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The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference
Centre for the Study of Democracy
University of Westminster
CSD Perspectives, Number 7 Winter 1995
Published By University Of Westminster Press
Introduction
The European Union—born on I November 1993—is about to embark on a constitutional convention, the aim of which is to consider what will be the appropriate institutional and policy arrangements to take it into the early twenty-first century. This convention labours under the title of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, or IGC. The eve of the conference is a good time to evaluate where the European Union (EU) currently finds itself and to reflect on the process of European integration.
Four institutions of the EU—the Council of Ministers, the Commission, the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament—have recently published reports on the functioning of the Union. 1 Each of these reports has been fed into a 'Reflection Group', which began work in June 1995. The Reflection Group is made up of representatives of the EU member states' governments, of the Commission, and of the European Parliament, and it intends to report on its deliberations at the Madrid European Council meeting in December 1995. The IGC proper will not start until 1996.
The focus of this paper is not primarily on the likely stances of the institutions of the Union towards the IGC. Nor is it on the stances of the EU member states, which are starting to become apparent, and which will inevitably undergo revision during the ebb and flow of the IGC. Rather, the paper uses the IGC process to bring into relief both the current status of integration through the EU and a set of imperatives that is likely to govern the direction of European integration as the Union enters the twenty-first century.
The paper explores three perspectives on the IGC—neo-constitutional, neo-functionalist, and informal integrative—and asks how, in the light of these perspectives, the current status and the future of European integration might be comprehended. These perspectives—and here they depart from those used in many discussions of the IGC—can be classed as 'anational' and 'ainstitutional'. That is, they do not reflect particular positions articulated or promulgated by any one EU member state or by an institution of the Union.
The IGC
The origins and the purpose of the IGC are to be found in the process of negotiation leading to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), agreed in Maastricht in December 1991 (the 'Maastricht Treaty') and which came into force on I November 1993. Article N.2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) stated that a 'a conference of representatives of the governments of the Member States shall be convened in 1996 to examine those provisions of this Treaty for which revision is provided.'
It is worth reflecting on this article. First, the conference itself has the broadest of formal start dates and, most important, there is no date set for its conclusion. Secondly, the participants in the IGC with the power of decision are representatives of the governments of the member states. Thirdly, the conference is intended to roll the Union forward within the framework of existing agreements and institutional structures. To borrow the language of the cold war, 'roll-back' was not considered when the article was drafted.
Since the drafting of the TEU the confidence of those promoting the relance of formal European integration—a relance that began with the single market programme launched in the mid-1980s—has been shattered, for a number of reasons: first, by the continuation of warfare in the territories of the pre-l991 Yugoslav Republic; secondly, by the fact that the Maastricht Treaty took twenty-one grueling months to ratify—and, as a result, came into effect eleven months late; thirdly, by the collapse of the Exchange Rate Mechanism in September 1992 and the subsequent calling into question of the timetable for monetary union fine-detailed in the TEU; fourthly, by the continuation of persistently high levels of unemployment in the member states of the Union. At the same time, the Union has enlarged itself to fifteen members and committed itself to further enlargements to the east and the south. The context of the European integration process in the mid-199Os is almost the inverse of the situation in the mid-1980s. The approving consensus, shared by politicians and peoples, on the programme to create the single market has been replaced by uncertainty and division. This was demonstrated by the election of the anti-integrationist members of the 'Other Europe' to the European Parliament in June 1994, the electoral platform of President Chirac, and the deep divisions in the Conservative Party in the UK. In the light of such events it is not surprising that a set of papers by a self-styled 'Jean Monnet Group of Experts' in the UK has entitled its contributions to the debate on the IGC Crisis or Opportunity? 2 As a consequence of the force of these circumstances the IGC encompasses all facets of the activities of the EU.
The institutional and member state perspectives on the IGC are likely to capture headlines in the news media; and, if the intergovernmental process that resulted in the Maastricht Treaty is any indication, the debate will be cast in terms of winners and losers. However, alternative readings of the IGC are possible.
Perspective 1: Neo-Constitutional
A neo-constitutional perspective focuses attention on the existing constitutional framework. This perspective can do no more than seek to explore the text-based norms through which the institutions, practices, and principles of European Union governance are defined and structured.
The neo-constitutional perspective on the IGC explores the possible contents and context of the IGC by reflecting on the bedrock of the European Union, that is, the three Treaties, their subsequent revisions, and the body of law that derives from them. These treaties are the 1951 Treaty of Paris that created the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and the two 1957 Treaties of Rome that established, respectively, the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) and the European Economic Community (EEC).
The neo-constitutional perspective can be distinguished from approaches that focus on the EU from an international perspective. Furthermore, this perspective asserts that the EU has a functioning constitution, although one which does not readily sit within the framework of comparative constitutional literature. 3 The appellation 'neo-constitutionalism' has been applied to this perspective to distinguish it from that of the advocates of a new founding constitution for a United States of Europe, 4 and from the approach of those who have proposed a new draft constitution in order to ensure that a United States of Europe is not created. 5
From an International Relations standpoint the European Union is both a distinctive, and a problematic, actor in international society. An examination of the legal basis of the EU illustrates that the Union has transcended the commonplace understanding of the form and function of an international organization (IO), but does not conform to the classification, in international law, of a nation-state. The legal order of the EU illustrates, above all, the inadequacy of classifying the Union as an international organization. International organizations can be understood as being '. . . the more concrete manifestation of regularized international relations . . . with their formal and material existence separate from, though for the most part dependent on, states and groups within states'; 6 an I0 is '. . . a formal continuous structure established by agreement between members . . . with the aim of pursuing the common interest of the membership'. 7
The EU conforms to these definitions of an international organization. Specifically, the fact that its membership consists of nation-states designates it as an intergovernmental organization (IGO). However, the EU, and the European Community (EC) before it, have long puzzled theorists and commentators in the academic discipline of International Relations. In particular, the project of EU integration is one of the significant tests of theoretical virility in the on- going inter-paradigm debate between neo-realists and neo-liberals on the extent to which nation-states can act co-operatively and how state-to-state relations can be transformed. 8
The EU cannot simply be classified as an 10, IGO, or as an international regime because of its unique legal foundation and legal order. As two distinguished commentators have noted:
No other international organization enjoys such reliably effective supremacy of its law over the laws of member governments, with a recognized Court of Justice to adjudicate disputes. The Community legal process has a dynamic of its own. 9
The EU is similar to other international organizations by virtue of the fact that it was established by treaties that were enacted under international law. However, the content of these treaties also constitutes its point of departure from other international organizations. the treaties on which the EU rests establish independent Communities (the ECSC, EAEC and EEC—the latter amended to become the European Community [ECl under the Treaty on European Union) endowed with their own sovereign rights and competencies. The member state signatories have pooled parts of their own legislative powers and placed them in the hands of institutions in which, however, the member states retain substantial rights of participation. 10 This form of relationship, separate from, yet also composed of, the member states, is unusual enough to warrant its designation as a distinctive legal order. EC law enjoys a symbiotic relationship with the legal systems of the member states and with international law, yet it remains distinguishable from both systems: it is, indeed, a unique legal phenomenon. 11
The legal system of the Union is undoubtedly supranational. 12 This designation is intended to convey that the Union is endowed with independent authority, with distinctive sovereign rights, and with a legal order independent of the member states to which both the member states and their citizens are subject in those matters in which the EC has been granted competence. This granting of competence is important because powers have been conferred on the Community institutions only in limited spheres, and the EC institutions have not been given any power to increase their competences unilaterally. 13 Therefore, in this important respect the Community lacks the universal jurisdiction characteristic of a state: it does not have the power to create new fields of competence. 14
The political constitution of the European Union
It can be posited that the EU does, in fact, have a constitution and, further, that the existence of that constitution enables us to draw certain inferences about the form and functioning of the Union.
For the purposes of this paper a constitution refers to '. . . the institutions, practices, and principles that define and structure a system of government and to the written document that articulates such a system'. 15
Not only does the EU have a constitution but, indeed, two: a written legal constitution and a written political constitution. Both of these dimensions can identified in the arrangements created by the Treaty on European Union. 16
The EU can be characterised as a three-pillar structure. This image illustrates how the EU departs from the arrangements that obtained prior to its creation on I November 1993. The European Communities—the ECSC, EAEC, and the EC—have not disappeared but represent pillar one. Pillars two and three are provisions introduced by the TEU and consist of, respectively, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and co-operation on Home and Judicial Affairs (HJA).
The three pillars are the total political constitution of the EU. Furthermore the pillar structure also distinguishes between those elements covered by the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the differing roles played by the other institutions of the Union. In seeking to distinguish between the legal constitution and the political constitution as separate decision-making processes the role and jurisdiction of the ECJ is of defining importance.
Those elements that fall solely within the political constitution of the Union, and are not subject to the ECJ, are the following components of the TEU: Title I—the Common Provisions; Title V—Common Foreign and Security Policy provisions; Title Vl -provisions on co-operation in the fields of justice and home affairs (excluding the third paragraph of Article.3(2)(c).); and the Declarations attached to the Treaty. 17
The Common Provisions have several purposes. They clarify the intended relationship of the European Union, established by the Treaty, to existing Communities. 18 The intention of the drafters was that the European Union should not supplant the existing Communities but, rather, enjoy a complementary relationship with them. This intention is reinforced by Articles C—E of the Common Provisions that cover institutional matters. 19 Despite the commitment to a single institutional framework contained in the TEU, the roles and functions of the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, and the Court of Justice are different when use is being made of the provisions excluded from the written legal constitution as outlined above. 20 The only explicitly Union institution which is not a part of the written legal constitution is the European Council, which is composed of the heads of state or government of the member states and the president of the Commission. 21 The Common Provisions also outline the five-fold objectives of the Union:
- to promote economic and social progress which is balanced and sustainable, in particular through the creation of an area without internal frontiers, through the strengthening of economic and social cohesion and through the establishment of economic and monetary union, ultimately including a single currency in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;
- to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense;
- to strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of the nationals of its Member States through the introduction of a citizenship of the Union;
- to develop close co-operation on justice and home affairs;
- to maintain in full the acquis communautaire and build on it.
These objectives illustrate that the remit of the Union is intended to traverse activities normally considered to encompass both the domestic and the international spheres. However, the intention is not to supplant the core role and functions of the state in the domestic sphere. The elements of the written political constitution dealing with co-operation in the fields of justice and home affairs merely designate areas of common interest and establish mechanisms to co-ordunate action. 22 The intended method of operation replicates the second pillar of the Union, the CFSP.
The TEU designated areas of the written political constitution to be reviewed by the IGC. In particular, the IGC will consider revising the provisions of the TEU dealing with security and defense, including the Western European Union (WEU), on the basis of a report to be produced by the Council of Ministers for the European Council. 23 However, the European Council meeting at loannina in Corfu in June 1994 opened up the content of the IGC beyond the pre-programmed reviews contained within the TEU. Not only did the European Council establish the Reflection Group but it gave the Group a wide remit:
The Reflection Group will examine and elaborate ideas relating to the provisions of the Treaty on European Union for which revision is foreseen and other possible improvements in a spirit of democracy and openness, on the basis of the evaluation of the functioning of the treaty.... It will also elaborate opinions in the perspective of the future enlargement of the Union on the institutional questions set out in the conclusions of the European Council in Brussels and in the loannina agreement (weighting of votes, the threshold for qualified majority decisions, number of members of the Commission and any other measure deemed necessary to facilitate the work of the Institutions and guarantee their effective operation in the perspective of enlargement). 24
All three pillars of the Union are subject to the deliberations of the Reflection Group.
The legal constitution of the European Union
As indicated above (footnote 11) the Union does not enjoy a legal personality. Therefore, for the purpose of discussing the written legal constitution, we will refer to EC law and this expression is intended to encompass the law of all three Communities.
The EU constitution is not laid down in a single document encompassing a single legal order. The constitution includes not only the founding Treaties and their amendments, but other legal instruments as well: Community legislation, international law, and principles of law.
We will first present an exposition of the framework of the EC Treaty. As will immediately become apparent, EC law does not range as widely as the laws of its member states. For example, EC law is not directly concerned with matters of criminal law or family law.
The Treaties
The founding Treaties and their successive amendments are often called the primary law of the EC. If we focus upon the content of the Treaties (and we will use the EC Treaty as illustrative) it becomes apparent that much of this content concerns the details of policy, outlining both general principles and policy sectors which need to be developed. When compared with the written constitutions of the member states—for example, with the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany—the EC Treaty appears cluttered with policy matters, rather than just providing for the means by which policy is to be enacted.
The EC Treaty text is divided into six parts: 'Principles', 'Citizenship of the Union', 'Community Policies', 'Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories', 'Institutions of the Community', and 'General and Final Provisions'. 'Principles' establishes that the Community's primary concern is with economic activity:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and an economic and monetary union and by implementing the common policies or activities referred to in Articles 3 and 3a, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities, sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment, a high degree of convergence of economic importance, a high level of employment and of social protection, the raising of the standard of living and the quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member states. 25
The activities of the Community intended to give effect to these objectives are established in Article 3 of the EC Treaty. This article conveys differing levels of commitment to twenty differing activities. Aside from the creation of a customs union and an internal market, and matters concerned with the regulation of these two, such as competition policy, the strongest commitment is to common policies. These are in the fields of commercial policy, agriculture and fisheries, and transport. So-called 'policy areas', as distinct from common policies, cover the social sphere, environment, and development co-operation. Economic and social cohesion, and the competitiveness of Community industry activities, are to be subject to 'strengthening'; 'measures' are to be taken in the spheres of energy, 'civil protection', and tourism; research and technical development are to be promoted; 'encouragement' is to be given to the establishment of 'trans-European networks' (ie, a transport infrastructure); and a 'contribution' is to be made to consumer protection, health protection, education and training, and 'the flowering of the cultures of the member states'. 26
In none of these areas is the Community granted exclusive competence to exercise power (except the Common Commercial Policy). 27 Exclusive competence is important because of the principle of subsidiarity introduced to the EC Treaty by the TEU.
The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein.
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiary, only if and so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by member states and can therefore, by reason of the scale or the effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.
Any action of the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty. 28
The division of powers between the member states is perhaps obscured, rather than clarified, by the principle of subsidiary. It has always been clear that the Community can only act where it has a legal basis to do so, and the only area in which the exercise of power is unequivocal is in those matters of exclusive competence. The principle itself comes under the jurisdiction of the ECJ. Questions of subsidiary are also bound up with a discussion of the development of a legislative hierarchy of norms for EC law. 29
Part Two of the EC Treaty, as amended by the TEU, introduced the principle of citizenship of the Union. Although the shortest of the six parts of the EC Treaty, the placing of citizenship of the Union as the first part of the EC Treaty after 'Principles' and before consideration of the institutions of the Community is significant. Although, under the EC Treaty, the Community's citizens do not formally grant sovereignty directly to the Community, this placing might be read as an implicit acknowledgment that the Community has matured beyond being an international organization. The attainment of citizenship of the Union is through nationality of a member state. Under Article 8 of the EC Treaty, EU citizenship is intended to complement, rather than displace, citizenship of a member state. EU citizenship establishes a set of transnational citizenship rights:
- the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the member states;
- the right to vote and stand as a candidate in municipal elections in the EU state of one's residence;
- the right to vote and stand as a candidate of the European Parliament in whatever member state one resides;
- the right to petition the European Parliament;
- the right to raise any case of alleged maladministration by any EC institution with an Ombudsman;
- entitlement to diplomatic and consular protection in a third country by any of the other states when one's own state does not have representation. 30
The development of a European citizenship with rights and obligations has taken place since the foundation of the Community; 31 the establishment of a Union citizenship has created, in the words of one commentator, a 'Union of European States and Peoples'. 32 However, absent from the rights and duties of citizenship of the Union is a role in amending the Constitution—that is, the outcome of the IGC—aside from the role that derives from citizenship of the individual member states and the respective constitutional requirements of the member states that they ratify the outcome of the IGC. The European Parliament is granted no formal role in any intergovernmental conference or in the ratification of the outcome of such a conference.
Although there is, in the EC's written political constitution, a commitment to respect the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the European Community itself has not acceded to the Convention and the commitment article is not covered by the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. 33 Both the Commission and the European Parliament have urged that the EC accede to the Convention in their reports on the functioning of the TEU. Accession has also formed part of the deliberations of the Reflection Group, together with discussions on an EU citizens' charter of fundamental rights. 34
Part Three of the EC Treaty sets out Community policies. Of especial importance is that this part of the Treaty seeks to establish the four freedoms of the Community: the movements of goods, persons, services, and capital. These freedoms are exercised behind a Common External Tariff and a Common Commercial Policy. Citizenship rights and obligations are embedded in Community policies. The exponential increase in areas of internal Community policy competence, apparent in the 1987 Single European Act (SEA) and the TEU, looks unlikely to be a feature of the 1996 IGC, with neither the Commission, nor the European Council, nor the European Parliament, in their reports on the operation of the TEU, proposing expansion. 35 However, tme TEU committed the IGC to look at the introduction of titles dealing specifically with civil protection, energy and tourism.
The substance of Part Four of the EC Treaty is on the association of the Overseas Countries and Territories and reflects the colonial legacy of member states in general and the constitutional arrangements of the French Republic in particular. The form of Association established under Part Four, and currently in existence as the Lome IV Convention, is unlikely to continue in its present form beyond its expiry in 1999. The contents of this part of the Treaty are unlikely to feature on the agenda of the IGC, unless a wholesale re-writing of the Treaties is contemplated. The opinion of the ECJ is that '. . . the forthcoming process of revision might provide an opportunity for codifying and streamlining the constitutive Treaties'. 36
Part Five of the EC Treaty—'Institutions of the Community'—encompasses the decision- making processes of the Community and appears, in addition to the CFSP, to be the section that will attract greatest attention in the IGC. The widening of the Union beyond the existing fifteen member states is providing the impetus for institutional reform (as was noted by the European Council at Corfu). The TEU provided for a widening of the legislative process by introducing a third reading for legislation, the co-decision procedure: this greatly enhances the role of the European Parliament in the legislative process, but applies to limited areas. 37 The TEU also provided for an examination of a hierarchy of the different Community legislative acts. 38 The stress upon institutional questions, as noted in the Corfu Conclusions, has been reinforced by the Conclusions of the June 1995 European Council meeting in Cannes. Unwilling to wait for the report of the Reflection Group (which, as mentioned above, are due to be submitted to the Madrid European Council in December 1995), the European Council sent a 'postcard' from Cannes restating its conclusions reached at Corfu and, furthermore, discussed the IGC at an informal meeting in Majorca on 22-23 September 1995.
The neo-constitutional approach to the IGC seeks retrospectively to accommodate the practice of intergovernmental conferences that date back to the IGC which founded the European Coal and Steel Community and which have functioned as a form of constitutional convention. The 1996 IGC, pre-programmed by the TEU, has been provided with a number of items for its agenda by the TEU itself. Subsequently, these items have been joined by a number of issues raised since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and as a consequence of the recent enlargement of the Union: these include the loannina Agreement on the balance of votes and voting between large and small states in the Council of Ministers, and the size of the Commission. Also, and importantly, the Corfu summit expanded the mandate of the Reflection Group.
How does a neo-constitutional perspective assist in an understanding of the IGC? First, an examination of the EU's constitution demonstrates the pre-programmed set of aspirations, policy intentions and legislative practices in existence. The constitution has long functioned as a framework of aspirations that has been filled out over time. At the heart of the Maastricht IGCs was the debate as to whether to proceed with a 'tree' approach—that is, to add more on to the existing 'trunk' of the Community and its institutions—or to adopt the pillar approach—the latter was eventually realized in the Maastricht Treaty. The project to replace the pillar structure with the tree has already re-surfaced in the IGC debate. Secondly, the principle of 'subsidiarity' introduced to the constitution may well displace supranationality as the most significant concept in guiding future deliberations. Thirdly, the establishment of Union citizenship, especially coupled with developments in co-operation in the area of home and judicial affairs, opens up another front for debates on citizenship.
The weakness of the neo-constitutional perspective is that it provides only a limited framework within which to consider the context and processes of European integration beyond the IGC. The consideration of the process and the context of integration has long been considered through the prism of theories of integration. It is to a neofunctionalist, integrationist, perspective on the IGC that we now turn.
Perspective 2: Neo-Functionalism
The credibility and success of the EC/EU has long been judged by the degree of formal integration that is perceived to have been undertaken, planned, or to be in progress. 39 For example, the 1970s are often viewed as a period of 'Euro-sclerosis' or 'Euro-pessimism' because of the lack of substantive formal integrative developments in the EC in that period. In contrast, the period encompassing the construction of the Single Market in the mid-1980s until the completion of the negotiations for the TEU in 1991 can be viewed as a period of reinvigoration of the Community method. 40 Inevitably, any consideration of immigration requires us to reflect more deeply on the nature of the integrative process, the extent of integration, and on methods of comprehending and measuring integration. Any of these projects would, in themselves, require considerable exposition.
A comprehensive account of the European Union in general, and of the 1996 IGC particular, cannot be written from a purely integrationist standpoint. Rather, a more multifarious account is required. The standpoint of this paper is not that the logic of integration, or the methods of conceptualizing integration, are flawed, but, rather, that, in seeking to assess the possible direction of the IGC, a focus upon a process of integration can only provide a partial account. Of at least equal importance is the disintegrative counterpoint to any process of integration, 41 together with a consideration of the international and regional content within which integration takes place.
Formal Integration
Charting the history of, and inherent tensions, between integration/federalism and intergovernmentalism/member-state sovereignty in the European Union has long been a favoured device in accounting for the development of the EC/EU. 42 The growth of an integration process in the immediate post-war period in Western Europe generated the development of theories of integration which themselves, in turn, helped promote integration. It is, therefore, impossible to understand the integration process without having an understanding of the theory that sought to capture and account for that process.
Integration theories declined in fashion as the European integration process was perceived to falter. However, this process only faltered in what has been called the 'formal integrative' sense. 43 This is defined as integration undertaken through the framework of institutions, and the consequential rules, regulations and policies, created under the auspices of the Treaty of Paris, and reinforced and extended by the Treaties of Rome and the successive revision of these three treaties. The essence of the formal integration process is that it is both deliberate and discontinuous. 44
The formal integrative project has proceeded at an uneven pace. A period of high formal integration existed until the 1960s, when the notion of supranationalism was challenged by the French President, Charles de Gaulle. After this challenge different forms of co-operation were established. The Hague summit of 19t9 marked the start of this type of co-operation, and it continued with the creation of the European Council and initiation of European Political Co operation. These new forms of co-operation—parallel to the Community—were established in areas where the member states did not feel confident about working together within the Community. Community co-operation continued with the consolidation of the Community budget system, the launch of proposals for European Monetary Union (EMU) and the successive enlargements of the Community. The 1970s laid the foundations of the multi-dimensional forms of co-operation that characterise the Union today and which are built around a core of formal integration.
In this reading of the history of the Union the apogee of this multi-dimensional co-operation was the Treaty on European Union, which enriched the blend of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. It simultaneously strengthened the Community method of integration whilst codifying other associated forms of co-operation that were apparent in the 1987 Single European Act. 45 The combination of formal integrative developments within the Community with these other forms of co-operation raises the question as to how the integration process is conceived and whether traditional forms of accounting for integration retain any purchase.
Neo-functionalism revisited
During the early period of high formal integration of the late 1950s and early 1960s, the European Community provided the inspiration for a middle-range theory that sought to account for the creation and development of the integration process in Europe. E. B. Haas, in The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economical Forces, 1950-1957, 46 sought to offer a thesis about an emerging process of European integration. Haas's work remains the definitive approach to the study of European integration. (Others have subsequently written about integration but, unfortunately, without the blend of rigorous empirical work and theoretical reflection that is the hallmark of The Uniting of Europe.) In particular, Haas was aware of three elements of the European integration process that remain crucial to an understanding of contemporary European integration: first, an understanding of integration as an ideology; secondly, integration as a set of institutions and institutional practices; thirdly, integration as a process and, importantly, one which has both national and supranational dimensions.
Haas's study, published in 1958, focused on the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and specifically on those groups and countries accepting, rather than rejecting, European integration. Hence the voices and attitudes of those states other than the founding Six (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany), and those within the founding states opposed to integration, are absent from the study. Clearly, any attempt to understand the contemporary dynamics of the process of European Union integration needs to move beyond a focus on supporters of integration if it is to capture the full richness of the European Union. Haas also concluded that the model of the integration process outlined was germane only to the socio-political landscape of Western Europe. 47 The focus on the Western component of the content is no longer either feasible or desirable after the Cold War and after the commitment to enlarge the Union given at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993.
One of Haas's original key assertions was that for the ECSC to function as a scheme of political unification it did not require absolute majority support, nor did its members need to have identical aims. 48 Haas was clear that the process he was examining was one of 'political integration' leading to the formation of a political community understood as
a condition in which specific groups and individuals show more loyalty to their central political institutions than to any other political authority, in a specific period of time and in a definable geographic space. 49
The assumption was that group conflict was an integral part of the policy-making process of the member states, and would be a characteristic of the emerging Europe;m political community. Groups, understood as being composed on the basis of shared interests or affinity, were viewed as crucial to the integration process. In addition, Haas viewed a shared body of belief as a central characteristic of a political community, one which creates a reservoir of consensus about how to conduct any conflict that is deep enough to limit the conflict's severity.
For Haas, conflict, consensus, and the unity provided by national identity, despite the diversity within nation-states, were considered to be defining components of Western political communities, and were imputed to be characteristics of a larger Western European political unit. 50
Haas was looking for the creation of a 'new national consciousness' as an essential attribute of this political community. He was, thus, implying that the creation of a political community analogous to the nation-state was a pre-requisite for actor capability.
Haas's notion of political community explicitly did not suggest that the outcome of such a political community was a federal state. In a passage in which he discusses whether or not a confederation can have the characteristics of a political community, Haas offers what can only be considered as an accurate characterisation of the present European Union:
A structure could emerge, however, in which a compulsory and binding judicial system is combined with a majoritarian legislative device, supervising the work of a central administration of restricted powers but with direct jurisdiction over groups and individuals, while many major decisions are still made at the level of inter-governmental negotiations. If in such a system governments negotiate and compromise so that one or several severely modify their position in the effort to arrive at a binding common agreement of profound consequence, the resulting habitual pattern of reaching consensus could well fit into the definition of political community, though representing neither the typical unitary nor federal categories of constitutions. 51
Haas used a variety of expressions to refer to the activities and institutions of the EC, including 'federal', 'central', and 'supranational'. The task he then set himself was to assess whether or not the ECSC provided evidence to support the political community thesis. 52
Haas's formal definition of integration envisaged an end-point at which the new political community would be superimposed over those already in existence:
Political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. 53
Haas's concern was with the political elites and their actions in support of, and re-actions to, integration. As regards the existence of a doctrine or ideology of 'Europeanism', Haas suggests that its multifarious definitions and imprecision make it of little use in studying the integration process. He quotes Raymond Aron sympathetically:
several. . . the name Europe distinguishes a continent or a civilisation, not am economic or political unit.... The European idea is empty, it has neither the transcendence of Messianic ideologies nor the immanence of concrete patriotism. It was created by intellectuals, and that fact accounts at once for its genuine appeal to the mind and its feeble echo in the heart. 54
Haas's definition of integration as a process was supplemented and clarified by the notion of 'spillover', defined as the expansion of sectoral integration into other areas. 55 However, spillover was not a central feature of Haas's analysis in The Uniting of Europe. Indeed, he characterised the decision to create the EEC as a departure from the sectoral integration that was the hallmark of the ECSC and, although it was a step forward for integration, he did not regard it as spillover in action. 56 The bulk of Haas's monograph is devoted to identifying elements of a European political community, not sectoral spillover. Haas offered a set of criteria by which to measure integration. He focused—as stated above—on what were considered to be relevant elites, and he concluded that 'a spill-over into new economic and political sectors certainly occurred in terms of the expectations developing purely in the national contexts of the elites involved.' 57
Haas suggested that sectoral integration had its own expansive logic, which is separate and separable from the development of group demands or ideology. It is this aspect of integration that Haas was to explore in his later work, in which he down-played the initial concern with loyalty transference to a new political authority.
Neo-functionalism also underwent subsequent developments, modifications and refutation, most especially because of a perceived decline in its predictive power. The hypotheses of the theory were taken further in Lindberg's study of the formative years of the EEC. 58 However, the predictive power of the theory was checked by developments in the Community. Both functional spillover and political spillover were challenged in the 1965 crisis, when France withdrew from the institutions of the Community. Momentum was not regained until the start of the Delors Commission in 1985 and the drive to create the Single Market. Subsequent revisions of neo-functionalism sought to amend the notion of an automatic spillover, with one commentator suggesting a variety of alternative options: spill- around, build-up, muddle-about, retrenchment, encapsulation and spill-back. 59
The two IGCs that negotiated the Maastricht Treaty were the outcome of a variety of influences that eventually generated a document which, while it undoubtedly deepened formal integration, simultaneously created a new geometry of institutional arrangements, issue areas and decision-making processes. The deepening of formal integration was one part of an overall political package deal in which the member states, the Commission and the European Parliament all agreed to a spillover that was, contrary to Haas, neither gradual nor unpolitical. 60 A similar political process of politicised spillover can be anticipated for the 1996 IGC, as it will be the member states who have the power of decision in this process. One encounters difficulties in identifying spillover as a source of influence in the daily process of EU foreign policy decision-making. Nevertheless, spillover clearly remains an important concept in providing a partial explanation for macro-level constitutional developments in formal integration.
This leaves us with Haas's identification of the political community. The question is, to what extent has the European Union developed the characteristics of a political community? In short, is it possible to identify elements of a European political community that overlie the political communities of the member states? An emergent strand of the literature exploring these questions appears to reinvigorate Haas's earlier research agenda. 61 Alongside this literature, the emergent focus on the EU in the literature on public policy suggests that there is predictability in Community policy-making that now lends itself to exposition—to be expected after nearly fifty years of operation—and that there is a move beyond considering policy-making processes in terms of either integration or intergovernmentalism. 62
The most important departure that Haas made from his earlier work was the realisation that the international context, within which integration had taken place, had been neglected. 63
This element had been incorporated as 'externalisation'. 64 The context of 'informal integration', explored in perspective 3, is now arguably of even greater significance in accounting for Union developments.
Perspective 3: Informal Integration
During the period in which formal integration faltered a series of parallel structures developed. These structures were informed by the necessity for co-operation that underpinned the formal integrative process; they were more variegated in their form and functions than the formal processes, and they enjoyed relations of differing degrees of closeness with the Community institutions. The development of European Political Co-operation and the European Council both illustrate this more pluralistic approach.
The institutional landscape of Europe has broadened beyond the Community framework and the previously excluded eastern half of the continent. It appears unlikely, therefore, that the final form of any European integration project will be realized within an unreconstructed Community institutional structure. The European Union has contributed to a network of overlapping, variable geometry structures in Europe by creating, and participating in, a collection of arrangements: for example, Europe Agreements, Partnership and Co-operation arrangements, and the re-invigoration of the Western European Union with its attendant Associate Members, Associate Partners and Observers. The integration process is no longer taking place within the confines of the Community.
Another source of informal integration has been external pressure. For example, the United States provided an external source of influence in creating, and encouraging, a context in which integration could occur in the Western half of the European continent under US economic and political leadership. Security and economic integration drew, and continues to draw, all the states of Europe into a distinctive and identifiable region that has now spread from Western Europe to Central and Eastern Europe. These transnational interconnections render distinctions between EU Europe and non-EU Europe less significant and require an understanding of the broader European economic, institutional, security and political landscape.
The fact of informal integration suggests that the theoretical accompaniment to integration—neo-functionalism—no longer appears able to account for the integrative project. The uncertainty about the cogency of the tenets of neo-functionalism has led to the development of alternative ways of conceptualising the wider European process. Wallace draws upon the approach of Deutsch originally developed in the 1950s and 1960s in an attempt to map the wider Europe; his aim is to give us a more appropriate frame of reference than that provided by the Western half of the content, a region that was the locus for the earlier integrative project and its theoretical accompaniment, neo-functionalism. 65
Alongside, and pre-dating, formal integration there has been the development of a regional European economy that extends beyond the European Union but places all of the nation-states in the region in a single economic area. This development has not only created economic opportunity, but also constrains the micro- and macro-economic policies of the constituent states. Since the foundation of the ECSC, there has been an economic and social transformation of Europe that represents a very different context in which the largely unchanged institutional structure of the Union continues to operate.
Informal integration provides a corrective to the introspection that is likely to surround the IGC process with its preponderant focus upon institutions and institutional arrangements. The institutional and political arrangements that will encompass the wider Europe are unlikely to come through the early accession to the EU of candidates for membership. The variegated pattern of institutional arrangements provided by the Organization for Security and Co- operation in Europe (OSCE), NATO and Partnerships for Peace, the WEU, the Council of Europe—all existing alongside the EU and its eastern and central European Associate members and partners—provide the European institutional landscape of the immediate future and suggest the potential for differing relationships with the Union and with European integration. These patterns of variation are not exclusive to the environment outside the Union: a recent proposal, which opened the IGC debate prematurely, suggested the Union needs a re-ordering of its own. We will now examine this proposal.
Hard Core
In September 1994 the publication of, and media interest in, a paper entitled Reflections on European Policy, by Wolfgang Schauble and Karl Lamers of the CDU/CSU governing coalition in Germany, launched the Europe-wide debate. For our purposes, the Reflections paper is a good illustration of how the IGC debate can be read in the light of the three perspectives outlined above.
The paper contained a five-fold set of proposals, with one in particular capturing news headlines: that an existent 'hard core' of member states committed to European integration should seek to push ahead with the process of formal integration. At the 'core of the hard core' were to be enhanced Franco-German relations. A cacophony of objections met this proposal. The exclusion of founder-member Italy from the hard core generated virulent opposition from the Italian government and, briefly, united the Berlusconi government with its opposition in condemnation of the proposal.
The Schauble/Lamers proposal that a 'variable geometry' or multi-speed approach to European integration should be formalised was challenged by the notion of a 'Europe a la carte' by John Major who, less than a week later, in a speech at Leiden in the Netherlands, dismissed even the notion that there was a hard core of states or policies. The Schauble/Lamers paper followed hard on the heels of French premier Eduard Balladur's proposal for a multi-tiered Europe with Germany and France at its core.
The furore about the 'hard core' aspect of the Schauble/Lamers paper overshadowed the document's prescient analysis, am analysis that was intended to correct a set of tendencies that, Schauble and Lamers suggested, might weaken links between the member states. The tendencies flagged were the inability of Union institutions to cope with the pace and extent of enlargement of the Union; differences between the member states fueled by differing levels of socio-economic development; differing perceptions of internal and external priorities; Europe's continuing economic difficulties and, most especially, high-levels of unemployment; and heightened nationalism and the inability of national governments to cope with the increasing demands made by their publics. However, of particular concern to the authors, and the thrust of the document, was Germany's place in post-cold war Europe.
The paper offered other sets of proposals as correctives to these tendencies. These proposals also delineate the subsequent areas of debate. These included institutional questions. The openness and democratisation of Union institutions have long been part of the reformists' agenda for the European Union. The looming set of enlargements that the Union has accepted will take place now make institutional reform particularly acute. The paper proposed strengthening the institutions: the European Parliament would become the primary law-making body of the Union, the Council a chamber of the states, and the Commission a putative government.
Another area of debate is the issue of strengthening the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The paper's proposal for a common defense capability, viewed as crucial in endowing the EU with an international identity of its own, is now a common refrain. Alain Lamassoure (the then French Minister of European Affairs), in particular, has raised the most thorny question implied by a common defense policy: namely, that the UK and French independent nuclear deterrents must be expected to contribute to such a policy.
The Schauble/Lamers paper could be read as the opening gambit of the German government in the process of setting the agenda for the IGC. It can also be read from each of the three perspectives outlined in this paper: first, as a re-ordering of the Union's constitutional arrangements; secondly, from a neofunctionalist perspective, indicative both of a Community of Europe and of spillover with intergovernmentalism; thirdly, it can be read as an informal re-ordering of institutional arrangements to accommodate variations in the depth and scope of European integration.
The Reflection Group
The work of the Reflection Group on the agenda for the IGC culminates in the submission of a report to the Heads of State and Government at the Madrid European Council meeting on 15-16 December 1995 . The interim progress report produced in August 1995 by Reflection Group chairperson Carlos Westendorp reflected the main currents of the analysis of the Schauble/Lamers paper. 66
The Group's deliberations suggest that the agenda of the IGC will be limited and focus on making existing arrangements more effective. The three key themes that the Group are likely to recommend for the IGC agenda are, one, that decision-making processes be made more efficient and accountable; two, that the foreign policy-making capabilities of the Union be improved; and, third, that the role of citizens in the Union be enhanced.
However, despite agreement on the themes for the IGC, the Reflection Group members are divided on details. In proposals for the reform of the decision-making process to accommodate new member states there is disagreement on the following issues: extending the use of qualified majority voting; altering the relative weight of the vote of each member state; reducing the scope for vetos by the member states; and enhancing the powers of the European Parliament. The preservation of the existing pillar structure of the Union has been called into question: a majority of members of the Group favours both altering existing arrangements for co-operation in Home and Judicial Affairs and that HIA should be at least partially integrated into the Community pillar. The areas of contention for the reform of the Common Foreign and Security Policy include the proposal to create a Secretary-General for CFSP accountable to the European Council (a proposal to which the Commission is strongly opposed), and the future relationship between the WEU and the EU. The dispute on the EU-WEU relationship is between a minority view that the existing autonomy of the WEU should be preserved and the majority view that the WEU should be progressively integrated into the EU (though there is disagreement within the majority as to the appropriate time scale for this).
The IGC will formally commence under the Italian Presidency of the European Union in the first half of 1996. The work of the Reflection Group makes apparent that the outcome of this Intergovernmental Conference is unlikely to widen the scope of the European Union beyond the substantive measures agreed in the previous IGC that resulted in the Maastricht Treaty. However, for two important reasons, the 1996 IGC represents more than a review of the Treaty on European Union: first, because of the commitment by the Union to enlarge the existing constitutional settlement (codified in the founding Treaties and their successive amendments) to include the states of Central and Eastern Europe. This commitment will be scrutinized in the knowledge that the agreements on institutional and decision-making reforms it produces will determine the form of further enlargements (which will expand membership to up twice its current size of fifteen). Secondly, because the relationship of the citizen to the Union, and the language of citizenship, have become central to the Union's discourse. As the chairperson of the Reflection Group has noted, 'the Union's principal internal challenge is to reconcile itself to its citizens'. 67
Conclusion
The 1996 IGC provides a challenge for the study of the European Union. As a constitutional convention, the IGC allows for a process of negotiation and decision-making distinct from normal Union processes. As a process in which the member states have the power of decision, their positions on topics of discussion are of particular interest and the Presidency of the Union takes on a particular significance in driving forward the negotiations. The IGC can be charted in these terms, that is, in terms of the ebb and flow of governmental negotiations. Alternatively, the European Union, now forty-five years old, can be represented as a mature polity with a constitution and citizenry, situated within a progressively widening European political arena which encompasses the member states, the non-member states, and the peoples of Europe.
Whatever the case, one conclusion is central: study of the IGC needs to consider the appropriate frameworks within which to assess the deliberations of the IGC, not least because these deliberations, and their impact beyond the Union of the Fifteen, are of pressing importance to the citizens and governments of the prospective members of the Union.
Note 1: Commission of the European Communities, Report on the Operation of the Treaty on European Union, Brussels 10.05.1995 SEC(95) 731 Final; Council of Ministers, Report of the Council of Ministers on the Functioning of the Treaty on European Union, Supplement to European Report No. 2032, 12 April 1995; Court of Justice of the European Communities, Report of the Court of Justice on Certain Aspects of the Application of the Treaty on European Union, Luxembourg, May 1995; Court of First Instance of the European Communities, European Parliament, Resolution on the functioning of the Treaty on European Union with a view to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference—Implementation and development of the Union A4—0102/95. Back.
Note 2: Discussion Papers of the Jean Monna Group of Experts, Various nos 1-18 (Hull: Centre for European Union Studies, 1995). Back.
Note 3: For a recent attempt to consider the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty of Rome alongside the constitutions of the UK, the USA, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Russian Federation; see: S. E. Finer, V. Bogdanor, and B. Rudden, Comparing Constitutions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). Back.
Note 4: See, for example, the draft constitution produced by a committee of the European Parliament: Second Report of the Institutional Committee on the Constitution of the European Union (European Parliament, A3 0064/94, 9 February 1994). Back.
Note 5: A Proposal for a European Constitution, Report by the European Constitutional Group (London, 1993). F. Vibert, Europe: A Constitution for the Millennium (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995). Back.
Note 6: C, Archer, International Organizations, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 3. Back.
Note 8: D. A. Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 5. Back.
Note 9: R. O. Keohane and S. Hoffmann (eds), The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change (Oxford: Westview, 1991). Back.
Note 10: For example, the comotology process by which the member states involve themselves in the oversight of implementation. Back.
Note 11:
The expression 'EC Law' is used because the European Union does not enjoy a legal personality and, therefore, 'EU law' is a misnomer.
The European Court of Justice has taken a particular view of the legal arrangements of the Community: '. . . the EEC Treaty, albeit concluded in the form of an international agreement, none the less constitutes the constitutional charter of a Community based on the rule of law.' Opinion 1/91: 119921 I Common Market Law Review 245 at 269. Back.
Note 12: For the inclusion of legal competences in a definition of supranational see: P. Taylor, 'Supranationalism', in A. J. R. Groom and P. Taylor (eds), Frameworks for International Cooperation (Pinter: London, 1990). Back.
Note 13: The remit of the Community cam only be expanded, without amending the Treaties, to expand the objectives of the EC. The relevant article (Article 235, EC Treaty) reads as follows: 'If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, take the appropriate measures.' Back.
Note 14: K. Borchardt, The ABC of Community Law 3rd ed. (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1991). Back.
Note 15: S. Hemberger in: J. Krieger (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World p. 189. Another recent definition is as follows: 'Constitutions are codes of norms which aspire to regulate the allocation of powers, functions, and duties among the various agencies and officers of government, and to define the relationships between these and the public.' (Finer, Bogdanor and Rudden, op. cit., p. 1.) Back.
Note 16: For this distinction see: N. Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union 3rd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1994), Chapter 8. Back.
Note 17: Article L of the Treaty on European Union outlines those items of the Treaty covered by the Provisions of the three founding Treaties concerning those areas subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. Back.
Note 18: TEU, Article A: 'By this Treaty, the High Contracting Parties establish among themselves a European Union, hereafter called "the Union. This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which the decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen. The Union shall be founded on the European Communities, supplemented by the policies and forms of cooperation established by this Treaty. Its task shall be to organise, in a manner demonstrating consistency and solidarity, relations between the Member States and between their peoples.' Back.
Note 19: TEU, Article C: 'The Union shall be served by a single institutional framework which shall ensure the consistency and the continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain its objectives while respecting and building upon the acquis communautaire.' Back.
Note 20: TEU, Article E. Back.
Note 21: TEU, Article D. Back.
Note 22: 22 Under TEU Article Title Vl, Article K. I the following areas of common interest are designated:
- asylum policy;
- rules governing the crossing by persons of the external borders of the Member States and the exercise of controls thereon;
- immigration policy and policy on nationals of third countries;
- combating drug addiction;
- combating international fraud;
- judicial co-operation in civil matters;
- judicial cooperation in criminal matters;
- customs co-operation;
- police co-operation; involves the creation of Europol (a European Police Office).
Note 23: TEU, Articles J.4.6 and J. 10. Back.
Note 24: Presidency Conclusions, European Council at Corfu, 24-25 June 1994, SN 150/94 EN. p. 26. Back.
Note 25: EC Treaty, Article 2. Back.
Z EC Treaty, Article 3. Back.
Note 27: This has been complicated by a recent ruling by the ECJ on the ratification of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) Uruguay Round, which gives exclusive competence to the Community to conclude international agreements relating to goods but states that, with regard to services and intellectual property, competence is to be shared with the member states. See: 'Ruling on EU's competence', Financial Times, 22 November 1994, p. 20. Back.
Note 28: EC Treaty, Article 3b. Back.
Note 29: For further discussion, see: 'Towards a Definition of Subsidiarity', in A. Duff (ed.), Subsidiarity within the European Community (London: Federal Trust, 1993). Back.
Note 30: EC Treaty, Articles 8a-8d. Back.
Note 31: E. Meehan, Citizenship and the European Community (London: Sage, 1993). Back.
Note 33: See articles F and L of the TEU. Back.
Note 34: For reports see footnote 1. On the deliberations of the Reflection Group see: 'Westendorp says diagnosis agreed, but not remedy', Wire Service: Reuters Euro Community Report, Tuesday, July 4, 1995. Back.
Note 35: See footnote 1. Back.
Note 36: ECJ, ibid. (footnote 1). Back.
Note 37: Article 189b.8. Back.
Note 38: TEU Declaration No. 16: 'On the hierarchy of Community acts'. Back.
Note 39: Accounts of the health and vitality of the formal integrative project have been offered at different stages of the history of the Union. See: E. B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economical Forces, 1950-1957 (London: Stevens Sons, 1958), M. Camps, European Unification in the Sixties: From the Veto to the Crisis (New York: McGraw Hill, 1966); B. Barber and B. Reed (eds), The European Community: Vision and Reality (London: Croom Helm, 1973); K. Kaiser et al. (eds), The European Community: Progress or Decline? (London: RIIA, 1983). Back.
Note 40: 'The Transformation of the European Community, 1985-1988', in D. Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to the European Community (London: Macmillan, 1994), Chapter 5; J. Pinder, 'The Single Market: a step towards union' in J. Lodge (ed.), The European Community and he Challenge of the Future, 2nd ed. (London: Pinter, 1993). Back.
Note 41: I am indebted to Irene Brennan on this point. For details see: 1. Brennan, 'The Concept of Antinomic Process and its Relevance for Integration Theory' in F. R. Pfetsch (ed.), International Relations and Pan-Europe: Theoretical Approaches and Empirical Findings (Hamburg, Lit, 1993). Back.
Note 42: For a recent example see: M. Holland, European Community Integration (London: Pinter, 1993). Back.
Note 43: W. Wallace, The Dynamics of European Integration (London: Pinter for RIIA, 1992). pp. 8-12. Back.
Note 45: The Single European Act codified European Political Co-operation and also provided the European Council with a legal foundation. At the same time as the new, Treaty-based forms of cooperation were created, the Eureka programme (1985) was established, the Schengen agreement (1985) struck, and the Western European Union revitalized. Back.
Note 46: See footnote 39. Back.
Note 47: Haas, ibid., pp. xv-xvi. Back.
Note 48: Ibid., p. xiii. Back.
Note 49: Haas, ibid., p. 5. Back.
Note 52: Haas used six criteria to judge whether or not a political community was being created: ibid., pp. 9-10. Back.
Note 54: Ibid., pp. 28-29. Back.
Note 56: Ibid., p. 109: 'Sector integration has yielded to general economic unity.' Back.
Note 58: L. N. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Oxford: OUP, 1963). Back.
Note 59: P. Schmitter, 'A revised theory of regional integration', International Organization, 24, 4 (Autumn 1970). Back.
Note 60: For a full account of the roles of the different actors in the process see: F. Laursen and S. Vanhoonacker, The Intergovermnental Conference on Political Union (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992). Back.
Note 61: P. Howe, 'A Community of Europeans: The Requisite Underpinnings', The Journal of Common Market Studies 33, 1 (March 1995), pp. 27-46. Back.
Note 62: See, for example, Journal of European Public Policy 1:2, Autumn 1994. Back.
Note 63: E. Haas, 'Turbulent fields and the theory of regional integration', International Organization 30, 2 (Spring 1976), pp. 173-212. Back.
Note 64: P. Schmitter, 'Three neofunctional hypotheses about international integration', International Organization 23, 1 (Winter 1969), pp. 161-166. Back.
Note 65: William Wallace (ed.), The Dynamics of European Integration (London: Pinter, 1990). Back.
Note 66: 'Progress Report by EU Reflection Group Chairman Carlos Westendorp on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference', Reuters European Community Report, Wednesday September 6, 1995. Back.
