CIAO DATE: 02/02

Arms Control Regimes under the Dayton Agreement

Heinz Vetschera
Counselor on Arms Control, Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Austria

1999 - 2000

The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)

1. General Remarks

The arms control regimes under the Dayton Agreement of 1995, following the wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina, are unique in several aspects:

• First, they encompass not only State Parties but also non-State entities as equal partners to an arms control regime. This is due to the particular situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina where Serbs, Croats and Muslims had been at war with each other for several years. The war between Muslims and Croats was terminated with the Washington Agreement of 1994, which also created the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and led, in theory, to the establishing of joint armed forces of the Federation, consisting of the (Muslim) "Armija of Bosnia and Herzegovina" and the "Croatian Defence Council" (HVO). The opposite side were the Serbs with armed forces of their own, backed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Under the Dayton Agreement's provisions on the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation became one of the two constitutional entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with the Serbian "Republika Srpska", with both entities retaining their respective armed forces. The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina has assigned defence and military matters not to the central State's competencies, but to the two entities;
• Second, two out of three arms control negotiations foreseen by the Dayton Agreement were initiated and successfully concluded within a short time after the end of hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and, concerned parties which had been at war with each other practically until some weeks before the negotiations, took off;
• Closely related to that fact, they did not originate from the Parties concerned but came about under significant pressure by a third party; and
• Finally, they foresee the active involvement of an international organization (the Organization for Security and Co-operation-OSCE) both in the negotiation process, and in assisting the implementation and verification of some of the achieved agreements.

The regimes are a "mixed bag" in several respects. They contain, on the one hand, agreements achieved within a remarkably short time after the end of hostilities between the belligerents in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the other hand, the widest set of negotiations tasked by the Dayton Agreement has only recently been opened and is still under negotiation. In addition, the regimes concern on the one hand "soft" arms control (viz. confidence-and security-building measures) and "hard" arms control (viz. arms limitation and reductions). Finally, while the main bulk of arms control regimes has been assigned by the Dayton Agreement to separate negotiations, the Dayton Agreement itself, in its military provisions, contains several regulations which in the widest sense could be seen as "arms control" issues.

1.1) What is arms control?

The following analysis has been based on a wide understanding of arms control, as it has been introduced in the early sixties when it was founded on several premises. One was the recognition that in the modern era, the purpose of military force is not simply to win wars, but to deter aggression, while avoiding the kind of threat that may provoke desperate, preventive, or irrational military action on the part of other countries. Another one was to recognize the necessity that a nation's military force, while opposing the military force of potentially hostile nations, is also bound to collaborate, implicitly if not explicitly, in avoiding the kinds of crises in which withdrawal is intolerable for both sides, in avoiding false alarms and mistaken intentions, and in providing reassurance that restraint on the part of the potential enemies would be matched by restraint on one's own side.

Since then, arms control has been devoted, in principle, to achieve three objectives: First, arms control should reduce the likelihood of war; second, arms control should reduce the scope and violence of war if it occurs; third, it should reduce the political and economic costs of being prepared for war.

By pursuing these objectives, arms control differs considerably from the concept of disarmament: Disarmament is directed towards the reduction of armaments, without regarding its impact on international security. Arms control, on the other hand, is primarily oriented towards achieving military stability and thus contributing to international security. It is a broader term, but not in opposition to "disarmament" in the more literal sense, involving the straightforward notion of simple reductions in military force, military manpower, military budgets, aggregate explosive power, and so forth. There is, however, nothing in the concept of arms control to prevent the increase of certain types of armaments, if it appears in the interest of national or world security to do so.

Its essential features are, however, the recognition of the common interest, of the possibility of reciprocation and cooperation even between potential enemies with respect to their military establishments, and the overall objective in (national and) international security.

1.2) Approaches in Arms Control

To achieve stability in the military situation, two different approaches have been taken within arms control: a mechanistic, or "arms" approach, and a regulative, or "control" approach. The mechanistic approach tries to achieve stability by parity in military hardware. The regulative approach, however, is less concerned with a numerical equilibrium than with certain ways of conduct, i.e. with the dynamics of the military.

The "regulative approach" has been a part of the original arms control concept to no lesser degree than the "mechanistic approach". Reductions or increases in certain kinds of military force, qualitative changes in weaponry, different modes of deployment, or arrangements superimposed on existing military systems have all been included in the original scope of arms control, as well as the idea of improved intelligence about each other's military doctrines and modes of deployment, or the provision of superior communication between governments in the event of military crisis.

The same wide understanding of arms control will also give the framework for the purposes of our paper.

2. The Dayton Agreement and its Military Provisions

The General Framework Agreement of Dayton was signed under American mediation between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in November 1995 and entered into force in December 1995. It consists of a framework text of 11 articles and 11 annexes. The latter concern the substance matters, whereby not only the mentioned states, but in some instances the two Entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina (i.e. the Federation and the Republika Srpska), too, have been made parties to the Agreement with respect to those matters.

The annexes create inter alia the constitutional basis for Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the distribution of competencies between the (relatively weak) central government, and the two Entities, but they also attribute several matters and tasks to different international institutions, as for example:

• military peace-keeping (and, if necessary, peace-enforcement) has been entrusted to a multi-national NATO-lead Implementation Force (in the meantime re-named into Stabilization Force - SFOR). The previous United Nations peace-keeping force (UNPROFOR) was withdrawn (Annex 1-A);
• The civilian part has been entrusted in Annex 10 to a "High Representative", to be appointed consistent with relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. The High Representative shall inter alia monitor the implementation of the peace settlement, and coordinate the activities of the civilian organizations and agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina to ensure the efficient implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace settlement;
• Under Annex 11, The United Nations have been tasked to establish a UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) to carry out, throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, a program of assistance inter alia in monitoring, observing, and inspecting law enforcement activities and facilities, advising local law enforcement personnel and forces, and training local law enforcement personnel;
• Annex 7 has tasked the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to develop a repatriation plan that will allow for an early, peaceful, orderly and phased return of refugees and displaced persons; and
• The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has been mandated with the following tasks:
• Organization of free, fair, and democratic elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in accordance with relevant documents of the OSCE (Annex 3);
• Negotiations on military confidence- and security-building and arms control as well as assistance in the implementation and verification of achieved agreements (Annex 1-B, "Regional Stabilization"); and
• Together with the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and other intergovernmental or regional human rights missions or organizations to monitor closely the human rights situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Annex 6).

2.1) The Military and Arms Control Dimension

The military and arms control dimension has been enshrined in Annex 1. While Annex 1-B ("Regional Stabilization") in itself is the arms control part of the Dayton Agreement, Annex 1-A (Agreement on the Military Aspects of a Peace Settlement) also contains several elements crucial from an arms control perspective. In particular, some of its provisions have pre-determined the arms control framework in the narrower sense.

2.1.1) Relevant Provisions within Annex 1-A

First, the Parties accept the deployment of a multinational military Implementation Force (IFOR), mandated by the United Nations and established by NATO. They also explicitly commit themselves to establish lasting security and arms control measures as outlined in Annex 1-B.

Then, the Parties explicitly commit themselves to the cessation of hostilities and to ensure that all personnel and organizations with military capability under its control or within territory under its control, including armed civilian groups, national guards, army reserves, military police, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs Special Police (MUP) comply with this Annex.

A particular emphasis has been given to the withdrawal of all foreign forces. All foreign forces, including individual advisors, freedom fighters, trainers, volunteers, and personnel from neighboring and other States, shall be withdrawn from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Furthermore, the Parties have committed themselves to a gradual redeployment and de-mobilization of their forces. The Parties shall, within 120 days after the Transfer of Authority to IFOR, withdraw all heavy weapons and Forces to cantonment/barracks areas or other locations as designated by the IFOR Commander. "Heavy weapons" refers to all tanks and armored vehicles, all artillery 75 mm and above, all mortars 81 mm and above, and all anti-aircraft weapons 20 mm and above, and demobilize Forces which cannot be accommodated in cantonment/barracks areas.

The Parties also agreed to the establishing of a Joint Military Commission, chaired by the IFOR Commander and consisting inter alia of the senior military commander of the forces of each Party within Bosnia and Herzegovina and other persons as the Chairman may determine; the High Representative shall attend Commission meetings, and offer advice, particularly on matters of a political-military nature. The Parties have been obliged to provide information to the Commission regarding the status of their respective Forces within Bosnia and Herzegovina and to keep it updated on changes in this information.

While the bulk of these obligations for the Parties may be derived from the very nature of Annex 1-A, in safeguarding the cease-fire and establishing a kind of only thinly veiled occupation regime, some of the provisions have, to a certain degree, pre-determined the pertinent measures within the following negotiations, as for example the definition of "forces with a military capability", the definition of "heavy weapons", or the time-table for the withdrawal of forces and armaments to cantonments/barracks. Also, the provision to establish the Joint Military Commission, and to furnish it with relevant military information, to a certain degree parallels the idea of openness and transparency which is inherent to the very idea of confidence- and security-building measures.

2.1.2) Annex 1-B and the Regional Stabilization of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Annex 1-B has been titled "Agreement on Regional Stabilization". It contains several provisions which provide for a concentric-circle shaped, step-by-step negotiation framework on arms control issues (in the wider sense) between the Parties to the Dayton Agreement, and it provides for the "establishment of progressive measures for regional stability and arms control" and obliges the parties to devise "new forms of cooperation in the field of security aimed at building transparency and confidence and achieving balanced and stable defence force levels at the lowest numbers consistent with the Parties' respective security and the need to avoid an arms race in the region".

2.2) The Framework - Articles II, III, IV and V

Within Annex 1-B, the pertinent Parties have committed themselves, in parts under certain deadlines, to negotiations on arms control, some of which should take place "under the auspices of the OSCE".

Art. II foresees, as a first step, that seven days after the Agreement enters into force, the parties shall at an appropriate high political level commence negotiations under the auspices of the OSCE to agree on a series of measures to enhance mutual confidence and reduce the risk of conflict... The objective of these negotiations is to agree upon an initial set of measures within 45 days after this Annex enters into force...

Art. III provides that the Parties should:

1. not import any arms for 90 days after the Annex enters into force; and
2. not import for 180 days after the Annex enters into force or until the arms control agreement referred to in Article IV below takes effect, whichever is the earlier, heavy weapons or heavy weapons ammunition, mines, military aircraft, and helicopters. Heavy weapons refers to all tanks and armored vehicles, all artillery 75 mm and above, all mortars 81 mm and above, and all anti-aircraft weapons 20 mm and above.

Article IV gives the framework for negotiations on Sub-Regional Arms Control. It provides that in order to achieve balanced and stable defence force levels at the lowest numbers consistent with the respective security, the Parties shall within thirty days commence negotiations under the auspices of the OSCE to reach early agreement on levels of armaments consistent with this goal. The agreements should establish numerical limits on holdings of tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters, as defined in the relevant sections of the CFE Treaty, with the additional understanding that artillery pieces will be defined as those of 75 mm calibre and above. The negotiations should be completed within 180 days after the Annex had entered into force. The Parties should also commence negotiations on an agreement establishing voluntary limits on military manpower.

Par. 4 of Art. IV further explicitly foresees that the OSCE will assist the Parties in their negotiations under Articles II and IV of this Annex and in the implementation and verification (including verification of holdings declarations) of resulting agreements.

Finally, Art. V in its original wording and meaning aims at a Regional Arms Control Agreement with the goal of establishing a regional balance in and around the former Yugoslavia. The OSCE will assist the Parties by designating a special representative to help organize and conduct these negotiations under the auspices of the OSCE Forum on Security Cooperation (FSC) In contrast to the previous mandates for the two other negotiation fora, this provision does not contain any timeframe or deadlines for the beginning or duration of the negotiations. The pertinent decision was finally adopted at the Copenhagen OSCE Council Meeting in December 1997.

2.3) Assessment of the Framework

There is a certain inner coherence between the different sets of negotiations, the range of participation, and the timetable, including the correlation between the deadlines in articles III and IV, so that the Parties would be, in effect, barred from importing heavy weapons, while the negotiations on ceilings would go on.

Table I

The Framework for Negotiations under Annex 1-B

Time-frame	Directly defined obligations under Annex 1-B	Negotiations on CSBMs in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Art. II)	Negotiations on Sub-Regional arms Control (BiH, FRY, Croatia)
Day 0	Signing of the Agreement, Agreement enters into force
Day 7		parties commence negotiations under the auspices of the OSCE
Day 30	parties report their holdings as defined		parties commence negotiations under the auspices of the OSCE
Until day 45		parties agree upon an initial set of measures
Until day 90	no imports of any arms (Art. III)
Until day 180	no imports of heavy weapons etc. (Art. III)		parties complete negotiations

 

In contrast to the strict timetables envisaged for the immediate measures and the negotiations under articles II and IV, no such fixed timetable has been foreseen for the negotiations under Art. V.

With regard to the purposes and the scope of participation, one could see an approach in "concentric circles". In the first instance, stability should be achieved within Bosnia and Herzegovina, with negotiations on CSBMs only and with a limited participation (BiH, FBiH, RS). In the second step, the participants in the Bosnian war (the parties within BiH and the external actors - Croatia and FRY) should negotiate a stable military balance among themselves, thereby also eliminating the grave asymmetries which had been, inter alia, a major factor in triggering the past wars. In the last step, negotiations between all States of the Former Yugoslavia and her neighbors should lead to eliminate possible instabilities, and to re-integrate the region into the wider European security space.

3) The Negotiation Processes and Their Results

The Negotiations were initiated with a conference on Confidence-Building and Arms Control on 18 December 1995 on the Petersberg near Bonn, upon invitation by the German Government. This conference encompassed 32 governments (with the other OSCE governments as observers) and organizations such as the OSCE and NATO. The conference was intended to demonstrate the international community's commitment to these issues. The conference also decided on the appointment of the two chairmen for the Art. II and IV negotiations, namely Ambassador Dr. Istvan Gyarmati from Hungary for Art. II, and Ambassador (former General) Vigleik Eide from Norway for Art. IV.

3.1) The Agreement on Confidence-and Security-Building Measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina ("Art- II/Vienna Agreement")

Negotiations under Art. II started in substance in Vienna on 4 January 1996, and could be successfully concluded on 26 January 1996 with the Agreement on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina ("Vienna/Article II-Agreement").

3.1.1) The Mandate and Negotiations

The negotiations' mandate, as outlined by the pertinent provisions, was to agree on a series of measures to enhance mutual confidence and reduce the risk of conflict, drawing fully upon the 1994 Vienna Document... However, Art. II in itself also prescribed some explicit measures to be negotiated and adopted, namely:

1. restrictions on military deployments and exercises in certain geographical areas;
2. restraints on the reintroduction of foreign Forces in light of Article III of Annex 1-A to the General Framework Agreement;
3. restrictions on locations of heavy weapons;
4. withdrawal of forces and heavy weapons to cantonment/barracks areas or other designated locations as provided in article IV of Annex 1-A;
5. notification of disbandment of special operations and armed civilian groups;
6. notification of certain planned military activities, including international military assistance and training programs;
7. identification of and monitoring of weapons manufacturing capabilities;
8. immediate exchange of data on the holdings of the five Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) weapons categories as defined in the CFE Treaty, with the additional understanding that artillery pieces will be defined as those of 75 mm calibre and above; and
9. immediate establishment of military liaison missions between the Chiefs of the Armed Forces of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska.

Some of these measures additional to the "classical" CSBMs of the Vienna Document are visibly rooted in the corresponding provision of Annex 1-A. While in Annex 1-A one could relate measures as for example the confinement of forces and heavy weapons to cantonments/barracks to a kind of "imposed post-war demobilization regime", Annex 1-B builds the bridge to turn these steps into confidence-building measures. Similar considerations would also hold true for other measures, as for example the restraints on the reintroduction of foreign forces, or the restrictions on locations of heavy weapons.

The negotiations were conducted under pressure to achieve the Agreement in time. While they were formally held between Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, (the State of) Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federation during the negotiations were represented by a joint Muslim/Croat delegation. After first attempts to politicize the meetings, they soon could be brought into a business-like setting which allowed for serious negotiations in substance. The main bulk of provisions was, however, mostly forced down the throat of the Parties by the chairmanship of the negotiations. Thus, the negotiations could be concluded in time on 26 January 1996.

Parallel to the negotiations, the OSCE in mid-January 1996 also organized a seminar in Sarajevo for the armed forces of the Parties to the negotiations, in order to make them acquainted with the very ideas of confidence-building and arms control.

3.1.2) The Agreement on Confidence-and Security-Building Measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina ("Art- II/Vienna Agreement")

The Agreement of 26 January 1996 ("Art. II/Vienna Agreement") pertains to the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its main objective is openness and transparency on the armed forces and the constraining of military options, as well as the prevention of unintended escalation, and the promotion of military cooperation between the two entities and the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a classical CSBM agreement it does not, however, foresee any limitations of forces and armaments.

The Parties have committed themselves to the following measures, which have in parts been further detailed in the annexes to the Agreement.

Table II

Confidence-and Security-Building Measures (Art. II Agreement)

 

Measure	Contents
I	Exchange of Military Information
- I(I)	Annual Exchange of Information
- I(II)	Data Relating to Major Weapons and Equipment Systems
- I(III)	Demonstration of new types of major weapons or equipment systems
- I(IV)	Information on plans for the deployment of major weapon and equipment systems
- I(V)	Information on defence-related matters
II	Notification of Changes in Command Structure or Equipment Holdings
III	Risk Reduction
- III(A)	Mechanism for Consultation and Co-operation as Regards Unusual Military Activities
- III(B)	Co-operation as Regards Hazardous Incidents of a Military Nature
IV	Notification and Observation of and Constraints on Military Activities
- IV(A)	Notification
- IV(B)	Observation
- IV(C)	Constraining Measures/Annual Calendars
V	Restrictions on Military Deployments
VI	Restraints on Reintroduction of Foreign Forces
VII	Withdrawal of Forces and Heavy Weapons to Cantonments/Barracks
VIII	Restrictions on Locations of Heavy Weapons
IX	Notification of Disbandment of Special Operations and Armed Civilian Groups
X	Identification and Monitoring of all Weapons Manufacturing Capabilities
XI	Military Contacts and Co-operation
- XI(I)	Military Contacts
- XI(II)	Military Co-operation (joint exercises and training)
- XI(III)	Visits to Military Bases
- XI(IV) and Annex 7	Establishment of Military Liaison Missions (including Annex 7)
XII	Principles Governing Non-Proliferation
XIII and Annex 1	Verification and Inspection (including Annex 1)
XIV and Annex 4	Communication (including Annex 4)
XV and Annex 5	Implementation Assessment (including Annex 5); Establishing of a Joint Consultative Commission (JCC)

 

The measures clearly indicate where they have been derived from:

• Measures I to IV as well as some elements in measures XI (I-III), XIV and XV have been clearly shaped along the lines of the Vienna Document 1994, albeit with several adaptations. For example, the calibre threshold for notifiable artillery has been lowered, in accordance with the already established provisions of Annex 1-A, to 75 mm. Also, the thresholds for the notification and observation of activities have been significantly reduced. Then, the Vienna Document's difference in thresholds for notification and observation of military activities has been eliminated, thus in principle making each notifiable activity also an observable one. Finally, while the Vienna Document foresees Annual Implementation Meetings to he held in the framework of the OSCE's Forum for Security Co-operation, the Vienna Agreement establishes a separate body, the Joint Consultative Commission, for the same task;
• Measures V to X as well as Measure XI (IV) have their roots in the pertinent provisions of Annex 1-B. Some of them are also, to a certain degree, correlated to the pertinent provisions of Annex 1-A. Thus, where Annex 1-A obliges e.g. the Parties (implicitly vis-à-vis IFOR) to demobilize their forces by a certain deadline, the Agreement foresees the notification to each other, thus increasing openness and transparency and thereby building confidence. Similar considerations also hold true for the provisions concerning the notification of disbandment of special operations and armed civilian groups, or the restraints on re-introduction of foreign forces. These provisions have been partly reinforced by specific mechanisms in the case of the suspicion of non-compliance;
• Measure XII (Principles of Non-Proliferation) has been based on a similar document adopted by the then CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation in 1994. It extends the obligation from a State-to-State to the entity level; and
• Finally, the provisions on Verification and Inspection (Measure XIII and the pertinent Annex 1) have been based mostly on the pertinent provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE).

The Agreement thus contains a multitude of provisions with different roots, which in sum offer, however, a well-balanced regulative framework for confidence-building.

While the above distinction has followed the roots of the pertinent provisions, another categorization may be based on the distinction of:

• measures of an obligatory character (the majority, as for example all provisions on notification, information, constraining provisions, etc.); and
• measures of a non-obligatory character, as for example the Program for Contacts and Co-operation.

The latter provisions have by themselves already a strong confidence-building character. Their non-obligatory character does not result from a lower esteem, but from the fact that confidence-building in the proper sense cannot be enforced, but has to grow by the good will of the Parties concerned.

3.1.3) Implementation - The First Phase

Confidence-building is an on-going process. However, the Agreement in itself has set a certain time-frame for a phased approach, with the end of 1997 as a kind of approximate line where the process of confidence-building should have become self-sustaining among the parties, and would require a lesser involvement of the OSCE.

Thus, the Review Conference which took place in February 1998 gave a good occasion for stock-taking. It confirmed in many instances earlier observations. Initial problems had in many cases been rooted in organizational, administrative, or technical shortcomings rather than in lacking political will on the Parties' sides. Frequently, there occurred delays and missing of deadlines, and occasionally also a lack of implementation in substance. However, in most cases it was possible - not at least by a certain degree of flexibility in application of the pertinent provisions - to solve emerging problems on-site, before they could grow into disputes. Thus, with respect to the measures of an obligatory character, even at an early stage a relatively positive implementation pattern emerged.

There was, however, a significant lack of willingness in application of the non-obligatory measures in the area of contacts and co-operations. Thus, the OSCE Mission in 1996 and 1997 organized seminars on confidence-building subjects for the Parties of the Art. II Agreement. They should serve two purposes: On the one hand, to establish and deepen contacts between the political and military elites of the parties to the Agreement; On the other hand, to make them better acquainted with the subjects concerned. The following seminars were subsequently organized:

• A Seminar on Democratic Control of Armed Forces (December 1996) - the subject was intentionally selected to address pertinent deficiencies of the Parties;
• A Seminar on Regional Arms Control (February 1997) - it should make the Parties better acquainted with the role of regional arms control in the overall context of arms control and confidence-building in Europe, in particular with reference to the idea of an open-skies regime; and
• A Seminar on Military Doctrines (June 1997); it should, in analogy to earlier CSCE/OSCE-wide seminars, lead to more openness and transparency with respect to the respective military doctrines, which indeed succeeded.

Against the background of experiences gained, the following implementation assessment for the Agreement on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures might be undertaken:

• The quality of exchanged military information has consistently improved. Exchanged information until mid-1997 did not yet contain any indication on notifiable reserve, police and similar forces, but additional information was requested and finally provided. Also in mid-1997, a breakthrough could have been achieved in the notification of weapons manufacturing capabilities which had until then been contentious due to a differing interpretation of that term by the Republika Srpska;
• Establishing of the Military Liaison Missions in both entities had finally been achieved, leading to the agreed presence, albeit not yet of a continued character, of the Missions as military representatives to the other entity. In addition, the regular meetings of the Missions under chairmanship of the OSCE, although in no way foreseen by the Agreement, had developed into a crucial pillar of confidence-building between the Parties;
• Inspections could be conducted successfully, after initial complications, and confirmed grosso modo the exchanged military information; and
• Parties in the course of 1997 undertook first steps with respect to non-obligatory measures. For example, the Federation invited the Republika Srpska and the OSCE to visit a weapons depot for armaments provided under the "train-and-equip" program, which formally had not yet been notifiable under terms of the Agreement. In a similar way, both sides organized visits to weapons manufacturing capabilities.

There were, however, some remaining deficiencies to be addressed:

• Different standards in information exchange and in the use of agreed formats;
• Inadequate information exchanges on Defence Planning where Parties still lacked the basics;
• Neglecting the necessity for information exchange and notification, whenever similar or identical information had already been exchanged under the Article-IV Agreement, or notified to SFOR. The Parties tended to mix up the different regimes;
• In a similar way, neglecting of concrete notification of military activities, whenever they had already been subject to notification in the Annual Calendars; and
• Establishing of direct communication lines between the headquarters of the two entities' armed forces has not yet been achieved and had to be "subsidized" by using the OSCE-Mission as a kind of go-between.

3.1.4) Further Development

While the first phase had been characterized by the efforts to reduce the still existing military tensions between the armed forces of the two entities, and to achieve some kind of "cold peace", the following phase was marked by quite successful efforts to turn from confrontation towards cooperation. This pertained, in the first instance, to a consistent improvement in the implementation pattern of the obligatory measures foreseen by the Vienna Agreement. It pertained, however, even more to the participation in voluntary activities under Measure XI (Contacts and Cooperation):

• With respect to the measures of an obligatory character, the annual exchanges of military information finally included not only classical military forces, but also police forces, including - in the case of the Federation - its cantonal police forces. The parties also agreed in June 1999 at the 20th meeting of the Consultative Commission to provide additional exchanges of military information, as well as quarterly notifications of relevant changes in the annual information exchanges, thereby significantly improving the scope of military information. Also, the parties in 2000 finally exchanged their military budgets, both the 1999 outlays, and the 2000 authorization; and
• On the side of voluntary measures, efforts by the international community, in particular by the Personal Representative, gradually widened the scope to include additional objectives. The most important one has been the gradual development of a common Security and Defence Identity for Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole. Other objectives in the same direction were the development of the capabilities of Bosnia and Herzegovina to live up to the commitments under the OSCE-wide Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security Building Measures, and of the potential for a future participation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole in international operations for peacekeeping, disaster relief, and the like. Finally, efforts aimed at an overall reduction of armed forces and of military budgets.

To achieve these additional objectives in cooperation, the Personal Representative successfully resumed the organizing of Seminars which reflected the changing scope, too, increasingly focusing on matters requiring the cooperation of the parties concerned. While "classical subjects", as for example the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Issues, or confidence-building measures and arms control were continued, they also have become increasingly complemented by subjects concerning the active cooperation of armed forces for a common purpose, as for example peacekeeping operations, military support for disaster relief operation, and the like. The quantum leap was taken in 1999 with seminars explicitly aiming at supporting the idea of establishing a distinct security and defence identity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as for example a Seminar on Security Studies, or a seminar on establishing a common military doctrine for the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Seminar on Security Studies in June 1999 laid the ground for a network of all universities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in cooperation with international research institutions, to study subjects of common interest, as for example

• The geopolitical role of Bosnia and Herzegovina in South-Eastern Europe;
• new arms control and CSBMs for the Stability Pact in South-Eastern Europe;
• GeoEconomis of Bosnia and Herzegovina - the Security Dimension;
• Problems Related to the Re-entry of Refugees - the BiH Experience;
• Integration of BiH in the Euro-Atlantic security system;
• Organized and Financial Crime and the Legal Structure of the Privatization Process and Foreign Investment Framework in BiH;

and the like.

Even more indicative for the changes was the Seminar on Military Doctrines, organized on behalf of the OSCE by Austria in August 1999. While the discussions indicated that a common military doctrine for BiH would be still a long way to go, even more so as there are yet no developed military doctrines of the different armed forces in BiH available as a common basis for it, and some constitutional provisions are still missing on all sides, the Parties nevertheless agreed to some common basic elements, as for example that a common BiH Security Policy and Defence Doctrine would be a necessary contribution to security and permanent peace in BiH, and that it should be based on basic values as for example peace, democracy, territorial integrity of BiH, good neighbourly relations, equality and freedom of citizens, peoples and entities, and entering European and Atlantic institutions.

The development was more a positive sign, as during the course of the seminar the highest-ranking representative of the Republika Srpska, then Chief of General Staff General Talic, was arrested by Austrian police on grounds of an indictment by the ICTY, and immediately flown to the Hague. While the remaining participants from the Republika Srpska left the seminar and the pertinent decision was taken by consensus of the remaining participants, the Republika Srpska on 10 September 1999 nevertheless subscribed to the adopted document.

3.1.5) Assessment and Outlook

The instruments as well as the signs for progress - as well as for setbacks - were manifold. One of the main instruments were continuous and coordinated efforts by the representatives of the international community, as for example the Head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Personal Representative for Art. II and IV, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the High Representative, or the Commander of SFOR.

There were, however, on the side of the Parties several factors which contributed to that development, too. One was the gradual growing of a specific "Bosnian" identity on the side of the Republika Srpska. In the first instance, it was the result of an internal shift of power towards more pragmatic politicians. In addition, however, with the progressing political and economic decline in the FRY, the very idea of a Serbian "Anschluss" became less and less attractive for the Serbian side in Bosnia. The development achieved a visible climax during NATO's air campaign against the FRY, when the Republika Srpska, despite expectations to the contrary, showed a remarkably low profile and after some formal acts of solidarity returned to a "business as usual" attitude. This does not mean that cooperation did not suffer some setbacks, but they were predominantly caused by reasons specific for the Republika Srpska, as for example the (in their view) unfavorable decision on the Status of Brcko, the arrests of indicted war criminals, etc. Thus, while the Republika Srpska has continued to retain its own Serbian identity and has acted accordingly, this does no longer imply identification with Yugoslav Serbia.

On the Federation's side, there had always been a more positive attitude towards the international community, in particular on the Muslim side, but also on the Croatian side. While the attitude towards the Republika Srpska somehow mirrored their increasingly positive attitude, tensions between the Croatian and Muslim components within the Federation did not ease away but continued for most of the time. The tensions were not only a reflection of the earlier war, which had been formally overcome by the Washington Agreement of 1994 which founded the Federation, but also by the numerical discrepancies between Muslims and Croats, the latter being in a visibly inferior position of 3:1. While the Muslim side thus frequently used their numerical superiority and therefore would have preferred proportional representation in Federal institutions, the Croatian side would have preferred numerical parity on the grounds of ethnic equality. There had been several approaches to overcome these different positions, including strong Western efforts, but the problem remained to limit the Federation's capabilities inter alia with respect to fully cooperate as envisaged by the Agreement, and expected by the international community. They only gradually started to ease with the political changes in Croatia from a hard-line towards a more pragmatic position vis-á-vis Bosnia and Herzegovina as a consequence of the elections in early 2000, but are far from overcome.

A visible sign for the efforts to bear some fruit was the establishing and further work of the Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM) as foreseen by the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Committee proved to be a crucial focal point for the development of a State identity in security and defence matters. Efforts suffered from several setbacks, for example during the Republika Srpska´s reaction to the decision on the status of Brcko, or during the Western air campaign in the Kosovo crisis, or in reaction to the arrest of General Talic. Nevertheless, the SCMM on its 15 session in June 1999 succeeded in establishing its own permanent secretariat, and several working groups, addressing inter alia questions of a "new security architecture" for a (State) security policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the reduction of military personnel, and the reduction of military budgets. In the course of further developments, working groups are now established to address the following issues:

• Security Policy;

• Reductions (lower than Art. IV limits);

• Joint participation in UN peacekeeping operations;

• Questions of military housing; and

• Fulfillment of International Obligations.

The latter refers inter alia to enable BiH to live up to the obligations under the OSCE-wide Vienna Document, in preparing and submitting the required annual exchange of military information and other information exchanges, and to participate both actively and on the receiving side in the pertinent verification regime.

The SCMM also took decisions on the deployment of military attachés by BiH, and on the transparency of military budgets.

While the establishing and gradual improvement of the work of the SCMM has not formally been related to the Vienna Agreement, there has nevertheless been an implicit correlation by the fact that the central institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina have been a Party to the Agreement, and that the very purpose of overcoming mistrust and building confidence between the two entities and their armed forces, and the central institutions almost by necessity had to lead to develop a common understanding of a security and defence identity of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole. It required, however, not only certain developments on the sides of the parties but also strong efforts undertaken by the Personal Representative under Art. II, using the cooperative measures under the Vienna Agreement as well as a series of seminars organized by the OSCE, but also by some OSCE participating States as instruments which significantly contributed to that development.

3.2) The Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control ("Art. IV/ Florence Agreement")

Article IV gave the framework for Negotiations on Sub-Regional Arms Control, which included not only Bosnia and Herzegovina and her entities but also Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The negotiations were aimed at establishing numerical limits on holdings of tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters.

The underlying reason for the negotiations was to redress the military balance with respect to the major weapons systems, as indicated above. The balance had throughout the wars always been in favor of the Serbian/Yugoslav side, which could heavily draw on the arsenals of the former Yugoslav People's Army (YPA), and was mostly in a position to outgun the opposing forces.

There has thus been a certain strategic correlation within the time-frame for achieving a certain military balance under the Art. IV Agreement and the envisaged termination of the presence of IFOR/SFOR. A stable military balance achieved under Art. IV would have made the continued presence of IFOR/SFOR less a necessity to prevent the renewed outbreak of armed conflict between the Parties. Parallel to the implementation processes as mandated by the Art. IV Agreement, in particular by the US government, therefore supported the "outgunned" Federation in achieving the military strength it would have been, in principle, entitled within the limits agreed under Art. IV.

3.2.1) Mandate and Negotiations

The negotiations were conducted in Vienna, too, under chairmanship of Norwegian Ambassador Vigleik Eide.

For a viable balance, the envisaged agreement should take into account at a minimum the following criteria: population size, current military armament holdings, defence needs, and relative force levels in the region.

If the Parties would have failed to agree to such limits in the pertinent weapons categories within the deadline of 180 days after entry into force of the Dayton Agreement, the following limits would have applied, according to a ratio of 5:2:2 based on the approximate ratio of populations of the Parties:

1. the baseline should be the determined holdings of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;
2. the limits for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should be 75 percent of the baseline;
3. the limits for the Republic of Croatia should be 30 percent of the baseline;
4. the limits for Bosnia and Herzegovina should be 30 percent of the baseline; and
5. the allocations for Bosnia and Herzegovina would be divided between the Entities on the basis of a ratio of 2 for the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 1 for the Republika Srpska.

While the mandate would have given a certain flexibility, negotiations were curtailed by several factors. One was the Parties' general attitude that they would not easily accept any provisions different from the CFE Treaty. While following the CFE Treaty gave them the impression that they were somehow equal to "established" CFE States, any deviations would have been perceived as being put under a special regime for the region, which they were not ready to accept. Another factor was the FRY´s (unsuccessful) attitude to use the negotiations as a bargaining chip to be (re-) admitted to the OSCE. Finally, the Muslims and Croats were reluctant to accept anything which even in the slightest way would have supported the Republika Srpska's claim for independent statehood.

Thus, the negotiations finally fell back to the pre-arranged/default settings as already envisaged in Art. IV. Furthermore, despite the given deadline of 180 days after the entry into force, the negotiations had to be continued for some days beyond that date. The corresponding Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control could thus only be signed belatedly in Florence on 14 June 1996 ("Florence/Article IV Agreement"), and with the results pre-established by Art. IV itself.

3.2.2) The Agreement

In its philosophy and structure, the Art. IV Agreement closely follows the lines of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. It contains, at its core, ceilings for major weapons systems / Armaments Limited by the Agreement (ALA; main battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery pieces, combat aircraft, and combat helicopters) for all Parties. The Parties also agreed on voluntary limits on the personnel of their armed forces.

All excessive ALA are liable to reduction, whereby 25 percent of the reduction liability may be exported. Certain numbers of combat aircraft may be converted to trainer aircraft. At the core, however, reduction has to be achieved by physical destruction of the weapons.

The Agreement foresees a staged approach to achieve its objectives. First, the Parties by 21 June 1996 had to declare their existing holdings ("baseline"), which were subject to a distinct inspection regime ("baseline validation"). Then, within 30 days after signing the Agreement, each Party had to notify its reduction liability, defined as the difference between its actual holdings as notified, and its agreed ceilings for holdings.

Actual reductions were to be conducted in two phases, to be completed no later than 16 months after 1 July 1996. In the first reduction phase, i.e. within 6 months after 1 July 1996, each Party had to eliminate 40 percent of its total reduction liability for artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters, and 20 percent of its total reduction liability for tanks and armored combat vehicles. In the second reduction phase, that is, no later than 16 months after 1 July 1996, each Party had to have eliminated its total reduction liability in each of the categories of armaments limited by the Agreement.

Table III

Art. IV Reduction Process

Event	Date
Information Exchange	21 June 1996
Baseline Validation = verification	4 months after 01 July 1996
Reduction Period = elimination of "reduction liability"	12 months following = 16 months after 01 July 1996
- first reduction phase 40% for artillery combat aircraft attack helicopters; 20% for tanks armoured combat vehicles	not later than 6 months after 01 July 1996
second reduction phase: All remaining reduction liabilities	not later than 16 months after 01 July 1996

 

Table IV

Notified Actual Holdings (Baseline)

(June 1996)

PARTY	BATTLE TANKS	ARMOURED COMBAT VEHICLES	PIECES OF ARTILLERY	COMBAT AIRCRAFT	ATTACK HELI-COPTERS
F.R.Y.	1512	913	4919	230	56
CROATIA	284	128	2229	27	4
FEDERATION	130	96	2940	0	0
REP. SRPSKA	193	121	579	18	7

 

Table V

Agreed Ceilings under the Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control

PARTY	BATTLE TANKS	ARMOURED COMBAT VEHICLES	PIECES OF ARTILLERY	COMBAT AIRCRAFT	ATTACK HELI-COPTERS
F.R.Y.	1025	850	3750	155	53
CROATIA	410	340	1500	62	21
BiH, out of which	410	340	1500	62	21
FEDERATION	273	227	1000	41	14
REP. SRPSKA	137	113	500	21	7

 

Table VI

Reduction Liabilities

PARTY	BATTLE TANKS	ARMOURED COMBAT VEHICLES	PIECES OF ARTILLERY	COMBAT AIRCRAFT	ATTACK HELI-COPTERS
F.R.Y.	487	63	1169	75	3
CROATIA	—	—	729	—	—
FEDERATION	—	—	1940	—	—
REP. SRPSKA	56	8	79	—	—

Physical destruction of excessive armaments was to be executed on specific reduction sites under international verification, following specific provisions on reduction procedures.

The Agreement further contains a regime on information and notifications, and on on-site verification of exchanged information as well as of the reduction process and the remaining holdings. Similar to the CFE Treaty and the Agreement on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it establishes a consultative body, the Sub-Regional Consultative Commission.

3.2.3) Art. IV and the Role of the "Train-and-Equip" Program

The Florence Agreement has been closely linked to the so-called "Train-and-Equip" Program, under which the United States and some of her allies have undertaken military support for the armed forces of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. While the Program has been frequently criticized for its "remilitarization" of the Federation and blamed for potentially triggering a new arms race in South Eastern Europe, much of the criticism has evidently been made without taking into account the framework of the Florence Agreement.

In its substance, the Program does not differ very much from earlier programs of military assistance, as they had been undertaken by all sides during the Cold War, offering (mostly old and surplus) armaments and instructors to their proxies while hoping to forestall the expansion of the other side as well as to gain political influence over the recipient of the military assistance. It is true that in the historical context, some of these undertakings might have indeed led to the militarization of certain regions, and to regional arms races, as for example in Asia, Africa, or Latin America.

The Program differs, however, in its purpose. While in the historical cases, military assistance had been undertaken in a clearly confrontational setting and without any regulative framework, the "train-and-equip" program has from a rather early stage been linked to the arms control framework, in particular, the Florence Agreement.

Whereas the Florence Agreement established a clear-cut military balance between the Parties involved, at the time of its signature this balance existed only on paper. As it could be derived from table III, there were significant discrepancies in the military capabilities of the Serbian/Yugoslav side on the one hand, and the others, in particular the Federation, on the other side. The Serbian/Yugoslav side had armaments and holdings by far in excess of the agreed limits, while the others, in particular the Federation, had holdings significantly lower than the agreed limits.

The situation posed several dilemmas for the West. On the one hand, it would have been quite some problem to gain the Federation's consensus to the Florence Agreement, if they would have been left with actual de facto holdings much lower than what they would have been entitled to. Secondly, if they might have agreed nevertheless, they would then have been absolutely free to acquire the lacking arms to reach the ceilings under the Florence Agreement, from whatever sources. Given the fact that already during the war, the Muslim side had established close links to radical Islamic States to (at that time illegally) purchase lacking military equipment, it would have been foreseeable that they would continue that pattern as soon as they would have been entitled to do so, and the radical Islamic States would have been more than willing to step in, offering not only equipment but also instructors, as well as political advisers.

Such a development would have been the least acceptable outcome from a Western perspective. The American offer to close the gaps between the actual holdings and the agreed limits thus served several purposes. In the first instance, it could persuade the Federation to agree to the Florence Agreement, as they could be assured that they would not be left with their lower actual holdings but would be given a fair chance to reach the agreed limits. It thus also established the kind of military balance which was seen as a necessity to prevent the resumption of armed conflict in case the Implementation/Stabilization Force (I/SFOR) would be finally withdrawn. Then, it practically closed the door for any offers by radical Islamic States, as any additional arms imports beyond the agreed limits would have become illegal. Finally, the United States also used the program to establish some kind of political influence over the armed forces of the Federation, in particular its Muslim component. In that context, the first delivery of armaments in mid-1996 was made conditional to the resignation of the Federation's Deputy Defence Minister, Hasan Cengic, who during the war had been the main contact for arms procurements from Iran.

In the following time, the Program was also used to exert pressure on the Federation to overcome the structural problems which had existed due to the co-existence of the Croat and Muslim components of their armed forces, and to give shape to the common Ministry of Defence. The funneling of equipment was, for example, a major instrument in overcoming Croatian foot-dragging in cooperating in the common military institutions, and deliveries to the two sides were switched on and off, in accordance with their more or less cooperative attitudes towards the common defence institutions in the Federation. "Train-and-Equip" advisers to the Federation's Ministry of Defence were sometimes also successfully contacted by the OSCE's Office for Regional Stabilization in order to exert their influence on the Federation's compliance with measures under the Vienna or Florence Agreements.

Furthermore, the "training" component was not only limited to enhance purely military skills, but also to insert western thinking with regard to the role of the military, the acceptance of civilian control of the armed forces, and the like. Thus, while the creation of the Federation's joint institutions often lagged behind, it had some progress in the defence sector, not at least due to the influence of the instructors attached in the framework of the train-and-equip program.

Seen in isolation from the Florence Agreement, a superficial view of the "Train-and-Equip" program might thus understandably lead to some of the mentioned criticism. For example, the program had been frequently blamed for having given the Federation twice the military capabilities. However, such a view ignores that the correlation of forces had already been established in the Florence Agreement and that the arms deliveries under the program merely executed what had been the substance of the Florence Agreement.

In a comprehensive view, however, the "Train-and-Equip" Program must be seen as an indispensable complementary element to the very purposes of the Florence Agreement. Without it, the acceptance of the limits established by the Agreement by the Federation might have been quite remote, and even in case of its acceptance by the Federation, there would always have been the danger that radical Islamic States would have seized the opportunity to firmly establish their influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with all possible negative consequences for South Eastern Europe and beyond.

3.2.4) Implementation

The Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control had a clearly defined objective in achieving reduction to the agreed limits, which could be realized after some delays on 21 November 1997, with 6,580 items of military hardware eliminated. The residual holdings are subject to further verification. Any further changes in holdings have to be notified, and exchanged information will be subject to further verification.

Implementation of the Agreement during its initial phase was delayed due to the broader participation and the higher complexity caused thereby. This refers in particular to the equal participation of three sovereign States and two non-State entities (but with partial subject status under the Agreement), which on the side of Bosnia and Herzegovina led to the - in parts justified, but also exaggerated - fears that the Republika Srpska could claim full statehood.

Thus the Federation for some time saw reason not to establish the required "Points of Entry/ Exit" for inspection teams along the intra-entity boundary line, which led to delays with the scheduled inspections. It also concerned the conduct of inspections by Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the Republika Srpska for quite some time refused to participate in mixed inspection teams of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while correspondingly the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would not have accepted such inspections without participation of the Republika Srpska, etc.

In substance, problems similar to the implementation of the Agreement on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures could be identified:

• Exchanged information tended to be incomplete. Furthermore, there was substantiated suspicion that the Republika Srpska would have taken excessive advantage of exception clauses which could be solved only by a more stringent definition of these provisions; and
• the mentioned political questions led to delays in the baseline validation and thereby to a backlog in the beginning of the reduction process as well as in completing its first and second phases in time.

Thus, at the First Review Conference in July 1998, the overall assessment was quite a positive one. The Final Document notes a visible improvement in the data exchange and brought consensus inter alia on an improved Protocol on Existing Types ("POET"), and to address issues concerning exceptions from the application of the Agreement, as for example ALAs in de-commissioning status, ALA held by police forces, and other exceptions which might in one way or another have been used as "loopholes" in the Agreement's obligations. The Review Conference also took a decision that all inspection reports should be shared with all other Parties of the Agreement, thereby increasing openness and transparency. Finally, it was the occasion when chairmanship in the meetings of the Subregional Consultative Commission (SRCC) was transferred from the Personal Representative to the Parties, on a rotating schedule. The next Review Conference was scheduled to take place in June 2000.

3.2.5) Further Development and Outlook

While the Florence Agreement in principle would have been more of a technical nature, and thus less prone to the impact of political developments, the very fact of its wider participation made it also more likely to become hostage of developments in the political field.

This concerned first and foremost the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. When the Kosovo crisis escalated into the Western air campaign in March 1999, the FRY suspended all cooperation in the implementation of the Florence Agreement. Also, the Republika Srpska reduced their participation in all cooperative efforts, but only for a shorter while. As in the implementation of the Vienna Agreement, it became visible that Serbian solidarity was no longer the dominating subject, but that cooperation within Bosnia and Herzegovina - and with the international Community - had gained at least as prominent a place on the Republika Srpska's agenda as solidarity with the FRY.

Non-cooperation by the FRY lasted beyond the air campaign. However, in September 1999 the FRY offered an additional data exchange, taking into account the losses through the previous air campaign and the re-deployment of their armed forces due to the withdrawal from Kosovo, as well as full cooperation in the implementation including inspections etc. The overall impression of the attitudes both of the FRY MoD and its Verification Center was described as "good will and spirit of co-operation".

In the course of the declared will of the Parties within Bosnia and Herzegovina to further reduce their armed forces, both the Republika Srpska and the Federation announced reductions in the course of the year 2000 by 100 and by 40 ALA respectively. Also, Croatia, after the political changes as a result of the elections, announced that it would further reduce its armaments.

The work in the framework of the Sub-Regional Consultative Commission (SRCC) continued without major complications. Working groups were established to address inter alia the updating of the POET, the question of definitions, the solution of some "loopholes" as for example armaments given to historical collections, and other relevant issues. While not all of them came to quick results, the very continuation of their work could be seen as an element in the - despite all adverse factors - improving cooperation.

However, at the end of the SRCC Meeting in May 2000, and already in preparation of the upcoming Second Review Conference to the Florence Agreement which it was supposed to chair, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia announced that it would suspend its participation in all Dayton-related activities, including implementation of the Florence Agreement, and participation in the Art. V negotiations. The formal reason has to be seen in the decision not to admit the FRY to the meetings of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), the highest body to supervise the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. However, there is also a certain probability that the withdrawal might have been rooted in the increasingly destabilizing situation in the FRY itself, with a government confronted with increasingly popular unrest, and in itself a shaky composition of an old-fashioned communist nomenklatura in coalition with Serbian fascists.

While retaliation against those responsible for the FRY's non-admission to the PIC would be an understandable reaction, the non-cooperation under Annex 1-B with the FRY's partners in the Florence Agreement, including the Republika Srpska, and with all the other participants in the Art. V negotiations, must be seen as a self-defeating act which certainly would gain no positive responses for the FRY's position.

3.3) Verification of Compliance with the Agreements and Inspection

Verification of compliance by on-site inspections is a crucial factor. Within both agreements, the inspection regime has been basically shaped along the lines of the CFE Treaty, but it has been adapted to the specific requirements of the situation, in particular with the Agreement on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. Planning and coordination of the inspections both under the Art. II and Art. IV Agreements has been taken under the responsibility of a Verification Co-ordinator established at the OSCE Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna. It pertains to inspections both by the OSCE, and by the Parties.

3.3.1) Verification of the Agreement on Confidence - and Security - Building Measures

The verification regime within the Art. II/Vienna Agreement pertains to verification of compliance, in principle, with all agreed measures. In practice, however, it had primarily been applied to verify the validity of the exchange of military information.

During the "baseline inspection", which lasted until the end of June, 1996, OSCE-led inspections were conducted practically on a weekly basis in both entities. During that time the OSCE was responsible for all inspections, whereby in practice the team-leader and the majority of team-members were provided by the verification centers of a "lead-nation", i.e. a Party to the CFE Treaty.

Responsibility for inspections was subsequently transferred to the Parties to the Agreement, which since then have been entitled to request and conduct inspections by themselves. However, coordination has still remained with the OSCE's Verification Coordinator. Also, the OSCE has still been represented by three international inspectors in each inspection team, and continues to conduct a certain percentage of all possible inspections.

3.3.2) Verification of the Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control

Verification of the Art. IV/Florence Agreement follows a similar procedure. It has come even closer to the CFE regime, as the purpose of the Agreement is closer to the CFE Treaty. Consequently, the purposes of verification are more limited than in the Art. II Agreement. Inspections had to verify:

• the baseline data until 31 October 1996;
• the reduction of ALA during the following two reduction phases (1 November 1996 until 31 October 1997);
• the results of the reduction processes. i.e. reduction down to the agreed ceilings; and
• the continued compliance with agreed ceilings.

A further essential difference has to be seen in the rather limited role of the OSCE under Art. IV. First, the Personal Representative is not entitled by himself to request inspections. Secondly, there are no provisions whatsoever on any OSCE inspection teams in the proper sense.

3.3.3) Practical Experiences and Evaluation of the Inspection Regime

Reliable verification of agreed obligations is a cornerstone for military stability. The conduct of inspections is thus a core matter where the Parties as well as the international inspection teams representing the OSCE would directly contribute to build mutual confidence, but also objective military security. Their professionalism would thus constitute a main pillar for the durability of the Agreement.

Practice has proven that inspection teams of both the Parties concerned, and of the OSCE, have in general lived up to the expectations on the technical level, but there were also quite some shortcomings to be registered. It is quite natural that difficulties occurred on the sides of the Parties, in particular in the initial phase when the first inspections under the Agreement on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures were to be conducted as early as March 1996. They were in part rooted in a lack of familiarity with the inspection procedures, but also in a continuation of enemy images from the war which had been terminated less than half a year ago.

Furthermore, during this period the then military leadership of the Republika Srpska which was still controlled by General Mladic frequently attempted either to be at least implicitly accepted by the OSCE as an equal partner, or to undermine the beginning process of cooperation between the two sides and the OSCE. These problems could, however, be overcome, not at least thanks to the training and increased professionalism of inspectors from both entities, and vanished with the decline of the "old guard's" political influence.

Subsequently, however, complaints by the Parties increased against the actions by international inspection teams, as they appeared to indiscriminately follow the established procedures of CFE inspections, without considering the differences under the Article II-Agreement, compliance with which they were supposed to verify. Occasionally, inadequate terminology led to some misunderstandings, in particular when international inspection teams would have applied the CFE inspection regime unmodified.

Although in some cases one could assume that the local Parties used such complaints to deflect blame from their own mistakes towards the representatives of the international community in general, and the OSCE in particular, there still remains a hard core of mistakes by international inspection teams which were made available to the OSCE.

4) The Negotiations under Art. V

The Agreement on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina constituted the first step towards military stability in that area of the war theater in former Yugoslavia. Its implementation demonstrated that it was possible, despite understandable problems in its initial phase, to create a basis of mutual confidence between former belligerents in a relatively short time. This had been, inter alia achieved by the active role of the OSCE and its Mission on the ground, which frequently had to act as catalyst, mediator, and mentor for implementation.

At the same time, however, the basis was laid for the subsequent negotiations and agreements on arms control. Stability within Bosnia and Herzegovina and openness as well as verification of armed forces in that area paved the way for concluding the Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control, which, conversely, should create the conditions for further arms control efforts in South-Eastern Europe.

Table VII

Mandate	Space	time	ROLE of the OSCE
Art. II	BiH	Concluded short-term	active in all areas
Art. IV	BiH, HR, BRJ	Concluded mid-term	limited
Art. V	"in and around" former YU	started in 1999 long-term	none

The pertinent framework was, however, created only belatedly and reflected the changes on the ground which in the meantime had taken place. First, already in 1996 some States neighboring the former Yugoslavia and belonging to the CFE Treaty had indicated that they would only participate in the Art. V negotiations if their ceilings under the CFE Treaty would remain unchanged. A similar position was then taken by the three Parties to the Art. IV Agreement. Thus, the OSCE decision finally taken at the Copenhagen Council Meeting in 1997 on the future negotiations under Article V explicitly foresees that existing arms limitations under the CFE Treaty or the Article IV should not be affected by negotiations under Art. V.

This would have referred to the majority of potential participants with exception of Albania, Austria, Macedonia and Slovenia. On the other hand, the Copenhagen Decisions explicitly refer to "a broad security dialogue" as "a significant element in establishing regional stability", and to "the development of CSBMs and other appropriate measures ... and information exchange and verification activities", which could be perceived as indicating a shift in emphasis towards "soft arms control".

Thus, when the negotiations on a mandate began in early 1998, only a minority of States still aimed at establishing numerical balances/limits. One the one hand, the majority of participants belongs either to the CFE Treaty or the Art. IV Agreement and is therefore exempted from further negotiations on their forces. On the other hand, the four remaining States took the position that the negotiations would have an asymmetric structure if only their own forces would be the subject of deliberations, while the forces of the other States would not be affected.

Only after it had been made clear that emphasis would be given to CSBMs, Austria as the last potential participant decided to definitely join the negotiations for a mandate, and beyond.

The negotiation framework now encompasses 20 States, including:

• all successor States of the Former Yugoslavia;
• all States neighboring the Former Yugoslavia;
• the Contact Group; and
• other interested Osce States (as for example the Netherlands, Spain, and Turkey).

Negotiations on a mandate took most of 1998. In the course of these negotiations, the contours for a future Art. V agreement became more visible, in particular by the disappearance of any mention of the terms "limits" or "ceilings", but also by a clear inclination towards "soft" arms control. The mandate was finally adopted in November 1998 and submitted to the OSCE Oslo Council Meeting in December 1998. It encompasses inter alia the following areas:

• a regime for the exchange of military information and notification which may draw on existing agreements and treaties, such as the CFE Treaty, the Article II and IV Agreements and the Vienna Document, as appropriate;
• a regime for verification activities which may draw on existing agreements and treaties, such as the CFE Treaty, the Article II and IV Agreements and the Vienna Document, as appropriate;
• provisions relating to the holdings of conventional arms and equipment for those Participating States not subject to either the CFE Treaty or the Art. IV Agreement;
• cooperative measures for risk reduction and increased transparency, or any other confidence- and security-building measures which may be proposed and decided upon by the Participating States for the enhancement of security and stability in Southeast Europe; and
• provisions for a commission to facilitate implementation of the agreement.

Emphasis has thus been given clearly to CSBM-type measures. While the mandate still cryptically mentions in its third tick future "provisions on holdings for States not Parties to the CFE Treaty or the Article IV Agreement", it has been made clear by the States concerned that these provisions must not be understood as pertaining to limits/ceilings.

The negotiations would have been due to take on in substance in early 1999, but the outbreak of the Kosovo-conflict interrupted the process for several months. They were resumed in earnest only after the summer break in 1999 with a view to achieve an agreement by the envisaged OSCE Council Meeting in November 2000.

At current, proposals submitted by various States participating in the negotiations concern a comprehensive set of VD-99 type CSBMs with down-scaled parameters, increased transparency in defence budgets and defence planning, measures concerning small arms and light weapons, measures for risk-reduction and cooperative measures, and the like. There have been, however, several setbacks due to the political developments in Yugoslavia. First, in March 2000 the FRY announced to abstain from participation in memory of the anniversary of NATO's air campaign. Negotiations were then resumed in April and continued on a business-like basis, with an often quite visible positive attitude on the side of the FRY, but their decision of 25 May to boycott until further notice all Dayton-related activities also pertained to the negotiations under Art. V. While it would be technically possible to negotiate and adopt a set of measures even in absence of the FRY, such steps would only be of symbolic value and would fail to achieve the main purpose of the negotiations, i.e. increasing military stability in South Eastern Europe. Active participation of all twenty States is thus an essential prerequisite for any meaningful negotiations.

5) Conclusions

The arms control regimes under the Dayton Agreement are, on the one hand, particular in themselves. They had to create military stability, complementary to a quasi-occupation regime as established under Annex 1-A, by:

• quickly stabilizing the most fragile situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina by giving it a framework of CSBMs; eliminating, in a mid-term-perspective, the military imbalances which in the past had favored, and presumably also induced, the Yugoslav/Serbian side in the wars with Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and
• re-integrating the region into the wider European security space by linking the space of the Former Yugoslavia to its former neighbors, but also to other European States.

While the implementation of the achieved agreements has consistently improved, the very framework has still left some gaps open, concerning the complementarity between "soft" and "hard" arms control. Within Bosnia and Herzegovina, the earlier Art. II Agreement on CSBMs was quickly complemented by the Art. IV Agreement, pertaining also the correlation of forces between the Federation and the Republika Srpska. On the other hand, in the State-to-State relations between Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and the FRY, only the part of "hard" arms control has been covered by the Art. IV Agreement, whereas the "soft" part has been left open as there is no corresponding agreement between them in place.

The latter would also give the perspective for the negotiations under Art. V. The original idea had evidently been to bridge the gap between the three Art. IV States and their military environment, as defined by the CFE Treaty, and to adapt the limits to their forces correspondingly. The situation has changed in the meantime, on the one hand, because of the lack of willingness of the States concerned to adapt their ceilings. On the other hand, the successful adaptation of the CFE Treaty has opened the chance to achieve the envisaged purposes by accession of the three Art. IV States, as well as the four other States participating in the Art. V negotiations, to the CFE Treaty, rather than by negotiating possible adaptations of existing, or establishing of new, arms limitations in a separate framework. Finally, Art. V could become the main instrument to close the gap in confidence-building left by the Art. IV Agreement, as indicated above. It would become more of a political instrument, gaining the quality of re-integrating the region in politico-military issues both within itself, but also with its wider European environment. For the overall conceptual development of arms control, one must not forget that the arms control agreements under Annex 1-B of the Dayton Agreement had been the first agreements shaped not in a pro-active situation, but shortly after a conflict had been ended, and that they were concerned not only with preventing a classical conventional conflict, but that type of internal, low-intensity conflict which has become the typical armed conflict of the nineties and beyond.

Here, the Dayton Agreement in itself has offered an innovative approach by accepting, in the constitutional provisions under Annex 4, the existence of "two entities, each with armed forces, within one State", while simultaneously laying the ground for a development from confrontation towards cooperation between the two sides, complemented by both "soft" and "hard" arms control under Annex 1-B, and Articles II and IV. The same approach might become a model for addressing similar situations of internal, secessionist conflict, as for example in Nagorno Karabakh, or in Transnistria.

Within the agreements achieved under Annex 1-B, the Florence/Art. IV Agreement has mostly been a kind of "carbon copy", down to the comma, of the traditional CFE-type agreement on limitations on heavy weapons, with only minor adaptations and practically no innovations. The major area of development could, however, be seen in the area of "soft" arms control. Here, the Vienna/Art. II Agreement has introduced some innovative measures, as for example the notification and monitoring of weapons manufacturing capabilities. It has adequately addressed the question of other than conventional forces, taking their "military capabilities", rather than any formal criteria, as a point of departure. Also, the definition for "heavy weapons" as derived from Annex 1-A, and the pertinent provisions regarding their confinement and movements, could give a useful model for similar provisions in other CSBM agreements, in particular in areas/regions with similar problems. In sum, arms control agreements under the Dayton Agreement, and here in particular the Vienna/Art. II Agreement, have shown that it is possible to adapt instruments developed in the context of military stability between major conventional forces towards the requirements to prevent the outbreak/resumption of low-intensity conflicts, too. This could be seen as a major contribution by the Dayton framework for the overall conceptual development of arms control.

Table VIII

Comparison of the Art. II (Vienna) and Art. IV (Florence) Agreements

	Art. II (Vienna, 26 01 1996)	Art. IV (Florence, 14 06 1996)
Purpose	Predictability; Openness, Transparency	limitations of armaments
Instruments	Notifications, Regulations for Actions, Verification,	Agreed Limits, Reductions, Verification,
Parties	BiH, Federation, Republika Srpska	BiH, Federation, Republika Srpska; Croatia; Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
osce Role	Quasi-Party; right to initiate, to assist, to verify	limited; only assistance with verification

 

 

Annex

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio November 21, 1995

AGREEMENT ON REGIONAL STABILIZATION

ANNEX 1B

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The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republika Srpska (hereinafter the "Parties") have agreed as follows:

Article I

General Obligations

The Parties agree that establishment of progressive measures for regional stability and arms control is essential to creating a stable peace in the region. To this end, they agree on the importance of devising new forms of cooperation in the field of security aimed at building transparency and confidence and achieving balanced and stable defence force levels at the lowest numbers consistent with the Parties' respective security and the need to avoid an arms race in the region. They have approved the following elements for a regional structure for stability.

Article II

Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Within seven days after this Agreement (hereinafter "Annex") enters into force, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republika Srpska shall at an appropriately high political level commence negotiations under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (hereinafter "OSCE") to agree upon a series of measures to enhance mutual confidence and reduce the risk of conflict, drawing fully upon the 1994 Vienna Document of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures of the OSCE. The objective of these negotiations is to agree upon an initial set of measures within forty five (45) days after this Annex enters into force including, but not necessarily limited to, the following:

 

1. restrictions on military deployments and exercises in certain geographical areas;
2. restraints on the reintroduction of foreign Forces in light of Article III of Annex 1-A to the General Framework Agreement;
3. restrictions on locations of heavy weapons;
4. withdrawal of Forces and heavy weapons to cantonment/barracks areas or other designated locations as provided in Article IV of Annex 1-A;
5. notification of disbandment of special operations and armed civilian groups;
6. notification of certain planned military activities, including international military assistance and training programs;
7. identification of and monitoring of weapons manufacturing capabilities;
8. immediate exchange of data on the holdings of the five Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (hereinafter "CFE") weapons categories as defined in the CFE Treaty, with the additional understanding that artillery pieces will be defined as those of 75mm calibre and above; and
9. immediate establishment of military liaison missions between the Chiefs of the Armed Forces of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska;

Article III

Regional Confidence- and Security-Building Measures

To supplement the measures in Article II above on a wider basis, the Parties agree to initiate steps toward a regional agreement on confidence- and security-building measures. The Parties agree:

1. not to import any arms for ninety (90) days after this Annex enters into force; and
2. not to import for 180 days after this Annex enters into force or until the arms control agreement referred to in Article IV below takes effect, whichever is the earlier, heavy weapons or heavy weapons ammunition, mines, military aircraft, and helicopters. Heavy weapons refers to all tanks and armored vehicles, all artillery 75 mm and above, all mortars 81 mm and above, and all anti-aircraft weapons 20 mm and above.

Article IV

Measures for Sub-Regional Arms Control

1. Recognizing the importance of achieving balanced and stable defence force levels at the lowest numbers consistent with their respective security, and understanding that the establishment of a stable military balance based on the lowest level of armaments will be an essential element in preventing the recurrence of conflict, the Parties within thirty (30)days after this Annex enters into force shall commence negotiations under the auspices of the OSCE to reach early agreement on levels of armaments consistent with this goal. Within thirty (30) days after this Annex enters into force, the Parties shall also commence negotiations on an agreement establishing voluntary limits on military manpower.
2. The Parties agree that the armaments agreement shall be based at a minimum on the following criteria: population size, current military armament holdings, defence needs, and relative force levels in the region.

1. The agreement shall establish numerical limits on holdings of tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters, as defined in the relevant sections of the CFE Treaty, with the additional understanding that artillery pieces will be defined as those of 75 mm calibre and above.
2. In order to establish a baseline, the Parties agree to report within thirty (30) days after this Annex enters into force their holdings as defined in sub-paragraph (a) above, according to the format prescribed in the 1992 Vienna Document of the OSCE.
3. This notification format shall be supplemented to take into account the special considerations of the region.

3) The Parties agree to complete within 180 days after this Annex enters into force the negotiations above on agreed numerical limits on the categories referred to in paragraph 2(a) of this Article. If the Parties fail to agree to such limits within 180 days after this Annex enters into force, the following limits shall apply, according to a ratio of 5:2:2 based on the approximate ratio of populations of the Parties:

 

1. the baseline shall be the determined holdings of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter the "baseline");
2. the limits for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall be seventy-five (75) percent of the baseline;
3. the limits for the Republic of Croatia shall be thirty (30) percent of the baseline;
4. the limits for Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be thirty (30) percent of the baseline; and
5. the allocations for Bosnia and Herzegovina will be divided between the Entities on the basis of a ratio of two (2) for the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and one (1) for the Republika Srpska.

4. The OSCE will assist the Parties in their negotiations under Articles II and IV of this Annex and in the implementation and verification (including verification of holdings declarations) of resulting agreements.

 

Article V

Regional Arms Control Agreement

The OSCE will assist the Parties by designating a special representative to help organize and conduct negotiations under the auspices of the OSCE Forum on Security Cooperation (FSC) with the goal of establishing a regional balance in and around the former Yugoslavia. The Parties undertake to cooperate fully with the OSCE to that end and to facilitate regular inspections by other parties.

Further, the Parties agree to establish a commission together with representatives of the OSCE for the purpose of facilitating the resolution of any disputes that might arise.

Article VI

Entry into Force

This Annex shall enter into force upon signature.