CIAO DATE: 09/04

UN Conference on Small Arms Concludes with Consensus

Rachel Stohl

Center for Defense Information

July 2001

After two weeks of harsh statements, compromise, and tough negotiations, the member states of the United Nations agreed to a Programme of Action for the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects.

The Conference, held July 9-20, 2001, began on a rather sour tone with the statement of U.S. Under Secretary of State John Bolton, who expressed the U.S. position on the issue of small arms and the Conference in no uncertain terms. Bolton stressed that the Conference should address only the illicit transfer of military style weapons, excluding firearms and non-military rifles (the weapons responsible for terrible carnage and destruction around the world every year).

Bolton bluntly stated the position of the United States in front of the ministerial-level portion of the meeting, describing the U.S. "redlines," items unacceptable for inclusion in the Conference plan. Bolton stated that the United States could not support a final Conference document that included:

• restrictions on the legal trade and manufacture of small arms and light weapons;
• promotion of international advocacy by NGOs and international organizations;
• restrictions on the sale of small arms and light weapons to entities other than governments;
• a mandatory review conference; and
• a commitment to begin discussions on legally binding agreements.

For two weeks, governments debated the 86 paragraph document. On the last day, after an all night session during which governments debated the most divisive of issues (non-state actors, civilian possession, self-determination, transparency, export criteria, and follow-up), the Conference concluded with consensus. The final debate centered on the U.S. refusal to allow any mention of restrictions on sales to non-state actors, with several African states taking the opposite position. In the end, the Africans relented and all paragraphs related to non-state actors and civilian possession were stricken from the action plan.

The United States repeatedly used its political capital to weaken the Programme of Action and block progress in the debate. While the United States had clearly defined the items that would receive no U.S. support, the United States did not publicly push U.S. best practices on export criteria or on export controls. In addition, the United States did not push for an international agreement on brokering (or the beginning of discussions of such an agreement).

The Small Arms Working Group (SAWG), an alliance of U.S.-based non-governmental organizations and individuals working together to promote change in U.S. policies on small arms and greater harmony in international controls on the small arms trade, had called for a Programme of Action mandating that states start early negotiations on the following three legally binding instruments: A Framework Convention on International Arms Transfers that sets out normative export criteria based on states' current obligations under international law; An International Agreement on Brokering that creates international norms controlling the activities of arms brokers and strengthens national laws to prosecute traffickers who violate these norms; and An International Agreement on Marking and Tracing that develops systems for adequate and reliable marking of arms at manufacture and import together with record-keeping on arms production, possession and transfer. The Conference failed to adopt any language that would have mandated such processes.

SAWG had also urged that the Programme of Action include: the establishment of regional and international transparency mechanisms; concrete steps to achieve improved implementation and enforcement of arms embargoes; norms for civilian possession of small arms and light weapons; and a strengthened relationship between NGOs and governments working on advocacy and awareness-raising on the small arms issue. Again, the document fell short of the majority of expectations that SAWG had put forward.

Although many compromises could not be reached, the Conference document did succeed in establishing a comprehensive approach, and included recognition of the grave humanitarian consequences caused by the proliferation of small arms. In addition, states now have a document on which they can base their future work on small arms. The Conference also agreed on a follow-up conference no later than 2006 with the precise date to be determined by the General Assembly at its 58th session, and biennial conferences to gauge progress on the implementation of the Programme of Action.

For the hundreds of non-governmental organizations present, the Conference served as a tool to galvanize international political, media, and public support on the issue of small arms. The Conference energized and mobilized NGOs to continue their work collaboratively on all aspects of the small arms issue, and the Programme of Action will provide the framework for continued action by like-minded states and NGOs in the future.

For general information on the conference and conference process, visit the UN's small arms website or the International Action Network on Small Arms website.