|
|
|
Email this citation
The European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy
Centre for the Study of Democracy
University of Westminster
Winter 1996
The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations. 1
INTRODUCTION
The Treaty on European Union (TEU, or 'Maastricht Treaty'), which came into force on 1 November 1993, established a 'three pillar' structure for the new European Union. Pillar one consists of the European Communities - the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC); the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC); and the European Community (EC). Pillars Two and Three were introduced by the TEU and consist of, respectively, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and co-operation in Home and Judicial Affairs (HJA).
This structure provides the Union with a set of goals that includes the 'assertion of its identity on the international scene'. 2 The existing identity that the Union projects internationally is informed by a combination of factors: the depth of formal and informal integration that has been undertaken within and between the Member States; the institutions and policies that operate at the European level; and the fifteen distinctive national identities that the Member States bring to the Union. Successive enlargements of the European Community and the European Union have affected each of these factors, and, consequently, have altered the international identity of the Union itself. There is no question but that enlargement to include the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) will change the international identity of the Union.
The European Union was launched with a new, distinctive external policy domain: the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The CFSP is an attempt to address the expectations of states outside Western Europe, and those of Member States themselves, that, after the Cold War, the Community's economic strength should translate into greater political influence in the international system. With the debate on the future of the formal integrative process under way in the context of the Union's 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, the enhancement of the CFSP, which was intended to be the primary international political instrument of the Union, is under examination.
The aim of this paper is to reflect on the functioning of the CFSP since its inception, on the proposals that have been advanced for the amendment of the CFSP, and on the implications for the CFSP of enlargement of the Union. The paper contends that if the self-proclaimed aspirations of the Union are used as the basis on which to measure the success of the CFSP then the policy thus far must be judged a failure. Many of the factors that are perceived as obstacles to the creation of a genuine common foreign and security policy will not easily disappear and are not susceptible to quick fixes. Consequently, enlargement of the Union is likely to exacerbate the problematic nature of the CFSP process.
FROM EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION TO THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY
Attempts to create a European foreign policy involving the member states of the European Community (EC) predate the Treaty of Rome that founded the European Economic Community (EEC). The earliest attempt was the de Gasperi initiative of 1952 (the year after the creation of the first EC institution, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)). 3 The aim of the initiative, which accompanied the ill-fated attempt to create the European Defence Community (EDC) by the six members of the ECSC, was to create a federalist European Political Community with a common foreign policy, 4
The legacy of the failure of the EDC was the removal of questions of defence and of a common foreign policy from the formal agenda of European integration until the TEU. However, in the interim, the Member States engaged in a process of foreign policy co-operation - European Political Cooperation, or EPC - that, although unspectacular, was a tacit recognition that the process of economic integration generated both expectations and responsibilities beyond Europe.
From its initiation in 1970 until its demise with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, European Political Cooperation represented - in the words of the 1970 Luxembourg Report - an opportunity for Member States to
ensure greater mutual understanding with respect to the major issues of international politics, by exchanging information and consulting regularly [and] to increase their solidarity by working for a harmonization of views, concertation of attitudes and joint action when it appears feasible and desirable. 5
Clearly, what did not develop was a joint foreign policy that was binding on the participating states. However, EPC was successful in progressively creating a mechanism for consultation and in developing instruments for its own implementation. The institutions and procedures initiated under EPC - the importance of the Presidency in driving forward the process; the use of the troika (last, current, and next Presidencies); the creation of the Political Committee and its attendant working groups; the development of a role for embassies in third countries; the creation of a telex network linking foreign ministries; a full-time secretariat; and the use of economic sanctions as a mechanism to implement decisions - remain central to the CFSP decision-making and implementation processes.
The period from the commencement of the two intergovernmental conferences in 1990 (on EMU and Political Union, respectively) until the eventual enactment of the TEU were the twilight years of EPC. They coincided with the Gulf War and the outbreak of the conflict in former Yugoslavia. The perceived inadequacy of the Community response towards these events mocked EPC in its old age. Although the Community had been presented with crisis management situations in the 1970s - the invasion of Cyprus and the democratic revolutions in Portugal and Spain - the magnitude of the two major conflicts of the early 1990s overwhelmed the instruments available through EPC and primacy was accorded to other fora: the United Nations and NATO.
THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION AND THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY
The Treaty on European Union agreed at Maastricht on 11 December 1991 reflected aspirations for a common foreign policy and went beyond the modest aims of the EPC process. To quote Article B of the Treaty:
The Union shall set itself the following objectives: . . . to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence. 6
The CFSP transformed EPC into an integral part of the three-pillar structure of the Union. The CFSP retains a style of decision-making distinct from that which operates under the Community pillar of the Treaty. However, the two decision-making systems have been brought very much closer under the CFSP; and, as Article C of the Treaty states, the 'Union shall be served by a single institutional framework'. 7 Nevertheless, the article goes on to give particular attention to the Union's international identity, asserting that
The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring such consistency. They shall ensure the implementation of these policies, each in accordance with its respective powers. 8
Title V of the TEU covers the 'Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy'. The objectives of the policy established by Article J.1.2, and the attempts to realise them, will be explored below after an examination of the CFSP decision-making and implementation process. 9
CFSP decision-making and implementation
The CFSP process of decision-making has been altered from that which operated under EPC. Article C of the Maastricht Treaty requires that the Union shall be served by a single institutional framework. The General Affairs Council (the council of foreign ministers) of the European Communities has now adopted the title of the Council of the Union (hereafter, 'the Council'). The distinction between EPC ministerial meetings and General Affairs Council meetings had been progressively eroded; it has now been terminated altogether. The Council is now the sole forum for CFSP. 10 This means that the formal EPC ministerial meeting, held each six months in the capital of the country holding the Presidency, has been abolished. The Gymnich informal meetings (so called after the German town where they were first held) remain in place.
The Council, in its meetings, now operates with a single agenda and in a single setting, with CFSP and other Union business taken together. As a member of the Council has noted, the content of meetings increasingly concerns the European Union's international identity:
[the] Council now concentrates the bulk of its discussions on the Union's external relations. To confine myself to the Councils held since 1 January, under the French Presidency, out of 61 agenda items, thirty-nine - two thirds - concerned external relations, eighteen of them actions embarked on under the CFSP proper. 11
The preparation of CFSP items remains, as under EPC, the responsibility of the Political Committee (which works for the General Affairs Council and is made up of civil servants from national foreign ministries). The Political Directors (the most senior of these civil servants) meet on a monthly basis with the European Correspondent responsible for day-to-day contacts. The EPC Secretariat has been merged with the General Secretariat of the Council. This new Secretariat is staffed by fifteen diplomats seconded from each Member State and by an equal number of officials from the Council Secretariat. 12 The COREU telex network, which conducts communications in English and French, is to continue 'for the time being' but all Common Foreign and Security Policy texts that are considered or adopted in Council or European Council meetings are in all community languages. 13 EPC units within the foreign ministries, which are responsible for co-ordinating the positions of the individual Member States and supporting the Correspondents and the Political Directors, have been re-named rather than re-structured. 14
The Commission for its part responded to the recognition of its full association with CFSP and its ability, shared with the Member States, to submit any proposals to the Council by dividing in two the Directorate General, the main department with responsibility for external relations. It now consists of the DGI, responsible for External Economic relations, and the DGIA, responsible for External Political Relations. 15 This new assertiveness was reinforced with the appointment of Hans van den Broek, a former minister for foreign affairs of the Netherlands, as the Commissioner with responsibility for external political relations. 16
The Presidency of the Union is explicitly granted the responsibility for the implementation of the CFSP under the TEU, and the troika and 'bi-cephalic troika' (the troika plus the Commission) are also retained as other instruments at the disposal of the Union. 17 The Presidency retains the responsibility for the extensive network of political dialogue commitments that are the day-to-day substance of CFSP.
In pursuance of the objectives of the CFSP two approaches are provided for. The first entails ' . . . establishing systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of the policy, in accordance with Article J.2. . 18 Article J.2 requires that
Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that their combined influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent action. 19
This requirement does not represent a substantial departure from EPC. However, the Member States have made it possible to go beyond this process by creating 'common positions'. 20 Member States must ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions and, furthermore, that these are upheld in international organisations and conferences, even when all the Member States are not participants. 21
The TEU also goes further and provides for 'gradually implementing, in accordance with Article J.3, joint action in the areas in which the Member States have important interests in common'. 22 The introduction of joint actions has also generated a new decision-making process through which these positions are formulated. Joint actions are intended to provide for self-contained 'packages' of foreign policy:
Whenever the Council decides on the principle of joint action, it shall lay down the specific scope, the Union's general and specific objectives in carrying out such action, if necessary its duration, and the means, procedures and conditions for its implementation. 23
The decision as to what should be the subject of a joint action resides with the Council, acting under general guidelines from the European Council. Both common positions and joint actions require unanimous agreement in the Council. However, voting has been introduced, albeit in limited circumstances, and this has broken the previous EPC practice of unanimity: 'The Council shall, when adopting the joint action and at any stage during its development, define those matters on which decisions are to be taken by a qualified majority [author's emphasis].' 24
The Treaty on European Union appeared to inaugurate a new era in European foreign policy: it seemed to signify that EPC would give way to a more binding intergovernmental process. The planned use of Community institutions also appeared to signify a relaxation of the attempt to maintain control over EPC by governments at all levels of the process. However, the role of the European Parliament remains marginal.
Under CFSP the Union has gone beyond EPC in creating a structured relationship with the Europe Agreement countries; 25 this is in addition to implementing the structured dialogue defined in the Presidency Conclusions of the 1994 Essen meeting of the European Council. The Europe Agreements signed by the Central and East European Countries (CEECs) contain an obligation to support the construction of an appropriate political dialogue with the Union. 26 Subsequently the General Affairs Council approved an extension of the dialogue with the CEECs and provided for the CEECs to be able to associate with the EU in statements, dŽmarches and joint actions. 27
Once per Presidency a special Council meeting is convened; the Union has involved the applicants for CFSP membership - 'Associates' - in CFSP actions by inviting them to half-yearly political committee meetings and working group meetings. 28 The Associates have been invited to create 'Shadow European Correspondents', and a mechanism has been established which allows them to align themselves with the Union by making common declarations, implementing joint actions, and by co-ordinating within international organisations. In the first nine months of 1996 there were, in addition to a foreign affairs ministers meeting on 27 February, two meetings of Political Directors (in February and May). 29 Therefore, under the CFSP the Union has created a status of Association analogous to that existing within the Western European Union (WEU), which also represents an attempt to broaden and deepen the relationship with the Associates beyond the Community pillar. (See below for a detailed discussion of the WEU.)
Other innovative features of the joint actions are detailed below following a sketch of the other manifestations of CFSP which place the joint actions in perspective as only a minor part of a relatively undeveloped process. (However, no attempt is made to detail expectations of the candidates in the realm of CFSP as the White Paper produced by the Commission does (Preparation of the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into the Internal Market of the Union.) 30
THE CEECs AND THE CFSP: THE CONSEQUENCES OF ENLARGEMENT
The inclusion of the CEECs within the existing decision-making structure of CFSP will have four immediate consequences. Firstly, the accommodation of the additional 'chairs at the table'. This might increase the volume of communications, the potential number of different viewpoints, and the opportunities to construct different coalitions. The requirement for unanimous agreement for action that currently operates under the CFSP might then be reformed by changes to voting arrangements that have been proposed in the context of the IGC (detailed below). This could reduce some difficulties in decision-making, but the question of equal rights to initiate discussion or action has not been proposed.
Second, the importance of the Presidency in driving the CFSP process will be both enhanced and diminished: enhanced because the Presidency will need to consult with a larger number of parties to achieve consensus for action (or non-action), and also because the Presidency will represent a larger group of states in both bilateral and multilateral contexts; diminished in two possible ways: through the creation of a new figure-head for CFSP (detailed below in a discussion of proposals for reform), and through the slower rotation of the Presidency. A consequence of the latter two developments is that the Member States outside the CFSP process may be more likely to undertake unilateral policy initiatives.
Third, enlargement will affect the implementation of CFSP. The CFSP has relied heavily upon declaratory diplomacy for its implementation (see below for details). Joint actions require collective expenditure and the current lack of a budget for operational expenditure for CFSP means that each joint action has to be the subject of a separate agreement, which in turn gives rise to decision-making problems. Elements of the CFSP that contain a defence dimension are the preserve of the Western European Union. This aspect of implementation is explored below.
The fourth consequence of enlargement is that new foreign policy traditions, interests, and aspirations will influence foreign policy processes. New cleavages between Member States will emerge as, inevitably, Eastern Europe, the Baltic and the Balkans become the primary focus of foreign policy concern for the CEECs once they are inside the Union. 31 Those states that have important bilateral extra-Union relations beyond Europe in the Mediterranean, Africa, Latin America, Pacific may have to contemplate a relative decline in the commitment to these areas.
The CFSP to date
The existing Member States have defined a set of broad objectives for CFSP, the broad aim of which is, in the words of the TEU, 'to assert [the Union's] identity on the international scene'. These are given in Article J.1.2 of the Treaty as:
- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;
- to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways;
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter;
- to promote international cooperation;
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 32
The content of these broad objectives contains nothing the CEECs would find difficult to accept. The Member States have gone somewhat further. The European Council meeting in Maastricht in December 1991 tasked the Foreign Ministers with preparing a report which would provide the beginnings of a strategic rationale within which to conduct the CFSP. In the aftermath of the signing of the TEU on 7 February 1992, and with the expectation that the Treaty would come into force on 1 January 1993, the foreign ministers of the then twelve Member States presented a report 'on the likely development of the CFSP with a view to identifying areas open to joint action vis-ˆ-vis particular countries or groups of countries' to the European Council meeting in Lisbon in June 1992. 33
The Foreign Ministers stated that the CFSP should both be seen not only as the successor to EPC but also that:
With specific aims and means, the CFSP represents a 'saut qualitatif' in the sense that it integrates the 'Acquis' of EPC and gives it greater potential, principally by means of joint action, an additional instrument which implies a strict discipline among Member States and enables the Union to make full use of the means at its disposal. 34
In particular, the CFSP was to ensure that the external action of the Union was to be less reactive to events and 'more active in the pursuit of the interests of the Union and in the creation of a more favourable international environment'. 35 The intention, clearly influenced by the experience of the Community in the early stages of the Yugoslav conflict, was that the Union would engage in preventive diplomacy. 36
The Lisbon Report proposed both 'geographical areas' and 'horizontal domains' as the basis on which to implement the CFSP. Each area identified for activity was to have specific objectives. A set of these was outlined in the Report:
- strengthening democratic principles and institutions, and respect for human and minority rights; - promoting regional stability and contributing to the creation of political and/or economic frameworks that encourage regional cooperation or moves towards regional or sub-regional integration; - contributing to the prevention and settlement of conflicts; - contributing to a more effective international co-ordination in dealing with emergency situations; - strengthening existing cooperation in issues of international interest such as the fight against arms proliferation, terrorism and the traffic in illicit drugs; - promoting and supporting good government. 37
The foreign ministers defined the strategic rationale of the CFSP as integrative diplomacy, which would both promote regional integration and, more broadly, support the creation and perpetuation of international regimes for co-operation. The ministers went further than specific objectives by listing a three-fold set of factors that should be considered in determining the common interests of the Union: geographical proximity; an important interest in the political and economic stability of a region or country; and the existence of threats to the security interests of the Union. 38
Recognising that the Union's Members States had common interests the foreign ministers set out their definition for the first phase of the CFSP. They moved beyond trying to harmonise individual states' foreign policies and began to identify a set of interests for a single actor. These interests were given a two-fold definition: in terms, firstly, of areas of 'geographical interest' and, second, of 'horizontal domains'. These are both the primary interests of the Union as a single actor and indicate the order in which the Union might define its interests.
Geographical interests were ranked largely in terms of their geographical proximity to the EU. They were divided into two broad regions with subdivisions within those regions. Priority was accorded to Central and Eastern Europe, encompassing, in order: 'Russia and the Former Soviet Republics ; . . . Other countries in Central and Eastern Europe including the Balkans'; and 'Former Yugoslavia'. The second broad region was 'Maghreb and the Middle East', the 'Union's southern border' and 'one of the constant preoccupations of the Community and its Member States.' 39
Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean are also mentioned in passing and treated as a collective group with which 'the Union may want to develop gradually in a consistent and co-ordinated manner its external activities'. 40 Only the industrialised nations of the US, Canada and Japan are mentioned by name and it was made clear that these relations are to be conducted on the basis of existing joint bilateral declarations.
Within horizontal domains - which encompass security - priority was accorded to the then CSCE process, disarmament and arms control in Europe, nuclear non-proliferation, economic aspects of security (defined as control of arms exports), and the transfer of military technology. 41
The geographical interests largely accord with the primary concerns of the CEECs, although Russia and other former Soviet republics, and the Balkans, because of their proximity, are obviously of greater significance for the CEECs. If Union enlargement encompasses all the CEECs the Union will share borders with Belarus, Ukraine, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Turkey, and FYROM; and Romanian membership of the Union would add Moldova and the Black Sea. The expansion of the Union to these limits would make the new neighbours of direct concern for 'Pillar Three' activity - the exercise of border controls through cooperation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs.
The fragmentary nature of the CFSP process to date ensures that the CEECs would not have to ingest a substantial or clearly defined common foreign policy. An examination of the joint actions, common positions, declarations provides an indication of the development of the CFSP to-date.
To give practical effect to its interests and in accordance with the provisions of Article J.3.1 on decision-making within the CFSP, the European Council has laid down general guidelines for the areas that the Council of Ministers should consider to be the subject of joint action. At a European Council meeting in Brussels on 29 October 1993, the European Council primed the CFSP pump by asking the Council of Ministers to outline the basis for joint action in five areas: the reinforcement of the democratic process and development of co-operation in Central and Eastern Europe via the promotion of a stability pact; the use of the political, economic and financial resources of the Union in support of the Middle East peace process; support for the transition towards multi-party democracy in South Africa, through the assistance of preparation and monitoring of elections and the creation of a framework for economic and social assistance; searching for a solution to conflict in former Yugoslavia by means of contributions to the implementation of the peace plan and humanitarian action; and support for the democratic process in Russia by dispatching observers to the Russian Parliamentary elections on 12 December. 42
At two European Council meetings in 1994, at Corfu and Essen, another three joint action areas were added: joint action on the preparation of the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Conference, and two decisions on the control of exports of dual-use goods. Subsequently, an additional nine joint actions have been agreed - five of these have concerned the EU's involvement in the former Yugoslavia and two developed support already offered for the Middle East peace process. Only one new area has been created: joint action to combat the use of anti-personnel mines by support for the Conference to Review the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of Certain Conventional Weapons (see Appendix I).
Because the Union has created distinctive arrangements for the implementation of these joint actions, they represent a manifestation of European Union 'actorness'. In EPC, as was noted above, the EC sought to draw on the economic significance of the Union. This is still a component in the CFSP and explicitly provided for in one area of the Treaty of Rome, as amended by the TEU. Under Article 228a of this amended treaty CFSP can use economic sanctions as a foreign policy instrument:
Where it is provided, in a common position or in a joint action adopted according to the provisions of the Treaty on European Union relating to the common foreign and security policy, for an action by the Community to interrupt or to reduce, in part or completely, economic relations with one or more third countries, the Council shall take the necessary urgent measures. The Council shall act by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission. 43
Sanctions have been enacted under article 228a in support of common positions on Libya, Sudan, Haiti and the former Yugoslavia. The enactment or termination requires a Regulation to be passed that takes effect, without the need for measures at the level of the Member States, either once the Regulation is published in the 'L' (Legislation) series of the Official Journal of the European Communities or on the date contained in the Regulation. 44
However, the Union has not only drawn on existing Community strengths in the joint actions it has undertaken. It has also sought to create specific instruments to serve particular joint actions. Although these draw upon the resources of the Community and the Member States their explicit aim is to further the CFSP and, in turn, enhance the international identity of the European Union. They thus represent an operationally tentative, but profoundly symbolic, advance on EPC. In particular, the WEU has been used for the implementation of joint actions ( see below). If we examine the CFSP between its implementation on 1 November 1993 and 31 December 1995 it becomes clear that the Union has relied heavily on the use of declaratory instruments. Declarations issued under CFSP have departed from the practice, followed under EPC, of using the plural expression 'the Community and its Member States' to distinguish between the two entities. 45 Declarations under the CFSP refer to the 'European Union' in the singular. 46 Despite the ordering of interests detailed in the Lisbon Report the majority of the 216 CFSP declarations of the period have concerned the African region (geographical breakdown detailed in Appendix II).
Declarations are used by the Union as reactive instruments to respond to unfolding international events. But it is perhaps the silences rather than the declarations that are of interest. Declarations, which either welcome or condemn events, are a public expression of consensus among the Fifteen. The paucity of declarations about the Mediterranean basin, despite the intensity of the violence in Algeria during the period, can be read as a lack of substantive agreement among the Member States on an appropriate response to events. Likewise, the use of troops by the Russian Federation in Chechnya on 11 December 1994 did not generate a declaratory position by the Union until 18 January 1995. Speaking on the events in Chechnya the Belgium foreign minister Frank Vandenbroucke characterised the difficulties in a Union response by stating that 'European foreign policy is handicapped by the requirement for unanimity by member states for each decision'. 47
The other two ways through which the Union can pursue these objectives are 'common positions' and 'joint actions', both of which, as noted above, also require a unanimous decision by the Member States. From 1 November 1993 until 31 December 1995 the Council adopted nineteen common positions. Ten of these provided for embargoes (Sudan, Haiti, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), a further six for the use of common positions to detail the objectives and priorities for the Union's relations with countries (Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Nigeria and Ukraine), and another two were used to set out common positions on the joint leasing of diplomatic missions and blinding lasers.
The joint actions initiated during the period have already been outlined. They are of particular interest because of the development of new instruments through which to give them effect. Joint actions of the Council are legal acts and come into effect when published in the Official Journal alongside other Community legislation. The first two joint actions covered the convoying of aid in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the sending of observers to the Russian elections; they were adopted by the Council at its meeting as the Council of the European Union on 8 November 1993. 48
The expenditure for the Bosnia-Herzegovina humanitarian aid joint action was divided between the Commission and the Member States. 49 A total expenditure of 48 million ecus was allocated to fund the action. 50 The joint action with respect to the Russian elections was given effect through a Moscow-based European Union Observer Centre for the Russian elections on 12 December 1993. The centre was staffed by one representative of the Belgian Presidency, one from the European Parliament and two from the Commission, as well as by Russian personnel. 51 The Centre, which reported to the Council, was responsible for providing transport and communications assistance to the twenty-four observers sent by the European Parliament and monitors sent by the national parliaments and NGOs of the Member States. Furthermore, the Union employed the German-based NGO, the European Institute for the Media (EIM), to monitor election coverage. 52
A similar unit, fielding 312 observers, was created for the joint action on the South African elections. The Union established a 'European Electoral Unit' in South Africa with a budget of twelve million ecus headed by Jacob de Ruiter, a former Dutch minister of justice and minister of defence. 53 The unit's role was to monitor the electoral process and to administer and oversee the deployment of European Union monitors and, in particular, to co-ordinate the Union's efforts with those of the United Nations. It was dissolved one month after the elections. 54
The joint action on the Conference for Stability in Europe illustrates the importance of the role of the Member States as both a source of influence on the CFSP and of initiatives conducted under its auspices. Furthermore, it indicates the intention of the existing Member States to transform the CEECs from subjects of into participants in the CFSP by seeking to resolve existing bilateral disputes before they accede. The proposal, originally floated by the then French prime minister Balladur (and subsequently dubbed the Balladur Pact), was adopted by the Council as a joint action on 20 December 1993. 55 The inaugural conference to launch the initiative was convened in Paris on 26-27 May 1994. The purpose of the initiative was to 'implement preventative diplomacy, aimed at arousing neighbourly relations and to encourage the countries, notably through concluding appropriate agreements, to consolidate their frontiers and settle the problems of national minorities which they may face'. 56 The Union explicitly used the aspiration of CEECs to join the Union as leverage to ensure their compliance. 57 The then Union President, Greece, (with Germany and Belgium making up the troika), and France, as the host country of the inaugural conference, were all deployed, both bilaterally and multilaterally through their respective embassies in the region, to promote agreements. 58 The initiative eventually resulted in a collection of over one hundred bilateral treaties and a declaration on good neighbourly relations between Central and East European states, which were collectively handed to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe for the monitoring of compliance with the agreements. 59 The Stability Pact illustrates how the Member States can seek to enhance their own international standing through Union diplomacy. As an EU diplomat noted, 'It was the classic French technique of coming up with a grand-sounding idea, having it changed in the process, and then claiming success at the outcome'. 60 Outstanding business from the Stability Pact has recently been tidied up with the Basic Treaty signed by the Hungarian and Romanian governments. 61
The then six associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe - Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria - were involved in joint action for the renewal of the NPT. France, as the President of the EU, opened the general debate at the review and extension conference, speaking not just for the fifteen but also for these countries. 62
Incurring expenditure on such operations raises the yet unresolved question of the source of finance for operational expenditure. Article J.11 of the Maastricht Treaty provides for either Community or Member State funding. The administrative expenditure for the CFSP is currently financed out of the Community budget. 63 The question of how operational expenditure should be financed is an intractable problem. If financing occurs under the Community budget then the question of what heading and/or procedure becomes important. This is one area where the European Parliament has its greatest powers, and, if the budget falls under non-obligatory expenditure, Parliament would have the final say over the Council and this would take the powers of the Parliament in CFSP beyond consultation, questioning and making recommendations. 64 If financing takes place directly by the Member States then there are questions of management. The question currently remains unresolved with the dispute being whether operational expenditure should be funded by the Commission or from the Council section of the budget. 65
THE WEU AND THE CFSP
The armed forces of the Member States and the CEECs are brought together in four main structures: the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP), the Western European Union (WEU); and Eurocorps. Through these organisations the Member States have a 'variable geometry' of defence relationships and obligations. Of the fifteen Member States only Ireland remains outside any of these institutional arrangements. The strongest relationships exist within the NATO structure with the eleven Member States who are committed, alongside other members of NATO, to a common defence under the Washington Treaty. This defence burden is shared with the other four members of NATO outside the Union. The commitment of the United States to the defence of these members and the existence of a pluralist security community binding these NATO members together is of greatest significance. The Partnership for Peace draws Finland, Sweden, Austria and the CEECs into a bilateral co-operative relationship with the NATO members ' . . . for the purpose of joint planning, training and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may be subsequently agreed'.
The TEU, in establishing the CFSP, widened the extent of the Member States efforts at foreign policy harmonisation to 'include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence', and designated the WEU as the body which would 'elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications'. 66
In the TEU the Union had signalled the intent of the Member States of the Union to move beyond a civilian-power Europe and to develop a defence dimension to the Union's international identity. In a declaration attached to the TEU the then nine members of the WEU spelled out their proposals for the role of the WEU and the relationship of the WEU and NATO. They pledged that the
WEU will be developed as the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. To this end, it will formulate common European defence policy and carry forward its concrete implementation through the further development of its own operational role. 67
As well as setting out a list of practical measures to enhance relations with the EU, and a strengthening of the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and its own operational role, the declaration offered either accession to the WEU or observer status to any member of the Union. Other European members of NATO were offered associate membership status.
The WEU, under article V of the founding Brussels Treaty signed in 1948, offers a collective defence guarantee to any of the signatories if they suffer armed attack in Europe. 68 Reactivated in 1984 as a forum in which to pursue closer European collaboration within NATO, the WEU has permitted the Western European members to act collectively outside the NATO area of operations, as in the Persian Gulf from 1985. 69 In the aftermath of the Gulf War and the outbreak of conflict in Yugoslavia 70 the Council of Ministers of the WEU, in the Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992, signalled their intent to expand the operations of the WEU to encompass 'humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management'. These are now known as the 'Petersberg tasks'. 71
To facilitate the realisation of these objectives a Planning Cell was established and located within the WEU Council. The Council was moved from London to Brussels, thereby symbolically indicating the WEU's new status with respect to the European Union (and taking advantage of the practical benefits of proximity). Within the Planning Cell the WEU has recently added an Intelligence Section, alongside a Situation Centre and a politico-military group in support of the Council, as part of its commitment to enhance its operational development.
The development of capabilities by the WEU to match its aspirations was given a boost by the NATO summit of January 1994 and the endorsement of the principle that NATO assets and capabilities could be made available for WEU operations, and in particular through the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). A slow move towards the interoperability of EU non-NATO and the CEECs with NATO assets was demonstrated by Austria, Finland and Sweden and four of the CEECs (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania) contributing troops to the Implementation Force for Bosnia (IFOR). 72
NATO has now gone further and approved the implementation of the CJTF, thereby creating military structures to run military operations that may not include the United States and further support the development of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO. 73 Alongside this endorsement, the WEU Planning Cell developed an inventory of Forces Answerable to WEU (FAWEU) to identify those forces available to carry out WEU tasks and created a framework for the development of a WEU Maritime Force. By enhancing the WEU satellite centre at Torrejon, Spain, the WEU has also made a commitment to create an independent European satellite system and to further develop the WEU's capability to use satellite imagery for security purposes. 74 The WEU was also offered Russian satellite intelligence data by Andrei Kozyrev in a speech to the WEU Parliamentary Assembly in December 1994. 75 In the future a WEU strategic transport capability may be enhanced through the Future Large Aircraft project. 76
The WEU has already produced a preliminary document outlining the objectives, scope and means of a common European defence policy (CEDP) and described by the minister of foreign affairs of the Netherlands as 'the acquis, as it were - which have already been developed in the WEU, in the European Union and in NATO'. 77 The preliminary work details four levels of responsibilities and interests:
- WEU governments have a direct responsibility for the security and defence of their own peoples and territories.
- WEU governments have a responsibility to project the security and stability presently enjoyed in the West throughout the whole of Europe.
- WEU governments have an interest, in order to reinforce European security, in fostering stability in the southern Mediterranean countries.
- WEU governments are ready to take on their share of the responsibilities for the promotion of security, stability and the values of democracy in the wider world, including through the execution of peacekeeping and other crisis management measures under the authority of the UN Security Council or the CSCE, acting either independently or through WEU or NATO. They are also ready to address new security challenges such as humanitarian emergencies; proliferation; terrorism; international crime and environmental risks including those related to disarmament and the destruction of nuclear and chemical weapons. 78
The proposal was also made that the CEDP required a greater strengthening of operational capabilities, in particular: the exercising, preparation and inter-operability of forces; generic and contingency planning; strategic mobility; anti-missile defences and defence intelligence in Europe; and a mechanism for the sharing and burdens and the pooling of resources. 79 The importance of creating a European armaments policy, as a part of a CEDP, was acknowledged as taking place through the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) and with the eventual aim of establishing a European armaments agency.
The Union, through the WEU, has, although tentatively, created a defence force and an embryonic defence policy. These are intended to be compatible with the Atlantic Alliance and to strengthen its European pillar based upon the principle of separable, but not separate, military capabilities. However, the disjuncture between WEU and EU membership remains. Only ten members of the Union are currently full members of the WEU and enjoy the defence guarantee of Article V; Ireland, Denmark, Austria, Sweden and Finland are currently confined to observer status within the WEU.
The defence identity of the Union therefore excludes one third of the membership of Union but, at the same time, through different forms of membership of the WEU, encompasses another seventeen states. Alongside an observer status the WEU created, through the Document on Associate Membership (agreed at the WEU Ministerial Council in Rome on 20 November 1992), an Associate Member status open to European members of NATO. This has been granted to Turkey, Norway and Iceland. These Associate Members, by their nomination of assets to FAWEU, now participate in WEU operations on same basis as full members. The Associate Members are also integrated into WEU planning through the nominating of officers to the Planning Cell and connection to the WEUCOM communications network. 80
The WEU has also created an Associate Partner status offered to the nine Central European and Baltic countries that have Europe Agreements with the EU. The Associate Partner status offers involvement in the meetings of the WEU Council, liaison arrangements with the Planning Cell, participation in exercises, and association with the WEU operations involving Petersberg tasks. In any involvement in WEU operations a right to involvement in the Council's decision-making process and command structures is granted. 81 These arrangements have not been without their critics: one group of expert commentators characterised them as 'an approach which simply serves to blur the concepts of a common defence policy and common defence'. 82
The future of the WEU and its relationship with the European Union was programmed for discussion at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference of the Union. This would take place as the expiry date (1998) of the WEU's founding treaty, the Brussels Treaty, was approaching. 83 Proposals currently include the full integration of the WEU with the EU, 84 the creation of a new pillar of the Union containing a European intervention force based upon Eurocorps with the WEU preserved for collective defence, 85 or leaving matters as they are with the addition of a WEU summit. 86 The possibility has also been raised by a French European Affairs minister that the British and French nuclear deterrents should contribute to a common defence policy. 87
The individual Member States of the Union currently have varying degrees of military deployment outside Europe. France, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom have combat forces abroad, in addition to those engaged in UN peacekeeping or NATO duties. Fourteen of the fifteen member states (the exception is Luxembourg) currently have personnel deployed on UN peacekeeping duties. Eleven of the member states, nine of the WEU members (again Luxembourg has committed no troops), along with Denmark and Norway had forces deployed in Operation Sharp Guard. This enforced UN imposed embargoes on the territories of the former Yugoslavia, under a combined WEU/NATO task force. Alongside Operation Sharp Guard the WEU was involved in a WEU police and customs operation enforcing UN sanctions on the Danube and providing the police deployment for the EU-administered town of Mostar. The latter is the first occasion on which the WEU is implementing a decision of the EU, as envisaged under Article J.4.2 of the TEU. The WEU Presidency, Secretariat and Planning Cell have also met with a Troika of EU Consular Affairs experts to make preparations for the WEU's role in evacuation operations overseas.
The question of deepening the defence identity through a common European army is raised by Eurocorps. Eurocorps, which contains German, French, Spanish, Luxembourg and Belgium forces, was formed by an expansion of a previously existing Franco-German brigade on 5 November 1993, four days after the TEU came into effect. Based in Strasbourg and with an emblem containing a map of Europe, the twelve stars of the Union's flag and a broadsword, the Eurocorps has signed an accord with NATO to come under its command as a unit in times of crisis. 88 Eurocorps is now operational and consists of 40,000 troops. 89
Alongside Eurocorps the Member States have a number of bilateral arrangements, which have been placed at the disposal of the WEU. These include an Anglo-Dutch amphibious force - which Portugal has said it intends to join 90 - and a Franco-British Euro Air Group to co-ordinate RAF-French air force joint operations, in support of either peacekeeping or of offensive activities. 91 France, Italy and Spain have organised EUROFOR, a land force, and EUROMARFOR, a maritime force, open to all WEU members. These have been designated as 'forces answerable to WEU'.
The EU, through the WEU and its associates, and through bilateral arrangements between the Member States, has a developing defence profile, both in potential capabilities and policy. Alongside the EU's emerging defence identity the Member States, taken collectively, retain considerable numbers of armed forces personnel and defence expenditure. However, clearly all of these capabilities of the Member States are not at the direct disposal of the Union. In particular there remains a disjuncture between the willingness of all the Member States to commit military personnel to UN peacekeeping across the globe and a reluctance of some to make a commitment to a credible EU collective defence. This reluctance is rooted either in Member States' neutrality (for example, Ireland), or is the product of particular historical experiences (for example, Germany). 92
THE 1996 IGC AND THE FUTURE OF THE CFSP
A significant issue being explored in the IGC is: what improvements can be made to the functioning of the CFSP? Such improvements fall into two categories: those that require amendments to the existing Treaties and those that do not. The debate is complicated by theological disputes about the obstacles to an effective CFSP and the most appropriate mechanisms for decision-making and implementation. The dichotomous positions in this debate can be expressed in terms of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism: whether in the long-term a more effective CFSP would be ensured by the CFSP's integration into the Community structure with its existing methods of decision-making and implementation, or, alternatively, whether any attempt to create a policy that would supersede national foreign policy is unattainable and Member States will always want to retain full freedom of action. Such viewpoints have not been so starkly expressed in the IGC CFSP debate but such thinking can be inferred from positions adopted by Member States and the Commission.
Discussions on proposed amendments to the CFSP in the context of the 1996 IGC have been conducted formally since the creation of the Group of Reflection in June 1994 at the European Council in Ioannina (expressed in its report submitted to the European Council in Madrid in December 1995). They have continued in the deliberations of the Intergovernmental conference launched in Turin. This was chaired initially by the Italian Presidency (with the state of the negotiations summarised in the report Progress of the Intergovernmental Conference submitted to the Florence summit in June 1996) until 1 July 1996, when the Irish presidency took over. The candidate countries themselves have not been formally involved in the IGC deliberations but have been briefed by the Presidency on state of the negotiations. 93
The deliberations have coalesced around a number of issues and indicate what are perceived to be obstacles to the effective functioning of the CFSP: amending decision-making, an enhanced analysis capability, improved representation, funding, and the relationship of the EU to the WEU.
Decision-making. The dominant view among the Member States is that the operation of the CFSP is severely hampered by the requirement for unanimous agreement before action can be undertaken. The view that this handicap could be overcome by the use of majority voting is strongly opposed by the UK government. Discussions have revolved around the possibility of techniques such as 'constructive abstention' or 'unanimity minus one' to deal with the decision-making problem. The European Parliament has taken issue with the failure to consider any enhancement of its role in the conduct of the CFSP.
Analysis and Planning Centre. There is general agreement among the Member States on the need to create an analysis unit to prepare CFSP strategy. 94 The Commission position is that it should pool resources with the Council of Ministers' Secretariat to create an analysis and planning unit. As regards a planning and analysis unit the UK government supports a strengthening of the Council Secretariat by seconding staff from the Member States' foreign ministries and the Commission.
Improved representation. Perhaps the most eye-catching proposal for the modification of the CFSP has been the French government's proposal for a 'Mr CFSP' or 'Ms CFSP' appointed by the European Council. The idea appear to have wide acceptance but most Member States have reservations in appointing a high profile politician to such a position. 95 The UK government has proposed that the representative should be at the rank of Secretary General, appointed by the Council of Ministers with a role in formulating matters to be discussed by the General Affairs Council and who, if thought necessary, could represent policies on behalf of the Union. 96 Unsurprisingly, the Commission is opposed to such a proposal and has promoted the idea of a Commission Vice President to be a tandem voice alongside the Council Presidency. A variant of these two positions is a new troika comprising the Presidency, the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and a Secretary General of the Council responsible for foreign affairs. 97
Funding. There is an acceptance of the notion that operational expenditure should be charged to the Community budget under certain conditions.
Defence. The expiry of the WEU's founding treaty in 1998 has generated a discussion about the future relationship between the EU and the WEU as noted above. Proposals range from the preservation of the WEU as an autonomous organisation representing the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance (the position of the UK government) to the eventual full integration of the WEU into the EU (the position of the French and German governments). 98
There is now an acceptance on the part of the neutral states (Finland, Sweden 99 , Ireland 100 and Austria 101 ) of their involvement and contribution to the humanitarian and peacekeeping elements of the Petersberg tasks. The key questions for the CEECs will be the relationships between both the WEU and the EU and the WEU and NATO, and when their own accession to the Union occurs. Reform of the WEU-EU relationship to incorporate Petersberg tasks into an amended Maastricht Treaty and with the addition of a protocol to the Treaty committing the signatories to territorial defence appears a possible part of the acquis politique by the next round of enlargement. The significance of the WEU-NATO relationship will be in terms of the membership of NATO by the CEECs. Membership of NATO prior to membership of the EU now appears a possible scenario. The symbolism for NATO of expanding on its fiftieth anniversary, or at the millennium, to incorporate the CEECs may prove overwhelming. 102
THE STATE OF THE DEBATE
The group of the EU Foreign Ministers' Personal Representatives for the IGC, meeting under the Chairmanship of the Irish representative Noel Dorr, last discussed the CFSP on 22/23 July 1996. On that occasion the Irish Presidency, working to a strategy of offering texts to modify the existing treaties, tabled concrete proposals for the reform of the CFSP. On the decision-making process three alternatives were proposed:
- a move to qualified majority voting whilst explicitly recognising in the Treaty the right to 'invoke an essential national interest in order to oppose the use of majority voting in a specific case [while stimulating that] either that such a vote could be exercised only by recourse to the European Council or that the request to exercise such a vote could be rejected by a qualified majority';
- amending Article J.8.2 of the TEU to read 'in cases where a Member State abstains from a Council decision, this shall not prevent the adoption of the said decision by unanimity'; and
- when the Council adopts a decision for which unanimity is required, a Member of the Council may make a formal declaration that it does not oppose adoption of the said decision, but that it will not participate and refraining from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action. Such a decision would be adopted providing it is adopted by a qualified majority of Member States. : 103
As for implementing CFSP the Irish Presidency proposed several amendments to Article J.5 of the Treaty:
- making CFSP the responsibility of the Secretary General of the Council;
- the Secretary General of the Council to be responsible for CFSP;
- a High Representative for CFSP to be appointed by the European Council; and
- a special representative or special envoy to be appointed by the Council each time it sees fit and with a specific mandate for a joint action (as already exists for Mostar and the Great Lakes in Africa). 104
In another set of proposals for security and defence the Irish Presidency proposed a series of alternative amendments to Article J.4 that sets out the putative defence dimensions of the CFSP:
- including Petersberg tasks (humanitarian, peacekeeping, crisis management) and to provide for the 'progressive eventual framing of other elements of a common defence policy';
- development towards a common defence rather than a common defence policy 'in the perspective of a common defence';
- an optional protocol containing a mutual defence commitment;
- a new sub-title in either Article J.1.4 or Article J.4: that 'all Member States affirm their commitment to work together in a spirit of loyalty to enhance and develop the mutual political solidarity which has bound them together within the European Union'; and
- insert a reference to the EU's territorial integrity in Article J.2. 2. 105
Additionally, the Irish Presidency proposed granting legal personality to the EU to make it possible for the Union to conclude international agreements. 106
THE PROSPECTS FOR THE CFSP
The conflict in the territories of the former Yugoslavia has been used to demonstrate both the inability of the Union to cope with a conflict of such magnitude through its own efforts and also the problems of decision-making in a system in which the Member States are a substantive source of influence. The EU can take little comfort from its involvement in the region and has been a secondary actor in the attempts at conflict resolution since the UN involvement at the end of 1991. A paradox exists in which the EU was the political actor of greatest significance in Europe yet was effectively marginalised in the resolution or the management of the conflict. The Yugoslav crisis has proved a salutary lesson in the development of the international identity of the Union and has contributed to the closure of the gap between the realisation of the capabilities of the Union and expectations made of it. 107 The innovative instruments that the European Union has utilised in the Yugoslav crisis have not mitigated the criticism that the EU was inactive and ineffective. In short, there remains a gap between the expectations made of the Union and its actual capabilities. The Union's expected capabilities are that it can replicate the actions and instruments of the nation-state-as-actor in international relations. Clearly, at present, it cannot.
The declarations issued, common positions and joint actions undertaken via the CFSP do not yet add up to a coherent foreign policy for the Union. Indeed the Union's failure to respond collectively and with a single voice to crises - as demonstrated during recent Greece-Turkey disputes and in the Middle East - leave a more lasting impression than any of the successful activities undertaken via the CFSP. Indeed, a greater attention to mechanisms for crisis management would represent the greatest advance for the CFSP.
The prospects for the CFSP might also be improved if expectations were lowered and became more realistic. In this respect the CEECs have designated NATO as the best guarantee of their military security and have actively pursued NATO membership. 108 Under the CFSP the Union has tentatively gone beyond drawing upon existing Community strengths in the joint actions that it has undertaken thus far by seeking to create specific instruments to serve particular joint actions. However, the relatively underdeveloped content of the CFSP ensures that there is not a substantial body of policy for the CEECs to digest.
Foreign policy has traditionally been an area of 'high' politics and, as is illustrated in the three-pillar structure created by the Treaty on European Union, there is an unwillingness by the Member States to relinquish direct control. EPC and now the CFSP have operated through the existing structure of foreign ministries and embassies operated by the Member States. However, as signatories to the Treaty of Rome, the Member States of the EC ceded representation of economic issues in an international context to the EC. The CFSP process has moved beyond the economic strength of the EC to back up its foreign policy decisions through the joint actions detailed above. As has been outlined, these measures have not displaced the actions and efforts of Member States, but, instead, rely on the Members being the primary source of influence and implementation. The addition of extra participants in the process ensures that there will be a re-calibration of policy to reflect new foreign policy concerns.
In short, the greatest obstacles to a coherent CFSP are the Member States who want to maintain distinctive individual foreign policies and the means through which to conduct them. Paradoxically, the greatest long term prospect for the CFSP is for that very experience and expertise to be reflected in a CFSP that is also tied to the economic strength of the Union.
Dr Richard Whitman
Centre for the Study of Democracy
University of Westminster
London
December 1996
GLOSSARY
Common European Defence Policy
Central and East European Countries
Common Foreign and Security Policy
Combined Joint Task Forces
European Atomic Energy Community
European Defence Community
European Economic Community
European Community
European Coal and Steel Community
Forces Answerable to WEU
Implementation Force for Bosnia
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
Treaty on European Union
Western European Union
Footnotes
Note 1: Council of the European Communities, Commission of the European Communities, Treaty on European Union (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1992), Article J.1.4. [Hereafter: TEU.] Back.
Note 2: TEU, Title I, 'Common Provisions', Article B. Back.
Note 3: W. Wallace, 'Political Cooperation: Integration Through Intergovernmentalism', in H. Wallace, W. Wallace and C. Webb (eds.), Policy-Making in the European Community, Second Edition, (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1983), pp. 373-4. Back.
Note 4: For a full account of the de Gasperi proposals and the factors behind the EDC, see E. Fursdon, The European Defence Community: A History (London: Macmillan, 1980), pp. 212-17 and chapters 6-8. Back.
Note 5: 'Report by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States on the Problems of Political Unification', Bulletin of the European Communities 11, 1970, pp. 9-14 [Hereafter: Bulletin.] Back.
Note 8: TEU , Title I, Article C. Back.
Note 9: For these objectives, see page 15. Back.
Note 10: This is illustrated by contrasting the press releases of General Affairs Council meetings before and after the TEU. As illustrative of pre-TEU divisions see: 'General Affairs', 1558th Council Meeting, Brussels, 2 March 1992; Press Release, Council of the European Communities General Secretariat 4934/92; 'General Affairs - Political cooperation', 1573rd Council Meeting, Brussels , 11 May 1992; Press Release , Council of the European Communities General Secretariat 6326/92 (Presse 71). For a contrast of these with the post- TEU situation see: 'EU Council of Ministers' Conclusions', 5221/95, Reuters Euro Community Report, March 1995. Back.
Note 11: 'Speech by M. Alain Lamassoure, Minister Delegate, attached to the Minister of Foreign Affairs with responsibility for European Affairs, to the European Parliament', Brussels, 26 April 1995, Statements, Ambassade de France ˆ Londres, Service de Presse et d'Information SAC/95/81, p. 1. Back.
Note 12: G. Edwards & S. Nuttall, 'Common Foreign and Security Policy', in A. Duff, J. Pinder & R. Pryce (eds), Maastricht and Beyond: Building the European Union (London: Routledge for the Federal Trust, 1994). Back.
Note 14: Interview with Assistant Head, Western Europe Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 7 December 1992. Back.
Note 15: TEU, Title V, Articles J.9 & J.8.3. For the organisational sub-division see: Directory of the European Commission: 16 December 1993 (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1994). Back.
Note 16: The appointment created a private and public dispute between van den Broek and the other Commissioners dealing with external relations, Leon Brittan and Manuel Marin. See: 'Daggers out in war for words', The European, 8-11 April 1993, p. 12. Back.
Note 17: TEU, Title V, Article J.5.1-3. Back.
Note 18: TEU , ibid., p. 124. Back.
Note 19: TEU, Title V, Article J.2.1. Back.
Note 20: TEU, Title V, Article J.2.2. Back.
Note 21: TEU, Title V, Article J.2.2-3. Back.
Note 22: TEU, Title V, Article J.1.3. Back.
Note 23: TEU, Title V, Article J.3.1. Back.
Note 24: TEU, ibid., p.125. A declaration attached to the Treaty, 'On voting in the field of common foreign and security policy', takes this principle further: '. . . with regard to Council decisions requiring unanimity, Member States will, to the extent possible, avoid preventing a unanimous decision where a qualified majority exists in favour of that decision'. Full text in TEU, Appendix II, p. 239. Back.
Note 25: Those countries of Central and Eastern Europe - Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary - that have signed an Association Agreement with the European Union. (An Association Agreement anticipates membership of the EU.) Back.
Note 26: As indicative of this see the Europe Agreement signed by the Czech Republic, and the provisions contained in: Title I 'Political Dialogue: Proposal for a Council and Commission Decision concerning the conclusion of a Europe Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Czech Republic, of the other part', COM (93) 386 final, Brussels, 28 July 1993. Back.
Note 27: 'Guidelines for the Implementation of the 7 March General Affairs Council Conclusions on Enhanced Political Dialogue with the Associated Central and Eastern European Countries', Doc. 10344/94. Back.
Note 28: Agence Europe , 9 March 1994, pp. 4-5. In the second half of 1995 a series of 12 either troika or plenary meetings of experts dealt with the following topics: terrorism, the UN, disarmament, security, OSCE, nuclear non-proliferation, chemical and biological non-proliferation, drugs, conventional arms exports, human rights, former Yugoslavia, Central Europe, and Central Asia. 'Relations with the Associated CCEE in the Second Half of 1995', Presidency Conclusions - Madrid, 15 and 16 December 1995, Annex 6. Back.
Note 29: Report from the Council on relations with the associated CEECs during the first half of 1996 (8169/96 PECOS 81), Presidency Conclusions, Florence 21 and 22 June 1996. Back.
Note 30: COM(95)0163 - C4-0166/95. Back.
Note 31: As indicative see the positions of Czech and Bulgarian commentators: Jaroslav Sedivy, 'Common Foreign and Security Policy: A Central European View' in: S. A. Pappas & S. Vanhoonacker (eds.), The European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Challenges of the Future (Maastricht: EIPA, 1996); P. Pantev, V. Rachev & V. Tsachevski, Bulgaria and the Balkans in the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union (Sofia: Institute for Security and International Studies, 1995). Back.
Note 32: TEU, J.1.2, pp. 123-124. Back.
Note 33: Annex I, Conclusions of the Presidency, European Council, Lisbon 26-27 June 1992. (DOC92/3, Commission of the European Communities.) Back.
Note 34: Ibid., Point 2. Back.
Note 35: Ibid., Point 3. Back.
Note 36: 'This will enable the European Union to have an improved capacity to tackle problems at their roots in order to anticipate the outbreak of crises.' Idem. Back.
Note 37: Ibid., Point 10. Back.
Note 38: Ibid., Point 12. Back.
Note 39: Ibid., points 30 & 32. Back.
Note 40: Ibid., Point 17. Back.
Note 41: Ibid., point 35. Back.
Note 42: Presidency Conclusions, European Council in Brussels, 29 October 1993, p. 3. Back.
Note 43: EC Treaty, Article 228a. Back.
Note 44: For an example see: Council Regulation (EC) No109/95 of 23 January 1995, amending Regulation (EC) No 2472/94, which suspends certain elements of the embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Official Journal No L 20, 27.1.1995. Back.
Note 45: See any European Political Cooperation Press Release. For example: 'Statement on Nigeria', Brussels, 13 July 1993, P.69/93. Back.
Note 46: For example: 'Declaration by the European Union on Algeria', Common Foreign and Security Policy Press Release , 31 January 1995, PESC/95/5. Back.
Note 47: 'Belgium calls for clear EU policy on Russia', Reuters Euro Community Report , 10 January 1995. Back.
Note 48: Europe: Agence Internationale d'Information pour la Presse [Hereafter: Agence Europe], No. 6103, 8/9 November 1993, p. 3. Back.
Note 49: Agence Europe, No. 6123, 8 December 1993, p. 3. Back.
Note 50: Agence Europe, No. 6164 5, February 1994, p. 3. Back.
Note 51: Agence Europe , No. 6125, 10 December 1993, p. 4. Back.
Note 53: Agence Europe No. 6152, 20 January 1994, p. 6. Back.
Note 54: Agence Europe No. 6123, 8 December 1993, p. 3. Back.
Note 55: 'New French pact aims to avoid Ò second YugoslaviaÓ', Financial Times, 10 June 1993, p. 2. Back.
Note 56: Agence Europe, No. 6139, 31 December 1993, p. 3. Back.
Note 57: Note the comments by Alain JuppŽ: '. . . to our minds there is also a link between this exercise in preventive diplomacy and the major issue that will be on the next decade's agenda: the enlargement of the European Union. . . . [It is] that the applicant countries also put their own affairs in order, in the same way as the Union must put its affairs in order, by solving their own problems of neighbourly co-existence. This is why the conference on stability will help facilitate future enlargement'. 'Address by M. Alain JuppŽ, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the Anglo-American press lunch', Service de Presse et d'Information , Ambassade de France ˆ Londres, 2 May 1994, SS/94/89, p. 15. See also 'Foreign Secretary to Visit Paris', Press Release , Foreign and Commonwealth Office No. 76, 26 May 1994: 'The EU's objective is to help nine countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria) resolve problems, especially concerning frontiers and minorities, which could be an impediment to EU membership.' Back.
Note 58: 'Address by M. Alain JuppŽ, Minister of Foreign Affairs to the National Assembly (Paris, 12 April 1994), Speeches and Statements , Ambassade de France ˆ Londres, Service de Presse et d'Information SS/94/72, p. 27; and Agence Europe ,No. 6154, 22 January 1994, p. 3. Back.
Note 59: Financial Times, 21 March 1995, p. 2. Back.
Note 60: 'Stability pact may be Balladur's swansong', Reuters Euro Community Report , 20 March 1995. Back.
Note 61: Agence Europe, No. 6803, 4 September 1996, p. 2. Back.
Note 62: 'Address by M. Alain JuppŽ, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on behalf of the European Union and the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, at the NPT Review and Extension Conference (New York, 18 April 1995)', Statements, Ambassade de France ˆ Londres, Service de Presse et d'Information SAC/95/78, p. 31. Back.
Note 63: Agence Europe , No. 6141, 5 January 1994, p. 5. Back.
Note 64: The role of the Parliament is detailed in TEU, Title V, Article J.7. Back.
Note 65: For details of the debate see: Agence Europe, No. 6147, 13 January 1994, p. 5; No. 6153, 21 January 1994; No. 6171, 16 February 1994, p. 5; No. 6174, 19 February 1994, p. 5; No. 6175 , 21/22 February 1994, p. 5; No. 6184, 5 March 1994, p. 7; No. 6185, 7/8 March 1994, p. 9; No. 6212, 16 April 1994; and No. 6216, 22 April 1994, p. 5. Back.
Note 66: TEU, Title V, Articles J.4.1 & J.4.2. Back.
Note 67: TEU, Declaration No. 30. Back.
Note 68: Brussels Treaty, as amended by the Protocol modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty, signed at Paris on October 23, 1954. Article V states: 'If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.' Back.
Note 69: P. Tsakaloyannis, The Reactivation of the Western European Union and its effects on the European Community and its Institutions (Brussels: EIPA, 1985). Back.
Note 70: For an account of the history of the WEU from 1985 to 1992 see: T. Salmon, 'Testing Times for European political cooperation: the Gulf and Yugoslavia, 1990-1992', International Affairs 68, 2 (1992) pp. 233-53. Back.
Note 71: Western European Union Council of Ministers, Petersberg Declaration, Bonn, 19 June 1992, II.4. Back.
Note 72: Of prospective EU members, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, also contributed troops. Back.
Note 73: North Atlantic Council, 'CommuniquŽ from the Ministerial Meeting in Berlin, 3 June, AgenceEurope Documents, No. 1989, 5 June 1996. Back.
Note 74: Western European Union Council of Ministers, Kirchberg Declaration, 9 May 1994, I.6. Back.
Note 75: The Economist ,10 December 1994, p. 40. Back.
Note 76: The UK government disputes that the proposed aircraft is large enough to be considered strategic. See: 'Britain relents on common defence', Financial Times , 15 May 1995, p. 2. Back.
Note 77: Hans van Mierlo, Nato Review , March 1995, p. 8. Back.
Note 78: Preliminary Conclusions on the formulation of a Common European Defence Policy. The document was endorsed by the WEU Council of Ministers in the Noordwijk Declaration of 14 November 1994. Back.
Note 79: Preliminary Conclusions on the Formulation of a Common Defence Policy, Part B, II.25. Back.
Note 80: Nooordwijk Declaration, 14 November 1994. Back.
Note 81: WEU, Kirchberg Declaration, II, 'Document on a Status of Association with WEU for the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, The Republic of Hungary, The Republic of Latvia, The Republic of Lithuania, The Republic of Poland, Romania, and the Slovak Republic.' Back.
Note 82: High Level Group of Experts on the CFSP, European security policy towards 2000: ways and means to establish credibility, Brussels, 19 December 1994, p. 4. Back.
Note 83: TEU, Declaration No.30, I. 6. Back.
Note 84: See 'A European Union capable of more effective action in the field of foreign and security policy', Discussion Paper of the Executive Committee of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group for the Intergovernmental Conference in 1996. Back.
Note 85: High Level Group of Experts, ibid, p. 13. Back.
Note 86: The position of the UK government. See: 'PM outlines plan for European defence pact', Financial Times, 2 March 1995, p. 10. Back.
Note 87: 'French minister seeks EU defence pact in 1996', Reuters Euro Community Report , 10 January 1995. Back.
Note 88: 'Nato blessing for the Euro-corps', Financial Times , 22 January 1993, p. 2. Back.
Note 89: 'Europe presents arms', The European, 12-18 November 1993, p. 6. Back.
Note 90: 'Portugal proposes WEU intelligence organisation', Reuters Euro Community Report , 4 January, 1995. Back.
Note 91: 'Air forces link paves the way to a new European alliance', The Guardian, November 19 1994 , p. 11. Back.
Note 92: For a recent discussion on the shifting concept of neutrality and its different foundations in EU Member States, see: P. Calvocoressi, 'Neutrality Now', in S. Harden (ed.), Neutral States and the European Community (London: Brassey's, 1994). Back.
Note 93: The foreign ministers of the Central and Eastern European countries, together with those of Malta and Cyprus, took part in a dinner with the EU15 after the first ministerial meeting of the IGC on 29 March. Agence Europe, No.6700, 1/2 April 1996, p. 3. Back.
Note 94: The differences in position of the Member States were made clear in the words of the Reflection Group Report: 'For most of us, this unit should be answerable to the Council. Many of us also think that it should be recruited from Member States, Council Secretariat and Commission and be established within the institutional framework of the Union. It has been suggested by some that the head of the unit, whose functions could eventually merge with those of the Secretary General of the WEU, should be the Secretary General of the Council. Presidency Conclusions - Madrid 15 and 16 December 1995, Annex 15. Back.
Note 95: Agence Europe, No. 6777, 25 July 1996. Back.
Note 96: Agence Europe, No. 6786, 7 August 1996. Back.
Note 97: This is the proposal of the Christian Democratic Union special committee on foreign affairs. See: 'Bonn spurs moves for joint foreign policy', Financial Times, 17 September 1996, p. 2. Back.
Note 98: The Reflection Group Report offered four options for the future WEU-EU relationship: 1) Maintaining full autonomy of WEU but a reinforced partnership; 2) A closer link to allow the Union to direct the WEU for Petersberg tasks; 3) Incorporation of the Petersberg tasks into the TEU; 4) A gradual integration of the WEU into the EU through the WEU either agreeing to a full merger or a WEU commitment to implement military issues. The Report proposed that the fourth option could be realised not just by incorporating the Petersberg tasks into the Treaty but via a collective defence commitment contained either in the main body of the Treaty or as a Protocol to the revised TEU. Back.
Note 99: See the joint memorandum issued by the Finnish and Swedish governments: 'The IGC and the Security and Defence Dimension: Towards an enhanced EU Role in Crisis Management', 25 April 1996. INTERNET: http://www.cec.lu./en/agenda/igc-home/ms-doc/state-fi/finlswed.html. Back.
Note 100: Ireland's first ever White Paper on defence policy has raised the possibility of involvement on a case-by-case basis. See: 'Irish may seek to join NATO peace partnership', Financial Times, 27 March 1996, p. 2. Back.
Note 101: Speech by Ambassador Scheich, Austria's Permanent Representative to the EU, to the Konrad-Adenauer-Stifung, 12 June 1996. Agence Europe ,No.6748, 14 June 1996. Back.
Note 102: Illustrated most recently by Jacques Chirac in an address to the Polish Parliament. 'Chirac wants Poland in EU by 2000', Financial Times, 13 September 1996. For a recent comprehensive study on the financial, political and strategic costs of enlargement see: R. D. Asmus, R. L. Kugler & F. S. Larrabee, 'What will NATO enlargement cost?', Survival 38, 3 (Autumn 1996), pp. 5-26. Back.
Note 103: Agence Europe, No. 6777, 25 July 1996. Back.
Note 106: Agence Europe, No. 6779, 27 July 1996. Back.
Note 107: C. Hill, 'The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualising Europe's International Role', Journal of Common Market Studies 31, 3 (September 1993, pp. 305-28. Back.
Note 108: Public support for membership of NATO varies across the CEECs, as recent Eurobarometer polling indicates. In Poland 69 per cent support membership and only 6 per cent oppose; in Romania 64 per cent approve and 4 per cent disapprove. The greatest number of those opposed to membership are to be found in Bulgaria (26 per cent); the Czech Republic (23 per cent); and Hungary (22 per cent) (Central and Eastern Europe Eurobarometer, No. 6 March 1996.) Back.
