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Email this citationCIAO DATE: 04/02
Kim Dae-Jung's Engagement Policy and the South-South Conflict in South Korea: Implications for U.S. Policy
Byung-Hoon Suh
Asian Update Series
Summer 2001
Asia Society
Contents
The year 2000 will long be remembered as the occasion of the historic summit between South Korean president Kim Dae-Jung and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il. The meeting presented pleasant surprises not only to Koreans in the North and South but also to people around the world. Kim Dae-Jung was rewarded for his efforts with a Nobel Peace Prize. Given this, Kim deserves to relax. However, there's little reason for him to do so.
One matter for concern, perhaps the most important one, is that President Kim's political influence has grown weaker. The majority of South Koreans disapprove of his government. With less than one-and-a-half years left in his term, more than two-thirds of the people have turned their backs on Kim. After his inauguration in February 1998, Kim Dae-Jung saw his approval rating skyrocket to as high as 80 percent. But the latest polls show that even his loyalists are defecting; at present, only 18.6 percent of South Koreans are willing to support him (JoongAng Ilbo, June 4, 2001). Meanwhile, opposition camps led by the Grand National Party (GNP) and its president, Lee Hoi-Chang, are repeatedly reported to have a very good chance of winning the next presidential election, scheduled in December 2002. In short, President Kim's political clock seems to be running out of time.
The fact that President Kim has been widely discredited by the South Korean people seems to surprise an international community that still reveres him. For example, Donald Gregg, a former U.S. ambassador to South Korea, says it is baffling why Kim has not gotten more credit from Koreans for what he's done. He thinks the response of the public has been "unfair" (Far Eastern Economic Review, May 24, 2001).
President Kim's present low political popularity can be explained in many ways, but it is specifically his policies toward North Korea that have put him on the defensive. These policies can best be examined in light of a brief review of the president's domestic political difficulties. Last fall, right after his winning of the Nobel Peace Prize, Kim Dae-Jung faced mounting criticism from his own followers as well as from the opposition. Young lawmakers of the ruling Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) pressed him to change his authoritarian handling of the government, demanding that he initiate the internal democratization of the party, his administration, and the Blue House.
Many expected Kim to accept the cry for political reform. But, surprisingly, he did not. Instead, President Kim opted for "strong government." He restored the fragile coalition with a conservative splinter, the United Liberal Democrats (ULD), led by Kim Jong-Pil. Four lawmakers "defected" from the ruling party to the ULD so that the latter could form a bargaining body in the National Assembly, which enraged the opposition. More than 80 percent of South Koreans severely criticized President Kim's nondemocratic political engineering.
But he did not change his mind. Major newspapers that were critical of him had to face a thoroughgoing tax audit. Despite the government's denial of political calculation behind such a move, many believe that the ruling party is trying to muzzle the pro-opposition press. And Kim's misfortunes have continued to multiply. Graft scandals have risen in waves; mismanagement of reform policies such as health insurance and education has fatally discredited his years-long catchphrase of "well-prepared president"; exports are falling and another financial crisis seems to be around the corner.
In the midst of rising criticism and cynicism, Kim's MDP was defeated in local by-elections in late April. Finally, Kim had to fire his new justice minister within forty-three hours of his appointment. The ruling party has been plunged into ferocious internal strife.
Kim has had to pay for his misjudgments. A recent internal poll of the MDP placed the president's national popularity at only 27.2 percent. More important, it showed that the opposition has a good chance of taking over the Blue House by the end of next year.
It's common knowledge in South Korea that Kim has been a typical victim of South Korea's regional strife. Ironically, it is undeniable that Mr. Kim, at the same time, has been a major beneficiary of the tragic division. He has been showered by overwhelming popularity from certain areas--in particular, the Cholla provinces, in the southwest of the Korean peninsula--but poll results show that even this decade-long political trend appears to be changing. Almost every poll, in fact, echoes that the GNP is defeating the ruling MDP in terms of popularity.
Given the fact that the political clocks in South Korea seem to be rapidly moving in a direction unfavorable to Mr. Kim, his engagement policy vis-à-vis North Korea is required to undergo a serious review.
Although Kim's efforts and his general policy direction aiming at reconciliation and cooperation between the North and South are quite admirable, his leadership style is not. As we have seen, South Koreans have grown increasingly dissatisfied with his authoritarian government, and the general public's distrust of him has already hurt his Sunshine Policy. Kim's loss of political influence and his lame duck status are having an extremely negative impact on the nation.
President Kim needs to overhaul and depoliticize his engagement policy with North Korea. He is urged to hurry and reach a consensus with the opposition regarding unification issues. For these purposes, his principle of flexible reciprocity toward North Korea must no longer be accompanied by his low-profile approach so far. The assistance of North Korea, of the opposition party in South Korea, and that of the United States are needed to ensure any measure of success.
Signs of Deepening Conflict in South Korea
Overall, South Koreans continue to support the incumbent government's Sunshine Policy. But, except for the normative imperative that the divided nation be reunified in the near future, they disagree with President Kim's approach in almost every detail.
For example, even North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il's delayed visit to Seoul, which is believed by the majority of South Koreans to play an extremely important role in establishing a peace system in the Korean peninsula, has not succeeded in silencing the ultraconservatives. President Kim in late May issued a public appeal to the North Korean leader to honor his promise to come to Seoul. The GNP's president, Lee Hoi-Chang, also insisted that the North Korean chairman keep his word to visit Seoul. Lee added that the North's stalled relations with the United States could be no excuse for evading its responsibility.
But former South Korean president Kim Young-Sam has different ideas, and many South Koreans stand behind him. In an implicit criticism of his successor's politics, the former president demanded Chairman Kim's official apology for his alleged terrorist attacks on civilians. Such widely supported departures from President Kim's engagement policy leave him few options but to accommodate his North Korean drive to the conservatives' perspectives.
There are, of course, widely differing views on the mind-set of North Korea. Will North Korea change? How should one evaluate Chairman Kim Jong-Il's remark that he is willing to have a dialogue with South Korean leaders? Many South Koreans are very skeptical of North Korea's true designs; this is the most serious obstacle for President Kim's engagement policy.
According to a survey of May 2000 (Han Joon, "South Korean People's Understanding of North Korea, Reunification and the North-South Korea Relations after the North-South Summit," Sahoi Bipyung [Social Critique], Summer 2001), 61.6 percent of South Koreans had expected that North Korea would sooner or later initiate some changes. The number jumped to 92.3 percent in August of the same year, two months after the historic summit between President Kim and Chairman Kim. But more than half (52.3 percent) believe that such change is just for tactical gains. For several reasons, they say, North Korea will not undertake the adventure of fundamental change.
Another survey of specialists on the issue conducted last October confirms the same story. It notes that ten out of forty experts (i.e., 25 percent) believe that North Korea is undergoing radical change. But 75 percent of the respondents have an opposite evaluation: North Korea will surely change, they say, but gradually and far more slowly than anticipated by the proponents of Kim's engagement policy (Bae Chin-Soo, Evaluation of the Prediction Capabilities of the Experts on the Korean Questions [Seoul: Korean Institute of Military Affairs, 2001]).
In this connection, North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il's visit to China early this year aroused extraordinary interest among South Koreans because he made the observation that his country would become a "second China." Again, a majority of specialists express doubt about the possibility of rapid change in North Korea (Korea Herald, January 26, 2001).
How sincere is Pyongyang with regard to dialogue with Seoul? Since late last year, the North has been dragging its feet on official exchanges, and dialogue has been all but cut off. Superficially, the North's freeze on official contacts with the South seems to be provoked by the hard-line stance of the U.S. administration toward North Korea. Pyongyang does not hide its discontent about the seeming inability of Seoul to influence U.S. policy. However, many experts in South Korea pay more attention to the failure of Kim Dae-Jung to live up to his promise of more economic assistance to North Korea. The North evidently believes that a freeze on dialogue with the South will be an effective form of pressure on Seoul to keep its promises (JoongAng Ilbo, May 31, 2001).
Proponents of the Kim Dae-Jung administration flatly reject this interpretation. They believe--or, to put it more precisely, they want to believe--that North Korea is surely changing and has no other way to do so than to seek cooperation with the South. But, they argue, it takes time for Pyongyang to adjust to new circumstances (Hankyoreh Shinmun, May 10, 2001).
Meanwhile, a debate ensues over the National Security Laws (NSL). Earlier this year the ruling MDP tried to revise these laws during an extraordinary session of the National Assembly. The MDP called for the deletion of Article 2, which officially denies the existence of a North Korean government; Article 10, which makes any nonreporting of espionage activities subject to severe penalty; and for removing portions of Article 7, which punishes praise of North Korea. Analysts said that the government was in a hurry to do this because of the widely rumored visit of North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il.
However, both the opposition GNP and the splinter ULD, a coalition partner of the MDP, maintained a hard-line position to oppose the legislation, calling it premature. As interparty bickering over the controversial change of law flared up again, the MDP announced that the revision would not be sought until after Kim Jong-Il's visit (Chosun Ilbo, February 2, 2001).
Such confrontation once again ignited head-on collisions among major newspapers, which were split along pro- and anti-government lines. On the one hand, Hankyoreh Shinmun (February 2 & 8, 2001) continued its years-long campaign for the abolition of the "anti-human and anti-national" NSL. In the newspaper's view, the NSL has been misused for the oppression of the "nationalist activists" by the antidemocratic, authoritarian, ultraconservatives. A liberal democratic system, the paper argues, should be maintained through the exercise of democracy, not the execution of the law. If North Korea continues to be defined as an anti-state entity, cooperation between North and South cannot be rationalized. The newspaper emphasizes that if the NSL were abolished, what would be lost would be the sense of confrontation--but, in return, peaceful coexistence would be gained.
But the Big Three newspapers--Chosun Ilbo, Dong-a Ilbo, and JoongAng Ilbo--will not give up their opposition to an overall change of the law. Dong-a Ilbo, in particular, made it clear in its editorials that the dispelling of the several clauses of the NSL is premature. The newspaper acknowledged that the NSL needs to be streamlined to adapt to the era of inter-Korean peace and cooperation. But it is seriously concerned that the ruling camp's rush to change the anti-Communist law coincides with the forthcoming visit to Seoul by Kim Jong-Il. The editorials warned that any attempt to revise the NSL in haste could entail serious consequences that do harm rather than good to the nation, with the potential split of national opinion in the South, stemming from ideological complications (Dong-a Ilbo, February 3, 2001).
As Kim's visit to Seoul is not likely to happen in the near future, hot debates about the revision of the NSL have recently cooled in South Korea. However, activists and their chosen venue, Hankyoreh Shinmun, are never tired of the anti-NSL campaign, and the conservative sides continue their counterattacks. Though President Kim continues to emphasize the necessity of revision of the antihuman elements contained in the NSL, he does not seem to have enough political resources to overcome the conservatives' skepticism that some legal devices are indispensable against North Korea's provocation.
Opinions differ as well on the issue of "giving too much for nothing." Deputy Prime Minister for Education and Human Resources Han Wan-Sang, one of the leading figures who wholeheartedly supports Kim Dae-Jung's Sunshine Policy, caused controversy early this year by criticizing those voicing concern over North-South relations. Mr. Han said that people who thought the South was giving too much to the North, and that the speed of rapprochement was too fast, wanted "to stay in the frozen land of the Cold War." He argued that claims that the pace of reconciliation should be tempered came only from "people who don't want peace in the Korean peninsula." A couple of weeks after he made this controversial remark, which was aired by the MBC-TV of South Korea, Han was appointed as a deputy prime minister.
Immediately after his comment was made public, the conservative media blatantly criticized Deputy Prime Minister Han. Among the attackers was, of course, Chosun Ilbo. In an editorial, the paper argued that the reason the current government's North Korean policy was drawing criticism was not so much because of the scale of aid for the North, but rather the fact that the aid was being given unilaterally, regardless of whether the North responded in kind. According to the editorial, the North has done nothing to demonstrate that it has been changing since the June summit. On the contrary, it acts as if the South's kindness is a "political victory." The problem is that the aid is being given "as if poured" on Pyongyang. The newspaper concluded that peace is not achieved by giving in completely, a practice that can sometimes make the other side arrogant and much less willing to compromise (Chosun Ilbo, February 2, 2001).
Three months later, Chosun Ilbo again harshly criticized the Kim Dae-Jung government's "throwing money at the North." Its editorial described the South Korean people as dumbfounded to hear that the Ministry of Finance and Economy and other ministries had multiplied their budget requests for operations involving North Korea next year. The paper demanded that the "pouring" of benevolence on the North not continue next year, given the difficult economic conditions of South Korea (Chosun Ilbo, May 15, 2001).
However, the pro-Kim Dae-Jung media have quite different views on this matter. For instance, the weekly magazine Hankyoreh 21 featured a cover story on May 8, 2001, severely criticizing the conservatives' propaganda of "giving too much for nothing to North Korea." Its sister paper, Hankyoreh Shinmun, introduced the calculation that Seoul has provided about 300 million U.S. dollars to North Korea in the space of five years. In return, it argues, the South Korean people have been given many precious things that can never be measured in terms of money, such as the reunion of several hundred separated families, relief from the fear of another war in the peninsula, and so on. Thus the pro-government paper urges "impatient and short-sighted" people not to miss the long-term balance sheet (Hankyoreh Shinmun, April 20 and May 10, 2001).
Objectively speaking, the South Korean people as a whole do not blame their government's willingness to give aid to North Korea only if such materials are used for humanitarian purposes. The problem is that there are no means to verify whether the food rations or other materials sent northward are ending up with those the aid is intended for. More important, South Koreans doubt that the North Korean government has any desire to even try to make such accommodations. North Korea's overbearing and arrogant approach to the South and Seoul's seemingly low posture begging for dialogue with Pyongyang are the main causes of South Korean disappointment with Kim Dae-Jung's engagement policy.
Divided Public Opinion on Engagement
The cost and patience demanded for the reunion of North and South Korea will probably be beyond imagination. That's why so many South Koreans give the nod to President Kim's pledge that the South does not expect--and is not capable of accomplishing--abrupt reunification. Based on this acknowledgment, Kim's efforts to engage North Korea enjoy full support among his people. But with respect to the details of accomplishing such aims, it's a different story.
Chosun Ilbo recently published a poll showing that 55 percent of South Koreans highly praised President Kim's efforts last year to improve North-South relations. His engagement policy was positively accepted by 71.4 percent of respondents. However, Kim's low-profile approach to Pyongyang, especially "giving too much for nothing" to the North, was sharply criticized by 49.5 percent of the public (Chosun Ilbo, May 10, 2001).
Meanwhile, the opposition leader Lee Hoi-Chang's proposal emphasizing verification and reciprocity has secured the endorsement of two-thirds of the people (66 percent). Even residents in the Cholla provinces preferred Lee's approach to dealing with North Korea to that of Kim (Monthly Chosun, May 2001).
How do South Koreans evaluate the speed of rapprochement between the North and South? According to a survey conducted last October, 64.7 percent of respondents asked the government to slow down the speed of the engagement policy, while only 4.2 percent hoped for more haste (Munhwa Ilbo, November 1, 2000).
Recently, Professor Han Joon of Hallym University has comprehensively re-analyzed and criticized the various referendums conducted by the media on issues related to North Korea, reunification, and inter-Korean relations. He made comparisons of the change of national mood before and after the inter-Korean summit, and his survey confirms that many South Koreans demand the government slow down the rapprochement between two Koreas. Regardless of the ups and downs of the opinion polls, it is undeniable that about half of the South Korean people are not satisfied with President Kim's quick-tempered rush to the North. They want to tell him that haste makes waste (Sahoi Bipyung, Summer 2001).
What strikes perhaps the most serious note is that Kim Dae-Jung's engagement policy is getting increasingly politicized. It's no secret in South Korea that Kim's political supporters almost exclusively come from the relatively progressive sectors of the people, including the younger generations and blue-collar workers, on the one hand, and residents from the Cholla provinces, on the other. By contrast, his opponents comprise a large cluster of conservatives and their supporters, and those who reside in the Kyongsang provinces.
Perhaps Kim's most worrysome legacy is the perpetuation of a bitter rift between the southeastern Kyongsang provinces and his own stronghold, the Cholla provinces of the southwest. Many people desperately hoped he would reduce regional animosity. Three-and-a-half years of his government have betrayed such an aspiration. The opposition correctly points out that key public offices, and Kim's own team of advisers, are dominated by loyalists from the Cholla provinces. Kim's failure to heal the regional divide means that the political pendulum is likely to swing back to Kyongsang if the opposition wins next year's presidential election.
Lee, the opposition's possible candidate, expects overwhelming support from the Kyongsang provinces--60.2 percent of people in South Kyongsang and 52.3 percent of the residents from North Kyongsang can be counted as strong Lee supporters (Monthly Chosun, May 2001).
The deepening of the opinion gap among regions over Kim Dae-Jung's North Korean policy has attracted serious concern. Until last August, the level of difference of opinion between residents living in the Cholla provinces and those of the Kyongsang provinces had remained at around 10 percent. But data collected four months later indicated that it had widened to 45.1 percent. As many as 80 percent of the residents of the Cholla provinces continued to support Kim's engagement policy. But in the South Kyongsang provinces, the figures plummeted to a mere 34.3 percent. This indicates that Kim's engagement policy has been critically politicized in accordance with the regional division (Sahoi Bipyung, Summer 2001). Another poll showed that 71.1 percent of the people residing in Kyongsang are very critical of Kim's approach, 6.4 percent higher than the national average; 39.2 percent of those in the Cholla provinces support the current developments between the North and South, again 6 percent higher than the national average (Munhwa Ilbo, November 1, 2000).
It is true that democratic society is characterized by internal discord and sometimes even by the radical splits in the opinions of the people. But the division of South Korea's "epistemic community" (a term originally used by Peter Haas in his book Saving the Mediterranean [NY: Columbia University Press, 1990]) is far more serious than usual. The society has already suffered from political and regional confrontations. Now its distrust and antagonism have been further aggravated because of conflicting views on engagement policy. Political feuds, regional disharmony, and bitter antagonism over the engagement policy are coinciding to the degree that some analysts worry about the further division of the South Korean society--a society in which so many have suffered already from the North-South division.
It is deplorable that South Koreans are dangerously polarized on engaging the North, a senior government official of South Korea recently stated, adding: "We don't know how to debate in this country. The domestic consensus should be better looked after" (Far Eastern Economic Review, May 24, 2001).
Those who reside in the Cholla provinces, who support Kim Dae-Jung, and are oriented to the leftist ideology are relatively more friendly toward Kim's engagement policy. But recent surveys unanimously report that his pro-engagement-policy support is decreasing. Kim has no alternative but to seek to engage those who live in the Kyongsang provinces and are skeptical of North Korea--and who are least willing to cast their votes for the MDP's candidate next year.
The criticisms that conservatives have raised against the engagement policy aren't convincing. It is hard to imagine how the options they suggest could foster peace and cooperation between Pyongyang and Seoul. Nonetheless, conservatives seem to have their own good reasons for not happily adopting Kim's North Korean policy.
First of all, conservatives do not trust North Korea. They're not sure whether or not Kim Jong-Il has really given up the idea of reunifying the two Koreas by nonpeaceful means. North Korea pretends to be interested in the dialogue with the South, but conservatives argue that this is nothing but a tactic for procuring more economic aid from Seoul. It was widely reported in the conservative media in the South that recent cutoffs of contacts between the two sides have been caused by the North's lack of concern for anything but eliciting more material support from the South (Dong-a Ilbo, May 26, 2001).
Secondly, the conservatives are very upset by the radicals in the South. The progressives (who are almost automatically identified in conservatives' minds with pro-Pyongyang elements) are said to attempt to disarm the South Korean society as a whole in terms of ideology. Extreme conservatives like Lee Chul-Seung, president of the National Congress of Freedom and Democracy, even suspect that "irresponsible and anachronistic leftist radicals" are preparing the way for the North to take over the capitalist South. It is common in Seoul to hear the claim that Kim Dae-Jung's rush to North Korea is deeply influenced by those pro-North progressives.
Thirdly, Kim's political opponents believe that his North Korean policy has been motivated by impure political purposes. Some of them do not hesitate to repeat the slander that his cry for dialogue with the North last year was only made in order to create grounds for his being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
In summary, the majority of South Koreans and, in particular, the conservatives want Kim Dae-Jung to revise his approach to North. The idea of the engagement policy itself is plausible, but, they say, some behaviors--like Kim's low-profile handling of North Korea and "giving too much for nothing"--must be stopped. As Scott Snyder, the representative to Korea from the Asia Foundation, correctly points out, many South Koreans blame Kim Dae-Jung for pursuing inter-Korean progress at the expense of South Korea's domestic agenda.
As the next presidential elections approach, Kim has to pay much more attention to the moves of the conservatives. Key figures of the ruling party insist that the elections are still far ahead in the future and that there is enough time to reverse Kim Dae-Jung's unfavorable political situation. Kim Jong-Il's visit to Seoul is expected to be one of the big cards that will at once roll the tide of opinion back into their favor. But past experiences indicate that such a political breakthrough is very unlikely. A more realistic prediction is that any hurry to politicize the North Korean issue will turn out to be a political catastrophe for the incumbent government (Weekly Dong-a, May 10, 2001).
Another hope for the ruling party is the possibility of economic recovery. If the South Korean economy can emerge from its stagnation, Kim's supporters can expect that negative public opinion against the government will be to a great degree appeased. But many experts on the South Korean economy are not optimistic. In fact, they urge that Kim Dae-Jung's government be ready for the worsening of the economy later this year (Dong-a Ilbo, May 28, 2001).
Given these indications, President Kim must awake from whatever daydream he's having and completely review his engagement policy. It must also be stressed that North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il has a crucial role to play in helping his counterpart in the South.
Certainly North Korea is coming out of its years-long seclusion from the international world and beginning to respond positively to the South's demand for mutual dialogue. But Pyongyang must move faster. Kim Dae-Jung badly needs help from the North if he is to continue pushing for engagement. Chairman Kim must recognize that no other politician in the South is likely to be more sympathetic to him than Kim Dae-Jung has been--and it is predicted by many that next year there will be a new president of South Korea coming from the opposition camp.
That's all the more reason for the North to hurry to establish a more solid system of peace in the Korean peninsula while President Kim is still in power. In doing so, Pyongyang must recognize that many South Koreans have been deeply hurt by its high-handed and arbitrary manner of dealing with the South. The process will require that North Korea be careful not to trample down Seoul's self-respect.
What, then, should Kim Dae-Jung do from this point forward with regard to North Korea? First, President Kim must not attempt to use the reunification issue for political purposes. Before last year's summit talk, the ruling party expected to reap a political bonanza from the successful meeting, but this never happened. The experiences of the past decades clearly show that any attempt to link reunification policies to political points is doomed to failure. President Kim's political crisis deepened at the very moment last year when people all over the world celebrated his admirable achievements in North Korean relations. He has to remember that success in engagement policy has nothing to do with his approval rating in domestic politics.
It follows that if Kim Dae-Jung is unconcerned with political returns from rapid improvement in North-South relations, he has no reason not to accommodate the opposition, which argues for more rigorous reciprocity with North Korea. Opposition leader Lee Hoi-Chang criticized the incumbent government on the grounds that its engagement policy lacked principles for reciprocity, transparency, and verification. As a result, he continued, "The current administration's give-and-wait Sunshine Policy only succeeded in removing incentives to make change to the North" (JoongAng Ilbo, May 31, 2001). But note that even Lee never rejects the necessity of the engagement policy itself. He seems to be willing to pay for the welcoming of the North Korean leader's visit to Seoul. In other words, Kim's principle of flexible reciprocity can be harmonized with the GNP's position--a position that is, it seems, far from strict reciprocity per se.
If President Kim is able to make the opposition believe that his government will not politicize the engagement policy, he will be able to have a heart-to-heart talk with his political rivals. The fact is that any politician who does not express sympathetic views on the reunification issue cannot survive in Korean society. Regrettably, there has been no report so far that Kim has sought sincere and candid conversation with the opposition leaders. It's time for him and the opposition as well to make their utmost efforts to heal the divided epistemic community in South Korea resulting from the controversial engagement policy.
Early this year, Cardinal Kim Soo Whan, perhaps the most widely respected public figure in South Korea, advised President Kim to be less attached to political interests and more tolerant of his opponents. The need for President Kim to change is, I believe, as important as the need for North Korea to change, if there is to be peace and prosperity in the Korean peninsula. President Kim must recognize that reconciliation of the South-South conflict is a pre-condition for a successful engagement policy (JoongAng Ilbo, May 2, 2001).
Finally, looking at the United States' options regarding the Korean question, the Bush administration is said to be about to complete its review on North Korean policies. Though its position seems to be not so different from that of the Clinton administration, many South Korean specialists express concern that Bush's hard-line position toward North Korea may have a negative impact on the rapprochement between the two Koreas. A tenacious call from the United States for strict verification and overly rigorous reciprocity could set back the engagement policy pursued by Kim's government. The United States is therefore expected to adopt a more prudent stance toward the North, lest its policies become a source of instability on the peninsula (JoongAng Ilbo, May 28, 2001).
One hopes that the United States will leave President Kim Dae-Jung's hands free to pursue his own engagement policy. For his part, Kim needs to proclaim his determination to establish more reciprocity in dealing with North Korea. The opposition in South Korea has to admit that a flexible approach to the North is the only option open to Koreans. North Korea's Kim Jong-Il should not toy with the goodwill and patience of South Koreans. And Mr. Bush, one hopes, will favor policies toward North Korea that can simultaneously send reconciliatory messages to President Kim, the opposition parties of South Korea, and Chairman Kim of the North.
Young Kug Chung
Associate Professor
The Academy of Korean Studies
50 Bungi, Unjung-dong
Pundang-gu, Seungnam-si
Kyunggi-do
Korea
Tel: 82-31-709-6082
E-mail: chungyk@aks.ac.kr
L. Gordon Flake
Executive Director
The Mansfield Center for Pacific Affairs
1401 New York Avenue, NW, Suite 740
Washington, DC 20005-2102
Tel: 202-347-1994
Fax: 202-347-3941
E-mail: lgflake@mcpa.org
Il Young Kim
Associate Professor
Department of Political Science
Sung Kyun Kwan University
53 Bungi, Myungryun-dong, 3 Ka
Seoul 110-745
Korea
Tel: 82-2-760-0385
E-mail: iykim@skku.ac.kr
Young Rae Kim
Professor
Ajou University
#11-204 Hyundai, Apt. 129-1
Wooman-dong, Paldal-ku
Suwon City 442-192
Korea
Tel: 82-31-213-1133
Fax: 82-31-219-2195
E-mail: youngraekim@hanmail.net
Kongdan Oh
Research Staff Member
Institute for Defense Analyses
7602 Boulder Street
Springfield, VA 22151-2802
Tel: 703-913-5472
Fax: 703-913-5473
E-mail: ohhassig@ix.netcom.com
Scott Snyder
Korea Representative
The Asia Foundation
106-5 Hwa-dong
Chongno-ku
Seoul 110-210
Korea
Tel: 822-732-2044
Fax: 822-739-6022
E-mail: ssnyder@tafko.or.kr
Byung-Hoon Suh
Professor
Department of Political Science
Soongsil University
Dongjak-ku
Seoul 156-743
Korea
Tel: 82-2-820-0525
Fax: 82-2-822-3486
E-mail: bhsuh@saint.ssu.ac.kr
Byung-Hoon Suh is a political theorist who has taught at the Department of Political Science in Soongsil University, Seoul, since 1989. He was director of the Institute of the Social Sciences of Soongsil University in 1999-2000. A graduate of Yonsei University, Seoul, he went to Rice University for Ph.D. studies in political science. His books include Conservatism in South Korea (1999, coauthored) and Liberalism and the South Korean Society (2001, coauthored) as well as Plato and John Stuart Mill on Freedom (2000). Dr. Suh is currently contributing monthly political columns to Dong-a Ilbo and the Weekly Dong-a.
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Political Paralysis: Iran's 2001 Election and the Future of Reform, by Farideh Farhi (June 2001)
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President Clinton's Visit to Vietnam, by Frederick Z. Brown (November 2000)
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