the more normal conditions enjoyed by the democratic states in Western Europe, the occasions when military deployment to tackle international terrorists is required will be very rare.

There are a number of dangers involved in deploying the army in a major internal terrorist emergency role which need to be constantly borne in mind. First, an unnecessarily high military profile may serve to escalate the level of violence by polarizing pro-and anti-government elements in the community. Second, there is a constant risk that a repressive over-reaction or a minor error of judgement by the military may trigger further civil violence. Internal security duties inevitably impose considerable strains on the soldiers who are made well aware of the hostility of certain sections of the community towards them. Third, anti-terrorist and internal security duties absorb considerable manpower and involve diverting highly-trained military technicians from their primary North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and external defence roles. Fourth, there is a risk that the civil power may become over-dependent upon the army's presence and there may be a consequent lack of urgency in preparing the civil police for gradually reassuming the internal security responsibility. Finally, in the event of an international terrorist attack, a military operation to punish a state sponsor or to strike at alleged terrorist bases may trigger an international conflict worse than the act of terrorism one is seeking to oppose.

Britain is fortunate in having an army steeped in the democratic ethos. It has demonstrated skill, courage and patience in carrying out a number of difficult counterinsurgency tasks around the world since 1945. Its loyalty in carrying out its instructions from the civil government has never been put in question and it has performed its internal security role in Northern Ireland with humanity, restraint and effectiveness. It would be naive to assume that all liberal democracies are as fortunate. Many armies, particularly conscript armies, have been notoriously infiltrated and subverted by extremist organizations of left and right. Both the Italian and Spanish armies have had to weed out leftwing and right-wing activists who were undermining military discipline. The recent history of Greece affords a vivid demonstration of the consequences of widespread disaffection and political subversion within the armed forces. It is a warning that no liberal democracy can afford to ignore, for loyal and disciplined armed forces are the last line of defence for democracies in crisis.

In the UK and most EU countries, we have the great advantage of considerable professional expertise in combating terrorist crime within the major police forces. London's Metropolitan Police has a world-wide reputation in this field, represented in its Anti-Terrorist Squad, Special Branch, the various special protection groups, its forensic experts and its command structure. However, problems can and do arise as a result of the UK's rather fragmented structure of policing. To cite an example from a current area of security debate: the British role in the security of the Channel Tunnel is shared by the transport ministry, the British Transport Police, the Metropolitan Police (Special Branch), Eurotunnel staff and Customs officials. However, these potential difficulties of police structure co-ordination pale into insignificance compared to the importance of enhancing the counter-terrorism intelligence effort.

High quality intelligence is the heart of the pro-active counter-terrorism strategy. It has been used with notable success against many terrorist groups. By gaining advanced warning of terrorists' planned operations, their weaponry, personnel, financial assets and fundraising, tactics, communications systems and so on, it becomes feasible to pre-empt terrorist attacks, and ultimately to crack open the terrorist cell structure and bring its members to trial. Impressive examples of this pro-active intelligence-led counter-terrorism strategy are frequently ignored or forgotten by the public, but this should not deceive us into underestimating their value. At the international level, the most impressive example was the brilliant intelligence co-operation among the Allies to thwart Saddam Hussein's much-vaunted campaign of `holy terror' during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

Sadly, such high levels of international co-operation against terrorism are hard to find. Just as the lack of intelligence sharing between uniformed and non-uniformed security agencies often damages national counter-terrorism responses, so international mistrust and reluctance to share information often vitiates an effective international response. The most useful enhancements of policy to combat terrorism at the international level need to be made in intelligence gathering, by every means available, intelligence sharing, intelligence analysis and threat assessment. This is my key recommendation, and it is the author's hope that this paper might stimulate a fuller debate on refining a better pro-active strategy for America and all G7 countries.

Prophylaxis, Preventive Diplomacy and Efforts towards Conflict Resolutions

So far this paper has concentrated on the security policies that have a proven track record in reducing, or in some cases eradicating, terrorist campaigns against liberal states. An effective pro-active counter-terrorism policy based on a high-quality intelligence system and effective co-ordination and professionalism, determination and courage among the police and judiciary may be enough to eradicate ideological groupuscules such as the CCC in Belgium, the AD in France and the BR in Italy. But they are unlikely to be sufficient to quell a terrorist movement with a genuine base of mass support among an ethnic or ethno-religious constituency. No truly liberal democratic government can afford to ignore the demands and aspirations of a genuinely popular movement, even if that movement only has the full support of a sizeable minority of the population. The democratic authorities need to defeat the terrorist leadership at the political level by showing that the government is capable of responding imaginatively to the legitimate demands and aspirations of the very social groups the terrorists seek to mobilize.

An efficient democratic government will attempt to remain sensitive to the needs of all sectors of society and take effective action to remedy widely perceived injustices before they fester into full-blown rebellion. It is a common mistake to assume that such injustices are always perceived in purely materialistic terms, such as access to jobs, housing and so forth. Social scientific research suggests that perceived deprivation of civil and political rights, such as downgrading the status of a language, is far more of a danger to stability than purely material deprivation.

Timely and effective political, social and economic reform measures should be introduced because of their inherent worth and the degree of popular support they enjoy. At the same time, such measures can have the inestimable advantage of serving as prophylactics against violence, insurrection and terrorism.

In cases of long-standing and potentially bitter and violent ethnic conflicts within liberal democratic states, imaginative policies designed to give fuller recognition and rights to a minority population can be the most effective way of preventing or greatly diminishing polarization and armed conflict. An outstanding example of this method of heading off a potentially bitter and prolonged civil war was the Italian government's 1972 statute granting a considerable degree of autonomy to the German-speaking province of South Tyrol, where terrorist violence was an increasing danger at that time. There is wide agreement that Italy's policy on the South Tyrol issue was pretty effective.

Similarly, the 1978 Statute of Autonomy granted to the Basque region by the Madrid government, appears to have been very successful, and has led to the increasing isolation of ETA-M, which has so far refused to abandon its demand for a totally independent Marxist Basque state, or to cease waging terrorism to achieve it. The Statute of Autonomy has not been sufficient to eradicate ETA violence, but it has helped to marginalize it and it has captured the allegiance of the overwhelming majority of Basques. The French have tried a similar approach in their attempts to resolve the Corsican conflict, but so far with little success.

However, attempts to resolve bitter international conflicts which have spawned international terrorism are fraught with even more difficulties and dangers. The current efforts by the Israeli government and the moderates in the Palestinian movement to counteract rejectionist terrorism deserve the widest possible support from liberal democratic countries throughout the world. There is no doubt that the recent barbaric terrorist bomb attacks by Hamas and Islamic Jihad were aimed at derailing the peace process Tragically the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, the Hamas suicide bombings, and the election of the Netanyahu government have brought the peace process into crisis, and there is now a grave danger of a fresh war in the Middle East, unless Herculean efforts are made to get it back on track.

Realistically, in the light of the ideologies and track-records of the terrorist groups involved and the despotic Islamic fundamentalist regime that sponsors and succours them, we must expect more desperate attempts to block the peace process. Indeed, the closer we come to a negotiated diplomatic settlement of major outstanding issues, the more likely it is that we shall see bloody terrorist attacks by the maximalist groups who view any such agreements as a betrayal of their commitment to the total eradication of the state of Israel. This is all the more reason for the democratic friends of Israel at home and abroad to stand by it and not allow the diplomatic agenda to be hijacked or overturned by the extremists. Hence, an important part of the strategy for countering international terrorism is to adopt and implement the principle that `one democracy 's terrorist is another democracy's terrorist', and to give the Israeli authorities the fullest possible political and moral support and wholehearted international intelligence, police and judicial co-operation in their efforts to defeat terrorism and keep the peace process on track. Solidarity between Britain, the other EU states and the United States is a vital part of this strategy.

Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the Implications for Aviation Security

Faced with this scenario of future terrorism, what are the prospects of European states achieving radical improvements in their measures to combat terrorism up to 2010 and beyond? It would be foolish to be sanguine. So much depends on the quality of the political leaders and the moral strength and determination of democratic societies. The true litmus test will be the Western states' consistency and courage in maintaining a firm and effective policy against terrorism in all its forms. They must abhor the idea that terrorism can be tolerated as long as it is only affecting someone else's democratic rights and rule of law. They must adopt the clear principle that `one democracy's terrorist is another democracy's terrorist'. The general principles of the firm hardline strategy for the liberal democratic states, and which have the best track record in reducing terrorists, are:

• no surrender to the terrorists, and an absolute determination to defeat terrorism within the framework of the rule of law and the democratic process;
• no deals and no concessions, even in the face of the most severe intimidation and blackmail;
• an intensified effort to bring terrorists to justice by prosecution and conviction before courts of law;
• tough measures to penalize the state sponsors who give terrorist movements safe haven, explosives, cash and moral and diplomatic support;
• a determination never to allow terrorist intimidation to block or derail international diplomatic efforts to resolve major political conflicts in strife-torn regions, such as the Middle East: in many such areas terrorism has become a major threat to peace and stability, and its suppression therefore is in the common interests of international society.

To conclude on an optimistic note, there is one major aspect of advanced technology which does give the democratic governments a potentially winning card in their battle with terrorist organizations. Whereas developments in terrorism weaponry and the vulnerability of modern complex societies help the terrorists, the development of sophisticated fine-grained computers and terrorism databases provides a superb asset for the intelligence war against terrorism. If this development is matched by greatly enhanced international intelligence sharing and counter-terrorism collaboration, this can lay the foundations of long-term success overt terrorist organizations.

In Conflict Study 226, 'The Lessons of Lockerbie' (December 1989) , the writer argued that, despite the Lockerbie tragedy and two more sabotage bombings in 1989 over Africa and Latin America, the world civil aviation system had failed to take the long-overdue measures to protect civil aviation against this major threat. It is depressing to report that a further seven years have gone by without any significant improvement in blocking the major loopholes in many parts of the world's airport system. Another Lockerbie could happen tomorrow and the carnage caused would, of course, be even greater if the terrorists succeeded in destroying an airliner over a densely populated area.

The greatest weaknesses in aviation security, (all too apparent even in the USA, the leading civil aviation power in the world) are: (i) the failure to install explosive detection systems in airports capable of reliably detecting plastic explosives; (ii) the failure to establish efficient and reliable PPBM (Positive Passenger Baggage Match) systems in our airports; and (iii) the absence of effective national and international regulatory bodies capable of monitoring and enforcing security standards throughout the international airport system.

The US has had a grim warning, in the form of the Ramzi Yousef conspiracy, that US civil aviation is still a prize target for terrorists. Nor should we be planning simply to meet the continuing threats of hijacking and sabotage bombing. The threat of missile attack against civil aviation is already with us. The enhancement of aviation security, in the US and globally, is both a technological and a political challenge, because it is crucial to mobilize the political will and resources needed. To be effective, action against terrorists must be synchronized at both national and international levels. Strong national policies to deal with terrorism are the building-blocks of a more effective international response. Despite America's recent experience of terrorist outrages, there is still no clear evidence that America has the political will to meet the challenges involved, setting an example to the international community, as it did in the early 1970's in pioneering measures against aircraft hijacking ₁₄ .

*: Paul Wilkinson is Professor of International Relations, and Chairman, Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St Andrews Scotland. Back.

Note 1: For a useful discussion of definitions, see Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman (eds.), Political Terrorism: A New Guide (1988).For a useful discussion of definitions, see Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman (eds.), Political Terrorism: A New Guide (1988). Back.

Note 2: See, for example, Walter Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism (1987). Back.

Note 3: Its popularity and ubiquity is borne out by the leading database chronologies of international terrorism recorded over recent years; see, for example, the annual RAND-St Andrews chronologies of international terrorism and Edward Mickolus' ITERATE data. Back.

Note 4: This idea was explicitly advocated by Carlos Marighela in his Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla. Back.

Note 5: For an interesting multi-disciplinary discussion on the causes of terrorism, see Walter Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism; Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (1990). Back.

Note 6: Robert Moss, Urban Guerrillas (1972), 64. Back.

Note 7: A great deal of evidence for this view is collected by Alex P. Schmid and Ronald D. Crelinsten (eds.), Western Responses to Terrorism (1993). Back.

Note 8: Ibid. Back.

Note 9: On the wider implications of Lockerbie for aviation and counter-terrorism policy, see Paul Wilkinson, The Lessons of Lockerbie (1989). Back.

Note 10: The damage from the IRA's two huge truck bombs in the City of London (April 1992 and 1993) totalled £ 600 million: Richard Clutterbuck, Terrorism in An Unstable World (1994), 24. The total damage caused in Northern Ireland and mainland Britain by the twenty-five year campaign has not even been estimated. Back.

Note 11: See Yonah Alexander and Dennis Pluchinsky, Europe's Red Terrorists (1992). Back.

Note 12: See Alison Jamieson, The Heart Attacked (1989), 172-232. Back.

Note 13: For a review of the Greek situation, see George Kassimeris, ' The Greek state response to terrorism', Terrorism and Political Violence, vol.5, no. 4, winter 1993, 288-310. Back.

Note 14: The Report of the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism (Washington, 1990) presents an invaluable study of practices and policy options with respect to preventing terrorist acts involving aviation. In my own view it is a tragic waste of this study that so few of its recommendations have been fully implemented. I was not requested to deal with aviation security measures in my contribution to this White House Commission conference. Participants unfamiliar with my position on these matters will find it detailed in The Lessons of Lockerbie (London, 1989), my paper, 'Designing an effective international aviation security system', Proceedings of the 9th World Airports Conference (London, 1992), and my article 'Aviation Security: The Fight Against Terrorism; Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Vol. 18, No. 2 (June 1993), pp 163-173, the text of my Inaugural Lecture at St Andrews University. Back.