CIAO DATE: 04/01

A Verification for Warhead Control

Liu Suping

The Center for International Security and Cooperation

January 2000

 

Introduction

After a brief period of progress, the U.S.-Russian nuclear reduction process has reached a stalemate. ₁ This situation causes us to rethink the following issues:

• What is the motivation for the two nuclear superpowers to conduct nuclear reductions?
• How can the focus of the nuclear arms reduction process be changed from verification of reduction of delivery vehicles to verification of reduction of warheads and nuclear materials?
• What is the objective for future nuclear reductions?
• What kind of verification regime will be required for future nuclear reductions?

 

Full Text of Paper (pdf)

 

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Endnotes

Note 1:   George Bunn, The Nonproliferation Regime under Siege (Stanford: Center for International Security and Cooperation, September 1999). Anatoli Diakov and Eugene Miasnikov, “Breaking the Deadlock: Confidence—Building Measures Could Accelerate the Nuclear Weapons Reduction Process” (Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology: Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, April 1999). Back.