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CIAO DATE: 08/04


Unrestricted Arms Sales Not the Answer to Terror

Rachel Stohl

Center for Defense Information

September 2001

The U.S. response to the Sept. 11 terror attacks on New York and Washington has been clear and concise: “If you’re not with us, you’re against us.”

As the United States develops an international coalition against terrorism, the administration of President George W. Bush is looking for partners who will join in the military, political, economic and diplomatic efforts necessary to stamp out the terrorists and their networks. To that end, the Bush administration has expressed a willingness to provide weapons to countries that in the past have been criticized for human rights violations, lack of democracy and even support of terrorism.

Initially, the administration proposed allowing arms sales to countries currently ineligible to receive U.S. weapons because of such concerns. Met with stiff domestic and international criticism, the lifting of such bans may now apply only to India and Pakistan. However, this fact remains: The United States is committed to arming potential allies in the war against terrorism with U.S. weapons as quickly as possible.

As the antiterrorism bill makes its way through Congress, the reality is that there is no need for new arms export legislation. There is existing U.S. law — specifically Section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act — that provides more than enough wiggle room for Bush to waive existing regulations governing arms exports and sell weapons to whatever country he chooses, regardless of their human rights or democratic practices.

As the Bush administration weighs its military options, U.S. export law should not be given an end–run simply because the United States is “at war.” The regulations in the Foreign Assistance Act and Arms Export Control Act were developed to ensure that U.S. weapons went into the hands of only so–called desirable actors. The principles supporting U.S. export law are still relevant, irrespective of the coalition being built. It is a standing tenet of U.S. policy that weapons exports should not undermine long–term security and stability, weaken democratic movements, support military coups, escalate arms races, exacerbate ongoing conflicts, cause arms build–ups in unstable regions, or be used to commit human rights abuses.

All of these criteria remain in the U.S. interest. The United States should want now, more than ever, to limit the quantity of U.S. weapons in circulation. The U.S. government already has problems with the effectiveness of the end–use monitoring system designed to ensure that exports do not fall into the wrong hands. Weapons, especially small arms — those that will be particularly useful for any ground invasion of Afghanistan or attempts to uproot terror networks — are difficult to control once they leave U.S. borders. The risk of diversion, especially for light weapons, is incredibly high.

The United States could find itself facing down terrorists armed with its own weapons. In fact, the Stinger antiaircraft missiles now threatening any U.S. effort in Afghanistan were supplied by the U.S. government to help the mujahadeen during their war to oust the Soviet Union from the country. It is not infeasible to believe that any weapons sent to Pakistan or India might be used in the conflict between the two countries over Kashmir, and eventually might fall into the hands of Osama bin Laden’s many followers in Pakistan.

The United States simply cannot afford to provide mass quantities of weapons abroad and do nothing but hope they will be used properly in the end.

The basis for offering weapons — either sold or given away — seems to be a kind of quid pro quo. Many countries desire military upgrades in exchange for intelligence sharing, use of bases and airspace, as well as loyalty. However, if an exchange of some sort is needed, the United States should send these countries — many of them part of the developing world — resources they really need, those that strengthen democracy and support infrastructures that create an unfriendly environment for terrorist elements.

Providing weapons to countries that have been on the U.S. blacklist for poor human rights records, consistently harboring and supporting terrorism, and those involved in military coups, undermine the very principles for which the United States stands — freedom, justice and democracy. Moreover, such a policy rewards bad actors and sends the message that the United States will forgive past sins (and perhaps look aside later), as long as the effort to hunt down al–Qaida takes center stage.

It makes no sense to throw out arms export practices that have served well for so long in a moment of passion and fear. The core values and principles underlying current restrictions on arms transfers still make sense. It would be illogical to exempt human rights abusers or harborers of terrorists who may, for this moment, be on our side. Just like in Afghanistan, we can’t predict whose side they may be on tomorrow.

Rachel Stohl is senior analyst at the Center for Defense Information, Washington.

 

 

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