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Email this citationCIAO DATE: 2/00
Promoting Peace and Democracy in the Aftermath of the Balkan Wars: Comparative Assessment of the Democratization and Institutional Building Processes in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Fr Yugoslavia
School of International Relations
University of Southern California
August 1999
The Center for International Studies
University of Southern California
Processes of democratization in the aftermath of the Cold War in socialist countries have revealed old ethnic, religious, and cultural differences and animosities. In some of them, these have led to the ethnic violence and intrastate wars that jeopardize world security. The worst case scenario happened in the former Yugoslavia where the response of scholars and policymakers was not prompt and appropriate. As a result, the former Yugoslavia disintegrated along the lines of the former internal borders of the Yugoslav Republics. Thus, the first phase of “democratization” led to civil war, disintegration, and creation of new states. If we assume that the further disintegration of newly created states along the lines of ethnic communities is not the most likely scenario of further democratization in the Balkans, then we come to the question of what kind of democratization processes will lead the Balkans to permanent peace and stability.
The establishment of a new Yugoslavia and recognition by the United Nations of the secessionist republics in 1992 officially marked the end of an era of a unified South Slav state. The new states created by disintegration of the former Yugoslavia faced a new challenge, namely, the democratization of their own severely divided societies. The processes of constitution making created the first opportunity for procedural and substantial democratization of the severely divided societies of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. My question is: What are the common denominators of democratization processes regardless of particular structural arrangements that we can use in empirical theory building of democratization in severely divided societies? I argue in this paper that the democratization of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia does not depend exclusively on the form of their formal institutions but also on the state of mind of the people and their level of participation in political activities. It means that democratic capacities must be strengthened outside formal institutions in a civil society, and this process should start from the very beginning of constitution making. To achieve this is possible only by developing a new mindset characterized by democratic culture and incorporating all ethnic groups and other segments of a pluralist society in political activities. In effect, it seems to me that today’s emphasis on the significance of formal institutions of democracy (typically associated with elite bargaining) should be accompanied by an emphasis on democratic culture (typically associated with broad public education, training, participation, and incorporation of all ethnig groups and other segments of society in political activities such as constitution making). From a democracy assistance perspective, it means that programs designed to assist democracy need more emphasis on democratic culture in order to prevent relapses of violent conflicts in severely divided societies in the Balkans. 1
Democratization in Severely Divided Societies
A wave of economic and political liberalization is sweeping the world. Almost all countries in Eastern Europe and many countries in other regions of the world are undergoing a transition from an authoritarian to a liberal democratic polity. 2 Even so, seven years after the collapse of global communism the new global “order” seems a bundle of contradictions. 3 In the formal sense of civilian, constitutional, and multiparty regimes, there are more democracies in the world than ever before, while at the same time, in a growing number, democracy is eroding and threatening to collapse under the weight of ethnic and religious conflict, secessionist violence, terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, economic disarray, and state decay. 4 According to Diamond, ethnic conflict that escalates into large-scale violence, civil war, refugee flows, state collapse, and general anarchy presents just one of the most important threats to world order in the coming decade. He argues that, in each instance, the development of democracy is an important prophylactic, and in some cases the only long-term protection, against disaster. 5
During the past few decades, one school of thought has focused on democratic systems as the best guarantor not only of freedom but also of peace. Promoting democracy, however, is not a straightforward activity. It asks for answers to the following questions: How does one create and ensure a democratic polity? What are the specific institutional structures and mechanisms that are essential to democracy and that distinguish it from a nondemocratic system? 6
Apologists for authoritarian rule in severely divided societies argue that multiparty electoral competition breeds ethnic rivalry and polarization, while strong central control keeps the lid on conflict. But when multiple ethnic and national identities are forcibly suppressed, the lid may pop violently when the regime falls apart. The fate of Yugoslavia and some other countries in the world dramatically refutes the argument for authoritarian rule. 7
Diamond further elaborates on the idea that, overwhelmingly, theory and evidence show that the path to peaceful management of ethnic pluralism lies not through suppressing ethnic identities and superimposing the hegemony of one group over others. Rather, he contends that sustained interethnic moderation and peace follow from the frank recognition of plural identities, legal protection for group and individual rights, devolution of power to various localities and regions, and political institutions that encourage bargaining and accommodation at the center. Such institutional provisions and protections are not only significantly more likely under democracy, they are possible only with some considerable degree of democracy. 8
To understand, design, and support democratization processes, we need first to make an effort to define what democracy is. Democracy, broadly defined, encompasses not only a civilian, constitutional, multiparty regime, with regular, free, and fair elections and universal suffrage, but organizational and informational pluralism; extensive civil liberties (freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations); effective power for elected officials; and functional autonomy for legislative, executive, and judicial organs of government.
In support of the argument of this study is Diamond’s statement that important normative and political issues are at stake in the way we define democracy. If we rest content to promote merely a constitutional form of democracy, pressure for democratization will cease once the structural form is put in place, and assistance may go mainly to strengthen formal institutions and assist economic reform and development. To be sure, those are necessary objectives for democratization, but they are not sufficient. In a great many “near-democracies” and partial, “poor,” “low-quality,” or struggling democracies, democratic capacities must be strengthened outside the formal system, in a civil society, and the international community must continue to pay attention to problems of military domination and of ongoing political and human rights violations. 9 A parallel argument is provided by Quigley, who underlines the importance of recognizing the difference between procedural and substantive democracy. 10
For severely divided societies, according to Sisk, within consensual, noncoercive approaches to ethnic conflict management, there are but two broad options: partition or democracy. 11 If peaceful partition is an unlikely and highly unusual outcome in divided societies, and authoritarian methods (normative concerns aside) are at best a short-term solution to the management of ethnic conflicts, then multiethnic societies need democracy by default. Sisk further observes that most multiethnic societies lack the political culture—defined as prerequisite values—that engender democracy. Political culture theorists (Almond and Verba 1963) focus on the beliefs and norms of participation and tolerance associated with western society and include social homogeneity as a prerequisite for successful democracy—in sum, value consensus, crosscutting allegiances, and moderate attitudes must exist prior to the introduction of open electoral competition. When these cultural attributes are absent, so too is democracy. 12 Other scholars like Rebushka and Shepsle are not optimistic about democracy in severely divided societies. The question, “Is the resolution of intense but conflicting preferences in the [deeply divided] society manageable in a democratic framework?” is answered by them: “We think not.” 13
Despite such arguments, the majority of scholars consider that there are no viable alternatives to democracy as a system of just and stable conflict management in severely divided societies. Where ethnic tensions have been successfully managed, the regime is open and respectful of human rights and features a participatory civil society, universal suffrage, free and fair elections, and a modicum of fairness in the distribution of economic resources. In addition, patterns of reciprocal interactions among competing ethnic groups are institutionalized through the widely accepted and consensually framed rules of the political game. 14
So what is to be done? In many countries in transition from civil war to a new government, one of the first important tasks is drafting a new constitution to serve as the cornerstone for the rule of law and further consolidation of peace. Kritz submits the notion that when a constitution is drafted and imposed by a small group of elites from the victorious party, a foundation may result that is not only less democratic but also less stable. According to Kritz, alternatively, constitution making can involve a process of national dialogue, allowing competing perspectives and claims within the postwar society to be aired and incorporated, thus facilitating reconciliation among these groups. It can also be a process of national education with respect to concepts of government, the problems and concerns of different groups within the country, the development of civil society and citizen responsibility, and international norms of human rights, nondiscrimination, and tolerance that have been incorporated into a recent constitution. In short, the process of constitution making can contribute to peace and stability. 15
Democratization and Constitution Making In Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Fr Yugoslavia
Constitution making in the aftermath of civil wars can be an important means in peace promotion and democratization of severely divided societies, as indicated by Kritz and other scholars. It could include only the leadership of domestic and international political parties and organizations, but, to be effective in democratizing an entire society, it should include the entire civil society. Making a broad, plural base for constitution ownership can also be the first step in creating long-term stability and peace in the Balkans. The process of constitution making can incorporate not only a procedural, but also a substantive democracy by introducing new formal institutions and incorporating a plural society to support it.
In my analysis I will identify major events that characterize constitution making in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and FR Yugoslavia, and at the same time will emphasize the efforts of domestic and international policymakers, along with their achievements and missed opportunities.
Croatia
In the case of Croatia, the new constitution was adopted in 1990 when the Republic of Croatia formed an integral part of the former Yugoslavia. The Republic of Croatia, then already on the road to independence from the former Yugoslavia, used simple majoritarian principles in creating a new constitution. By emphasizing the dominance of the Croatian people and the right of a dominant people to choose the state formation, the Croats failed to use the opportunity to include and recognize the needs of other people from the Republic of Croatia, primarily the Serbs. As a result, the lack of dialog in the process of constitution making among the then constituent people of the Republic of Croatia and the former Yugoslavia later led to the civil war and violent disintegration of the former Yugoslavia.
The Croatian Constitution of December 22, 1990, resembled all the features of the idea of an ethnic nation and its state. 16 Hayden explains that this concept of an ethnic nation was made explicit by Franjo Tudjman. 17
Despite their millennial search for statehood, the Croats lacked an understanding or recognition of the other people that had shared the same land with them for centuries, and their right for identity, self-determination, and independence, as well. The first article of the constitutional basic provisions makes it clear that the Republic of Croatia is a unitary and indivisible democratic and social state. In creating a unitary state, the Croats found themselves with a form of state that they had fought against for so many centuries. Such an insensitive policy toward plurality and recognition of diversity led to the civil war in 1991 that lasted until 1995.
The lack of dialog and readiness of the Croatian majority in the Republic of Croatia to recognize the plurality of their society in the process of peace and constitution making was compensated for by Croatian military offensives in 1995 and cleansing of the Serbian population from the Western Slavonia and Krajina region, and by subsequent pressure and involvement of the international community to protect the rights of national minorities in the newly almost purified Croatian state.
In order to end the war, preserve the Croatian unitary state, and protect the remaining Serbian population in the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium, the international community pressed for signing and implementation of the Basic Agreement of the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium in Erdut on November 12, 1995. The objective of this agreement was to create the United Nations Transitional Administration (UNTAES) and to allow the Croatian state to take over authority from this temporary international governing institution while securing Serbian population rights for the national minority. The takeover of the Croatian administration was implemented on January 15, 1998.
The process of takeover was paralleled with changes in the Croatian Constitution. On December 12, 1997, the Croatian Assembly adopted amendments to the Croatian Constitution. Under the amendments, the name of the Croatian Assembly, previously the “Parliament of the Republic of Croatia,” was changed to the “Croatian State Parliament.” The Serbs, who in the 1990 version of the Constitution had been denied the recognition of a constitutive people and subsequently recognized as “ethnic community,” were now further marginalized as the “national minority,” as indicated in the amendment which reads, “The Republic of Croatia is a national state of the Croatian people and a state of the members of national minorities who are its citizens: Serbs, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians,....” According to this amendment, the Moslems did not even merit the status of national minority. 18
The Croats, also adopted an additional constitutional Amendment that prohibited everyone in the state from initiating a process of reestablishing any of the Yugoslav or Balkan state unions. 19
In order to reassure the international community and concerned national minorities of their good intentions, the Croatian Parliament, in the process of drafting the above-listed amendments, indicated a readiness to provide all rights to the national minorities in accordance with the European Council national minority documents. 20 However, despite the rhetoric of Croatian authorities and efforts of the international community to minimize the effects of Croatian unitarization on national minorities, the marginalization and violation of the basic human and minority rights of Serbs and other minorities in the new Croatian state continued. As a result, Serbs from the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium were abandoning their homes and trying to find refugee status in neighboring Yugoslavia, Republica Srpska, and some other countries in Europe.
The democratization processes in Croatia are lacking substance. In reality ownership of the new Croatian Constitution is in the hands of only the privileged Croatian identity, and there is not enough readiness of the Croatian leadership to build an all-inclusive substantive democracy. It seems that the first need of Croatian nationalism is to eradicate the negative energy accumulated during the last 900 years of statelessness. Once this energy runs out and Croatia becomes a more or less purified state, the new arena for democratization will open. Within their own group this new force can trigger the demand for a substantive democracy. However, it is possible that this journey could take too long for an ethnically diverse pluralist society to survive.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s drive to independence was officially launched at the end of February 1992 by the referendum recommended by the European Community. The Moslems and Croats voted overwhelmingly for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s independence. The Serbs, however, abstained from voting. In an environment where lack of sensitivity for a pluralist all-inclusive society in an already tense atmosphere prevailed, the alliance of the Croats and Moslems used the concept of simple majoritarian rule to over-vote the Serbian population. This action triggered the civil war that inflicted severe suffering to all the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
On the eve of the civil war the international community recognized the importance of dialog among all parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the future form of the mutual state. Under the auspices of the European Community and its chair and chief negotiator, Jose Cutileiro from Portugal, talks among the Moslem, Croat, and Serbian leadership took place in Lisbon with the objective of finding a political settlement upon which the three-party leadership could agree in order to establish Bosnian stability and sovereignty. By the time of the Lisbon Conference in March 1992, when violence had already started in Bosnia, all three parties spoke of ethnic cantonization of the Republic into three parts, something that would resemble Switzerland. Accepting the principles of the cantonization, the parties signed the Lisbon Agreement on March 18, 1992,.
The opportunity for a peaceful settlement provided by the Lisbon Agreement was abandoned by, at first, President Izetbegovic who reneged within a week on his commitment to the document, and then by the Croat leader, Mate Boban, who followed him. By late March, the Republic was at war. In the events that followed, Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognized on April 6, 1992, by the United States and the European Community, eliminating the last hope of a comprehensive settlement that could prevent further war. 21
It took three and a half years for the international community to come up with a new proposal acceptable to all three parties to end the war. It happened in Dayton, Ohio. Under the auspices of the United States the peace agreement was formulated and later signed in Paris at the end of 1995. The Dayton Agreement provided a significant step in ending the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It created new conditions for bringing permanent peace to the Balkans. It also provided an institutional framework for a Bosnia and Herzegovina nation-state. The Dayton Constitution provides that Bosnia and Herzegovina is to be divided into two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republica Srpska. It also specifies that Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be a democratic state operating under the rule of law, with free and democratic elections.
Further, according to the Constitution, politics of the pluralist Bosnia and Herzegovina society are to be managed through the Parliamentary Assembly with two chambers: the House of Peoples and the House of Representatives. The House of Peoples shall be composed of 15 delegates, two-thirds from the Federation (including five Croats and five Bosniacs) and one-third from the Republica Srpska (five Serbs). Nine members of the House of Peoples shall comprise a quorum, provided that at least three Bosniac, three Croat, and three Serb delegates are present.
The House of Representatives shall include 42 members, two-thirds elected from the territory of the Federation and one-third from the territory of the Republica Srpska. A majority of all members elected to the House of Representatives shall comprise a quorum. As to decision-making procedures, all legislation requires the approval of both Chambers. All decisions in both Chambers shall be by a majority of those present and voting. However, a proposed decision of the Parliamentary Assembly may be declared to be destructive of a vital interest of the Bosniacs, Croats, or Serbs. Such a proposed decision shall require approval by the House of Peoples, with a majority of Bosniac, Croat, and Serb delegates present and voting.
With the Dayton Agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina got a framework for the future state. Since then, it has been the duty of two Bosnia and Herzegovina’s entities, namely, Republica Srpska and Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to get the agreement implemented. However, the signatories of the Dayton Agreement also included neighboring Croatia and Yugoslavia, who accepted their obligation to bring a permanent peace to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and, with the support of the international community, to work on democratization of the entire Balkan region.
More than two years after the signing of the Dayton Agreement, some positive results of the democratization processes supported by the international community are becoming apparent in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The most recent local and parliamentary elections in both entities have provided an opportunity for all people in Bosnia and Herzegovina to choose their representatives and their leadership. It appears that moderate political forces are gaining support among the population, particularly in Republica Srpska. With the recent election of Milorad Dodik as Prime Minister of Republica Srpska, the full implementation of the Dayton Agreement seems more realistic.
The prospect of moderation in the severely divided society of Bosnia and Herzegovina is today more promising then ever before in the short history of that state. It appears that, supported by the will of the people and incentives of the international community, the members of an ethnically and politically diverse pluralist society can united build bridges, rather than to destroy them. In a society where dialog prevails and guns are at rest, the future form of a state can be just a matter of design rather than of substance. In such an environment, substantive democracy can falsify or refute the Dayton design for the benefit of all. The new events in Bosnia and Herzegovina are, nevertheless, just a new beginning. It will take time for the society of Bosnia and Herzegovina to evolve into a society of substantive democracy.
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
In the case of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia constitution making in the process of disintegration of the former Yugoslavia took the form of an agreement between the two remaining republics of the former Yugoslavia. The Republic of Serbia and Republic of Montenegro agreed to join each other in a new Yugoslav federation. The Declaration of a new Yugoslavia was adopted by Serbia and Montenegro on April 27, 1992. The Serbs and Montenegrins inherited the positions of a constituent people, while Albanians, Hungarians, and others inherited the position of national minorities.
In such an environment, the initial processes of substantial democratization in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were primarily based on the free expression of political preference among the political parties rather than ethnic groups. It seems that major disagreements existed among the government and the opposition, culminating in irregularities in local elections held in Serbia in 1996. Long winter demonstrations in 1996 and 1997 and constructive involvement of the international community returned Yugoslavia and Serbia to the path of democratization.
In the most recent parliamentary and presidential elections in Serbia in 1997, part of the opposition, 22 owing to a bad experience from the 1996 elections, asked for minimal electoral conditions. 23 The requests emphasized that if the required conditions were not fulfilled, the signatory political parties would undertake the obligation not to contest the elections and to organize an anti-election campaign. As a result, their determination not to participate in elections if the electoral conditions were not fulfilled excluded them from government posts and the opportunity to play a more active role in the political life of Serbia and Yugoslavia. They thereby missed an opportunity to join the democratization process by democratizing the political life and changing the conditions that included mobilization of the people in the election process rather then waiting for change to “happen.”
However, the leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Republics of Serbia and Montenegro neglected the question of national minorities and the form of their incorporation in the pluralist society. The demands of the Albanian population for change and independence were ignored rather than considered and adequately addressed. Instead of reducing the tensions through dialog and consideration of available internationally recognized solutions, the two parties allowed the tension to turn into violence. Albanian rejection to recognize the state where they lived led them to boycott the most recent parliamentary and presidential elections in Serbia, thereby missing an opportunity to take active participation in government activities and to initiate change through the process of substantial democratization rather than through direct confrontation with the people who share the land and state with them.
Discussion and Conclusions
A comparative assessment of the processes of constitution making in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia indicates that in the first phase Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina used the simple majoritarian rule to secede from the former Yugoslavia and to frame new constitutions. Lack of an effort to create national dialog and consensus among the constituent national groups on the future form of the state led Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to engage in civil wars.
Croatia missed an opportunity while introducing a new constitution in 1990 to generate dialog among its constituent people and address the centuries of mutual life shared by the Croats and Serbs. Instead, Croatia opted for creation of a state for Croats, emphasizing the history of the Croatian people rather than the shared history of Croatian and Serbian people in the region occupied today by the Republic of Croatia.
In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, an opportunity was missed when the alliance of Moslems and Croats decided in 1992 to proceed with secession from the former Yugoslavia and creation of a unitary state without an agreement with the Serbs, the third constituent people of the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The lack of consensus on the future form of the state led to civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The second opportunity to avoid civil war was missed when the Lisbon Agreement was rejected.
In the case of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the new Constitution in 1992 came as a result of the secession of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, and Macedonia, and the will of Serbia and Montenegro to stay together in a new Yugoslav federal state. However, the major problem of the new Yugoslavia was not in the consensus of the constituent republics of Serbia and Montenegro but in the problem of the Albanian national minority that lives in Kosovo and Metohija with the Serbs and Montenegrins. The process of constitution making did not generate a broad national dialog that could provide an opportunity for accommodation of Serbian, Montenegrin, and Albanian national questions in the Kosovo and Metohija region of Serbia. The lack of dialog among Serbs, Montenegrins, and Albanians led to violence that escalated in the spring and summer of 1998.
The gap created by ignorance, neglect and lack of dialog that led to civil wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina was closed by peace agreements brokered by the United States and international community.
In the case of Croatia, peace was provided by the Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium, signed by Croatia and Serbian representatives from Croatia in Erdut on November 12 1995, under the auspices of the United States and international community. According to this agreement, the United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium was established on January 15, 1996, to govern the region for a maximum of two years with an objective to reintegrate the region peacefully into Croatia’s constitutional system.
At the beginning of 1998, reintegration of the region as well as unitarization of Croatia was completed. Unfortunately, the problem of confidence, return and protection of the Serbian national minority remain unsolved. With new amendments to the Croatian Constitution, their position is further marginalized, as is the case with other minorities. In such an environment, where dominance of the Croats is further institutionalized, it is less likely that the return of refugees can be completed. A substantial democratization of Croatian society could take much more time than expected, subsequently making a pluralist society and the immediate return of refugees next to impossible.
The civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina ended with the United States-brokered Dayton Agreement, initialled on November 21, 1995, by President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, and President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, representing and acting on behalf of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian Serbs. On December 14, 1995, the Dayton Agreement became an official peace agreement when the same parties signed it in Paris. The Dayton Agreement was a product of bargaining among Moslem, Serbian, and Croatian leadership and of pressure put on them by the United States and the international community to end the war. With the Dayton Agreement Bosnia and Herzegovina got its Constitution too. The mistake made in 1992 was avoided by allowing all three parties to voice their positions. Although the broad national dialog was missing, the reality in the field was taken into account in the process of constitution making.
According to the Agreement, the state formation of the new Bosnia and Herzegovina is made from the federal, confederal, and consociational institutions, particularly if we include the options for confederal connectedness with Croatia and parallel arrangements with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The creators of the Dayton Agreement assumed that such an institutional framework should create an environment where differences among three constituent ethnic groups could be reconciled. Although the Dayton Agreement is not clear enough about the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Balkans, it nevertheless provided a framework for democratization of the severely divided society of Bosnia and Herzegovina. To be effective, the Agreement will need to add the will of the people to it. This process was generated by recent elections. Results from these elections, particularly in the Republica Srpska, indicate that, although divided by ethnic lines, the peoples’ political preferences are moving toward moderation that will allow reconciliation and the return of refugees, making a plural society possible within power-sharing rather than a unitary constitutional system.
The process of democratization of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has been slow ever since the new Yugoslavia was proclaimed. The most difficult obstacle in the procedural and substantial democratization of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is how the Albanian, Serbian, and Montenegrin national question will be solved in Kosovo and Metohija. This is also the question that most concerns international community, which is pressing for dialog, peace, and accommodation.
Albanians are demanding independence and secession from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and they want the international community to intervene directly in their favor. In response the international community is insisting on a solution that will accommodate Albanian demands within the existing borders while providing them with an adequate level of autonomy.
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s democratization and constitution making processes were spared until recently from the direct intervention of the international community. However, the escalation of violence in Kosovo and Metohija prompted direct involvement of international community in internal matters of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Again it was necessary to come with an agreement which should create framework for substantial democratization of the severely divided society.
The violence that erupted in Kosovo and Metohija and subsequent intervention of international community indicates how important it is to start immediately with dialog and democratization processes that will include all groups from a pluralist society in the conduct of designing the institutions of their mutual state.
According to this paper it seems to me that empirical evidence of democratization processes in severely divided societies in the Balkans are falsifying the following pattern: Democratization led to violence instead to national dialog on the future constitutional order and political practices; Lack of national dialog and violence led to escalation of conflict that attracts the international community; The international community intervenes by providing and enforcing a peace agreement that brings peace and replaces or supplements existing constitutional order.
Such empirical evidence indicates that domestic polities in the severely divided societies in the Balkans are not able to overcome challenges of democratization processes alone. Need for timely and balanced involvement of international community appears to be necessary in such cases. However, in order to spare the severely divided societies from unnecessary losses and human suffering, efforts of the international community to aid democratization processes should start before violence erupts by providing support for substantial democratization rather then exclusively relaying on intervention to stop the violence, provide and enforce the peace agreements that also replace or supplement existing constitutional order typically associated with elite barganing.
Endnotes
Note 1: Kevin F. F. Quigley, 1997, “Political Scientists and Assisting Democracy: Too Tenous Links,” in Political Science and Politics, Volume XXX, Number 3, September 1997, p. 564. Back.
Note 2: Arend Lijphart and Carlos H. Waisman, eds., Institutional Design in New Democracies—Eastern Europe and Latin America. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, p. 1. Back.
Note 3: Larry Diamond, 1995, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives. A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. Carnegie Corporation of New York, p. 1. Back.
Note 6: Neil J. Kritz, 1997, “The Rule of Law in the Postconflict Phase—Building a Stable Peace,” in Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall, eds., Managing Global Chaos—Sources of and Responses to International Conflict. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, p. 589. Back.
Note 10: Quigley, p. 565. Back.
Note 11: Timothy D. Sisk, 1996, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, p. 28. Back.
Note 15: Kritz, pp. 599-600. Back.
Note 16: Robert M. Hayden, 1992, “Constitutional Nationalism in the Former Yugoslav Republics,” in Slavic Review, 51, No. 4, pp. 654-73. Back.
Note 17: Following Tudjman’s idea of the ethnic nation, the Croatian Constitution in its preamble refers to historic foundations as follows: The Millennial national identity of the Croatian nation and the continuity of its statehood, confirmed by the course of its entire historical experience in various state forms and by the perpetuation and growth of the idea of one’s own state, based on the Croatian nation’s historical right to full sovereignty, manifested itself:
- in the independent medieval state of Croatia founded in the ninth century;
- in the Kingdom of Croats established in the tenth century;
- in the preservation of the subjectivity of the Croatian state in the Croatian-Hungarian personal union;
- in the autonomous and sovereign decision of the Croatian Sabor of 1527 to elect a king from the Hapsburg dynasty;
- in the autonomous and sovereign decision of the Croatian Sabor to sign the Pragmatic sanctions of 1712;
- in the conclusion of the Croatian Sabor of 1848 regarding the restoration of the integrity of the Triune Kingdom of Croatia under the power of the Ban, on the basis of the historical statal and natural right of the Croatian nation;
- in the Croato-Hungarian Compromise of 1868 regulating the relations between the Kingdom of Hungary, on the basis of the legal traditions of both states and the Pragmatic sanction of 1712;
- in the decision of the Croatian Sabor of October 29, 1918, to dissolve state relations between Croatia and Austro-Hungary, and the simultaneous affiliation of independent Croatia, invoking its historical and natural rights as a nation, with the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, proclaimed on the theretofore territory of the Hapsburg Monarchy;
- in the fact that the Croatian Sabor never sanctioned the decision of the National Council of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs to unite with Serbia and Montenegro in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (December 1, 1918), subsequently (October 3, 1929) proclaimed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia;
- in the establishment of the Banovina of Croatia in 1939 by which Croatia state identity was restored in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia;
- in laying the foundations of state sovereignty during the Second World war, through decisions of the Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Croatia (1943), as counter to the proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia (1941), and
- subsequently in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Croatia (1947), and several later constitutions of the Socialist Republic of Croatia (1963-1990).
At the historic turning point marked by the rejection of the Communist system and changes in the international order in Europe, the Croatian nation reaffirmed at the first democratic elections (1990) by its freely expressed will its millennial statehood and its resolution to establish the Republic of Croatia as a sovereign state. (In Snezana Trifunovska,ed., 1994, Yugoslavia Through Documents—From Its Creation to Its Dissolution, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) Back.
Note 18: Information from the Croatian Assembly. Back.
Note 20: Nasa Borba, December 3, 1997. Back.
Note 21: Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, pp. 280-83. Back.
Note 22: The Following political parties signed the memorandum on minimal conditions: Democratic Party of Serbia, Civic Alliance of Serbia, Democratic Party, Serbian Liberal Party, National Reunion Party, Democratic Center, United Radical Party of Serbia, Christian-Democratic Movement of Vojvodina-Hungarians, “Zapis” party of Small Businessmen, Liberal-Democratic Party, Serbian National Renewal-Nova Pazova, National Radical Party (Beograd, June 4, 1997). Back.
Note 23: Such as (1) the number of electoral units not be increased; (2) the Constitution and laws be strictly observed in the process of nominating candidates for president and in electing the president; (3) complete control of the electoral process be ensured, from forming voters’ rolls and printing ballots to counting votes, processing data, and publishing results; (4) media, and especially television, be impartial during the election campaign; and (5) rules be adopted to regulate financing of political parties and of the election campaign. Back.
