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Email this citationCIAO DATE: 07/03
Anti-terrorism and Peace-building During and After Conflict
Ekaterina Stepanova
June 2003
Abstract
Since the tragic events of 11 September 2001, much has been said about potential links between the fight against terrorism and peace-building. In the meantime, the fight against terrorism and peace-building have, by and large, continued to be implemented separately and by different sets of actors.
The events of 11 September might have led the world 's leading states to reassess terrorism as a security threat, but could hardly fundamentally alter the nature of peace-building operations and tasks, from institution-and democracy-building to post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. It is not surprising that the way the threat of terrorism is addressed by actors involved in peace-building activities is often limited to its possible effect on the security environment for their operations. It is thus seen as a problem to be solved either by the security component of the mission, or by an ad hoc international security force, or by national security structures (if any). A certain reserve towards the fight against terrorism on the part of the peace-building community is not without foundation, and may be seen as a natural reaction to the declaration after 11 September 2001 of a global 'war on terrorism ' which goes far beyond traditional anti-terrorist priorities and needs. In fact, many of the adverse effects of this global campaign stem precisely from a lack of clarity about its nature and operational goals.
Against this background, it is not surprising that the impact of the war on terror- ism on the many conflict and post-conflict areas around the world has so far been very mixed, at best. While some of the harsher measures undertaken as part of the war on terrorism, such as inflicting direct military losses on groups involved in terrorist activities, depriving them of safe havens and blocking their financial chan- nels, have helped temporarily to improve the security environment in certain areas, there have also been serious adverse effects. These have included (but are not limited to)the serious disruption of economic activity in post-conflict areas as a result, for instance, of the targeting of key business groups operating in those regions for their alleged terrorist ties. Above all, the impression given by some of the world 's leading states that they are now prioritizing the need to fight terrorism over all other considerations has provided room for endless attempts by all sides to local conflicts to misuse the anti-terrorist agenda for their own purposes.
Similarly, chances to use the war on terrorism as a lever to pressure local actors in conflict and post-conflict areas to engage in more active cooperation among themselves and with the international community appeared to be greatest in the immediate aftermath of 11 September, but tended to fade afterwards. Early hopes that the global campaign against terrorism would provide an opportunity to launch new or more ambitious peace-building efforts in previously neglected areas have been accompanied by concerns that political and financial resources might be diverted away from these activities, as they cannot be as easily tied to the vital national security interests of the world 's leading states as the fight against terrorism can. In sum, the mixed effects of the war on terrorism may well have persuaded the peace-building community of the need to play down anti-terrorism concerns in the interest of avoiding damage to longer-lasting and, ultimately, more fundamental peace-building efforts.
The 'do no harm ' approach is certainly a sound point of departure, , but it should not be used as an excuse for doing nothing in the fight against terrorism. Actors involved in terrorist activities do threaten peace and stability, and anti-terrorism should not be played down for the sake of building a lasting peace. In other words, in conflict or post-conflict areas where terrorism is an issue, 'peace-building as usual' will not do .
Both the difficulty of reconciling anti-terrorism and peace-building in conflict and post-conflict areas and the way in which they are inseparably interlinked can be demonstrated by one of the most complicated challenges posed by the global war on terrorism when it is applied to some of the most protracted armed conflicts and some of the most demanding post-conflict environments. This is the problem of targeting locally or regionally based indigenous non-state organizations which are tainted with terrorist connections or directly involved in terrorist activities. The problem of dealing with these groups and movements operating in conflict or post- conflict environments is complicated by the fact that terrorism is rarely their only or main mode of action. Many such groups are also involved in other types of vio- lent activity, such as rebel attacks against governmental security and military targets, and inter-communal violence. Additionally, some of the organizations which have been or continue to be engaged in armed confrontation may also be involved in non-violent activities that can range from social and community work to economic, political and religious functions. These activities are of critical importance in 'failed' or weak states where non-state groups often have to fill the governmental void, as local authorities, if there are any, are unable to perform their direct political, security and social functions.
It need hardly be said that this combination of violent and non-violent activities is often found in Islamic fundamentalist organizations which operate in conflict and post-conflict areas — from the large and highly visible Palestinian Hamas to the low-profile Somalia-based al-Ittihad al-Islami — if only because, in fundamentalist Islam, politics, religion, state and society are inseparable. The problem of targeting these non-state actors is further complicated by the fact that they may have their own concepts and ideas of the state to be built (the Islamic state), which are not compatible with either other locally driven agendas or those designed by the international community in line with Western political discourse. Also, some of these groups' economic activities, often with the backing of Muslim states, funds and charities, can be seen as efforts for reconstruction in war-torn areas. Finally, the most extensive influence of Islamic fundamentalist groups is to be found in social and community work. While working within society, these groups ultimately aspire to create an alternative to elements of modern civil society. Some of them have also been quite successful in infiltrating traditional societal networks (such as clan structures) which have survived armed confrontation and are often the only remaining functioning social mechanisms in a war-torn society. As such, these societal networks are particularly crucial from the point of view of peace-building (which is as much about rebuilding a stable society as it is about rebuilding a functional state).
In sum, while the terrorist activities and connections of these non-state actors operating in a conflict or a post-conflict environment cannot be ignored, the political, ideological, social and other fundamental challenges posed by them can go far beyond any terrorist threat they might present. This further underlines the need to reintegrate the peace-building perspective into the anti-terrorism agenda.
Even this brief outline suggests that the tools used to destroy and deter clandestine transnational terrorist networks with a global outreach and agenda, such as al-Qaeda, may not always be particularly well tailored for dealing with homegrown groups involved in terrorist activities that are generated by and tied to specific armed conflicts. A critical challenge here is to try to ensure that the various tools and methods used in the war on terrorism, as applied to conflict and post-conflict areas, are modified and refocused so that they at least do not interfere with and, at best, complement and reinforce the more fundamental and longer-term work of peace-building.
How can the far-reaching goal of integrating anti-terrorist measures into the more general framework of peace-building be achieved? What political, military, legal, economic and other tools can be employed for anti-terrorist purposes in conflict and post-conflict areas, and what are the comparative advantages and disadvantages of these tools? How effective are formal mechanisms, instruments and institution-building processes for countering the challenges posed by organizations involved in terrorist activities? Should the same methods be applied to different groups that are operating in conflict and post-conflict areas? These are some of the issues that are addressed in this policy paper.
First, however, the main terms must be defined, because any discussion of terrorism always boils down to the same basic theoretical and methodological issues focused on the fundamental problem of defining terrorism itself.
