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The False Promise of an Institution: Can Cooperation between OSCE and NATO Be a Cure?
Center for International Security and Arms Control
January 1997
| “Cooperation at the strategic and political-military level remains fragmentary and weak, with perhaps the weakest linkage being between NATO and the UN, and NATO and the CSCE.” 1 | |
| Major General John Sewall | |
| “Are we really useful?” 2 | |
| French President François Mitterrand | |
1. Introduction
Conflict prevention and crisis management are high on the European security agenda. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, formerly Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE) claims a prominent role in this respect. According to the 1994 Budapest Summit Declaration, OSCE will be a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, and crisis management in the region. 3 The Atlantic Alliance (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO), a more coherent union of states than OSCE, faces formidable difficulties in undertaking new responsibilities in post–Cold War crisis management, peacekeeping, and peace support operations. OCSE, a looser association of states, will certainly face even greater difficulties if it is to have an assertive role in the area of conflict prevention and crisis management.
OSCE is stipulated to have a central role in European security. 4 However, organizations and institutions are viable only to the extent that they are related to the interests of their member states (or participating states, as it is the case with OSCE). The fate and role of OSCE will, therefore, largely depend on these interests, which, however, are not frequently spelled out and are not at all self-evident.
There are also two distinct ways of looking at the development of OSCE, depending on whether the observer prefers an optimistic or a pessimistic approach. The optimistic view argues that OSCE has been a success story, albeit a low-profile one. According to Gyarmati, “An instrument of preventive diplomacy very rarely hits the headlines. It does not in itself make headlines.” 5 Even if there are shortcomings in the functioning of the Organization, they can surely be overcome through minor adaptive measures. The pessimistic approach considers that the performance of OSCE is more of a failure than a success.
The European institutional structure seems to be set for a division of labor between institutions. In this division of labor, part of the responsibility would be born by “mandating” organizations and part by mandated ones. 6 OSCE (alongside the United Nations, UN) would assume a “mandating” role, while NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) would serve in mandated roles (in missions other than collective self-defense; i.e., in non-Article 5 missions). NATO and WEU Council decisions point in this direction. The distinction between “mandating” and “mandated” roles is not so clear-cut, however. OSCE has ambitions in “executive” roles as well, while WEU, connected to the political framework of the European Union’s (EU) common foreign and security policy, can also have an autonomous role. 7 There are also views that even the Atlantic Alliance would not necessarily require a UN or OSCE mandate for non-Article 5 missions. Under these circumstances, the role that would best fit OSCE would be a “framework organization” for European security.
This paper raises the following questions: Can OSCE live up to high expectations for conflict prevention and crisis management? Is it able and equipped to meet this demanding task? Is OSCE well-suited and placed to play a central role in European security? Is the role of a “framework organization” a suitable task for OSCE? The underlying issues are about the relationship and links between OSCE and the Atlantic Alliance—whether the ambiguities of OSCE’s performance can be warded off, and whether the overall performance of OSCE can be improved by cooperation with NATO.
The paper proceeds by first outlining the Budapest experience of OSCE; it then considers the debate between institutional optimism and pessimism; next it investigates the capabilities, competence, and performance of OSCE. The paper goes on to examine the interests that the participating states have in the organization; and finally turns to the various areas of contact between OSCE and the Atlantic Alliance.
2. The Budapest Experience
The Budapest experience of OSCE offers a good starting point in the sense that the Summit marked both the highs and lows of the Organization, thus providing a good background to the ambiguous performance of OSCE in European security. The Summit was an ambitious enterprise. The former Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was promoted into an Organization, without changing its lack of legal status. CSCE was declared to have a central role in “building a secure and stable CSCE community, whole and free”, “a security structure embracing states from Vancouver to Vladivostok.” The main governing bodies of the former CSCE, the Council of Ministers, the Committee of Senior Officials, and the Permanent Committee, were renamed Ministerial, Senior, and Permanent Councils without any changes in their respective roles and responsibilities. The Summit also adopted the “CSCE first” principle, according to which “the CSCE will be a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management in the region.” It was agreed that the participating states “will make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes before referring them to the United Nations Security Council.” The participating states will have to wait for “exceptional circumstances” before they may “jointly decide that a dispute will be referred to” the UN Security Council on behalf of CSCE. The Summit also adopted a “Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security,” but it was not opened for signature, nor was it registered under Article 102 of the UN Charter. Apart from regulations in regard to the control and use of military forces in democratic societies, the Code did not bring any new engagements. It only repeated and elaborated previously accepted principles, including those addressed in other fora, like the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and Partnership for Peace (PFP).
The Summit confirmed the role of the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) in working out new measures of arms control and confidence- and security-building, and in implementing these measures, as well as in promoting complementarity between regional and CSCE-wide approaches. FSC was also assigned a role in addressing regional security problems, including crises, with an emphasis on longer-term stability in Southeastern Europe. The Summit also adopted the 1994 Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, along with documents on the Global Exchange of Military Information, Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers, and Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations.
As far as regional issues are concerned, the participating states of OSCE agreed for the first time to provide a multinational peacekeeping force, in order to help settle the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict once there has been an agreement among the parties for cessation of the armed conflict and there has been an appropriate resolution from the United Nations Security Council.
The Summit was expected to mark a turning point in the development of OSCE. However, contributions to the Organization did not meet expectations and, in fact the Summit was accompanied by significant failures. In regard to regional issues, the Summit accepted a Declaration on Baltic Issues, and a statement on Georgia and Moldova (in addition to the declaration on the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh), but there was no mention of the conflict in former Yugoslavia. Two declarations were prepared, however. One of them would have condemned Serbian violations of the Bihac safe-area. The declaration would have called the Serbs aggressors and regretted the failure of efforts to defeat the destructive forces of aggressive nationalism and of territorial expansionism. The second declaration would have demanded the cessation of hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and condemned the fighting and ethnic cleansing by Bosnian Serb forces. Because of Russian objections, however, both declarations had to be dropped. 8 The Hungarian prime minister tried then to issue a bland statement calling for a cease-fire and access for humanitarian aid. This statement was not made an official conference document because of Bosnian objections over the weakness of the declaration. 9
It is possible to argue that the adoption of the declarations mentioned above would have been of a questionable importance. It would not have improved the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and it would have amounted only to a repetition of previous calls and declarations. 10 However, it is problematic when an all-European security organization simply disregards the most pressing conflict in Europe. This failure of OSCE’s highest forum to address the conflict was a serious challenge to the credibility of the Organization. The Budapest Summit demonstrated therefore in a significant way the profoundly ambiguous performance of the OSCE. There are two distinct approaches to this ambiguity. They could be described as institutional optimism and institutional pessimism.
3. The Approaches of Institutional Pessimism and Optimism
The approach of institutional optimism maintains that the institutional structure of OSCE corresponds to the tasks of OSCE and offers advantages specific to the Organization. The approach of institutional pessimism concedes that OSCE has certain advantages but asserts that the weak results of the Organization in its areas of responsibility could be strengthened only through a vigorous improvement of its institutional structure. Short of such a vigorous improvement, the record of the Organization will remain poor.
The institutional pessimism approach holds that the local centralization of OSCE offices should be carried out, moving the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (based in Warsaw) to Vienna, where most of OSCE’s offices are now located. 11 In the same vein, the Conflict Prevention Center should have been turned into an operational arm of OSCE or it should have been dissolved. The rule of consensus should be replaced by majority voting. Putting the Organization on legal grounds could also help. 12 The German-Dutch proposal to authorize the Secretary General of OSCE to call the attention of the main decision-making body to any situation likely to threaten peace, security, and stability in the CSCE area also fits in this line. The idea raised in this proposal that CSCE should play the primary role in the settlement of local disputes before referring them to the UN is aimed at strengthening the institutional capabilities of CSCE. 13 The joint Austro-Hungarian proposal to establish a “CSCE Advisor on Issues of Stability and Security” was also a contribution to this line of argument. 14 The post of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) could also be strengthened by including in his mandate the task of addressing the root causes of tensions and conflicts, including economic dimension factors. According to this conception, CSCE should be given the competence to identify priority security projects in the field of the economic dimension and to submit such projects to the relevant international economic organizations. 15 There are also ideas to strengthen the institutional links of the OSCE with other security organizations, including NATO and WEU. According to a recommendation of the Assembly of the Western European Union, an agreement should be concluded between OSCE, NATO, and WEU on a division of labor between these three organizations in peacekeeping, crisis management, and crisis prevention. 16 The approach outlined above is pessimistic because it stresses that, in the absence of strengthening the institutional structures and capabilities of OSCE, the Organization will not be able to improve its record of success.
The optimistic approach maintains, on the contrary, that the institutional structures and capabilities of OSCE are by and large suitable to its tasks and responsibilities. There is no need for further strengthening OSCE’s capabilities. The participating states, making full use of the potential of OSCE, could easily improve its performance. According to the head of the U.S. (then) CSCE mission, the problem lies in that “bureaucratic structures within governments have not yet been adjusted to make possible full utilization of CSCE tools.” 17 In other words, the instruments of OSCE can fit its responsibilities. It can shape its missions to suit various situations. Besides, wielding no military threat and inclusive of all the states of Europe, North America, and the former Soviet Union on an equal basis, OSCE can go to places NATO cannot. 18 The main strength of OSCE resides not in institutional streamlining or maximally efficient operational arrangements but rather in serving as a “forum for cooperative security as well as for political consultation on the basis of equality.” 19 After all, OSCE cannot expect to emulate the UN. If in search of efficiency OSCE were to emulate UN missions, it would be going the wrong way. 20 The difficulty rather lies in that “CSCE activities are known neither to the general public…journalists, politicians nor to parliamentarians. Even foreign ministry officials know little about them if they are not directly working in the respective department.” 21 In this view, OSCE is more or less up to its tasks; only the low level of its public awareness is responsible for its bad reputation. In the same vein, the failures of any organization, including OSCE, are well publicized in the press, whereas the successes do not make good headlines. 22 If OSCE has been able to record successes, it is in the field of its low-profile performance. 23 The low-profile approach of OSCE can even prove helpful in some circumstances. The HCNM underlined, for instance, that in his case “going public” could easily turn out to be counterproductive and “exacerbate matters, unnecessarily prompting parties to take up stronger and more intransigent positions.” 24 Similarly, a former Chairman-in-Office noted that in conflict prevention or mediation the parties are often called upon “to step back from previous positions in order to give the other side the leeway needed for a compromise.” 25 Parties can hardly be expected to comply with such a call when they have to face the vengeance of public opinion. It is also clear that “parties cannot always be expected to compromise in open meetings” attended by representatives of several other governments. 26 In any case, although adaptation is a continuous process in OSCE, it is unlikely that fundamental changes will be necessary in the near future. 27
The pessimistic and optimistic approaches are not strictly separate from each other; there is a connection between them. The result is that the OSCE occasionally takes minor steps of adaptation. More importantly, however, these two approaches do not provide appropriate vantage points in regard to the difficulties OSCE has to cope with in assuming its responsibilities.
4. Responsibilities and Problems
The responsibilities of CSCE/OSCE can be divided into three periods up to now. From 1975 to 1985 CSCE was involved in overcoming Cold War divisions with an emphasis on the human dimension. Between 1986 and 1992 CSCE focused on the military aspects of security. During this period a new generation of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM) were negotiated, and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Treaty on Open Skies were agreed upon. Since 1992, the focus of CSCE/OSCE has been on the areas of preventive diplomacy and crisis management; integrating the human dimension into a broader security process; and the post–Cold War arms control process. 28 OSCE has to cope with serious problems in all of these areas.
a) Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Arms Control
OSCE has long been involved in negotiating and implementing CSBMs, and has been closely associated with arms control efforts. However, there was no official link between arms control negotiations and CSCE until the establishment of FSC within the framework of CSCE in 1992. With the creation of FSC, CSCE was officially admitted into the area of arms control in Europe. FSC has become the only multilateral arms control negotiating forum in Europe, and has therefore a mandate both in the field of CSBMs and arms control.
FSC was given its mandate by the Helsinki Summit in 1992. Its tasks include the negotiation of concrete measures aimed at keeping or achieving the levels of armed forces to a minimum commensurate with common or individual legitimate security needs within Europe and beyond; the harmonization of obligations agreed upon by participating states under various instruments concerning arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs; and the negotiation of new stabilizing measures as well as new CSBMs. 29 The Budapest Decisions assigned additional tasks to FSC: to develop a framework that will support an agenda for establishing new measures of arms control, including confidence- and security-building; and to address specific regional security problems, with special emphasis on longer-term stability in Southeastern Europe. 30
The Forum negotiated and agreed upon a long list of documents up until the time of the Budapest Summit. These include the Vienna Document of 1994 (which includes statements on military contacts and defense planning); a document on stabilizing measures for localized crisis situations; the Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers; the Principles Governing Non-Proliferation; a Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security; and a document on the global exchange of military information.
However, there are serious problems in regard to the usefulness and applicability of the security-related commitments undertaken in the framework of OSCE. It is often argued that the proliferation of CSBMs, the cost of their implementation, and the growing complexity and intrusiveness of the CSBM regime could decrease rather than increase confidence among participating states. The negotiations could easily be seen as an aim in itself rather than as a means to enhance security. 31 Similarly, it has become almost routine to reach CSBM accords, because they are not particularly relevant to new circumstances and, consequently, not controversial. What is lacking is rather a comprehensive strategy for arms control in Europe. 32 CSBMs do not respond adequately to security problems in Europe, especially in terms of preventing conflicts. Considering that the post-Cold War conflicts in Europe have started as intra-state conflicts, the value of traditional CSBMs cannot be applied effectively. In this sense, there is not much left to negotiate. 33 As far as stabilizing measures or crisis CSBMs are concerned, “…the various elements in it are just voluntary...and therefore do not represent a real prior commitment by individual countries” and “…when a country or region is labeled to be a crisis zone…it is too late and one can hardly expect the countries of the given region to provide even the normal peacetime information under the traditional CSBMs.” 34 Besides, there has been no progress on the harmonization of arms control obligations, no specific arms control agenda was agreed upon at the Budapest Review Conference, and no agreement was reached in Budapest on a regional security agenda. 35
b) The Human Dimension
The human dimension, second-track diplomacy, has been integrated into a broader security framework by two developments. One of them was the inclusion of CSCE rapporteur missions into the framework of the human dimension mechanism (“Moscow mechanism”) and the other was the establishment of the post of HCNM. The Moscow mechanism of 1991 builds on the Vienna mechanism of 1990. Following the first two phases of the Vienna mechanism (exchange of information and bilateral meetings) the initiating state may request the other state to invite a mission of experts. If the other state refuses to do so, the initiating state may ask for the establishment of a mission of rapporteurs with the support of five other CSCE states. It may also ask for the establishment of a mission of rapporteurs before requesting the other state to invite a mission of experts, but in this case it would need the support of at least nine other participating states.
The Moscow mechanism turned out to be a rather complicated instrument. Beside that, it proved to be disproportional for serious problems and was initiated only on a few occasions. Under the mechanism, a mission cannot even fulfill its task if the state against which it was initiated rejects cooperation. 36
The office of the HCNM exists more on the security side than the human dimension side. It was not intended to serve as a human rights instrument but as an instrument of conflict prevention at the earliest possible stage. According to the Helsinki Summit Declaration, the High Commissioner was established as a CSCE instrument of early warning. 37 Although the High Commissioner’s mandate includes “early warning” and de-escalation at the earliest possible stage “in regard to tensions involving national minority issues that have a potential to develop into a conflict within the CSCE area,” 38 the High Commissioner is not intended to serve as a “ombudsman” for national minorities or as an investigator of individual violations of CSCE human rights standards. 39 If, therefore, the High Commissioner cannot take up individual contentious issues, his role is restricted to early warning. But “early warning” is not the problem. After all, did not the embassies in Belgrade and Moscow warn their governments early enough about the events unfolding before them? 40
The post of the High Commissioner is often claimed to be the success story of the OSCE. The High Commissioner visited several areas, including the Baltic states, particularly Latvia and Estonia, and Slovakia, Hungary, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania, Romania, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Kyrgyzstan. He also paid attention to the Roma and Gypsy populations in a number of OSCE states. A specific contribution he is supposed to have made in the field of conflict prevention was the persuasion of Estonia to revise its law on aliens. 41 The heart of the matter was the fate of the approximately half million non-citizens (mostly Russians) in a population of about one and a half million. The High Commissioner was certainly not alone in working out recommendations in regard to the law on aliens. The CSCE mission to Estonia and the Council of Europe were also involved. At some point even the EU intervened. The success of the CSCE role was partly the result of the cooperation of the Estonian government, which initiated the Moscow mechanism against itself, 42 and requested both the CSCE mission to Estonia 43 and the Council of Europe to give their comments on the Law on Aliens. In spite of the amendments, the government of Estonia still had some room to maneuver concerning the application procedure for obtaining citizenship. 44 And so, the extent of the contribution made by the High Commissioner is very difficult to ascertain. Another example is the High Commissioner’s attention to the problems of the Hungarian minorities in Slovakia and Romania. The High Commissioner’s attention could not prevent the adoption of a language law in Slovakia and of an education law in Romania; both of them were criticized and contested by the respective Hungarian minorities.
The High Commissioner is certainly a useful instrument of OSCE, in terms of concentrating in one office the consideration of minority issues. However, when there are individual cases on which the different parties (states and minorities) hold distinct views and one of the sides concerned is unprepared to make concessions or to cooperate with the High Commissioner, his usefulness is seriously damaged.
c) Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management
OSCE has developed a variety of instruments of conflict prevention and crisis management, including CSBMs, the various (Vienna, Berlin, and Moscow) mechanisms, and both short (fact-finding, rapporteur, and expert) and long-term missions. The latter are mostly associated with crisis management. OSCE deployed ten long-term missions by 1995. They were delegated to Kosovo, Sangjak, and Voividina; Skopje; Georgia; Estonia; Moldova; Latvia; Tajikistan; Ukraine; Sarajevo; and Chechnya. Crisis management is the area where OSCE’s performance is most exposed to the danger of ambiguity because of the difficulties of the tasks.
The most recent challenge to OSCE has been the conflict in Chechnya. Russia committed serious violations of OSCE agreements and other treaty obligations stipulated in the CFE Treaty. From the point of view of OSCE, it is above all OSCE commitments that come into account. The military invasion and siege of Chechnya is in violation of the Code of Conduct, event though Russian officials try to use it to justify the use of force. 45 Point 25 of Chapter VII stipulates that the participating states will not tolerate or support forces that are not accountable to or controlled by their constitutionally established authorities. 46 But the Russian invasion is already in violation of the second half of this same article, which states that if a participating state is unable to exercise its authority over such forces, it may seek consultations within OSCE to consider steps to be taken. There were no reports of any such consultations within or outside the framework of OSCE. Chapter VIII, Point 36 of the Code stipulates that if “recourse to force cannot be avoided in performing internal security missions, each participating state will ensure that its use must be commensurate with the needs for enforcement. The armed forces will take due care to avoid injury to civilians or their property.” The Russian use of force was clearly disproportionate with the needs for enforcement. The indiscriminate shelling and bombing of targets, including civilian targets, in Chechnya and Grozny did not avoid heavy injury to civilians or damage to their property. Chapter VIII, Point 37 stipulates that “the participating states will not use armed forces to limit the peaceful and lawful exercise of their human and civil rights by persons as individuals or as representatives of groups nor to deprive them of their national, religious, cultural, linguistic or ethnic identity.” The invasion of Chechnya was an attempt to use armed forces to limit the exercise of human and civil rights of the Chechen population.
The Russian invasion of Chechnya is also in violation of the Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. Specifically, Russia did not comply with Chapter IV of the Vienna Document on the prior notification of certain military activities. Russia did not notify the participating states either of the engagement of “formations of land forces…conducted under a single operational command independently or in combination with any possible air or naval component,” or of the “concentration in the zone” of forces transferred from outside or inside the zone of application for CSBMs to participate in a notifiable engagement. 47 Russia failed to give notification in writing to all other participating states either forty-two days or more in advance or at the time of the engagement of the troops involved. 48
These violations of the fundamental commitments undertaken in the framework of OSCE could easily undermine the credibility of the commitments. But these are not put at risk solely by the Russian side in the Chechen conflict. The other participating states also have a share in the responsibility. Western states were very moderate in response to the conflict. On behalf of the EU, for instance, France appealed to Moscow to renounce violence in Chechnya but restated that the rebellion was an internal Russian matter. 49 Similarly, President Bill Clinton and other Western leaders restrained themselves to call for “a minimum of blood” in the Russian offensive. 50 This does not mean that Western states did not take any steps to counter Russian operations in Chechnya. German Defense minister Volker Rühe disinvited Pavel Grachev to Germany in protest and publicly condemned Russian violations of OSCE commitments. 51 The EU also delayed the signing of an economic and trade cooperation agreement with Russia. But no use was made of the OSCE mechanisms designed to deal with situations like the one in Chechnya. The Vienna mechanism on unusual military activities was not triggered by any participating state. 52
OSCE has had difficulties with many other crises. The easing of tensions in Ukraine and the Crimea was achieved almost in spite of the involvement of the CSCE representative based in Simferopol. While he was reported to urge Crimean legislators to toughen their stance on autonomy, 53 Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma managed to ease tensions by first placing the peninsula under his control and suspending the constitution and the presidency of the autonomous republic (in March 1995), and second by reestablishing the autonomy and authorizing the Crimean parliament to prepare a new constitution. 54 The establishment of the mission to Tajikistan was decided in December 1993 and the mission was deployed in February 1994. The mission was mandated to promote dialogue and confidence-building between opposing political forces in the country; respect for human rights; adherence to OSCE norms and principles; and ways and means for OSCE to assist in the development of legal and democratic political institutions and processes. 55 The mission, however, found it difficult to establish effective channels of communication with the government and parliamentary bodies. The role of the mission in restoring peace in Tajikistan was thoroughly marginalized. 56 The mission in Georgia, which was initially mandated to deal with the conflict in South Ossetia, was later tasked to monitor the Joint Peacekeeping Forces in South Ossetia, to contribute to a political settlement of the conflicts in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and to promote human rights in the whole of Georgia. In spite of its engagement from the early stages of the conflicts in Georgia, the OSCE does not provide the lead in crisis management and its role is restricted to assistance. 57 In Moldova, OSCE’s main achievements were the encouragement of contact between the conflicting parties and the submission of specific recommendations. As a result, the president of Moldova and the representative of the Trans-Dniester region signed a joint declaration confirming their resolve to seek a solution to the problems. 58 However, in the follow-up to the declaration, the search for a political settlement of the conflict was slow, in particular on the issue of the Trans-Dniester region’s future constitutional status within Moldova. 59 Moldova, Russia, and the Trans-Dniester region established a tripartite Peace Enforcement Force and set up a Joint Control Commission to command it. The OSCE mission could work out an agreement of cooperation with the Joint Control Commission belatedly, after protracted negotiations. 60 In the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, OSCE was unable to set up a local mission (even on a rotating basis among the three capitals, Baku, Stepanakert, and Yerevan), because of the disagreement between the parties to the conflict regarding the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. 61 The OSCE decision to set up a peacekeeping force of three thousand troops to monitor a peace agreement still to be reached over Nagorno-Karabakh will put to the test the ability of OSCE to mobilize its participating states in order to provide the troops.
It would, of course, be ill-advised to suppose that OSCE has the ability to provide quick solutions to difficult problems or that it can succeed where other institutions fail. This does not mean, on the other hand, that OSCE cannot have a useful role in European security. But this usefulness has built-in weaknesses that may become more manifest in the future. The High Commissioner has been involved exclusively in the Eastern part of Europe while there are serious minority problems in the Western part as well. There is also a very good chance that the Code of Conduct will become a one-sided instrument in the hands of Western Europe and will be applied only to the armed forces in East European states. Once OSCE comes to be considered as a one-sided instrument turned against one part of the participating states by another part, interest in the Organization will be lost. Moreover, the ambiguous performance of OSCE in its areas of responsibility points beyond the debate between institutional optimism and pessimism and brings the national interests of the participating states into the perspective.
5. National Interests
This section analyzes where OSCE is located in the framework of the national interests of the participating states, i.e., what national interests the participating states have in OSCE and what interests OSCE can serve. In lieu of examining every participating state one by one, it may be sufficient to consider some of the states individually and some of them as parts of a group of states.
The United States has three broad areas of interest in OSCE. It has an interest in including not only Russia, but also other states remaining outside of NATO in a security framework on an equal basis. Second, it has an interest in moderating and monitoring Russian involvement in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Third, it has an interest in engaging the Central Asian states in a European course of development.
The point, however, is that the European policy of the United States remains first of all the Atlantic Alliance. In the words of a former diplomat, NATO is the European policy of the United States. 62 OSCE is significant only as a secondary, maybe complementary, area of policy. American politicians have made it clear several times that it is inconceivable for OSCE to substitute for either NATO or the European Union. OSCE cannot be made “superior” to NATO, and it will not become the umbrella organization for European security nor will it oversee the work of the NATO Alliance. 63 Although OSCE can serve as “the fabric of stability” in Europe, it will never be allowed to oversee NATO. 64 The United States has an interest in remaining a European power, and NATO is the most important of the European institutions in that perspective. 65 OSCE can, of course, be strengthened to some extent, but this can only happen to the extent that the Alliance undertakes greater responsibilities in European security. More precisely, some upgrading of OSCE is conceivable, but only if it is to serve as a compensation for the enlargement of NATO and also of the European Union. 66
The United States does not have primary security interests at stake with OSCE. The Organization is seen as a “kind of outreach program to maintain and propagate…human rights, democracy, economic liberty, security, openness and the rule of law…in the newly independent states from the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia.” 67 OSCE is perceived, therefore, as the right forum for involving Russia in European security affairs on an equal basis. It is not involved with war and peace in the traditional sense, but with instability at Russia’s borders. 68 OSCE could also have a role in involving the CIS states, and particularly the Central Asian states in European security concerns. “The CSCE, alone among international organizations, has accepted the challenge of bringing these distant regions into a real relationship with the international community and saving them from isolation…” 69 OSCE can also be used as an instrument to moderate and monitor Russian involvement in the CIS area. The U.S. administration and also other OSCE participating states have no intention of giving Russia a free hand for intervention in the CIS. The United States is determined to block Russian efforts to win a special mandate for military intervention in the “near abroad.” Russia would have to be independently invited to intervene in conflicts and the intervention would have to be for a limited duration and with clear goals. 70
Russia has, for a long time, been the main proponent of strengthening OSCE. Russia propagated the view that OSCE should be a major player in European security. At some point, they meant by this a hierarchical security system under the leadership of OSCE. Russia reviewed its position since then and said that there was no need for a “hierarchical system.” But Russia still keeps coming up with proposals that would turn OSCE into an organization with a leading and coordinating role in European security. Such a solution would aim at putting the CIS as an international organization on the same footing with NATO or the European Union. OSCE would be directed by an “executive committee” of ten nations with permanent and rotating members. The committee could mandate NATO or the CIS to engage in peacekeeping in conflict areas. 71
In spite of these efforts, Russia does not have any major interests in OSCE as far as its security concerns in its neighborhood are concerned. Russia does have an interest in obtaining international acceptance of CIS peacekeeping, but it can easily manage these tasks without international support. CIS peacekeeping means basically the deployment of Russian troops. Not only can Russia take care of its security concerns alone, it also does not expect any Western engagement in the conflict areas. “Both the political leadership of NATO states and the international military staff of the Alliance have been reluctant to be involved in military hostilities in Europe. Would they send their troops to Nagorno-Karabakh or Tajikistan?” 72 The most Russia could expect of international support for Russian/CIS peacekeeping would be some financial, technical, or economic assistance. 73 Russia is quite unlikely to get this sort of help, but obtaining international acceptance is only a secondary issue for Russian peacekeeping.
Nor is Russia interested in a strong OSCE asserting itself in the field of crisis management and peacekeeping. An assertive OSCE would be an uncomfortable partner for Russia in the CIS area. That is why Russia has been attempting to exclude an OSCE role in settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Russia would be interested in introducing its own “peacekeeping” troops in Azerbaijan and not in an international effort to settle the conflict. The Russian ambassador for Nagorno-Karabakh, Vladimir Kazimirov, was, for instance, very critical of the “Minsk Group.” He publicly rejected “persistent pretensions to assigning to the group a central role in settling the Karabakh issue.” The OSCE role aims at diminishing Russia’s autonomous role as a mediator. 74 Accordingly, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev dismissed CSCE mediation in Nagorno-Karabakh as an “immature” attempt to compete with Russian mediation and called for the CSCE “to renounce its rivalry in the Karabakh conflict…in favor of practical assistance to Russia’s diplomatic efforts and, in the longer term, its peacekeeping forces.” 75
Russia is therefore skeptical about a reinforced OSCE role in regard to its own security concerns, but still advocates a strengthened OSCE role for European security. The reason behind this asymmetric attitude is Russia’s attempt to weaken the role of NATO in European security with the help of OSCE. General Grachev proposed, for instance, the transformation of European security with NACC as the military arm and OSCE assuming a central role. 76 Foreign Minister Kozyrev advocated in the same vein the establishment of a European security system with NACC and OSCE playing a central role. In this institutional set-up, NACC could be turned into an independent body, which would promote military-political cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic area. 77 As Russia’s OSCE policy is mainly motivated by its mistrust of NATO, plans to enlarge the Alliance have added further fuel to the policy. Russian proposals to upgrade OSCE are directed to a great extent at ending the “endless arguments on the expansion of NATO” and opposing “a hasty expansion of the Alliance.” 78 If Russia came to the conclusion that the main direction of the Alliance was set at maintaining stability in Europe, away from its own borders, and would not reside in hostility towards Russia, 79 enlargement could be easily acceptable for Russia. If Russia did not come to this conclusion, Russian policy would be directed at weakening the role of the Alliance in European security. In this case, leadership in European security would have to be assumed by an “effective partnership between NATO and Russia,” with the CIS accepted at the rank of NATO and the EU, and with OSCE providing the framework. 80
OSCE is not of primary concern to the members of the European Union. For Germany, for instance, the overriding national foreign policy priorities are the strengthening of the EU and maintaining the Alliance, as well as the eastward expansion of both. 81 Another concern of Germany is that it be perceived as a “normal” country. The partners in these efforts are primarily NATO and the EU and their respective member states. OSCE comes into account as an instrument of overseeing and promoting a “normal” and civilized (re-)integration of the CIS. 82 For Britain, OSCE is an outreach program, a framework in which all of the Eurasian states, however small and distant, can be accommodated. It could serve as an instrument of involving in a security framework those states that cannot readily join either NATO or the EU. Not least, OSCE could serve as the venue for acknowledging Russia’s great power status, strategic interests, and role in European security. 83 In the French conception, the European architecture would consist of three concentric circles. The largest one would include all those states that have an ambition of joining the EU; the second includes the current member states ready to comply with the acquis communautaires; and the third would include those that are prepared to push ahead with further integration. The WEU has an association arrangement with the Central and Eastern European states that have an association agreement with the EU. OSCE comes into account only as a complementary element offering an area of concentration between EU’s largest circle and the CIS area. 84
OSCE is not a central concern for Central and East European states either, although they can make use of it to some extent. Hungary, for instance, as a small Central European state has some specific interests. OSCE is a forum where Hungary can demonstrate its readiness to undertake a leadership role in international politics and assume international responsibilities even above its weight. Hungary can prove this way that it can provide a contribution to international security. Hungarian performance can promote the issue of Hungarian accession to the EU and NATO. Accordingly, there was talk in the corridors of Vienna’s Hofburg that Hungary approached its OSCE leadership as a test of maturity for EU membership. 85 Hungary also has an interest in OSCE because of its minority standards. Hungarian policy tries to transmit the minority standards worked out in the OSCE framework into legally binding documents in its state treaties with its neighbors. This was the case with the Treaty with Slovakia. 86 The treaty states that the contracting parties will apply as legally binding the norms and political commitments included in the June 29, 1990 document of the Copenhagen human dimension meeting of CSCE (along with UN General Assembly Recommendation 47/135 on the rights of persons belonging to national, ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities, and Recommendation No. 1201 [of 1993] of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe). Hungary also supports the work of the HCNM, who can monitor to some extent the observance of minority standards. The High Commissioner is a more flexible instrument of monitoring than the Vienna or Moscow Human Dimension Mechanism. The triggering of this mechanism could be perceived as a hostile or aggressive step, which could easily undermine Hungary’s original intention. That is why a more flexible solution related to the HCNM was worked out to investigate the minority issue between Hungary and Slovakia. The Committee of Senior Officials decided to establish a mission of experts reporting to the HCNM on this issue. The mandate was for a period of two years and for two visits per year in each country. The mandate was extended for another year. Hungary also has an interest in implementing an arms control and security-building regime in the former Yugoslavia. 87
The point remains, however, that OSCE is not a central security concern either for Hungary or for other Central and East European states. OSCE is engaged in building a security based on linking various elements of cooperation but it is far off from the prospect of achieving collective security. 88 Although OSCE serves as a “forum for pan-European dialogue and a guardian of rights and principles across the continent,” it does not meet the security needs of most of the states of Central and Eastern Europe. 89 Even after an eventual enlargement of the EU and NATO, the stabilization of the security space between the NATO/EU area and the CIS area will require a “varied set of relationships.” This set of relationships will range between less than full membership and more than mere participation in OSCE. 90
The participating states have a wide variety of interests in OSCE but they have no major national interests at stake in it. The interests the participating states have in OSCE are related to some degree to the Atlantic Alliance.
6. OSCE and NATO
a) The NATO Caucus and OSCE
The connection between OSCE and NATO is provided for by their overlapping membership. All NATO members are at the same time participating states of OSCE, thus giving the ground for a role of the NATO group in CSCE/OSCE affairs. The NATO caucus served as a forum for coordination in pre-1990 CSCE and it has also served as such a forum in post-1990 CSCE and in OSCE. The 1990 London declaration of the NATO Council made very detailed proposals in regard to the institutionalization of CSCE. 91 These proposals were adopted without any major modifications by the Paris Summit of CSCE. 92 Similarly, the NATO group decided that the Alliance would support peacekeeping undertakings by CSCE on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with its own procedures. 93 The Oslo ministerial council decision played a role in that the Helsinki CSCE Summit adopted a decision related to CSCE peacekeeping. According to the decision, CSCE could seek the help of international institutions and organizations like NATO and the WEU in undertaking peacekeeping responsibilities. 94 In another institutional development, the NATO caucus played a central role in working out a mandate for CSCE’s Forum for Security Cooperation. The NATO proposal was presented by Norway and provided the basis for the CSCE decision to set up the Forum. 95
After the establishment of the Forum, the role of the NATO caucus changed. The NATO group of states has manifested itself less and less as a NATO caucus in the political aspects of OSCE. The role of the NATO caucus is restricted more and more to the military, arms-control and confidence- and security-building aspects of OSCE. A new division of labor is emerging between the European and American sides of the Alliance within the OSCE. In the Permanent Council the European side of the Alliance (basically the EU) and the American side (mainly the United States) usually take separate standpoints. In the FSC, the NATO group of states still has a role as a NATO caucus.
These developments mean two things for the connection between OSCE and NATO. First, the role of the NATO caucus does not guarantee an institutional link between OSCE and NATO. Second, the role of the NATO group is more and more restricted to a specific segment of OSCE’s responsibilities, mainly in the framework of the FSC. With the restriction of the role of the NATO caucus to a specific area, the overall links between NATO and the OSCE could become weaker.
b) NACC and OSCE
The most evident connections between OSCE and NATO, in an operational sense, are to be found in the parallelism between the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and OSCE, mainly the FSC. A comparison of their mandates easily reveals this situation. The work plan of NACC is redrawn every year, but these annual plans have permanent features. The work plan for 1994/95 included such elements as the discussion of specific political and security-related matters, including regional security issues; conceptual approaches to arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation; early consultations, particularly on regional tensions with a potential to grow into crises; consultations on policy planning with regard to mid- and long-term foreign and security policy issues; consultations on defense planning issues, including defense conversion, defense expenditures, and defense budgets; cooperation in peacekeeping in a conceptual, planning, and operational sense (within the framework of the Politico-Military Steering Committee’s Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping); and discussions of defense policy/strategy/military doctrine. 96
The FSC of OSCE has an almost identical mandate. The Programme for Immediate Action includes the following fields: harmonization of obligations concerning arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building; negotiation of new measures; exchange of military information; cooperation in the field of non-proliferation; regional measures; force planning; defense conversion; and military cooperation and contacts. 97 It is not unsurprising in these circumstances that OSCE and NACC have sponsored seminars on the same issues.
NACC was instrumental in negotiating the Oslo Final Document enabling the implementation of the CFE Treaty after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. NACC provided the framework for negotiating the document through the establishment of the High Level Working Group, an analogy to the Alliance’s internal coordinating body on disarmament and arms control issues, the High Level Task Force. The negotiations focused mainly on the treaty obligations assumed by the former Soviet Union, some of which did not apply automatically to each of the new states. Eight states of the former Soviet Union—Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakstan, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine—and the three Baltic states were concerned. The Final Document of the Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was adopted in the margins of the Oslo meeting of NACC ministers. 98
With the establishment of OSCE’s FSC, negotiations of this kind clearly became the responsibility of OSCE. In this way, OSCE took away one part of the tasks of NACC, weakening its role in European security; on the other hand, the parallelism between OSCE and NACC turned into almost complete overlapping. Such overlapping does not give ground to simple cooperation; rather, the same group of states ends up working on the same security issues in two different frameworks. This situation calls for some sort of cooperation, division of labor between the two fora, or other simplification. The eradication of some of the responsibilities of either of the organization; the dissolution of one of them (obviously the NACC); or a coordination of their tasks could come into account in this respect.
However, there is not very much cooperation between NATO and OSCE, except for visits by their respective leading officials to each other’s various meetings. NACC and OSCE work side by side, following their own similar agendas. There have been calls for coordination; but coordination raises immediately the issue of subordination. Coordination could work by either a disconnection of NACC from NATO and by its connection to OSCE, or by its subordination to OSCE even without its disconnection from the Alliance. Some of the proposals of Russia went in this direction. Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev proposed in June 1994 a genuine “division of labor between CIS, NACC, the EU, the Council of Europe, NATO, WEU and CSCE” with CSCE playing a “coordinating role” and having “overriding responsibility.” 99 This proposal was in line with an earlier proposal, made in January 1994, to turn NACC into the armed wing of OSCE. 100 But these solutions are clearly unacceptable for NATO members and all those states wishing to join the Alliance. There is a strong interest on their part in retaining NACC because it has remained useful as a consultation forum and provided the means to coordinate political, economic and scientific cooperation in close relations with the Alliance. 101
If there is an area where cooperation and coordination between NATO and OSCE could be most conceivable, it is the area of overlap between the tasks of NACC and the FSC of OSCE. However, these relations do not arise in institutional terms but in terms of weakening the role of the Alliance in European security, possibly by subordinating it to OSCE, or at least by inserting some of its work into an OSCE framework; or on the contrary, in terms of maintaining the independent role of the Alliance. Although the overlapping between NACC and OSCE could give ground for wide-ranging cooperation and coordination, the interests of the states involved quite simply do not bear out such an outcome.
c) The Partnership for Peace and OSCE
NACC did not work to the satisfaction of the states wishing to join the Alliance, and to some extent neither to that of some of the member states. NACC did not bring any differentiation between the partner states, nor was it related to the possible enlargement of the Alliance. The Partnership for Peace (PFP) was initiated precisely to address these deficiencies while at the same time delaying decisions on differentiation and enlargement. The conception was that partner states would engage in a course of self-differentiation, depending on their interests in and commitment to cooperate with NATO, and that preparations in the framework of PFP could prepare the interested partner states for joining the Alliance. But there was no official link between participation in PFP and NATO enlargement.
PFP did not replace NACC, it was inserted into its framework. PFP demonstrated that NACC did not meet the expectations of many of the partner states. PFP provided for the permanent representation of partner states at NATO Headquarters and at the Partnership Coordination Cell; many military exercises have been held between member and partner states; and a consultation mechanism was set up on a sixteen and one basis, in case a partner state perceives a threat “to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.” 102 This latter provision, the consultation mechanism, has an important implication for OSCE. Although OSCE is supposed to provide the appropriate forum for security consultations, the PFP provision takes away an important area of this responsibility. Those issues, dangers, threats, and problems that are related to the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of the partner states have a clear chance of being placed outside the framework of OSCE. This is not a division of labor, nor is it a cooperation; rather, it is a mistrust in, or restriction of the area of competence of the OSCE.
PFP has another implication for OSCE. A major challenge for PFP was whether Russia could also be involved somehow in the program. When Russia joined the Partnership program by signing the framework document, a Summary of Discussions was issued. The summary was issued at the specific request of Russia. It acknowledged Russia’s role as a major European, international, and nuclear power and set the framework for a bilateral NATO/Russia relationship both inside and outside the Partnership for Peace. 103 This consultation mechanism, which is more specific than those derived from the UN or OSCE, is a recognition of the situation that OSCE is not a sufficient forum for the great power partnership between Russia and NATO. This great power relationship has, therefore, a good chance of being placed outside the framework of OSCE. In this way, there is a chance that the substantive part of NATO/Russia relations will be channeled outside OSCE, which would remain a secondary forum of discussion and coordination. This development allows less for cooperation between NATO and OSCE than for a serious challenge to OSCE’s competence in European security issues.
d) Peacekeeping
Another area that could provide ground for cooperation between NATO and OSCE is peacekeeping. The respective decisions by OSCE and NATO states provide the framework for such cooperation. The Oslo ministerial meeting of NACC offered an Alliance contribution to peacekeeping tasks undertaken by OSCE. According to the Communiqué of the meeting, the Alliance is “prepared to support, on a case by case basis in accordance with its own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise.” CSCE participating states decided in Helsinki similarly that “peacekeeping constitutes an important operational element of the overall capability of the CSCE,” and that “CSCE may benefit from resources and possible experience and expertise of existing organizations such as the EC, NATO, and the WEU, and could therefore request them to make their resources available in order to support it in carrying out peacekeeping activities.”
The possibility of cooperation between OSCE and NATO in the area of peacekeeping is less than evident, however. There are problems with the feasibility of OSCE peacekeeping, to begin with. The conditions of OSCE peacekeeping are very restrictive. OSCE peacekeeping operations cannot entail the use of force; they must be conducted impartially and require the consent of the parties directly concerned; they cannot be a substitute for a negotiated settlement and must be limited in time; the parties will have demonstrated their commitment to creating favorable conditions for the execution of the operation; and operations cannot be launched without the establishment of an effective and durable cease-fire, an agreement on the necessary Memoranda of Understanding with the parties concerned, and without the provision of guarantees for the safety at all times of personnel involved. 104 Considering the conflicts in former Yugoslavia or in the CIS region, there is very little chance for peacekeeping operations under such restrictive conditions. It is no wonder, therefore, that OSCE has not been involved so far in a peacekeeping operation.
NATO capabilities, on the other hand, are out of proportion with the requirements of peacekeeping. The Alliance can engage in peace-support operations involving combat missions. But it is a very difficult issue to put Alliance soldiers in situations where they could become hostages, where they could not defend themselves properly, or where they could suffer casualties without major interests of Alliance members at stake. In peacekeeping operations these situations cannot be avoided. The Alliance is suited to engagement in more robust operations, but these operations go well beyond the confines of peacekeeping. For peacekeeping operations there is no need for Alliance engagement and NATO capabilities. Accordingly, NATO has not been involved in peacekeeping operations. But it has been involved in more robust operations. NATO assets and infrastructure were made available in the Gulf War. NATO was involved in monitoring and enforcing an arms embargo and a no-fly zone in the Yugoslav crisis. NATO has agreed to undertaking military strikes in case of non-compliance with agreements; to providing close air support for peacekeeping forces in emergency situations; to deliver air strikes in order to contain conflicts in specific areas; to providing protective measures for the withdrawal of peacekeeping forces; and even to imposing a settlement.
At a declaratory level, peacekeeping is an area where cooperation could develop between NATO and OSCE. Neither NATO nor OSCE has, however, been involved in peacekeeping, albeit for very different reasons. If there is a gap of culture between NATO and the UN, there is an even bigger gap between NATO and OSCE. Quite simply, NATO and OSCE are not partners in the field of peacekeeping.
e) The Dayton Agreement
The Dayton Peace Agreement signed on November 21, 1995, provides the first instance in which NATO and OSCE both have a role to play in a peace operation. This is the first serious occasion for cooperation. The role of NATO is the imposition of the peace agreement. The 60,000 troops involved, among them 20,000 American troops, undertake their task as a NATO contingent, following NATO procedures and rules of engagement. The operation is run as a NATO operation and not as a UN operation.
OSCE has a threefold task according to the peace agreement. First, OSCE has to supervise the preparation and conduct of free elections and to head an electoral commission composed of international experts and representatives of both entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Second, OSCE has to provide an ombudsman to investigate human rights violations, issue findings, and bring proceedings before a newly created Human Rights Chamber. OSCE also has a role, together with other international organizations, in monitoring human rights. Third, the parties conduct negotiations under OSCE auspices on a set of confidence-building measures. OSCE assists the parties with arms control negotiations and the implementation and verification of resulting agreements. 105
OSCE has, therefore, an important role in the settlement of the Yugoslav crisis in the framework of the Dayton agreement. This role complements the role of NATO. But the cooperation between OSCE and NATO does not follow the scenario outlined in the mutual declarations. The role of OSCE does not reside in providing a framework for the settlement under its authority. The situation is not that OSCE benefits from NATO’s resources, experience, and expertise, or that the Alliance makes them available to OSCE. Rather, the agreement is built on NATO’s robust capabilities and contribution to the settlement, and the experience and expertise of OSCE complements the efforts of the Alliance. OSCE’s capabilities are made available to the international effort, the backbone of which is provided by the NATO operation. It is rather the efforts of OSCE that are complementing the role of the Alliance. Instead of OSCE providing the framework for NATO involvement, it is the NATO engagement which provides the framework for the OSCE role.
The peace initiative itself did not arise from OSCE. The initiative was due mainly to the efforts of a single country, which found it more promising to proceed on its own. The initiative could have been doomed to failure, should it have been put into an OSCE framework. OSCE could assume only a segment of the implementation of the settlement instead of serving as the forum for taking the initiative, or at least as the framework for its implementation. The division of labor between NATO and OSCE did not arise from an institutional interface between the two organizations, nor is it likely to set a pattern for regular cooperation. The possibility of cooperation is due to the role undertaken by a single state, the United States, whose involvement in the NATO operation made NATO’s involvement in the settlement credible, which in turn made the implementation of the peace accord itself feasible. The role assumed by OSCE fits into the framework of the feasibility and credibility of the settlement. The experience of the Dayton agreement suggests that a cooperation between OSCE and NATO will require a massive NATO involvement, a strong leadership provided by a state, and a convergence of important interests of the states participating in the peace operation. Therefore, the cooperation between OSCE and NATO in the settlement of the Yugoslav conflict is rather the exception than the rule.
7. Partnership without Cooperation
OSCE has a useful role to play in European security in all of its areas of responsibility, from the human dimension, through the military aspects of security, to conflict prevention and crisis management. The participating states have a wide variety of interests in it. But OSCE cannot be expected to play a leading, primary role; it is rather confined to assuming a secondary and complementary role. OSCE does not have the capabilities to be a primary player; nor do the participating states have enough important national interests at stake in OSCE for it to assume a more central role.
Serious ambiguities in OSCE’s performance cannot be avoided during cooperation between OSCE and NATO. Such cooperation is not, in any event, on the European security agenda with any major emphasis. First, OSCE and NATO follow different agendas; second, the interests of the states do not bear out any significant cooperation between the two organizations on a regular basis. NATO’s agenda is about collective defense on the one hand, and about promoting the interests of members in and out of area, including in situations calling for determinate and massive Alliance involvement in non–Article 5 operations, on the other. Based on its capabilities, the Alliance also has a role in promoting cooperative security through its outreach programs. OSCE is to serve as an overall European security framework in which each state can participate on an equal basis.
The interests of the member and participating states do not bear out any major cooperation between NATO and OSCE either. The interests of the member states in NATO are much more coherent with one another than the interests of the participating states in OSCE, which are diversified, differentiated, and many times not even compatible with each other.
The major challenge to OSCE as a comprehensive organization is to ease the dilemma of European security, that is the division of the European security space without exclusion. The main merit of OSCE is its non-exclusiveness, but its participating states have to make use of it in a divided European security space. One of the most difficult decisions in European security today is “about which countries would be close to, or join, NATO, and fall on the Western side…and which countries would not develop such close relations, and would find themselves on the Eastern side…” As Russia itself cannot join NATO “without destroying it or at least rendering it meaningless,” the dividing line in European security will remain. 106 Even a possible enlargement of the Alliance will imply division and exclusion. In order for enlargement to be feasible, some of the potential candidates will have to be excluded. 107 The management of the division of the European security space is not an easy task and OSCE is not up to that task. But OSCE’s complementary role could be facilitated by a reduction of the “inter-space” between the Alliance area and the CIS region, that is by enlargement, and also by extending the scope of cooperative arrangements based on the Alliance and its member states. An enlargement of NATO would also call for an upgrading of the role of the OSCE.
Many of the interests of OSCE’s participating states are related to the Alliance. This means that by maintaining or even strengthening the role of NATO in European security the interests of the participating states in OSCE could also be enhanced. A strong and relevant Alliance coupled on occasions with a decisive leadership provided by a member state could provide better grounds for OSCE’s role in European security and could better keep up the motivations of various states to make use of OSCE.
An institutional cooperation between OSCE and NATO is unlikely and it will only happen exceptionally. In a contingency calling for robust NATO involvement, OSCE is unlikely to play any major role. In a situation which can be handled and addressed by OSCE, there would be no need for the involvement of NATO. But a strong and relevant Atlantic Alliance, an enlarged NATO, could only enhance the credibility of OSCE. A NATO losing its relevance in European security, including its relevance with regard to the interests of its member states and its credibility to candidates and partners, could only lead to a loss of credibility of OSCE and a loss of motivations of its participating states to make good use of it. The best way to ensure an enhanced role and credibility of OSCE is to find a new relevance for the Atlantic Alliance, to have NATO address the security concerns of its partners, and to proceed with its enlargement.
Does the Alliance have a new relevance? And if it does, how does its new relevance compare with its old one of “keeping the Americans in, the Germans down, and the Soviets out”? With the disappearance of the single major common enemy to deter, does the Alliance have any new or remaining functions that would keep it together and that would be able to maintain a sufficient level of allied solidarity?
Keeping the Soviets out is no longer a relevant function. This task cannot be shifted to apply to Russia. Russia is no longer the enemy to be kept at a secure distance. The task does not arise in terms of “balancing” Russia, but rather in terms of involving it in the management of European security. This task clearly exceeds the capabilities of the Alliance. NATO, at least alone, cannot fulfill this task properly. The strategy for NATO members to “ally themselves with a rival” 108 would be too much and miss the purpose; engaging in a low-profile cooperation, as in the framework of the Partnership for Peace, would be too little and not ambitious enough to structure the partnership between NATO, its members, and Russia. Russia cannot join NATO as a member, because its Western partners do not need it as a guarantor of Western security, nor can they extend credible security commitments to Russia. Moreover, Russia is not threatened by any state that would also pose a threat to the West. 109 The Partnership for Peace, although a useful channel for communication and cooperation, is too narrow and technical to serve as a basis for relations with the West. 110
NATO is a useful instrument in engaging Russia in security cooperation, but it is clearly not enough to give an overall institutional framework for this cooperation. There is here a role for OSCE, which consists of providing a framework for the involvement of Russia to a much greater extent than its cooperation with NATO would allow. If the Allies and Russia can find common interests in managing international problems, there is no need for a special relationship. Making full use of the cooperative frameworks provided by OSCE would be enough, especially if the proposal that OSCE can refer a dispute to the UN Security Council in the absence of the parties could be accepted. 111
The question of Germany does not arise in terms of keeping it down or “harnessing” it, but rather in terms of directing German capabilities in a way that is consistent with allied and European interests. The unification of Germany is one of the main reasons for maintaining the Alliance. The tight cooperative framework of the Alliance is the best way to integrate German ambitions into a Euro-Atlantic framework and to provide reassurance for some states, especially France.
It is notable that the unification of Germany was one of the main reasons for an increased French interest in the Alliance. Insecurity in the face of a united Germany pointed to the need for France of “anchoring” Germany in the West. 112 Accordingly, the French government perceived a need as early as 1990 to integrate more deeply into NATO as an effective means of containing the future power of Germany and of normalizing France’s relations with the Alliance. 113
But it is not only France that is interested in tying Germany closer to the Alliance. Germany itself has the same interest. Germany has been all too anxious to provide reassurance for its neighbors both in the framework of the European Union and in the framework of NATO. 114 Besides, Germany has a strong interest in the functioning of a NATO framework because Germany no longer has sufficient financial means to promote a European Defense Identity due to the burdens it bears with regard to Central and Eastern Europe and the EU at large. 115
Keeping the Americans in is a task that has some relevance. The relevance of this task in the post–Cold War world can be broken down into two dimensions. One of the dimensions is leadership. Maintaining the American leadership role in European security seems to be an essential role of the Alliance if one considers the Dayton attempt to seek a solution to the Yugoslav crisis. The Dayton agreement suggests that, when it comes to protracted crisis situations, there is hardly any chance of a solution without U.S. leadership. The framework of this leadership is provided for by the Atlantic Alliance. The EU members are unable to provide this sort of leadership, either alone or in pairs (like France with Germany, or Italy, or Spain). 116 The European Union is even less suited for a leadership role.
However, it is quite possible that the Bosnia experience is more the exception than the rule. Considering that it is unlikely for the Alliance to be used in the CIS area, and that after a successful implementation of the Dayton Agreement the chances of a NATO involvement in the former Yugoslavia will be very low, the American leadership role needs reassessment. The relevance of this role can be conceived in terms of the Alliance as a major instrument of confidence-building.
The United States is suited to undertake this role because of the degree to which it is involved in European security. The United States is present in Europe but its presence is restricted. It is involved in European security but it is not a member of the EU. There is an American military presence in Europe but the United States is at a considerable distance from the European continent. The Alliance serves this way as a major guarantee that the European integration cannot be hijacked by any member state for its national purposes. The European Union is based on the assumption that the member states are able to formulate their national interests in concert with the Union’s interests. This assumption works least in the fields of foreign and security policy. In the words of Jacques Santer, president of the European Commission, the member states of the EU are “unable to define appropriately their common interests” 117 in the area of common foreign and security policy. Or similarly, “what has been missing up to now is an identity of interests between the states of the Union in matters of security policy and a common strategic concept regarding when and where it would be essential to make a commitment in the area of military management of crises.” 118 In these circumstances, the Atlantic Alliance provides a useful alternative of defining and coordinating national interests instead of attempting to coordinate security policy cooperation on the basis of unspecified common European interests.
The American role in Europe has another dimension, which is closely related to the European integration process. The political motivation behind the European integration is just as strong as the economic one. The political motivation consists in turning the European integration into more than just a free trading area. An essential part of this motivation is to establish a common European foreign and security policy as well as a common defense policy. Such a common defense policy and eventually a common defense is unlikely to be achieved without the contribution of the Alliance. An independent European defense, based on a WEU disconnected from the Alliance, is inconceivable for many years to come. The building-up of independent European capabilities in the fields of strategic transport, satellite intelligence, and advanced reconnaissance, areas where the United States has a clear advantage over its European allies, would be a burdensome and divisive task for those states. 119 If the members of the EU are committed to maintain their ambitions in the area of security and defense, they would have to rely on the capabilities of the Alliance.
The new relevance of the Alliance consists of a threefold task, just as its old one did. These tasks are to integrate Germany, to secure an American leadership (or at least a mediating) role, and to contribute to the security and defense policy ambitions of the EU. The more the members and nonmembers of the Alliance come to terms with this renewed relevance of NATO, the less the relationship between NATO and OSCE will be burdened with indifference or competitiveness, and the more the promises of OSCE could be kept.
In sum, the emergence of an institutional partnership between NATO and OSCE is unlikely. However, there is a chance for a strategic partnership. The Alliance addresses a number of security issues, but it cannot properly address the issue of involving Russia. OSCE also addresses a number of security issues, but its main strength is the involvement of Russia. It gives Russia a forum where it can participate fully in European security deliberations, and where Russian concerns can be addressed in a European framework. The successful involvement of Russia has to meet two criteria, however. One of them is the maintenance of the principle of universality, the main merit of OSCE. The other is the avoidance of giving Russia “special treatment” within OSCE; in other words, reassuring the states between the NATO/EU area and Russia that no deal will be made above their heads. The roles of the Alliance and of OSCE are complementary. A good strategic partnership will emerge if both organizations fulfill their tasks in their own areas. The relationship between NATO and OSCE will be partnership without regular cooperation.
8. Alternative Futures for OSCE
That is the situation for the moment. However, OSCE will face major challenges in a few years’ time. These challenges will not arise primarily from threats to “international” or regional security but much more from a shake-up of the European institutional structure. The European integration process, including the expansion of the European Union and the enlargement of NATO, will certainly put a strong pressure on OSCE. With an enlargement of the EU to twenty to thirty states in the foreseeable future, and with the enlargement of NATO to include twenty to fifty-three members, the role of OSCE will be challenged in all of its areas of responsibility. These figures are not arbitrary. The European Union, which has recently been expanded, stands at fifteen members. The countries having association agreement (and therefore are prospective candidates for membership) with the EU could bring the number of members up to twenty-five. These candidate countries are the states of Central and Eastern Europe, Slovenia, and the Baltic states (but they do not include the states of the CIS). Turkey and Switzerland are also interested in joining the EU, just as Cyprus and Malta are. Norway could become a candidate for membership again. In the case of NATO, the membership could be brought up to twenty with the accession of the Visegrad states (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary) or even up to fifty-three with the inclusion of all the states of Central and Eastern Europe, the CIS, and any other state that has already joined or might be interested in joining the Partnership for Peace program.
The OSCE will have three basic alternative paths of adaptation:
- The participating states can decide that there is no need for a major reform of OSCE and that the Organization can go on as it has so far. In this scenario, OSCE will not overcome the consensus rule in its major decisions; no “executive committee” will be set up for a more efficient governance in case of conflict prevention and crisis management; and no major institutional cooperation will develop between OSCE and the other European institutions. This scenario is probable only in the case the enlargement process extends to a few new states. In this case OSCE will lose some of its credibility. When the concerns of the new member states of the European Union, Western European Union, and NATO are taken care of in more integrated structures; and when an acceptable reintegration of the CIS happens, the states remaining outside these structures will lose interest in OSCE and will see in it only an instrument to harness them. OSCE will have in this case a moderate role as the administrator of the conventional armaments and of the confidence-and security-building regimes.
- The member states can come to the conclusion that the efficiency of OSCE should be enhanced and an “executive committee” should be established for that purpose. The increasing of the efficiency of OSCE makes sense only if it can make a significant contribution to conflict prevention and crisis management. This issue is also related to the integration process because without the expansion of the EU/NATO area the participating states will not see any incentive to strengthen OSCE. This scenario is dependent on two assumptions. One of them is that there will be a need for a more efficient handling of issues, and that the resolve of OSCE will be put to the test by crises of the order of former Yugoslavia where OSCE has important (although supplementary and not leading) tasks. Smaller crises would not require greater efficiency. The other is that the participating states have important interests in solving a crisis, and that the greater efficiency of OSCE can ultimately be used to dispatch military forces to regions of trouble. The greater efficiency of OSCE would also imply a routine and regular cooperation with institutions more concerned with military operations. If both assumptions are wrong, that is, if no major regional crisis is looming on the horizon, and if any emerging crisis situation is utterly unimportant as far as the interests of the states capable of intervention are concerned, a strengthening of OSCE will be of no help, and it will most likely not happen.
- If the integration process makes substantial progress both in the East and the West, OSCE will have to be adapted as well. With largely overlapping memberships, there will be a need and a possibility for simplifying the European institutional structure. The most radical solution would be the inclusion of the Central and East European states, including Russia and the CIS, into NATO. In this case, NATO would supersede OSCE, instead of OSCE providing a framework for NATO. OSCE could easily be dissolved in that case; or it could be turned into the “internal” conflict prevention and human rights monitoring arm of NATO. If not dissolved, OSCE could become a directorate of NATO. The few neutral states would probably revise their policies and become members of the Alliance.
Such an “overall enlargement” of the Alliance is more easily said than done. The Russian armed forces are out of proportion with the armed forces of the European NATO members, just as are the American armed forces. Integrating them to any greater extent than the American forces are integrated into NATO would be a dream. The NATO structure would not be a control over those forces; rather, Russia would gain control over NATO. Interestingly enough, this scenario would disconnect the enlargement of NATO from that of the European Union, but it could benefit the ambitions of the EU to build up a common defense. An EU smaller than NATO but fully covered by it would have no major problems in developing a European security and defense identity, which could easily serve as the European pillar of the Alliance. In the case of a NATO covering a larger area than the EU the problem of “backdoor guarantees” would be solved. The members of the WEU (who are also members of the EU and NATO) could decide to include the new members of the EU without the danger of “covertly” extending to them the NATO (and ultimately the United States) security guarantee, because these new members would anyhow be covered by these commitments. In that case there would be no institutional obstacle before implementing the ambitions for a common European defense identity.
If the enlargement of NATO goes alongside with the expansion of the European Union or even lags behind it, there will be a need for greater policy coordination between the main centers of European politics: NATO, the EU, and the Russia/CIS region. The framework for such a coordination would not have to be reinvented. OSCE could readily accommodate the policy coordination between these centers.
9. Proposals
The future of OSCE will not be decided within the framework of OSCE itself. The fate of the Organization will depend upon the success or failure of the integration processes going on in Europe. These include the expansion of the EU, the enlargement of NATO, and the reintegration of the CIS. Proposals for the development of OSCE can only be made in this perspective. In order to make the most effective proposals, it would be useful to choose a different classification for OSCE’s responsibilities than the classification used at the outset. According to the new classification, OSCE is involved in collective security, in cooperative security, and in implementing various regimes.
OSCE’s involvement in collective security pertains to its responsibilities in conflict prevention and crisis management, but its usefulness cannot be substantially improved by upgrading its capabilities as an instrument of collective security.
OSCE is involved in cooperative security with engagements in the field of conventional arms control and confidence-building measures. OSCE has important responsibilities in negotiating new arms control measures, monitoring the implementation of the CFE Treaty, and working out new confidence-building measures. OSCE’s role could be further developed in this area if a greater cooperation is required between the centers of integration in Europe.
OSCE also has responsibilities in various regimes. It manages several, most importantly a human rights regime. There is a great possibility here to upgrade OSCE’s capabilities. Once rules and norms are established, they must be fully implemented and monitored. It has been suggested that OSCE’s comparative advantage resides precisely in its weak operational capabilities and in its norm setting unconstrained by legally binding commitments. Participating states may be even less ready than they currently are to arrive at common OSCE norms in the field of the human dimension, for instance, if these norms were to be turned into legally binding regulations. Even in this case, however, a regular and systematic review of the implementation of the human rights regime and the Code of Conduct could make a difference. An upgrading of the implementation review process offers itself as an option.
Based upon these considerations, the following proposals can be made:
- Proceed with the expansion of the EU and the enlargement of NATO.
- Do not strengthen OSCE as an instrument of collective security and do not dilute any more the principle of consensus in this field. OSCE does not need any stronger capabilities in this respect, and it is unnecessary to turn it into a European UN. Strengthening OSCE as an instrument of collective security would push the Organization further into a worsening of conceptual and practical difficulties.
A conceptual difficulty could arise with respect to peacekeeping. It is conceivable that some sort of a majority voting (or a consensus minus the disputing parties) can be introduced at some point to decide about referring a dispute to the UN Security Council. A Dutch-German proposal, which foresaw a procedure in which OSCE states would make every effort to achieve the pacific settlement of disputes, was widely debated at the 1994 Budapest Review Conference. In case these efforts fail, OSCE states could refer the dispute to the UN Security Council without the consent of the parties to the dispute. The initiative was not adopted only because of Armenian objections. If such a procedure were to be adopted, however, and it came to a UN Security Council resolution calling for a peacekeeping operation in an OSCE state, it is likely that OSCE states would have to implement the mission. But the OSCE principles on peacekeeping call for the consent of the parties to the conflict to allow the operation. It would be a hard decision for the states who are to implement the mission to bypass OSCE principles. OSCE would come to a conceptual contradiction.
A practical difficulty has already arisen with respect to Serbia/Montenegro. Once the participation of Serbia/Montenegro was suspended in OSCE in July 1992, it was impossible for the Organization to send either short or long-term missions to potential trouble spots in Serbia, like Kosovo, Sandjak, or Voivodina, precisely when there was a great need to monitor the situation there.
- Enhance the cooperative security arrangements within OSCE. This is to be achieved mainly by establishing stronger links between OSCE and the cooperative arrangements of NATO—the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace. If there is an area where cooperation and coordination between NATO and OSCE are most conceivable, it is the overlapping between the tasks of the NACC and the OSCE’s FSC. The NACC and the FSC follow almost identical working agendas. These include the discussion of specific political and security-related matters, including regional security issues, conceptual approaches to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation; consultations on policy and defense planning issues; consultations on force planning, defense budgeting and expenditures, defense conversion, etc. There is a similar parallelism between OSCE and the Partnership for Peace. The Partnership for Peace program is very much geared toward preparation and training for peacekeeping tasks, a field in which OSCE has serious ambitions. It is not clear why a joint OSCE/NACC coordination group could not be set up to work out and implement a joint work plan. Similarly, a joint OSCE/PFP working group could be established for the planning and assessment of multilateral exercises to be held within the framework of the PFP.
- Strengthen OSCE where it is strongest. If OSCE’s main advantage resides in that it serves consciousness-raising purposes, turn OSCE into the consciousness of Europe. This move would not require the turning of OSCE commitments into legally binding ones. It would be enough to establish a Commitment Monitoring Intelligence Unit to review the implementation of the commitments related to the human rights regime (including the proposals made by the High Commissioner on National Minorities) and the Code of Conduct. This task force would prepare reports month by month and submit them to the Permanent Council. The Permanent Council could discuss the reports but it would not have to approve them. But even more important than that, the task force would present these reports at Press Conferences. The review of implementation cannot be left entirely to nongovernmental organizations or to quick biannual review conferences. Nor can the results be kept in the closed circle of OSCE diplomats. The review process and the role of OSCE as a consciousness-raising instrument in Europe can be credible only to the extent that the public at large is regularly kept informed.
- As the process of European integration proceeds, the need will arise for a coordination of policies between the main centers of integration. It would be desirable to establish a “Policy Coordination Council” (PCC) at a ministerial level within OSCE. The PCC would serve as a European forum for policy coordination; it would set the guidelines for the working of OSCE, but it would not be a governing body. The governing body of the OSCE would remain the Permanent Council. The PCC could be composed of the representatives of the United States and Russia, of the North Atlantic Council on a rotational basis, of the non-Russian CIS on a rotational basis, of the Chairman-in-Office of OSCE, of the EU presidency, and depending on how many states remain outside EU/NATO or CIS frameworks, of one or two representatives, again on a rotational basis.
These proposals do not aim at turning OSCE into the centerpiece of European security. They could, however, help enhance the standing of this loose organization among the other multilateral instruments of policy. The increased credibility of OSCE would be to the benefit of better meeting its own responsibilities and of the European integration process at large.
Notes
Note 1: Major General John Sewall quoted by Doug Bereuter, “Interlocking Institutions Do Not Work,” The Wall Street Journal, December 16, 1995. Back.
Note 2: French President François Mitterrand addressed this question to the OSCE Summit Meeting in Budapest. “Baptême du feu pour l´OSCE,” Le Figaro, January 25, 1995. Back.
Note 3: CSCE Budapest Document 1994, “Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era,” Summit Declaration, point 8. Back.
Note 4: “We believe in the central role of the OSCE in building a secure and stable CSCE community, whole and free,” Budapest Summit Declaration, point 2. Back.
Note 5: István Gyarmati, “On Current Issues of the OSCE,” in Péter Tálas and Sebestény Gorka (eds.), After the Budapest OSCE Summit (Budapest: SVKI, 1995), p. 54. Back.
Note 6: Uwe Nerlich, “The Relationship between a European Common Defense and NATO, the OSCE and the United Nations,” in Lawrence Martin, John Roper (eds.), Towards a Common Defense Policy (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, 1995), p. 78. Back.
Note 7: Peter Schmidt, European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI): A Brief Analysis From a German Point of View, SWP-IP 2883 (Ebenhausen: SWP, 1995), p. 18. Back.
Note 8: Pierre Lefèvre, “Budapest: silence embarrassé sur la Bosnie,” Le Soir, December 7, 1994. Back.
Note 9: “Russia Blocks Any Reference to the Conflict,” International Herald Tribune, December 7, 1994. Back.
Note 10: Adam Daniel Rotfeld, “Europe: the multilateral security process,” in SIPRI Yearbook 1995 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 289. Back.
Note 11: Victor-Yves Ghebali, “After the Budapest Conference: The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe,” NATO Review, March 1995, p. 25. Back.
Note 12: Victor-Yves Ghebali, “La fuite en avant de la CSCE”, Défense Nationale pp. 78, 107. Back.
Note 13: A Joint Agenda for Budapest, by Germany and the Netherlands, May 17, 1994. Back.
Note 14: A Road from Vienna to the CSCE Summit in Budapest, by Austria and Hungary, July 27, 1994. Back.
Note 15: Max van der Stoel, “The Role of the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in CSCE Conflict Prevention,” in Studia Diplomatica (No. 4, 1994), p. 68. Back.
Note 16: Document No. 1456 (Report) on “Europe and the establishment of a new world order for peace and security,” Assembly of Western European Union, May 15, 1995, p. 3. Back.
Note 17: John Kornblum quoted by John Borawski and Bruce George, “The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: A Case of Identity,” International Defense Review. Back.
Note 18: John Maresca, “An Important Role for an Evolving CSCE: Preventive Diplomacy,” in International Herald Tribune, August 23, 1994. Back.
Note 19: Rome Decisions. Back.
Note 20: A Portuguese delegate to a CSCE seminar on peacekeeping held in Vienna over 7–9 June, 1993, quoted in Borawski and George. Back.
Note 21: Zdenek Matejka, head of the Czech delegation to the CSCE in Vienna quoted in Borawski and George, ibid. Back.
Note 22: Gyarmati, ibid. Back.
Note 23: Pál Dunay, “Cooperation in Conflicts: The Chairman-in-Office and the Secretary General—A Problem for the Future?” Back.
Note 24: M. van der Stoel, ibid., p. 63. Back.
Note 25: Margaretha af Ugglas, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, “Conditions for Successful Preventive Diplomacy,” in Steffan Carlsson (ed.), The Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy: The Experience of the CSCE (Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1994), p. 27. Back.
Note 26: M. af Ugglas, ibid. Back.
Note 28: Adam Daniel Rotfeld, “The Future of the CSCE: An Emerging New Agenda,” Budapest Seminar on the Institutionalization of the CSCE, 2–3 September 1994, pp. 1, 12. Back.
Note 29: Helsinki Document 1992, Helsinki Decisions, V, CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, Points 11–14. Back.
Note 30: Budapest Document 1994, Budapest Summit Declaration, Point 11. Back.
Note 31: Zdislaw Lachowski, “The Vienna confidence- and security- building measures in 1992,” in SIPRI Yearbook, p. 630. Back.
Note 32: Zdislaw Lachowski, “Conventional Arms Control in Europe, The CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation,” in SIPRI Yearbook 1995, pp. 593–594. Back.
Note 33: Zdislaw Lachowski, note 31, pp. 618, 620. Back.
Note 34: A CSCE diplomat quoted by Borawski and George. Back.
Note 35: Zdislaw Lachowski, “Conventional Arms Control in Europe, The Forum for Security Cooperation,” in SIPRI Yearbook 1995, pp. 783, 788, 790. Back.
Note 36: See on this point CSCE, Secretary General, Annual Report 1993 (note 14), p. 13. Back.
Note 37: Helsinki Document 1992, Helsinki Summit Declaration: Promises and Problems of Change, Point 20. Back.
Note 38: Helsinki Document 1992, Helsinki Decisions, Point 23. Back.
Note 39: Konrad J. Huber, “The CSCE and Ethnic Conflict in the East,” RFE/RL Research Report, July 30, 1993, p. 31. Back.
Note 40: Canadian Ambassador Christopher Anstis, quoted in Rachel Brett, “The Human Dimension Mechanism of the CSCE and the CSCE Response to Minorities,” in Michael R. Lucas (ed.), The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Cooperation (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993), p. 159. Back.
Note 41: Wilhelmm Höynck, Secretary General of the CSCE, “CSCE Missions in the Field as an Instrument of Preventive Diplomacy—Their Origin and Development,” in Steffan Carlsson (ed.), ibid., p. 66. Back.
Note 42: Estonia initiated the Mechanism in December 1992 in order to study its legislation and compare it and its implementation with universally accepted human rights norms. Back.
Note 43: The mission to Estonia was decided by the Committee of Senior Officials on December 13, 1992. The mission was deployed with a conflict prevention mandate in February 1993. Back.
Note 44: Tima Lahelma, “The Role of the CSCE Missions in Preventive Diplomacy—The Case of Estonia (August 1993–June 1994),” in Steffan Carlsson (ed.), ibid., p. 95. Back.
Note 45: OSCE Representative Ambassador Gyarmati, quoted in “Sérieuse menace, selon Bruxelles,” Le Soir, January 13, 1995. Back.
Note 46: Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, Ch. VII, Point 25. Back.
Note 47: Vienna Document 1994 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, Chapter IV, Points 38.1, 38.3. Back.
Note 48: Vienna Document 1994, Chapter IV, Points 36, 39. Back.
Note 49: “A Chechen Cease-Fire,” The Wall Street Journal, January 11, 1995. Back.
Note 50: Sophie Shihab, “La Russie face au risque de dislocation,” Le Monde, December 15, 1994. Back.
Note 51: Frederick Kempe, “Restless Germany Rummages for a Foreign Policy,” The Wall Street Journal, February 2, 1995. Back.
Note 52: Vienna Document 1994, Chapter II, Risk Reduction, Mechanism for Consultation and Cooperation As Regards Unusual Military Activities. Back.
Note 53: Adrian Karatnycky, “An OSCE Diplomat Bungles Diplomacy in Crimea,” The Wall Street Journal, June 7, 1995. Back.
Note 54: Nathalie Nougayrède, “Leonid Koutchma apaise le conflit entre l´Ukraine et la Crimée,” Le Monde, November 5–6, 1995. Back.
Note 55: OSCE Handbook (Vienna: OSCE Secretariat, 1995), p. 13. Back.
Note 56: Adam Daniel Rotfeld, “Europe: The Multilateral Security Process,” in SIPRI Yearbook 1995 , p. 292. Back.
Note 57: Edward Marks, “Dynamics of Peacekeeping in Georgia,” Strategic Forum, No. 45, September 1995. Back.
Note 58: A. D. Rotfeld, p. 291. Back.
Note 59: OSCE Handbook, p. 13. Back.
Note 60: Adam Daniel Rotfeld, “In Search of a Political Settlement: The Case of the Conflict in Moldova,” in Staffan Carlsson (ed.), ibid., p. 103, and OSCE Handbook, p. 13. Back.
Note 61: Margaretha af Ugglas, ibid., pp. 24-25. Back.
Note 62: John Maresca, The End of the Cold War Is Also Over (Stanford, CA: Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, April 1995). Back.
Note 63: “Holbrook Discusses the Future of NATO,” USIS, April 6, 1995. Back.
Note 64: “Holbrook Says US Will Remain Engaged in Europe,” USIS, June 22, 1995. Back.
Note 66: A senior American politician quoted in “Washington veut reprendre l´initiative en Europe,” Le Monde, November 18, 1994. Back.
Note 67: John J. Maresca, “Russia’s Emerging European Policy,” The Wall Street Journal, September 6, 1994. Back.
Note 68: U.S. Representative to OSCE Sam Brown quoted in “O&A: US and Russian Differences on European Stability,” International Herald Tribune, October 10, 1994. Back.
Note 69: John Maresca, “An Important Role for an Evolving CSCE: Preventive Diplomacy,” International Herald Tribune, August 23, 1994. Back.
Note 70: U.S. Representative to OSCE quoted in Virginia Marsh, “Russia Softens its Stance on Role of OSCE,” Financial Times, October 11, 1994; see also Joseph Fitchett, “US Won’t Allow Russia a Free Hand,” International Herald Tribune, September 28, 1994. Back.
Note 71: “Russia and West Split on Europe’s Security,” Financial Times, October 10, 1994; and “Mr. Nyet Tests Patience of the West,” Financial Times, March 4, 1995. Back.
Note 72: Andrei V. Zagorski, “The New Republics of the CIS in the CSCE,” in Michael R. Lucas (ed.), The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Cooperation (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993), p. 289. Back.
Note 73: Deputy Chairman of the upper house of the Russian parliament Valerian Viktorov quoted in Suzanne Crow, “Why Russia Hates NATO Air Strikes,” The Wall Street Journal, September 7, 1995. See also John Maresca, “Russia’s Emerging European Policy,” The Wall Street Journal, September 6, 1994. Back.
Note 74: Kazimirov quoted in Adam Daniel Rotfeld, “Europe: the multilateral security process,” in SIPRI Yearbook 1995, p. 294, note 115. Back.
Note 75: Suzanne Crow, “Breaking Russia’s Peacekeeping Addiction,” The Wall Street Journal, September 27, 1994. Back.
Note 76: A. D. Rotfeld, ibid., p. 276. Back.
Note 78: Andrei Kozyrev, “For a New Model of Security,” Moscow News No. 24-25, June 30–July 6, 1995. Back.
Note 79: This is the conclusion of a study by IMEMO in 1995. See A. D. Rotfeld, “In Search of a Common, Cooperative and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe,” Background Paper, p. 12. Back.
Note 81: Frederick Kempe, “Restless Germany Rummages for a Foreign Policy,” The Wall Street Journal, February 2, 1994. Back.
Note 82: Uwe Nerlich, “L´Allemagne—un pays comme les autres?” Politique Étrangère p. 114. Back.
Note 83: Alyson J. K. Bailes, “Sécurité européenne: le point de vue britannique,” Politique Étrangère p. 95. Back.
Note 84: Daniel Vernet, “L´UE selon M. Balladur,” Le Monde, November 18, 1994. Back.
Note 85: Piotr Switalski, “An Ally for the Central and Eastern European States,” Transition, June 30, 1995, p. 29. Back.
Note 86: State Treaty between Hungary and Slovakia, March 19, 1995, Art. 15. Para. (4) (b). Back.
Note 87: Ambassador István Gyarmati, “The Future of Arms Control in the Balkans,” Studia Diplomatica, No. 4, 1994, pp. 55–57. Back.
Note 88: K. Skubiszewski quoted in A. D. Rotfeld, “Europe: The Multilateral Security Process,” p. 269, note 17. Back.
Note 89: Ian Gambles (ed.), A Lasting Peace in Central Europe? Chaillot Paper 20 (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies), p. 93. Back.
Note 90: Uwe Nerlich, “NATO at the Crossroads, Once Again: NATO’s Future Functions, Structure and Outreach,” SWP-S406 (June 1995), p. 65. Back.
Note 91: London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London on 5–6 July 1990, Point 22. Back.
Note 92: Charter of Paris for a New Europe. Back.
Note 93: Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo, June 4, 1992, Point 11. Back.
Note 94: Helsinki Document 1992, “The Challenges of Change,” Helsinki Decisions, III, Cooperation with Regional and Transatlantic Organizations, Point 52. Back.
Note 95: Niels Möller-Gulland, “The Forum for Security Cooperation and Related Security Issues,” in M. R. Lucas (ed.), ibid, p. 31-60. Back.
Note 96: Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation 1994/95, Issued at the meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, December 2, 1994. Back.
Note 97: Helsinki Document 1992, Helsinki Decisions, V, CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, Programme for Immediate Action. Back.
Note 98: Amadeo de Franchis, “The CFE Treaty—The Role of the High Level Working Group,” NATO Review, October 1992, pp. 12-16. Back.
Note 99: Michael Mihalka, “Restructuring European Security,” Transition, No. 11, June 30, 1995, p. 6. Back.
Note 100: Tasos Kokkinides, “L´OSCE: une opportunité perdue pour la sécurité européenne,” in Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, No. 18, p. 93. Back.
Note 101: “NATO in the 1990s,” Strategic Forum, No. 12, November 1994. Back.
Note 102: Partnership for Peace: Framework Document, Point 8. Back.
Note 103: Summary of Discussions between NATO and Russia, NATO Review, August 1994, p. 5. Back.
Note 104: Helsinki Document 1992, Helsinki Decisions, III, Points 22–30. Back.
Note 105: “Dayton Peace Agreement Foresees Important OSCE Role,” OSCE Newsletter, Vol. 2, No. 11, November 1995. Back.
Note 106: John Maresca, ibid., p. 12. Back.
Note 107: Uwe Nerlich, ibid., p. 65. Back.
Note 108: Paul W. Schroeder, “Alliances, 1815–1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management,” in Klaus Knorr (ed.), Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1976), p. 255. Back.
Note 109: Alexei Arbatov, “NATO and Russia,” in Security Dialogue, No. 2 (June), 1995, p. 141. Back.
Note 110: Arbatov, ibid., p. 140. Back.
Note 111: Walter Kemp, “The OSCE and the UN: A Closer Relationship,” Helsinki Monitor, No 1. 1995, p. 27. Back.
Note 112: Anand Menon, “From Independence to Cooperation: France, NATO and European Security,” International Affairs, No. 1 1995, p. 22. Back.
Note 113: Margaret Blunden, “France after the Cold War: Inching Closer to the Alliance,” Defense Analysis, No. 3 1993, p. 260. Back.
Note 114: Günther Hellmann, “Einbindungspolitik: German Foreign Policy and the Art of Declaring Total Peace,” prepared for presentation. Back.
Note 115: Peter Schmidt, ibid., p. 27. Back.
Note 116: Dominique Moisi, “Insecurities, Old and New, Plague the Paris-Bonn Axis,” The Wall Street Journal, February 7, 1995. Back.
Note 117: Pierre Bocev, “Europe: une diplomatie commune en échec,” Le Figaro, February 2, 1994. Back.
Note 118: Mathias Jopp, “Langer Weg—Kühnes Ziel: Gemeinsame Verteidigungspolitik,” Europa Archiv, No. 13/14 1994, p. 397, quoted in“A European Security Policy,” Report of the Assembly of the Western European Union, Document 1439, November 10, 1994. Back.
Note 119: J. L. Motchane and G. F. Rozier, “Feu à la doctrine française de défense,” Le Monde Diplomatique, April 1992. Back.
