A Political Economy of North African Immigration to Europe

Gregory White

Center for International Studies, University of Southern California
November 20, 1997

Abstract

It is often asserted that pressures for North African migration to Europe would be reduced if the European Union encouraged economic development on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. Such arguments inspire questions about the efficacy of past and present endeavors by Europe to support economic development in North Africa. This article argues that the European Union's efforts have, ironically, encouraged a form of economic development in its southern neighbors that prompts, rather than discourages, migration. Deeper economic reform is necessary, by the European Union itself -- within the economic space that Europe dominates -- if genuine progress is to be made on North African migration pressures.

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Most discussions of the problems associated with North African immigrants in Europe conclude in a similar fashion: economic development must be encouraged in North Africa. Academics, journalists, and policy makers all invoke economic growth in North Africa as a solution to immigration pressures on Europe, regardless of their political perspective, analytic purchase, or the specific subject under consideration. An enlightened self-interest on the part of the advanced-capitalist countries, so goes the reasoning, would see economic development on the southern shores of the Mediterranean in Europe's interest because North Africans would remain at home and not be "pushed" toward Europe. For example, Covey and Kupiszewski concluded a recent article on the Schengen Agreement with the following:

An enlightened approach which may work to gradually lessen the pressure of inward migration might be for the Union to seek to reduce the push factors existing in third world countries and to commence various forms of cooperation with them, which would include the formulation of policies aimed at the management of migration, the development of skills to manage these policies, and the more general encouragement of positive public and individual attitudes towards inward migrants (1995:960, emphasis added).

Similarly, Bodega et. al., in their analysis of Moroccan immigration to Spain, argue:

By investing in the country of origin we may have a chance to control this migratory current.... The [United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization] recommends important investments for the improvement of agricultural production in North Africa. Perhaps this is the best way out (1995:818).

In part, it is easy to be sympathetic to such statements. There are, indeed, grave economic problems in North Africa, known as the Maghrib in Arabic. ₁ The statements calling for economic development, however, seem to be offered as afterthoughts following lengthy analyses of the "problems" Maghribis cause Europe. Moreover, the frequency of the seemingly obligatory call for economic development suggests several questions: What has been the track record of past efforts on the part of the European Union to help Maghribi development efforts? What are the EU's current efforts? What is Europe not doing?

This article argues that development assistance efforts by the EU have been (and remain) inadequate. Moreover, they may, ironically, continue to engender the very circumstances that fuel immigration. For example, the EU's Common Agricultural Policy has contributed to the decline of the Maghrib's agricultural sector(s), prompting urban migration within Maghribi countries and, in turn, emmigration to Europe. Rather than calling for economic development in the Maghrib -- and pressing Maghribi governments to adopt politically unfeasible economic policies -- EU policy makers should examine their own foreign economic policy and seek to exert a vision that will transcend the current state of xenophobic public opinion.

To explicate this argument this article, first, examines the factors that impel Maghribi migration. Second, it turns to a treatment of the official response by Europe and, third, offers a consideration of what Europe is not doing. Finally, the article concludes with a call to situate the Maghrib within, not outside, the European economic space. Such a perspective will go far in reminding European officials and citizens that the European political economy needs reform writ large if immigration is to cease being perceived as a problem.

Factors that Propel Migration from the Maghrib

Before turning to an examination of Euro-Maghribi relations -- and the character of European assistance to North African countries -- it is appropriate to consider the factors that push migration to Europe. Why are Moroccans, Algerians, and Tunisians inclined to migrate northward?

First, and most obviously, there exists a profound differential in the standards of living and economic development between the northern and southern banks of the Mediterranean. The advanced-industrial societies of Europe continue to outpace their industrializing counterparts to the south. Maghribi efforts to industrialize in the post-colonial era have been hampered by a wide array of factors, ranging from the legacy of colonialism to climactic conditions, from poor government to inhospitable international markets.

One useful indicator of the North-South differential is the UN Development Program's human development index (UNDP, 1995). The human development index (HDI) is an aggregate indicator that combines several factors such as GDP per capita, literacy rate, education, and life expectancy in assessing the quality of life of a given country's population. ₂ To be precise, the Southern European economies of Spain, France, and Italy are ranked respectively 9th, 8th, and 20th on the HDI list. By contrast, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia are ranked 117th, 85th, and 75th. Table 1 provides the data for these rankings.

Table 1 Human Development Index for Selected Countries 3
Country	HDI Rank	Life Expectancy (years) 1992	Adult Literacy Rate (%) 1992	Educational Enrollment Ratio (%) 1992	Real GDP Per Capita (PP$) 1992
France	8	76.9	99.0	86	19,510
Spain	9	77.6	98.0	86	13,400
Belgium	12	76.4	99.0	84	18,630
Germany	15	76.0	99.0	81	21,120
Italy	20	77.5	97.4	70	18,090
Portugal	36	74.6	86.2	77	9,850
Libya	73	63.1	72.4	66	9,782
Tunisia	75	67.8	62.8	64	5,160
Algeria	85	67.1	57.4	66	4,870
Egypt	107	63.6	49.1	67	3,540
Morocco	117	63.3	40.6	43	3,370

Second, wage remittances are of central importance to Maghribi economies. Remittances are earnings repatriated to families remaining in the sending country and are a key component of domestic economies. In Morocco, for example, remittances in 1990 reached $2 billion, a figure that dwarfed the $165 million earned from foreign direct investment (FDI). Middle-income countries seek foreign capital such as FDI, but find remittances more flexible and exceptionally lucrative. Table 2 provides the figures for the Maghrib.

Table 2 Foreign Direct Investment and Workers' Remittances: Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, 1980-1992 4
	Country	Foreign Direct Investment Net $ Mns	Workers' Remittances $ Mns
Algeria	1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992	349 0 5 4 13 12 0 12 12	406 314 358 487 379 345 352 233 774
Morocco	1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992	89 20 1 60 85 67 165 320 424	1,054 967 1,398 1,587 1,303 1,337 2,006 1,990
Tunisia	1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992	235 108 63 92 61 79 75 126 379	319 271 361 486 544 488 599 570 633

Wage remittances have prompted the creation of rather shrewd methods of currency exchanges between Europe and the Maghrib. Maghribi currency is non-convertible on the international market; the Tunisian dinar, for example, has been carefully controlled by the Bourguiba (1957-1987) and Ben Ali (1987-) regimes. In Paris one might exchange a wallet full of dinars for French francs, but at a very poor rate. In turn, a returning migrant might convert French francs to the local currency, but be subject to sophisticated and expensive controls. As a result, strategies of cash transfers have developed outside official exchange mechanisms. An Algerian explained how a Maghribi worker in Paris might employ a four-party currency transfer. Such a transfer initiates during a phone call home to Algeria. The caller [party A] asks a family member [party B] to give dinars to the family [party C] of a fellow immigrant [party D]. Once the second family [C] receives the money it informs its family member in Paris [D] to give an equivalent amount of French francs to the first caller [A]. ₅

Remittances are such a pivotal component of Maghribi economies that, in the eyes of their European counterparts, Maghribi officials have been slow to check emigration. Despite lip service to limit emigration and the efforts to cooperate with European officials (discussed below), the governments of Tunisia's Ben Ali, Algeria's Zeroual, and Morocco's Hassan know how crucial immigration is to their economies and societies.

Third, along with the material and actual differences reflected in the UNDP data, and the importance of remittances, there are profound ideological and cultural factors at work. The Maghrib is within a cultural and economic space dominated by European media and entertainment industries. Satellite dishes are increasingly affordable to Maghribis, and urban and suburban landscapes throughout the region are dotted with parabolas turned toward Europe. Coupled with the colonial legacy of French language facility for many Maghribis, such programs reinforce perceptions of a better life in Europe. French language programs are the most common. But one can also obtain Spanish-language programs in Northern Morocco and Italy's Rai Uno in Tunisia. A Tunisian woman affirmed that, although she could speak only a little Italian, she understood and enjoyed Italian programs. ₆ Commercials, news programs, movies, and situation comedies give Maghribis a view, however distorted, of European (and American) life. Europe's ideological hegemony combines with actual, concrete differences to create a complex belief that the grass is greener across the Mediterranean. ₇

Fourth, and finally, there is a profound demand for legal and, increasingly illegal immigrant labor in Europe, primarily in construction, seasonal agricultural labor, and domestic service sectors. For example, according to the Spanish Council for Scientific Research (CSIC) in Madrid, the bulk of illegal immigrants in Spain are Moroccan (Bodega et al., 1995) and tend to live in agricultural regions and in coastal, tourist areas; if they live in cities, they are primarily in Madrid and Barcelona. Moroccan immigrants in Spain are generally young and single; if they are married, they do not come with their spouses. Illegal immigrants arrive in Spain through a variety of means, with some coming across the Strait of Gibraltar on pateras (Huband, 1995) The demand for Maghribi labor persists although the official rate of unemployment in Spain in 1995 was 21.4 percent (Eurecom, 1996:4).

Similar dynamics are evident in Italy as well, as Maghribis endeavor to reach Lampedusa, an Italian island off the coast of Tunisia. Once in Lampedusa, Italian officials send the illegal immigrants onto processing centers in Sicily, where they are given an expulsion order that gives the immigrants fifteen days to leave the country. Most do leave, by heading north into Europe, not back home (Bohlen, 1997).

In sum, despite European efforts to limit immigration in the 1980s and 1990s, the push from the Maghrib (and the pull towards Europe) remains. Europe's demand for cheap labor, the perceived and real differences in the economic conditions between the different coasts of the Mediterranean, and the crucial importance of remittances to Maghribi economies have served as fuel to propel migration northward.

One final observation needs to be made before turning to the official responses by European governments and the European Commission in Brussels. Algeria's horrific civil war continues to rage within Algeria and reverberate beyond its borders. A full examination of the war is well beyond the scope of this study. ₈ But the cancellation of the January 1992 elections and the bloody confrontation between the corrupt military junta and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) has left the Algerian population lost in the middle, longing for peace. Even the June 1997 elections have not dampened the tensions and uncertainties within Algeria, and Algerians seek to emigrate and escape the conflict.

In addition, neighboring Tunisia and Morocco reel from the conflict as illiberal governments must contend with Islamist opposition movements. Tunisia, for example, has clamped down severely and has now become a focus of criticism of international human rights organizations as the Ben Ali regime has eradicated all opposition. It is difficult to assess the validity of European fears that Algerian instability prompts immigration, but it would be shortsighted to ignore that they are robust.

The Official Response by Europe

It is important to acknowledge that the calls to support Maghribi development are not new. European officials have long recognized the need to support and promote economic development to the south. As the old aphorism goes, "Europe lacks a Southern border," and European officials appear to understand that underdevelopment in the Maghrib can come back to haunt Europe in the future. Since the Maghrib's independence from France in the late 1950s and early 1960s, various agreements have been signed by Europe and the Maghrib, with the oft-stated goal of encouraging industrialization and job creation at the forefront. Most prominent in these efforts were two bi-lateral Association Agreements in 1969 that Europe signed each with Morocco and Tunisia. The Association Agreements were followed, in turn, by three bi-lateral Cooperation Accords in 1976 that Europe signed with Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. All were designed to facilitate the import into Europe of Maghribi industrial exports and had the effect of limiting agricultural exports (Vanderwalle, 1996).

In the 1990s, new efforts have been launched in the aftermath of the 1991 Maastricht Treaty, the demise of the Soviet Union, Europe's competition with NAFTA and East Asia, and the above-mentioned instability in Algeria. The new diplomatic and international efforts have profound implications for the flow of migrant labor to the north. Three efforts merit mention in this analysis.

First, in November 1995, the Spanish government hosted a much-vaunted conference in Barcelona. Spain held the presidency of the European Union in the latter half of 1995. Along with France and Italy, Spain has sought to turn the EU's attention southward and counteract the preoccupation of Germany and other northern member countries with developments in Central and Eastern Europe. ₉

The result of the Barcelona Conference was, indeed, a significant enhancement of aid to the Maghrib, with the Mediterranean to receive 4,685 million ECUs ($6,090.5 million) in aid over the five years from 1995-99. This, however, is much less than the aid earmarked towards the Eastern European countries of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The enhanced aid packages included funding to Maghribi governments, as well as agricultural crop substitution programs. The latter featured, most prominently, programs to discourage the growth of Cannabis in the Rif Mountains of Morocco (Simonnet, 1995). Hashish is an astronomically lucrative crop because of the demand for (and criminalization of) the drug in advanced-industrialized countries, and the EU wishes to promote the growth of other non-traditional exports such as cut flowers. Such efforts, however, may prove insufficient given the centrality of hash production to the northern Moroccan economy. In short, "Barcelona," for the time being, is a euphemism for Europe's attention to its southern neighbors. ₁₀

The second initiative by the EU is related to the Barcelona Conference: the signing of Partnership Accords in 1995. Signed by the EU and Tunisia in June 1995, and the EU and Morocco in November 1995, the two Partnership Accords supplanted the 1976 Cooperation Accord framework. ₁₁ Tunisia and Morocco's Accords are designed to phase-in free trade zones over a twelve-year period and are similar to Agreements the EU has also signed with Turkey and Israel. From the perspective of the European Commission, these "European NAFTAs" will support Tunisia and Morocco's efforts to attract FDI and create employment. Moreover, they are meant to ensure, in theory, Tunisian and Moroccan stability so that they do not become like Algeria.

From the perspective of the governments of Hassan and Ben Ali, the Partnerships are logical extensions of the respective structural adjustment programs (SAPs) pursued since the 1980s. Morocco's SAP began in 1983 and Tunisia's in 1986. The SAPs, sponsored by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), exacted political costs in their implementation, with popular unrest emerging after austere budget cuts to social programs (Walton and Seddon, 1994). Moreover, they prompted the "form" of economic development that encouraged migration in the first place. Despite such instabilities and contradictions, Europe and the international community continues to urge the countries to pursue further reforms. Recently, for example, a team of analysts for the IMF concluded:

[Tunisia and Morocco] have undertaken commendable macroeconomic policy reforms in recent years...There nevertheless remains a clear need for sustained reform efforts...Adjustment will inevitably involve short-term costs, given the resource reallocation requirements. The emphasis must therefore be on minimizing these costs through proper planning and sequencing of policies, and protecting the most vulnerable segments of the population (Chaufor et al., 1996:48).

Similarly, Uri Dadush of the World Bank wrote in Jeune Afrique:

Tunisia's Free Trade Agreement with Europe will consist of a substantial increase in aid, but it will have only a limited impact on Tunisia's access to Europe's market because Europe's tariff barriers are already rather low for industrial imports. All of this underlines the importance of the establishment of [market] reforms designed to stimulate investment in an export sector that is more diversified and more dynamic (Dadush, 1997: 39).

In sum, the ongoing pursuit of economic liberalization will continue to exact costs on the Moroccan and Tunisian populations. For example, free trade is likely to have a devaluation pressure on Maghribi currency, a dynamic that will not work to the advantage of immigrants seeking to repatriate their earnings (Tapinos, et. al.1994:93).

Securing the Agreements were high priorities for both regimes. There are concerns expressed, however, that the gradual opening of the Maghribi economies to European economies by 2009 will promote severe economic dislocation, rather than job creation (Wall, 1996). One factoid bandied about in Morocco's economic press, for example, is that Morocco's private sector will lose as much as one-third of its domestic firms as larger, more efficient foreign firms arrive. Whatever the actual figures, it is probable that the next ten to fifteen years will be exceptionally precarious vis-à-vis the Partnership Agreements. The Partnership Agreements also reinforce vertical cooperation between Morocco and the European Union, and Tunisia and the European Union. Economists have dubbed this trade-distortion phenomenon the "hub-spoke effect," with Europe as the hub of a wheel from which spokes emanate.

The third and final realm of European-Maghribi relations moves beyond direct economic cooperation, although it has implications for immigration. Namely, the Interior Ministries of the EU and the Maghrib are cooperating very closely. This cooperation has always existed, but it has deepened in the 1980s and 1990s. In the Maghrib, the most powerful ministries, by far, are the Interior Ministries. Maghribi Interior Ministries are complex amalgams of intelligence bureaus, information agencies, and police and military forces. In short, they dominate the political landscape. For example, Interior Minister Driss Basri in Morocco has been a central actor in Moroccan politics since his appointment by Hassan in the 1970s. Responsible for managing political stability, Maghribi Interior Ministries have been the subject of harsh criticism by human rights analysts for years (Waltz, 1991; Manaï, 1995; Perrault, 1991; Burgat, 1993). In turn, the Ministries have been rather honest about their priorities. Commenting on the need to maintain stability to ensure the viability of Tunisia's tourist sector and its attractiveness to European visitors, then Interior Minister Abdallah Kallel said in 1992: "We do not have petrol, we have sun, and the sun needs security."

Since the early 1980s the European Union has supported an enhancement in the degree of cooperation between Mediterranean Interior Ministries -- an internationalization of Interior Ministries -- whereby European Interior Ministers meet biannually in the Council of Ministers, with Maghribi counterparts in attendance. Driss Basri and his staff have attended every biannual summit of European Interior Ministers since 1988. In addition, Maghribi Interior officials travel frequently to Madrid, Paris, or Rome for summit meetings. In October 1996, for example, Rabat's newspapers were filled with reports of Basri's meetings in Madrid with his Spanish peer, Jaime Moyor Oreja, to discuss illegal immigration, drugs, and terrorism. These are, surely, serious problems, but the meetings provide de facto legitimization for a Moroccan government that has, at best, a spotty democratization track record (Gardner, 1997). More specifically, the meetings bolster explicitly a ministry that is highly illiberal.

Such meetings also have led to perversely paradoxical and even tragic statements by Maghribi officials that play on the racist fears of Europeans. Unless the Maghrib receives support, aid, or concessions on negotiations, so goes the threat by Maghribi officials, economic circumstances will prompt Maghribis to migrate north. More powerful than the stability card when played in international negotiations, the immigration card has the unseemly effect of justifying European fears (White, G., 1996).

In sum, the Barcelona Agreement, the Partnership Accords, and collaborations between Interior ministries are efforts championed by European officials. Despite their ostensible goals of promoting economic development, their prospects for success are uncertain.

Europe's "Non-Response"

Given the efforts to support Maghribi development, it is also important to assess what the EU is not doing. Rather than talking about Maghribi development(s), how might the EU reform itself in a fashion that would contribute to a relaxation of immigration pressures? This is a profound question that demands a multi-faceted response. Four tentative observations are offered here.

First, the EU is not pursuing needed reform of its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Established in the 1960s, the CAP protects European farmers from external agricultural competition and was responsible for the vibrant rebuilding of the European agricultural sector(s) in the aftermath of World War II. The policy is essentially a package of import substitution mechanisms that supports European farmers, protects them from cheaper agricultural imports, and subsidizes European exports. Unable to feed itself in the 1950s, Europe became a net exporter of agricultural produce by the 1960s, and today, along with the United States, dominates the world agricultural market.

By contrast, the three Maghribi economies offer a mirror image of Europe's agricultural developments. Net exporters of agricultural commodities in the 1950s, the Maghribi countries were able, upon independence, to feed themselves. By the 1970s, however, the Maghrib had lost its "agro-alimentary self-sufficiency." Maghribi officials, over the decades, have found it more cost effective (economically and politically) to purchase cheap European commodities -- especially wheat -- to satisfy powerful urban interests (Richards and Waterbury, 1996). Such disincentives drove down Maghribi wheat production. In addition, exports of "Mediterranean" products -- citrus, wine, tomatoes, olive oil -- are effectively shut out of the European market, especially since Spain joined the EC in 1986. ₁₂ Before Spanish accession, the EC was not self-sufficient in such commodities and Moroccan oranges or Tunisian olive oil could enter, albeit with careful restrictions. By the late 1980s, however, Maghribi exports were effectively shut out.

The transformation of the Maghrib's agricultural production profile must be considered in the same context as the vibrant "shadow" cast by the CAP. Of course, the dismal state of Maghribi agriculture can be tied to poor policy decisions and climactic calamities. But the effects of European expansion and integration have to be highlighted, as well. As the agricultural sectors have declined in recent decades, Maghribis have, variously, migrated to cities and/or overseas, escaping rural areas that have proven unable to support the population. If the European Union wants Moroccans to stay in Morocco as farmers, then it has to support equitable, sustainable development, rather than the deterioration of once fertile areas, such as Morocco's gharb (Swearingen, 1986).

Second, and on a related note, Europe must reform its patterns of consumption. Admittedly, this is a tall, if not impossible order, but Europe's industrial society devours resources at an enormous rate. The subordinate position of the Maghrib in the European economic space is a function of the seemingly insatiable appetite of advanced-industrial countries. For example, trans-Sahara gazoducs run 1) from Algeria through Morocco to Spain and Portugal and 2) from Algeria through Tunisia to Italy. ₁₃ Oil companies possess concessions in Algeria and Tunisia. Morocco's prized phosphates continue to find ready markets. European tourists visit the sunny beaches and historic ruins in enclaved tourist centers. Export-producing zones employ Maghribis at low wages. European boats strip Moroccan waters of high-value catch such as sardines and tuna (White, G., 1997b). In sum, the distortion of Maghribi industrial development and, most notably in this context, the inability of the Maghrib to generate employment is the obverse of European "development."

Third, the EU (and the United States) is refraining from calling for greater attention to political rights in the region. Throughout the post-colonial era, the West has supported Maghribi countries with troubling democratic records and the affluent few in each country that provide government with crucial support -- e.g., arms deals, financial aid, preferential arrangements on oil and phosphate exploitation, joint military exercises. "Security concerns" have justified support to undemocratic governments. During the Cold War, such security concerns were based on fears of Soviet expansion in North Africa.

In the 1990s, however, fundamentalist Islam has supplanted the Communist threat. Fear of Islamism in the West has prompted support for a government such as Tunisia's Ben Ali that, as noted above, has eradicated all opposition, loyal or otherwise (Grimaud, 1996). For its part, Algeria remains one of the seminal ethical questions of the late 20th century. Should democratization be canceled if its outcome is deemed unsavory? The political climate in the Maghrib motivates many of its people to seek emigration. Yet, paradoxically, the inhospitable terrain for political liberties in the Maghrib requires support from the West (White, G., 1997a).

Fourth, and finally, the EU and member countries persist in crafting restrictive notions of European identity. Such notions of identity ignore that individuals are shot through with multiple identities and that a given European family may have descended from non-European immigrants. The Mediterranean, in particular, has a deep history in which individual identities are tangled. There is a profound degree of irony, for example, in French citizens in southern France asserting their "Frenchness" when their ancestors immigrated from various parts of the Mediterranean. To cite another example, why was this author, the grandchild of Irish immigrants, able to obtain an Irish passport and citizenship from the Irish Consulate in Chicago? He is now the citizen of a country to which he has never traveled, only because the Irish government wishes to nurture its tourist economy and does not fear a wave of return migration from North America. Yet, perhaps, a Tunisian living in Dublin -- who has worked there legally for years, contributed to the economy, and raised a family -- is sharply restricted in his or her ability to become a citizen.

In 1987, Morocco petitioned to join the European Community, a petition that was rejected in two months. When an official at the European Commission was asked what the prospects were for Moroccan membership in the EU, he responded frankly, "No chance. After all, they're Muslims." ₁₄ Such dichotomous constructions of identity have persisted in being fashionable (Huntington, 1993). But they must be challenged, especially by European officials and its citizenry, if it is to avoid becoming even more destructive.

Conclusion

Much is made in popular and academic discourses about the need to support economic development in the Maghrib. The onus is placed on Maghribi policy makers and citizens. In other words, Maghribis must reform their economies. At the most, Europe is called upon to support such efforts. Again, the theory of such an argument is that by improving the Maghribi economy, pressures on external border controls -- entry visas, long-term work and residency permits -- would be eased. Europe deploys a wide array of mechanisms to limit inward migration, but problems will persist in Europe absent a reduction of external pressures. A 1990 report on investment opportunities in North Africa argued:

The EC also has its own self-interested concerns for the accelerated economic development of North Africa -- and not only as a potential for its own exports. The EC would much prefer North Africans to find prosperity at home rather than add to the tide of immigrants from the south [Strange, 1990 #56].

This article argues, however, that such efforts are hardly sufficient. Moreover, the neo-liberal policies that are promoted by international financial institutions and the European Union risk engendering the kind of economic and political developments that one should hope to avoid. By opening the economies to competition that they are not well positioned to confront, and implementing supply-side policies that are unlikely to trickle-down, the policies may make the countries much less attractive to foreign investment and less stable.

In the end, one wonders if Europe might pursue a truly enlightened self-interest and reform itself.

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Note 1: The usage of al-Maghrib can be confusing. The Maghrib includes the former French colonies of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. In Arabic, Maghrib means, literally, "where the sun sets," and Morocco is known in Arabic as al-Maghrib because of its situation on the westernmost part of the Arab world. In addition, the Maghrib increasingly includes Libya and Mauritania. Here, however, the three central countries of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia are the focus. Back.

Note 2: Granted, the HDI is imperfect because such data does not adequately reflect disparities and irregularities within a country. It is valuable, nonetheless, because it provides an illustration of the disparities between countries. Back.

Note 3: UNDP, 1995: 155-156. Back.

Note 4: World Bank data in Pfeifer, 1996: 63. Back.

Note 5: Interview with author, Rabat, June 22, 1994. On a related note see Cassarino (1997) for an analysis of trans-Mediterranean business networks that migrants form while they are in Europe. Back.

Note 6: Interview with author, Tunis, June 7, 1991. Back.

Note 7: See Bianchi, 1989, for an analysis of similar dynamics within Egypt. Back.

Note 8: See, inter alia, Mortimer, 1996, and Addi, 1996. Back.

Note 9: The full text is available on the internet at "http://www-ercim.inria.fr". See Marks, 1996, and Barbé, 1996. Back.

Note 10: A follow-up conference was held in Malta in April 1997. Back.

Note 11: Algeria, for its part, has not signed an Accord and is unlikely to do so in the future. Back.

Note 12: Portugal also joined the Community in 1986. The "Second Enlargement" of the EC includes Greece, which joined in 1981. Back.

Note 13: See D. White, 1997, for an analysis of the importance of Portugal's access to Algerian gas. Back.

Note 14: Interview with author, Brussels, June 17, 1993. Back.