CIAO DATE: 05/02

From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict

Executive Summary
Overview and Introduction
Participation
Issues and Debates: Conceptualizing and Implementing Prevention
Development and Prevention
Leadership
Prevention: A Range of Tools
From Information to Analysis and Prevention
"Proving" Prevention
Issues and Debates: Who Does What?
Security Council
The Secretary-General and the Secretariat
General Assembly
Member States
Regional Organizations
Strengthening UN Capacities: The Way Forward
Participants

Executive Summary

On 9-10 February, 2001, in light of the anticipated report of the UN Secretary-General on conflict prevention, the International Peace Academy held a workshop with Security Council members and others on prevention at West Point, NY. Important points from the wide-ranging discussion are:

The UN is an important, but by no means the only or always the most important, actor engaged in preventive action; nor does each UN organ play an equally important role in preventive action:

• The Secretary-General has a central role to play in the prevention of violent conflict, personally, through special representatives and envoys, and through the preventive apparatus being developed via numerous departments and agencies;

• National governments are critical-the UN will often need to engage with them, mostly through the Secretary-General;

• The Security Council has a role, but a constrained one, due to limits in its mandate, capacities, and methods of work. The General Assembly may have more than a symbolic role to play, but the relevancy and impact of Assembly debates and decisions is nowadays discounted by many; as well its size, structure, and procedures make it an unwieldy forum for operational efforts; and

• Regional arrangements also play a role, particularly in instances where they might enjoy greater legitimacy locally to act.

Prevention, which is widely supported, needs to be seen as distinct from intervention, which remains highly controversial;

Development is an important basis for preventive action, but development assistance plays a limited (albeit important) role in securing economic growth and stability relative to national policies;

Leadership at the national level, both good and bad, plays a key role in fomenting and preventing violent conflict; and

The capacity for more sophisticated analysis, not merely early warning, is needed, if the UN's role in preventive action is to be enhanced.

Overview and Introduction

While the United Nations has a longstanding mandate to engage in conflict prevention, embodied in the charter of the organization, and successive Secretaries-General engaged frequently through their diplomatic "good offices" to prevent violent conflict or its escalation, the UN only began to seriously engage in developing capacity for preventive action subsequent to Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1992 report, An Agenda for Peace. Preventing violent conflicts has subsequently risen on the organization's agenda, with significant Security Council Presidential Statements in November 1999 and July 2000, culminating in the request that the UN Secretary-General submit a report on the subject to the Security Council in May 2001. The UN does not act alone in prevention-regional organizations, member states, development actors and others may all have a role to play, frequently a more significant one than the UN. Similarly, while the Security Council has a high profile, it will not always be the most appropriate or most effective preventive actor. The Secretary-General may have a far more crucial role to play, given his broad network of interlocutors at all levels who can be engaged quietly.

Participation

The speakers and participants represented a broad cross-section of the UN community and beyond, including:

• Security Council member states, including all of the permanent five (P-5) states as well as many of the rotating members;

• Permanent missions of other member states, from both developed and developing countries, including friends of prevention and states that have expressed significant reservations about the concept;

• UN Departments and Agencies whose activities may significantly bolster preventive action, including the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), which has been designated by the Secretary-General as the focal point for prevention within the UN system;

• Foreign ministry representation from several member states;

• Academic experts on prevention.

Issues and Debates: Conceptualizing and Implementing Prevention

The distinction between prevention and intervention, the role of development in prevention, the role of national leadership in fomenting and preventing conflict, the importance of accurate and sophisticated analysis, and the difficulty of assessing preventive efforts were all subjects of debate.

Prevention vs. Intervention

A central theme of the discussion, highlighted in introductory remarks by Ambassador Pierre Schori (Permanent Representative of Sweden to the UN), was the distinction between prevention and intervention. He emphasized, as did subsequent participants, that governments needed to view prevention not as a threat but as an opportunity and that successful prevention diminished the risk of intervention. Other participants, particularly from the south, concurred that preventive action can obviously be beneficial, but demonstrated concern that it could not serve as a façade for interfering in states' domestic affairs. Nonetheless, it was widely accepted that preventive efforts, carried out properly, are less costly in human and economic terms than intervention at a later stage.

Development and Prevention

It will often be important to seek to address the root causes of conflict with preventive action. This requires addressing underlying economic, social, humanitarian, and other concerns that might flare into conflict and fuel it once under way. In particular, development plays a key role in such "structural" prevention. However, simply deeming all development programs to constitute prevention is an empty rhetorical gesture; conversely seeing development assistance as the principal preventive instrument defies expert opinion. While poverty is linked to conflict, exclusion and inequality are equally important. Thus development actors seeking to engage in prevention need to tailor their activities to the root causes of potential conflict, and need to bear in mind the likely limits of solely development assistance-based preventive strategies. The role of national actors, particularly leaders, remains critical.

Leadership

Individual leaders of nation-states or armed groups play a significant role both in the propagation and the prevention of violent conflict. In order to implement preventive action effectively, it will be necessary to address the behavior of leaders instrumental in precipitating conflict, and whose cooperation would be required to terminate it. Informal coalitions of proactive leaders and ministers, particularly those from regional powers, sometimes acting with major powers, are vital in promoting prevention; only they, ultimately, can galvanize the political will and resources to prevent conflict.

Prevention: A Range of Tools

The appropriate measures will likely vary greatly depending upon the phase of the conflict and thus of the preventive action. Preventive measures can include:

• targeted development aid

• preventive diplomacy, including SC missions

• mediation

• sanctions

• use of force

• post-conflict peacebuilding ranging from security sector reform to institution-building (as relapse into conflict is always a great risk)

Further, successful prevention will likely involve a complex array of actors and measures. This may necessitate the refinement of the tools available, particularly because as conflict becomes imminent, the options available narrow significantly. A possible implication is that early, structural, prevention, is likely to be more successful than later, crisis prevention and management.

From Information to Analysis and Prevention

Fruitful discussion occurred with regard to the relationship between early warning, information, and analysis in the development of preventive measures. The real obstacle to preventive action is now well understood not to be the absence of information; for example, there was ample warning about the impending genocide in Rwanda, but insufficient analysis and no consensus about the appropriate course of action to take, and little political will to take costly actions. In this light there was a general consensus that what is lacking is not information, but analysis that might provide the Secretary-General and the Security Council (where appropriate) with a "road map" that might help convince governments and publics to engage in action. However, the proposal to create such a function in the Secretariat in the Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations of August 2000 (Brahimi Report) was greeted with reservations by a number of countries in the south. It might be worth asking whether such analytic functions that serve preventive action, the need for which is widely supported, could be ensured in another format.

"Proving" Prevention

It will often be difficult to clearly identify successful prevention, given that a success is often a non-event. Numerous variables and actors come into play, and demonstrating that preventive action works is a difficult proposition. This makes prevention a questionable proposition for some, who object to the allocation of scarce resources to it, and who challenge the legitimacy of the Security Council as an actor in this area. However, perhaps the priority should be not to demonstrate that it works, but rather to endeavor to generate conditions under which conflict would be less likely to develop.

Issues and Debates: Who Does What?

Central issues addressed included the appropriate role and comparative advantage of the spectrum of actors within the UN system-the Security Council, the Secretary-General, the General Assembly, developmental institutions (including the International Financial Institutions), and member states. There was also some discussion of the possibility that there might be instances when regional organizations ought to take the lead.

Security Council

Concerns are often expressed about the composition of the Council and the perceived selectivity of its actions. ₁

In addition, Council attention might in some cases be counter-productive, drawing unhelpful political attention to sensitive situations and "legitimizing" rogue actors. The Council has traditionally become involved somewhat later in the conflict cycle, after a conflict is underway. Several potential preventive roles for the Council were suggested, including more regular discussion on early warning alerts; establishing ad hoc mechanisms to follow early warning cases; and the possibility of Council members engaging in more frequent discussion with experts within and outside the UN system on early warning and prevention when appropriate.

However, there was a strong sense among some participants that the "lead" on prevention needed to rest with the Secretary-General, given the Council's already heavy work-load, its leaky operations, and its lack of universally accepted mandate in this area.

The Secretary-General and the Secretariat

There was a near-consensus that the Secretary-General's office has, over the years, in conjunction with key secretariat units, special representatives and envoys, and a host of other instruments, developed valuable capacity for preventive measures, a capacity many would like to see strengthened. The Secretariat has already developed significant mechanisms for prevention including the Prevention Team, the Framework for Coordination, and the Early Warning and Preventive Measures course at the UN Staff College. In recent years the use of Special Representatives of the Secretary-General for particular countries or issues has proven to be effective. Other measures suggested for the Secretary-General included modifying the manner in which he/she reports on early warning; the establishment of a more systematic link between the Secretary-General and the Council, and independent early warning mechanisms; and the opportunities to address early warning issues during the regularly scheduled separate meetings between the Secretary-General and the presidents of the Council and the General Assembly and with members of the Council. Nonetheless, as with Security Council involvement in prevention, some worry that overt attention by the Secretary-General towards countries of concern could be counter-productive, making self-fulfilling prophecy of early warning alerts.

General Assembly

The General Assembly, as the body comprising the entire membership of the UN, could, in theory, have a role to play; Assembly engagement might provide a useful venue for the voices of such states at risk to be heard and for them to hear from their peers. Specific roles for the General Assembly might well include a more prominent and active role for its president in early warning; the establishment of more regular mechanisms linking the Assembly to early warning information; and encouraging more systematic contact between members of the Assembly and the Council, possibly through their presidents.

However, while the Security Council's legitimacy is sometimes questioned due to its composition, the General Assembly's deliberative activities have become so sterile in many instances as to discredit the body decisively with many beyond the immediate UN community. ₂ In addition, its size and working methods do not favor operational roles.

Member States

There is a limit to the degree and nature of preventive action that states would countenance, due to the necessarily intrusive and often selective nature of preventive initiatives. Nevertheless, a number of states have welcomed a range of UN preventive measures while others have tolerated them. Yet others are clearly (and often definitively) hostile to them.

States may also play positive roles in preventive action in their own neighborhoods and elsewhere: through groups of friends or other coalitions in support of UN action. They may also act as regional powers to bring intransigent actors to heel. The recent emphasis of the European Union and the G-8 on conflict prevention, though not discussed in great detail, may prove a welcome contribution. In addition, as donor states they may make funds available to strengthen preventive measures.

Regional Organizations

There might be instances when regional organizations would have greater legitimacy to act in conflict prevention than the UN; frequently it may well be the case that regional bodies are best placed to act first, and the UN step in only later. Further, the UN generally neither can nor should act alone in prevention. Hence the need for greater coordination with such organizations, and for analysis of which bodies might be best placed to act at what phase of the conflict or potential conflict. The Secretary-General and the Secretariat have begun to seek closer coordination with regional organizations in ways that may need to become more specific and convincing, possibly in smaller and more cohesive groups; the Security Council needs to bear them in mind constantly as well.

Strengthening UN Capacities: The Way Forward

A central theme of the meeting was that none of the preventive activities prescribed should occur in isolation, but should be part of a broader pattern of activity guided by coordinated decision-making.

On an optimistic note, there was a sense that the UN actually does more, and more successfully, in preventive action than is frequently acknowledged, and that among other things the UN needs to better convey to the world its past activities and successes. This, in a sense, is a challenge of "self-conceptualization".

There does however, remain significant analysis to be done with regard to what mechanisms and measures will best strengthen UN activities in conflict prevention. The Secretary-Generals report will also need to reflect at least some of the UN's more recent experiences, display an awareness of key research emerging in recent years, and avoid familiar bromides to the very governments whose actions may generate the need for preventive action. The measures articulated above for the Secretary-General, the Security Council, the General Assembly, and member states deserve to be analyzed in more detail in order to advance the cause of conflict prevention.

Participants

Co-Chairs
Mr. Danilo Türk, UN Department of Political Affairs
Dr. David M. Malone, International Peace Academy Speakers

Discussants
Mr. David Angell, Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations
Mr. Reda Bebars, Permanent Mission of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the United Nations Mr. Jamal Benomar, UN Development Programme (UNDP)
H.E. Mr. Carlos Dos Santos, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Mozambique to the United Nations
H.E. Mr. Andrés Franco, Permanent Mission of Colombia to the United Nations
Mr. Alistair Harrison, Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the United Nations
Mr. Tapio Kanninen, UN Department of Political Affairs
Mr. Adriaan Kooijmans, Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations
H.E. Mr. Jean-David Levitte, Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations
Dr. Michael Lund, Management Systems International, Inc.
H.E. Mr. Kishore Mahbubani, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Singapore to the United Nations
Mr. Michael Moller, UN Department of Political Affairs
H.E. Mr. Pierre Schori, Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations
Professor Peter Wallensteen, Uppsala University, Sweden
H.R.H Prince Zeid Raad Zeid Al-Hussein, Permanent Mission of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the United Nations

Participants
Mr. Ruhul Amin, Permanent Mission of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh to the United Nations
Dr. Fernando Andresen-Guimarães, Permanent Mission of Portugal to the United Nations Mr. Benoni Belli, Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations
Mr. Henk-Jan Brinkman, UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA)
Mr. Nicolas Bwakira, UN High Commission for Refugees
Ms. Vanessa Chan, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Singapore to the United Nations Ms. Helen Eduards, Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations
Mr. Oneil Francis, Permanent Mission of Jamaica to the United Nations
Ms. Wandia Gichuru, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department, DFID, UK
Dr. Joao Honwana, UN Department of Disarmament Affairs (DDA)
Mr. Rick Hooper, Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum (CPPF)
H.E. Mr. Cameron, Hume United States Mission to the United Nations
Mr. Tom Kelly, Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the United Nations
Mr. Jehangir Khan, UN Department of Political Affairs
Ms. Svenja Korth, Early Warning and Preventive Measures (EWPM) Training Course, UN Staff College
Ms. Karin Kronhoffer, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Mr. Iain Levine, UNICEF
Sra. Aura Lucia Lloreda, Permanent Mission of Colombia to the United Nations
Ms. Laila Manji, UN Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG)
Sra. Gabriela Martinic, Permanent Mission of Argentina to the United Nations
Mr. Fadl Nacerodien, Permanent Mission of South Africa to the United Nations
Mr. Charles A. Ononye, Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the United Nations
Ms. Debra Price, Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations
Mr. Cao Qing, Permanent Mission of the Peoples Republic of China to the United Nations Mr. Yashvardhan Kumar, Sinha Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations
Mr. Geir Sjoberg, Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations
H.E. Mr. Bjorn Skogmo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway
Mr. Vsevolod O. Sobko, Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations
Mr. Francesco Maria Talò, Permanent Mission of Italy to the United Nations Minister Roberto Toscano, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Italy
Mr. Axel Wennmann, UN Department of Political Affairs
Mr. Vladimir F. Zaemsky, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations
Ms. Laura Zanotti, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

IPA Staff
Ambassador John L. Hirsch
Dr. Chandra Lekha Sriram
Ms. Elisabeth Diaz
Ms. Laura Eldon
Ms. Karin Wermester

Endnotes

Note 1 The argument is sometimes made that the Council generally prefers to act in Europe rather than Africa. As a result of these allegations, some do not view it as a legitimate or appropriate initiator of preventive action. This engendered some discussion of the necessity for Security Council Reform. However, others pointed out that the Council does not have an extensive history of engaging in preventive action, and thus did not have a record on which selectivity could currently be judged. Further, it was observed that, the perception of selectivity notwithstanding, the bulk of the Council's work in recent years has dealt with Africa; most UN peacekeeping personnel is currently deployed in Africa. Yet others pointed out that the Council's principal handicap might be the quality and effectiveness of its decisions rather than its composition.Back

Note 2 This is evidenced, not least, by the lack of media coverage of its debates and decisions. Back