Post-Hegemonic and Post-Socialist Regionalism: A Comparison of East Asia and Central Europe

Abstract

This paper explores the dynamics, sources and management of regional cooperation by examining the post-socialist and post-hegemonic regionalisms of Central Europe and East Asia.

In Central Europe, although many efforts to facilitate cross-border cooperation have been made by economic actors, local authorities and civic organizations, its regionalism is primarily defined by hierarchical and formal groups of states. Few of these groupings are located in the region itself; rather the thrust is towards formal membership in state-based organizations outside the region, especially NATO and the European Union.

In East Asia, regional cooperation does not rely on any clearly formulated institutions or on elite or popular ideologies, except in the loose sense of talking about common Asian values. Cooperation is driven by a combination of corporate interests and strategic necessities. Although pious hopes are expressed about the emergence of an autonomous regional East Asian civil society, its rise anytime soon is quite unlikely. The growing multi-polarity of the region means that its development cannot be steered by any single country. Therefore, the regional power structure grows from the niche between governments and civil society, especially from the economic actors linked with the state in all major countries of the region.

1. Globalism Versus Regionalism

Practically everyone writing today on regionalism argues that it is growing strongly in almost every part of the world. This conclusion is reached either by observing economic, political, and institutional developments or setting normative criteria for the development of a desirable world order. The standard arguments on the rise of regionalism mention, at a minimum, the establishment of NAFTA, the deepening integration in the European Union, and the growing economic interdependence in East Asia. The critical issue addressed is usually whether this development is leading to a more polarized or a more cooperative world economy and world order.

Subregional examples of the trend towards regionalization include the new dynamism (and the possible decline) of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the restructuring of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the expanding activities of Mercosur in the Southern Cone. Sometimes it is surmised that the success stories of regional integration, especially in Western Europe, have stimulated, through a demonstration effect, similar efforts in other parts of the world. Even more importantly, (sub)regional integration can be a reaction to the globalization of the world economy either to protect it against the competitive pressures or to benefit from them. Often regionalism develops under a cross-pressure of globalization and local responses to it. ₁

The external explanation of regional integration is not necessarily true, however. It is also possible that the interregional relations are derived primarily from the internal economic and political dynamics of the regions (genealogical causality). In reality, the intra- and inter-regional factors probably interact and thus shape each other. ₂ All regions have their characteristic paths of development, embedded economic, political, and ethnic cleavages, and security dilemmas which fuel intra-regional politics. ₃ Still the influence of external economic and political forces on interregional relations cannot be discarded.

It is true that regionalism has been recently on the rise practically all over the world. This trend, sometimes depicted as the second coming of regionalism (the first one took place in the 1960s), has been explained by several, often disparate factors. The decline of the U.S. material hegemony, the end of the Cold War, the rise of the Asia-Pacific region, and the reorientation of the development strategies in the Third World have all fostered a more decentralized international system. This has, in turn, enhanced the autonomy of regions and their dominant actors. Regionalism has been further encouraged by the democratization and new attitudes towards international cooperation in which absolute rather than relative gains have come to dominate. ₄

As mentioned, regional cooperation may also be promoted as a counterweight to the uneven globalization of the world economy (which is, in turn, shaped by regional economic projects). Regionalism may also be a reaction against dominant powers which try both to co-opt local actors by granting special privileges to them and marginalize them. However, more likely than a regionalist response to gain greater political autonomy and influence is the invitation of external powers to participate in regional politics to the benefit of one local actor or another. ₅

Before trying to answer to the query on how globalization and regionalization are linked with each other, one has to recognize that both of these processes are complex and heterogenous. Regionalization can be either market-led (e.g. East Asia) or institutionally-driven (e.g. the European Union) or a mixture of these two models. ₆ One may assume that the institutionally-driven regionalism is steered more by the interests of governments than of corporations (unless governments have only a very limited autonomy). It has been suggested that the end of the Cold War has decoupled power from purpose as material wealth and political ambitions are not matched as closely as before. ₇ Thus, in the 1990s and beyond, regionalism, reflecting the global redistribution of wealth, is more driven by markets than political ambitions.

Regionalism has two faces; defensive and offensive. Thus, it aims both to enhance the autonomy of the region and its ability compete with other regions. The question is how these two aspects of regionalism are related to each other and to what extent they are compatible with global multilateral cooperation. It seems rather obvious that a defensive emphasis on regional autonomy is more compatible with multilateralism than interregional rivalry, especially if the latter occurs mostly between states. ₈ Offensive regionalism requires a strong institutional-political direction which is not in the offing, not even in the European Union. This all suggests that the future of regionalism is characterized by a combination of political defensiveness and market expansiveness.

Hirst and Thompson have suggested that there are two main types of globalized systems; a world-wide international economy and a globalized international economy. The main difference between them is that the interdependence in a world-wide economy manifests itself mainly in the closer relations between states and is, therefore, of "strategic type". On the other hand, in a globalized international economy, "distinct national economies are subsumed and rearticulated into the system by essentially international processes and transactions". In the former the states are in charge, in the latter the corporations. As a result, state-based multinational corporations evolve into transnational corporations pursuing a strategy of "local globalization". Hirst and Thompson think that the present system resembles more of the world-wide international economy. ₉

By utilizing these distinctions between two types of regionalism and of globalism, one arrives at the following typology:

The relationship between the two types of regionalisms is interactive in both variants of globalism; it boils down to a movement between the forces of domination and of emancipation in the struggle for core and peripheral positions. ₁₀ In the state-based globalism, tension occurs between large and small powers which both may try to augment regional cooperation to strengthen their economic and political positions. Their struggle is for relative shares of power and gains. In this model regional cooperation is pursued both for economic and non-economic reasons; for example, to create a regional industrial base, enhance bargaining power, lock in domestic political reforms, or avoid national isolation. ₁₁ The dominant model of explanation is neorealism which considers regions to be power containers defined by the physical boundaries of their members.

In the globalized version, the tension concerns the spatial location of international economic activities and boils down to the core-periphery relationship. This economic relationship can exist either between one hegemonic core and several subordinated peripheries or between several regional cores and their peripheries (in the same way the state-centric system can be either unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar). ₁₂ In this approach regions are mostly conceptualized as zones of economic activity in the world system and in that sense market-driven. Peripheral regions have seldom adequate coherence and resources to counter the challenge of economic globalization by mutual cooperation. The failure of most efforts at regional integration between developing countries bear testimony of this problem.

ASEAN is providing interesting evidence on whether the robust economic growth in a region can create an opportunity for regional autonomy to challenge globalizing tendencies. The deepening of ASEAN integration is no doubt motivated by economic gains, but it is also assumed to have a political basis due to shared historical experiences and "Asian values". On the other hand doubts have been expressed on whether Southeast Asia can be treated as a coherent region. Rather than being a regional security complex it it said to be divided between the maritime and continental subregions in both of which China looms large. Economically, the close links of ASEAN both with the United States and East Asia seem to reduce the "regionness" of South East Asia. ₁₃

The political motive has been strong in the Malesian effort to set up a counter-hegemonic economic group to Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) called the East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC). Mahathir Mohamad's policy is informed by him finding "intolerable the self-centered negotiating stance of Western nations, which seemed ignoring the voices of developing countries". ₁₄ As Higgott and Stubbs point out, the establishment of the EAEC as a wider East Asian group was "a response to the challenges coming from the global economy... The EAEC was geared as much to combating the political power of the US and Europe as it was to advancing the cause of economic liberalism". ₁₅ Thus, we probably need both state-based and TNC-based approaches to fully grasp the external challenges fuelling regional responses.

The complex relationship between globalization and regionalization seems is a main reasons for the recent interest in the nature and impact of regional cooperation. The juxtaposition of these two tendencies refers also to deeper tensions; globalism is equated with universalism and functionalism, while regionalism is considered synonymous with protectionism and territoriality. While globalization is regarded as conducive to cooperation and peace, regionalization, especially its malign variant, is feared to fuel discrimination and competition, and thus conflict. Nightmarish forecasts refer to coming wars between the increasingly inward looking regions. In reality, however, the relationship between economic and political cooperation both within and between regions is complicated and conditioned by a number of factors. ₁₆ continental subregions i

Critical political attitudes towards regionalism are often shaped by the negative historical experiences of the 1930s, especially in Europe and East Asia. Criticism is not entirely unfounded as today's historical links with the German domination in Eastern Central Europe and Japan's Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere are not easy to severe completely. According to Peter Duus, the Sphere has been reinvented in Japan in the 1990s as a possible model for its regional role in the post-Cold War era. Its reinvention has been motivated by Japan's dominant economic position and its increasing resentment with the U.S. policies in East Asia. Japan is now also freer than before to assume a regional security role. It is unlikely, though, that this tendency will result in any new initiatives in Japanese policies. ₁₇ On the contrary, there is a tendency in the official Japan to bury the concept at least six feet deep and let the United States lead.

More benign interpretations of economic regionalism do not only consider it compatible with the global multilateral cooperation, but also suggest that it may even accelerate multilateralism. ₁₈ In studying the trade policies of the 1980s, Kenneth A. Oye has even found that some major measures of economic liberalization were achieved through discriminatory bilateral or regional strategies. The reason was that discrimination empowered export-oriented sectors to defend their interests in free trade and gave an incentive for the excluded third parties to become involved in trade negotiations. ₁₉

A balanced judgement suggests that the global economic impact of a regional free trade zone or customs union depends on how it is implemented in practice. Closed regional arrangements may divert rather than create trade and discriminate against others, for instance, by providing large subsidies to agriculture or promoting strategically specific national or sectoral industries. In recent years, regional economic arrangements have tended to be more open than before, however. If its rules and practices are largely consistent with global policies, the open regional cooperation can create new wealth and foster multilateral cooperation. ₂₀

The relationship between economic regionalism and multilateralism can also be scrutinized empirically. There is a fair amount of consensus that measured statistically by trade flows and foreign direct investments, the world economy is not moving towards closed regional blocs. True, various measures suggest that the share and intensity of intra-regional economic flows have been increasing over time. However, at the same the propensity of regions to interact with other regions has also increased so that international integration and the liberal, multilateral economic order have also made progress. This observation is compatible with a political analysis concluding that in the future multilateral cooperation between the United States, the European Union, and Japan is more likely than unilateralism or the formation of regional blocs. ₂₁

Intra-regionalism has been stronger in trade relations than in the international flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) in which especially Japan has sought extra-regional partners. In general, North America and especially Western Europe are somewhat more closed regions than East Asia. In the postwar era, the biggest growth has been recorded in the intra-EU trade, which has been also historically high, and in the trade between Japan and the United States on the one hand and between Japan and the European Union on the other. ₂₂ Thus, there are distinct regions shaping but not dominating the world order.

A key question in the future of regionalism is whether the European Union will create an increasingly closed trading bloc to be underpinned by "continental Keynesianism" due to major infrastructural investments. ₂₃ The jury is still out, but the possibility of "Fortress Europe" cannot be entirely denied. ₂₄ The uncertainty about the future reflects, in part, the tug of war between French emphasis on strategic trade and the British penchant for free trade and thus the tension between politically driven and market driven regional integration. While the growing influence of Germany in the European Union has not entirely resolved this tension, it seems probable that the Union will adopt a cooperative stance in its external relations. ₂₅ This is much due to the "taming" of German domestic and external power, which is bound to be the linchpin in the development of the European Union. ₂₆

In sum, regionalism is rising both in the industrial and developing parts of the world where it naturally differs in many ways. ₂₇ So far, the potential to form trading blocs, "proto-blocs", has been largely confined to the North, but this potential is emerging also in the South. ₂₈ Moreover, several regional economic and political arrangements link different zones of economic development, especially core and semiperipheral regions, to each other. This is true both for the European Union (links with Southern and Eastern Europe) and especially North America (with Mexico), and East Asia (with China and ASEAN).

Such an intraregional economic heterogeneity creates an economic division of labor linking the core and (semi)periphery with each other. It also fuels tensions and create the need to manage them politically. The management of both intra- and extra-regional relations hinges, in turn, on the regional power configuration and especially on whether it is hegemonic or pluralistic. The empirical record suggests, however, that regional powers, even if they enjoy a hegemony in the region, have not been particularly capable in managing political and economic cooperation. ₂₉

2. The Research Task

2.1. Similarities and differences

This paper aims to explore the new regional dynamics, their sources and management by studying two regional trajectories in the post-Cold War period, i.e. Eastern Central Europe and East Asia, mostly North East Asia. These regions have at least one interesting similarity. In both of them states have historically played a major role in promoting and regulating economic development, while the transnational economic integration has been limited. Both domestic economic development and external economic relations have been steered or even commanded by the state. However, in recent years these regions have faced the new challenges of marketization, including transnational pressures to liberalize economies, absorb foreign direct investments, and develop new regulatory regimes.

A further common characteristic of Eastern Central Europe and North East Asia is that they are historical regions which today resemble, however, proto-regions rather than full-fledged regional arrangements, i.e. they have not yet fully developed their economic and/or political potential. Regions are not permanent fixtures of the international reality; their territorial shape changes, they move from one zone of economic development to another, and they may disappear altogether. "Historical regions" have a trajectory over time; "regions are created, reproduced, and finally disappear from the world scene". ₃₀

In the 1930s, the East Asian region was a creation of Japanese and Mitteleuropa of German imperialism. With their defeat in the World War II, these regions ceased to exist. The question is to what extent they are reconstructed now and in the future. Some observers believe that Germany and Japan are reassuming their previous role as regional powers and reconstituting them as important pillars of the emerging world order. ₃₁

East Asia was partitioned by the Cold War, not only in the Korean Peninsula, but also as a region. Military rivalries, political fragmentation, and relative economic isolation characterized almost all aspects of East Asia's international relations during that period. In spite of the dominant U.S. presence in the region, the East Asian subsystem was never hegemonic after the immediate postwar years. Rather, it has been a multipolar region in which the United States played, directly and indirectly, the role of a regional manager. For instance, astonishment has been expressed on the very limited strategic impact the defense relationship with the United States had on Japanese policies during the Cold War even if it faced the Chinese and Soviet security challenges. ₃₂

In Europe, the Soviet occupation of Eastern Central Europe was tolerated by the West. During the Cold War, regionalism in Eastern Central Europe was subordinated to the planned economy and Communist internationalism of the Soviet Union. The compartmentalization of national economies by the "socialist division of labor" and the unilateral ideological penetration of societies made a (sub)regional autonomy virtually impossible. This fact was further reinforced by the spheres-of-influence agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. This understanding limited the extension of Western influence to Eastern Europe and thus the establishment of any countervailing power there.

The spheres of influence were a result of the deliberate decision by both the West and the East to divide Germany and, as a result, the entire Central Europe. On the other hand in East Asia, the United States and the Soviet Union were in the immediate postwar years limiting their influence and avoiding thus its division. This gave political space to local political efforts to unify their countries, especially in Indochina, China, and Korea. The growing influence of the local forces and the political challenges they posed to the U.S.-led world order were manifested in the outbreak of wars in Korea and Indochina and the division of these countries. ₃₃

To exaggerate somewhat, while the division of Europe was based on deliberate decisions by the great powers, the partioning of Asian countries happened more by default. In addition to cultural factors, this may also be a reason for the more structured nature of the European politics and the more informal and fluid character of East Asian interstate relations. This is, again, compatible with the suggestion that the Asian regionalism is "soft", i.e. advances without formal agreements, while the European regionalism is "structured", i.e. based on treaties and institutions. ₃₄

2.2. A new Central Europe

Historically, countries of Eastern Central Europe have been oriented to Paris and London, not to speak of Berlin and Vienna, rather than to Moscow. While Russia has occasionally wielded influence in the region, its efforts at dominance have been half-hearted and systematically resisted. The dissolution of the Habsburg empire in the aftermath of the World War I opened the gates to the expansion of the German influence in the region and to a grossdeutsche solution in the 1930s. The German defeat in World War II and the Soviet military expansion westwards fragmented Mitteleuropa and cut off its connections to Western Europe. The new geopolitical situation created a political and civilizational disjuncture in which (Eastern) Central Europe, in a historical perspective, ended on the wrong side of the fence. ₃₅

The new intellectual uprising of the 1980s in Eastern Central Europe, facilitated by the internal change in the Soviet Union and the progress in the integration of the European Union, was to hoist the banner of cultural and political autonomy of the region and call for its reintegration with Western Europe. Milan Kundera was the first one to argue forcefully that Central Europe did not belong culturally to the Russian sphere, which has its own historical distinctiveness, but to the European mainstream. ₃₆ The cultural commitment of the Central European intellectuals to the West hints to the broader issue of how regional identity is defined on the basis of the difference from the Other which in Central Europe was clearly Russia (or in some interpretations only the Soviet Union). ₃₇

The Central European project succeeded politically; thanks to the persistence of intellectuals and the rise of civil society in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, and in particular to the dissolution of the monolithic Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. One can say that the multiple deconstruction of Eastern Europe in the late 1980s permitted the political reconstruction of Central Europe reaching out to the West. ₃₈ This development has given rise to the question whether (Eastern) Central Europe is, along with Western Europe and the Russian sphere, the third mega-region of Europe, or whether it is merely an extension of the atlanticizd Western Europe. The former option is favored by James Kurth who sees Mitteleuropa as a third way between East and West, largely because its cultural and political life has been shaped by the Catholic social teaching. ₃₉

Independently of the answer to that query, a further question arises on whether (Eastern) Central Europan region has a center either within or outside the region. ₄₀ Responses to these questions reveal whether Eastern Central Europe has a (sub)regional autonomy in relation to major powers and core economies or not. The conventional wisdom says that the region's economies and polities are "in transition" from the subordination to Russia to dependence on the European Union and NATO. Moreover, according to this argument, the transition is fuelled more by the internal preferences of the region than by external pressures by the West.

The alternative vision, originally formulated by T.G. Masaryk in the 1920s, suggests that there is a place for a "Third Europe" comprising of sovereign small states of Zwischeneuropa in which citizenship and self-determination would be respected. ₄₁ The Eastern Central European case is one in which the dominant center (the Soviet Union) has crumbled and the region is searching for a mixture of regional self-organization and orientation to external centers. As a working hypothesis, one can suggest that the external orientation to the United States (in military issues) and the European Union (in economic matters) are the dominant trends. This penchant for "returning to the West", and having close ties with the United States, has been so strong that many of the historical links of the region have been deliberately omitted. ₄₂

2.3 East Asia

In the Asia-Pacific region the situation is different in that the United States continues to wield there major, though not hegemonic influence. Obviously, its regional role is declining, but not nearly as visibly as the Russian role in Eastern Central Europe. The relative decline of the United States has fostered, in turn, concerns about the rise of regional hegemonic rivalries and unstable balance-of-power policies in East Asia.

Robert A. Manning summarizes the situation by the following words: "One of the principal reasons that there is so much concern and uncertainty about the emergence of China and Japan is the relative decline of the United States in the region. This is true in both the military and the economic spheres, though in absolute terms, U.S. trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific continue to grow significantly. And U.S. military capabilities remain substantially greater that those of any other Pacific power. The net effect of these trends is likely to be a process transforming the United States from the predominant power to a major power in the region over time". ₄₃ In sum, East Asia faces a period of adjustment in which the nature and extent of multilateral regional cooperation to promote political stability and economic development will be a key issue.

After the World War II, the United States stepped in the Asia-Pacific region as the leading global economic and military power. to replace Japan's regional dominance acquired since the late 19th century. Japan's economic expansion to East Asia followed in the wake of its military conquests in Taiwan, Korea, and China. Its economic imperialism relied on agricultural, infrastructural, and industrial investments which developed local centers of production in parallel with its own economy. Such a policy created also economic ties within the East Asian region; in 1938 some 70 per cent of Japan's and China's trade was with East Asia, while Taiwan and Korea traded only within the region. The regional interdependence fostered by the Japanese imperialism have had long-lasting legacies which can be discerned even today. ₄₄

During the Cold War, the U.S. political presence in Asia was spearheaded by its role as the military protector of its allies against the potential attack by China and the Soviet Union. Obviously, the activities by the U.S. multinational corporations in North East Asia were underpinned by bilateral alliance relations, especially with Japan and South Korea. Also other political factors, such as the Japanese aid policies and the division of Korea, have redirected trade and capital flows. Neither should one underestimate the regional impact of domestic structures of key states. In spite of all these factors, the postwar economic interdependence in East Asia has resulted mostly from the expansiont of market forces, especially trade and FDI. ₄₅

Regional multilateral institutions have been conspicuously absent in North East Asia; somewhat paradoxically, GATT has been more important than any regional organization. This state of affairs has been a result of the Cold War divisions and historical suspicions which have prevented the development of an genuine multilateral system of economic cooperation in the region. Instead, a three-tier regional economy developed in which Japan functioned as the intermediary between the United States on the one hand and South Korea and Taiwan on the other. Since the 1980s, this structure has changed, however, as Japan has been climbing up to the top of hierarchy.

A major political change has also taken place; the U.S. military role, although declining, has been generalized from bilateral alliance relations to the coordinator of the emerging multilateral security system. After the Cold War, according to The Economist, the United States has "preferred to see itself as regional 'balance wheel' rather than precinct cop". The U.S. balancing role is needed because the states in the region do not trust each other; political relations between China, Japan, and South Korea are still ridden by historical tensions which are further intensified by the existence of North Korea and Taiwan as challenging state actors in their own right. It is commonly believed that this political cauldron can be kept from boiling over only by the continuing stabilizing presence of the United States in the region. Especially the U.S. security embrace of Japan has "helped to prevent the region's natural rivalries - above all between Japan and China - from turning into armed competition". ₄₆

Central Europe has gone through a major political upheaval which has resulted in the adoption of new models of society, closer integration with the West, and the rejection of any significant Soviet/Russian role in the region. In Central and Eastern Europe Germany and Russia continue to provide an overlay which no single power in the region can eliminate. Although Russia is weak, it has a limited veto power in military arrangements concerning Eastern Central Europe. Therefore, the political autonomy of Mitteleuropa will remain limited because of the need to accommodate Russia by NATO, especially the United States and Germany. Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary resent that, but do not have power to alter the situation. They could enhance regional autonomy by closer mutual cooperation, but do not want to take that risk.

The East Asian system is more multipolar and complex, although the U.S. influence remains strong. There are four or five major players in the region which have to arrange their mutual relations by a mixture of deterrence and accommodation. Depending largely on the U.S. reactions, the emerging multipolarity can lead to a greater regional autonomy and thus to more rivalries. In this perspective the characterization of East Asia's regional multipolarity as "uncertain" is justified. ₄₇ There are mitigating factors, however, such as the growing economic interdependence, but they are slow to develop and cannot spearhead political changes in the region. ₄₈

3. Concepts and Methods

Region is a spatial concept which is defined by a combination of geographical proximity, density of interactions, shared institutional frameworks, and common cultural identities. Regions can be identified empirically by relying on data on mutual interactions, similarities of actor attributes, and shared values and experiences. Such an approach to the definition of a region is, however, both too static and mechanistic; it provides only a snapshot of regional cooperation, neglects its dynamic evolution, and omits the processes of social construction and perceptions. Regions are not so much measurable building blocs of the international order as spatially defined cultural, economic, and political constructions whose nature and functions are transformed over time. ₄₉

The dynamic aspects of regional cooperation are often captured by the concept of regionalization defined by the growth of social and economic interaction and of regional identity and consciousness. Regionalization results from the increasing flow of goods, people, and ideas within a spatial entity which thus becomes more integrated and cohesive. Regionalization grows from below, from the decisions by companies to invest and by people to move within a region. Regionalization should be distinguished from regionalism which refers to political, state-based efforts to create cohesive regional units and common policies for them. ₅₀

Understood in the above way, the processes of regionalization are strongest in the regions in which productive forces are robust and people educated enough to become transnationally active. Individual and collective actors have capabilities to seriously reach beyond national borders which are made porous by the spread of democracy, capitalism, and modern technology. On the other hand there can be historical and cultural barriers to intraregional exchanges. If countries have deep-rooted, ancient civilizations, the value of cross-border communication may not be as much as appreciated than in relations between neighboring small states. China and Japan on the one hand and the Nordic countries on the other provide contrasting examples in this regard.

Where it takes place, the process of globalization across the borders confronts the local communities with new challenges. The need arises to mobilize more effectively their resources for cooperation and competition with other regions. This requires, in turn, cultural readjustment and economic restructuring which reshapes, but does not abolish the traditional core-periphery structures. Core and peripheries are surprisingly lasting structures in international relations. On the other hand, some authors argue that among industrialized countries the spread of information and service industries erodes these structures and lead to a new "mosaic model" of regions. ₅₁

The breakdown of Cold War divisions and the process of economic restructuring have given rise to various conceptions of new regionalism in Europe. One author divides Europe into ten "superregions", including Latin Crescent, Baltic League, Atlantic Coast, Mitteleuropa, Danube Basin, Balkan Peninsula, and Slavic Federation. In many cases the borders of these regions follow the national boundaries. However, as regional borders are defined primarily by linguistic, religious, and economic criteria, they also can divide states between several regions (as happens for France and Germany). ₅₂

Economic regions are nothing new in Europe. In fact, the second industrial revolution, which started in the 1860s, gave in many parts of the continent rise to industrial regions which have lingered until these days. ₅₃ Today, regionalization in Europe is often a reaction to the transnationalization of the economy and the decline of the old industries. Therefore, they are structured increasingly around capital flows and financial services, although infrastructural development also remains importan. In addition to being reactions to economic pressures, regions also have ideological roots, either reflecting liberal and socialist antagonism to local provincialism or the federalist effort to circumvent the nation state. ₅₄

The process of regionalization is, indeed, shaped by several forces. Some of the emerging regions have deep historical roots; for instance the Baltic region can be dated back to the Hanseatic League of the 14th and 15th century and Mitteleuropa is often traced back to the Hasburg empire. A historical perspective leads to consider the role of culture and identity in cementing a region. In a more systematic way, it has been suggested that the process of regionalization has four constitutive phases; the constitution of territorial and symbolic shapes, the creation of institutions, and the establishment of the region in the consciousness of people. ₅₅

This approach points to the possibility to consider regions as social constructs in which spatiality is shaped in human minds and by human (inter)actions and leads to "regional understandings". ₅₆ The social constructionist view of regions considers them malleable by human actions; their internal structures and external boundaries are constantly rearticulated and redefined. The region as a focus of identification has been analyzed most extensively by French authors, while the region as a medium of social interaction and as a local response to the capitalist world economy has been of greater interest to English-speaking authors. ₅₇

Focusing on economic forces, Paul Krugman rejects the mosaic model and stresses the importance of geographic location and various core structures for the concentration of those economic activities that assure higher returns. Regions with adequate population base, concentration of specialized skills, and dense transport infrastructure create strong centers of production and networks of innovation based on technology complexes. Such centers reflect the uneven regional distribution of economic activities and shift only slowly. It seems that the locations of production are more concentrated in the United States than in Europe. ₅₈

This leads to an interesting question of whether the recent erosion of national and other barriers is leading to a more specialized and regionalized Europe. The tentative answer is yes. For instance, it seems that the recent emphasis on the European transport infrastructure leads both to creation and diversion of transports ("corridor effects" versus "shadow effects") which erodes old regional structures and stimulates new ones and may even fuel conflicts between them. Transport infrastructure can be remodeled both by developing new webs of land transportation, such as the European High Speed Rail Network, and by completing the missing links, including the Channel Tunnel, the Øresund crossing, and Via Baltica from Finland through the Baltic Republics to Central Europe. ₅₉

The process of regionalization has two distinct faces; the construction of (sub)regional zones of cooperation which include the national territories of two or more states and the emergence economic and cultural regions across the national boundaries. The latter regions reflect the process of regionalization from below (although governments may encourage them), while the former are initiated by governments (but also reflect other forces). In the process of regionalization economic forces are naturally constrained by national boundaries, but today also increasingly defy them.

The power of economic interests and of historical and cultural identities is reflected in the rise of transborder regions combining territories from two or more countries. Such regions utilize physical proximity to serve material and cultural needs. One arc-shaped transborder region, based on networks of paper, metal and high-tech industries, has been rising in the Finnish and Swedish coastal areas around the northern parts of the Gulf of Botnia. In addition to its transregional economic agglomeration, the region also has common historical and linguistic connections. ₆₀

Regionalism is clearly in focus today. This is reflected in the establishment of new (sub)regional organizations for economic cooperation, conflict prevention, and environmental protection in almost all parts of the world. On the other hand, the empirical evidence on the impact of these new organizations on the promotion of regional cooperation is mixed at best; regions do not always deliver expected political and economic results.

If (sub)regional organizations are not justified by their performance, there must be other reasons for the popularity of the regional perspective. One such reason may be the regionalization as a source of identity formation and social construction. Regionalism is assumed to provide intangible benefits. This approach to regionalism has a prescriptive aspect; a socially constructed region is seen as an alternative to both national isolationism and global hegemonism and provide a medium of action for policy makers squeezed between these non-preferable options.

The normative commitment to regionalism may lead, however, to untenable conclusions. For instance a subregion, Northern Europe, where internal cooperation in reality is declining, has been declared as a "megaregion" providing identity and security for the Nordic people. In such an approach the distinctiveness of a region is defined by social and cultural criteria and considered a medium of politics in the changing Europe. For instance, Northern Europe is defined by its pluralism and permissiveness which has avoided compliance with the traditional rules of the international power game. ₆₁

Such an "inside out" reading of the regional reality easily leads, however, to an inadequate picture which must be, at a minimum, complemented by the analysis of external constraints and incentives. ₆₂ The weakness of bottom-up approaches is reflected in the proposals that the Nordic cooperation could be reinvigorated by strengthening its security dimension. It would lend legitimacy to the new Nordic involvement in the Atlantic and West European security collaboration and "put an end to the present sclerosis of Nordic cooperation by signalling a new deal". ₆₃

Prescriptive views on the role and development of regionalism tend to lead to conclusions that regionalism is increasingly growing from below, from the expanding transnational civil society. While it is true that especially in industrialized countries the capacity of citizens to interact across the borders has increased significantly, regional projects are still mostly launched and steered by the political elites. The main reason for this is obvious; the political survival of elites depends much on the kind of regional environment in which they have to operate and what kinds of costs and benefits it produces for them. Regional cooperation can, for instance, provide new sources of legitimacy, protection against international intervention, and an alternative framework for failed sectoral policies of economic development. ₆₄

Regionalism can be pursued (and resisted) both by democratic and authoritarian political elites. This suggestion flies in the face of the assumption that the spread of democratic institutions and values is, as such, a source of more extensive and open regional cooperation. Etel Solingen has stated that the nature of regionalism depends on the coalitional politics in participating states, i.e. whether liberalizing or protectionist elites are in power and what is the configuration of their mutual relations in the region. Liberalizing elites may reinforce each other's policies, but also shun regional cooperation at the expense of the primacy given to relations with core powers. Nationalist-protectionist elites are more likely to engage in mutual conflicts undermining regional cooperation, while the mixed cases of liberalist and protectionist elites confronting each can lead to a variety of outcomes. ₆₅

In any case, it is clear that regionalization cannot be comprehended only by considering the popular consciousness, images, and myths pertaining to a particular region. Neither can the region be constructed by "telling the story" from inside out. This is a trap in which several postmodernist writers have fallen. It would be at least equally important to study the elite interests in and images of the "regionness" of a spatial unit. The penchant of national elites for closer regional cooperation is defined largely by the gains they expect from it and its effectiveness to respond to global economic and political pressures. Of course, if regional cooperation makes adequate progress, a new transnational elite can emerge with its own interests entrenched in regionalism.

4. Eastern Central Europe

After the profound political transformation in 1989-91, the economic landscapes of Eastern Central Europe are changing quickly. The four main changes are; (a) the reorientation of economic relations to match the new realities in the continent; (b) the u-turn to Western political and economic institutions; (c) the restructuring of the role of state in internal and external relations; and (d) the redefinition of the historical and cultural identities of the region. These changes have been made possible by the abolition of the Soviet/Russian overlay in the region, owing to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and of the Soviet Union, and the economic and political decline of Russia. In this situation the Central Europeans are facing a difficult task of living with a "double identity", both of these identities having several faces. They have to reconcile with each other the traditional identity of nationalism and the post-communist identity of integration. ₆₆

The main argument of this section is that these four changes have taken place in a mutually reinforcing manner. As a result, very little space has been left for serious subregional cooperation in Central Europe. Most of its political actors have focused almost single-mindedly on West European and Atlantic political, economic, and military organizations. However, the restrictionist policy of the European Union has meant that so far the benefits derived by Central European countries from its association with the Union have been, at least in trade, quite limited. ₆₇ Although the membership of the Central European countries in the European Union is quite likely at a future date (year 2005 or so), the slow pace and structural problems in the Union may well delay the process and make closer regional cooperation necessary in the years to come.

4.1. Trade and capital flows

An impression of the degree of reorientation in the trade flows by the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia can be obtained by comparing them in 1987 and 1994. The following table provides the percentage breakdown of the exports by these four countries to each other, Russia, Austria, and key members of the European Union:

The patterns emerging from the table warrant some comments. First, it is interesting to note that the total exports of the four Central European countries have increased little, if at all, in spite of their market-oriented economic reforms. This is probably due to the strong initial decrease of their economic production, disappearance of the Soviet market, and the protectionism by the European Union. Russia is not for Central Europe an economic actor of consequence any more; a fact which is further underlined by the absence of any relations of foreign direct investments between them.

Russia's place has been taken by Germany which has become a new economic center for Central European countries, especially for Poland. The collapse of the trade with the Soviet Union/Russia has been due both to political changes and their economic consequences, such as the adoption of dollar clearing and world market prices in trade which, in addition to their lower quality, reduced considerably the attractiveness of Russian goods. Semiperipheral Russia has simply been unable to compete with the Western core powers in the profit-based world economy.

The role of the other members of the European Union than Germany has remained limited in Eastern Central Europe, although Italy has made some economic inroads there. Austria's role as a regional economic hub has been growing stronger hinting to its gateway function in the EU trade with Central and Eastern Europe. The mutual trade between the four European countries examined has declined in all cases, and is very modest especially for Hungary and Poland. They exchange only some 5 per cent of their total trade with the countries in the region, while this share is roughly one half for Slovakia and one quarter for the Czech Republic. Central European countries trade on an average 6-7 times more with the European Union than with each other.

The economic relationship between the Czech Republic and Slovakia remains strong and is rather balanced if measured by the value of trade flows. However, if the different economic sizes of the countries are taken into account, Slovakia is much more dependent on the Czech Republic than the other way around. This is an indication of its development lag associated with the prevalence of outdated industrial plants, including military production, in Slovakia's economy. The importance of this relationship in Central Europe can be illustrated by the fact that the total value of the Czech-Slovakian trade, $ 4.5 billion in 1994, was greater than the total of all other trade relations in the four-nation group ($ 2.5 billion in 1994). In fact, in this group of four the only other relevant economic dyad is between the Czech Republic and Poland ($ 958 million in 1994).

The general conclusion is that the Central European countries remain, in spite of some success in their reforms, rather marginal in the European economic system, are dependent on the German market, and conduct only limited trade with each other. This relatively bleak picture can be specified by looking at some further economic characteristics of the four countries:

The Central European countries have opted for quite different economic models. Slovakia and Hungary are the polar opposites. Slovakia has relatively isolated, but balanced economy living, however, on the edge because of limited currency reserves. On the other hand, Hungary has an externally imbalanced economy, due to its high indebtedness and current account deficit, which continues, though, to attract foreign investment and currency. Poland and the Czech Republic mix these extreme elements and have economies which have produced rather high growth rates. Especially in the Czech Republic the deficits in foreign trade and state budget have produced macroeconomic strains which have forced to devalue the currency.

In 1995 the GNP grew by 6,5 per cent in Poland and Slovakia, by 4,0 in the Czech Republic, and by 2,0 per cent in Hungary. Slovakia and the Czech Republic had in 1995 the lowest inflation rates in the region (11 and 10 per cent), while Poland and Hungary suffered from a rather high rate of 29 per cent. In 1996 the inflation rate decreased, however, in all these countries. ₆₈

4.2. Institutional cooperation

The Central European Triangle, comprising Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, has been in the center of the efforts to promote economic and political cooperation in the region. In and interesting way, its emergence in 1990-91 blends together initiatives of states and civil societies. The triangular cooperation between the three governments started already within the Warsaw Pact where they agreed on the need to work towards the abolition of the alliance. This governmental effort converged in the 1980s with another non-governmental underpinning of the Triangle as the Czech, Hungarian, and Polish dissidents cooperated clandestinely to create a community of common political values and interests. ₆₉

The Triangle has not been, however, an autonomous and united group. In the different phases of its development, external powers, including Austria and Italy, have tried to steer the subregional cooperation in a specific direction. However, Germany and the United States have had by far the strongest influence, a kind of contextual impact, on the policies of Central European states. Early on, the members of the Triangle understood that the roads to NATO and the Europe Union, their preferred targets, go through Bonn and Washington. Therefore, the Baker-Genscher statement of October 2, 1991 on the need to develop a new institutional relationship between NATO and Central European states was received with considerable enthusiasm. A response, demanding a "qualitatively higher" link with NATO, was issued a few weeks later by the Triangle in its Cracow summit. ₇₀

In concrete terms, the (Eastern) Central European region has evolved from two different origins. The Visegrad summit in February 1991 codified the trilateral cooperation between Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. It was a major effort by the presidents of these three countries, whose kings had met in the same Hungarian city in 1335, to consolidate their international position in an increasingly unpredictable Europe. The summit decided to promote mutual cooperation, including economic and defense ties, and develop a common strategy to approach NATO and the European Union.

Although intraregional cooperation was on the Visegrad agenda, the basic goal was to dismember the Warsaw Pact (and the CMEA). The objective was not so much to increase their national or subregional autonomy than to bandwagon the West. Zwischeneuropa, as an independent regional alternative, had no chance in the political atmosphere of the early 1990s. Determination to join the West was the hallmark of Visegrad cooperation. Its sponsors understood, however, full well that to be embraced by the West required successful management of their mutual disagreements arising from different economic interests, political ambitions, and minority problems.

The overarching goal of the Triangle was to join NATO both to prove its Western politico-cultural credentials and seek protection against the instability in the Soviet Union/Russia. The Cracow declaration in October 1991 codified the common goals of the membership in both NATO and the European Union, while only scant references were made to mutual cooperation. In fact, the Maastricht process in the European Union increased pressures on the Visegrad countries to agree on their external grand strategy vis-a-vis the West European and Atlantic institutions. On the other hand, both NATO and the Union poured cold water on the Visegrad countries and played down their enthusiasm to join these institutions. ₇₁

In addition, while the Union was lukewarm to the needs of Central European economies and wanted to socialize them through negotiations, it at the same time subsidized the Russian economy in the manner that undermined the opportunities of Central Europe to prevail in the Russian market. ₇₂ The strategy of the European Union towards Central European states, including their mutual cooperation, has been mixed at best. Since the initial participation of Italy in the Pentagonale, the Union members have not been willing to promote subregional cooperation in Central Europe, but neither have they been ready to move ahead in accepting new members. Only in 1997 has the Union started seriously the process of membership negotiations with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia (in addition to Cyprus).

The Central European Initiative grew out from the Danube-Adria Group, set up in 1987, evolved into Pentagonale and Hexagonale and in 1991 into a Central European Initiative (CEI). The Pentagonale brought into Central European cooperation a Southern dimension by involving Italy and the former Yugoslavia. The CEI evolved into a network of commissions and conferences, but it never developed a clear rationale and strategic purpose, neither did it capture the attention of the ordinary people. ₇₃ The CEI was a non-starter, partly because it never engaged serious elite interest, but was rather fostered by the ambiguous need to do something in an uncertain situation. The lack of its relevance is indicated by the fact that in 1996 the CEI had 16 members and its summits focussed on issues like fighting drugs.

The establishment of the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA) in 1992 was an effort to move from declaratory policies and futile networking into concrete action. While waiting and preparing for the coming of Godot, i.e. membership in the European Union, the Central European states wanted to start dismantling their mutual barriers of trade. The original aim of CEFTA was to realize free trade in the area by 2002. In April 1994, CEFTA decided to speed up the liberalization of trade by moving to free trade in agricultural products by 1998. While some limited progress has been made, the intraregional cooperation in Central Europe has been plagued by a number of difficulties, including political conflicts over minorities between Hungary and Slovakia.

Looking beyond the immediate conflicts of economic interests or political posturing, one cannot avoid the conclusion that the four Central European countries are inherently different, "individualistic". A detailed analysis of national differences being beyond this paper, only a few remarks can be made. In general, Poland and Slovakia see Central European institutions as important, although for different reasons, while the Czech Republic and Slovenia have opted for unilateral solutions with the West (Hungary being the mixed case). ₇₄ Slovakia's chances to become more closely integrated with the West have been eroded by its chaotic and semi-authoritarian domestic political situation.

The Polish subregionalism seems to derive from its position as the only major power in the region. In the Polish view, its status justifies both an early membership in NATO and the European Union as it is needed to maintain stability in Central and Eastern Europe. For this purpose, Poland is developing a special relationship with Germany, while following at the same time with concern the signs of instability in Belarus and Russia. For Poland, subregional cooperation in Central Europe is mostly a necessary home base, but subordinated to its Atlantic ties. Poland's main purpose is to stabilize its position in the center of Europe. It is not unconceivable, though, that as by far the largest country in Eastern Central Europe it may want to play in the future a more ambitious role - as it did during the interwar period. ₇₅

Slovakia supports subregional options for the simple reason that it does not have any other real options. It is now clear that it will not accepted to NATO and the European Union together with three other Visegrad states. The Czech Republic and Slovenia, on the other hand, firmly believe that they have a birth right to join the Western institutions at an early date because of their relatively advanced and productive industrial base, and the Central European cultural roots. They are, like Poland, also bandwagoning Germany, although the Czech Republic in particular have had simmering historical conflicts with it. ₇₆ In 1997 this obstacle was removed, however, as Germany and the Czech Republic signed their historic act of reconciliation.

4.3. Transborder regions

The collapse of the central national control in Eastern and Central Europe and the attraction of the European Union's emphasis on regionalism, have encouraged subnational regions to seek closer cross-border ties with each other. In fact, transborder regional cooperation in Eastern Central Europe has imitated the West European regionalism which started from the establishment of Regio basiliensis in 1963 to promote cooperation between northwest Switzerland and adjoining regions in Germany. Especially from the 1980s on, the promotion of Euroregions and the institutionalization of their cooperation has become a visible part of the work by the European Union. ₇₇

In Central Europe, the establishment of the Euroregion of Nysa in May 1991 by Czech, German, and Polish local governments started the transborder organization in the region (Nysa covers 12,000 km2 and has about 1,7 million people). By early 1994, a total of eight transborder regions were established, combining, in different ways, mostly Czech, German, Hungarian, Polish, Slovakian, and Ukrainian local communities. The transborder cooperation in Central Europe covers a number of fields ranging from environment and economy to culture, health and public administration. The central driving forces of transborder cooperation in the region include the need to learn from the experiences of the others across the border on how to best adjust to the post-socialist era and, most importantly, to earn "eurocredentials" in the eyes of the European Union. ₇₈

Transborder cooperation has to be seen in Central Europe as a response to the crises left in the wake of the collapse of Communism. The lack of an effective national economic strategy and systematic regional policies, the local policy makers have had to innovate to be able to respond to the problems of economic restructuring, environmental deterioration, and infrastructural decay. Successes, though limited, to develop transborder cooperation between local governments, rather than between companies, have increased the political legitimacy of local policy makers. The long-term success of the Central European transborder regions is by no means assured, however. ₇₉ On the hand, such regions can serve a variety of political goals. For instance, the Polish government is trying to integrate the Brest oblast in the Euroregion Bug to slow down the reintegration of Belarus with Russia. ₈₀

5. East Asia

A major similarity between East Asia and Eastern Central Europe is that in neither of these regions has today an effective hegemonic power, although there is in both regions a transition process underway. In Central Europe, the Russian hegemony has waned and Germany has been the quickest to realize the potential economic attractions of Eastern Central Europe. Germany's influence is growing gradually but steadily through economic expansion and political integration. Germany has not wavered from its commitment to bring the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland into the fold of both the European Union and NATO. ₈₁ In one interpretation Germany is now making effors to stabilize by integration Eastern Central Europe which it helped to subvert primarily by detente and economic cooperation. ₈₂

The strengthening of its leadership in Central Europe is not, however, a national political project for Germany, but it works towards this end through Western institutions, especially the EU and NATO. Japan's leadership strategy in East Asia is equally gradual and cautious, but it is handicapped by the absence of a multilateral economic and political framework in the region in which its integration strategy could be embedded. Therefore, Japan's neighbors become more easily suspicious of its intentions and make the burden of its history heavier than in the case of Germany.

Katzenstein observes that the lack of political multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific region is, in part, due to the fact that the United States did not introduce in the immediate postwar era multilateral norms and institutions to the region in the same way it did in Europe. Moreover, the Asian cultural tradition, eschewing formal institutions both domestically and internationally may be less inclined to set up robust multilateralism than more legally and bureaucratically oriented Europeans. ₈₃

On the other hand, there are at least two big differences between the regions; (a) the states and markets in East Asia are much bigger than in Central Europe, making the game of regionalism more harsh, and (b) the degree of interpenetration, especially through foreign direct investments, is more pervasive. While Central Europe is bandwagoning NATO in security policy, East Asia seems to be moving towards a combination of more autonomous balance-of-power politics and multilateral coordination of security interests. In Central Europe, the leaning on NATO as a source of security guarantees is undergirded by growing economic dependence on the European Union and especially Germany. In East Asia the (potentially destructive) security policy autonomy of states relies only on an emerging regional pattern of economic interdependence.

5.1. Leadership in East Asia

In spite of its slow economic growth and the bursting of banking and real estate "bubbles" in recent years, Japan remains a dynamic, leading economy. The growth of its relative economic strength has been due both to its own successful policies and the mismanagement of the U.S. economy, especially in the 1980s. Japan's "surplus economy", due to the surplus in the current account and the high savings rate, together with the appreciation of yen since 1985, have both enabled and forced it to become a regional and global economic power of consequence. ₈₄ Japan's leading role in the world economy imposes on it a number of requirements, such as the need of domestic adjustments, of increasing imports, and the provision of funds for various international endeavors.

Japan is and will probably remain an incomplete hegemon because it does not possess overwhelming military power and political determination, and its role in the global financial system is limited. Therefore, it will continue to adjust, mostly in constructive ways, to the global economic and political systems led by the United States. It will not be a spoiler, but will provide public goods to support international cooperation. ₈₅ Let alone for this reason one cannot treat Japan only as a regional power in East Asia

The relative decline of the United States means that is unable to exercise effective leadership in all the main regions of the world. Therefore, its regional roles will devolve and local powers allied with it will increasingly take over its economic and even political and military responsibilities. These transitions will mostly happen consensually between the United States and its allies, but they may create controversies with other regional powers, not privileged by a U.S. alliance commitment. Such controversies are possible both in East Asia (China) and Europe (Russia).

The above argument leads to assume that Japan will shoulder in East Asia a successively greater amount of regional responsibilities, including political ones. This process may not be altogether incomparable with the gradual British withdrawal from the Western hemisphere, and even East Asia, in the late 19th century letting the United States to replace its leadership there. An important difference is, of course, that today's Japan is much less willing to use military force in exercising its regional leadership than the United States did before the World War I. The restructuring the U.S.-Japanese military relationship in 1997 is a sign of the larger regional role which Tokyo isn expected to play. However, because of the residual fears in the region, the redefinition of Japan's security role will slow and cautious.

As I will document below, Japan's influence in East Asia is primarily economic by nature. This should not lead, however, to discount its growing role in regional security which is underpinned by a comprehensive security agenda on which military and political issues interact with economy and environment. Moreover, one has to make a distinction between the "high" and "low" military politics. The former embodies the military strategies of deterrence, pre-emption, and retaliation, while the latter promotes military consultations, confidence-building, and various types of exchanges.

In recent years, Japan has been quite active in military "low" politics, both in the subregional and bilateral contexts. A standard Japanese argument is that in the Asia-Pacific region a multifaceted approach to security is needed. Such an approach should deepen regional economic integration, enhance subregional security cooperation and mutual reassurance, and rely on firm and predictable U.S.-Japanese cooperation. ₈₆ In recent years, Japan's low-level military cooperation with South Korea has been surprisingly active and its ties with ASEAN expanding, while contacts with China have recently sufferred from its nuclear testing and intimidation of Taiwan. ₈₇

Japan's future relations with South Korea and China are, of course, pivotal for the future stability of East Asia. In recent years, South Korea has emerged as a regional actor which cannot be neglected when the future configuration of East Asia is analyzed. Its relationship with Japan is delicate; historical tensions and boundary problems aside, South Korea has an option to develop closer cooperation with China and Russia and join them in a potentially anti-Japanese alliance. On the other hand, it is not prudent for South Korea to provoke Japan into rearmament or confrontational policy because of the large economic and technological power base of the latter. ₈₈

The Japan-ROK relationship is dwarfed by the Sino-Japanese relationship. There is a cottage industry predicting that the future of East Asia will be shaped by the strategic rivalry between China and Japan in which the former, being more prone to use force, may emerge victorious. To avoid this, Japan and the United States must cooperate more closely. ₈₉ Such forecasts are simplified and sensational, but they hint to a vital problem. The end of the Cold War has opened up in East Asia a protracted era of structural adjustment which can be quite painful for the region.

Rapid economic growth has generated new resources which have, in part, been allocated to military capabilities enhancing state power and starting competitive processes of arms acquisitions. Partly for this reason some believe that the structural adjustment in the region will be steered by the state power rather than the market and involve the use of military force: "there are no guarantees that rapid economic growth and market-driven global economic integration will produce a more harmonious political order". ₉₀

Other observers are more confident that growing economic interdependence is shaping the nature of relations in East Asia. The main argument to support this contention is the growing economic influence of Japan in fostering interdependence in the region. In general, Japan has manifested "strategic pragmatism" in its economic expansion to Asia; an entrepreunial approach relying on governmental guidance which has been mostly accepted by the neighboring states. ₉₁ One can at least suggest that the key elements of "strategic pragmatism", which puts more emphasis on concrete results than visibility, can be also used to promote a multilateral framework for regional security.

Such a framework can hardly provide traditional international leadership and solve the "big" military problems of East Asia, but it can soften contradictions by developing rules and practices for mutual cooperation. Ultimately, these premises boil down to the conclusion that Japan will increasingly lead the Eastern rim of Asia, but lead it "from behind". ₉₂ To fully grasp this point, one has to realize that Japan's external policy is "nested"; a "global partnership" with the United States and the European Union has the main priority for Japan with which its growing regional role in East Asia has to be reconciled. ₉₃ The global dimension in Japan's policy means that it wants to be treated equal with other centers of world power, but define its duties in a more limited way than especially the United States. Despite that Japan's global role will have an increasing bearing on East Asia as its chief representative on the world scene.

The critical issue is the future development of Japan's public opinion. It now shuns any ambitions for any grand political and military strategy in East Asia, but is more ready than before accept more limited and constructive engagements. On the other hand, it has been suggested that in Japan's divided domestic politics there is a growing impatience with the United States and willingness to give Asia a higher priority which is diluted, however, by the "quiet ambivalence" about China's future intentions. ₉₄ China does not have a grand strategy, either. Its policy is ambivalent and tries to muddle through by adopting elements from both the Japanese and U.S. strategies in the region. This hesitant adjustment to the external realities reflects the effort to maintain the current configuration of domestic power. ₉₅

5.2. The economic framework

The economic relationships between East Asian countries will be explored here at two different levels; by scrutinizing the extent of trade and direct investment flows and the nature of industrial dynamics in the region. It was concluded above that the intraregional economic interdependence in East Asia has strongly increased in recent years, but the region continues to be more "open" than especially the "closed" European Union. However, from 1980 to 1990 the intraregional trade in East Asia, which comprises both South East and North East Asia, increased from 33.8 to 38.4 per cent of the total regional trade. Similarly, the intraregional investment flows have also expanded significantly and created a regional pattern of manufacturing which, in turn, has reoriented trade flows. Japan's role in the region is superior. ₉₆

Trade flows in the Asia-Pacific region are not symmetric. To the contrary, their pattern resembles of a hierarchy in which the United States and Japan are on the top. An empirical study of intraregional trade flows among all the Pacific Rim countries in 1965 and 1990, shows that the United States is firmly in command, while Japan's role as number two over a quarter century has not become all that much stronger. In fact, the South East Asian NICs have defected by 1990 from the Japanese cluster to the U.S. one. According to this study, even though the structure of trade in the Pacific is somewhat bipolar, Japan has more limited influences and continues to rely heavily on the U.S. market. ₉₇

These conclusions give a wrong impression on the present economic reality in East Asia because it neglects to consider the regional system of manufacturing and its impact on trade flows, and changes which have taken place since 1990. Existing research has documented the fact that the industrial development of North East Asia has been strongly shaped by Japan both through its colonial expansion and post-World War II economic growth. Without debating the exact nature of transnational technology transfers and product cycles in East Asia, it suffices to say that Japan has had a pivotal role in its economic regionalism. ₉₈

Obviously Japan's technological edge in East Asia matters and the transfer of capital equipment to the countries of the region give rise to transnational product cycles. Japan is far ahead of its neighbors in the quality and scope of its technologies which are increasingly exported, under Japanese control, to the industrial plants of the region. Japanese technology and parts drive the electronics and other industries in East Asia and their exports to the United States and Europe. Many industrial firms in the region have become junior members of the transnational, keiretsu-type organization of production. It is a vertical organization in which Japanese companies, supported by public and private institutions, are at the top of the pyramid. ₉₉

The roles of technology and institutional ties in the East Asian regionalism can be understood only by considering it in the context of the massive flow of Japanese direct investments there, especially after the middle of the 1980s (when currency appreciation also influenced relative wages). Japanese FDIs have gone both to North East and South East Asia, while South Korea and Taiwan have also invested extensively in China and the ASEAN, but they have been unable to create a regional network of production alliances. These networks are both transnational and hierarchical in nature, and ultimately project the domestic economic-political system of Japan to the regional level. ₁₀₀

The spread of Japanese capital in East Asia has erected industrial export platforms. Japanese subsidiaries are more inclined to import from the parent company than those of other transnational corporations and export to third-country markets (rather little of their production is exported back to Japan). This is one explanation why all industrializing countries in East Asia have a deficit in trade with Japan and a major surplus in trade with the United States (South Korea and Taiwan follow roughly the same pattern as Japan). This pattern of differentiated and hierarchical foreign trade is supported also by the increasing intra-industry trade between Japan and the ASEAN economies. ₁₀₁

The emergence of a new industrial hierarchy in East Asia has, together with the sheer size of Japan's economy, significantly increased its staying power in the region. For instance, it has been suggested that the Chinese dependence of Japanese capital is so great that Tokyo can exercise major influence on Beijing's policy decisions. ₁₀₂ It may be that its East Asian partners have imitated and imported Japanese institutions and economic practices. While there is evidence that the institutional convergence between Japan and East Asia has taken place, it should not probably be exaggerated as many historical and structural differences tend to inhibit any close convergence. ₁₀₃ It is more likely that Japan has developed a transnational reach for its own institutions; "Japanese developmentalism has gone regional". ₁₀₄

Japan's attitudes are revealed by an episode in which it made an effort to convert the World Bank from its free-market orthodoxy to accept the central role of state in steering economic development in East Asia. This effort, though only partially successful, shows how convinced the Japanese are -- for ideological, bureaucratic, and material reasons -- that the promotion of their own model of development is also in the best collective interest in East Asia. ₁₀₅ Japanese themselves try carefully avoid concepts that would reveal the real extent of their control in East Asia and awaken unpleasant historical memories. The concept, which is officially used to describe the new hierarchical industrial division of labor in East Asia, is "work sharing". ₁₀₆

5.3. Transborder regions

Transborder regions have flourished in East Asia since the late 1980s. They result, in part, from Chinese economic reforms which have created new opportunities for investing and otherwise cooperating with its special economic zones. This is especially true for Greater South China Economic Zone which has blended capital from Hong Kong and Taiwan with the labor force in Guangdong and Fujian provinces of China. External capital employs a minimum of ten million people in these provinces in which the economic reforms have relaxed the control of the central government. The transborder economic region in South China has become one of the most important production and export complexes in the world. ₁₀₇

Transborder cooperation has been also flourishing in ASEAN where the geographical proximity and economic complementarities have encouraged the establishment of several growth triangles, such as SIJORI and Northern Growth Triangles as well as East ASEAN Growth Area combining regions in Indonesia and the Philippines. The gains from this transregional cooperation have been distributed rather unevenly, however. Singapore has been the main beneficiary from SIJORI and Northern Triangle, reflecting its central status in the financial and technological hub of South East Asia. On the other hand, Malesia has felt that it has been disadvantaged in the distribution of benefits from the growth triangles. ₁₀₈

Other transregional projects in East Asia have focused on the development of the Mekong Basin, the Yellow See Rim, and Tumen River Area. The development of the Mekong Basin, home of 230 million people, has been sponsored by ASEAN and the Asian Development Bank. Its major and often unstated task is to give China's interior access to the world markets. ₁₀₉ After initial difficulties the Tumen River Economic Development Area, initially suggested by the UNDP, was set up in December 1995 by three parallel agreements between China, Mongolia, Russia, and the bboth Koreas. A major reason for advancing the Tumen River project has been to involve North Korea more in international economic cooperation, but it has also helped the neighboring Chinese provinces to expand their cross-border ties. ₁₁₀

While economic complementaries and private entrepreneurship are important for the understanding of the emergence of transborder regions in East Asia, the role of governments seems to have been even more vital. It is impossible that the South China Economic Zone and the development of Mekong or Tumen River Basins could have started without a public push. The central role of governments both reflects and deviates from the general East Asian pattern. The regional economic integration there is, in the first place, market-driven, but at the same time regulated by governmental guidelines and intergovernmental agreements.

6. Conclusions

Regional cooperation has everywhere multiple layers which are shaped in a complex manner by material interest, institutional ties, and shared experiences. Thus, the shape and structure of a region is never a constant but is reshaped by mutually reinforcing and opposing social forces. There are, however, significant differences between Central European and East Asian regionalisms. Although there are in the former efforts by the economic actors, local authorities, and civic organizations to organize cross-border cooperation, its regionalism is primary defined by hierarchical and formal groups of state. Few of these groupings are located in the region itself, but the thrust is towards formal memberships in state-based organizations, especially NATO and the European Union. They are considered end states of regional integration processes.

The institutional nature of Central European regionalism means that it borders are clearly demarcated. The location of these lines of demarcation even becomes a major political issue as the experiences of the NATO enlargment indicate. On the other hand, in Asia, formal boundaries do not matter to the same extent and the notion of a region is more metaphorical than concrete. ₁₁₁ This observation is compatible with the conclusion that (Central) European regionalism is more state-centric than the East Asian where the informal economic and cultural networks seem to matter more. This also means that the substance of power is different in these two regions; in Central Europe the distribution of capabilities is pivotal, whil0e in East Asia access to networks is more important.

Thus, in spite of some similarities, Central European and East Asian regionalisms differ significantly. In Central Europe, the national elites have made a conscious choice to link the subregion as closely as possible with the core organizations, NATO and the European Union. Interestingly enough, this strategy of integrating Central European countries with the West has been pursued both by the liberal and national elites and supported by the majority of public opinion. It seems that a main reason for this committed choice is the need to define in a positive way the postcommunist identity, i.e. to identify the countries in transition with the Atlantic Europe, the only remaining core region on the continent. ₁₁₂

Both economic and cultural ties within Central Europe, have turned out to be weaker than what one would have expected on the basis of the intellectual debates of the late 1980s. The "individualism" of the states in the region, rooted in their different historical backgrounds, has not provided a solid basis for the development of a regional grand strategy. Neither has the limited intraregional economic exchanged created incentives to cooperate more closely. All integrating factors point to the Atlantic Europe which has unconditionally become the target of Central Europe's choice of partners. This approach may, however, lead to a backlash if the rewards, as it is likely, the membership in NATO and the European Unnion will be smaller than expectd.

In East Asia, regional cooperation does not rely on any clearly formulated institutions or elite and popular ideologies, except in the loose sense of talking about common Asian values. Cooperation is driven by a combination of corporate interests and strategic necessities. Although pious hopes are expressed about the emergence of an autonomous regional East Asian civil society, ₁₁₃ its rise anytime soon is quite unlikely. Although one should not underestimate the U.S. preponderance, which is stronger in East Asia than in Europe, the growing multipolarity of the region means that its development cannot be steered by any single country. Therefore, the regional power structure grows from the niche between governments and the civil society, especially from the economic actors linked with the state in all major countries in the region.

The spread of the Japanese direct investment and technologies in the region have created a production network which needs politics, but cannot easily be destroyed by it. In this sense the Japanese yen and technology are in command. Japan's power has been accepted by the other states in the region because foreign investments create economic growth which, in turn, help to keep the present governments in power. Japan's infrastructural power is considered legitimate as long as it does not try to convert it into formal inter-state arrangements ratifying its pre-eminence. In that sense the role of Germany in Eastern Central Europe may not be entirely different.

Multiple power transitions in East Asia create uncertainties and potential instabilities which economic interdependence among the corporations cannot alone cope with. Therefore, the role of governments is important in creating a regional multilateral framework within which potential conflicts can be settled before they damage seriously the economic relations. In Central Europe, governments push integration with Atlantic Europe, while in East Asia they are expected to establish an institutional framework that would permit economic regionalization to flourish. This difference may be due to the fact that of the major powers Germany is not a part of Eastern Central Europe, while Japan is in East Asia.

Notes

Note 1:James H. Mittelman, 1996, ""Rethinking the 'New Regionalism' in the Context of Globalization". Global Governance, vol. 2, no. 2, 1996, pp. 189-214. Back.

Note 2: Alain Lipietz, 1994, "The National and the Regional: Their Autonomy vis-à-vis the Capitalist World Crisis", Ronen P. Palan & Barry Gills (eds.), Transcending the State-Global Divide. A Neostructuralist Agenda in International Relations. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp. 28-29. Back.

Note 3:W. Howard Wriggins, 1992, "Conclusion", in W. Howard Wriggins (ed.), Dynamics of Regional Politics. Four Systems on the Indian Ocean Rim. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 275-300. Back.

Note 4:These and other reasons for the rising tide of regionalism have been discussed, for example, by Richard Rosecrance, 1991, "Regionalism and the Post-Cold War Era". International Journal, vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 373-93 and Louise Fawcett, 1995, "Regionalism in Historical Perspective", in Regionalism in World Politics. Regional Organization and International Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 17-30. Back.

Note 5:This also the conclusion by Wriggins op.cit. 1992, pp. 291-95. In fact, one has to take seriously the possibility that major powers have participated in regional politics as much by invitation as imposition as the local power-holders have needed resources from them to maintain their own clientelist arrangements; on Africa, see Christopher Clapham, 1996, Africa and International System. The Politics of State Survival. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Back.

Note 6:Vincent Cable, 1994, "Overview", in Vincent Cable and David Henderson (eds.), Trade Blocs? The Future of Regional Integration. London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, pp. 5-6. Wyatt-Walter makes a comparable distinction between regionalism as a conscious public policy and as the outcome of economic processes; see Andrew Wyatt-Walter, 1995, "Regionalism, Globalization, and World Economic Order", in Louise Fawcett & Andrew Hurrell (eds.), Regionalism in World Politics. Regional Organization and International Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 77-78. Back.

Note 7:Zaki Laïdi, 1994, "Introduction: Imagining the Post-Cold War Era", in Zaki Laïdi (ed.), Power and Purpose after the Cold War. Oxford: Berg, pp. 11-19. Back.

Note 8:Wayne Sandholtz et al., 1992, The Highest Stakes. The Economic Foundations of the Next Security System. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 172-77. Back.

Note 9:Paul Hirst & Grahame Thompson, 1992, "The Problem of 'Globalization': International Economic Relations, National Economic Management and the Formation of Trading Blocs". Economy and Society, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 360-65. See also Paul Hirst & Grahame Thompson,1996, Globalization in Question. The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 7-13. Back.

Note 10:This idea is further developed in Raimo Vayrynen, 1988, "East-West Rivalry and Regional Conflicts in the Third World", in Björn Hettne (ed.), Europe. Dimensions of Peace. London: Zed Books. Back.

Note 11: Clinton Shiells, 1995, "Regional Trade Blocs: Trade Creating or Diverting". Finance and Development, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 30-31. Back.

Note 12:Andrew Gamble & Anthony Payne, 1996, "Conclusion: The New Regionalism", in Andrew Gamble & Anthony Payne (eds.), Regionalism and World Order. New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 258-64. Back.

Note 13:Tim Huxley, 1996, "Southeast Asia in the Study of International Relations: The Rise and Decline of a Region". The Pacific Review, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 212-18. Back.

Note 14:Mahathir Mohamad, 1996, "EAEC Idea Born of Frustration with West". Nikkei Weekly, February 15. Back.

Note 15:Richard Higgott & Richard Stubbs, 1995, "Competing Conceptions of Economic Regionalism: APEC versus EAEC in the Asia Pacific". Review of International Political Economy, vol. 2, no. 3, p. 523. Back.

Note 16:Helen Milner, 1994, "The Evolution of the International Trade Regime: A Three-Bloc Trading System", in Zaki Laï di (ed.), Power and Purpose after the Cold War. Oxford: Berg, pp. 114-23. Back.

Note 17:Peter Duus, 1993, "Remembering the Empire: Postwar Interpretations of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere". The Woodraw Wilson Center. Asia Program. Occasional Paper, No. 54. Washington, D.C., pp. 5-8. See also Glenn Hook, 1996, "Japan and the Construction of the Asia-Pacific", in Andrew Gamble & Anthony Payne (eds.), Regionalism and World Order. New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 186-89. Back.

Note 18:Cable op.cit. 1994, pp. 12-13. Back.

Note 19:Kenneth A. Oye, 1992, Economic Discrimination and Political Exchange. World Political Economy in the 1930s and the 1980s. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, pp. 137-70. Back.

Note 20:Gamble & Payne op.cit. 1996, pp. 251-53, Jagdish Bhagwati, 1992, "Regionalism versus Multilateralism". The World Economy, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 535-55, Robert D. Hormats, 1994, "Making Regionalism Safe". Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 2, pp. 97-108. Back.

Note 21:Bruce Cumings, 1993, "The End of the Seventy-Years' Crisis: Trilateralism and the New World Order", in Meredith Woo-Cumings & Michael Loriaux (eds.), Past as a Prelude. History in the Making of a New World Order. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 19-20, 25. Back.

Note 22:Milner op.cit. 1994, pp. 109-14l, Wyatt-Walter op.cit. 1995, pp. 97-108, Kym Anderson & Hege Norheim, 1993, "History, Geography, and Regional Economic Integration", Kym Anderson & Richard Blackhurst (eds.), in Regional Integration and the Global Trading System. New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 19-51, and John O'Laughlin & Luc Anselin, 1996, "Geo-Economic Competition and Trade Bloc Formation: United States, German and Japanese Exports, 1968-1992. Economic Geography, vol. 72, no. 2, pp. 131-60. Back.

Note 23:Hirst & Thompson op.cit. 1996, pp. 163-64. Back.

Note 24:John A.C. Conybeare, 1993, "1992, the Community and the World. Free Trade of Fortress Europe", in Dale L. Smith & James Lee Ray (eds.), The 1992 Project and the Future of Integration in Europe. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 143-63. Back.

Note 25:Stephen George, 1996, "The European Union, 1992 and the Feat of "Fortress Europe", in Andrew Gamble & Anthony Payne (eds.), Regionalism and World Order. New York: St. Martin's Press, pp.21-54. Back.

Note 26:Peter Katzenstein, 1993, ""Taming of Power. German Unification, 1989-1990", in Meredith Woo-Cumings & Michael Loriaux (eds.), Past as Prelude. History in the Making of a New World Order. Boulder, CO: Westview, pp. 59-81. Back.

Note 27:On recent moves towards regional integration in the South, see Peter Robson, 1993, "The New Regionalism and Developing Countries". Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 31, no. 3. Back.

Note 28:Barrie Axford, 1995, The Global System. Economic, Politics and Culture. New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 120-22. Back.

Note 29:For case studies confirming this conclusion, see Iver B. Neumann (ed.), 1992, Regional Great Powers in International Politics. New York: St. Martin's Press. Back.

Note 30:P.J. Taylor, 1991, "A Theory and Practice of Regions: The Case of Europes". Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 184-86. Back.

Note 31:James Kurth, 1993, "Mitteleuropa and East Asia. The Return of History and Redefinition of Security", in Meredith Woo-Cumings & Michael Loriaux (eds.), Past as Prelude. History in the Making if a New World Order. Boulder, CO: Westview, pp. 33-57. Back.

Note 32:This point is further developed in Frank Langdon, "The Posthegemonic Japanese - U.S. Relationship", 1993, in Tsuneo Akaha & Frank Langdon (eds.), Japan in the Posthegemonic World. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp. 71-73. Back.

Note 33:For a more detailed analysis, see Robert Schaeffer, 1990, Warpaths. The Politics of Partition. New York: Hill and Wang, pp. 121-42 Back.

Note 34:Suisheng Zao, 1997, Power Competition in East Asia. New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 186-89. Katzenstein also stresses the difference between "formal" European and "informal" Asian regionalism; Peter Katzenstein, 1996, "Regionalism in Comparative Perspective". Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 123-59. Back.

Note 35:For a historical view, see Guenter Bischof & Emil Brix, 1991, "The Central European Perspective", in Robert S. Jordan (ed.), Europe and the Superpowers. Essays on European International Politics. London: Pinter, pp. 217-34 and Jacques Le Rider, 1994, Mitteleuropa. Auf den Spuren eines Begriffes. Wien: Deuticke, pp. 149-65. Back.

Note 36:Milan Kundera, 1984, "The Tragedy of Central Europe". New York Review of Books, 26 April. Back.

Note 37:Iver B. Neumann, 1993, "Russia as Central Europe's Constituting Other". East European Politics and Societies, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 349-69. Back.

Note 38:See Ferenc Fehér, 1989, "On Making Central Europe". Eastern European Politics and Societies, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 412-27 and George Schöpflin, 1989, "Central Europe: Definitions Old and New", in George Schöpflin & Nancy Wood (eds.), In Search of Central Europe. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 7-29. Back.

Note 39:Kurth op.cit. 1993, pp. 42-45. Back.

Note 40:Fehér op.cit. 1989, pp. 427-39 (fn. 8). Back.

Note 41:Vesa Saarikoski, 1996, "Kolmas Eurooppa 1900-luvulla: olematon vaihtoehto?". Politiikka, vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 86-97. Schaeffer (op.cit. 1990) also strongly emphasizes how the Cold War denied the people of Central Europe their self-determination and citizen rights. Back.

Note 42:Ian Kearns, 1996, "Eastern Europe in Transition into the New Europe", in Andrew Gamble & Anthomy Payne (ed.), Regionalism and World Order. New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 55-91. Back.

Note 43:Robert A. Manning, 1996, "Security in East Asia", in William M. Carpenter & David G. Wiencek (eds.), Asian Security Handbook. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 26-29 (the quotation is on p. 28) Back.

Note 44:Peter A. Petri, 1993, "The East Asian Trading Bloc: An Analytical History", in Jeffrey A. Frankel & Miles Kahler (eds.), Regionalism and Rivalry. Japan and the United States in Pacific Asia. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 30-36. Back.

Note 45:Petri op.cit. 1993, pp. 39-42. The same conclusion is reached by Robert Z. Lawrence, 1996, Regionalism, Multilateralism, and Deeper Integration. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, pp. 80-83 and Peter Katzenstein, 1997a, "Introduction: Asian Regionalism in Comparative Perspective", in Peter J. Katzenstein & Takashi Shiraishi (eds.), Network Power. Japan and Asia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 1-44. Back.

Note 46:"Asian Security: East Asia's Wobbles". The Economist, December 23, 1995, pp. 35-37. Back.

Note 47:Zhao op.cit. 1997, pp. 229-31. Back.

Note 48:Aaron L. Friedberg, 1993-94, "Ripe for Rivalry. Prospectsfor Peace in a Multipolar Asia". International Security, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 5-33. Back.

Note 49:These approaches to the study of regionalism are discussed in Raimo Vayrynen, 1992, "Regional Systems and International Relations", in Helena Lindholm (ed.), Approaches to the Study of International Political Economy. Gothenburg: Peace and Development Researech Institute, University of Gothenburg, pp. 119-24. Back.

Note 50:Andrew Hurrell, 1995, "Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective", in Louise Fawcett & Andrew Hurrell (eds.), Regionalism in World Politics. Regional Organization and International Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 39-45. "Regionalism" and "regionalization" are also discussed by Hettne who coins the term "regionness" which seems to refer to empirical and other criteria by which the cohesiveness of a region can be assessed; see Björn Hettne, 1994, "The New Regionalism: Implications for Development and Peace", in Björn Hettne & András Inotai, The New Regionalism. Implications for Global Development and International Security. Helsinki: UNU/WIDER, pp. 1-11. Back.

Note 51:Sven Illeris, 1993, "Regional Development in Western Europe. A Mosaic Model", in Lars Lundqvist & Lars Olof Persson (eds,), Visions and Strategies of European Integration. Berlin: Springer Verlag, pp. 32-48. Back.

Note 52:Darrell Delamaide, 1994, The New Superregions of Europe. London: Dutton. Back.

Note 53:N.J.G. Pounds, 1990, An Historical Geography of Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 410-29 specifies several such regions in Western, Central, and Eastern Europe. Back.

Note 54:Christopher Harvie, 1994, The Rise of Regional Europe. London: Routledge. Back.

Note 55:Anssi Paasi, 1986, "The Institutionalization of Regions. A Theoretical Framework for Understanding the Emergence of Regions and the Constitution of Regional Identity". Fennia, vol. 164, no. 1, pp. 105-46. Back.

Note 56:Alexander B. Murphy, 1991, "Regions as Social Constructs: The Gap between Theory and Practice". Progress in Human Geography, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 22-35. Back.

Note 57:Anne Gilbert, 1988, "The New Regional Geography in English and French-speaking Countries". Progress in Human Geography, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 208-28. Back.

Note 58:Paul Krugman, 1991, Geography and Trade. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press and Detlev Lorenz, 1992, "Economic Geography and the Political Economy of Regionalization: The Example of Western Europe". The American Economic Review, vol. 82, no. 2, pp. 84-87. Back.

Note 59:R.W. Vickerman, 1994, "Transport Infrastructure and Region Building in the European Community". Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 1-24 and Jussi Raumolin, 1993, "Transport, Logistics, Environment and Integration in the Baltic Sea Area", in Lars Lundqvist & Lars Olof Persson (eds.), Visions and Strategies in European Integration. A North European Perspective. Berlin: Springer Verlag, pp. 175-92 Back.

Note 60:Marja Salmela, 1996, "Perameren kaari on voiman pesa". Helsingin Sanomat, September 3, p. D1. Back.

Note 61:Pertti Joenniemi, 1992, "Norden as a Mystery. The Search for New Roads into the Future", in Jan Øberg (ed.), Nordic Security in the 1980s. Options in the Changing Europe. London: Pinter Publishers, pp. 35-83 and Pertti Joenniemi, 1994, "Norden - en europeisk megaregion", in Svenolof Karlsson (ed.), Norden ar död. Lange leve Norden! Stockholm: Nordiska rådet, pp. 23-51. Back.

Note 62:In the case of Northern Europe this conclusion is also reached by Peter Katzenstein, 1996, "Regionalism in Comparative Perspective". Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 129-34. Back.

Note 63:Iver B. Neumann, 1996, "Nordic Security Cooperation in a Homogenized Political Setting". Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 417-32 (the quotation is on p. 429). Back.

Note 64:Paul Taylor, 1990, "Regionalism: The Thought and the Deed", in A.J.R.Groom & Paul Taylor (eds.), Frameworks for International Co-operation. London: Pinter, pp. 166-68. Back.

Note 65:Etel Solingen, 1996, "Democracy, Economic Reform and Regional Cooperation". Journal of Theoretical Politics, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 79-114. See also her "Economic Liberalization, Political Coalitions, and Emerging Regional Orders", in David Lake & Patrick Morgan (eds.), Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World. Philadelphia: Penn State University Press. Back.

Note 66:Stefan Tafrov, 1995, "Interests and Identities in Central and Eastern Europe", in Pál Dunay et al., A Lasting Peace in Central Europe? The Expansion of the European Security Community. Chaillot Paper No. 20. Paris: The Western European Union, pp. 80-92. Back.

Note 67:Kearns op.cit. 1996, pp. 78-82. Back.

Note 68:Zukrowska op. cit. 1996, p. 45. Back.

Note 69:Rudolf L. Tõkés, 1992, "From Visegrád to Kraków: Cooperation, Competition, and Coexistence in Central Europe", in György Szoboszla (ed.), 'Flying Blind'. Emerging Democracies in East-Central Europe. Budapest: Hungarian Political Science Association, pp. 255-58. Back.

Note 70:Tõkés op.cit. 1992, pp. 266-67. It is interesting that Hans-Dietrich Genscher does not even mention in his memoirs (Erinnerungen. Berlin: Siedler Verlag 1995) this joint statement with Baker. Back.

Note 71:Vayrynen op.cit. 1992, pp. 129-32, Joshua Spero, 1992, "The Budapest-Prague-Warsaw Triangle: Central European Security after the Visegrad Summit". European Security, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 58-83, John Fitzmaurice, 1993, "Regional Co-operation in Central Europe". West European Politics, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 391-93, and Heinz Timmermann, 1993, "Europa - der zentrale Bezugspunkt für die Lander des Ostens". Osteuropa, vol. 34, no. 8, pp. 713-25. Back.

Note 72:Kalypso Nicolaïdis, 1993, "East European Trade in the Aftermath of 1989: Did International Institutions Matter", in Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye & Stanley Hoffmann (eds.), After the Cold War. International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 229-31, 235-39. Back.

Note 73:Fitzmaurice op.cit. 1993, pp. 393-97 and Alfred A. Reisch, 1993, "The Central European Initiative: To Be or Not To Be". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report, vol. 24, no. 34, pp. 30-33. Back.

Note 74:"Central Europe: Concrete Heads". The Economist, September 16, 1995, pp. 60-61. Back.

Note 75:Iver B. Neumann, 1993, "Poland as a Regional Great Power: The Inter-war Heritage", in Iver B. Neumann (ed.), Regional Great Powers in International Politics. New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 121-50. Back.

Note 76:These ideas are derived, in part, from Zukrowska op.cit. 1996, pp. 42-50, Jirí Stepanovsky, 1995, "Cooperation within the Central European Visegrád Group. A Czech Perspective". Paper presented at the 36th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Chicago, February 21-25, and Radovan Vukadinovic, 1996, "From Visegrad to CEFTA". Peace and the Sciences, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 13-18. Back.

Note 77:Delamaide op.cit. 1994, pp. 64-68. For case studies on transborder cooperation in Southern and Southeastern Europe, see Dennish Rumley & Julian V. Minghi (eds.), 1991, The Geography of Border Landscapes. London: Routledge. Back.

Note 78:Pawel Kepinski, 1995, "Regionalism on the Sub-nation-state Level: Euroregions in East Central Europe". Paper presented at the 36th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Chicago, IL, February 21-25. Back.

Note 79:Bob Jessop, 1995, "Regional Economic Blocs, Cross-border Cooperation, and Local Strategies of Postsocialism". American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 38, no. 5, pp. 694-96, 702-703. Back.

Note 80:OMRI Daily Digest, No. 140, July 22, 1996. Back.

Note 81:"The Return of the Habsburgs. A Survey of Central Europe". The Economist, November 18, 1995, pp. 23-24. Back.

Note 82:Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, 1994, "The Purpose of German Power", in Zaki Laïdi (ed.), Power and Purpose after the Cold War. Oxford: Berg, pp. 35-53. Back.

Note 83:Katzenstein op.cit. 1996, pp. 141-48. Back.

Note 84:Miyohei Shinohara, 1991, "Japan as a World Economic Power". Annals of AAPPS, no. 513, pp. 12-24. Back.

Note 85:Richard Rosecrance & Jennifer Taw, 1990, "Japan and the Theory of International Leadership". World Politics, vol. 42, no. 2, pp. 184-209 and Koji Taira, 1991, "Japan, an Imminent Hegemon?". Annals of AAPSS, no. 513, pp. 151-63. Back.

Note 86:Yukio Satoh, 1995, "Emerging Trends in Asia-Pacific Security: The Role of Japan". The Pacific Review, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 267-81. Back.

Note 87:Christopher W. Hughes, 1996, "Japan's Subregional Security and Defense Linkages with ASEANs, South Korea and China in the 1990s". The Pacific Review, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 229-50. Back.

Note 88:David Arase, 1993, "Japan in East Asia", in Tsuneo Akaha & Frank Langdon (eds.), Japan in the Posthegemonic World. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp. 115-17. Back.

Note 89:Denny Roy, 1994, "Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security". International Securityt, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 149-68 and Gerald Segal, 1993, "The Coming Confrontation Between China and Japan". World Policy Journal, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 27-32. Back.

Note 90:Paul Dibb, 1995, "Towards a New Balance of Power in Asia". Adelphi Paper 295. London: International Institute of Strategic Studies (the quotation is on p. 20). Back.

Note 91:Michèle Schmiegelow & Henrik Schmiegelow, 1989, Strategic Pragmatism. Japanese Lessons in the Use of Economic Theory. Praeger: New York. Back.

Note 92:Alan Rix, 1993, "Japan and the Region: Leading from Behind", in Richard Higgott, Richard Leaver & John Ravenhill (eds.), Pacific Economic Relations in the 1990s. Cooperation or Conflict? Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp. 62-82. For its "leadership from behind", Japan has developed various institutions to solve the coordination problems arising from the lack of multilateral solutions"; Richard F. Doner, 1997, "Japan in East Asia: Institutions and Regional Leadership", in Peter J. Katzenstein & Takashi Shiraishi (eds.), Network Power. Japan and Asia. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, pp. 198-202. Back.

Note 93:Davis B. Bobrow, 1993, "Where and How Does Japan Fit?", in Richard Leaver & James L. Richardson (eds.), Charting the Post-Cold War Order. Boulder, CO: Westview, pp. 188-89, 191-92. Back.

Note 94:Kent E. Calder, 1996, Pacific Defense. Arms, Energy, and America's Future in Asia. New York: William Morrow, pp. 94-103. Back.

Note 95:Gaye Christoffersen, 1996, "China and Asia-Pacific. The Need for a Grand Strategy". Asian Survey, vol. 36, no. 11, pp. 1067-85. Back.

Note 96:Colin Kirkpatrick, 1994, "Regionalisation, Regionalism and East Asian Economic Cooperation". World Economy, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 191-202 and T.J. Pempel, 1996, "Transpacific Torii: Japan and the Emerging Asian Regionalism", in Peter J. Katzenstein & Takashi Shiraishi (eds.), Network Power. Japan and Asia. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, pp. 47-82. Back.

Note 97:Jessie P. Poon & Kavita Pandit, 1996, "Pacific Trade and Regionalization, 1965-1990. The International Trade Journal, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 199-221. Back.

Note 98:Petri op.cit. 1993, Bruce Cumings, 1984, "The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy: Industrial Sector, Product Cycles and Political Consequences". International Organization, vol. 38, no. 1, and Mitchell Bernard & John Ravenhill, 1995, "Beyond Product Cycles and Flying Geese. Regionalization, Hierarchy and the Industrialization of East Asia". World Politics, vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 171-209. Back.

Note 99:For a detailed analysis of this regional network of production, see Walter Hatch & Kozo Yamamura, 1996, Asia in Japan's Embrace. Building a Regional Production Alliance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, esp. chs. 7 and 8. Back.

Note 100:Barnard & Ravenhill op.cit. 1995, pp. 179-88, Doner op.cit. 1997, pp. 197-233, Maarten H.J. van den Berg, 1995, "Culture as Ideology in the Conquest of Modernity: The Historical Roots of Japan's Regional Regulation Strategies". Review of International Political Economy, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 371-93, and Richard F. Doner, 1993, "Japanese Foreign Investment and the Creation of a Pacific Asian Region", in Jeffrey A. Frankel & Miles Kahler (eds.), Regionalism and Rivalry. Japan and the United States in Pacific Asia. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 159-216. Back.

Note 101:For more details, see Bernard & Ravenhill op.cit. 1995, pp. 200-205 and White Paper on International Trade. Japan 1992. Tokyo: JETRO 1992, pp. 119-46. Back.

Note 102:Arase op.cit. 1993, pp. 117-18. Back.

Note 103:Doner op.cit. 1993, pp. 191-97. Back.

Note 104:Katzenstein op.cit. 1997, p. 36. For documentation, see Doner op.cit. 1997. Back.

Note 105:Robert Wade, 1996, "Japan, the World Bank, and the Art of Paradigm Maintenance: The 'East Asian Miracle' in Political Perspective". New Left Review, no. 217, pp. 3-36. Back.

Note 106:This term is consistently used by White Paper on International Trade ... op.cit. 1992. Back.

Note 107:Chia Siow Yue & Lee Tsao Yuan, 1993, "Subregional Economic Zones: A New Motive Force in Asia-Pacific Development", in C. Fred Bergsten & Marcus Noland (eds.), Pacific Dynamism and the International Economic System. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, pp. 249-64 and Randall S. Jones, Robert E.King & Michael Klein, 1993, "Economic Integration Between Hong Kong, Taiwan and the Coastal Provinces of China". OECD Economic Studies, no. 20, pp. 115-44. Back.

Note 108:Yue & Yuan op.cit. 1993, pp. 229-30, 239-49 and Amos A. Jordan & Jane Khanna, 1995, "Economic Interdependence and Challenges to the Nation-State: The Emergence of Natural Economic Territories in the Asia-Pacific". Journal of International Affairs, vol. 48, no. 2, pp. 450-57. Back.

Note 109:Peter Kandiah, 1996, ASEAN Tackles Mekong Development". Nikkei Weekly, July 15 and "Watching the Mekong Flow". The Economist, September 7, 1996, pp. 31-32. Back.

Note 110:Jordan & Khanna op.cit. 1995, pp. 433-62, James Cotton, 1996, "China and Tumen River Cooperation: Jilin's Coastal Development Strategy". Asian Survey, vol. 36, no. 11, pp. 1086-1101, and the advertisement searching the Director for the Tumen Secretariat, The Economist, June 8, 1996, p. 12. Back.

Note 111:This point is developed further in Pekka Korhonen, 1996, "Regional Boundaries: Europe and Asia". Paper prepared for Conference of the Nordic Political Science Association, Helsinki, August 15-18. Back.

Note 112:Taylor op.cit. 1991, pp. 191-93. Back.

Note 113:Mitchell Bernard, 1996, "Regions in the Global Political Economy: Beyond the Global-Local Divide in the Formation of the Eastern Asian Region". New Political Economy, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 335-53. Back.